注：机翻，未校。
2000 年互联网泡沫的兴起和破灭
The Rise and Burst of 2000 The Dot-Com Bubble
March 12, 2024
Eli Hren
Definition of the Dot-Com Bubble 互联网泡沫的定义
The dot-com bubble, a period of speculative fervor that defined the late 1990s and early 2000s, remains a pivotal chapter in the history of technology and finance. This era was characterized by the rapid rise and subsequent fall of internet-based companies, known colloquially as “dot-coms.” The bubble was fueled by the advent of the internet as a commercial entity, widespread investor enthusiasm, and an abundance of venture capital funding, leading to inflated stock prices of startups and tech companies that often had minimal revenues, unproven business models, and sometimes, no products or services at all.
互联网泡沫是 1990 年代末和 2000 年代初的投机狂热时期，仍然是科技和金融史上的关键篇章。这个时代的特点是互联网公司的迅速崛起和随后的衰落，俗称 “互联网公司”。互联网作为一种商业实体的出现、投资者的广泛热情以及丰富的风险投资资金助长了泡沫，导致初创公司和科技公司的股价上涨，这些公司通常收入微薄，商业模式未经证实，有时甚至根本没有产品或服务。
Investors, captivated by the potential of the internet to revolutionize commerce, communication, and entertainment, poured money into any company that had a “.com” in its name, betting on the future profitability of these enterprises. This unbridled optimism led to soaring stock valuations, with the Nasdaq Composite Index, heavily weighted toward technology stocks, reaching unprecedented heights. The term “dot-com bubble” encapsulates the overvaluation of these companies and the speculative bubble that grew around them, driven by the novelty of the internet and the fear of missing out on the digital revolution.
投资者被互联网彻底改变商业、通信和娱乐的潜力所吸引，向任何名称中带有 “.com” 的公司投入资金，押注这些企业未来的盈利能力。这种肆无忌惮的乐观情绪导致股票估值飙升，纳斯达克综合指数（Nasdaq Composite Index）以科技股为主，达到了前所未有的高度。“互联网泡沫” 一词概括了这些公司被高估了，以及在互联网的新颖性和对错过数字革命的恐惧的推动下，围绕它们生长的投机泡沫。
A Surge in Speculation and Investment投机和投资激增
The build-up of the dot-com bubble through the late 1990s was a phenomenon driven by unprecedented investor enthusiasm for the burgeoning internet sector, marked by a rush to invest in any company associated with the digital economy. This period saw the meteoric rise of numerous internet startups, alongside established technology companies pivoting to embrace the web, with their stock prices soaring to stratospheric levels, often disconnected from traditional financial metrics such as earnings and revenue.
互联网泡沫在 1990 年代后期的积累是一种现象，是由投资者对蓬勃发展的互联网行业前所未有的热情所推动的，其特点是急于投资任何与数字经济相关的公司。在此期间，许多互联网初创公司迅速崛起，同时成熟的科技公司也转向拥抱网络，其股价飙升至平流层水平，往往与收益和收入等传统财务指标脱节。
Nasdaq Index from 1995 to 2010
Key players in this speculative frenzy included a mix of internet service providers, e-commerce companies, web hosting services, and various online platforms. Notable examples include Pets.com, known for its rapid rise and equally swift collapse, and Webvan, an online grocery delivery service that expanded too quickly. Other companies, like Amazon.com and eBay, also saw their stock prices skyrocket during this period, although they managed to navigate the eventual downturn and emerge as giants in their respective sectors.
这场投机狂潮的主要参与者包括互联网服务提供商、电子商务公司、网络托管服务和各种在线平台。值得注意的例子包括以快速崛起和同样迅速的崩溃而闻名的 Pets.com，以及扩张过快的在线杂货配送服务 Webvan。其他公司，如 Amazon.com 和 eBay，在此期间也看到了股价的飙升，尽管他们设法度过了最终的低迷期，并成为各自行业的巨头。
Moreover, the financial markets facilitated this expansion through easy access to capital. Many startups went public with initial public offerings (IPOs) that generated enormous sums, despite the companies’ lack of profits and sometimes even viable business models. The prevailing belief was that traditional metrics did not apply to internet companies, as the focus was on growth and market share, not profitability. This led to a speculative bubble, with stock prices driven by investor sentiment and the fear of missing out on the next big thing, rather than grounded financial realities.
此外，金融市场通过容易获得资本促进了这种扩张。许多初创公司通过首次公开募股 （IPO） 上市，产生了巨额资金，尽管这些公司缺乏利润，有时甚至缺乏可行的商业模式。普遍的看法是，传统的指标不适用于互联网公司，因为关注的是增长和市场份额，而不是盈利能力。这导致了投机泡沫，股票价格受到投资者情绪和对错过下一件大事的恐惧的推动，而不是基于金融现实的因素。
Cisco Systems– As a key supplier of networking hardware and software, Cisco’s stock was highly sought after. At its peak, Cisco’s market capitalization exceeded $500 billion, making it the most valuable company in the world at the time. From early 1998 to its peak in 2000, Cisco’s stock price increased by over 1,000%.
思科系统 – 作为网络硬件和软件的主要供应商，思科的股票备受追捧。在巅峰时期，思科的市值超过 5000 亿美元，使其成为当时世界上最有价值的公司。从 1998 年初到 2000 年的高峰，思科的股价上涨了 1000% 以上。
Qualcomm– Known for its telecommunications equipment and semiconductors, Qualcomm saw its stock rise approximately 2,619% in 1999 alone, one of the most dramatic rises during the dot-com era.
高通 – 以其电信设备和半导体而闻名，高通公司的股价仅在 1999 年就上涨了约 2,619%，是互联网时代最戏剧性的涨幅之一。
Yahoo!– As one of the leading internet portals and search engines, Yahoo!’s stock price surged, with an increase of over 600% between 1996 and its peak in 2000. At its height, Yahoo! had a market cap of around $125 billion.
雅虎 – 作为领先的互联网门户网站和搜索引擎之一，雅虎的股价飙升，从 1996 年到 2000 年的峰值增长了 600% 以上。在鼎盛时期，雅虎的市值约为 1250 亿美元。
AOL (America Online)– AOL’s stock benefited greatly from the internet boom, as it was one of the primary means for Americans to access the internet. From 1996 to its peak in 2000, AOL’s stock price increased by over 70,000%, before it merged with Time Warner in 2000.
AOL（美国在线） – AOL 的股票从互联网繁荣中受益匪浅，因为它是美国人访问互联网的主要手段之一。从 1996 年到 2000 年的高峰，AOL 的股价上涨了 70,000% 以上，然后在 2000 年与时代华纳合并。
Amazon.com– Although not as extreme as some of its contemporaries, Amazon’s stock also experienced significant growth during the bubble. From its IPO in 1997 to the peak in 1999, Amazon’s stock price increased by over 5,000%, valuing the company at tens of billions of dollars despite having yet to turn a profit.
Amazon.com – 虽然不像一些同时代的公司那样极端，但亚马逊的股票在泡沫期间也经历了显着增长。从 1997 年的 IPO 到 1999 年的高峰，亚马逊的股价上涨了 5,000% 以上，尽管尚未盈利，但该公司的估值仍达数百亿美元。
eToys.com– An online toy retailer, eToys.com went public in 1999 and saw its stock price increase by over 280% on its first day of trading. However, the company was unable to sustain its business model and filed for bankruptcy in 2001.
eToys.com – 在线玩具零售商 eToys.com 于 1999 年上市，上市第一天股价上涨超过 280%。然而，该公司无法维持其商业模式，并于 2001 年申请破产。
Why Did the Dot-Com Bubble Burst? 互联网泡沫为什么会破裂？
The dot-com bubble burst in the early 2000s was the inevitable result of a complex interplay of factors that led to the rapid deflation of overinflated tech stock valuations. This dramatic turn of events marked the end of an era characterized by unchecked speculation, irrational exuberance, and the widespread belief in the infallibility of the burgeoning internet sector. Several key reasons contributed to the bubble’s collapse:
2000 年代初的互联网泡沫破灭是多种因素相互作用的必然结果，这些因素导致了过度膨胀的科技股估值迅速通货紧缩。这一戏剧性的转变标志着一个时代的结束，其特点是不受约束的投机、非理性的繁荣，以及人们普遍相信蓬勃发展的互联网行业是绝对可靠的。导致泡沫破灭的几个关键原因：
Overvaluation and Speculation: A fundamental reason for the bubble’s burst was the extreme overvaluation of internet companies. Stock prices were often based on speculative futures rather than actual revenue or profitability, creating an unsustainable market where valuations had little grounding in financial reality. When investors began to reevaluate these metrics, confidence waned, leading to a mass sell-off.
高估和投机：泡沫破裂的一个根本原因是互联网公司的极度高估。股票价格通常基于投机性期货，而不是实际收入或盈利能力，从而形成了一个不可持续的市场，估值几乎没有财务现实基础。当投资者开始重新评估这些指标时，信心减弱，导致大规模抛售。
Rising Interest Rates: The late 1990s saw relatively low interest rates, which encouraged borrowing and investing in the stock market, particularly in tech stocks. However, as the Federal Reserve began to raise interest rates in 1999 to combat inflationary pressures, borrowing costs increased. This made bonds and other fixed-income investments more attractive compared to risky tech stocks, prompting a shift in investment away from the stock market.
利率上升：1990 年代后期的利率相对较低，这鼓励了借贷和投资股票市场，尤其是科技股。然而，随着美联储在 1999 年开始提高利率以应对通胀压力，借贷成本增加。与高风险的科技股相比，这使得债券和其他固定收益投资更具吸引力，促使投资从股票市场转移出去。
Market Saturation and Competition: The rapid influx of numerous startups seeking to capitalize on the dot-com craze led to market saturation. Many of these companies offered similar services, resulting in fierce competition and a dilution of potential revenue streams.
市场饱和和竞争：许多初创公司迅速涌入，试图利用互联网热潮，导致市场饱和。其中许多公司提供类似的服务，导致激烈的竞争和潜在收入来源的稀释。
Companies That Survived the Dot-Com Crash 在互联网泡沫破灭中幸存下来的公司
While the dot-com crash led to the downfall of many internet companies, a select few not only weathered the storm but emerged stronger, going on to dominate the digital landscape. These survivors adapted, evolved, and leveraged the lessons of the crash to build sustainable businesses that have significantly influenced how we interact with the internet today.
虽然互联网泡沫破灭导致许多互联网公司倒闭，但少数几家公司不仅经受住了风暴，而且变得更加强大，继续主导数字领域。这些幸存者适应、发展并利用了坠机事故的教训来建立可持续的业务，这些业务极大地影响了我们今天与互联网的互动方式。
Amazon.com– Initially focused on selling books online, Amazon quickly expanded its offerings, aiming to become the “everything store.” Despite skepticism about its broad focus and heavy spending, Amazon’s commitment to customer service, logistics, and innovation paid off. Today, it’s a global e-commerce giant and a leader in cloud computing through Amazon Web Services (AWS), reflecting its incredible evolution from a dot-com era survivor to a dominant internet and technology company.
Amazon.com – 亚马逊最初专注于在线销售图书，后来迅速扩大了其产品范围，旨在成为 “一切商店”。尽管对其广泛的关注和大量支出持怀疑态度，但亚马逊对客户服务、物流和创新的承诺得到了回报。如今，它是一家全球电子商务巨头，并通过亚马逊网络服务（AWS）成为云计算的领导者，这反映了其从互联网时代的幸存者到占主导地位的互联网和技术公司的令人难以置信的演变。
eBay– Launched as an online auction and shopping website, eBay managed to survive the dot-com crash by maintaining a clear focus on its business model and steadily growing its user base. The company thrived by facilitating consumer-to-consumer and business-to-consumer sales through its platform. Over the years, eBay has expanded globally and diversified its services, remaining a major player in the e-commerce sector.
eBay – 作为在线拍卖和购物网站推出，eBay 通过保持对其商业模式的明确关注和稳步增长其用户群，成功地在互联网崩溃中幸存下来。该公司通过其平台促进消费者对消费者和企业对消费者的销售而蓬勃发展。多年来，eBay 在全球范围内扩张并使其服务多样化，仍然是电子商务领域的主要参与者。
Google– Founded in 1998, Google was still in its infancy when the dot-com bubble burst. However, its innovative search algorithm and clear, ad-based revenue model quickly set it apart from other search engines. Google’s focus on delivering relevant search results led to rapid growth. Today, it’s a cornerstone of the Alphabet conglomerate, with ventures spanning multiple technology sectors, including online advertising, cloud computing, software, and hardware.
谷歌 – 谷歌成立于 1998 年，当互联网泡沫破裂时，谷歌仍处于起步阶段。然而，其创新的搜索算法和清晰的、基于广告的收入模式很快使其与其他搜索引擎区分开来。谷歌专注于提供相关的搜索结果，导致了快速增长。如今，它已成为 Alphabet 集团的基石，其企业涉及多个技术领域，包括在线广告、云计算、软件和硬件。
Priceline– Now known as Booking Holdings, Priceline navigated the dot-com crash by adapting its business model and focusing on profitable sectors like online travel bookings. Its “Name Your Own Price” system and subsequent acquisitions of companies like Booking.com and Kayak have made it a leading player in online travel and related services.
Priceline—— 现在被称为 Booking Holdings，Priceline 通过调整其商业模式并专注于在线旅游预订等有利可图的行业，度过了互联网泡沫危机。其 “命名自己的价格” 系统以及随后对 Booking.com 和 Kayak 等公司的收购使其成为在线旅游和相关服务的领先者。
Salesforce– Founded in 1999, Salesforce offered a novel software-as-a-service (SaaS) model for its customer relationship management (CRM) software, challenging the traditional enterprise software delivery model. By focusing on cloud computing and customer success, Salesforce not only survived the crash but also became a key driver in the adoption of cloud services across industries.
Salesforce – Salesforce 成立于 1999 年，为其客户关系管理 （CRM） 软件提供了一种新颖的软件即服务 （SaaS） 模型，挑战了传统的企业软件交付模式。通过专注于云计算和客户成功，Salesforce 不仅在崩溃中幸存下来，而且成为各行各业采用云服务的关键驱动力。
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The Rise and Burst of 2000 The Dot-Com Bubble
https://www.tickerhistory.com/2024/03/12/the-dot-com-bubble-explained/
对 2000 年互联网泡沫的揭示 —— 以及它如何影响我们今天的生活
A revealing look at the dot-com bubble of 2000 — and how it shapes our lives today
Dec 4, 2018 / Brian McCullough
Daniel Fishel
The successful dot-coms of the late ‘90s and early ‘00s had a few things in common: they all vowed to “change the world”, had crazy-high valuations, and were wildly unprofitable. Here’s a look at one company’s rapid rise and fall — and the bubble’s lasting impact, from internet historian Brian McCullough.
90 年代末和 00 年代初成功的互联网公司有几个共同点：它们都发誓要 “改变世界”，估值高得离谱，而且非常无利可图。以下是互联网历史学家布莱恩・麦卡洛（Brian McCullough）对一家公司的快速崛起和衰落以及泡沫的持久影响的介绍。
If you were looking for a single company that exemplified the dot-com era, you could choose Priceline.com. It was founded by Jay Walker, an entrepreneur with a clever solution to a real problem: every day, 500,000 airline seats were going unsold. Priceline offered these seats to online customers who could name the price they were willing to pay. Consumers got cheaper flights; airlines sold excess inventory; inefficiencies were ironed out of the market; and Priceline took a cut for facilitating the process: your garden-variety win-win-win-win that only the internet could make happen.
如果你正在寻找一家代表互联网时代的公司，你可以选择 Priceline.com。它由杰伊・沃克（Jay Walker）创立，他是一位企业家，他巧妙地解决了一个实际问题：每天有 500,000 个航空公司座位未售出。Priceline 向在线客户提供这些座位，他们可以说出他们愿意支付的价格。消费者获得了更便宜的航班；航空公司出售了过剩的库存；效率低下的问题被排除在市场之外；Priceline 在促进这一过程方面采取了一些措施：只有互联网才能实现的花园式双赢。
Launching in April 1998, Priceline was a dot-com “overnight success,” growing from 50 employees to more than 300 and selling more than 100,000 airline tickets in its first seven months of business. By the end of 1999, it was selling more than 1,000 tickets a day. It attempted to expand into hotel bookings, car rentals, home mortgages, and Walker’s intention was to take the Priceline idea to every applicable market.
Priceline 于 1998 年 4 月推出，在互联网公司 “一夜成名”，从 50 名员工发展到 300 多人，并在开业的前七个月销售了 10 万多张机票。到 1999 年底，它每天销售 1000 多张门票。它试图扩展到酒店预订、汽车租赁、房屋抵押贷款，而 Walker 的意图是将 Priceline 的想法带到每个适用的市场。
Walker intended to get to ubiquity the way Yahoo had done: by building a brand through relentless marketing. In its first six months, the company spent more than $20 million in advertising, the keystone of which was clever ads featuring Star Trek’s William Shatner. All of this succeeded in placing Priceline fifth in internet brand awareness by the end of 1998, behind only AOL, Yahoo, Netscape and Amazon.
沃克打算像雅虎那样无处不在：通过不懈的营销来建立品牌。在最初的六个月里，该公司在广告上花费了超过 2000 万美元，其基石是以《星际迷航》的威廉・夏特纳（William Shatner）为主角的巧妙广告。到 1998 年底，Priceline 在互联网品牌知名度方面排名第五，仅次于 AOL、雅虎、Netscape 和亚马逊。
In March 1999, Priceline went public at $16 a share. On its first day of trading went up to $88, before settling at $69. This gave Priceline a market capitalization of $9.8 billion, the largest first-day valuation of an internet company to that date. Few investors were concerned that in its first few quarters in business Priceline racked up losses of $142.5 million. Or that it had to buy tickets on the open market — at cost — to fulfill customers’ lowball bids, losing, on average, $30 on every ticket it sold. Or that Priceline customers often ended up paying more at auction than they could have paid through a traditional travel agent. Investors were more interested in grabbing a piece of a company that was going to change the future of business.
1999 年 3 月，Priceline 以每股 16 美元的价格上市。第一天交易时，价格上涨至 88 美元，然后收于 69 美元。这使得 Priceline 的市值达到 98 亿美元，是迄今为止互联网公司最大的首日估值。很少有投资者担心，在开业的头几个季度，Priceline 亏损了 1.425 亿美元。或者说，它不得不在公开市场上以成本价购买门票，以满足客户的低价出价，平均每售出一张门票就损失 30 美元。或者说，Priceline 的客户最终在拍卖会上支付的费用往往比他们通过传统旅行社支付的要多。投资者更感兴趣的是抓住一家将改变商业未来的公司的一部分。
The venture capitalists who backed companies like Priceline, eToys, and Kozmo.com were aiming for supernova IPOs because that’s when they got paid.
支持 Priceline、eToys 和 Kozmo.com 等公司的风险投资家们的目标是超新星 IPO，因为那是他们获得报酬的时候。
By 1999, losing money was the mark of a successful dot-com. And few could lose money as prolifically or creatively as Priceline. The head of a rival website named CheapTickets complained that his company couldn’t compete with Priceline’s hype. “We’ve got a policy here at CheapTickets,” founder Michael Hartley groused. “We need to make money. It hurts our valuation.”
到 1999 年，亏损已经成为互联网公司成功的标志。很少有人能像 Priceline 那样大量或创造性地赔钱。一家名为 CheapTickets 的竞争对手网站的负责人抱怨说，他的公司无法与 Priceline 的炒作竞争。“我们在 CheapTickets 有一项政策，” 创始人迈克尔・哈特利（Michael Hartley）抱怨道。“我们需要赚钱。这损害了我们的估值。
So many of the companies that would embody what we think of when we remember the dot-com bubble — Pets.com, eToys, Kozmo.com, UrbanFetch — shared some or all of Priceline’s traits: a business plan that promised to “change the world”; a Get Big Fast strategy to reach ubiquity and corner a particular market; a tendency to sell products at a loss in order to gain that market share; a willingness to spend lavishly on branding and advertising to raise awareness; and a sky-high stock market valuation that was divorced from any sort of profitability or rationality.
许多我们在回忆互联网泡沫时所想到的公司 —— 例如 Pets.com、eToys、Kozmo.com 和 UrbanFetch—— 都与 Priceline 共享了一些或全部特征：一个承诺 “改变世界” 的商业计划；一种快速扩张的策略，旨在实现普及并垄断特定市场；为了获得市场份额而倾向于以亏损方式出售产品；愿意在品牌推广和广告上大手笔花费以提高知名度；以及一种与任何盈利能力或理性完全脱离的高估值。这些共同点反映了当时行业中普遍存在的投机心态和过度乐观的预期，这最终导致了许多公司的崩溃。
It became a joke that the dot-coms that started out promising a grand vision of a more efficient way of doing business were — almost to a company — unprofitable. It’s entirely possible that a lot of them could have focused on the very real efficiencies that selling online made possible, and thereby slowly grown into sustainable businesses. But that was not the name of the game in the late nineties.
这变成了一个笑话，那些一开始承诺更高效经营方式的宏伟愿景的互联网公司 —— 几乎对一家公司来说 —— 是无利可图的。他们中的许多人完全有可能专注于在线销售带来的非常真实的效率，从而慢慢发展成为可持续的业务。但在九十年代后期，这并不是游戏的名称。
The venture capitalists who backed these companies were aiming for supernova IPOs because that’s when they got paid. Any IPO meant an exit for venture investors. Those incredible first-day “pops” that dot-com stocks experienced when IPOing? That was the early money cashing out, selling their shares to the investing public. The dot-com bubble was a fantasy period when a lot of VCs actually didn’t care if a business turned a profit, because it didn’t need to. “We’re in an environment where the company doesn’t have to be successful for us to make money,” a venture capitalist at Benchmark admitted when mulling over a pre-IPO investment in Priceline.
支持这些公司的风险投资家的目标是超新星 IPO，因为那是他们获得报酬的时候。任何首次公开募股都意味着风险投资者的退出。互联网股票在首次公开募股时经历的那些令人难以置信的首日 “爆裂”？这是早期的资金套现，将他们的股票出售给投资公众。互联网泡沫是一个幻想时期，许多风险投资公司实际上并不关心企业是否盈利，因为它不需要盈利。“我们所处的环境是，公司不一定要成功才能赚钱，”Benchmark 的一位风险投资家在考虑对 Priceline 的 IPO 前投资时承认。
The bubble era engendered a fever for entrepreneurship that probably hadn’t existed in this country since before the Great Depression.
泡沫时代引发了对企业家精神的狂热，这种狂热可能自大萧条之前就不存在了。
It became imperative to keep the pipeline of new companies — and new IPOs — coming. Fortunately, the bubble era engendered a fever for entrepreneurship that probably hadn’t existed in this country since before the Great Depression. By the spring 1999, one in twelve Americans surveyed said that they were in some stage of founding a business.
当务之急是要保持新公司和新 IPO 的陆续到来。幸运的是，泡沫时代引发了创业热，这种热潮可能自大萧条之前就不存在。到 1999 年春天，每 12 个接受调查的美国人中就有一个表示他们正处于创业的某个阶段。
In October 1999, the market cap of the 199 internet stocks tracked by Morgan Stanley’s Mary Meeker was a whopping $450 billion. But the total annual sales of these companies came to only about $21 billion. And their annual profits? What profits? The collective losses totaled $6.2 billion. “People come in here all the time and say, ‘The last thing I want to be is profitable,’ ” one investment banker bragged in June of 1999. “‘Because then I wouldn’t get the valuation of an internet company.’”
1999 年 10 月，摩根士丹利的玛丽・米克尔 （Mary Meeker） 追踪的 199 只互联网股票的市值高达 4500 亿美元。但这些公司的年总销售额仅为 210 亿美元左右。他们的年利润呢？什么利润？这些集体损失共计 62 亿美元。“人们总是来到这里说，’ 我最不想做的就是盈利，'” 一位投资银行家在 1999 年 6 月吹嘘道。因为那样的话，我就不会得到一家互联网公司的估值了。
Over the second half of 1999, it wasn’t a question of whether or not a bubble existed, it was a question of how big a bubble it was, and when it would pop. Most people knew it was unsustainable, but no one wanted to admit it. If you could squeeze your IPO out before the window closed, then you could pick your moment to cash out, hopefully before everyone else got the same idea.
在 1999 年下半年，问题不在于泡沫是否存在，而在于泡沫有多大，以及泡沫何时会破裂。大多数人都知道这是不可持续的，但没有人愿意承认这一点。如果你能在窗口关闭之前把你的 IPO 挤出来，那么你就可以选择你的时机来兑现，希望在其他人得到同样的想法之前。
One by one, the weakest of the dot-coms began to underperform. Dot-coms ceased being sure stock market winners — in a trickle, and then all at once. Falling stock prices turned into stock market delistings and then became actual bankruptcies. On January 14, 2000, the Dow Jones Industrial Average peaked at 11,722.98, a level it would not return to for more than six years. The tech-heavy Nasdaq peaked on March 10, 2000, at 5,048.62, a level it would not reach again until March 2015. From that March 2000 peak, all the way down to the trough it reached on October 9, 2002 (the bear market bottom would be 1,114.11), the Nasdaq would lose nearly 80 percent of its value.
一个接一个，最弱的互联网公司开始表现不佳。互联网公司不再是股市的确定赢家 —— 在涓涓细流中，然后一下子就全部了。股价下跌变成了股市退市，然后变成了真正的破产。2000 年 1 月 14 日，道琼斯工业平均指数达到 11,722.98 的峰值，这一水平在六年多的时间里不会回到。以科技股为主的纳斯达克指数在 2000 年 3 月 10 日达到顶峰，达到 5,048.62 点，直到 2015 年 3 月才再次达到这一水平。从 2000 年 3 月的峰值一直下降到 2002 年 10 月 9 日达到的低谷（熊市底部为 1,114.11），纳斯达克指数将损失近 80% 的价值。
By April 2000, just one month after peaking, the Nasdaq had lost 34.2 percent of its value.
到 2000 年 4 月，也就是达到顶峰仅一个月后，纳斯达克指数就损失了 34.2% 的价值。
Was there any one thing that pricked the bubble? No, there were a myriad of factors. The Fed had finally begun to raise interest rates: three times in 1999 and then twice more in early 2000, the most sustained round of fiscal tightening over the whole of the late 1990s. Just as suddenly, Fed language shifted to an open attempt to rein in equity prices. Added to this was the fact that Wall Street analysts began advising their clients to lighten up on internet stocks, saying the technology sector was “no longer undervalued.” But more than anything else, it was the weak constitution of all those “iffy” dot-coms that had hit the market toward the tail end of 1999 that tipped the scales, companies without a realistic chance to make money over the long term.
有没有一件事刺破了泡沫？不，有无数的因素。美联储终于开始加息：1999 年加息三次，然后在 2000 年初又加息两次，这是整个 1990 年代后期最持久的一轮财政紧缩。同样突然之间，美联储的语言转变为公开试图控制股票价格。除此之外，华尔街分析师开始建议他们的客户减少对互联网股票的青睐，称科技行业 “不再被低估”。但最重要的是，在 1999 年底进入市场的所有那些 “不稳定” 的互联网公司的薄弱构成使天平倾斜，这些公司没有长期赚钱的现实机会。
By April 2000, just one month after peaking, the Nasdaq had lost 34.2 percent of its value. Over the next year and a half, the number of companies that saw the value of their stock drop by 80 percent or more was in the hundreds. And for most, no recovery ever came, even for the biggest names. Priceline cratered 94 percent.
到 2000 年 4 月，也就是达到顶峰仅一个月后，纳斯达克指数就损失了 34.2% 的价值。在接下来的一年半时间里，股票价值下跌 80% 或更多的公司数量达到数百家。对大多数人来说，复苏从未到来，即使是对大牌公司也是如此。Priceline 下跌了 94%。
There are various ways to measure the amount of wealth that was annihilated when the bubble burst. As early as November 2000, CNNFN.com pegged the losses at $1.7 trillion. But that would count only public companies. Beyond them, it’s estimated that 7,000 to 10,000 new online enterprises were launched in the late 1990s, and by mid-2003, around 4,800 of those had either been sold or gone under. Trillions of dollars in wealth vanished almost overnight.
有各种方法可以衡量泡沫破裂时湮灭的财富数量。早在 2000 年 11 月，CNNFN.com 就将损失定为 1.7 万亿美元。但这只包括上市公司。除此之外，据估计，1990 年代后期有 7,000 至 10,000 家新的在线企业成立，到 2003 年中期，其中约有 4,800 家已被出售或倒闭。数万亿美元的财富几乎在一夜之间消失了。
Between September 1999 and July 2000, insiders at dot-com companies cashed out to the tune of $43 billion, twice the rate they’d sold at during 1997 and 1998.
从 1999 年 9 月到 2000 年 7 月，互联网公司的内部人士套现了 430 亿美元，是 1997 年和 1998 年的两倍。
Obviously, that much money leaving the playing field had to have some effect on the economy. The US government would date the start of the dot-com recession as beginning in March 2001. And by the time of the economic shock from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there was no longer any doubt. In that tragic month of September, for the first time in 26 years, not a single IPO came to market. The dot-com era was over.
显然，这么多钱离开竞争环境必然会对经济产生一些影响。美国政府将互联网经济衰退的开始日期定为 2001 年 3 月。到 2001 年 9 月 11 日恐怖袭击带来的经济冲击时，人们不再有任何疑问。在那个悲惨的 9 月份，26 年来首次没有一家公司上市。网络时代结束了。
Of course, the era didn’t end disastrously for everyone. Between September 1999 and July 2000, insiders at dot-com companies cashed out to the tune of $43 billion, twice the rate they’d sold at during 1997 and 1998. In the month before the Nasdaq peaked, insiders were selling 23 times as many shares as they bought.
当然，这个时代并没有对每个人造成灾难性的结局。从 1999 年 9 月到 2000 年 7 月，互联网公司的内部人士套现了 430 亿美元，是 1997 年和 1998 年的两倍。在纳斯达克指数见顶前的一个月，内部人士出售的股票数量是他们购买的股票的 23 倍。
So, who ended up holding the bag? Average investors. Over the course of the year 2000, as the stock market began its meltdown, individual investors continued to pour $260 billion into US equity funds. This was up from the $150 billion invested in the market in 1998 and $176 billion invested in 1999. Everyday people were the most aggressive investors in the dot-com bubble at the very moment the bubble was at its height — and at the moment the smart money was getting out. By 2002, 100 million individual investors had lost $5 trillion in the stock market. A Vanguard study showed that by the end of 2002, 70 percent of 401 (k) s had lost at least one-fifth of their value; 45 percent had lost more than one-fifth.
所以，最终是谁承担了损失？普通投资者。在 2000 年这一年，随着股市开始崩溃，个人投资者继续向美国股票基金投入 2600 亿美元。而这个数字较 1998 年的 1500 亿美元和 1999 年的 1760 亿美元都有所上升。在互联网泡沫达到顶峰的时刻，普通人是最积极的投资者，而此时聪明的钱却在纷纷撤出。到 2002 年，1 亿个个人投资者在股市中损失了 5 万亿美元。一项来自先锋集团的研究显示，到 2002 年底，70% 的 401 (k) 计划至少损失了五分之一的价值；45% 的计划损失超过了五分之一。
In recent years, there’s been a lot of talk about how the American public — especially the middle and working classes — have come to believe the economic structure of America is rigged against them, and everything is tilted in favor of the moneyed, the elite. I’d argue that this belief first took hold when the dot-com bubble burst, especially to investors who came to the stock market for the first time in those years. Baby Boomers invested in stocks; they bought and held. For a time, they did well, seeing their nest eggs go up by five, even six, figures. Then they watched it all evaporate.
近年来，人们讨论了美国公众 —— 尤其是中产阶级和工薪阶层 —— 如何开始相信美国的经济结构对他们不利，所有的一切都偏向那些富有的精英。我认为这种信念最早是在互联网泡沫破裂时形成的，特别是对于那些在那几年第一次进入股市的投资者来说。婴儿潮一代投资股票；他们买入并持有。在一段时间内，他们表现良好，看到自己的投资组合增长至五位数甚至六位数。然后，他们目睹这一切化为乌有。
Baby Boomers watched the insiders and the bankers, the lucky and the elite, walk away scot-free while they, the hardworking people who did what they were told, lost everything. This all happened to them again less than a decade later in the housing market. The bursting of the dot-com bubble was the opening act of our current economic era, and the repercussions from its aftermath are still with us today, economically, socially, and politically.
婴儿潮一代目睹了内部人士和银行家、幸运者与精英们轻松离去，而他们这些遵循指示的辛勤工作的人却失去了一切。这一切在不到十年后又一次发生在住房市场上。互联网泡沫的破裂是我们当前经济时代的开幕篇章，其后果至今仍对我们产生影响，无论是在经济、社会还是政治方面。
Even now when entrepreneurs talk about how their technology will change the world, in the back of their minds is the cautionary tale of the dot-com bubble’s implosion.
即使在现在，当企业家谈论他们的技术将如何改变世界时，他们心中也仍然会浮现出互联网泡沫破裂的警示故事。
At the same time, a whole generation of workers who staked their careers on the dream of technology were unemployed. It was later estimated that between 2001 and early 2004, Silicon Valley alone lost 200,000 jobs. In the space of a decade, a group of people had gone from being young upstarts who “got it,” to masters of the universe who were transforming the world, to completely redundant. The hangover from this comeuppance haunts the tech industry today. Even now when young entrepreneurs talk glowingly about how their technology will change the world, in the back of any internet entrepreneur’s mind is the Icarus-like cautionary tale of the dot-com bubble’s implosion, as well as a fear that someday they too will be exposed for their hubris.
与此同时，一整代把职业寄托在技术梦想上的工人失业了。据估计，从 2001 年到 2004 年初，仅硅谷就失去了 20 万个工作岗位。在短短十年的时间里，这群人从 “懂行” 的年轻新秀，变成了改变世界的宇宙主宰，最终却变得完全多余。这一教训的后果至今仍困扰着科技行业。即使在现在，当企业家谈论他们的技术将如何改变世界时，他们心中也仍然会浮现出互联网泡沫破裂的警示故事。以及对某一天他们也会因自身的狂妄而被揭露的恐惧。
Many observers of the dot-com bubble have compared it to earlier bubbles like tulipomania in 17th-century Holland or the collapse of the South Sea Company in 18th-century London. But it’s the example of the railroads in Britain in the 1840s that’s the most analogous. Railways were cutting-edge in the 1840s. As with the dot-coms, there was a period when Britons rushed to invest in schemes surrounding this new technology. Eight hundred miles of new railways were floated for development in 1844; 2,820 miles of new track were proposed in 1845; 3,350 miles authorized in 1846. Because Parliament had to pass legislation approving each scheme, the railway bills passed by Parliament provide an amusing analogy to the IPOs of the dot-com period. Forty-eight railway acts were passed by Parliament in 1844, and 120 in 1845. By 1847, investment in the railways represented 6.7 percent of all national income.
许多互联网泡沫的观察者将其与早期的泡沫相提并论，例如 17 世纪荷兰的郁金香狂热或 18 世纪伦敦的南海公司倒闭。但最相似的是 1840 年代英国铁路的例子。铁路在 1840 年代处于领先地位。与互联网公司一样，曾有一段时间，英国人争先恐后地投资于围绕这项新技术的计划。1844 年，800 英里的新铁路投入开发；1845 年提出了 2,820 英里的新轨道；1846 年授权的 3,350 英里。由于议会必须通过立法来批准每个计划，因此议会通过的铁路法案与互联网时期的首次公开募股（IPOs）进行了有趣的类比。1844 年议会通过了 48 项铁路法案，1845 年通过了 120 项铁路法案。到 1847 年，铁路投资占国民总收入的 6.7%。
The railroad bust came because, in historian Christian Wolmar’s words, the bubble was ultimately based on “little more than optimism feeding on itself.” It was pricked in part by the Bank of England raising interest rates, and its aftermath feels similar to the aftermath of the dot-com asco, albeit with a Victorian tinge. As Wolmar wrote in his book Fire and Steam: How the Railways Transformed Britain, “A contemporary chronicler reckoned “no other panic was ever so fatal to the middle class. . . . There was scarcely an important town in England what [sic] beheld some wretched suicide. It reached every hearth, it saddened every heart in the metropolis.”
铁路崩溃的原因在于，正如历史学家克里斯蒂安·沃尔马尔所言，这个泡沫最终只是建立在“几乎仅仅是自我滋养的乐观情绪”之上。部分原因是英格兰银行提高了利率，其后果与互联网泡沫破裂后的情形相似，尽管带有维多利亚时代的色彩。正如沃尔马尔在他的书《火与蒸汽：铁路如何改变英国》中所写，“一位当代编年史家认为‘没有哪场恐慌对中产阶级造成如此致命的打击……几乎每个重要城镇都发生过悲惨的自杀。这波动荡席卷了每一个家庭，让大都市中的每一个心灵都感到忧伤。’”
What Wolmar’s account also points out is to what degree the bubble, and the railroads constructed from it, created the infrastructure that would enable the high Industrial Revolution in Britain. The mileage of rail schemes authorized in the bubble years came to represent 90 percent of the total route mileage on Britain’s rail system.
沃尔玛的叙述还指出，泡沫以及由泡沫建造的铁路在多大程度上创造了使英国能够进行高度工业革命的基础设施。在泡沫年代授权的铁路计划的里程占英国铁路系统总路线里程的 90%。
All of the money poured into tech companies in the first half decade of the Internet Era created an infrastructure and economic foundation that would allow the internet to mature.
在互联网时代的前五年，所有涌入科技公司的资金都创造了基础设施和经济基础，使互联网能够成熟。
But even after the railway investment mania went away, the railways never did … and the lesson of the dot-com bubble is similar. While the dot-coms went away, while AOL — for one brief shining moment, the embodiment of the internet in American life — went away, the internet itself didn’t go away. All of the money poured into tech companies in the first half decade of the Internet Era built out the infrastructure and economic foundation that would allow the internet to mature in a tangible, physical way. During the dot-com bubble, there was a less publicized bubble in telecommunications companies. This estimated $2 trillion bubble ended in a similar bloodbath with the bankruptcies of companies like WorldCom and Global Crossing.
但即使在铁路投资狂潮消退后，铁路本身依然存在……而互联网泡沫的教训也类似。尽管许多网络公司消失了，例如 AOL——曾在一个短暂而辉煌的时刻成为美国生活中互联网的化身——但互联网本身并没有消失。在互联网时代的前五年中，投入到科技公司的资金构建了基础设施和经济基础，使互联网得以在有形的、实际的方式上逐渐成熟。在互联网泡沫期间，电信公司也经历了一场较少被提及的泡沫。这一估计为 2 万亿美元的泡沫以类似的惨烈结局告终，许多公司如 WorldCom 和 Global Crossing 相继破产。
Before the bubble burst, telecom companies raised $1.6 trillion on Wall Street and floated $600 billion in bonds to crisscross the country in digital infrastructure. These 80.2 million miles of fiber optic cable represented fully 76 percent of the total base digital wiring installed in the United States up to that point in history and would allow for the maturation of the internet. And because of a resulting glut of fiber in the years after the dot-com bubble burst, there was a severe overcapacity in bandwidth for internet usage that allowed the next wave of companies to deliver sophisticated new internet services on the cheap. By 2004, the cost of bandwidth had fallen by more than 90 percent, despite internet usage doubling every few years. As late as 2005, as much as 85 percent of broadband capacity in the United States was still going unused. That meant as soon as new “killer apps” were developed, there was plenty of cheap capacity allowing them to roll out to the masses. The tracks, as it were, had already been laid.
在泡沫破裂之前，电信公司在华尔街筹集了 1.6 万亿美元，并发行了 6000 亿美元的债券，以在全国范围内铺设数字基础设施。这 8020 万英里的光纤电缆占美国历史上已安装的总基数数字接线的 76%。这些基础设施为互联网的成熟奠定了基础。由于互联网泡沫破裂后的光纤过剩，导致了带宽严重过剩，这使得下一波公司的新互联网服务能够以低廉的成本推出。到 2004 年，尽管互联网使用量每几年翻一番，但带宽成本却下降了超过 90%。直到 2005 年，美国多达 85% 的宽带容量仍未被使用。这意味着，一旦新的 “杀手级应用” 开发出来，就有充足的廉价带宽可以让它们迅速推广到大众市场。可以说，轨道已经铺就。
Many have made the case that the dot-com era was doomed to failure simply because there were too many companies chasing what at the time were too few users. When the bubble burst in 2000, there were only around 400 million people online worldwide. Ten years later, there would be more than 2 billion (best estimates peg the current number of internet users at 3.4 billion). In the year 2000, there were approximately 17 million websites. By 2010, there were an estimated 200 million (today, that number is over a billion). Far from being a fad, the habits we acquired during the bubble era ingrained themselves into the rhythms of everyday life. The dot-coms from that time, the training wheels for the internet, taught us to live online.
许多人认为，互联网时代注定要失败，仅仅是因为有太多的公司追逐当时太少的用户。当 2000 年泡沫破裂时，全球只有大约 4 亿人上网。十年后，互联网用户数量将超过 20 亿（据估计，目前的互联网用户数量为 34 亿）。在 2000 年，大约有 1 700 万个网站。到 2010 年，估计有 2 亿（今天，这个数字超过 10 亿）。我们在泡沫时代养成的习惯远非一时兴起，而是根深蒂固地融入了日常生活的节奏。当时的互联网公司，互联网的训练轮，教会了我们在线生活。
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A revealing look at the dot-com bubble of 2000 — and how it shapes our lives today
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