博弈论拾遗4(不定期更新)

1.There’s two things you need to know about accountants. One is that they’re usually boring, and the other is that they’re often wrong.
2.Strategy effect: Other players are going to change their behavior.

1.If we know that tomorrow I’m going to win the war, I’m actually going to win it today.

1.If a stage game has more than one NE then we may be able to use the prospect of playing different equilibrium tomorrow to provide incentives (rewards and punishments for cooperation today).

1.For an ongoing relationship to provide incentives for good behavior today, it helps for there to be a high probability that the relationship will continue (the weight you put on the future)
2.The less likely tomorrow is to occur the bigger that reward has to be tomorrow.

1.The lack of a signal can be informative.
2.It’s a very simple idea, but there’s a natural tendency when you’re dealing with information to focus on the evidence that is there, rather than the evidence that’s not there.
3.Silence speaks volumes.
4.A good signal needs to be differentially costly across types.
5.Some children have to be left behind (for education to work as a signaling device).

1.Bid if you know you win.
2.In common values auction, you need to shade your bid considerably.
3.Winner’s Cruse.
4.The first price auction and the second price auction and indeed, any other kind of auction which has the property that in equilibrium the person with the highest value ends up winning the good, any such auction in expectation yields exactly the same revenue.