信仰与理性：信仰的认识论

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Faith

信仰

First published Wed Jun 23, 2010; substantive revision Sat Dec 9, 2023

Questions about faith have inspired centuries of philosophical and theological reflection, particularly, though by no means exclusively, as faith is understood within the Christian branch of the Abrahamic religions. What is faith? What makes faith reasonable or unreasonable, valuable or disvaluable, morally permissible or impermissible, virtuous or vicious? How does faith relate to psychological states such as belief, desire, trust, and hope? How does faith relate to action? To what extent is faith under our voluntary control? Because answers to these further questions depend on what faith is, as well as on assumptions about relevant evaluative norms and the philosophical psychology and theory of action applicable to faith, this entry focuses on the nature of faith, while also touching upon implications of various models of faith for assessments of its reasonableness and value.
关于信仰的问题激发了几个世纪的哲学和神学反思，特别是，尽管绝不仅限于信仰，因为信仰是在亚伯拉罕宗教的基督教分支中被理解的。什么是信仰？是什么使信仰合理或不合理，有价值或无价值，道德上允许或不允许，美德或恶毒？信仰与信仰、欲望、信任和希望等心理状态有何关系？信心与行动有什么关系？信仰在多大程度上处于我们的自愿控制之下？因为这些进一步问题的答案取决于信仰是什么，以及关于相关评价规范的假设和适用于信仰的哲学心理学和行动理论，所以本条目侧重于信仰的本质，同时也触及了各种信仰模式对评估其合理性和价值的影响。

‘Faith’ is a broad term, appearing in locutions that point to a range of different phenomena. We speak of ‘having faith that you will succeed, despite setbacks,’ ‘having faith in democracy,’ ‘putting faith in God,’ ‘believing that God exists by faith,’ ‘being a person of faith,’ ‘professing and keeping the faith (or losing it),’ ‘keeping (or failing to keep) faith with someone,’ and so on. At its most general, ‘faith’ means much the same as ‘trust.’ Uses of ‘faith’ and ‘faithfulness’ closely parallel ‘trust’ and ‘trustworthiness,’ and these are often used interchangeably. Yet one of the striking and intriguing facts about theorizing in this area (the study of faith, faithfulness, and related phenomena) is that people have offered radically different accounts of what faith is—to such an extent that there remains disagreement even about the basic ontological category to which faith belongs. Is it a psychological state, and if so, is it cognitive, affective/evaluative, or perhaps some combination of both? Is it an act or disposition to act—or is there at least some sort of connection to action essential to faith, and if so, to what sorts of acts?
“信仰” 是一个广义的术语，出现在指向一系列不同现象的语言中。我们谈到 “有信心，尽管遇到挫折，你会成功”，“对民主有信心”，“相信上帝”，“相信上帝因信而存在”，“成为一个有信仰的人”，“承认并保持信仰（或失去信仰）”，“保持（或未能保持）对某人的信仰”，等等。在最一般的情况下，“信心” 的含义与 “信任” 大致相同。“信心” 和 “信实” 的用法与 “信任” 和 “可信度” 密切相关，它们经常互换使用。然而，在这个领域（对信仰、忠诚和相关现象的研究）的理论化，一个引人注目和有趣的事实是，人们对信仰是什么提供了截然不同的描述 —— 以至于甚至在信仰所属的基本本体论范畴上仍然存在分歧。它是一种心理状态，如果是这样，它是认知的、情感的 / 评估的，还是两者的结合？它是一种行为或行动的倾向 —— 或者至少与信仰所必需的行动有某种联系，如果是这样，与什么样的行为有关？

This entry will focus on religious faith as paradigmatic—or, rather, it will focus on the kind of faith exemplified in theistic faith (i.e., faith in God, faith that God exists, and commitment to a theistic interpretation of reality), while leaving open whether faith of that same general kind also belongs to other, non-theistic, religious contexts, or to contexts not usually thought of as religious at all. The question of faith outside of a theistic context, such as whether it is apt to speak of the faith of a humanist, or even an atheist, using the same general sense of ‘faith’ as applies to the theist case, is taken up in the final Section (11).
这个条目将重点关注作为范式的宗教信仰 —— 或者更确切地说，它将关注有神论信仰所体现的那种信仰（即，对上帝的信仰，对上帝存在的信仰，以及对现实的有神论解释的承诺），同时对同样普遍的信仰是否也属于其他非有神论的宗教背景留有待观察。 或者到通常根本不被认为是宗教的语境。在有神论背景之外的信仰问题，例如是否适合使用适用于有神论情况的相同的一般 “信仰” 来谈论人文主义者甚至无神论者的信仰，在最后一节（11）中进行了讨论。

Philosophical reflection on theistic religious faith has produced markedly different accounts or models of its nature. This entry organizes discussion of accounts or models of faith around key components that feature in such accounts—with varying emphases, and with varying views about how these components relate to one another. These components are the cognitive, the affective, the evaluative, and the practical (volitional, actional and behavioural). Models of faith may also be usefully categorized according to further principles, including
对有神论宗教信仰的哲学反思对其本质产生了明显不同的描述或模型。本条目围绕这些记载中的关键组成部分组织了对记载或信仰模式的讨论 —— 具有不同的侧重点，以及关于这些组成部分如何相互关联的不同观点。这些组成部分是认知的、情感的、评估的和实践的（意志的、行动的和行为的）。信仰的模式也可以根据其他原则进行有益的分类，包括

• how the model relates faith as a state to the actional components associated with faith;
  该模型如何将信仰作为一种状态与与信仰相关的行动组成部分联系起来；
• whether the model takes the object of faith to be exclusively propositional (e.g., faith that such and such) or not (e.g., faith in persons or ideals);
  该模型是否将信仰的对象完全视为命题（例如，对某某的信仰）或否（例如，对人或理想的信仰）；
• the type of epistemology with which the model is associated—whether it is broadly ‘internalist’ or ‘externalist’, ‘evidentialist’ or ‘fideist’;
  与该模型相关的认识论类型 —— 无论它是广义的 “内在主义” 还是 “外在主义”，“证据主义” 还是 “信仰主义”；
• whether the model is necessarily restricted to theistic religious faith, or may extend beyond it.
  该模型是否必然局限于有神论的宗教信仰，或者可能超出有神论的宗教信仰。

The entry proceeds dialectically, with later sections presupposing the earlier discussion.
本文辩证地展开，后面的小节以前面的讨论为前提。

1. Models of faith and their key components

信仰的模式及其关键组成部分

While philosophical reflection on faith of the kind exemplified in religious contexts might ideally hope to yield an agreed definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions that articulate the nature of faith, the present discussion proceeds by identifying key components that recur in different accounts of religious faith. It also aims to identify a focal range of issues on which different stances are taken by different accounts. There is a plurality of existing philosophical understandings or models of faith of the religious kind. This discussion therefore aims to set out dialectically an organisation of this plurality, while also giving indications of the reasons there may be for preferring particular models over others. Since ‘religion’ itself may well be a ‘family resemblance’ universal, essentialism about faith of the religious kind might be misplaced. Nevertheless, the concept of faith as found in the Abrahamic, theist, religious traditions is widely regarded as unified enough for an inquiry into its nature to make sense, even if a successful real definition is too much to expect (this kind of faith might conceivably be a conceptual primitive, for example).
虽然在理想情况下，对宗教背景下所举例的那种信仰的哲学反思可能希望在必要和充分的条件方面产生一个商定的定义，以阐明信仰的本质，但目前的讨论是通过确定在对宗教信仰的不同叙述中反复出现的关键组成部分来进行的。它还旨在确定一系列重点问题，不同方面对这些问题采取不同的立场。存在着多种现存的哲学理解或宗教信仰模式。因此，本讨论旨在辩证地阐述这种多元性的组织，同时也指出了偏爱特定模式而不是其他模式的原因。由于 “宗教” 本身很可能是一种 “家庭相似性” 的普遍性，因此关于宗教信仰的本质主义可能是错误的。然而，在亚伯拉罕、有神论、宗教传统中发现的信仰概念被广泛认为是足够统一的，以至于对其本质的探究才有意义，即使一个成功的真实定义太过期望（例如，这种信仰可能是一个概念上的原始概念）。

Note that some philosophers approach the target of religious faith by first classifying and analysing ordinary language uses of the term ‘faith’ and locutions in which that term occurs. See, for recent examples, Audi 2011 (Chapter 3, Section I), who identifies seven different kinds of faith, and Howard-Snyder (2013b), who attempts a general analysis of ‘propositional’ faith—i.e., faith that p is true, where p is a relevant proposition. The present discussion, however, deals directly with the target notion of the kind of faith exemplified in religious faith, assuming the background of a working grasp of the notion as deployed in religious forms of life, and specifically in those belonging to the theist traditions. Insights from the analysis of faith understood more broadly may, nevertheless, be important in constructing models of faith of the religious kind, as will emerge below in the discussion of religious faith as a kind of trust (Section 6).
请注意，一些哲学家通过首先对 “信仰” 一词的普通语言使用以及出现该术语的语言进行分类和分析来接近宗教信仰的目标。关于最近的例子，参见 Audi 2011（第 3 章，第一节），他确定了七种不同的信仰，以及 Howard-Snyder（2013b），他试图对 “命题” 信仰进行一般分析，即相信 p 是真实的，其中 p 是一个相关的命题。然而，目前的讨论直接涉及在宗教信仰中体现的那种信仰的目标概念，其假设的背景是对这一概念的工作理解，如在宗教生活形式中，特别是在那些属于有神论传统的生活中。然而，从更广泛地理解的信仰分析中得出的见解对于构建宗教信仰的模型可能很重要，正如下面将讨论宗教信仰作为一种信任一样（第 6 节）。

The notion of religious faith as the possession of a whole people is familiar, and arguably theologically primary in the theist traditions. Philosophical accounts of theistic faith typically focus, however, on what it is for an individual person to ‘have faith’ or be ‘a person of faith’. An initial broad distinction is between thinking of faith just as a person’s state when that person ‘has faith’, and thinking of it as also involving a person’s act, action or activity. Faith may be a state one is in, or comes to be in; it may also essentially involve something one does. An adequate account of faith, perhaps, needs to encompass both. In the Christian context, faith is understood both as a gift of God and also as requiring a human response of assent and trust, so that their faith is something with respect to which people are both receptive and active.
宗教信仰是整个民族的财产这一概念是熟悉的，而且可以说在有神论传统中在神学上是主要的。然而，对有神论信仰的哲学描述通常集中在个人 “有信仰” 或成为 “有信仰的人” 是什么。最初的广泛区别是，当一个人 “有信仰” 时，将信仰视为一个人的状态，而认为信仰也涉及一个人的行为、行动或活动。信仰可能是一个人处于或即将处于的状态；它本质上也可能涉及一个人所做的事情。也许，对信仰的充分描述需要包括两者。在基督教的语境中，信仰既被理解为上帝的礼物，也被理解为需要人类的同意和信任的回应，因此他们的信仰是人们既接受又积极的东西。

There is, however, some tension in understanding faith both as a gift to be received and as essentially involving a venture to be willed and enacted. A philosophical account of faith may be expected to illuminate this apparent paradox. One principle for classifying models of faith is according to the extent to which they recognise an active component in faith itself, and the way they identify that active component and its relation to faith’s other components. It is helpful to consider the components of faith (variously recognised and emphasised in different models of faith) as falling into three broad categories: the affective, the cognitive and the practical. There are also evaluative components in faith—these may appear as implicated in the affective and/or the cognitive components, according to one’s preferred meta-theory of value.
然而，在理解信仰时，既将其视为一种需要接受的礼物，又将其本质上涉及一种需要遗嘱和实施的冒险，存在着一些紧张。对信仰的哲学描述可能会阐明这个明显的悖论。对信仰模型进行分类的一个原则是，根据他们在多大程度上认识到信仰本身的一个活跃的组成部分，以及他们识别这个活跃的组成部分及其与信仰其他组成部分的关系的方式。将信仰的组成部分（在不同的信仰模式中得到不同的认识和强调）分为三大类是有帮助的：情感的、认知的和实践的。信仰中也有评价成分 —— 根据一个人偏爱的元价值理论，这些成分可能表现为与情感和 / 或认知成分有关。

2. The affective component of faith

信仰的情感成分

One component of faith is a certain kind of affective psychological state—namely, having a feeling of assurance or trust. Some philosophers hold that faith is to be identified simply with such a state: see, for example, Clegg (1979, 229) who suggests that this may have been Wittgenstein’s understanding. Faith in this sense—as one’s overall ‘default’ affective attitude on life—provides a valuable foundation for flourishing: its loss is recognised as the psychic calamity of ‘losing one’s faith’. But if foundational existential assurance is to feature in a model of faith of the kind exemplified by theists, more needs to be added about the kind of assurance involved. The assurance of theistic faith is essentially a kind of confidence: it is essentially faith in God. In general, faith of the kind exemplified by theistic faith must have some intentional object. It may thus be argued that an adequate model of this kind of faith cannot reduce to something purely affective: some broadly cognitive component is also required. (For an account that takes faith to be fundamentally affective, while allowing that it might also involve cognitive aspects, see Kvanvig 2013.)
信心的一个组成部分是某种情感心理状态 —— 即，有一种确信或信任的感觉。一些哲学家认为，信仰应该简单地与这种状态相等同：例如，参见克莱格（Clegg，1979,229），他认为这可能是维特根斯坦的理解。从这个意义上说，信仰 —— 作为一个人对生活的整体 “默认” 情感态度 —— 为繁荣提供了一个宝贵的基础：它的丧失被认为是 “失去信仰” 的心理灾难。但是，如果基本的存在主义保证要出现在有神论者所举例的那种信仰模式中，那么就需要增加更多关于所涉及的保证类型。有神论信仰的保证，本质上是一种信心：它本质上是对神的信仰。一般来说，以有神论信仰为代表的那种信仰必须有某种有意为之的对象。因此，可以说，这种信仰的适当模型不能简化为纯粹的情感：还需要一些广泛的认知成分。（对于一个认为信仰从根本上是情感的，同时允许它也可能涉及认知方面的叙述，请参阅 Kvanvig 2013。）

3. Faith as knowledge

信仰即知识

What kind of cognitive component belongs to faith, then? One possibility is that it is a kind of knowledge, but there is then a question about the kind of knowledge that it is: e.g., is it knowledge ‘by acquaintance,’ or ‘propositional’ knowledge ‘by description,’ or both? One type of model of faith as knowledge identifies faith as propositional knowledge of specific truths, revealed by God. A model of this type has received prominent recent defence in the work of Alvin Plantinga, who proposes an account which he regards as following in the tradition of the reformers, principally John Calvin (see Plantinga 2000, 168–86). Calvin defines faith thus: ‘a firm and certain knowledge of God’s benevolence towards us, founded upon the truth of the freely given promise in Christ, both revealed to our minds and sealed upon our hearts through the Holy Spirit’ (John Calvin, Institutes III, ii, 7, 551, quoted by Plantinga (2000, 244)).
那么，什么样的认知成分属于信仰呢？一种可能性是，它是一种知识，但随之而来的是关于它是一种知识的问题：例如，它是 “熟人” 的知识，还是 “描述” 的 “命题” 知识，还是两者兼而有之？一种将信仰视为知识的模式将信仰确定为上帝所揭示的特定真理的命题知识。这种类型的模式最近在阿尔文・普兰廷加（Alvin Plantinga）的著作中得到了突出的辩护，他提出了一个他认为遵循改革者（主要是约翰・加尔文）传统的解释（见 Plantinga 2000,168-86）。加尔文这样定义信仰：“对上帝对我们的仁慈的坚定和确定的知识，建立在基督里白白给予的应许的真理之上，既向我们的思想揭示，又通过圣灵印在我们的心中”（约翰・加尔文，研究所 III，ii，7,551，引自 Plantinga（2000,244））。

Appeal to a special cognitive faculty

诉诸特殊的认知能力

‘Reformed’ epistemologists have appealed to an externalist epistemology in order to maintain that theistic belief may be justified even though its truth is no more than basically evident to the believer—that is, its truth is not rationally inferable from other, more basic, beliefs, but is found to be immediately evident in the believer’s experience (see Plantinga and Wolterstorff 1983, Alston 1991, Plantinga 2000). On Plantinga’s version, (basic) theistic beliefs count as knowledge because they are produced by the operation of a special cognitive faculty whose functional design fits it for the purpose of generating true beliefs about God. Plantinga calls this the sensus divinitatis, using a term of Calvin’s. (For discussion of the extent to which Plantinga’s use of this term conforms to Calvin’s own usage see Jeffreys 1997 and Helm 1998.) This quasi-perceptual faculty meets functional criteria as a mechanism that, when functioning in the right conditions, confers ‘warrant’ (where warrant is whatever must be added to true belief to yield knowledge) and, granted theism’s truth, it probably yields ‘basic’ knowledge because God designs it just for that purpose. In defence of specifically Christian belief, Plantinga argues that the same warrant-conferring status belongs to the operation of the Holy Spirit in making the great truths of the Gospel directly known to the believer.
“改革宗” 认识论者诉诸于外在主义认识论，以坚持认为有神论信仰可能是合理的，即使其真理对信徒来说只不过是基本显而易见的 —— 也就是说，它的真理不是从其他更基本的信仰中理性推断出来的，而是在信徒的经验中被发现立即显现出来的（见 Plantinga 和 Wolterstorff 1983，Alston 1991，Plantinga 2000）。在普兰廷加的版本中，（基本）有神论信仰算作知识，因为它们是由一种特殊的认知能力的运作产生的，这种认知能力的功能设计适合它，目的是产生关于上帝的真正信仰。普兰廷加称其为 “神感”（sensus divinitatis），使用了加尔文（Calvin）的术语。（关于 Plantinga 对这个术语的使用在多大程度上符合 Calvin 自己的用法的讨论，参见 Jeffreys 1997 和 Helm 1998。）这种准知觉能力作为一种机制满足了功能标准，当在适当的条件下运作时，它赋予了 “保证”（在这种情况下，保证是必须添加到真正信仰中以产生知识的任何东西），并且，鉴于有神论的真理，它可能产生 “基本” 知识，因为上帝就是为了这个目的而设计的。在为基督教信仰辩护时，普兰廷加认为，同样的授权地位属于圣灵在使信徒直接了解福音的伟大真理方面的运作。

The welcome certainty of faith

信仰的确定性是受欢迎的

This appeal to a God-given ‘higher’ cognitive faculty is found (in the early 12th Century) in al-Ghazâlî’s Deliverance from Error, where it provides the key to the ‘Sufi’ resolution of his religious crisis and his sceptical doubts about the deliverances of sense perception and unassisted human reason. Faith is thus understood as a kind of basic knowledge attended by a certainty that excludes doubt. But faith will not be exclusively cognitive, if, as in Calvin’s definition, faith-knowledge is not only ‘revealed to our minds’ but also ‘sealed upon our hearts’. For, on this model, faith will also have an affective/evaluative component that includes a welcoming of the knowledge received.
这种对上帝赋予的 “更高” 认知能力的诉求（在 12 世纪初）在加扎利的《从错误中解脱出来》中得到了体现，它为 “苏菲派” 解决他的宗教危机和他对感官知觉和无辅助人类理性的解脱持怀疑提供了关键。因此，信仰被理解为一种基本知识，伴随着一种排除怀疑的确定性。但是，如果像加尔文的定义那样，信仰 - 知识不仅 “向我们的思想揭示”，而且 “印在我们的心中”，那么信心就不完全是认知性的。因为，在这个模型中，信仰也将有一个情感 / 评估的组成部分，包括对所接受的知识的欢迎。

Practical aspects of faith on this model

实践方面的信仰模型

This model of faith as a kind of knowledge, certain and welcome, exhibits faith as essentially something to be received, something delivered by the proper functioning of a special cognitive faculty. Nevertheless, the model may admit a practical component, since an active response is required for reception of the divine gift. Such a practical component is implied by the real possibility that faith may be resisted: indeed, Christians may hold that in our sinful state we will inevitably offer a resistance to faith that may be overcome only by God’s grace. It is, however, a further step for persons of faith to put their revealed knowledge into practice by trusting their lives to God and seeking to obey his will. On this ‘special knowledge’ model of faith, however, this activity counts as ‘acting out’ one’s faith rather than as a part of faith itself. Persons of faith thus act ‘in’, ‘through’ or ‘by’ faith: but, on this model, their faith itself is the welcomed revealed knowledge on which they act.
这种信仰模式作为一种知识，确定的和受欢迎的，将信仰本质上展示为一种需要接受的东西，一种通过特殊认知能力的正常运作而提供的东西。然而，该模型可能会承认一个实际的组成部分，因为接受神圣的礼物需要积极的回应。这种实际的成分被信仰可能受到抵制的真实可能性所暗示：事实上，基督徒可能认为，在我们罪恶的状态下，我们将不可避免地对信仰进行抵抗，而这种抵抗只有靠上帝的恩典才能克服。然而，对于有信仰的人来说，通过将他们的生命托付给上帝并寻求顺服他的旨意，将他们所启示的知识付诸实践是进一步的一步。然而，在这种 “特殊知识” 的信仰模式中，这种活动被视为 “表演” 一个人的信仰，而不是信仰本身的一部分。因此，有信仰的人是 “在”、“通过” 或 “通过” 信仰行事的：但是，在这个模式中，他们的信仰本身就是他们所受到欢迎的启示知识，他们作为这些知识行事。

4. Faith and reason: the epistemology of faith

信仰与理性：信仰的认识论

Models of faith as knowledge may be thought lacking because they admit no actional component in faith itself. Faith seems essentially to involve some kind of active venture in commitment and trust, even if talk of a ‘leap of faith’ may not be wholly apt. Many have held that faith ventures beyond what is ordinarily known or justifiably held true, in the sense that faith involves accepting what cannot be established as true through the proper exercise of our naturally endowed human cognitive faculties. As Kant famously reports, in the Preface to the Second Edition of his Critique of Pure Reason: ‘I have … found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith’ (Kant 1787 [1933, 29]). Theist philosophers do, however, typically defend the claim that faith is not ‘contrary to reason’. On models of faith that take a cognitive component as central, and construe faith’s object as propositional, reasonable faith therefore seems subject to a general evidentialist principle—‘a wise man … proportions his belief to the evidence’, as Hume puts it (Hume 1748 [2007], “Of Miracles”, 80). And W. K. Clifford elevates evidentialism to the status of an absolute moral requirement, affirming that ‘it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence’ (Clifford 1877 [1999, 77]. Faith’s venturesomeness may thus seem in tension with its reasonableness, and models of faith differ in the way they negotiate this tension in response to evidentialist challenges. Another way to classify models of faith, then, is in terms of their associated epistemology—and, in particular, whether and according to what norms of ‘evidential support’, they accept that faith’s cognitive component needs to meet a requirement to be grounded on available evidence.
作为知识的信仰模式可能被认为是缺乏的，因为它们不承认信仰本身的行动成分。信仰似乎本质上涉及某种在承诺和信任方面的积极冒险，即使谈论 “信仰的飞跃” 可能并不完全恰当。许多人认为，信仰超越了通常已知或有理由认为是真实的，从某种意义上说，信仰涉及接受无法通过适当运用我们自然赋予的人类认知能力来确定为真实的东西。正如康德在他的《纯粹理性批判》第二版的序言中所说的那样：“我有… 发现有必要否认知识，以便为信仰腾出空间 “（康德 1787 [1933，29]）。然而，有神论哲学家通常为信仰并非 “与理性相悖” 的说法辩护。在以认知成分为中心，并将信仰的对象解释为命题的信仰模型中，理性信仰因此似乎受制于普遍的证据主义原则 ——“一个智者… 正如休谟所说，将他的信念与证据相称 “（Hume 1748 [2007]，” 奇迹 “，80）。W.K. 克利福德（W. K. Clifford）将证据主义提升到绝对道德要求的地位，肯定 “无论何时何地，任何人在证据不足的情况下相信任何事情都是错误的”（Clifford 1877 [1999，77]。因此，信仰的冒险似乎与其合理性之间存在冲突，而信仰的模式在应对证据主义挑战时处理这种紧张关系的方式也有所不同。因此，对信仰模型进行分类的另一种方法是根据其相关的认识论，特别是，他们是否以及根据 “证据支持” 的规范，接受信仰的认知成分需要满足基于现有证据的要求。

The Reformed epistemologist model of faith as ‘basic’ knowledge (outlined in Section 3) generates an epistemology under which, although ordinary cognitive faculties and sources of evidence do not yield firm and certain inferred knowledge of theistic truths, there is (if Christian theism is true) a ‘higher’ cognitive faculty that neatly makes up the deficit. This model seems thus to secure the rationality of faith: if faith consists in beliefs that have the status of knowledge, faith can hardly fail to be rational. And, once the deliverances of the special cognitive faculty are included amongst the believer’s basic experiential evidence, an evidential requirement on reasonable belief seems to be met. (Note that Plantinga originally expressed his defence of ‘properly basic’ theistic belief in terms of the rationality of believing in God ‘without any evidence or argument at all’ (Plantinga 1983, 17). He does respect an evidential requirement, however, holding that it may be fully met through what is basically, non-inferentially, evident in the believer’s experience. Hence Plantinga’s insistence that his Reformed epistemology is not fideistic (Plantinga 2000, 263).)
改革宗认识论者将信仰视为 “基本” 知识的模型（在第 3 节中概述）产生了一种认识论，在这种认识论下，尽管普通的认知能力和证据来源并不能产生关于有神论真理的坚实和确定的推断知识，但（如果基督教有神论是正确的）存在着一种 “更高” 的认知能力，巧妙地弥补了这一缺陷。因此，这种模式似乎确保了信仰的理性：如果信仰在于具有知识地位的信仰，那么信仰就很难不具有理性。而且，一旦特殊认知能力的拯救被包含在信徒的基本经验证据中，关于合理信仰的证据要求似乎就得到了满足。（请注意，普兰廷加最初表达了他对 “适当基本” 有神论信仰的辩护，即 “没有任何证据或论据” 相信上帝的合理性（Plantinga 1983,17）。然而，他确实尊重了证据要求，认为可以通过信徒的经验中基本上、非推断性地显而易见的东西来完全满足这一要求。因此，普兰廷加坚持认为他的改革宗认识论不是信仰主义的（普兰廷加 2000，263）。）

Reflective faith and the question of entitlement

反思性信仰和权利问题

It is not clear, however, whether Reformed epistemology’s model of faith can achieve all that is needed to show that theist faith is reasonable. From the perspective of reflective persons of faith (or would-be faith), the question of entitlement arises: are they rationally, epistemically—even, morally—entitled to adopt or continue in their faith? This question will be existentially important, since faith will not be of the kind exemplified by religious faith unless its commitments make a significant difference to how one lives one’s life. Reflective believers, who are aware of the many options for faith and the possibility of misguided and even harmful faith-commitments, will wish to be satisfied that they are justified in their faith. The theist traditions hold a deep fear of idolatry—of giving one’s ‘ultimate concern’ (Tillich 1957 [2001]) to an object unworthy of it. The desire to be assured of entitlement to faith is thus not merely externally imposed by commitment to philosophical critical values: it is a demand internal to the integrity of theistic faith itself. Arguably, believers must even take seriously the possibility that the God they have been worshipping is not, after all, the true God (Johnston 2009). But, for this concern to be met, there will need to be conditions sufficient for justified faith that are ‘internalist’—that is, conditions whose obtaining is, at least indirectly if not directly, accessible to believers themselves. And, as already noted, those conditions are widely assumed to include an evidentialist requirement that faith is justified only if the truth of its cognitive content is adequately supported by the available evidence.
然而，目前尚不清楚改革宗认识论的信仰模式是否能够达到证明有神论信仰是合理的一切。从有信仰（或潜在信仰）的反思者的角度来看，出现了权利问题：他们是否在理性上、认识论上 —— 甚至道德上 —— 有权接受或继续他们的信仰？这个问题在存在上是重要的，因为信仰不会是宗教信仰所体现的那种，除非它的承诺对一个人的生活方式产生重大影响。反思的信徒，他们意识到信仰的许多选择，以及可能被误导甚至有害的信仰承诺，他们会希望满足于他们的信仰是称义的。有神论传统对偶像崇拜怀有深深的恐惧 —— 害怕将自己的 “终极关注”（Tillich 1957 [2001]）赋予一个不值得的对象。因此，确保获得信仰权利的愿望不仅仅是由对哲学批判价值的承诺外在强加的：它是有神论信仰本身的完整性的内在要求。可以说，信徒甚至必须认真对待他们一直崇拜的上帝毕竟不是真神的可能性（Johnston 2009）。但是，要满足这一关切，就需要有充分的条件来支持称义的信仰，这些条件是 “内在主义的”—— 也就是说，信徒自己至少可以间接地获得这些条件，如果不是直接的话。而且，如前所述，这些条件被广泛认为包括一项证据主义的要求，即只有当其认知内容的真实性得到现有证据的充分支持时，信仰才是合理的。

The Reformed epistemologist model as leaving the question of entitlement unanswered

改教宗认识论者的模型在权利证成问题上仍未给出答案

It may be argued, however, that, if the Reformed epistemologist’s model is correct, those who seek to meet an evidentialist requirement will be unable to satisfy themselves of their entitlement to their faith. Theistic truths may be directly revealed, and experienced as immediately evident, yet, on reflection, one may doubt whether such experiences are genuinely revelatory since competing ‘naturalist’ interpretations of those experiences seem available. Furthermore, there are rival sources yielding contrary claims that equally claim to be authentically revelatory. It may be true, as Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology maintains, that if God exists then certain basic theist beliefs meet externalist criteria for knowledge, even though the truth of the propositions concerned remains open to reflective ‘internalist’ doubt. On an externalist account, that is, one might lack independent evidence sufficient to confirm that one has knowledge that God exists while in fact possessing that very knowledge. One may thus refute an objector who claims that without adequate evidence one cannot possess knowledge. But this consideration is still insufficient to secure entitlement to theistic faith—if, as may be argued, that entitlement requires that one has evidence adequate to justify commitment to the truth that God exists. For, one has such evidence only conditionally on God’s existence—but it is precisely entitlement to believe that God exists that is at issue (Kenny 1992, 71; Bishop and Aijaz 2004). For a wider discussion of the possibility of religious knowledge that, inter alia, endorses the present point, see Zagzebski 2010.
然而，也许有人会说，如果改革宗认识论者的模型是正确的，那么那些寻求满足证据主义要求的人将无法满足他们对信仰的权利。有神论的真理可以直接被揭示出来，并被体验为立即显现出来，然而，经过反思，人们可能会怀疑这些经验是否真的具有启示性，因为对这些经验的相互竞争的 “自然主义” 解释似乎是可用的。此外，还有一些相互竞争的消息来源提出了相反的说法，这些声明同样声称具有真正的启示性。正如普兰廷加的改革宗认识论所坚持的那样，如果上帝存在，那么某些基本的有神论信仰就符合外在主义的知识标准，即使相关命题的真理性仍然受到反思性的 “内在主义” 怀疑。从外在主义的角度来看，也就是说，一个人可能缺乏足够的独立证据来证实一个人知道上帝存在，而实际上却拥有这种知识。因此，人们可以反驳那些声称没有充分证据就无法拥有知识的反对者。但是，这种考虑仍然不足以确保对有神论信仰的权利 —— 如果像有人可能会争论的那样，这种权利要求一个人有足够的证据来证明对上帝存在的真理的承诺是合理的。因为，一个人只是有条件地拥有关于上帝存在的证据 —— 但恰恰是相信上帝存在的权利才是有争议的（Kenny 1992, 71; Bishop and Aijaz 2004）。关于宗教知识可能性的更广泛讨论，除其他外，支持目前的观点，见 Zagzebski 2010。

5. Faith as belief

信仰即信念

Annotation by 斐夷所非
 
Faith 和 Belief 在哲学和神学语境中有明确的区别：

• Faith（信仰）通常指一种更深层次的、与宗教或精神相关的信任、信念或承诺，往往涉及对超越性事物的接受和信赖。
• Belief（信念）则更偏向于对某个命题或观点的接受，是一种认知状态，通常基于证据、推理或个人的判断。
   
  从 Faith 与 Belief 的语义与语境辨析中解析其宗教哲学内涵
  https://blog.csdn.net/u013669912/article/details/146102140

If faith is not “firm and certain” basic knowledge of theistic truths, then a model of faith as having a propositional object may still be retained by identifying faith with belief of relevant content—and the question whether a faith-belief may have sufficient justification to count (if true) as (non-basic) knowledge may remain open. To have theist faith might thus be identified with holding a belief with theological content—that God exists, is benevolent towards us, has a plan of salvation, etc.—where this belief is also held with sufficient firmness and conviction. Richard Swinburne labels this the “Thomist view” of faith, and expresses it thus: “The person of religious faith is the person who has the theoretical conviction that there is a God” (Swinburne 2005, 138). (Aquinas’s own understanding of faith is more complex than this formulation suggests, however, as will be noted shortly.)
如果信仰不是对有神论真理的 “坚定和确定” 的基本知识，那么，通过将信仰与相关内容的信念等同起来，仍然可以保留具有命题对象的信仰模式 —— 而信仰 - 信念是否有足够的理由（如果是真实的）作为（非基本）知识的问题可能仍然悬而未决。因此，拥有有神论的信仰可以等同于持有具有神学内容的信念—— 上帝存在，对我们仁慈，有救赎计划，等等 —— 在这种信仰中，这种信念也以足够的坚定和信念持有。理查德・斯威本（Richard Swinburne）将其标记为 “托马斯主义的信仰观”，并这样表达：“具有宗教信仰的人是具有理论信念的人，即存在上帝”（Swinburne 2005, 138）。然而，阿奎那自己对信仰的理解比这个表述所暗示的要复杂得多，正如稍后将要指出的那样。

The rationality of faith on this model will rest on the rationality of the firmly held theological beliefs in which it consists. As Swinburne notes, if such beliefs are founded on evidence that renders their truth sufficiently more probable than not, then the beliefs concerned may amount to knowledge on a contemporary “justified true belief” fallibilist epistemology, even though they fall short of knowledge on Aquinas’s own criteria, which require that what is known be “seen” (i.e., fully and directly comprehended) (Summa Theologiae 2a2ae 1, 4 & 5 (Aquinas 1265–1273 [2006], 27)). In any case, the reasonableness of faith on this model of faith as (non-basic) theological belief depends on the beliefs concerned being adequately evidentially justified. The claim that this condition is satisfied is defended by John Locke in The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695 [1999]), and, in contemporary philosophy, by Richard Swinburne’s Bayesian approach to the epistemology of Christian belief (see, for example, Swinburne 2003).
在这个模型上，信仰的合理性将建立在它所包含的坚定持有的神学信念的合理性之上。正如斯威本所指出的，如果这种信念是建立在证据之上的，这些证据使它们的真实性比没有证据更有可能，那么所涉及的信念可能相当于对当代 “正当的真正信念” 谬误认识论的知识，即使它们缺乏对阿奎那自己的标准的知识，这些标准要求已知的东西被 “看到”（即完全和直接理解）（《神学大全》2a2ae 1, 4 & 5 (Aquinas 1265–1273 [2006], 27)）。无论如何，在这种作为（非基本）神学信念的信仰模式上，信仰的合理性取决于有关信念是否有足够的证据证明是正当的。约翰・洛克（John Locke）在《基督教的合理性》（1695 [1999]）中为这一条件得到满足的主张辩护，在当代哲学中，理查德・斯威本（Richard Swinburne）对基督教信仰认识论的贝叶斯方法（参见，例如，斯威本 2003）也支持这一观点。

Some argue, however, that the truth of theism is “evidentially ambiguous”—that is, that our total available evidence is equally viably interpreted from both a theist and a naturalist/atheist perspective (Hick 1966 and 1989; Davis 1978; Penelhum 1995; McKim 2001). This thesis of evidential ambiguity may be supported as the best explanation of the diversity of belief on religious matters, and/or of the persistence of the debate about theism, with philosophers of equal acumen and integrity engaged on either side. Or the ambiguity may be considered systematic—for example, on the grounds that both natural theological and natural atheological arguments fail because they are deeply circular, resting on implicit assumptions acceptable only to those already thinking within the relevant perspective. (In relation to Swinburne’s Bayesian natural theology, in particular, this objection surfaces in criticism of assumptions about how to set the prior probabilities implicated in calculations of, for example, theism’s probability on the evidence of the “fine-tuning” of the Universe’s basic physical constants, or of the probability, on all our evidence, of the truth of the Resurrection.) If the ambiguity thesis is correct, then—assuming evidentialism—firmly held theistic belief will fail to be reasonable.
然而，一些人认为，有神论的真理是 “证据上模棱两可的”—— 也就是说，从有神论者和自然主义者 / 无神论者的角度，我们所有可用的证据同样可以得到解释（Hick 1966 和 1989; Davis 1978; Penelhum 1995; McKim 2001）。这种证据模糊的论点可以作为对宗教问题上信仰多样性的最好解释，和 / 或关于有神论的辩论的持续存在，双方都有同样敏锐和正直的哲学家参与其中。或者，这种模糊性可以被认为是系统性的 —— 例如，基于自然神学和自然无神论的论证都失败了，因为它们是深刻的循环，建立在只有那些已经在相关视角下思考的人才能接受的隐含假设之上。（特别是关于斯威本的贝叶斯自然神学，这种反对意见体现在对如何设定先验概率的假设的批评中，这些假设涉及的假设，例如，有神论的概率基于宇宙基本物理常数的 “微调” 证据，或者根据我们所有的证据，复活的真理的可能性。）如果模棱两可的论点是正确的，那么 —— 假设证据主义 —— 坚定持有的有神论信念就不合理了。

On this model of faith as non-basic belief, all that characterizes faith apart from its theological content is the firmness or conviction with which faith-propositions are held true. Firm belief in the truth of a scientific theoretical proposition, for example, fails to count as faith only through lacking the right kind of content. This model therefore shares with the Reformed epistemologist model in taking its theological content as essential to what makes theistic faith faith, and so rejects the suggestion that faith of the same sort as found in the theist religious traditions might also be found elsewhere.
在这种信仰作为非基本信念的模式中，除了信仰的神学内容之外，信仰的特征就是信仰命题被正确的坚定或信念。例如，对一个科学理论命题的真实性的坚定信念，仅仅因为缺乏正确的内容，就不能算作信仰。因此，这个模型与改革宗认识论者模型的共同点是，将其神学内容视为使有神论信仰成为信仰的必要条件，因此拒绝了在有神论宗教传统中发现的相同类型的信仰也可能在其他地方找到的说法。

Furthermore, in taking faith to consist in non-basic belief that theological propositions are true, this model invites the assumption that theological convictions belong in the same category of factual claims as scientific theoretical hypotheses with which they accordingly compete. That assumption will lead those who think that theological claims are not reasonably accepted on the evidence to regard faith as worthless and intellectually dishonourable—at best, “a degenerating research programme” (Lakatos 1970). (On this negative assessment of faith’s evidential support, persons of faith come perilously close to the schoolboy’s definition mentioned by William James: “Faith is when you believe something that you know ain’t true” (James 1896 [1956, 29]). Or, if persons who have theistic faith readily abandon theological explanations whenever competing scientific ones succeed, their God gets reduced to “the God of the gaps”.) These misgivings about the model of faith as firmly held factual theological belief dissolve, of course, if success attends the project of showing that particular theological claims count as factual hypotheses well supported by the total available evidence. Those who doubt that this condition is or can be met may, however, look towards a model of faith that understands faith’s cognitive content as playing some other role than that of an explanatory hypothesis of the same kind as a scientific explanatory hypothesis.
此外，在把信仰看作是非基本信念，即神学命题是真实的，这个模型引发了这样一种假设，即神学信念与科学理论假设属于同一类事实主张，而科学理论假设则与之竞争。这种假设将导致那些认为神学主张在证据上没有被合理接受的人，认为信仰是毫无价值的，在智力上是不光彩的 —— 充其量是 “一个堕落的研究计划”（Lakatos 1970）。在这种对信仰的证据支持的负面评估中，信仰者危险地接近威廉・詹姆斯（William James）提到的小学生定义：“信仰是当你相信你知道不是真的事情时”（James 1896 [1956, 29]）。或者，如果有有神论信仰的人在相互竞争的科学解释成功时就轻易放弃神学解释，他们的上帝就会沦为 “缺口之神”。当然，如果成功与证明特定的神学主张算作事实假设的项目相辅相成，那么这些对信仰模式的疑虑就会消失，这些假设得到了全部可用证据的充分支持。然而，那些怀疑这个条件是否满足或能够满足的人，可能会寻求一种信仰模式，这种模式将信仰的认知内容理解为在与科学解释性假设相同的解释性假设之外发挥着其他作用。

Aquinas’s account of faith

阿奎那对信仰的叙述

Though firmly held theological belief is central to it, Aquinas’s understanding of faith is more complicated and nuanced than the view that faith is “the theoretical conviction that God exists.” Aquinas holds that faith is “midway between knowledge and opinion” (Summa Theologiae 2a2ae 1, 2 (Aquinas [2006], 11)). Faith resembles knowledge, Aquinas thinks, in so far as faith carries conviction. But that conviction is not well described as “theoretical,” if that description suggests that faith has a solely propositional object. For Aquinas, faith denotes the believer’s fundamental orientation towards the divine. So “from the perspective of the reality believed in,” Aquinas says, “the object of faith is something non-composite”—namely God himself. Nevertheless, grasping the truth of propositions is essential to faith, because “from the perspective of the one believing … the object of faith is something composite in the form of a proposition” (Summa Theologiae, 2a2ae, 1, 2 (Aquinas [2006], 11 & 13), our emphases).
虽然阿奎那坚定的神学信念是它的核心，但阿奎那对信仰的理解比信仰是 “上帝存在的理论信念” 的观点更为复杂和微妙。阿奎那认为信仰是 “知识和意见之间的中间地带”（《神学大全》2a2ae 1, 2 (Aquinas [2006], 11)）。阿奎那认为，信仰类似于知识，因为信仰带有信念。但是，如果这种描述表明信仰只有一个命题对象，那么这种信念就不能很好地描述为 “理论的”。对于阿奎那来说，信仰表示信徒对神的基本取向。因此，阿奎那说，“从所信仰的现实的角度来看”，“信仰的对象是非复合的”（因此，绝对不是命题）—— 即上帝自己。然而，掌握命题的真理对信心至关重要，因为 “从相信的人的角度来看…… 信仰的对象是以命题形式构成的复合物”（《神学大全》2a2ae 1, 2 (Aquinas [2006], 11 & 13)，我们的重点）。

A further problem with describing as Thomist a model of faith simply as firm belief that certain theological propositions are true is that Aquinas takes as central an act of “inner assent” (Summa Theologiae, 2a2ae, 2, 1 (Aquinas [2006], 59–65)). This is problematic because, (i) in its dominant contemporary technical usage belief is taken to be a mental (intentional) state—a propositional attitude, namely, the attitude towards the relevant proposition that it is true; (ii) belief in this contemporary sense is widely agreed not to be under volitional control—not directly, anyway; yet (iii) Aquinas holds that the assent given in faith is under the control of the will. Aquinas need not, however, be construed as accepting “believing at will,” since assent may be construed as an act that has to be elicited yet terminates a process that is subject to the will—a process of inquiry, deliberation or pondering that involves mental actions, or, in the case of theist faith, a process of divine grace that can proceed only if it is not blocked by the will.
将信仰模式简单地描述为托马斯主义的另一个问题是，阿奎那坚信某些神学命题是真实的，那就是阿奎那将 “内心同意” 的行为作为中心（《神学大全》2a2ae 2, 1 (Aquinas [2006], 59–65)）。这是有问题的，因为：（i）在其占主导地位的当代技术用法中，信念被认为是一种心理（意向）状态 —— 一种命题态度，即对相关命题的态度，即它是真实的；（ii）这种现代意义上的信念被广泛认为不受意志的控制 —— 无论如何，不是直接的；然而（iii）阿奎那认为，出于信仰而给予的同意是在意志的控制之下的。然而，阿奎那不必被解释为接受 “随意相信”，因为同意可能被解释为一种必须被引发的行为，但终止了一个受制于意志的过程 —— 一个涉及心理行为的探究、审议或沉思的过程，或者，在有神论信仰的情况下，一个神圣恩典的过程，只有在没有被意志阻挡的情况下才能进行。

Most importantly, however, Aquinas says that assent is given to the propositional articles of faith because their truth is revealed by God, and on the authority of the putative source of this revelation. Terence Penelhum puts it like this: “Thomas tells us that although what one assents to in faith includes many items not ostensibly about God himself, one assents to them, in faith, because they are revealed by God … It is because they come from him and because they lead to him that the will disposes the intellect to accept them” (Penelhum 1989, 122: see Summa Theologiae, 2a2ae, 1, 1 & 2 (Aquinas [2006], 5–15)). So, Aquinas’s model of faith is of believing (assenting to) propositional truth-claims on the basis of testimony carrying divine authority. John Locke follows the same model: “Faith … is the assent to any proposition … upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication” (Locke 1698 [1924, 355]; compare also Alston 1996, 15).
然而，最重要的是，阿奎那说，人们之所以同意信条的命题，是因为它们的真理是由上帝启示的，并且是基于这个启示的假定来源的权威。特伦斯・佩内尔洪（Terence Penelhum）是这样说的：“托马斯告诉我们：‘尽管一个人凭信心同意的东西包括许多表面上不是关于上帝本人的事情，但一个人凭信心同意它们，因为它们是上帝启示的…… 正是因为它们来自他，因为它们导致了他，所以意志使智力接受了它们’”（Penelhum 1989, 122：见《神学大全》2a2ae 1, 1 & 2 (Aquinas [2006], 5–15)）。因此，阿奎那的信仰模式是相信（同意）命题真理的主张，这些主张建立在具有神圣权威的见证的基础上。约翰・洛克（John Locke）遵循相同的模式：“信仰…… 是对任何命题的同意…… 在提议者的功劳上，来自上帝，以某种非凡的交流方式”（Locke 1698 [1924, 355]; 同样参见 Alston 1996, 15)。

The unanswered question of entitlement—again

悬而未决的权利问题 —— 再次出现

Theist faith as assent to truths on the basis of an authoritative source of divine revelation is possible, though, only for those who already believe that God exists and is revealed through the relevant sources. Might such faith, then, have to rest on a prior faith—faith that God exists and that this is God’s messenger or vehicle of communication? Those foundational claims, it might be maintained, are held true on the grounds of adequately supporting evidence, such as putatively provided by arguments of natural theology and the claimed evidence for miraculous endorsement of a prophet’s authority. Theist faith might then have a purely rational foundation. But this could hardly be so for every person of faith, since not everyone who believes will have access to the relevant evidence or be able to assess it properly. Besides, and more importantly, although Aquinas allows that rational assessment of the available evidence may lead a person to faith, he does not think that such an assessment could ever elicit assent itself—only demonstration could achieve that and so high a level of proof is not here available (see Aquinas [2006], footnote 2b, 58–9). Aquinas’s view is thus that all believers stand in need of God’s grace: “the assent of faith, which is its principal act … has as its cause God, moving us inwardly through grace” (Summa Theologiae, 2a2ae 6, 1 (Aquinas [2006], 167)). It follows, then, that, on Aquinas’s view, believing that God exists and is revealed in specific ways is itself a matter of faith, and not a purely rationally evidentially secured prolegomenon to it.
然而，有神论的信仰，即在神圣启示的权威来源的基础上对真理的认同，是可能的，然而，只有对于那些已经相信上帝存在并通过相关来源被揭示的人来说，才有可能。那么，这种信仰是否必须建立在一种先验的信仰之上 —— 相信上帝存在，相信上帝是上帝的使者或沟通的工具呢？这些基本的说法可能会得到维护，因为有充分的证据支持，例如自然神学的论点和所声称的奇迹般地认可先知权威的证据，这些证据被认为是正确的。因此，有神论的信仰可能有一个纯粹的理性基础。但对于每个有信仰的人来说，这几乎是不可能的，因为不是每个相信的人都能获得相关证据或能够正确评估它。此外，更重要的是，尽管阿奎那允许对现有证据的理性评估可以使一个人产生信仰，但他不认为这样的评估本身能够引起同意 —— 只有证明才能做到这一点，而这里没有如此高的证据水平（见阿奎那 [2006]，脚注 2b，58-9）。因此，阿奎那的观点是，所有信徒都需要上帝的恩典：“信仰的同意，这是其主要行为… 以上帝为因缘，通过恩典使我们向内移动 “（Summa Theologiae，2a2ae 6，1 （Aquinas [2006]，167））。因此，根据阿奎那的观点，相信上帝存在并以特定的方式被揭示本身就是一个信仰问题，而不是纯粹理性地证明它所保证的序言。

Aquinas’s model of faith thus shares with the Reformed epistemologist model the problem that it leaves unanswered the reflective believer’s concern about entitlement. Attempting to settle that concern by meeting the evidential requirement leads to circularity: theological truths are to be accepted on divine authority, yet the truth that there is such an authority (historically mediated as the relevant tradition maintains) is amongst those very truths that are to be accepted on divine authority—indeed, it is the crucial one. As Descartes puts it in the Dedication to his Meditations, “It is of course quite true that we must believe in the existence of God because it is a doctrine of Holy Scripture, and conversely, that we must believe Holy Scripture because it comes from God. … But this argument cannot be put to unbelievers because they would judge it to be circular” (Descartes 1641 [Cottingham et al. 1984, 3]). Thus, although they differ on the question whether the firm beliefs of faith count as knowledge, both Aquinas and Calvin understand faith as essentially involving accepting the truth of propositions as revealed through willingly receiving God’s gracious gift of that very revelation. The question remains how accepting this gift could be epistemically rational. The externalist account of how Christian beliefs may have epistemic worth proposed in Plantinga’s model of faith (named “the A/C” model because its sources are supposedly found in Aquinas as well as Calvin) offers some help with the required explanation, but (as noted in the final paragraph of Section 4 above) may arguably not by itself be sufficient.
因此，阿奎那的信仰模式与改革宗认识论者模式存在同样的问题，即它没有回答反思的信徒对权利的担忧。试图通过满足证据要求来解决这个问题，导致了循环性：神学真理应该被上帝的权威所接受，然而，存在这样一个权威的真理（正如相关传统所坚持的那样，在历史上是中介的）正是那些需要被神圣权威接受的真理之一 —— 事实上，它是关键的。正如笛卡尔在《沉思录》中所说，“当然，我们必须相信上帝的存在，因为它是圣经的教义，相反，我们必须相信圣经，因为它来自上帝。… 但这个论点不能对不信的人提出，因为他们会判断它是循环的 “（笛卡尔 1641 [Cottingham et al. 1984，3]）。因此，尽管他们在坚定的信仰信仰是否算作知识的问题上存在分歧，但阿奎那和加尔文都认为信仰本质上涉及接受命题的真理，这些真理是通过心甘情愿地接受上帝对这一启示的恩典礼物而揭示出来的。问题仍然是，接受这份礼物在认识论上是如何合理的。在普兰廷加的信仰模型中提出的关于基督教信仰如何具有认识价值的外部主义描述（之所以被称为 “A/C” 模型，因为它的来源据说在阿奎那和加尔文身上都可以找到）为所需的解释提供了一些帮助，但（如上文第 4 节最后一段所述）可以说本身是不够的。

Revelation—and its philosophical critique

启示及其哲学批判

The reasonableness of belief that God exists is a focal issue in the Philosophy of Religion. Theist traditions typically, or some would say essentially, make a foundational claim about an authoritative source, or sources, of revealed truth. What is salient includes belief or some related sort of affirmation, not just that God exists but associated content such as that this God exists, the God who is revealed thus and so (in great historical acts, in prophets, in scriptures, in wisdom handed down, etc.). The reasonableness of theism is therefore as much a matter of the reasonableness of an epistemology of revelation as it is of a metaphysics of perfect being. The question of how God may be expected to make himself known has gained prominence through recent discussion of the argument for atheism from “divine hiddenness” (Schellenberg 1993; Howard-Snyder and Moser 2002). That argument holds that a loving God would make his existence clear to the non-resistant—but this claim is open to question. Perhaps God provides only “secret” evidence of his existence, purposely overturning the expectations of our “cognitive idolatry” in order to transform our egocentric self-reliance (Moser 2008); besides, there may be significant constraints logically inherent in the very possibility of unambiguous divine revelation to finite minds (King 2008).
相信上帝存在的合理性是宗教哲学的一个焦点问题。有神论传统通常，或者有些人会说基本上是对启示真理的权威来源或来源做出基础性的主张。突出的包括信仰或某种相关的肯定，不仅仅是上帝存在，而且还有相关的内容，例如这个上帝存在，这样那样被揭示的上帝（在伟大的历史行为中，在先知中，在经文中，在流传下来的智慧中，等等）。因此，有神论的合理性既是启示认识论的合理性问题，也是完美存在的形而上学的合理性问题。通过最近对 “神的隐藏性” 的无神论论点的讨论，上帝如何被期望使自己为人所知的问题得到了突出（Schellenberg 1993;Howard-Snyder 和 Moser 2002）。这个论点认为，慈爱的上帝会让不抵抗的人清楚地知道他的存在 —— 但这种说法是有待商榷的。也许上帝只提供了他存在的 “秘密” 证据，故意推翻我们 “认知偶像崇拜” 的期望，以改变我们以自我为中心的自力更生（Moser 2008）; 此外，在对有限思想的明确神圣启示的可能性中，可能存在逻辑上固有的重大限制（King 2008）。

Similarly, accounts of theistic faith will be open to critique when they make assumptions about the mechanisms of revelation. In particular, the model of faith as assent to propositions as revealed holds that, since God’s grace is required for that assent, when grace is effective the whole “package deal” of propositional revealed truth is accepted. This yields the notion of “the Faith,” as the body of theological truths to be accepted by “the faithful,” and it becomes a sign of resistance to divine grace to “pick and choose” only some truths, as heretics do (Greek: hairesis, choice; see Summa Theologiae 2a2ae 5, 3 (Aquinas [2006], 157–61)). For heresy to be judged, however, some human authority must assume it possesses the full doctrinal revelation, with God’s grace operating without resistance in its own case. Whether that assumption can ever be sufficiently well founded to justify condemning and purging others is an important question, whose neglect may be seriously harmful, as we are reminded by the fact that the phrase for “act of faith” in Portuguese—auto-da-fé—came to mean the public burning of a heretic.
同样，当有神论信仰的叙述对启示的机制做出假设时，它们也会受到批评。特别是，作为对所启示的命题的同意的信心模式认为，由于这种同意需要上帝的恩典，当恩典有效时，命题启示真理的整个 “一揽子交易” 就被接受了。这就产生了 “信仰” 的概念，作为 “信徒” 所接受的神学真理体系，它成为抵抗神圣恩典的标志，只 “选择” 一些真理，就像异教徒一样（希腊语：hairesis，choice; 见 Summa Theologiae 2a2ae 5,3（Aquinas [2006]，157-61））。然而，要使异端受到审判，某些人类权威必须假设它拥有完整的教义启示，上帝的恩典在其自身的情况下毫无抵抗地运作。这种假设是否有足够的充分理由来证明谴责和清洗他人是正当的，这是一个重要的问题，忽视这个问题可能会造成严重的伤害，因为葡萄牙语中 “信仰行为” 的短语 ——auto-da-fé—— 开始意味着公开焚烧异教徒，这一事实提醒我们。

But the deeper assumption made by this model of faith as non-basic (justified) belief (as, too, by the model of it as basic knowledge yielded by the proper functioning of a special cognitive faculty) is that God’s self-revelation is primarily the revelation of the truth of propositions articulated in human language (compare Swinburne 1992). Alternative understandings of revelation are available, however. In particular, it may be held that it is primarily the divine itself that is revealed—the reality, not merely a representation of it. (See Lebens 2023 for discussion of faith as knowledge by acquaintance with God from a Jewish perspective). Propositional articulations of what is revealed may still be essential, but they need to be accepted as at a remove from the object of revelation itself, and therefore as limited. The development of propositional articulations expressing the nature and will of the self-revealing God—the doctrines of “the Faith”—will, of course, be understood as a process under providential grace. It is often assumed that that process can achieve “closure” in a completed set of infallibly known creedal propositions. But this assumption about how divine inspiration operates may be contested, both on the theological grounds that it reflects the all-too-human desire to gain control over God’s self-revelation (to “pin God down once and for all”), and on the wider epistemological grounds that any attempt to grasp independent reality in human language will be in principle limited and fallible, subject to revision in the light of future experience.
但是，这种信仰模式作为非基本（正当的）信仰（同样，通过这种模式，作为一种特殊认知能力的正常运作而产生的基本知识）所做出的更深层次的假设是，上帝的自我启示主要是对人类语言中表达的命题真理的启示（比较 Swinburne 1992）。然而，对启示的其他理解是可用的。特别是，可以认为，被揭示的主要是神本身 —— 现实，而不仅仅是它的再现。（参见 Lebens 2023 从犹太人的角度讨论信仰是认识上帝的知识）。对所启示的事物的命题阐述可能仍然是必不可少的，但它们需要被接受，因为它们与启示的对象本身相去甚远，因此是有限的。表达自我启示的上帝的本质和旨意的命题表达的发展 ——“信仰” 的教义 —— 当然会被理解为在天意恩典下的一个过程。人们通常认为，这个过程可以在一套完整的、无误的已知信条命题中实现 “结束”。但是，这种关于上帝默示如何运作的假设可能会受到质疑，既基于神学基础，因为它反映了全人类想要控制上帝的自我启示（“一劳永逸地压制上帝”），也基于更广泛的认识论基础，即任何试图用人类语言抓住独立现实的尝试在原则上都是有限的和错误的，可根据未来经验进行修订。

6. Faith as an act of trust

信仰是一种信任的行为

Not all models of faith, however, identify it as primarily a matter of knowing or believing a proposition or a set of them, even with the addition of some affective or evaluative component. What is most central to theistic faith may seem better expressed as believing in God, rather than as believing that God exists. The Christian Nicene creed begins “Credo in unum Deum …” and it is arguable that in this context “belief in” is neither merely an idiomatic variant on, nor reducible to, “belief that” (Price 1965). It may thus be held that theists’ acceptance of propositional truths as divinely revealed rests on believing in God—and it is this “believing in,” or “having faith in,” which is, fundamentally, the nature of faith. Noting that, while faith is held to be a virtue, believing as such is not, Wilfred Cantwell Smith argues that “faith is not belief,” “but something of a quite different order” (Smith 1979, 128), requiring “assent” “in the dynamic and personal sense of rallying to [what one takes to be the truth] with delight and engagement” (142). Arguably, to put or to maintain faith in God involves a readiness to act, perhaps by relying on God in relevant ways and/or grounded in a practical commitment. Our considerations now shift, then, from propositional-attitude-focussed models of faith to those focussed on action, or what J. L. Schellenberg calls “operational” models (2005, 126).
然而，并非所有的信仰模式都将其主要确定为认识或相信一个命题或一组命题的问题，即使添加了一些情感或评估成分。对有神论信仰来说，最核心的东西似乎更好地表达为相信上帝，而不是相信上帝的存在。基督教尼西亚信条开始 “Credo in unum Deum …” 有争议的是，在这种情况下，“信念” 既不只是 “信念” 的惯用语变体，也不能简化为 “信念”（Price 1965）。因此，可以认为，有神论者接受神所揭示的命题真理，是建立在对上帝的信仰之上的 —— 而正是这种 “相信”，或者说 “有信心”，从根本上说，这就是信仰的本质。威尔弗雷德・坎特威尔・史密斯（Wilfred Cantwell Smith）指出，虽然信仰被认为是一种美德，但相信本身却不是，他认为 “信仰不是信仰”，“而是一种完全不同的东西”（史密斯 1979,128），需要 “同意”“在动态和个人的意义上，以喜悦和参与的方式团结起来 [一个人认为是真理]”（142）。可以说，要建立或保持对上帝的信仰，就要准备好采取行动，也许是以相关的方式依靠上帝和 / 或基于实际的承诺。因此，我们现在的考虑从以命题 - 态度为中心的信仰模式转变为以行动为重点的模式，或者 J.L. 谢伦伯格所说的 “操作” 模式（2005,126）。

Judeo-Christian scripture envisions humans as actively engaged in a covenantal relationship with God. Their ongoing participation in, and commitment to, such a relationship paradigmatically involves both faith in God and faithfulness to God (McKaughan and Howard-Snyder 2022a and 2023a; Pace and McKaughan 2020). The kind of faith of which Christian faith is a paradigm case, then, may be understood as “action-centred commitment” (McKaughan 2016, 78), e.g., to the Christian “way.” Arguably, faith understood as a combination of affective and cognitive elements would miss its essential active component. We now turn, then, to consider a fiducial model—a model of faith as trust, understood not simply as an affective state but as an action.
犹太教 - 基督教经文设想人类积极参与与上帝的盟约关系。他们对这种关系的持续参与和承诺在范式上涉及对上帝的信仰和对上帝的忠诚（McKaughan 和 Howard-Snyder，2022a 和 2023a;Pace 和 McKaughan 2020）。因此，基督教信仰是一个范例的信仰类型，可以被理解为 “以行动为中心的承诺”（McKaughan 2016,78），例如，对基督教的 “道路”。可以说，被理解为情感和认知元素的结合的信仰会错过其基本的积极成分。那么，我们现在转向考虑一个信任模型 —— 一个将信仰视为信任的模型，不仅被理解为一种情感状态，而且被理解为一种行动。

On a fiducial model, having faith in God is making a practical commitment—the kind involved in trusting God, or, trusting in God. (The root meaning of the Greek pistis, “faith,” is “trust” (see Morgan 2015).) On such a model, faith’s active, practical component takes central place, though a cognitive component may be presupposed by it. Swinburne calls it the “Lutheran” model, and defines it thus: “the person of faith does not merely believe that there is a God (and believe certain propositions about him)—he trusts Him and commits himself to Him” (2005, 142). Yet, as noted earlier, Aquinas too takes the ultimate object of faith to be God, “the first reality,” and, furthermore, understands “formed” faith as trusting commitment to God, motivated by, and directed towards, love of God as one’s true end (see Summa Theologiae 2a2ae, 4, 3; Aquinas [2006], 123–7). It is true that Aquinas allows that the devils have faith in a certain sense, but this “faith” amounts only to their belief that what the Church teaches is the truth, arrived at not by grace but “forced from them” reluctantly by “the acumen of their natural intelligence” (Summa Theologiae 2a2ae, 5, 2; Aquinas [2006], 155 & 157). Aquinas’s account of “saving” faith is thus also a fiducial model.
在信守模型上，对上帝有信心就是做出实际的承诺 —— 信靠上帝所涉及的那种承诺，或者说，信靠上帝。（希腊语 pistis 的根本含义，“信仰”，是 “信任”（见 Morgan 2015）。在这样的模型中，信仰的积极、实践的成分占据了中心位置，尽管它可能预设了认知成分。斯威本称其为 “路德宗” 模型，并这样定义它：“有信仰的人不仅相信有一位上帝（并相信关于他的某些命题）—— 他信任他并委身于他”（2005,142）。然而，如前所述，阿奎那也把信仰的最终对象看作是上帝，即 “第一现实”，此外，他将 “形成的” 信仰理解为对上帝的信任承诺，由对上帝的爱所激励，并朝着上帝的爱为目标，这是一个人的真正目的（见《神学大全》2a2ae，4,3; 阿奎那 [2006]，123-7）。诚然，阿奎那允许魔鬼在某种意义上有信仰，但这种 “信仰” 只相当于他们的信仰，即教会所教导的是真理，不是通过恩典而达到的，而是通过 “他们自然智慧的敏锐度” 不情愿地 “从他们那里强迫的”（Summa Theologiae 2a2ae，5,2; 阿奎那 [2006]，155 和 157）。因此，阿奎那关于 “拯救” 信仰的叙述也是一个信点模型。

The venture of trust

信托的冒险

As noted at the outset, there is a usage of “faith” for which “having/placing faith in” is (near enough) synonymous with “trusting” or “trusting in.” (For discussion of how faith relates to a range of contemporary theories of trust, see McKaughan and Howard-Snyder 2022b.) If, moreover, faith of the religious kind is itself a type of trust, then we may expect our understanding of religious faith to profit from an analysis of trust in general. It is therefore worth considering what follows about the nature of faith of the sort exemplified in theistic faith from holding it to be a kind of active trust.
正如开头所指出的，在 “信仰” 的用法中，“拥有 / 放置信仰”（足够接近）是 “信任” 或 “信任” 的同义词。（有关信仰如何与一系列当代信任理论相关的讨论，请参阅 McKaughan 和 Howard-Snyder 2022b。此外，如果宗教信仰本身就是一种信任，那么我们可以预期我们对宗教信仰的理解可以从对一般信任的分析中获益。因此，值得思考的是，关于有神论信仰所体现的那种信仰的本质，从认为它是一种积极的信任来看，接下来是怎么回事。

Conceptually fundamental to trust is the notion of a person (or persons)—the truster—trusting in some agent or agency—the trustee—for some (assumedly) favourable outcome (though what the trustee is trusted for is often only implicit in the context). Trust involves a venture; so too—it is widely agreed—does faith. So, if faith is trust, the venture of faith might be presumed to be the type of venture implicated in trust. A venture is an action that places the agent and outcomes of concern to the agent significantly beyond the agent’s own control. Trust implies venture. When we trust we commit ourselves to another’s control, accepting—and, when necessary, co-operating as “patient”—with the decisions of the trustee. Venturing in trust is usually assumed to be essentially risky, making oneself vulnerable to adverse outcomes or betrayal. Swinburne makes the point this way: “To trust someone is to act on the assumption that she will do for you what she knows that you want or need, when the evidence gives some reason for supposing that she may not and where there will be bad consequences if the assumption is false” (2005, 143). Annette Baier makes no requirement for evidence that the trustee may prove untrustworthy, but nevertheless takes trust to involve “accepted vulnerability to another’s possible but not expected ill will (or lack of good will) toward one” (Baier 1986, 235, our emphasis). Accordingly, it seems sensible to hold that one should trust only with good reason. But if, as is plausible, good reason to trust requires sufficient evidence of the trustee’s trustworthiness, reasonable trust appears both to have its venturesomeness diminished and, at the same time, to become more difficult to achieve than we normally suppose. For we often lack adequate—or even, any—evidence of a trustee’s trustworthiness in advance of our venture, yet in many such cases we suppose that our trust is reasonable (see, for example, Adams 1987). But, if adequate evidence of trustworthiness is not required for reasonable trust, how is reasonable trust different from “blind” trust?
从概念上讲，信托的基本概念是一个人（或几个人）—— 受托人 —— 信任某个代理人或机构 —— 受托人 —— 以获得某种（假定的）有利结果（尽管受托人被信任的原因通常只是在上下文中隐含的）。信托涉及风险投资；人们普遍认为，信心也是如此。因此，如果信仰是信任，那么信仰的冒险可能会被推定为与信任有关的冒险类型。冒险是一种行为，它使代理人和代理人所关注的结果大大超出了代理人自己的控制范围。信任意味着冒险。当我们信任时，我们承诺接受他人的控制，接受受托人的决定，并在必要时以 “耐心” 的身份合作。人们通常认为，在信任中冒险本质上是有风险的，使自己容易受到不利结果或背叛的影响。斯威本是这样指出的：“信任某人就是假设她会为你做她知道你想要或需要的事情，当证据给出一些理由假设她可能不会，如果假设是错误的，将会产生不良后果”（2005,143）。安妮特・拜尔（Annette Baier）没有要求提供证据证明受托人可能被证明是不可信的，但仍然认为信任涉及 “对他人可能但未预期的恶意（或缺乏善意）的可接受的脆弱性”（Baier 1986,235，我们的重点）。因此，认为一个人只有在有充分理由的情况下才应该信任，这似乎是明智的。但是，如果合理的充分理由要求有足够的证据证明受托人的可信度，那么合理的信任似乎既削弱了其冒险性，又同时变得比我们通常想象的更难实现。因为在我们投资之前，我们往往缺乏足够的 —— 甚至任何 —— 证据来证明受托人的可信度，但在许多此类情况下，我们认为我们的信托是合理的（例如，参见 Adams 1987）。但是，如果合理信任不需要足够的可信度证据，那么合理信任与 “盲目” 信任有何不同？

The answer seems clear: reasonable trust is practically rational trust. The question of when one may rationally trust another may thus be resolved by a decision-theoretic calculation, factoring in the extent to which one’s evidence supports the potential trustee’s trustworthiness and the utilities of the possible outcomes, given one’s intended aims. The exercise of practical reasoning does include mental acts which are epistemically evaluable, however. When one takes it to be true in practical reasoning that someone will prove trustworthy, that mental act may be more or less epistemically rational: it would break the evidentialist norm to employ in a decision-theoretic calculation a credence that does not match one’s available evidence. In many situations, it will be practically rational, given one’s intentions, to trust another person only if one believes, or, at least, believes with high probability, that the person will prove trustworthy. In such situations it is also often the case, as already noted, that we don’t have adequate evidence in advance that this person will be trustworthy in this particular respect. Yet, affording high credence to a person’s trustworthiness may still be epistemically rational given wider available evidence of, for example, the person’s past friendliness and trustworthiness in other matters, or, if the person is a stranger, of our shared social experience that trusting others generally elicits a trustworthy response. Nevertheless, it can still be rational—practically rational, that is—to trust another when we don’t have adequate evidence that they will prove trustworthy. In a life-threatening situation, for example, it may be rational to trust unlikely rescuers if they are the only ones available. Or, when we have wider aims, it may be practically rational to trust those without a record of trustworthiness, as with “educative” and “therapeutic” trust where people are trusted for the sake of their development or rehabilitation as trustworthy persons. Being in established relationships of friendship with others, too, can also require commitment to continue to trust them even in the face of evidence that, otherwise, would make it reasonable to believe them unworthy of trust.
答案似乎很清楚：合理的信任实际上是理性的信任。因此，一个人何时可以理性地信任另一个人的问题可以通过决策理论计算来解决，该计算考虑了一个人的证据在多大程度上支持了潜在受托人的可信度，以及考虑到一个人的预期目标可能的结果的效用。然而，实践推理的运用确实包括了在认识论上可以评估的心理行为。当一个人认为在实际推理中某人会被证明是可信的时，这种心理行为可能或多或少在认识论上是合理的：在决策理论计算中采用与一个人的现有证据不匹配的可信度，这将打破证据主义的规范。在许多情况下，考虑到一个人的意图，只有当一个人相信，或者至少很有可能相信这个人会被证明是值得信赖的时，信任另一个人实际上是合理的。如前所述，在这种情况下，我们事先没有足够的证据表明这个人在这方面是值得信赖的。然而，鉴于更广泛的可用证据，例如，这个人过去在其他事情上的友好和可信度，或者，如果这个人是一个陌生人，我们共同的社会经验表明，信任他人通常会引起值得信赖的反应，因此，对一个人的可信度给予高度的可信度在认识论上仍然是合理的。尽管如此，当我们没有足够的证据证明另一个人会被证明是可信的时，信任另一个人仍然是合理的 —— 实际上是理性的。例如，在危及生命的情况下，如果救援人员是唯一可用的救援人员，那么信任他们可能是合理的。或者，当我们有更广泛的目标时，信任那些没有可信记录的人可能实际上是合理的，就像 “教育” 和 “治疗” 信任一样，人们为了发展或康复而成为值得信赖的人而受到信任。与他人建立的友谊关系也同样需要承诺继续信任他们，即使面对证据，否则，有理由相信他们不值得信任。

On models that take faith of the theist kind to consist fundamentally in an act of trust, the analogy with interpersonal trust is suggestive. When one person trusts another there seems typically (though not uniformly) to be a doxastic aspect (the truster’s belief that the trustee is trustworthy). But what’s essential is the fiducial aspect, which consists in an active commitment or “entrusting” to the other. Paul Helm proposes that theist faith similarly has importantly distinct doxastic and fiducial aspects: in addition to belief about God’s existence and trustworthiness for salvation held with a degree of strength proportional to the believer’s evidence, persons of faith must also entrust themselves to the one on whom they rely (Helm 2000). While it is widely agreed that theist faith must have a cognitive aspect, some philosophers hold that this need not be doxastic (as we shall see in Section 8).
在那些认为有神论者的信仰从根本上构成信任行为的模型中，与人际信任的类比是具有暗示性的。当一个人信任另一个人时，通常（尽管不是一致的）似乎是一个 doxastic 方面（信任者认为受托人是值得信赖的）。但至关重要的是基准方面，它包括对他人的积极承诺或 “委托”。保罗・赫尔姆（Paul Helm）提出，有神论的信仰同样具有重要的不同教义和信任方面：除了对上帝存在的信念和对救赎的可信度与信徒的证据成正比的强度外，有信仰的人还必须将自己托付给他们所依赖的人（Helm 2000）。虽然人们普遍认为有神论的信仰必须具有认知的一面，但一些哲学家认为这不一定是教条主义的（正如我们将在第 8 节中看到的那样）。

7. Faith as doxastic venture

信仰作为 doxastic 冒险

There are significant differences, however, between the trusting involved in theistic faith and that involved in interpersonal trust. For one thing, trusting would seem not to risk any possibility of disappointment if God really is the trustee. Given the existence of the God of unchanging love, one trusts in ultimately perfect safety. But the venture of actually entrusting oneself to God seems to begin with the challenge of being able to believe or accept that, indeed, there is such a God. While some affirm that this claim is a matter of basic knowledge, and some that there is sufficient evidence to justify it, others, as already noted, hold that everyone has to confront the evidential ambiguity of foundational theistic claims. For those who reject the model of theist faith as basic knowledge and also think that the question of God’s existence cannot be settled intellectually on the basis of the available evidence, the venture involved in trusting in God (if such there be) may seem to include a doxastic venture: those who trust already venture beyond the available evidence, in their very believing or accepting that God exists and may be relied on for salvation. Trusting in God seems to presuppose, in other words, trusting that God exists. But, if so, the question becomes pressing whether, and under what conditions, one may be entitled to such an evidence-transcending venture in practical commitment to a particular view of ultimate reality and its implications for how we should live.
然而，在有神论信仰中涉及的信任和人际信任中涉及的信任之间存在着显着的差异。首先，如果上帝真的是受托人，那么信任似乎就不会冒任何失望的风险。鉴于爱不变的上帝的存在，人们相信最终完全的安全。但是，真正把自己托付给上帝的冒险似乎始于能够相信或接受确实存在这样一位上帝的挑战。虽然一些人断言这种说法是一个基本知识问题，有些人认为有足够的证据来证明它的合理性，但如前所述，其他人认为每个人都必须面对基础有神论主张的证据模糊性。对于那些拒绝将有神论信仰模式作为基本知识，并且还认为上帝存在的问题不能根据现有证据在智力上得到解决的人来说，相信上帝所涉及的冒险（如果有的话）似乎包括一种教条主义的冒险：那些相信的人已经超越了现有的证据，他们非常相信或接受上帝的存在，并且可以依靠上帝来救赎。换言之，信靠上帝似乎是以相信上帝的存在为前提的。但是，如果是这样的话，那么问题就变得紧迫了，即在什么条件下，一个人是否以及在什么条件下有权进行这种超越证据的冒险，以实际致力于对终极现实的特定观点及其对我们应该如何生活的影响。

Theological non-realism

神学非现实主义

One way to relieve this pressure is to offer a non-realist analysis of theological claims. Trusting God will then not entail any commitment to reality’s being a certain way. Rather, on arguably the most sophisticated kind of non-realist view, theological beliefs arise because living “trustingly” comes to be expressed and reinforced through a culturally constructed fiction about God and his great saving acts. This existential confidence may then be described, using the language of the fiction, as “trusting God” (Cupitt 1980, Geering 1994). On such a non-realist account, the model of faith as trust brackets the cognitive component of faith, and risks becoming, in effect, a model of faith as purely a certain kind of affective state. But, in any case, non-realist models will be rejected by those who take faith to have a cognitive component that functions as a grasping—or would-be grasping—of how things really are.
缓解这种压力的一个方法，就是对神学主张进行非现实主义的分析。因此，信靠上帝并不意味着对现实以某种方式存在做出任何承诺。相反，在可以说是最复杂的非现实主义观点上，神学信仰的产生是因为 “信赖” 的生活通过一种文化建构的关于上帝和他伟大的救赎行为的虚构来表达和加强。然后，可以使用小说的语言将这种存在主义的信心描述为 “信任上帝”（Cupitt 1980，Geering 1994）。从这种非现实主义的角度来看，作为信任的信仰模式将信仰的认知成分括起来，实际上有可能成为纯粹某种情感状态的信仰模式。但是，无论如何，非现实主义模型都会被那些相信具有认知成分的人所拒绝，这种认知成分可以作为对事物真实情况的把握 —— 或可能 —— 的把握。

Defending doxastic venture by analogy with interpersonal trust?

通过类比人际信任来为 doxastic 冒险辩护？

Assuming, then, that theist faith does include (under realist assumptions) a venture in practical commitment to truth-claims about ultimate reality, the justifiability of such a venture might yet be thought defensible by analogy with interpersonal situations where practical commitment seems justifiably to be made beyond one’s evidence to the claim that a person will prove trustworthy in some relevant respect. Reflecting on that proposal discloses further points of disanalogy, however. In cases of interpersonal trust, a venture is often needed in initially taking the trustee to be trustworthy, but evidence will inevitably later emerge which will either confirm or disconfirm the truth of that claim, and trust may, and rationally should, be withdrawn if the news is bad. But if—as we are here assuming—one ventures beyond evidential support in taking it to be true in practical reasoning that God exists and may be trusted for salvation, this may be a venture that is not confined to initial commitment but rather persists in needing to be made. This will be the case on accounts of the evidential ambiguity of theism that take the ambiguity to hold in principle, ruling out any possibility of evidential disambiguation. Those accounts may grant, of course, that continuing to journey in theistic faith may psychologically reinforce one’s commitment, providing subjective confirmation that the theist view of reality is correct. Yet these reinforcing experiences, which often involve faith renewed in the face of apparent failures of divine love, do not possess the uncontroversial status of evidence that independently and inter-subjectively confirms the initial venture.
因此，假设有神论的信仰确实包括（在现实主义假设下）对关于终极现实的真理主张的实际承诺的冒险，那么这种冒险的正当性可能被认为可以通过类比与人际关系情况来辩护，在这种情境中，实际承诺似乎有理由超越一个人的证据，声称一个人将在某些相关方面证明是可信的。然而，对这一建议的反思揭示了进一步的不同之处。在人际信任的情况下，最初往往需要冒险使受托人具有可信度，但后来不可避免地会出现证据，这些证据将证实或否定该主张的真实性，如果消息不好，信任可以而且理所当然地应该被撤回。但是，如果正如我们在这里所假设的那样，一个人冒险超越证据支持，在实际推理中认为上帝存在并且可能因救赎而受到信任是正确的，那么这可能是一次冒险，这种冒险并不局限于最初的承诺，而是坚持需要做出。在有神论的证据模糊性方面，情况就是如此，这种模糊性原则上认为模糊性是成立的，排除了任何证据消除歧义的可能性。当然，这些记录可以识得，继续在有神论的信仰中旅行，可能在心理上加强一个人的承诺，提供主观的确认，即有神论的现实观点是正确的。然而，这些强化的经历，往往涉及在面对神圣之爱的明显失败时更新的信心，并不具有无可争议的证据地位，独立地和主体间地证实最初的冒险。

Doxastic venture without doxastic voluntarism

没有自愿主义的冒险

Many dismiss the idea that one may venture in one’s very believing that God exists as committing a category error: ventures are voluntary, but propositional belief is not directly under voluntary control. Trusting God, however, entails practical commitment to the truth of theological faith-propositions, and commitment to the truth of a proposition in one’s practical reasoning may be under direct voluntary control.
许多人认为，一个人可能会冒险相信上帝的存在，认为这是犯了一个类别错误：冒险是自愿的，但命题信仰并不直接受到自愿的控制。然而，信靠上帝需要对神学信仰命题的真理作出实际的承诺，而在一个人的实际推理中，对命题真理的承诺可能在直接自愿的控制之下。

It is one thing to be in the mental state of holding that the proposition that p is true; it is another to take it to be true that p in one’s practical reasoning (although these typically go together, since to hold that p is true is to be disposed to take it to be true that p in practical reasoning whenever the question whether p becomes salient). Practical commitment to a faith-proposition’s truth therefore could be a venture: there is no category error in allowing this possibility. Doxastic venturing—venturing in believing—is thus not a matter of willing oneself to believe without adequate evidential support; rather it is a matter of taking an already held belief to be true in one’s practical reasoning even though (as one may oneself recognise) its truth lacks such support.
处于认为 p 为真的命题的心理状态是一回事；在一个人的实践推理中认为 P 为真是另一回事（尽管这些通常是一起的，因为认为 P 为真，就是在实践推理中，每当 P 是否突出的问题时，就倾向于认为 P 为真）。因此，对信仰命题真理的实际承诺可能是一种冒险：允许这种可能性不存在任何类别错误。因此，在没有足够证据支持的情况下，Doxastic 冒险 —— 冒险相信 —— 不是一个愿意自己相信的问题；相反，这是一个将已经持有的信念视为一个人的实际推理是正确的问题，即使（正如一个人自己可能认识到的那样）它的真理缺乏这样的支持。

The psychological possibility of doxastic venture

冒险的心理可能性

Some philosophers have argued, however, that one cannot (in full reflective awareness, anyway) believe that p while accepting that one has insufficient evidence for p’s truth (Adler 2002). The counterclaim that this is possible is defended by William James, in his controversial 1896 lecture, “The Will to Believe” (James 1896 [1956]). James agrees that belief cannot be directly willed and must be otherwise causally evoked (he later came to wish that he had used “The Right to Believe” as his lecture’s title). James observes, however, that many beliefs have causes that do not constitute or imply an evidential grounding of their truth. James labels such causes “passional”—again, a potentially misleading term, since its intended referents include much more than emotional causes of belief. In particular, beliefs may be caused by “the circumpressure of one’s caste or set,” of which one’s inherited religious tradition is a paradigm case (James 1896 [1956, 9]). James is thus able to explain the psychological possibility of doxastic venture: one already has a “passionally” caused belief, which one then takes to be true in practical reasoning despite its lack of adequate evidential grounding (compare Creel 1994, who similarly describes “faith” as a “non-evidential doxastic passion”).
然而，一些哲学家认为，一个人不能（无论如何，在充分反思的意识中）相信 p，同时接受一个人没有足够的证据证明 p 的真理（Adler 2002）。威廉・詹姆斯（William James）在他 1896 年有争议的演讲 “相信的意愿”（James 1896 [1956]）中为这种可能性的反驳辩护。雅各同意，信仰不能是直接的意志，必须以其他方式因果地唤起（他后来开始希望他用 “信仰的权利” 作为他演讲的标题）。然而，雅各观察到，许多信仰的原因并不构成或暗示其真理的证据基础。雅各给这些原因贴上了 “激情” 的标签 —— 同样，这是一个可能产生误导的术语，因为它所指的对象不仅仅是信仰的情感原因。特别是，信仰可能是由 “一个人的种姓或种姓的周绕压力” 引起的，其中一个人继承的宗教传统就是一个典型的例子（James 1896 [1956，9]）。因此，詹姆斯能够解释 doxastic 冒险的心理学可能性：一个人已经有一种 “热情” 引起的信念，尽管缺乏足够的证据基础，但人们在实践推理中认为这种信念是正确的（比较 Creel 1994，他同样将 “信仰” 描述为 “非证据的 doxastic 激情”）。

Note that a doxastic venture model of theistic faith reconciles faith as gift with faith’s active components: taking a faith-proposition to be true in practical reasoning is a basic (mental) action (which leads on to further actions involved in trusting God and seeking to do God’s will); the gift provides the motivational resources for this basic action, namely a firm belief in the truth of the faith-proposition, despite its lack of adequate evidential support. (In the next section, the possibility is considered that the gift of these motivational resources might be effective yet not amount to actual belief.) It is also worth noting that those who find the focus on the individual something of a deficiency in analytical accounts of faith (Eklund 2015) may perceive in James’ account some acknowledgment of the social aspect of faith. Arguably, the standard “passional” or “non-evidential” cause of religious belief is cultural immersion within an historical faith-tradition. The motivational resources for faith-commitment may thus be an essentially social possession.
请注意，有神论信仰的教条冒险模型将作为礼物的信仰与信仰的积极组成部分相调和：在实践推理中将信仰命题视为真实是一种基本的（心理）行动（这导致了涉及信任上帝和寻求遵行上帝旨意的进一步行动）；这份礼物为这一基本行动提供了激励资源，即对信仰命题的真实性有坚定的信念，尽管它缺乏足够的证据支持。（在下一节中，考虑了这些激励资源的礼物可能是有效的，但并不构成实际的信念。还值得注意的是，那些发现对个人的关注在信仰的分析叙述中有所缺陷的人（Eklund 2015）可能会在雅各的叙述中感受到对信仰的社会方面的某种承认。可以说，宗教信仰的标准 “热情” 或 “非证据” 原因是文化沉浸在历史信仰传统中。因此，信仰承诺的激励资源可能本质上是一种社会财产。

Examples of doxastic venture models

风险投资模型的例子

On the doxastic venture model, faith involves full practical commitment to a faith-proposition’s truth, despite the recognition that this is not “objectively” justified on the evidence. Kierkegaard’s definition of faith as “an objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness” in Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Kierkegaard 1846 [1968, 180]) is an example of a doxastic venture model. So too is Paul Tillich’s account of faith as “the state of being ultimately concerned,” since the claim of the object of one’s ultimate concern to “promise total fulfillment even if all other claims have to be subjected to it or rejected in its name” cannot in principle be established on the basis of the evidence (Tillich 1957 [2001, 1 and 21]).
在 doxastic 风险模型中，信仰涉及对信仰命题真理的完全实际承诺，尽管人们认识到这在证据上不是 “客观” 合理的。克尔凯郭尔在《结论性非科学的后记》（克尔凯郭尔，1846 [1968,180]）中将信仰定义为 “在最热情的内在的挪用过程中牢牢抓住的客观不确定性”，是教条主义冒险模型的一个例子。保罗・蒂利希（Paul Tillich）对信仰的描述也是如此，因为一个人最终关注的对象 “承诺完全实现，即使所有其他要求都必须服从它或以其名义拒绝”，原则上不能建立在证据的基础上（Tillich 1957 [2001，1 和 21]）。

Aquinas’s model of faith, though widely thought of as conforming to an evidential requirement on belief, may arguably be open to interpretation as a doxastic venture model. As noted in Section 5, Aquinas holds that the available evidence, though it supports the truth of foundational faith-propositions, does not provide what Aquinas counts as sufficient (i.e., demonstrative) support to justify inner assent (in addition to references to the Summa Theologiae given previously, see 2a2ae. 2, 1 (Aquinas [2006], 63); and compare also Penelhum 1989, 120). Now, whether practical commitment to the truth of a given faith-proposition does or does not venture beyond adequate evidential support will be relative to assumptions about (a) where the level of evidential support required for “adequacy” should be set, and (b) just how firm and decisive propositional faith-commitment needs to be. On some such assumptions, for example those made by Bayesians, the support provided by the evidence Aquinas adduces—or, by a suitable contemporary upgrading of that evidence such as that provided in the works of Richard Swinburne—may be considered enough to make reasonable a sufficiently high degree of belief (or credence) in the truth of theistic faith-propositions so that believers need not venture beyond the support of their evidence. Interpreting Aquinas’s model of faith as conforming to evidentialism may thus be viable. Nevertheless, Aquinas’s own assumptions on these matters may leave him closer to Kierkegaard and Tillich than is commonly thought (consider Summa Theologiae 2a2ae 4, 1 and, once again, 2a2ae 6, 1 (Aquinas [2006], 117–9 & 167)).
阿奎那的信仰模式，虽然被广泛认为符合对信仰的证据要求，但可以说，作为一种教条主义的冒险模式，可以被解释为一种教条主义的冒险模式。正如第 5 节所指出的，阿奎那认为，现有的证据虽然支持基本信仰命题的真实性，但并没有提供阿奎那认为足够的（即示范性的）支持来证明内心的同意（除了对前面给出的《神学大全》的引用外，见 2a2ae.2,1（阿奎那 [2006]，63）; 并比较 Penelhum 1989，120）。现在，对特定信仰命题的真实性的实际承诺是否超出充分的证据支持，将取决于以下假设：（a） 应该在哪里设定 “充分性” 所需的证据支持水平，以及 （b） 命题信仰承诺需要多么坚定和决定性。在一些这样的假设上，例如贝叶斯学派提出的假设，阿奎那所举出的证据所提供的支持 —— 或者，通过对这些证据的适当当代升级，如理查德・斯威本（Richard Swinburne）的著作中提供的证据 —— 可以被认为足以使有神论信仰命题的真理性具有足够高的信念（或可信度），这样信徒就不必冒险超越他们的证据的支持。因此，将阿奎那的信仰模式解释为符合证据主义可能是可行的。然而，阿奎那自己在这些问题上的假设可能使他比通常认为的更接近克尔凯郭尔和蒂利希（考虑 Summa Theologiae 2a2ae 4,1 和 2a2ae 6,1（Aquinas [2006]，117-9 和 167））。

The special role of faith-propositions

信仰命题的特殊作用

Bayesians might argue that there is no occasion for faith as doxastic venture since, once practical commitment to the truth of propositions is recognised as a matter of degree, whatever the state of the available evidence relating to a given proposition, there will always (given initial credences) be a rational credence properly associated with that evidence, and hence there are no possible circumstances where “the evidence does not decide,” so that an evidentialist requirement can indeed apply universally. Note, however, Lara Buchak’s (2012, 2018) discussion of ways in which Bayesians might understand faith as going beyond the evidence, and her own proposal that faith-ventures essentially include an additional practical commitment, which may be rational under certain conditions, not to inquire further into evidence relevant to the truth of the propositions concerned for the sole purpose of deciding what to do. (For critical discussion of this kind of restriction on inquiry in connection with faith commitments, see Dormandy 2018 and Howard-Snyder and McKaughan 2022a. Katherine Dormandy has recently proposed a positive defence of evidentialism in considering the question of what makes it good to form positive beliefs about those you have faith in, including God (Dormandy 2022).)
贝叶斯主义者可能会争辩说，信仰作为教条主义的冒险是没有机会的，因为一旦对命题真理的实际承诺被承认为程度问题，无论与给定命题相关的可用证据的状态如何，总会（给定最初的可信度）存在与该证据适当相关的理性可信度，因此，不存在 “证据不决定” 的可能情况，因此证据主义的要求确实可以普遍适用。然而，请注意，Lara Buchak （2012，2018） 讨论了贝叶斯主义者可能将信仰理解为超越证据的方式，以及她自己的建议，即信仰冒险本质上包括额外的实际承诺，在某些条件下可能是合理的，不是为了决定做什么而进一步调查与相关命题的真实性相关的证据。信仰承诺，见 Dormandy 2018 和 Howard-Snyder and McKaughan 2022a。 凯瑟琳・多曼迪 （Katherine Dormandy） 最近在考虑对包括上帝在内的信仰者形成积极信念的问题时，提出了对证据主义的积极辩护（Dormandy 2022）。

If the domain of faith is, as Stephen Evans puts it, “the assumptions, convictions and attitudes which the believer brings to the evidence for and against religious truth” (Evans 1985, 178), and faith’s cognitive component offers a “total interpretation” of the world of our experience (Hick 1966, 154), then (foundational) faith-propositions function as “highest-order framing principles” which necessarily cannot have their truth settled by appeal to the force of a body of independent evidence (Bishop 2007a, 139–44). Taking such a faith-proposition to be true, then, is not something that comes in degrees: either one “buys into” the overall worldview (foundational) faith-propositions propose, or one does not. Such a choice is existentially important, and settling it raises anxiety about exercising a responsibility that cannot—without “bad faith”—be transferred onto the relatively impersonal function of one’s reason, since a venture beyond any inter-subjectively rational evidential confirmation is required. The doxastic venture model may thus be regarded as capturing the spiritual challenge of faith more satisfactorily than do models that conform to evidentialism. This is because, on the doxastic venture model, faith involves a deeper surrender of self-reliant control, not only in trusting God, but in accepting at the level of practical commitment that there is a God—indeed, this God—who is to be trusted.
如果像斯蒂芬・埃文斯（Stephen Evans）所说的那样，信仰的领域是 “信徒为支持和反对宗教真理的证据而提出的假设、信念和态度”（Evans 1985,178），而信仰的认知成分提供了对我们经验世界的 “全面解释”（Hick 1966,154），那么（基础）信仰命题就充当了 “最高阶的框架原则”，这些原则必然不能通过诉诸独立证据的力量来解决其真理（毕晓普 2007a，139-44）。因此，将这样的信仰命题视为真理并不是有程度的事情：要么一个人 “接受” 所提出的整体世界观（基础）信仰命题，要么不。这样的选择在存在上是重要的，解决它会引起对行使责任的焦虑，这种责任不能 —— 如果没有 “恶意”—— 转移到一个人的理性的相对非个人的功能上，因为需要超越任何主体间理性证据确认的冒险。因此，与符合证据主义的模式相比，doxastic 冒险模式可能被认为更令人满意地捕捉到了信仰的属灵挑战。这是因为，在 doxastic 的冒险模型中，信仰涉及更深层次地放弃自力更生的控制权，不仅在信靠上帝方面，而且在实际承诺的层面上接受有一位上帝 —— 事实上，这位上帝 —— 是值得信任的。

Doxastic venture models of faith and epistemic concern

信仰和认识论关注的冒险模型

Doxastic venture in relation to faith-propositions can be justifiable, of course, only if there are legitimate exceptions to the evidentialist requirement to take a proposition to be true just to the extent of its evidential support—and only if the legitimate exceptions include the kind of case involved in religious, theistic, faith-commitment.
当然，只有当证据主义者要求在证据支持范围内将一个命题视为真实时，才有合法的例外，并且只有当合法的例外包括涉及宗教、有神论和信仰承诺的那种情况时，与信仰命题有关的教条主义冒险才是合理的。

A possible view of theistic faith-commitment is that it is wholly independent of the epistemic concern that cares about evidential support. On this view, faith reveals its authenticity most clearly when it takes faith-propositions to be true contrary to the weight of the evidence. This view is widely described as “fideist,” but ought more fairly to be called arational fideism, or, where commitment contrary to the evidence is positively favored, irrational or counter-rational fideism. Despite its popular attribution both to the church father Tertullian and to “the father of existentialism,” Kierkegaard, counter-rational fideism does not seem to have been espoused by any significant theist philosophers (passages in Tertullian and Kierkegaard that appear to endorse this position may be interpreted as emphasizing that Christian faith requires accepting, not logical contradiction, but “contradiction” of our “natural” expectations, wholly overturned in the revelation that the power of divine love is triumphant in the Crucified One).
对有神论信仰承诺的一种可能观点是，它完全独立于关心证据支持的认识论关注。根据这种观点，当信仰认为信仰命题是真实的，与证据的分量相反时，它最清楚地揭示了它的真实性。这种观点被广泛描述为 “信仰主义”，但更应该被公平地称为非理性信仰主义，或者，在与证据相反的承诺受到积极支持的情况下，非理性或反理性的信仰主义。尽管它被广泛归因于教父德尔图良和 “存在主义之父” 克尔凯郭尔，但反理性信仰主义似乎并未得到任何重要的有神论哲学家的支持（特图良和克尔凯郭尔中似乎支持这一立场的段落可能被解释为强调基督教信仰需要接受，不是逻辑上的矛盾，而是我们的 “自然” 期望的 “矛盾”，在启示中完全推翻了神圣之爱的力量在被钉十字架的人身上取得胜利）。

Serious philosophical defense of a doxastic venture model of faith thus implies a moderate version of fideism, for which epistemic concern is not overridden and for which, therefore, it is a constraint on faith-commitment that it not accept what is known, or justifiably believed on the evidence, to be false. Rather, faith commits itself only beyond, and not against, the evidence—and it does so out of epistemic concern to grasp truth on matters of vital existential importance. The thought that one may be entitled to commit to an existentially momentous truth-claim in principle undecidable on the evidence when forced to decide either to do so or not is what motivates William James’s “justification of faith” in “The Will to Believe” (James 1896 [1956]). If such faith is to be justified, its cognitive content will (on realist assumptions) have to cohere with our best evidence-based theories about the real world. Faith may extend our scientific grasp of the real, but may not counter it. Whether the desire to grasp more truth about the real than science can supply is a noble aspiration or a dangerous delusion is at the heart of the debate about entitlement to faith on this moderate fideist doxastic venture model.
因此，对教条主义的信仰冒险模式的严肃哲学辩护意味着一种温和的信仰主义，对这种信仰主义的关注并没有被推翻，因此，它对信仰承诺的限制是，它不接受已知的，或有理由相信的证据，是错误的。相反，信仰只是超越证据，而不是反对证据 —— 它这样做是出于认识论的关注，即在具有至关重要的存在意义的问题上掌握真理。一个人可能有权承诺一个存在重大的真理主张，原则上是无法根据证据决定的，当被迫决定是否这样做时，这就是威廉・詹姆斯在《信仰的意志》（詹姆斯，1896 [1956]）中 “信仰的辩护” 的动机。如果这种信念是合理的，那么它的认知内容（在现实主义的假设上）必须与我们关于现实世界的最佳循证理论相一致。信仰可以扩展我们对真实的科学把握，但可能无法对抗它。掌握比科学所能提供的更多关于真实真相的渴望是一种崇高的愿望还是一种危险的错觉，这是关于信仰权利的辩论的核心，这种温和的信仰主义教条主义冒险模型。

A discussion of the debate between the moderate, Jamesian, fideist and the evidentialist is beyond this entry’s scope. Still, it is worth remarking that those who think that faith understood as doxastic venture may be justified as reasonable face the challenge of providing the tools for weeding out intuitively unreasonable forms of faith. On the other side, those evidentialists who reject doxastic venture as always impermissible have to consider whether taking a stance on the nature of reality beyond anything science can even in principle confirm may not, in the end, be unavoidable, and potentially implicated in the commitments required for science itself (see Bishop 2007a, Chapters 8 and 9; Bishop 2023). For a useful recent collection of articles on the wider theme of the relation of religious faith to intellectual virtue, see Callahan and O’Connor 2014.
对温和派、詹姆斯派、信仰派和证据论者之间辩论的讨论超出了本条目的范围。尽管如此，值得一提的是，那些认为信仰被理解为教条主义的冒险可能被证明是合理的，因为他们面临着提供工具来消除直觉上不合理的信仰形式的挑战。另一方面，那些拒绝 doxastic 冒险的证据主义者必须考虑，对现实的本质采取超越科学甚至原则上可以确认的任何东西的立场，最终是否可能不是不可避免的，并且可能与科学本身所需的承诺有关（见 Bishop 2007a，第 8 章和第 9 章；主教 2023 年）。有关宗教信仰与智力美德关系这一更广泛主题的有用的最新文章集，请参阅 Callahan 和 O’Connor 2014。

8. Venturing faith, without belief

冒险信仰，没有信仰

Some accounts allow that faith centrally involves practical commitment venturing beyond evidential support, yet do not require (or, even, permit) that the venturer actually believes the faith-proposition assumed to be true. Such accounts may be described as proposing a “non-doxastic” venture model of faith. F. R. Tennant holds a view of this kind: he takes faith to be the adoption of a line of conduct not warranted by present facts, that involves experimenting with the possible or ideal, venturing into the unknown and taking the risk of disappointment and defeat. Faith is not an attempt to will something into existence but rather treating hoped-for and unseen things as if they were real and then acting accordingly (Tennant 1943 [1989, 104]). Swinburne refers to this as the “pragmatist” model of faith (Swinburne 2005, 147–8; Swinburne 2001, 211; compare also Golding 1990, 2003 and McKaughan 2016). The origins of Swinburne’s pragmatist model are to be found in a much earlier paper, Swinburne 1969.
一些记载允许信仰核心涉及实际的承诺，冒险超越证据支持，但并不要求（或者，甚至允许）冒险者实际上相信假设为真的信仰命题。这些叙述可以被描述为提出了一种 “非人肉崇拜” 的信仰冒险模式。F.R. 坦南特（F. R. Tennant）持有这种观点：他认为信仰是采取一种目前事实所没有根据的行为方式，即尝试可能的或理想的事物，冒险进入未知领域，并冒着失望和失败的风险。信仰不是试图将某物变为存在，而是将希望和看不见的事物视为真实事物，然后采取相应的行动（Tennant 1943 [1989，104]）。斯威本将其称为 “实用主义” 的信仰模式（斯威本 2005，147-8; 斯威本 2001，211; 还比较 Golding 1990,2003 和 McKaughan 2016）。斯威本实用主义模型的起源可以在更早的论文中找到，斯威本 1969 年。

William Alston (1996) suggests that faith may involve an active “acceptance” rather than purely receptive belief. A clearly non-doxastic venture model results if acceptance is understood on Jonathan Cohen’s account under which to accept that p is “to have or adopt a policy of deeming, positing, or postulating that p—i.e. of including that proposition … among one’s premisses for deciding what to do or think in a particular context, whether or not one feels it to be true that p” (Cohen 1992, 4, our emphasis). The firmness of faith-commitment is then just the firmness of one’s “resolve to use [faith-claims] as a basis for one’s thought, attitude and behaviour” (Alston 1996, 17): there is no firm assurance of their truth. Decisive commitment in the absence of such assurance may nevertheless be possible, motivated (as Swinburne suggested in the first edition of his Faith and Reason) by the evaluative belief that “unless [faith-propositions are true], that which is most worthwhile is not to be had” (Swinburne, 1981, 117). A faith venture that lacks belief in the faith-proposition to which commitment is made need not, and probably could not, lack cognitive components altogether, as this suggestion of Swinburne’s indicates.
威廉・奥尔斯顿（William Alston，1996）认为，信仰可能涉及积极的 “接受”，而不是纯粹的接受信仰。如果乔纳森・科恩（Jonathan Cohen）的账户理解了接受，那么就会产生一个明显的非教条主义风险模型，根据该模型，接受 p 是 “拥有或采用一种政策，即认为、假设或假设该 p—— 即包括该命题… 在一个人决定在特定情况下做什么或思考什么的前提中，无论一个人是否认为 p’（Cohen 1992,4，我们的重点）。因此，信仰承诺的坚定性只是一个人 “决心使用 [信仰主张] 作为一个人的思想、态度和行为的基础”（Alston 1996,17）的坚定性：对其真理没有坚定的保证。然而，在没有这种保证的情况下，决定性的承诺可能是可能的，其动机（正如斯威本在他的《信仰与理性》第一版中所建议的那样）是由一种评价性信念所激励的，即 “除非 [信仰命题是真实的]，否则最有价值的东西是不能拥有的”（斯威本，1981,117）。一个信仰冒险，如果对所承诺的信仰命题缺乏信念，那么它不需要，也可能不可能完全缺乏认知成分，正如斯威本的这个建议所表明的那样。

Andrei Buckareff (2005) and J. L. Schellenberg (2005, 138–9) propose non-doxastic (or, “sub-doxastic”) venture models of propositional faith, with Schellenberg emphasising the positive evaluation that persons of faith make of the truth-claim to which they commit themselves. In response to Daniel Howard-Snyder (2013a) Schellenberg allows that faith may in some instances involve belief while still maintaining that “non-doxastic religious faith … will turn out to be a particularly important way of having religious faith as we head into the future” (2013, 262). Bishop (2005), in response to Buckareff, also agrees that authentic faith need not always be a specifically doxastic venture. There may, then, be an emerging consensus amongst proponents of venture models that faith, at its core, consists in suitably motivated persistent practical commitment “beyond the evidence” to the positively evaluated truth of foundational faith-claims which may, but need not, actually be believed to be true.
Andrei Buckareff （2005） 和 J. L. Schellenberg （2005，138-9） 提出了命题信仰的非 doxastic（或 “sub-doxastic”）冒险模型，Schellenberg 强调有信仰的人对他们所承诺的真理主张做出的积极评价。作为对丹尼尔・霍华德・斯奈德（Daniel Howard-Snyder，2013a）的回应，谢伦伯格允许信仰在某些情况下可能涉及信仰，同时仍然保持 “非教条主义的宗教信仰… 当我们走向未来时，将成为拥有宗教信仰的一种特别重要的方式 “（2013,262）。毕晓普（2005）在回应巴卡雷夫时也同意，真正的信仰不一定总是一个特定的教条主义冒险。因此，在风险模型的支持者中，可能会形成一种共识，即信仰的核心在于 “超越证据” 的有适当动机的持续实践承诺，对基本信仰主张的积极评估真理，这些真理可能，但不一定，实际上被认为是真实的。

Robert Audi (2011) has also defended a non-doxastic account of faith, contrasting “fiducial faith” and “doxastic faith,” and arguing that authentic religious faith need only amount to the former. Audi’s account is not strictly a “venture” model, however, since he does not take commitment beyond the support of adequate evidence to be essential. Audi’s account suggests that religious faith is sui generis, but capable of being understood through its relations with other psychological states and actions, such as beliefs, evaluations and practical commitments. Rational assessment of religious faith, Audi thinks, must avoid treating it as implying belief, while recognising that greater confidence attaches to it than to religious hope. For another version of a non-doxastic account of faith, as a person’s “affective orientation or stance,” see Jonathan Kvanvig (2013, 2018). The question whether faith entails belief (even if it may not consist purely in beliefs) remains a lively focus of debate. For defence of the view that faith entails belief, see Malcolm and Scott 2016 and Mugg 2021; for criticism see Howard-Snyder 2019.
罗伯特・奥迪（Robert Audi，2011）也为一种非宗教信仰的叙述辩护，将 “信托信仰” 和 “宗教信仰” 进行对比，并认为真正的宗教信仰只需要相当于前者。然而，奥迪的叙述并不是严格意义上的 “风险投资” 模式，因为他并不认为除了充分证据支持之外的承诺是必要的。奥迪的叙述表明，宗教信仰是独一无二的，但能够通过其与其他心理状态和行为的关系来理解，例如信仰、评估和实际承诺。奥迪认为，对宗教信仰的理性评估必须避免将其视为暗示信仰，同时要认识到，对宗教信仰的信心比对宗教希望的信心更大。对于信仰的非教条主义描述的另一种版本，作为一个人的 “情感取向或立场”，见 Jonathan Kvanvig （2013，2018） 。信仰是否意味着信仰（即使它可能不纯粹由信仰组成）仍然是一个激烈的辩论焦点。对于信仰需要信仰的观点的辩护，请参阅 Malcolm and Scott 2016 和 Mugg 2021; 有关批评，请参阅 Howard-Snyder 2019。

9. Faith and hope

信心与希望

Some philosophers have suggested that the epistemological challenges faced by accounts of faith as involving belief beyond the evidence may be avoided by construing theist commitment as hope. Theist hope seems not to be mere tenacity (“clinging to one’s hopes”) (Taylor 1961), but a more complex attitude. James Muyskens suggests, for example, that one who hopes “keep [s] his life open or fluid with respect to [a faith-proposition] p—where (a) neither p nor not-p is certain for him, (b) he wants p and © he sees p as constructively connected with his own well-being and/or concept of himself as a person” (1979, 35). Muyskens contrasts hope with faith (understood as belief), arguing that a religion of hope is both epistemically and religiously superior to a religion of faith. But faith is not generally understood as competing with hope (Creel 1993), and some philosophers identify faith with hoping that the claims of faith are true (Pojman 1986; 2003). Hope as such is an attitude rather than an active commitment, and, as Audi observes, it contrasts with the attitude of faith at least in this respect, namely, that surprise makes little sense as a response to discovering that the object of one’s faith is indeed the case, whereas there need be nothing inappropriate in surprise at the fulfillment of one’s hopes (see Audi 2011, 74).
一些哲学家认为，通过将有神论的承诺解释为希望，可以避免对信仰的叙述所面临的认识论挑战，因为它涉及证据之外的信仰。有神论者的希望似乎不仅仅是坚韧（“坚持自己的希望”）（Taylor 1961），而是一种更复杂的态度。例如，詹姆斯・穆斯肯斯（James Muyskens）认为，希望 “在 [信仰命题] p 方面保持他的生活开放或流动的人 —— 其中（a）p 和不 p 对他来说都不确定，（b）他想要 p，（c）他认为 p 与他自己的幸福和 / 或他自己作为一个人的概念有建设性的联系”（1979，35）. 穆伊斯肯斯将希望与信仰（理解为信仰）进行对比，认为希望的宗教在认识论和宗教上都优于信仰的宗教。但信仰通常不被理解为与希望竞争（Creel 1993），一些哲学家将信仰等同于希望信仰的主张是真实的（Pojman 1986; 2003）。希望本身就是一种态度，而不是一种积极的承诺，正如奥迪所观察到的那样，它至少在这方面与信仰的态度形成鲜明对比，即，在发现一个人的信仰对象确实是事实确实如此时，这种惊讶几乎没有意义，而对一个人的希望的实现感到惊讶并没有什么不合适的（见奥迪 2011，74).

A more adequate model of faith as hope, then, may rather take faith to be acting in, or from, hope. Such a model then comes close to a non-doxastic venture model of faith, differing only in so far as acting from hope that God exists differs from taking this claim to be true (albeit without belief) in one’s practical reasoning, but this difference may be undetectable at the level of behavioral outcomes (see McKaughan 2013). A model of faith as acting in hope shares with the doxastic and non-doxastic venture models in rejecting the view that faith requires cognitive certainty. But one can act in hope with firmness and resilience, given a strong affective/evaluative stance, even if one lacks belief that one’s hopes will be fulfilled. Hoping that p, however, does not involve taking a stand on its being true that p, which is widely thought to be essential to faith.
因此，一个更恰当的信仰模式作为希望，可能更愿意将信仰视为在希望中行动，或从希望中行动。因此，这样的模型接近于一种非教条主义的信仰冒险模型，仅在于出于对上帝存在的希望而行动与在一个人的实际推理中将这种主张视为真实（尽管没有信仰）不同，但这种差异可能在行为结果的层面上是无法察觉的（见 McKaughan 2013）。在希望中行动的信仰模式与 doxastic 和非 doxastic 冒险模型相同，都拒绝了信仰需要认知确定性的观点。但是，一个人可以坚定而坚韧地在希望中采取行动，只要有强烈的情感 / 评价立场，即使一个人不相信自己的希望会实现。然而，希望 p 并不涉及对它的真实性采取立场，而 p 被广泛认为对信仰至关重要。

The “venture” models of faith (with or without belief) and the model of faith as a venture in hope all fit the view that faith is consistent with doubt, and, indeed, impossible without doubt of some kind, though they allow that persons who have faith may give firm and sustained commitment to the truth of faith-propositions in practice (for discussion of different kinds of doubt and their compatibility or incompatibility with faith and belief see Howard-Snyder 2013b, 359). The “certainty” of faith on these models is more a matter of the certainty that persons of faith find themselves conferring on the foundational claims of their faith, rather than a matter of discovering in themselves a certain knowledge or intellectual conviction of the truth of these claims. It is possible, then, on these accounts of faith, to be a committed person of faith and also an “agnostic” in Thomas Huxley’s original sense of someone who does not claim as knowledge the commitments he or she nevertheless makes as a foundational practical orientation to reality. (For discussion of the compatibility of Muslim faith and doubt, see Aijaz 2023.)
信仰的 “冒险” 模式（有信仰或没有信仰）和信仰作为希望冒险的模式都符合这样一种观点，即信仰与怀疑是一致的，事实上，如果没有某种怀疑，就不可能，尽管它们允许有信仰的人在实践中对信仰命题的真理做出坚定和持续的承诺（关于不同种类的怀疑及其与信仰和信仰的兼容性或不相容性的讨论，见霍华德 - 斯奈德 2013b，359）。在这些模型上，信仰的 “确定性” 更多的是有信仰的人发现自己赋予他们信仰的基本主张的确定性问题，而不是在他们自己身上发现对这些主张的真实性的某种知识或智力信念的问题。因此，根据这些关于信仰的叙述，有可能成为一个坚定的信仰者，同时也是一个托马斯・赫胥黎（Thomas Huxley）原本意义上的 “不可知论者”，即一个不声称他或她仍然作为对现实的基本实践取向的承诺为知识的人。（有关穆斯林信仰和怀疑的兼容性的讨论，请参阅 Aijaz 2023。）

10. Faith as a virtue

信仰是一种美德

Faith is traditionally regarded as one of the “theological” virtues. If a virtue is a “disposition of character which instantiates or promotes responsiveness to one or more basic goods,” then theistic faith qualifies since it is “a responsiveness to practical hope and truth,” provided theistic faith-claims are indeed true (Chappell 1996, 27). Faith will not, however, be a virtue as such, if it is accepted that faith can be misplaced or, even, “demonic,” directed upon a “false ultimate” (Tillich 1957 [2001, 21]). To be virtuous, faith must be faith in a worthy object: it is faith in God that is the theological virtue. More generally, faith is virtuous only when it is faith to which one is entitled. An account of the conditions under which faith is permissible is thus the key to an ethics of faith.
信仰传统上被认为是 “神学” 美德之一。如果一种美德是 “体现或促进对一种或多种基本商品的反应的性格性格”，那么有神论信仰就有资格，因为它是 “对实际希望和真理的回应”，只要有神论的信仰主张确实是真实的（Chappell 1996,27）。然而，如果人们接受信仰可能是错位的，或者甚至是 “恶魔般的”，指向 “虚假的终极”，那么信仰本身就不是一种美德（Tillich 1957 [2001，21]）。要成为有德行的人，信心必须是对一个有价值的对象的信心：对上帝的信仰才是神学的美德。更一般地说，只有当一个人有权获得信仰时，信仰才是美德的。因此，对信仰被允许的条件的解释是信仰伦理的关键。

On models of faith as a (special) kind of knowledge, or as firmly held belief, it may seem puzzling how faith could be a virtue—unless some implicit practical component emerges when such models are further explicated, or, alternatively, a case may be made for the claim that what is involuntary may nevertheless be praiseworthy, with theist faith as a case in point (Adams 1987). (For discussion of how faith might be voluntary, even if faith entails belief, or indeed is a type of belief, and belief is not under our direct voluntary control, see Rettler 2018.) Furthermore, as already suggested (Sections 4 & 5 above), models of faith as knowledge or belief fail to provide non-circular conditions sufficient for entitlement, unless the truth of faith-propositions is established by independent argument and evidence. If faith is understood as, or as essentially including, beliefs held on insufficient evidence, it is also hard to understand why Abrahamic religious traditions have valued it so highly, let alone why God might be thought to make salvation contingent on such belief (Kvanvig 2018, 106; McKaughan and Howard-Snyder 2021).
关于信仰作为一种（特殊）知识的模型，或者作为坚定的信念，信仰如何可能成为一种美德，这似乎令人困惑 —— 除非在进一步阐述这些模型时出现一些隐含的实际成分，或者，或者，可以提出一个案例，声称非自愿的东西可能是值得称赞的，有神论的信仰就是一个例子（Adams 1987）。（有关信仰如何是自愿的讨论，即使信仰需要信仰，或者确实是一种信仰，并且信仰不受我们直接自愿控制，请参阅 Rettler 2018。此外，正如已经建议的那样（上文第 4 节和第 5 节），作为知识或信仰的信仰模式无法提供足够的非循环条件来获得权利，除非信仰命题的真实性是由独立的论证和证据确定的。如果信仰被理解为或基本上包括建立在证据不足的基础上的信仰，那么也很难理解为什么亚伯拉罕的宗教传统如此高度地重视它，更不用说为什么上帝可能被认为以这种信仰为基础来获得救赎（Kvanvig 2018，106;McKaughan 和 Howard-Snyder 2021）。

Fiducial models of faith seem more attuned to exhibiting faith as a virtue, though a defence of the trustworthiness of the one who is trusted for salvation may be required. Doxastic and non-doxastic venture models of faith can vindicate faith as a virtue, provided they provide robust entitlement conditions, to ensure that not just any “leap of faith” is permissible. The Jamesian account already mentioned (Section 7) aims to meet this need. James’s own view of what suffices to justify a faith-venture arguably needs an ethical supplement: both the non-evidential motivation for the venture and its content must be morally acceptable (Bishop 2007a, 163–6).

如果宗教类型的信仰要被视为有价值和 / 或有道德的，那么似乎在做出的承诺中必须有适当程度的韧性（参见 Howard-Snyder 和 McKaughan 2022b，关于信仰需要韧性的论点；关于韧性信仰的价值和潜在美性或恶毒的讨论，参见 McKaughan 和 Howard-Snyder 2023a；关于韧性信仰的合理性，见 Buchak 2017，Jackson 2021，和 McKaughan 2016）。具有宗教信仰和忠诚的人都对他们的承诺对象充满信仰并忠于他们的承诺对象，尽管突出的忠诚可能是信仰的不断更新，而不是保持信仰不变的问题（Pace and McKaughan 2020）。参见 Audi 2014 年关于信仰和忠诚与美德相关的讨论。Audi 为忠诚辩护，认为忠诚就像勇气一样，是一种 “辅助” 美德，并认为成为 “有信仰的人” 算作 “人格美德”。

Faith is only one of the Christian theological virtues, of course, the others being hope and charity (or love, agapē): St. Paul famously affirms that the greatest of these is love (I Cor. 13:13). The question thus arises how these three virtues are related. One suggestion is that faith is taking it to be true that there are grounds for the hope that love is supreme—not simply in the sense that love constitutes the ideal of the supreme good, but in the sense that living in accordance with this ideal constitutes an ultimate salvation, fulfilment or consummation that is, in reality, victorious over all that may undermine it (in a word, over evil). The supremacy of love is linked to the supremacy of the divine itself, since love is the essential nature of the divine. What is hoped for, and what faith assures us is properly hoped for, is a sharing in the divine itself, loving as God loves (see Brian Davies on Aquinas, 2002). On this understanding, reducing faith to a kind of hope (Section 9 above) would eradicate an important relation between the two—namely that people of faith take reality to be such that their hope (for salvation, the triumph of the good) is well founded, and not merely an attractive fantasy or inspiring ideal. (See Jeffrey 2017 for discussion of the moral permissibility of faith, particularly in connection with hope.)

11. Faith beyond (orthodox) theism

What is the potential scope of faith? On some models, the kind of faith exemplified by theistic faith is found only there. On models which take faith to consist in knowledge or belief, faith is intrinsically linked to theological content—indeed, in the case of Christian faith, to orthodox Christian theological content, specifiable as one unified set of doctrines conveyed to receptive human minds by the operation of divine grace. The venture models, however, allow for the possibility that authentic faith may be variously realised, and be directed upon different, and mutually incompatible, intentional objects. This pluralism is an important feature of accounts of faith in the American pragmatist tradition. John Dewey strongly rejected the notion of faith as a special kind of knowledge (Dewey 1934, 20), as did William James, whose “justification of faith” rests on a permissibility thesis, under which varied and conflicting faith-commitments may equally have a place in the “intellectual republic” (James 1896 [1956, 30]). Charles S. Peirce, another influential American pragmatist, arguably held a non-doxastic view of faith (Pope 2018).

杜威和詹姆斯都为信仰模式辩护，以期推进这样一种观点，即真正的宗教信仰可以在通常被认为是神学正统的东西之外找到。此外，他们认为 “非正统” 信仰可能比 “正统” 信仰更真实。杜威说：“宗教信仰，”[我应该描述为] 通过效忠于包容性的理想目标来统一自我，想象力向我们展示了这些目标，人类的意志对此做出了回应，认为它值得控制我们的欲望和选择 “（1934,33）。雅各说：“宗教基本上说了两件事：第一，她说最好的东西是更永恒的东西，重叠的东西，宇宙中扔最后一块石头的东西，可以说，说出最后一句话。…〔和〕对宗教的第二个肯定是，如果我们相信她的第一个肯定是真实的，我们现在会变得更好 “（詹姆斯 1896 [1956，25-6]）。虽然杜威和詹姆斯关于正当信仰的一些观点可能看起来不现实，但事实上，他们都保留了这样一种观点，即宗教信仰渴望在证据之外掌握关于现实的重要真理。例如，杜威（Dewey）认为，宗教信仰是希望的基础，因为它需要对现实世界有一定的真实性，“这些真实性使一个人度过了黑暗和绝望的时期，以至于他们失去了通常的抑郁性格”（1934,14-5）。

A general—i.e., non-theologically specific—account of the religious kind of faith may have potential as a tool for criticising specific philosophical formulations of the content of religious faith. The conditions for permissible faith-venture may exclude faith in God under certain inadequate conceptions of who or what God is. Arguably, the “personal omniGod” of much contemporary philosophy of religion is just such an inadequate conception (Bishop 2007b). An understanding of what faith is, then, may motivate radical explorations into the concept of God as held in the theistic traditions (Bishop 1998; Johnston 2009; Bishop and Perszyk 2014, 2023).

Can there be faith of the same general kind as found in theistic religious faith yet without adherence to any theistic tradition? Those who agree with F. R. Tennant that “faith is an outcome of the inborn propensity to self-conservation and self-betterment which is a part of human nature, and is no more a miraculously superadded endowment than is sensation or understanding” (1943 [1989, 111]) will consider that this must be a possibility. Tennant himself suggests that “much of the belief which underlies knowledge”—and he has scientific knowledge in mind—“is the outcome of faith which ventures beyond the apprehension and treatment of data to supposition, imagination and creation of ideal objects, and justifies its audacity and irrationality (in accounting them to be also real) by practical actualization” (1943 [1989, 100]). Faith in this sense, however, may not seem quite on a par with faith of the religious kind. True, scientists must act as if their “ideal objects” are real in putting their theories to the empirical test; but they will “account them to be also real” only when these tests do provide confirmation in accordance with the applicable inter-subjective norms.

如果信仰被理解为超越独立的主体间证据支持，对经验和现实的某种整体解释的真理的承诺，那么所有（以足够的坚定性）致力于这种世界观或世界观的人都将是有信仰的人。这种信仰可能是宗教性的，也可能是宗教性的，当然，它可能不是有神论的，就像在古典佛教或道教中那样。一些人认为信仰是人类的普遍性：例如，坎特威尔・史密斯（Cantwell Smith）将其描述为 “一种行星性的人类特征，[涉及] 感知、象征和忠诚而丰富地生活的能力，即 [人类] 生活的超然维度”（1979,140-141）。可以说，也可能存在非宗教信仰：例如，“科学无神论者” 或 “自然主义者” 可能在进行信仰冒险时，他们认为现实的存在不超过自然科学原则上可以发现的更多。然而，无神论建立在信仰冒险之上的建议将遭到那些坚持 “无神论假设” 的人的抵制（Flew，1976）：如果无神论在理性上是默认立场，那么采用它就不需要冒险。

An atheist’s faith-venture may, in any case, seem oddly so described on the grounds that it provides no basis for practical hope or trust. Providing such a basis may plausibly be thought necessary for faith—the truth to which the venturer commits must be existentially important in this way. (Note James’s requirement that faith-commitment is permissible only for resolving a “genuine option,” where a genuine option has inter alia to be “momentous,” that is, existentially significant and pressing (James 1896 [1956, 3–4]).) Truth-claims accepted by faith of the religious kind seem essentially to be “saving” truths—solutions to deep problems about the human situation. And there may thus be arguments as to which religious tradition offers the best solutions to human problems (see, for example, Yandell 1990, 1999). J. L. Schellenberg (2009) argues that the only kind of religious faith that could be justified (if any is) is a sceptical “ultimism,” in which one “assents” to and treats as real an imaginatively grasped conception of a metaphysically, axiologically and soteriologically ultimate reality.

然而，有些人可能会争辩说，一种建立在希望基础上的至关重要的信仰可以属于一个完全世俗的背景 —— 也就是说，在任何可识别的意义上都不能算作 “宗教”。例如，坎特威尔・史密斯（Cantwell Smith）声称，“希腊罗马遗产… 它在西方生活中的生育作用 [可以] 被看作是我们世界的主要精神传统之一 “（1979,139）。安妮特・拜尔（Annette Baier）认为，“我们在道德以及科学或知识获取方面需要的对上帝的信仰的世俗等价物，是对人类社会及其不断发展的过程的信仰 —— 对多手认知野心和道德希望的前景的信仰”（Baier 1980,133）。更广泛地说，一些人坚持认为，有意义的灵性与非宗教无神论的自然主义是一致的，并且包括类似于信仰的东西，作为灵性所必需的。例如，罗伯特・所罗门（Robert Solomon）将灵性视为 “生活中宏伟而深思熟虑的激情”，并认为 “按照这些激情生活” 需要选择将世界视为 “良性的，生活是有意义的”，悲剧性不应被否认，而是被接受（Solomon 2002,6 和 51）。（有关世俗背景下信仰的进一步讨论，请参阅 Preston-Roedder 2018，Tsai 2017 和 Ichikawa 2020；有关在宗教和世俗背景下解决信仰哲学中各种问题的特别期刊，请参阅 Rice et al. 2017；Malcolm 2023；McKaughan 和 Howard-Snyder 2023b.）

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via:

• Faith (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/faith/