理解特定的心理状态 —— 欲望

注：机翻，未校。

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Desire

First published Wed Dec 9, 2009; substantive revision Thu Apr 9, 2015

To desire is to be in a particular state of mind. It is a state of mind familiar to everyone who has ever wanted to drink water or desired to know what has happened to an old friend, but its familiarity does not make it easy to give a theory of desire. Controversy immediately breaks out when asking whether wanting water and desiring knowledge are, at bottom, the same state of mind as others that seem somewhat similar: wishing never to have been born, preferring mangoes to peaches, craving gin, having world conquest as one’s goal, having a purpose in sneaking out to the shed, or being inclined to provoke just for the sake of provocation. These varied states of mind have all been grouped together under the heading of ‘pro attitudes’, but whether the pro attitudes are fundamentally one mental state or many is disputed.
欲望是处于一种特定的心理状态。这是每个曾经想喝水或想知道老朋友发生了什么事的人都熟悉的心理状态，但它的熟悉程度并不能轻易给出欲望理论。当被问及想要水和渴望知识是否归根结底与其他看起来有些相似的心态是相同的时，争论立即爆发了：希望永远不要出生，更喜欢芒果而不是桃子，渴望杜松子酒，以征服世界为目标，有偷偷溜到棚子里的目的，或者只是为了挑衅而倾向于挑衅。这些不同的心理状态都被归类为“专业态度”，但专业态度从根本上说是一种心理状态还是多种心理状态是有争议的。

In spite of the disputes, it is nonetheless possible to get a fix on desire itself. Desiring is a state of mind that is commonly associated with a number of different effects: a person with a desire tends to act in certain ways, feel in certain ways, and think in certain ways. If Nora desires tea, for example, then Nora will typically make herself a cup of tea; if she does not get herself some tea right away she will nonetheless typically feel the urge to do so; she will find the thought of tea pleasant and will find her current lack of tea unpleasant; she will find her thoughts repeatedly turning to the idea of tea; she will judge that tea seems like a good idea; and so on. These various effects have been the focus of efforts to develop theories that are theories of desire.
尽管存在争议，但还是有可能解决欲望本身的问题。渴望是一种通常与许多不同的影响相关的心理状态：一个有欲望的人倾向于以某种方式行动，以某种方式感受，以某种方式思考。例如，如果 Nora 想喝茶，那么 Nora 通常会给自己泡一杯茶;如果她没有立即给自己喝茶，她通常会有这样做的冲动;她会觉得喝茶的想法很愉快，也会觉得她现在没有茶很不愉快;她会发现自己的思绪反复转向喝茶的想法;她会判断茶似乎是个好主意;等等。这些不同的影响一直是努力发展欲望理论的重点。

Understanding desires requires at least two things: first, to have a theory of desire itself, and second, to have some familiarity with the varieties of desires that there are. Once acquired, an understanding of desire can illuminate a number of controversies surrounding desire.
理解欲望至少需要两件事：第一，要有一个关于欲望本身的理论，第二，对存在的各种欲望有一定的了解。一旦获得，对欲望的理解可以阐明围绕欲望的许多争议。

1. Theories of Desire 1. 欲望理论

There is a simple, conservative theory of desire according to which having a desire is a matter of having dispositions to act. According to this theory, dispositions to act are the only essential feature of desires; the tendencies a person has to feel certain ways or think in certain ways when she has a desire are interesting but inessential tendencies. If Nora desires tea, this is because she is disposed to get herself some tea, and her dispositions to feel good about tea, think positively about getting tea, or to keep having her thoughts turn toward getting tea are merely associated effects of her desire. The simple, conservative theory has a number of competitors, each emphasizing something different from, or in addition to, dispositions to action.
有一个简单、保守的欲望理论，根据该理论，有欲望就是有行动倾向的问题。根据这一理论，行为倾向是欲望的唯一基本特征;当一个人有欲望时，她必须以某种方式感受或以某种方式思考的倾向是有趣但无关紧要的倾向。如果诺拉想喝茶，那是因为她想给自己买点茶，而她对茶感觉良好的倾向，积极地考虑喝茶，或者不断让她的想法转向喝茶，这只是她愿望的关联影响。这个简单、保守的理论有许多竞争对手，每个竞争对手都强调与行动倾向不同或互补的东西。

In spite of the variety of theoretical options, the simple, conservative theory of desire—the action-based theory—is the most widely-held theory, making it the appropriate place to begin any discussion.
尽管理论选择多种多样，但简单、保守的欲望理论——基于行动的理论——是最广泛接受的理论，使其成为开始任何讨论的合适场所。

1.1 Action-Based Theories of Desire 1.1 基于行动的欲望理论

Consider a desire for a yellow mango. “The primitive sign of wanting,” Anscombe writes, “is trying to get” (Anscombe 2000). Taking this thought to heart, one might hold that if Janet tries to get a yellow mango, then a yellow mango is what Janet desires. But Janet can desire a yellow mango even when she is not trying to get one (she might be struck by a craving while all out of mangoes, and not be willing to go shopping at that moment). So there is reason to want something more elaborate as a theory of desire. To deal with Janet, it might seem simplest to hold that desires dispose us to action, without always bringing it about that we act. Although Janet is not trying to get a mango, she is disposed to get one—and would, were it only more convenient to do so. This leads to a simple, action-based theory of desire.
考虑一下对黄色芒果的渴望。“想要的原始标志，”安斯库姆写道，“是试图得到”（Anscombe 2000）。把这个想法放在心上，人们可能会认为，如果珍妮特试图得到一个黄色的芒果，那么一个黄色的芒果就是珍妮特想要的。但是珍妮特即使不想得到一个黄色的芒果，也可以渴望得到一个黄色的芒果（她可能会在芒果全部用完时被渴望所打击，并且不愿意在那一刻去购物）。因此，有理由想要一些更详细的东西作为欲望理论。要对付珍妮特，似乎最简单的做法是认为欲望使我们采取行动，而不是总是让我们行动起来。虽然珍妮特不是想买芒果，但她还是想买一个——而且会这样做，如果这样做更方便的话。这导致了一个简单的、基于行动的欲望理论。

For an organism to desire p is for the organism to be disposed to act so as to bring about p.
对于一个有机体来说，渴望 p 就是让有机体倾向于行动以产生 p。

This sort of theory has been criticized for being insufficiently restrictive, because it appears to attribute desires to organisms on the basis of mere behavioral tics. For instance, if a woman has a tendency to stutter, then it follows from the theory above that she has a desire to stutter—simply because she is disposed to act so as to stutter. For such reasons, it is common to prefer a more sophisticated version of an action-based theory of desire.
这种理论被批评为限制性不足，因为它似乎仅仅根据行为抽搐将欲望归因于有机体。例如，如果一个女人有口吃的倾向，那么从上面的理论可以得出她有口吃的欲望——仅仅是因为她倾向于口吃。由于这些原因，人们通常更喜欢基于行动的欲望理论的更复杂版本。

For an organism to desire p is for the organism to be disposed to take whatever actions it believes are likely to bring about p.
对于一个有机体来说，渴望 p 就是让有机体倾向于采取它认为可能带来 p 的任何行动。

According to this theory, for Janet to desire to have a yellow mango is just for her to be disposed to go to the fridge, or the store, or to ask her friend, or to do whatever else she believes likely to get her a yellow mango. She need not actually do any of these things, for she might desire to do something else even more, or might be asleep, or drugged, or otherwise prevented from doing the things she is disposed to do, but she must be (at least to some extent) disposed to do them all else being equal. Likewise, for John to desire that Janet love him is for John to be disposed to take whatever actions he believes are likely to make it the case that Janet loves him. And so on, for the various desires that people and other organisms are capable of having. Michael Smith has very clearly articulated this sort of theory of desire in a number of works (Smith 1987; 1994).
根据这个理论，珍妮特想要一个黄芒果只是为了让她愿意去冰箱，或者去商店，或者问她的朋友，或者做任何她认为可能让她得到一个黄芒果的事情。她实际上不需要做这些事情中的任何一件，因为她可能更想做其他事情，或者可能睡着了，或者被下了药，或者被阻止做她想做的事情，但她必须（至少在某种程度上）在其他条件相同的情况下愿意做这些事情。同样，约翰希望珍妮特爱他，就是约翰愿意采取任何他认为可能使珍妮特爱他的行为。等等，因为人类和其他生物体能够拥有的各种欲望。迈克尔·史密斯在许多著作中非常清楚地阐明了这种欲望理论（Smith 1987;1994）。

Like their less sophisticated counterparts, more sophisticated action-based theories of desire have been criticized for being insufficiently restrictive. Dennis Stampe points out that a person who believes that serving just so will cause him to double fault in tennis might thereby become disposed to serve just so and double fault (being nervous seems to have this effect quite often), but this would not show that such a person desires to double fault (Stampe 1986). And a number of philosophers have suggested that desires are only one psychological state able to initiate action, so that it is a mistake to identify desires with psychological states disposing us to actions. Some of these philosophers have focused on the negative point, that what might be called ‘true desires’ do not exhaust the possible motivational states (Davis 1986; Marks 1986). Others have focused on a positive alternative to desire as a motivating state, and these latter have tended to focus on the idea that a judgment of what is good (or obligatory) is at least one further psychological state that can lead to action, independently of antecedent desire. In both the case of desire and of belief in the good, being in such a state is being disposed to take whatever actions are believed likely to bring about what is desired or what is judged good. But according to these philosophers, desires and judgments of goodness are very different things. Hence action-based theories of desire fail to make an important distinction (e.g., McDowell 1978; Scanlon 1998).
与不太复杂的对应物一样，更复杂的基于行动的欲望理论也因限制不足而受到批评。丹尼斯·斯坦普 （Dennis Stampe） 指出，一个认为恰到好处的发球会导致他在网球比赛中出现双重错误的人可能会因此变得倾向于恰到好处和双重错误（紧张似乎经常有这种效果），但这并不表明这样的人希望双重错误（斯坦普 1986 年）。许多哲学家认为，欲望只是一种能够启动行动的心理状态，因此将欲望与使我们倾向于行动的心理状态相提并论是错误的。其中一些哲学家专注于消极的一点，即可能被称为“真实欲望”的东西并不能穷尽可能的动机状态（戴维斯 1986 年;Marks 1986 年）。其他人则关注将欲望作为一种激励状态的积极替代方案，而后者则倾向于关注这样一种观点，即对什么是好的（或强制性的）的判断至少是另一种可以导致行动的心理状态，独立于先前的欲望。在欲望和对善的信念的情况下，处于这样的状态就是倾向于采取任何被认为可能带来所期望的或被认为是善的行动。但根据这些哲学家的说法，欲望和对善的判断是截然不同的东西。因此，基于行动的欲望理论未能做出重要的区分（例如，McDowell 1978;Scanlon 1998 年）。

An important variant of action-based theories of desire holds that desires are mental states that have the function of producing actions, rather than mental states that merely dispose agents to act. On these theories, a desire might or might not dispose an actor to satisfy the desire, but causing that result is the job or purpose of the desire (the biological function of the desire), or bringing about the satisfaction of the desire is how the action-production systems do their jobs or fulfill their purposes (Millikan 1984; Papineau 1987). While these variations do well with Stampe-type objections (because it is not the purpose of a belief that one is going to double fault to cause a double fault), they nonetheless would seem to be subject to objections by those who think that beliefs in the good can also perform their functions by moving one to act.
基于行动的欲望理论的一个重要变体认为，欲望是具有产生行动功能的心理状态，而不是仅仅使主体采取行动的精神状态。根据这些理论，欲望可能会也可能不会为了满足欲望而处置行为者，但导致该结果是欲望的工作或目的（欲望的生物学功能），或者带来欲望的满足是动作生产系统如何完成其工作或实现其目的（Millikan 1984;Papineau 1987 年）。虽然这些变化与斯坦普式的反对意见相吻合（因为这不是相信一个人会犯双重错误导致双重错误的目的），但它们似乎仍然会受到那些认为对善的信念也可以通过促使一个人采取行动来履行其功能的人的反对。

To overcome these latter objections, the action-based theorist may follow any of a number of lines of argument. The action-based theorist may argue that mere beliefs in goodness cannot move agents to act, given an independently motivated theory of belief in general (a position open to many philosophers of mind with complementary theories of belief and desire). Or he may argue that there is an incoherence in the principles by which one should revise a belief in goodness and by which one should revise one’s dispositions to act (see the discussion of Lewis below in section 1.3), so that there is something incoherent in the idea of a belief in goodness that also moves one to act. Or, in a more concessive spirit, he may allow that the action-based theory of desire should be supplemented with other elements (dispositions to pleasure, for instance) not characteristic of beliefs in goodness.
为了克服后一种反对意见，基于行动的理论家可以遵循许多论点中的任何一条。基于行动的理论家可能会争辩说，鉴于一般的信仰理论是独立动机的（这一立场对许多具有信仰和欲望互补理论的心灵哲学家开放），单纯的善的信念并不能促使行动者采取行动。或者他可能会争辩说，一个人应该根据这些原则来修正对善的信念，以及应该根据这些原则来修正一个人的行动倾向（见下面第 1.3 节中对刘易斯的讨论），因此对善的信念的想法中存在一些不连贯的东西，这也促使一个人采取行动。或者，本着更让步的精神，他可能会允许基于行动的欲望理论应该辅以其他元素（例如，对快乐的倾向），这些元素不是对善的信念的特征。

One further difficulty for action-based theories of desire comes from apparent desires for things that action is ill-suited to bring about (evidence, that is, that the action-based theory of desire is excessively restrictive). For example, suppose it is possible for me to desire that pi be a rational number, or to desire that I had never been born, or to desire that a committee decide in my favor regardless of what I do (Schroeder 2004). These are desires that do not seem to exist in virtue of facts about dispositions to action, even facts about what actions I would perform if I were so foolish as to believe that I could fulfill my desires by actions. In response, the action-based theorist may hold that these attitudes are not true desires at all but only related conative attitudes: wishes, perhaps. A different line of response might be to hold that, even for such desires, dispositions to act still exist, even if they are unlikely to be acted upon in moderately reasonable people (Wall 2009).
基于行动的欲望理论的另一个困难来自于对行动不适合带来的事物的明显欲望（即，基于行动的欲望理论是过度限制的证据）。例如，假设我可能希望 pi 是一个有理数，或者希望我从未出生过，或者希望一个委员会做出对我有利的决定，而不管我做什么（Schroeder 2004）。这些欲望似乎不存在，因为事实是关于行动的倾向，甚至是关于如果我愚蠢到相信我可以通过行动来实现我的愿望，我会做什么行动的事实。作为回应，基于行动的理论家可能会认为这些态度根本不是真正的欲望，而只是相关的共生态度：也许是愿望。另一种不同的回应可能是认为，即使对于这样的愿望，行动的倾向仍然存在，即使它们不太可能在中等理性的人中采取行动（Wall 2009）。

1.2 Pleasure-Based Theories of Desire 1.2 基于快乐的欲望理论

As just suggested, philosophers who complain that an action-based theory of desire fails to distinguish judgments of goodness from desire sometimes suggest that pleasure is the key to this distinction. According to these philosophers, a person moved by a desire always enjoys what is desired, or eagerly anticipates the desire’s satisfaction, whereas a person moved only by a judgment of goodness does not share these feelings (Schueler 1995; Vadas 1984; see also Davis 1986). Insofar as this seems right, there is reason to try out a theory of desire according to which dispositions to pleasure (and displeasure) are all there is to desire. Perhaps desires only contingently move us to action, but necessarily give rise to certain feelings. A simple version of this theory holds:
正如刚才所建议的，抱怨基于行动的欲望理论无法区分善与欲望的判断的哲学家有时认为快乐是这种区分的关键。根据这些哲学家的说法，一个被欲望所驱使的人总是享受所渴望的，或者热切地期待欲望的满足，而一个只被善的判断所驱使的人则不分享这些感受（Schueler 1995;瓦达斯 1984 年;另见 Davis 1986）。只要这看起来是正确的，就有理由尝试一种欲望理论，根据该理论，对快乐（和不快乐）的倾向就是对欲望的全部。也许欲望只是偶然地促使我们采取行动，但必然会引起某些感觉。这个理论的一个简单版本是：

For an organism to desire p is for the organism to be disposed to take pleasure in it seeming that p and displeasure in it seeming that not-p.
对于一个有机体来说，渴望 p 就是让有机体倾向于以它似乎是 p 为乐，而对它似乎是非 p 感到不快。

In addition to considerations in moral psychology, there are also reasons to prefer a pleasure-based theory of desire that stem from the philosophy of mind. Galen Strawson defends a pleasure-based theory on two grounds: first, Strawson holds that being a desire for anything (or being a belief about anything or otherwise exhibiting intentionality) requires consciousness, and pleasure and displeasure are the states of consciousness most closely linked to desire. And second, Strawson holds that it is conceivable that there be creatures who would lack dispositions to act but who would have dispositions to feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and that these creatures would seem to have desires for the things that would please them. These creatures might include actual human beings suffering from neurological injuries removing their dispositions to act, and they might include purely imaginary beings never born with capacities to act, just capacities to feel (Strawson 1994).
除了道德心理学的考虑外，还有理由更喜欢源于心灵哲学的基于快乐的欲望理论。盖伦·斯特劳森 （Galen Strawson） 基于两个理由为基于快乐的理论辩护：首先，斯特劳森认为，对任何事物的渴望（或对任何事物的信念或以其他方式表现出意向性）需要意识，而快乐和不快乐是与欲望最密切相关的意识状态。其次，斯特劳森认为，可以想象，有些生物缺乏行动的倾向，但对快乐和不愉快的感觉有倾向，而且这些生物似乎对能取悦他们的东西有欲望。这些生物可能包括遭受神经损伤而消除他们行为倾向的真实人类，他们可能包括纯粹想象的生物，他们从来没有天生就具有行动能力，只是感觉能力（Strawson 1994）。

Carolyn Morillo has also defended a pleasure-based theory of desire, though on quite different grounds. Beginning on conceptual grounds, Morillo argues that desires are ontologically independent of action, because they are non-trivial explainers of action. And then on empirical (specifically, neuroscientific) grounds, Morillo argues that episodes of pleasure are identical to certain neural events (the release of dopamine by what is known as the ‘reward system’), and these same neural events are the causal origin (in conjunction with belief) of action. Thus, episodes of pleasure play the role of desires, and so desires are episodes of pleasure (Morillo 1990).
卡罗琳·莫里洛 （Carolyn Morillo） 也为一种基于快乐的欲望理论辩护，尽管理由完全不同。从概念出发，莫里略认为欲望在本体论上独立于行动，因为它们是行动的重要解释者。然后，根据实证（特别是神经科学）基础，Morillo 认为快乐发作与某些神经事件（通过所谓的“奖励系统”释放多巴胺）相同，而这些相同的神经事件是行动的因果起源（与信念一起）。因此，快乐的情节扮演着欲望的角色，所以欲望就是快乐的情节（Morillo 1990）。

A difficulty for pleasure-based theories of desire is that pleasure has seemed to some to have a causal or representational relationship to desire. According to these philosophers, net satisfaction of desire, or net increase in satisfaction of desire, is the standard cause of pleasure, and the pleasure caused perhaps represents this change in desire satisfaction. If such views are correct, then it seems desires must be ontologically distinct from pleasure in the way that causes are distinct from their effects, or objects of representation from their representations (Davis 1982; Schroeder 2004).
基于快乐的欲望理论的一个难点是，在一些人看来，快乐似乎与欲望有因果关系或表征关系。根据这些哲学家的说法，欲望的净满足，或欲望满足的净增加，是快乐的标准原因，而由此产生的快乐可能代表了欲望满足的这种变化。如果这种观点是正确的，那么似乎欲望在本体论上必须与快乐区分开来，就像原因与它们的效果不同，或者表征对象与它们的表征不同一样（戴维斯 1982 年;Schroeder 2004 年）。

1.3 Good-Based Theories of Desire 1.3 基于善的欲望理论

While some philosophers hold that desires need to be strongly separated from judgments of goodness, other philosophers think that they need to be more closely linked. It was perhaps the view of Socrates that to want something is simply to think it good, and it is simple enough to formulate a theory of desire on this basis.
虽然一些哲学家认为欲望需要与善的判断严格分离，但其他哲学家认为它们需要更紧密地联系在一起。也许苏格拉底的观点是，想要某样东西就是简单地认为它是好的，而在此基础上制定一个欲望理论是很简单的。

For an organism to desire p is for it to believe p is good.
对于一个有机体来说，渴望 p 就是它相信 p 是好的。

Recommending such a theory is the intuition, shared by many, that we are motivated to do what we judge good just because we judge it good (and the intuition that, if I am motivated to do something, I desire to do it). If I judge it good to go to a meeting of the PTA, then that suffices to motivate me to go to the meeting, it would seem, and thus (perhaps) to desire it.
推荐这样一种理论的是许多人都拥有的直觉，即我们之所以有动力去做我们认为好的事情，只是因为我们判断它是好的（以及直觉，如果我有动力去做某事，我就渴望去做）。如果我认为参加 PTA 的会议是好的，那么这似乎足以激励我去参加会议，因此（也许）渴望它。

David Lewis has mounted a challenge to such theories of desire on the basis of results from decision theory (Lewis 1988; 1996). Lewis considers the thesis, Desire As Belief, that a rational individual is motivated to make true a proposition p to the extent that she believes p to be good, and shows that within a familiar decision-theoretic framework inconsistencies result. In Lewis’s argument, the result follows because of the differences between rational belief revision and rational desire (or motivation) revision within the decision-theoretic framework. In response to Lewis, a number of philosophers have sought to defend the general idea that desires are beliefs in goodness (or are entailed by such beliefs in rational individuals) by defending different specific formulations of the thesis within decision theory (e.g., Price 1989; Byrne and Hájek 1997). There have also been efforts to show that formal decision theory might not be formalizing the right things to draw conclusions about desire and goodness (e.g., Broome 1991).
大卫·刘易斯 （David Lewis） 根据决策理论的结果对这种欲望理论提出了挑战（Lewis 1988;1996）。刘易斯认为，一个理性的个体有动力使命题 p 成为真，以至于她认为 p 是好的，并表明在熟悉的决策理论框架内会导致不一致。在刘易斯的论点中，结果的出现是因为决策论框架内的理性信念修正和理望（或动机）修正之间的差异。作为对刘易斯的回应，许多哲学家试图通过捍卫决策理论中对该论点的不同具体表述来捍卫欲望是对善的信念（或由理性个体的这种信念所包含的）的一般观点（例如，Price 1989;Byrne 和 Hájek 1997）。还有人努力表明，正式的决策理论可能没有将正确的事物正式化，以得出关于欲望和善良的结论（例如，Broome 1991）。

In a less formal mode, Dennis Stampe and Graham Oddie have independently advanced very similar good-based theories of desire according to which desires are a kind of high-level perceptual state: a perception of goodness.
丹尼斯·斯坦普（Dennis Stampe）和格雷厄姆·奥迪（Graham Oddie）以一种不太正式的方式独立提出了非常相似的基于善的欲望理论，根据该理论，欲望是一种高级的知觉状态：对善的感知。

For an organism to desire p is for p to appear good to the organism.
对于一个有机体来说，渴望 p 就是让 p 对有机体来说似乎是好的。

According to these theorists, perceptions of goodness are not like perceptions of cold or white light, but more like perceptions of something as looking like Mikhail Gorbachev—i.e., complex, high-level perceptual states that are nonetheless distinct from belief states. Stampe and Oddie are both careful to hold that the appearance of goodness is something quite distinct from the judgment or belief that something is good (and thus, though this is not their main concern, they evade Lewis’s formal arguments). On Stampe’s view, this distinctness is best demonstrated by the fact that it is consistent to claim to believe that something is good while it does not seem good (i.e., is not wanted), but it is not consistent to claim to desire something while it does not seem good (i.e., is not wanted). In a related vein, Oddie argues that, while it is not incoherent to believe that one course of action is the best while not desiring to take it, there is a tension in such a state of affairs, and this tension is best explained as resulting from the fact that desires represent their contents as good (Stampe 1987; Oddie 2005).
根据这些理论家的说法，对善的感知不像对冷光或白光的感知，而更像是对看起来像米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫的事物的感知——即复杂、高级的感知状态，但与信仰状态不同。斯坦普和奥迪都小心翼翼地认为，善的表象与判断或相信某物是好的完全不同的东西（因此，尽管这不是他们的主要关注点，但他们回避了刘易斯的正式论证）。在斯坦普看来，这种独特性最好地通过以下事实来证明：声称相信某物是好的，而它看起来并不好（即，不想要）是一致的，但声称渴望某物，而它看起来并不好（即，不想要）。与此相关的是，Oddie 认为，虽然相信一种行动方案是最好的，而又不想采取它，这并非不连贯，但在这种事态中存在一种张力，而这种张力最好地解释为欲望代表其内容是好的这一事实的结果（Stampe 1987;Oddie 2005 年）。

One other interesting variant of the position is defended by T.M. Scanlon (1998). According to Scanlon, motivating desires are judgments of, not what is good, but what we have reason to do. (Scanlon also holds that there are non–motivating desires that direct attention; these sorts of desires are discussed in the next section.)
T.M. Scanlon （1998） 为该立场的另一个有趣变体辩护。根据斯坎伦的说法，激励望不是对什么是好的判断，而是对我们有理由做什么的判断。（斯坎伦还认为，存在引导注意力的非激励望;这类欲望将在下一节中讨论。

Good-based theories of desire are motivated by considerations so different from action-based theories of desire (or pleasure-based theories) that it is very rare to see advocates of the one attack the other, with the exception of Lewis’s very technical work and the literature following from it. As a result, difficulties for good-based theories of desire have not been richly explored in the philosophical literature. One puzzle for such theories might be to explain the relationship of desires to non-human animals. On the one hand, it would seem that rats desire to get away from cats, desire to be around other rats, and the like. On the other hand, it would seem that rats do not represent anything as good (they would both seem to lack the concept of goodness and to lack a perceptual-style representation of goodness that would be well poised to generate such a concept). But if rats can desire without representing the good, then why would people be different? The options available for solving such puzzles have not yet been fully explored.
基于善的欲望理论的动机与基于行动的欲望理论（或基于快乐的理论）截然不同，以至于很少看到一个的倡导者攻击另一个，除了刘易斯非常技术性的工作和随后的文献。因此，哲学文献中没有充分探讨基于善的欲望理论的困难。这种理论的一个难题可能是解望与非人类动物的关系。一方面，老鼠似乎渴望远离猫，渴望与其他老鼠在一起，等等。另一方面，老鼠似乎并不代表任何善的东西（它们似乎都缺乏善的概念，也缺乏对善的感知式表示，而这种表示很有可能产生这样一个概念）。但是，如果老鼠可以欲望而不代表善，那么为什么人们会有所不同呢？可用于解决此类难题的选项尚未得到充分探索。

1.4 Attention-Based Theories of Desire 1.4 基于注意力的欲望理论

Another evaluatively loaded theory of desire has been proposed by T.M. Scanlon. Dubbed a theory of desire in the ‘directed-attention’ sense, this theory links desires to reasons, rather than goodness. But the theory does so through its characterization of how desire plays its most important role, which is its role in directing the attention of the subject who desires.
T.M. Scanlon 提出了另一种评价性的欲望理论。该理论被称为“定向注意力”意义上的欲望理论，将欲望与理性而不是善良联系起来。但该理论通过描述欲望如何发挥其最重要的作用来做到这一点，即它在引导欲望主体的注意力方面的作用。

For an organism to desire p is for the thought of p to keep occurring to the organism in a favorable light, so that its attention is directed insistently toward considerations that present themselves as counting in favor of p.
对于一个有机体来说，渴望 p 就是 p 的思想不断以有利的眼光出现在有机体上，因此它的注意力被坚持不懈地引导到那些看起来有利于 p 的考虑上。

Since, on Scanlon’s view, reasons are considerations that count in favor of propositions, it follows from this theory that a desire p exists if one’s attention is directed insistently toward apparent reasons to have it be the case that p. This is where the evaluative element enters the theory (Scanlon 1998).
因为，在斯坎伦看来，理由是有利于命题的考虑因素，因此从这个理论可以得出，如果一个人的注意力坚持不懈地指向明显的理由，那么愿望 p 就存在，以至于 p 是这样的。这就是评价元素进入理论的地方（Scanlon 1998）。

Technically, Scanlon does not present a complete attention-based theory of desire, but only an attention-based sufficient condition for the existence of a desire. Perhaps this is because Scanlon sees his theory as best suited to characterizing desires that are playing an active role at the moment—occurrent desires—but not as giving a good characterization of desires not having that role—standing desires (see below). A theory of standing desires that follows Scanlon’s lead might look something like the following.
从技术上讲，斯坎伦并没有提出一个完整的基于注意力的欲望理论，而只是一个基于注意力的欲望存在的充分条件。也许这是因为斯坎伦认为他的理论最适合描述目前正在发挥积极作用的欲望——潜在的欲望——而不是对没有那个角色的欲望——常设的欲望——给出一个很好的描述（见下文）。遵循斯坎伦的指导的常设欲望理论可能如下所示。

For an organism to desire p is for it to be disposed to keep having its attention drawn to reasons to have p, or to reasons to avoid not-p.
对于一个有机体来说，渴望 p 就是它倾向于不断将注意力吸引到拥有 p 的原因上，或者避免 not-p 的原因上。

Like good-based theories of desire, Scanlon’s attention-based theory of desire has not yet been engaged at length by proponents of more conservative theories of desire, and it remains to be seen what objections more conservative theorists might raise. One puzzle for the theory might come from its focus on one limited form of attention. According to the theory, desire’s characteristic effect is to direct attention toward reasons to fulfill the desire. But desire has notable effects on other forms of attention, too: if Katie desires that Ohio State win a football game, then her desire will direct her attention to information about the game, will direct her attention to opportunities to gain information about the game, will direct her attention to people discussing the game, and so on. These ways in which attention can be directed seem, pre-theoretically, just as important to the nature of desire as the ways that are of interest to the attention-based theory of desire.
与基于善的欲望理论一样，斯坎伦基于注意力的欲望理论尚未被更保守的欲望理论的支持者详细参与，更保守的理论家可能会提出什么反对意见还有待观察。该理论的一个谜题可能来自它对一种有限形式的注意力的关注。根据该理论，欲望的特征效应是将注意力引向满足欲望的原因。但是，欲望对其他形式的注意力也有显著的影响：如果 Katie 希望俄亥俄州立大学赢得一场橄榄球比赛，那么她的欲望会将她的注意力引导到有关比赛的信息上，将她的注意力引导到获取有关比赛的信息上，将她的注意力引导到讨论比赛的人上，等等。从理论上讲，这些可以引导注意力的方式似乎与基于注意力的欲望理论所感兴趣的方式对欲望的本质一样重要。

1.5 Learning-Based Theories of Desire 1.5 基于学习的欲望理论

All of the theories considered so far have treated desire as a suitable topic for a priori investigation, with one exception. Morillo’s methodology treats desires as a natural kind: the natural kind that is responsible for a familiar effect—action—one associates with desire. This general methodology is shared by another philosopher, Timothy Schroeder. But Schroeder sees the neuroscientific evidence as supporting a different conclusion from Morillo’s. Schroeder agrees with Morillo that there is a single neurological structure that is the unique common cause of the various phenomena associated with desire (at least, with action, pleasure, and some aspects of thought and attention), and agrees that this structure is the dopamine-releasing reward system. However, he argues that the activity of this neurological structure does not realize pleasure. (Pleasure is said to be one of its effects.) Rather, the output of this neurological structure realizes a form of unconscious learning known as contingency-based learning or reward-based learning. Schroeder thus concludes that desires are this natural kind: reward-based learning mechanisms. Desires have all of their familiar effects on action, feelings, and thought only contingently (compare Morillo 1990 to Schroeder 2004; compare both to the related view in Butler 1992).
到目前为止，所有考虑的理论都将欲望视为适合先验研究的主题，只有一个例外。Morillo 的方法论将欲望视为一种自然的种类：一种自然的欲望，它负责一种熟悉的效果——行动——一个人与欲望相关联。另一位哲学家蒂莫西·施罗德 （Timothy Schroeder） 也采用了这种通用方法。但施罗德认为神经科学证据支持与莫里略不同的结论。施罗德同意莫里略的观点，即存在一个单一的神经结构，它是与欲望相关的各种现象（至少与行动、快乐以及思想和注意力的某些方面）相关的唯一共同原因，并同意这种结构是多巴胺释放的奖励系统。然而，他认为这种神经结构的活动并不能实现快乐。（据说快乐是它的效果之一。相反，这种神经结构的输出实现了一种称为基于应急学习或基于奖励的学习的无意识学习形式。因此，施罗德得出结论，欲望是这种自然的：基于奖励的学习机制。欲望对行动、情感和思想具有所有熟悉的影响，只是偶然的（比较Morillo 1990和Schroeder 2004;将两者与Butler 1992的相关观点进行比较）。

For an organism to desire p is for it to use representations of p to drive reward-based learning.
对于一个有机体来说，渴望 p 就是它使用 p 的表示来驱动基于奖励的学习。

Schroeder’s version of a reward-based theory of desire is a development of a theory advanced by Fred Dretske (Dretske 1988, chapter 5). Dretske advances the view that desires in fact determine what states of affairs will drive reward-based learning, but does not go so far as to offer a complete theory of desire on this basis.
施罗德版本的基于奖励的欲望理论是弗雷德·德雷茨克 （Fred Dretske） 提出的理论的发展（Dretske 1988，第 5 章）。Dretske 提出了这样的观点，即欲望实际上决定了什么事态会驱动基于奖励的学习，但并没有在此基础上提供完整的欲望理论。

The dispute between Schroeder and Morillo over how to interpret the neural structure that is the unique common cause of phenomena such as action and pleasure highlights one way in which scientific research can become important to philosophical theories of desire. The dopamine-releasing reward system is said by Schroeder to be a cause of pleasure, but by Morillo to be the neural realization of pleasure (when active). Evidence that the reward system realizes pleasure comes principally from the fact that its activity coincides with pleasure (reviewed in Berridge 2003), and from the fact that stimulating the reward system (via drugs or electrodes) is known to cause pleasure (classics of this literature are reviewed in Stellar and Stellar 1985). But this evidence is also compatible with the theory that the reward system is one normal cause of pleasure. Evidence for this latter view has come in the form of evidence that some pleasure-causing drugs work independently of the reward system (reviewed in Berridge 2003), in the form of evidence that rats deprived of their reward systems can still experience gustatory pleasure (Berridge and Robinson 1998), and in the form of reasonable candidates for neural realizers of pleasure that are located causally “downstream” from the reward system (reviewed in Berridge 2003 in support of one candidate structure; a different candidate is defended in Schroeder 2004).
施罗德和莫里略之间关于如何解释神经结构的争论，神经结构是行为和快乐等现象的独特共同原因，这凸显了科学研究对欲望哲学理论变得重要的一种方式。Schroeder 说多巴胺释放奖励系统是快乐的原因，但 Morillo 说是快乐的神经实现（当活跃时）。奖励系统实现快乐的证据主要来自其活动与快乐相吻合的事实（Berridge 2003 年综述），以及已知刺激奖励系统（通过药物或电极）会引起快乐的事实（该文献的经典在 Stellar 和 Stellar 1985 中回顾）。但这一证据也与奖励系统是快乐的一个正常原因的理论相符。后一种观点的证据以以下形式出现：一些引起快乐的药物独立于奖励系统起作用（Berridge 2003 年综述），以证据形式证明被剥夺了奖励系统的大鼠仍然可以体验味觉愉悦（Berridge 和 Robinson 1998），以及以位于奖励系统因果“下游”的快乐神经实现者的合理候选者的形式（Berridge 2003 年审查以支持一个候选结构;在 Schroeder 2004 中为不同的候选人辩护）。

Of all the theories of desire considered here, learning-based theories of desire have the least a priori credibility: no one comes to grasp the idea of a desire through being taught about reward-based learning. A learning-based theory of desire is committed to holding that a desire can exist in a creature that cannot, by its nature, move or feel; so long as it can represent and learn in a certain way (and so long as these capacities are appropriately related), that suffices for a creature to have a desire. A priori, this is likely to seem outlandish. Our ideas about desire tell us that desires are all about actions and feelings, after all. The fact that the learning-based theory of desire holds that an organism could desire sunny days without feeling good about sunny days, without feeling bad about cloudy days, without being motivated to do whatever might help bring about a sunny day or even being moved to jump for joy when it turns sunny—this can be hard to swallow. The plausibility of learning-based theories thus requires either a rejection of a priori constraints on theories of desire, or acceptance of the idea that it is a priori that desires are best theorized as a natural kind that might, in principle, lack the features we most commonly associate with it (for versions of these criticisms, see, e.g., Bratman 1990; Brook 2006; Latham 2006).
在这里考虑的所有欲望理论中，基于学习的欲望理论具有最少的先验可信度：没有人通过学习基于奖励的学习来理解欲望的概念。基于学习的欲望理论致力于认为，欲望可以存在于一个就其本质而言不能移动或感觉的生物中;只要它能以某种方式表示和学习（只要这些能力适当相关），就足以让一个生物有欲望。先验地说，这可能看起来很古怪。我们对欲望的看法告诉我们，欲望毕竟是关于行动和感受的。事实上，基于学习的欲望理论认为，一个有机体可以渴望阳光明媚的日子，但对晴天感觉良好，对阴天没有感觉，没有动力去做任何可能有助于带来阳光明媚的事情，甚至在天气转为晴天时高兴地跳起来——这可能很难接受。因此，基于学习的理论的合理性要求要么拒绝对欲望理论的先验限制，要么接受这样一种观点，即欲望最好被理论化为一种自然类型，而这种自然类型在原则上可能缺乏我们最常与之相关的特征（有关这些批评的版本，请参阅， 例如，Bratman 1990;布鲁克 2006 年;Latham 2006 年）。

1.6. Holistic (Functionalist and Interpretationist) Theories of Desire 1.6. 整体（功能主义和解释主义）欲望理论

So far, only single-feature theories of desire have been considered. But there are also a number of theories of desire that refuse to privilege any one feature. Instead, these theories make central theoretical appeal to the total package of features associated with desire. To have a desire, according to such holistic theories, is a matter of having enough (often a somewhat vague constraint) of some set of desire-like features.
到目前为止，只考虑了欲望的单一特征理论。但也有一些欲望理论拒绝优先考虑任何一个特征。相反，这些理论将核心理论诉诸于与欲望相关的全部特征。根据这种整体理论，要有一个欲望，就是要有足够多的（通常是一个有点模糊的约束）一些类似欲望的特征。

A list of desire-like features for a holistic theory is rarely provided in full, but certain desire-like features are commonly mentioned and can be expected to play a role in most holistic theories. These are the features just considered as candidates for the essential feature of desires.
整体理论的欲望类特征列表很少完整地提供，但某些欲望类特征经常被提及，并且可以预期在大多数整体理论中发挥作用。这些特征只是被认为是欲望的基本特征的候选者。

1. A creature typically desires p if and only if it is disposed to take whatever actions it believes are likely to bring about p.
   当且仅当一个生物愿意采取它认为可能带来 p 的任何行动时，它才会渴望 p。
2. A creature typically desires p if and only if it is disposed to take pleasure in it seeming that p, and to take displeasure in it seeming that not-p.
   当且仅当一个生物倾向于以它看起来的 p 为乐，而为它似乎不是 p 而感到不快时，它通常渴望 p。
3. A creature typically desires p if and only if it is disposed to believe that p is good.
   当且仅当一个生物倾向于相信 p 是好的时，它才会渴望 p。
4. A creature typically desires p if and only if it is disposed to attend to reasons to have p.
   当且仅当一个生物愿意注意拥有 p 的原因时，它通常渴望 p。

Additional features that might well play a role in a holistic theory include any platitudinous observation about desires. A few follow, though platitudes about desire are so numerous that the list could be quite a bit longer than it is.
其他可能在整体理论中发挥作用的特征包括对欲望的任何平淡无奇的观察。一些紧随其后，尽管关于欲望的陈词滥调如此之多，以至于列表可能比实际要长得多。

1. Creatures tend to desire what is good.
   受造物往往渴望善良。
2. Creatures tend to desire what they need to survive and reproduce.
   生物往往渴望生存和繁殖所需的东西。
3. Creatures normally desire pleasure and do not desire (better: are averse to) pain.
   生物通常渴望快乐，而不渴望（更好的是：厌恶）痛苦。
4. Creatures that desire p tend to have their attention captured by information that bears on whether or not p.
   渴望 p 的生物往往会被与 p 是否相关的信息所吸引。

Holistic theories of desire come in two main forms: functionalist and interpretationist. In the functionalist form, a desire is an internal state-type that plays enough of the causal roles suggested by (1)–(8) etc. (e.g., Lewis 1972). In the interpretationist form, desires are not treated as internal state-types found in a causal network. Rather, desires are treated as states of the whole organism, states that exist in virtue of the organism’s displaying enough of the sorts of behaviors suggested by (1)–(8) etc. to be legitimately interpreted (in accordance with general principles of interpretation, such as a requirement to interpret creatures as means-end consistent) as having desires (e.g., Davidson 1980).
欲望的整体理论有两种主要形式：功能主义和解释主义。在功能主义形式中，欲望是一种内部状态类型，它发挥了 （1）-（8） 等所建议的足够因果作用（例如，Lewis 1972）。在解释主义形式中，欲望不被视为因果网络中发现的内部状态类型。相反，欲望被视为整个有机体的状态，这些状态是由于有机体表现出足够的 （1）-（8） 等所暗示的各种行为而被合法地解释为具有欲望（例如，戴维森 1980 年）。

Also worth noting here is work on caring by Agnieszka Jaworska. Jaworska does not take herself to be developing a theory of desire, and indeed appears to hold something like an action-based theory of desire. Rather, she takes herself to be developing a theory of what it is to care about someone or something. However, the theory which she develops looks much the way a holistic theory of desire would look. To care about someone, on Jaworska’s view, is to be motivated to act for that person’s welfare (for its own sake), be disposed to feel good at the prospect of the person doing well and bad at the prospect of the person doing poorly, to tend to attend to features of the person’s welfare, to have emotions in keeping with this general package—fear when the person’s welfare is in peril, relief when all works out for the best, and so on. Thus, while this is not Jaworska’s intention, one can read her as offering a holistic theory of desire focused on a subclass of desires: those that can be said to constitute caring about something or someone (Jaworska 2007a; 2007b; 1999).
同样值得注意的是 Agnieszka Jaworska 的护理工作。Jaworska 并不认为自己在发展一种欲望理论，而且确实似乎持有一种基于行动的欲望理论。相反，她认为自己正在发展一种关于关心某人或某事的理论。然而，她发展的理论看起来与欲望的整体理论非常相似。在贾沃斯卡看来，关心某人就是有动力为这个人的福利而行动（为了它本身），倾向于对这个人做得好的前景感到良好，而对这个人做得不好的前景感到不安，倾向于关注这个人的福利的特点，拥有与这个一般包装相一致的情绪——当这个人的福祉处于危险之中时感到恐惧， 当一切都朝着最好的方向发展时，解脱，等等。因此，虽然这不是 Jaworska 的意图，但我们可以将她解读为提供了一种专注于欲望的一个子类的欲望整体理论：那些可以说构成对某事或某人的关心的欲望（Jaworska 2007a; 2007b; 1999）。

2. Varieties of Desires 2. 欲望的多样性

With a theory of desire in hand one can go on to consider a number of varieties of desire. Even if desires form a large unified group of mental states, there is certainly room for there to be sub-types of desire, and a number have been discussed.
有了欲望理论，人们就可以继续考虑多种多样的欲望。即使欲望构成了一大群统一的心理状态，也肯定有空间存在欲望的子类型，并且已经讨论了一些。

2.1 Desires for Objects and Desires for States of Affairs 2.1 对客体的欲望和对事态的欲望

According to most theories, desires are always desires for conceivable states of affairs. A desire for tea is a desire for a certain state of affairs one has in mind: that one drink some tea. A desire for a new pair of skates is likewise a desire for another state of affairs: that one own a new pair of skates. And so on. This idea is also expressed with phrases such as ‘desires are attitudes toward propositions’ or ‘desires have propositional content’. Treating desires in this way makes it easy to see how there could be logical relations between the contents of beliefs, desires, and intentions.
根据大多数理论，欲望总是对可想象的事态的欲望。对茶的渴望是对一个人心中某种事态的渴望：喝点茶。对一双新溜冰鞋的渴望同样是对另一种情况的渴望：一个人拥有一双新的溜冰鞋。等等。这个想法也用诸如“欲望是对命题的态度”或“欲望具有命题内容”等短语来表达。以这种方式处理欲望，很容易看出信念、欲望和意图的内容之间是如何存在逻辑关系的。

A competing way of thinking about desires holds that some or all desires are desires for objects, not states of affairs. A desire for tea is simply for tea, not for any state of affairs involving the tea. This competing way of thinking has the advantage that it takes seriously the way we ordinarily talk about desires and think about them. It is far more natural to say that I desire tea than to say that I desire that I have some tea, and perhaps this naturalness is indicative of something deep about the nature of desire. Furthermore, it might well seem that non-human animals have desires without being able to grasp the propositions a grip on which we so readily attribute to human beings (Thagard 2006).
一种对欲望的竞争性思考方式认为，部分或全部欲望是对对象的欲望，而不是事态。对茶的渴望只是为了茶，而不是与茶有关的任何状态。这种竞争性的思维方式有一个好处，就是它认真对待我们通常谈论欲望和思考欲望的方式。说我想喝茶比说我想喝点茶要自然得多，也许这种自然性表明了欲望本质的深刻之处。此外，非人类动物似乎有欲望，但无法掌握我们如此容易将其归因于人类的命题（Thagard 2006）。

A response, though, is that the natural phrasing conceals some of the complexity inherent in desire, and that the non-human animals who have desires have structure to their cognitive capacities that is expressed by talking about propositional content. If Nora desires tea, there is a fact of the matter about which of the following four states of affairs is one in which her desire is satisfied:
然而，一种回应是，自然的措辞掩盖了欲望中固有的一些复杂性，而有欲望的非人类动物具有其认知能力的结构，这是通过谈论命题内容来表达的。如果诺拉想喝茶，那么事实是，以下四种情况中的哪一种是她的欲望得到满足的：

1. Nora possesses but does not drink a cup of tea in the near future.
   诺拉拥有但不久的将来没有喝一杯茶。
2. Nora possesses but does not drink a cup of tea someday.
   诺拉拥有但有一天没有喝一杯茶。
3. Nora drinks a cup of tea in the near future.
   Nora 在不久的将来喝杯茶。
4. Nora drinks a cup of tea someday.
   Nora 总有一天会喝一杯茶。

If it is (3) that would satisfy Nora’s desire, then there seems much gained and little lost in saying that Nora’s desire is for a state of affairs: that she drink a cup of tea in the near future. And likewise, if an owl desires a vole it seems that there is a fact of the matter about which of the counterpart states of affairs it is that would satisfy the owl’s desire (and the counterpart to (3) seems most likely).
如果 （3） 可以满足 Nora 的愿望，那么说 Nora 的愿望是某种事态：她在不久的将来喝一杯茶，似乎有很大的收获和很少的损失。同样，如果一只猫头鹰想要一只田鼠，那么似乎有一个事实，即哪种对应的事态会满足猫头鹰的愿望（而 （3） 的对应状态似乎最有可能）。

Even if it is accepted that desires are for conceivable states of affairs, there are other complications remaining. Some have pointed to the difficulties of specifying exactly what is desired: even if Nora wants to now drink a cup of tea, she might protest that she hasn’t received what she wants if it turns out that the tea is very stale, or laced with arsenic, or brought by a robber, or … (e.g., Lycan 2012). Others have pointed to the difficulties generated by conditional desires, such as the desire to have beer later if one is not too tired (e.g., McDaniel and Bradley 2008).
即使人们接受了欲望是为了可以想象的事态，仍然存在其他复杂因素。有些人指出了准确指定所需食物的困难：即使 Nora 现在想喝一杯茶，如果事实证明茶非常陈旧，或者掺有砒霜，或者是强盗带来的，或者…（例如，Lycan 2012）。其他人指出了有条件的欲望产生的困难，例如如果一个人不太累，希望以后喝啤酒（例如，McDaniel 和 Bradley 2008）。

2.2 Intrinsic, Instrumental, and Realizer Desires 2.2 内在、工具性和实现者欲望

Some desires are for states of affairs that are wanted for themselves: these are intrinsic desires. It is generally agreed that pleasure is desired for its own sake, and it is plausible that many people also desire the welfare of their children, the success of their favorite sports teams, and the end of injustice, and desire them all intrinsically. To desire something intrinsically is not to desire it exclusively for its own sake, but to desire it at least partially for its own sake: my father desires my welfare in part for my own sake, but no doubt he also desires it in part because he would have trouble sleeping were I doing poorly, and he does not want to lose sleep.
有些欲望是为了他们自己想要的事态：这些是内在的欲望。人们普遍认为，快乐本身就是可取的，而且许多人也希望孩子的福利、他们最喜欢的运动队的成功和不公正的结束，并且本质上都渴望它们。从本质上渴望某物并不是仅仅为了它本身而渴望它，而是至少部分地为了它本身而渴望它：我父亲希望我的幸福部分是为了我自己，但毫无疑问，他也希望得到它，部分原因是如果我做得不好，他会难以入睡，而他不想失眠。

That is to say, my father desires my welfare both intrinsically and instrumentally: as a means to an end. Normally, however, one calls a desire ‘instrumental’ when one means it is merely instrumental: when one means that the end is desired merely as a means to some other end, and not at all for its own sake (instrumental desires are also sometimes called ‘extrinsic’).
也就是说，我父亲在本质上和工具上都希望我的幸福：作为达到目的的手段。然而，通常情况下，当一个人的意思是它只是工具性的时，人们就会称其为“工具性的”：当一个人的意思是，目的只是作为达到其他目的的手段，而根本不是为了它本身（工具性的欲望有时也被称为“外在的”）。

An interesting case of instrumental desires might be many of the so-called ‘second-order desires’ that have been discussed in the wake of Harry Frankfurt’s work. According to Frankfurt, it is the power to form desires about their own desires, i.e., second-order desires, that makes us persons, makes us beings capable of having cares, loves, and free will (e.g., Frankfurt 1971; 1999). Second-order desires are desires regarding one’s first-order desires, and first-order desires are desires for ordinary (non-conative) things such as snacks or the trouncing of the New York Yankees. Thus, a desire to yell at a drunken reveler who disturbs my sleep is a first-order desire, while a desire that I not act on my desire to yell at the drunken reveler is a second-order desire. If one considers whether such a second-order desire is intrinsic or instrumental, the most reasonable conclusion is typically that the desire is instrumental: I desire not to act on my desire to yell because I desire to not have rocks thrown at my window, and I see not acting on my desire to yell as a means to not having rocks thrown at my window. (Note that David Lewis’ discussion of the role of second-order desires in valuing requires that they be intrinsic desires. This raises an interesting question: how often would a second-order desire be truly intrinsic? See Lewis 1989.)
工具望的一个有趣例子可能是在 Harry Frankfurt 的作品之后讨论的许多所谓的“二阶欲望”。根据法兰克福的说法，正是围绕自己的欲望形成欲望的力量，即二阶欲望，使我们成为人，使我们成为能够关心、爱和自由意志的存在（例如，法兰克福 1971;1999）。二阶欲望是关于一个人的一阶欲望的欲望，而一阶欲望是对普通（非同源）事物的欲望，例如小吃或纽约洋基队的嘲讽。因此，对打扰我睡眠的醉酒狂欢者大喊大叫的愿望是一级欲望，而我不对醉酒狂欢者大喊大叫的愿望采取行动的愿望是二级欲望。如果一个人考虑这种二阶愿望是内在的还是工具性的，最合理的结论通常是这种愿望是工具性的：我不想按照我大喊大叫的愿望行事，因为我不想在我的窗户上扔石头，而且我把不按照我大喊大叫的愿望行事看作是不被石头扔在我的窗户上的一种手段。（请注意，大卫·刘易斯 （David Lewis） 关于二阶欲望在估值中的作用的讨论要求它们是内在的欲望。这就提出了一个有趣的问题：二阶欲望真正内在的次数有多大？参见 Lewis 1989。

In the above scenario, I might also intrinsically desire to be civil and tolerant, and see not acting on my desire to yell as a way to be civil and tolerant. But in this case, the relation between my intrinsic desire and my desire not to act on my desire to yell is not quite an instrumental relation. Refraining from acting on my desire to yell is not a means for achieving the end of civil and tolerant behavior. Rather, it is an instance of civil and tolerant behavior. In such situations, it is said that my desire not to act on my desire to yell is a realizer desire: a desire for an end that would count as one possible realization of an intrinsic desire. This sort of desire gets some discussion in, e.g., Arpaly and Schroeder (2014) and Schmidtz (1994).
在上述情况下，我也可能天生渴望文明和宽容，并将不按照我大喊大叫的愿望行事视为文明和宽容的一种方式。但在这种情况下，我的内在愿望和我不按照我大喊大叫的愿望行事的愿望之间的关系并不完全是一种工具性关系。克制不按照我大喊大叫的愿望行事并不是达到文明和宽容行为目的的手段。相反，它是一个文明和宽容行为的例子。在这种情况下，据说我不按照我的大喊大叫的愿望行事的愿望是一种实现者的愿望：对结果的渴望，可以算作内在愿望的一种可能实现。这种愿望在 Arpaly 和 Schroeder （2014） 以及 Schmidtz （1994） 中得到了一些讨论。

2.3 Stronger and Weaker Desires 2.3 更强和更弱的欲望

It is generally held that desires come on a continuum of strength: desires can be stronger or weaker. The strength of a desire is typically said to be constituted by the desire’s causal power regarding the control of action: for one desire to be stronger than another is for the agent to be disposed to act upon it, rather than the second desire, in a situation in which (a) all else is equal, and (b) the agent believes that each desire is satisfiable by a distinct action, and © the agent believes that the desires are not jointly satisfiable. This way of characterizing desire strength is obviously most suited to an action-based theory of desire. But for each theory of desire there is a corresponding theory of desire strength available. Desire strength could be determined by the amount of pleasure or displeasure apparent satisfaction of the desire would bring, or by the degree to which a state of affairs seems good, or by the degree to which one’s attention is drawn to the reasons to bring some state of affairs about, or by the amount of reward-based learning apparent satisfaction of the desire would cause, or by some average of all of these.
人们普遍认为，欲望来自一个强度的连续体：欲望可以更强或更弱。欲望的力量通常被说成是由欲望对行动的控制所具有的因果力量构成的：因为一种欲望比另一种欲望更强大，就是在（a）其他所有欲望都相等，以及（b）能动者相信每个欲望都可以通过不同的行动来满足的情况下，倾向于对它采取行动，而不是第二个欲望。 （c） 代理人认为这些愿望无法共同满足。这种描述欲望强度的方式显然最适合基于行动的欲望理论。但是对于每种欲望理论，都有相应的欲望强度理论可用。欲望的强度可以取决于欲望的明显满足会带来的快乐或不快乐的数量，或者取决于事态看起来好的程度，或者一个人的注意力被吸引到导致某种事态的原因的程度，或者取决于欲望的明显满足会带来的基于奖励的学习量。 或者按所有这些的平均值计算。

Most theorists have little more to say about desire strength than what appears above. An exception is found in the work of decision theorists: within decision theory, preference is given a formal characterization, and through this formal characterization, various results can be proven. A foundational result about desire strength is that, if a minimally rational person has set of pairwise preferences (for A over B, for C over D, and so on), these pairwise preferences can be used to determine the strengths of preferences. That is, from a large set of basic facts about what is preferred to what, facts about how much each thing must be preferred to the other can be derived (e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944).
大多数理论家对欲望强度的描述比上面出现的要说的要多。在决策理论家的工作中发现了一个例外：在决策理论中，偏好被赋予了正式的特征，通过这种正式的特征，可以证明各种结果。关于欲望强度的一个基本结果是，如果一个最低限度理性的人有一组成对偏好（A 超过 B，C 超过 D，依此类推），这些成对偏好可以用来确定偏好的强度。也就是说，从一大堆关于什么比什么更可取的基本事实中，可以得出关于每个事物必须比其他事物优先多少的事实（例如，von Neumann 和 Morgenstern 1944）。

One puzzle for most theories of desire strength is that desires seem to vary in their power to manifest the typical signs of strength even when it would seem that there is no variation in how much their ends are wanted. Think of a standard intrinsic desire: a desire for the welfare of a child. My disposition to act so as to benefit Cecilia might well be stronger when I am in a good mood than when I am feeling low, it might well be stronger when I am wide awake than when I am very sleepy, might well be stronger when the change in welfare will happen right now rather than in a month, and so on. These changes in disposition seem unlikely to mark changes in how much I desire Cecelia’s welfare, however. Rather, they would seem to mark changes in how effectively my desire is poised to influence my actions. Similarly, the idea of certain harms to Cecelia’s welfare will make me feel terrible (the idea of her being bitten by a dog, say) while others will make me feel less terrible (the idea of her getting chicken pox, say), even while my estimation of the harm to her welfare might make the two scenarios quite similar. Again, this would seem to indicate some idiosyncrasy in how effectively my desire is poised to influence my feelings, rather than indicating a difference in strength of desire (in this case, getting chicken pox seems like an expected ordeal of childhood, and that seems to blunt my felt response). And likewise for appearances of goodness and dispositions to pay attention.
大多数关于欲望力量的理论的一个谜题是，欲望似乎在表现力量的典型迹象的能力上有所不同，即使它们的目的想要多少似乎没有变化。想想一个标准的内在愿望：对孩子福利的渴望。当我心情好的时候，我为了塞西莉亚的利益而行动的倾向，可能比我情绪低落时更强烈，当我完全清醒时，它很可能比我非常困的时候更强烈，当福利的变化发生在现在而不是一个月后时，它可能会更强烈。 等等。然而，这些性格的变化似乎不太可能标志着我对塞西莉亚福利的期望发生了变化。相反，它们似乎标志着我的欲望如何有效地影响我的行为发生了变化。同样，对 Cecelia 的福利造成某些伤害的想法会让我感到很糟糕（比如她被狗咬的想法），而其他想法会让我感觉不那么可怕（比如她得水痘的想法），即使我对对她福利的伤害的估计可能会使这两种情况非常相似。同样，这似乎表明我的欲望如何有效地影响我的感受存在一些特质，而不是表明欲望强度的差异（在这种情况下，得水痘似乎是童年预期的折磨，这似乎削弱了我的感觉反应）。同样，善良的外表和性情也要注意。

An advantage shared by learning-based theories and holistic theories of desire is that they are, in a natural way, able to hold that the strength of a desire can be a constant even while the effect of the desire on action, feelings, or thoughts seems disproportionate to the desire’s strength. In the case of learning-based theories of desire, so long as there is a merely causal relation between the learning signal and the ordinary signs of desire strength, there is no contradiction in holding that a strong desire has effects like those of a weak desire, or vice versa. In the case of holistic theories, so long as desire strength is not reduced to strength of a single phenomenon, there is no contradiction in holding that a strong desire has one or a few effects like those of a weak desire, or vice versa. It is when theories reduce desires to a single observable core phenomenon that apparently meaningless fluctuations in that phenomenon pose a problem.
基于学习的理论和整体性的欲望理论的一个共同优势是，它们能够以一种自然的方式认为，即使欲望对行动、感觉或思想的影响似乎与欲望的强度不成比例，欲望的强度也可以是恒定的。在基于学习的欲望理论的情况下，只要学习信号和欲望强度的普通迹象之间仅仅存在因果关系，那么认为强烈的欲望具有类似于弱欲望的效果，反之亦然，这并不矛盾。在整体理论的情况下，只要欲望的强度不被简化为单一现象的强度，那么认为强烈的欲望具有一种或几种与弱欲望一样的效果，反之亦然，这并不矛盾。当理论将欲望简化为一个单一的可观察的核心现象时，该现象中显然毫无意义的波动就会造成问题。

2.4 Occurrent and Standing Desires 2.4 Occurrent 和 Standing Desires

If Nora desires tea, then her desire is likely to be manifest: Nora is likely to be aware of her desire, and her desire is likely to generate its characteristic effects so long as Nora continues to desire tea. On the other hand, if Ben desires a new pair of skates, then his desire is not likely to be manifest all the time. A new pair of skates is something Ben might well desire for two or three months before getting a new pair, and it is unlikely that his desire will be manifesting itself for that entire time. More likely, Ben’s desire will lie quietly “in the back of his mind” most of the time, and occasionally generate thoughts, feelings, and actions of the familiar sorts.
如果诺拉想喝茶，那么她的欲望很可能是显而易见的：诺拉很可能意识到她的欲望，只要诺拉继续想喝茶，她的欲望就有可能产生其特有的效果。另一方面，如果 Ben 想要一双新的溜冰鞋，那么他的愿望不太可能一直表现出来。一双新的溜冰鞋是 Ben 在买一双新鞋之前可能想要两三个月的东西，而且他的愿望不太可能在整个时间内表现出来。更有可能的是，本的愿望大部分时间都会静静地躺在“他的脑海中”，偶尔会产生熟悉的想法、感受和行为。

Standing desires are desires one has that are not playing any role in one’s psyche at the moment. Occurrent desires, on the other hand, are desires that are playing some role in one’s psyche at the moment. Notice here that occurrent desires need not be in control of one’s actions: my desire to laze in bed is occurrent even while I am getting up and making breakfast, for my desire is leading me to think longingly of bed, and is perhaps acting upon my mechanisms of action production in a way that would lead me back to bed if only I did not also desire to get some things done. Desires of which one is not aware, but which are current causes of one’s behavior, are also occurrent on this way of thinking about things: a desire for a new inkstand might cause one to move clumsily so as to destroy one’s current inkstand without affecting one’s thoughts or feelings, and if so it would be occurrent at the moment of clumsiness.
常设欲望是一个人目前在心灵中没有发挥任何作用的欲望。另一方面，当前欲望是目前在一个人的心理中发挥一定作用的欲望。请注意，潜在的欲望不需要控制一个人的行为：即使在我起床做早餐的时候，我懒洋洋地躺在床上的欲望也是不可控的，因为我的欲望使我渴望地想着床，也许它正在以一种方式作用于我的行动产生机制，如果我不也想完成一些事情，就会把我带回床上。一个人没有意识到的欲望，但这些欲望是一个人行为的当前原因，也是这种思考事物的方式的隐蔽性：对新墨台的渴望可能会导致一个人笨拙地移动，从而在不影响一个人的思想或感情的情况下摧毁他现在的墨台，如果是这样，那么在笨拙的时刻就是隐蔽的。

Some philosophers hold that only occurrent desires are real desires. So-called standing desires are really just dispositions to generate desires, on this way of thinking. One difficulty for this position is that standing desires seem to be good components of causal explanations of various mental processes. For instance: why does the new tin of tea on the counter of her boyfriend’s kitchen catch Nora’s attention? It might be that it caught her attention because she has a standing desire to know about the tea that is available to her, and the tin in her boyfriend’s kitchen is relevant to this desire. Why is Nora delighted to see the tin? Because she has a standing desire to try new kinds of tea, and she has just seen that the tin contains a new kind of tea. And so on. The ground of the disposition to generate occurrent desires can do for these sorts of explanations, but it is truer to ordinary thinking about the mind to say that this ground just is a desire—a standing desire—than to say that it is anything else.
一些哲学家认为，只有当前的欲望才是真正的欲望。在这种思维方式下，所谓的常设欲望实际上只是产生欲望的倾向。这种立场的一个难点是，站立的欲望似乎是各种心理过程的因果解释的良好组成部分。例如：为什么她男朋友厨房柜台上的新罐茶引起了 Nora 的注意？这可能是因为它引起了她的注意，因为她一直渴望了解她可以买到的茶，而她男朋友厨房里的罐子与这个愿望有关。为什么 Nora 很高兴看到这个罐子？因为她一直渴望尝试新种类的茶，而且她刚刚看到罐子里装着一种新的茶。等等。产生潜在欲望的倾向的基础可以解释这类解释，但对于关于心智的普通思考来说，说这个基础只是一种欲望——一种持续的欲望——比说它是其他任何东西要真实得多。

Some philosophers hold that all occurrent desires are elements of one’s conscious life. Just as I have a capacity to see red that is not exercised until seeing red is an element of my consciousness, so too I have a capacity to desire that my French be fluent, and this capacity is not exercised until desiring that my French be fluent is an element of my consciousness. Notice that the thesis is not just that desires are only sometimes objects of one’s conscious life. That is, the thesis is not merely that I am only sometimes conscious of my desires in the same way that I am only sometimes conscious of my toes. Rather, the thesis in question is that there is a qualitative character to desire, a qualitative character that can be an element, feature, or aspect of one’s consciousness. Any philosopher holding that desires are constituted by pleasures or seemings might well take this position (e.g., Oddie 2005; Stampe 1987; Strawson 1994). Against it the argument has been made that the direction of fit of desire is incompatible with the direction of fit of elements of consciousness, on the grounds that desires (roughly) say how things should be while consciousness (roughly) says how things are (Hulse, Read, and Schroeder 2004).
一些哲学家认为，所有当前欲望都是一个人有意识生活的要素。正如我有一种看到红色的能力，直到看到红色是我意识的一个元素时才被行使的，我也有能力希望我的法语流利，而这种能力只有在希望我的法语流利是我意识的一个元素之前才被行使。请注意，这个论点不仅仅是欲望有时只是一个人有意识生活的对象。也就是说，论点不仅仅是我只是偶尔意识到我的欲望，就像我只是偶尔意识到我的脚趾一样。相反，所讨论的论点是，欲望有一个定性特征，一个定性特征，它可以是一个人意识的一个元素、特征或方面。任何认为欲望是由快乐或表象构成的哲学家都很可能采取这种立场（例如，Oddie 2005;斯坦普 1987 年;Strawson 1994 年）。反对它的论点是，欲望的适应方向与意识元素的适应方向是不相容的，因为欲望（大致）说事物应该是什么样子，而意识（大致）说事物是怎样的（Hulse， Read， and Schroeder 2004）。

3. Controversies Surrounding Desire 3. 围绕欲望的争议

Because desires feature prominently in theories of mind, action, free will, and morality (and more!), desires are enmeshed in far too many controversies to enumerate them all here. Nonetheless, some controversies surrounding desires are worthy of special attention, either because they are controversies surrounding key features of desire (the first three that follow) or because they are controversies that illustrate the larger role of desires in philosophical theorizing, especially ethical theorizing (the second three).
因为欲望在思想、行动、自由意志和道德（以及更多）理论中占有突出地位，所以欲望卷入了太多的争议中，无法在这里一一列举。尽管如此，围绕欲望的一些争议值得特别关注，要么是因为它们是围绕欲望关键特征的争议（接下来的前三个），要么因为它们是说明欲望在哲学理论化中发挥更大作用的争议，尤其是伦理理论化（后三个）。

3.1 The Direction of Fit of Desires 3.1 欲望的契合方向

Since Anscombe, desires are said to have a “direction of fit,” and one that is the opposite to the “direction of fit” of beliefs. One modest way of putting the point is this: beliefs are like declarative sentences, which are satisfied (made true) by whether the world as it is conforms to them, but desires are like imperative sentences, which are satisfied (fulfilled) by changes in the world bringing the world into conformity with them. What exactly this analogy amounts to, literally, is controversial. Is it perhaps that one’s beliefs ought to conform to the world, whereas the world ought to conform to one’s desires (Gregory 2012)? Is it perhaps that the world tends to cause satisfied beliefs (true beliefs), while desires tend to cause there to be a desire-satisfying (desire-fulfilling) world? This is still an area in which it is difficult to know just how to evaluate the proposals on offer, and there is little sign of a consensus emerging in the foreseeable future (see, e.g., Anscombe 2000; Schueler 1991; Smith 1994; Zangwill 1998).
自安斯库姆以来，人们认为欲望有一个“适合的方向”，并且与信念的“适合方向”相反。一种谦虚的表达方式是这样的：信念就像陈述句，通过世界的本来面目是否符合它们来满足（成为现实），但欲望就像祈使句一样，通过世界的变化来满足（实现）世界的变化，使世界与它们保持一致。从字面上看，这个类比究竟是什么，是有争议的。是否也许一个人的信仰应该符合世界，而世界应该符合一个人的愿望（Gregory 2012）？也许世界倾向于导致满足的信念（真正的信念），而欲望倾向于导致存在一个满足欲望（满足欲望）的世界吗？在这个领域，仍然很难知道如何评估所提供的提案，而且在可预见的未来几乎没有迹象表明会达成共识（例如，参见 Anscombe 2000;舒勒 1991;史密斯 1994 年;Zangwill 1998 年）。

Another and related puzzle is over whether there might be states of mind with both desire-like and belief-like directions of fit. These states of mind, sometimes called ‘besires’, are said to be of particular interest to ethicists interested in the possibility of belief-like attitudes motivating action all on their own (see, e.g., Smith 1994 chapter 4; Zangwill 2008).
另一个相关的谜题是关于是否存在同时具有欲望类和信念类拟合方向的心理状态。这些心理状态，有时被称为“besires”，据说对类似信念的态度本身激励行动的可能性感兴趣的伦理学家特别感兴趣（参见，例如，Smith 1994 第 4 章;Zangwill 2008 年）。

3.2 The Origins of Desires 3.2 欲望的起源

There is relatively little mystery about the generation of instrumental and realizer desires. These desires are generated by (conscious or unconscious) reasoning processes, in which one reasons one’s way to the conclusion that if only it were the case that p that would make it more likely that q or would be a realization of q. If it so happens that one already intrinsically desires that q, then this reasoning process will automatically and unconsciously generate an instrumental or realizer desire that p, at least in rational beings. (The strength of the new desire, in a rational individual, and all else being equal, increases with the strength of the intrinsic desire that q and the apparent usefulness of bringing it about that p toward bringing it about that q.) Or at least, this picture is a relatively uncontroversial one among philosophers who treat instrumental and realizer desires as components in a causal network that might be investigated by science. Philosophers who approach the mind as a field for interpretation are more likely to hold a non-mechanistic version of this story according to which a person should be interpreted as instrumentally or realizationally desiring p when we already interpret her as intrinsically desiring q and we already interpret her as believing that p would make q more likely.
关于工具望和实现欲望的产生，相对来说没有什么神秘之处。这些欲望是由（有意识或无意识的）推理过程产生的，在这个过程中，一个人通过推理得出结论，如果 p 的情况会使 q 更有可能或 q 的实现。如果碰巧一个人已经本能地渴望那个 q，那么这个推理过程将自动地、无意识地产生一个工具性或实现者的愿望，即 p，至少在理性生物中是这样。（在一个理性的个体中，在其他条件相同的情况下，新欲望的强度会随着 q 的内在欲望的强度以及带来那个 p 对实现那个 q 的明显有用性而增加。或者至少，在哲学家中，这幅图画相对没有争议，他们将工具性和实现者的欲望视为可能因果网络的组成部分，可能会被科学研究。将心灵作为解释领域的哲学家更有可能对这个故事持有一个非机械论的版本，根据这个版本，当我们已经将一个人解释为本质上渴望 q 并且我们已经将她解释为相信 p 会使 q 更有可能时，她应该被解释为工具性或实现性地渴望 p。

The generation of intrinsic desires is a matter of much more controversy and interest. The psychological hedonist holds that there is only one intrinsic desire—for pleasure—and this desire is innate (e.g., Pollock 2006). Philosophers who believe that we have a rich collection of intrinsic desires, including desires for the welfare of those we love and the success of those sports teams we support, are left with more difficult questions, however. Perhaps some of our desires are innate (for pleasure, for gentle touches and hugs, for adequate nutrition and hydration…) but many of our intrinsic desires clearly are not. If Ben intrinsically desires success for the Columbus Blue Jackets, this is certainly not a result of the innate structure of his mind.
内在欲望的产生是一个更具争议和兴趣的问题。心理享乐主义者认为，只有一个内在的欲望——快乐——而且这种欲望是与生俱来的（例如，Pollock 2006）。然而，那些相信我们有丰富的内在愿望的哲学家，包括对我们所爱之人的福祉和我们支持的那些运动队的成功的渴望，留下了更困难的问题。也许我们的一些欲望是与生俱来的（为了快乐、为了温柔的抚摸和拥抱、为了充足的营养和水分…），但我们许多内在的欲望显然不是。如果 Ben 本质上渴望哥伦布蓝夹克队的成功，那肯定不是他与生俱来的思想结构的结果。

Some have proposed that it is possible to acquire new intrinsic desires by reasoning. According to Michael Smith, if one believes that, were one rational, one would desire that p, then this will tend to generate an intrinsic desire that p. Thus, if I believe that, were I rational, I would want to give money to the Third World, then this will tend to generate an intrinsic desire in me to give money to the Third World (Smith 1994). There is a difficulty here in evaluating Smith’s idea. It certainly seems as though thinking about what I would—were I only perfectly rational—want to do is the sort of thing that can generate a new desire in me. But it is less clear that the desire generated is intrinsic as opposed to a realizer desire (a realizer for the desire to do what is rational, or perhaps moral). Phenomenologically, it seems difficult to distinguish the two, and so it is not easy to evaluate Smith’s theory. These difficulties have not prevented philosophers from trying, however (e.g., Dreier 2000).
有些人提出，通过推理可以获得新的内在欲望。根据迈克尔·史密斯（Michael Smith）的说法，如果一个人相信，如果一个人是理性的，那么他会希望得到p，那么这将倾向于产生一个内在的愿望，即p。因此，如果我相信，如果我是理性的，我会想把钱捐给第三世界，那么这往往会在我心中产生一种内在的愿望，想把钱捐给第三世界（Smith 1994）。这里很难评估 Smith 的想法。当然，似乎思考我会做什么——如果我只是完全理性的话——想做什么，是那种可以在我心中产生新欲望的事情。但不太清楚的是，产生的欲望是内在的，而不是实现者的欲望（实现者做理性的事情，或者可能是道德的愿望）。从现象学上讲，似乎很难区分两者，因此评估史密斯的理论并不容易。然而，这些困难并没有阻止哲学家尝试（例如，Dreier 2000）。

An interesting consequence of Smith’s proposal is that it makes it rational to have certain intrinsic desires, and irrational to lack other intrinsic desires, depending on what one believes to be true. This is a departure from a view of desires stemming at least from David Hume, according to which beliefs have no business dictating what we should desire intrinsically. (At most, beliefs can dictate what we should desire as a means or realizer to what we desire intrinsically, according to this line of thought.) But it aligns Smith with those who take it to be part of the business of reasoning to set “final ends” (e.g., Richardson 1997).
斯密的提议的一个有趣结果是，拥有某些内在的欲望是理性的，而缺乏其他内在的欲望是非理性的，这取决于一个人认为什么是真实的。这与至少源于大卫·休谟的欲望观点背道而驰，根据这种观点，信仰与决定我们应该内在渴望什么无关。（根据这种思路，信念最多只能决定我们应该渴望什么，作为我们内在渴望的手段或实现者。但它使斯密与那些认为设定“最终目的”是推理业务的一部分的人保持一致（例如，Richardson 1997）。

Another proposal regarding the generation of intrinsic desires leaves rationality out of the picture entirely. According to this proposal, new intrinsic desires are acquired by associating new states of affairs with ones that already satisfy existing intrinsic desires, according to the principles of reward-based learning. So, if a young child intrinsically desires a dry bottom and a full stomach, and is aware that its mother’s presence tends to help with these things, then the young child will naturally desire its mother’s presence instrumentally. But whether the child is aware of the instrumental relationship or not, if the mother’s presence often presages the satisfaction of the child’s intrinsic desires for a dry bottom and full stomach, then the learning processes generated by desire satisfaction will also tend to cause the young child to acquire an intrinsic desire for the presence of its mother (Schroeder 2004).
另一个关于内在欲望产生的提议将理性完全排除在外。根据这一提议，根据基于奖励的学习原则，通过将新的事态与已经满足现有内在欲望的事态相关联，可以获得新的内在欲望。因此，如果一个年幼的孩子天生渴望干燥的臀部和饱腹，并且意识到母亲的存在往往会帮助这些事情，那么年幼的孩子自然会渴望母亲的存在。但是，无论孩子是否意识到这种工具性关系，如果母亲的存在往往预示着孩子对和饱腹的内在渴望的满足，那么由欲望满足产生的学习过程也往往会导致年幼的孩子获得对母亲存在的内在渴望（Schroeder 2004）。

3.3 Preferences and Desires 3.3 偏好和欲望

Talk of preference, rather than desire, tends to dominate the literature of decision theory. The decision theorist sees human beings as making choices between options, and these choices express preferences among the options. If the human being is rational, her preferences are consistent and allow one to determine the expected utility of any given choice for her. The expected utility of an action, in turn, is the pleasure (or relief from suffering) it can be expected to bring, according to one (mostly older) approach, or is the degree to which the agent would (ideally) be inclined to choose it, according to the other (more modern) approach to utility (see, e.g., Skyrms 1990 for a discussion).
谈论偏好，而不是欲望，往往在决策论的文献中占据主导地位。决策理论家认为人类在选项之间做出选择，而这些选择表达了选项之间的偏好。如果人类是理性的，她的偏好是一致的，并允许人们确定任何给定选择对她的预期效用。反过来，一个行动的预期效用是它可以预期带来的快乐（或从痛苦中解脱出来），根据另一种（更现代的）效用方法（参见 Skyrms 1990 的讨论），它可以预期带来快乐（或从痛苦中解脱出来），或者是主体（理想情况下）倾向于选择它的程度（例如，参见 Skyrms 1990 的讨论）。

If utility is treated as pleasure, then decision theory is compatible with any theory of desire that holds pleasure to be the only thing desired. If utility is treated as choice-worthiness, then decision theory is compatible with any theory of desire at all (except perhaps for theories that hold desires are beliefs in goodness, as discussed in section 1.3). So the focus on preferences does not, on its own, generate conflict between decision theory and theories of desire.
如果效用被视为快乐，那么决策理论与任何认为快乐是唯一渴望的东西的欲望理论是兼容的。如果效用被视为值得选择，那么决策理论与任何欲望理论完全兼容（也许除了认为欲望是对善的信念的理论，如第 1.3 节所讨论的那样）。因此，对偏好的关注本身不会在决策理论和欲望理论之间产生冲突。

Conflict can arise, however, when one asks whether desires or preferences are more fundamental; John Pollock has recently brought attention to this dispute (Pollock 2006). Decision theorists have tended to treat pairwise preferences as basic: the basic attitude is that of preferring A to B (e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). Most other theorists of desire have treated desires as basic: the basic attitude is that of desiring A. If desires are basic, and desires have strengths, then it is easy enough to determine preferences from them: if I desire that my father be healthy to a high degree, and I desire that I do my laundry to a low degree, then it follows that I prefer my father’s health to doing the laundry, all else being equal. But if preferences are basic, then deriving something like desires from them becomes an interesting task (discussed briefly above, in Section 2.3).
然而，当一个人问欲望或偏好是否更基本时，就会出现冲突;约翰·波洛克 （John Pollock） 最近引起了人们对这一争论的关注 （Pollock 2006）。决策理论家倾向于将成对偏好视为基本态度：基本态度是更喜欢 A 而不是 B（例如，von Neumann 和 Morgenstern 1944）。大多数其他欲望理论家将欲望视为基本态度：基本态度是渴望 A 的态度。如果欲望是基本的，而欲望有其优点，那么很容易从中确定偏好：如果我希望我父亲健康到高度，而我希望我洗衣服到一定程度，那么在其他条件相同的情况下，我更喜欢我父亲的健康而不是洗衣服。但是，如果偏好是基本的，那么从中得出类似欲望的东西就变成了一个有趣的任务（在上面的第 2.3 节中简要讨论过）。

The simplest reason to suppose that preferences are basic is that they are readily introspected and acted upon, whereas desires with specific strengths are not. I can tell that I prefer securing my father’s health to doing the laundry, and I know which I would choose if it came to a choice. But can I introspect the degree to which I prefer my father’s health over clean laundry? Perhaps not. And if I cannot, perhaps this is because I have introspective access to the most basic psychological facts only, and these are facts about simple pairwise preferences. As von Neumann and Morgenstern write, “every measurement—or rather every claim of measurability—must ultimately be based on some immediate sensation, which possibly cannot and certainly need not be analyzed any further. In the case of utility the immediate sensation of preference—of one object or aggregate of objects as against another—provides this basis” (1944, 16).
假设偏好是基本的最简单的理由是它们很容易被内省和采取行动，而具有特定优势的欲望则不是。我可以看出我更喜欢保护我父亲的健康而不是洗衣服，而且我知道如果可以选择，我会选择哪一个。但是，我能反省一下，我到多大程度上更看重我父亲的健康，而不是干净的衣服呢？也许不是。如果我不能，也许这是因为我只能内省地访问最基本的心理学事实，而这些是关于简单成对偏好的事实。正如冯·诺依曼和摩根斯坦所写的那样，“每一次测量——或者更确切地说，每一次可测量性的主张——最终都必须基于某种直接的感觉，而这可能不能也肯定不需要进一步分析。在实用性的情况下，对一个对象或对象集合体相对于另一个对象的直接偏好感提供了这一基础“（1944,16）。

One reason to suppose that preferences are not basic is that it appears, within standard decision theory, that a very large number of basic pairwise preferences are required in order to settle facts about how much one prefers A to B for arbitrary objects A and B. That is, the facts about degrees of desire can only be generated from more basic facts about pairwise preferences given a truly enormous number of basic facts about pairwise preferences. Pollock (2006) argues that the number of such facts is on the order of a billion billions at the very least, just to encode the same facts about desire and preference that could readily be generated from just three hundred basic facts about desires. From the assumption that the basic psychological facts must be physically realized in the brain, Pollock concludes that it is psychologically realistic to believe in basic desires, not basic pairwise preferences.
假设偏好不是基本偏好的一个原因是，在标准决策理论中，似乎需要大量的基本成对偏好才能解决关于任意对象 A 和 B 的偏好程度的事实。也就是说，考虑到关于成对偏好的真正大量基本事实，关于欲望程度的事实只能从关于成对偏好的更基本事实中得出。Pollock （2006） 认为，此类事实的数量至少约为 10 亿，只是为了编码关于欲望和偏好的相同事实，这些事实可以很容易地从关于 欲望的 300 个基本事实中得出。从基本心理事实必须在大脑中物理实现的假设出发，波洛克得出结论，相信基本欲望，而不是基本的成对偏好，在心理上是现实的。

Complicating matters is empirical research suggesting that our preferences are subject to such powerful contextual influences that it is better to talk about the construction of coherent preferences than about their derivation from underlying desires (see, e.g., the papers in Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006). For example, in a classic study, it was found that offering subjects a free choice between one of two bets (of almost identical expected value—around $4—but with different maximum payoffs and different maximum penalties) led to subjects revealing a preference for one of the two bets. Offering the same subjects a chance to bid on each bet revealed that subjects were often willing to pay more to play the other of the two bets, apparently showing that subjects preferred the other of the two bets when bidding but not when choosing freely (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971). Thus, something as minimal as the difference between choosing and bidding can shift preferences between two near-equivalent bets, or so it would seem, calling into question the very existence of a stable fact about preference independent of the way a choice is framed. If this is the best way to look at things, then perhaps it will turn out that a small number of preferences are basic, and that there just are no facts about the degree to which something is desired overall by a person.
使问题复杂化的是，实证研究表明，我们的偏好受到如此强大的环境影响，以至于最好谈论连贯偏好的构建，而不是它们来自潜在欲望的衍生（例如，参见 Lichtenstein 和 Slovic 2006 年的论文）。例如，在一项经典研究中，发现让受试者在两种投注中自由选择一种（预期价值几乎相同，约为 4 美元，但最高收益和最高罚款不同）会导致受试者表现出对两种投注之一的偏好。为相同的受试者提供对每个赌注出价的机会表明，受试者通常愿意支付更多费用来玩两个赌注中的另一个，这显然表明受试者在出价时更喜欢两个赌注中的另一个，但在自由选择时则不喜欢（Lichtenstein 和 Slovic 1971）。因此，像选择和叫牌之间的差异这样微小的事情可能会改变两个几乎相等的赌注之间的偏好，或者看起来是这样，这让人质疑是否存在独立于选择构建方式的关于偏好的稳定事实。如果这是看待事物的最佳方式，那么也许事实证明，少数偏好是基本的，而且根本没有关于一个人总体上想要某样东西的程度的事实。

3.4 Reasons and Desires 3.4 理由与欲望

Turning to meta-ethics, a vibrant debate exists over the relation of desires to reasons to act. According to one tradition, typically called ‘Humean’ or ‘Neo-Humean’, the existence of reasons to act depends on the existence of desires possessed by the agent who would act. Thus, my reason to drink hot chocolate depends on my desires, and likewise my reason to help a stranger depends on my desires, according to the Humean.
转向元伦理学，关于欲望与行动原因的关系存在着一场激烈的辩论。根据一种通常被称为“Humean”或“Neo-Humean”的传统，行动理由的存在取决于将要行动的主体所拥有的欲望的存在。因此，根据 Humean 的说法，我喝热巧克力的原因取决于我的愿望，同样，我帮助陌生人的原因也取决于我的愿望。

Some have taken Humeanism to claim that reasons are identical to the having of desires (so that my reason to drink hot chocolate is the fact that I desire to drink hot chocolate) while others have taken Humeanism to claim that reasons are (typically) non-desire states of affairs that are reasons in virtue of their relations to desires (so that my reason to drink hot chocolate is that it tastes a certain way, but that it tastes a certain way is only a reason to drink hot chocolate because I desire to experience such tastes). Though related, these two positions have substantially different implications, as Mark Schroeder has argued (Schroeder 2007).
有些人认为 Humeanism 声称理由与拥有欲望相同（因此我喝热巧克力的原因是我想喝热巧克力），而另一些人则认为 Humeanism 声称理由是（通常）非欲望的状态，这些状态是原因，因为它们与欲望的关系（所以我喝热巧克力的原因是它的味道有某种方式， 但它的味道有某种方式只是喝热巧克力的一个理由，因为我想体验这种味道）。正如 Mark Schroeder 所指出的那样，这两个立场虽然相关，但具有截然不同的含义（Schroeder 2007）。

Humeans have defended their position in several ways, but contemporary debate has focused in large part on an argument developed by Bernard Williams. Williams argues that only Humeanism can explain the relation between reasons and motivation: if one has a reason to act, then one can act for that reason, Williams holds. But this is only guaranteed if having a reason to act involves having a desire. Hence reasons to act depend on the existence of desires (Williams 1981). Taking a somewhat different approach, Mark Schroeder argues that, when properly formulated, Humeanism simply fits best with our range of intuitions about what reasons there are to act and the ways in which these reasons are or are not contingent on facts about our psychologies (Schroeder 2007).
Humeans 以多种方式捍卫了他们的立场，但当代辩论在很大程度上集中在伯纳德·威廉姆斯 （Bernard Williams） 提出的一个论点上。威廉姆斯认为，只有 Humeanism 才能解释原因和动机之间的关系：威廉姆斯认为，如果一个人有行动的理由，那么他就可以为这个原因行动。但这只有在有行动理由涉及有欲望的情况下才能得到保证。因此，行动的理由取决于欲望的存在（Williams 1981）。马克·施罗德 （Mark Schroeder） 采取了一种略有不同的方法，他认为，如果表述得当，幽默主义最符合我们的直觉范围，即行动的原因是什么，以及这些原因如何取决于或不取决于我们的心理学事实（Schroeder 2007）。

Attacks on the Humean position have often been motivated by moral considerations: one does not need to have any desires whatsoever (not desires properly so-called, at any rate) in order to have a reason to do what is moral, according to some anti-Humeans, and so this particular reason to act, at least, is not in any way dependent upon desires (e.g., Schueler 1995). A more fundamental attack has been launched by Christine Korsgaard, who argues that, if it is true that there is a reason to act on one’s desires, then this is a fundamental evaluative fact—and so there is no reason to be skeptical about parallel fundamental evaluative facts that entail there are reasons independent of one’s desires (Korsgaard 1997).
对休谟立场的攻击往往是出于道德考虑：根据一些反休谬论者的说法，一个人不需要有任何欲望（无论如何，不是恰当的所谓欲望）就可以有理由去做道德的事情，因此，这个特定的行动理由，至少，在任何方面都不依赖于欲望（例如， Schueler 1995 年）。克里斯蒂娜·科斯加德 （Christine Korsgaard） 发起了更根本的攻击，她认为，如果真的有理由按照自己的欲望行事，那么这是一个基本的评价性事实——因此没有理由对平行的基本评价性事实持怀疑态度，这些事实意味着存在独立于一个人的欲望的原因（Korsgaard 1997）。

3.5 Well-being and Desires 3.5 幸福与欲望

Within normative ethics there is some interest in the notion of a person’s happiness, welfare, or well-being, especially within consequentialist approaches to morality holding that a moral action is one that maximizes well-being. One approach to well-being holds that a person’s well-being stems from the satisfaction of her desires.
在规范伦理学中，人们对一个人的幸福、福利或福祉的概念有一些兴趣，尤其是在结果主义的道德方法中，认为道德行为是使幸福最大化的行为。一种幸福的方法认为，一个人的幸福源于对她欲望的满足。

A central feature of desire-based theories of well-being is that they take actual states of affairs to be what is important to a person’s well-being, rather than the person’s perceptions of actuality. Thus, if I desire that I win an Olympic gold medal, then I am only well off in this respect if I win the medal: if I get tricked into believing that I have won the medal when I have not, then my well-being has not been increased in the relevant respect. This might be an advantage for desire-based theories of well-being (mere trickery seems unlikely to increase my actual well-being) or it might be a disadvantage (what I do not know cannot hurt me, can it?). Discussion of this point is ongoing (e.g., Sumner 1996).
基于欲望的幸福理论的一个核心特征是，它们认为实际的事态对一个人的幸福很重要，而不是这个人对现实的看法。因此，如果我渴望赢得一枚奥运金牌，那么我只有在赢得奖牌的情况下才在这方面过得富裕：如果我被欺骗相信我已经赢得了奖牌，而我并没有得到，那么我的幸福感在相关方面并没有得到提高。这可能是基于欲望的幸福理论的一个优势（单纯的诡计似乎不太可能增加我的实际幸福感），也可能是一个劣势（我不知道的东西不会伤害我，不是吗？关于这一点的讨论正在进行中（例如，Sumner 1996）。

A challenge for desire-based theories of well-being is that we would seem to have some desires the satisfaction of which would not, ultimately, contribute to our well-being in any obvious sense. Desires stemming from ignorance, from neurosis, or the like might be of this sort. Brandt (1979) develops a well known response to these sorts of concerns, arguing that the desires the satisfaction of which would contribute to one’s well-being are those that would survive a process of “cognitive psychotherapy.”
基于欲望的幸福理论的一个挑战是，我们似乎有一些欲望，这些欲望的满足最终不会在任何明显意义上为我们的幸福做出贡献。源于无明、神经症或类似事物的欲望可能属于这种。Brandt （1979） 对这类担忧提出了一个众所周知的回应，他认为满足其有助于一个人幸福的欲望是在“认知心理治疗”过程中幸存下来的欲望。

Desire-based theories of well-being have been challenged both by those who find them insufficiently attentive to the individual’s state of mind, especially to the pleasure enjoyed by the individual (e.g., Feldman 2004), and by those who find them excessively attentive to the individual’s state of mind, to the exclusion of what is essential to human flourishing (e.g., Nussbaum 2000, chapter 1).
基于欲望的幸福理论受到了挑战，既有人认为它们对个人的心理状态不够关注，特别是对个人所享受的快乐（例如，Feldman 2004），也受到那些认为它们过度关注个人心理状态的人，排斥了对人类繁荣至关重要的东西（例如， Nussbaum 2000，第 1 章）。

3.6 Praiseworthiness and Desires 3.6 值得称赞和欲望

Within moral psychology, desire features prominently in a debate over the conditions for moral praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.
在道德心理学中，欲望在关于道德值得赞美和值得责备的条件的辩论中占据突出地位。

According to a familiar Kantian doctrine, a person is only praiseworthy for doing the right thing if the person acts only from the motive of duty, and not from an “inclination” (a desire) to do the right thing (Kant 1964). Thus, if the right thing to do is to support microlending in Africa, and I do so, then I am praiseworthy only if I have acted out of my intellectual grasp of the fact that supporting microlending is my duty. If have acted out of a desire to feel good about myself, or even a desire to be kind or to work for justice, then I am not praiseworthy for doing the right thing. The thesis has also been defended by contemporary Kantians (e.g., Herman 1993, chapter 1).
根据一个熟悉的康德学说，一个人只有在做正确的事时，如果这个人只是出于责任的动机，而不是出于做正确事情的 “倾向”（一种愿望），那么他才值得称赞（康德 1964）。因此，如果正确的做法是支持非洲的小额贷款，而且我这样做了，那么只有当我出于对支持小额贷款是我的职责这一事实的理性理解而采取行动时，我才值得称赞。如果出于自我感觉良好的愿望，甚至是出于善良或为正义工作的愿望，那么我做正确的事情就不值得称赞。该论点也得到了当代康德主义者的捍卫（例如，Herman 1993，第 1 章）。

Opposing the familiar Kantian doctrine is work by Nomy Arpaly, who argues that praiseworthiness in fact requires acting on certain desires—namely, desires for what is in fact good (Arpaly 2002; see also Arpaly and Schroeder 2014). In Arpaly’s view, acting rightly from a sense of duty is compatible with acting rightly in a way that is not praiseworthy at all, if one’s view of duty is sufficiently mistaken that one ends up doing the right thing only by accident. Thus, if the right thing to do is to support microlending in Africa, and I do so, then I am praiseworthy according to Arpaly only if I have acted out of a desire to be kind (if that is the content of morality) or a desire to do what is just (if that is the content of morality).
反对熟悉的康德学说的是诺米·阿尔帕利 （Nomy Arpaly） 的工作，他认为值得称赞实际上需要根据某些欲望采取行动——即对实际上是善的事物的欲望（Arpaly 2002;另见 Arpaly 和 Schroeder 2014）。在 Arpaly 看来，如果一个人对责任的看法足够错误，以至于他最终只是偶然地做了正确的事情，那么从责任感出发的正确行为与以根本不值得称赞的方式正确行事是相容的。因此，如果正确的做法是支持非洲的小额贷款，而且我这样做了，那么根据 Arpaly 的说法，只有当我出于善良的愿望（如果这是道德的内容）或做正义的愿望（如果这是道德的内容）而行事时，我才值得称赞。

Between the contrasting views of Kant and Arpaly are the views of a number of virtue ethicists, Aristotle (perhaps) among them, who hold that a desire to do what is right and knowledge of the right are both required for an otherwise appropriate act to be praiseworthy (e.g., Aristotle 1999, Hursthouse 1999).
在康德和阿尔帕利的截然相反的观点之间，是许多美德伦理学家的观点，亚里士多德（也许）就是其中之一，他们认为做正确的事的愿望和对权利的了解都是值得称赞的必要条件（例如，亚里士多德 1999 年，赫斯特豪斯 1999 年）。

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via:

• Desire (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/desire/