认识论 | 知识与信念的历史哲学探究

注：机翻，未校。

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Epistemology: The History and Philosophy of ‘Knowledge’ and ‘Belief’

October 11, 2021

The word epistemology is derived from the ancient Greek epistēmē, meaning “knowledge”, and the suffix -logia, meaning “logical discourse”.
“认识论”一词源自古希腊语“epistēmē”，意思是“知识”，后缀“logia”，意思是“逻辑论述”。

Curated/Reviewed by Matthew A. McIntosh
Public Historian
Brewminate

Introduction

介绍

Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. Epistemologists study the nature, origin, and scope of knowledge, epistemic justification, the rationality of belief, and various related issues. Epistemology is considered a major subfield of philosophy, along with other major subfields such as ethics, logic, and metaphysics.[1]
认识论是与知识有关的哲学分支。认识论者研究知识的性质、起源和范围、认识论的正当性、信仰的合理性以及各种相关问题。认识论被认为是哲学的一个主要子领域，以及其他主要子领域，如伦理学、逻辑学和形而上学。[1]

Debates in epistemology are generally clustered around four core areas:[2][3][4]
认识论的争论通常围绕四个核心领域：[2][3][4]

1. The philosophical analysis of the nature of knowledge and the conditions required for a belief to constitute knowledge, such as truth and justification
   对知识的本质和信仰构成知识所需的条件的哲学分析，例如真理和称义
2. Potential sources of knowledge and justified belief, such as perception, reason, memory, and testimony
   知识和合理信念的潜在来源，例如感知、推理、记忆和证词
3. The structure of a body of knowledge or justified belief, including whether all justified beliefs must be derived from justified foundational beliefs or whether justification requires only a coherent set of beliefs
   一个知识体系或正当信念的结构，包括是否所有正当的信念都必须来自正当的基本信念，或者正当性是否只需要一套连贯的信念
4. Philosophical skepticism, which questions the possibility of knowledge, and related problems, such as whether skepticism poses a threat to our ordinary knowledge claims and whether it is possible to refute skeptical arguments
   哲学怀疑主义，质疑知识的可能性，以及相关问题，例如怀疑主义是否对我们的一般知识主张构成威胁，以及是否有可能反驳怀疑论点

In these debates and others, epistemology aims to answer questions such as “What do we know?”, “What does it mean to say that we know something?”, “What makes justified beliefs justified?”, and “How do we know that we know?”.[1][2][5][6][7]
在這些辯論和其他辯論中，認識論旨在回答一些問題，如“我們知道什麼？”、“說我們知道某事意味著什麼？”、“什麼使合理的信念是正當的？”以及“我們怎麼知道我們知道？”。[1][2][5][6][7]

Etymology and History

词源和历史

The word epistemology is derived from the ancient Greek epistēmē, meaning “knowledge”, and the suffix -logia, meaning “logical discourse” (derived from the Greek word logos meaning “discourse”).[8] The word’s appearance in English was predated by the German term Wissenschaftslehre (literally, theory of science), which was introduced by philosophers Johann Fichte and Bernard Bolzano in the late 18th century. The word “epistemology” first appeared in 1847, in a review in New York’s Eclectic Magazine. It was first used as a translation of the word Wissenschaftslehre as it appears in a philosophical novel by German author Jean Paul:
认识论一词源自古希腊语 epistēmē，意思是“知识”，后缀 -logia，意思是“逻辑话语”（源自希腊语 logos，意思是“话语”）。[8] 这个词在英语中的出现早于德语术语 Wissenschaftslehre（字面意思是科学理论），该术语由哲学家约翰·费希特和伯纳德·博尔扎诺在 18 世纪后期引入。“认识论”一词最早出现在1847年，发表在纽约《折衷主义杂志》的一篇评论中。它最初被用作德国作家让·保罗（Jean Paul）的一部哲学小说中出现的Wissenschaftslehre一词的翻译：

The title of one of the principal works of Fichte is ‘Wissenschaftslehre,’ which, after the analogy of technology … we render epistemology.[9]
费希特（Fichte）的主要作品之一的标题是“Wissenschaftslehre”，在技术类比之后…我们呈现认识论。[9]

The word “epistemology” was properly introduced into Anglophone philosophical literature by Scottish philosopher James Frederick Ferrier in 1854, who used it in his Institutes of Metaphysics:
1854年，苏格兰哲学家詹姆斯·弗雷德里克·费里尔（James Frederick Ferrier）将“认识论”一词正确地引入英语哲学文献中，他在《形而上学研究所》中使用了它：

This section of the science is properly termed the Epistemology—the doctrine or theory of knowing, just as ontology is the science of being… It answers the general question, ‘What is knowing and the known?’—or more shortly, ‘What is knowledge?’[10]
这门科学的这一部分被恰当地称为认识论——认识的学说或理论，就像本体论是关于存在的科学一样…它回答了一般性的问题，“什么是知道和已知？——或者更简单地说，“什么是知识？[10]

It is important to note that the French term épistémologie is used with a different and far narrower meaning than the English term “epistemology”, being used by French philosophers to refer solely to philosophy of science. For instance, Émile Meyerson opened his Identity and Reality, written in 1908, with the remark that the word ‘is becoming current’ as equivalent to ‘the philosophy of the sciences.’[11]
需要注意的是，法语术语“épistémologie”的使用与英语术语“epistemology”的含义不同且范围更窄，法国哲学家仅使用“认识论”来指代科学哲学。例如，埃米尔·迈耶森（Émile Meyerson）在1908年写的《身份与现实》一书的开头评论说，“正在变得流行”一词等同于“科学的哲学”。[11]

René Descartes, who is often credited as the father of modern philosophy, was often preoccupied with epistemological questions in his work. / Image courtesy Louvre Museum, Wikimedia Commons

Epistemology, as a distinct field of inquiry, predates the introduction of the term into the lexicon of philosophy. John Locke, for instance, described his efforts in Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) as an inquiry “into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent”.[12]
认识论作为一个独特的研究领域，早于该术语被引入哲学词典。例如，约翰·洛克（John Locke）在《关于人类理解的论文》（1689年）中将他的努力描述为“对人类知识的原始性、确定性和范围，以及信仰、观点和同意的理由和程度”的探究。[12]

Almost every major historical philosopher has considered questions about what we know and how we know it.[1] Among the Ancient Greek philosophers, Plato distinguished between inquiry regarding what we know and inquiry regarding what exists, particularly in the Republic, the Theaetetus, and the Meno.[1] A number of important epistemological concerns also appeared in the works of Aristotle.[1]
几乎每一位重要的历史哲学家都考虑过关于我们所知道的以及我们如何知道的问题。[1] 在古希腊哲学家中，柏拉图区分了对我们所知道的事物的探究和对存在的事物的探究，特别是在共和国、忒埃提图斯和梅诺。[1]亚里士多德的著作中也出现了一些重要的认识论问题。[1]

During the subsequent Hellenistic period, philosophical schools began to appear which had a greater focus on epistemological questions, often in the form of philosophical skepticism.[1] For instance, the Pyrrhonian skepticism of Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus held that eudaimonia (flourishing, happiness, or “the good life”) could be attained through the application of epoché (suspension of judgment) regarding all non-evident matters. Pyrrhonism was particularly concerned with undermining the epistemological dogmas of Stoicism and Epicureanism.[1] The other major school of Hellenistic skepticism was Academic skepticism, most notably defended by Carneades and Arcesilaus, which predominated in the Platonic Academy for almost two centuries.[1]
在随后的希腊化时期，哲学流派开始出现，这些流派更加关注认识论问题，通常以哲学怀疑主义的形式出现。[1] 例如，皮洛尼安（Pyrrhonian）和塞克斯图斯·恩皮里库斯（Sextus Empiricus）的怀疑论认为，eudaimonia（繁荣，幸福或“美好生活”）可以通过对所有非显而易见的事物应用epoché（暂停判断）来实现。皮洛洪主义特别关注破坏斯多葛主义和伊壁鸠鲁主义的认识论教条。[1] 希腊化怀疑主义的另一个主要学派是学术怀疑主义，最引人注目的是卡内阿德斯和阿尔塞西劳斯的辩护，它们在柏拉图学院中占主导地位近两个世纪。[1]

In ancient India the Ajñana school of ancient Indian philosophy promoted skepticism. Ajñana was a Śramaṇa movement and a major rival of early Buddhism, Jainism and the Ājīvika school. They held that it was impossible to obtain knowledge of metaphysical nature or ascertain the truth value of philosophical propositions; and even if knowledge was possible, it was useless and disadvantageous for final salvation. They were specialized in refutation without propagating any positive doctrine of their own.
在古印度，古印度哲学的阿吉纳纳学派提倡怀疑主义。Ajñana 是 Śramaṇa 运动，是早期佛教、耆那教和 Ājīvika 学派的主要竞争对手。他们认为，不可能获得形而上学本质的知识，也不可能确定哲学命题的真理价值;即使内识是可能的，它对最终的救赎也是无用和不利的。他们专门反驳，而没有传播任何他们自己的积极教义。

After the ancient philosophical era but before the modern philosophical era, a number of Medieval philosophers also engaged with epistemological questions at length. Most notable among the Medievals for their contributions to epistemology were Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham.[1]
在古代哲学时代之后，但在现代哲学时代之前，一些中世纪哲学家也深入探讨了认识论问题。中世纪人中最引人注目的是托马斯·阿奎那、约翰·邓斯·斯科特斯和奥卡姆的威廉。[1]

In the Islamic epistemology Islamic Golden Age which was booming prior to the Age of Enlightenment in Europe. One of the most prominent and influential philosophers, theologians, jurists, logicians and mystics Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali wrote over 70 books, including his best-known work in 1107 CE, his spiritual autobiography, “Deliverance from Error” (Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal). In this book Al-Ghazali was seeking to know what we can be certain about: what is true knowledge and not just opinion?
在欧洲启蒙时代之前蓬勃发展的伊斯兰认识论中，伊斯兰黄金时代正在蓬勃发展。阿布·哈米德·加扎利是最杰出和最有影响力的哲学家、神学家、法学家、逻辑学家和神秘主义者之一，他写了 70 多本书，包括他在公元 1107 年最著名的作品，他的精神自传“从错误中解脱”（Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal）。在这本书中，加扎利试图知道我们可以确定什么：什么是真正的知识，而不仅仅是意见？

Epistemology largely came to the fore in philosophy during the early modern period, which historians of philosophy traditionally divide up into a dispute between empiricists (including Francis Bacon, John Locke, David Hume, and George Berkeley) and rationalists (including René Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, and Gottfried Leibniz).[1] The debate between them has often been framed using the question of whether knowledge comes primarily from sensory experience (empiricism), or whether a significant portion of our knowledge is derived entirely from our faculty of reason (rationalism). According to some scholars, this dispute was resolved in the late 18th century by Immanuel Kant, whose transcendental idealism famously made room for the view that “though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all [knowledge] arises out of experience”.[13]
认识论在近代早期在很大程度上在哲学中脱颖而出，哲学史家传统上将其分为经验主义者（包括弗朗西斯·培根、约翰·洛克、大卫·休谟和乔治·伯克利）和理性主义者（包括勒内·笛卡尔、巴鲁克·斯宾诺莎和戈特弗里德·莱布尼茨）之间的争论。[1]他们之间的辩论经常使用这样一个问题来构建，即知识是否主要来自感官经验（经验主义），或者我们知识的很大一部分是否完全来自我们的理性能力（理性主义）。根据一些学者的说法，这一争论在18世纪后期由伊曼纽尔·康德（Immanuel Kant）解决，他的先验唯心主义为“尽管我们所有的知识都始于经验，但绝不是所有的[知识]都源于经验”的观点提供了著名的空间。[13]

There are a number of different methods that contemporary scholars use when trying to understand the relationship between past epistemology and contemporary epistemology. One of the most contentious questions is this: “Should we assume that the problems of epistemology are perennial, and that trying to reconstruct and evaluate Plato’s or Hume’s or Kant’s arguments is meaningful for current debates, too?”[14] Similarly, there is also a question of whether contemporary philosophers should aim to rationally reconstruct and evaluate historical views in epistemology, or to merely describe them.[14] Barry Stroud claims that doing epistemology competently requires the historical study of past attempts to find philosophical understanding of the nature and scope of human knowledge.[15] He argues that since inquiry may progress over time, we may not realize how different the questions that contemporary epistemologists ask are from questions asked at various different points in the history of philosophy.[15]
当代学者在试图理解过去认识论和当代认识论之间的关系时，使用了许多不同的方法。最有争议的问题之一是：“我们是否应该假设认识论的问题是永恒的，并且试图重建和评估柏拉图、休谟或康德的论点对当前的辩论也有意义？“[14]同样，也存在一个问题，即当代哲学家是否应该以理性地重构和评估认识论的历史观点为目标，还是仅仅描述它们。[14] 巴里·斯特劳德（Barry Stroud）声称，要胜任认识论，就需要对过去试图找到对人类知识本质和范围的哲学理解的历史研究。[15]他认为，由于探究可能会随着时间的推移而发展，我们可能没有意识到当代认识论者提出的问题与哲学史上不同时期提出的问题有多么不同。[15]

Central Concepts in Epistemology

认识论中的中心概念

Knowledge

知识

Bertrand Russell famously brought attention to the distinction between propositional knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance. / Photo via Wikimedia Commons

Nearly all debates in epistemology are in some way related to knowledge. Most generally, “knowledge” is a familiarity, awareness, or understanding of someone or something, which might include facts (propositional knowledge), skills (procedural knowledge), or objects (acquaintance knowledge). Philosophers tend to draw an important distinction between three different senses of “knowing” something: “knowing that” (knowing the truth of propositions), “knowing how” (understanding how to perform certain actions), and “knowing by acquaintance” (directly perceiving an object, being familiar with it, or otherwise coming into contact with it).[16] Epistemology is primarily concerned with the first of these forms of knowledge, propositional knowledge. All three senses of “knowing” can be seen in our ordinary use of the word. In mathematics, you can know that 2 + 2 = 4, but there is also knowing how to add two numbers, and knowing a person (e.g., knowing other persons,[17] or knowing oneself), place (e.g., one’s hometown), thing (e.g., cars), or activity (e.g., addition). While these distinctions are not explicit in English, they are explicitly made in other languages, including French, Portuguese, Spanish, Romanian, German and Dutch (although some languages related to English have been said to retain these verbs, such as Scots). The theoretical interpretation and significance of these linguistic issues remains controversial.
认识论中几乎所有的争论都在某种程度上与知识有关。最一般地说，“知识”是对某人或某事的熟悉、意识或理解，其中可能包括事实（命题知识）、技能（程序知识）或对象（熟人知识）。哲学家倾向于在“知道”某物的三种不同含义之间做出重要区分：“知道那个”（知道命题的真理）、“知道如何”（理解如何执行某些动作）和“熟人知道”（直接感知一个物体，熟悉它，或以其他方式接触它）。[16]认识论主要关注这些知识形式的第一种形式，即命题知识。“知道”这三个含义都可以从我们对这个词的日常使用中看到。在数学中，你可以知道 2 + 2 = 4，但也有知道如何将两个数字相加，以及了解一个人（例如，认识其他人，[17] 或了解自己）、地点（例如，一个人的家乡）、事物（例如，汽车）或活动（例如，加法）。虽然这些区别在英语中没有明确规定，但在其他语言中却明确规定，包括法语、葡萄牙语、西班牙语、罗马尼亚语、德语和荷兰语（尽管据说一些与英语相关的语言保留了这些动词，例如苏格兰语）。这些语言问题的理论解释和意义仍然存在争议。

In his paper On Denoting and his later book Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell brought a great deal of attention to the distinction between “knowledge by description” and “knowledge by acquaintance”. Gilbert Ryle is similarly credited with bringing more attention to the distinction between knowing how and knowing that in The Concept of Mind. In Personal Knowledge, Michael Polanyi argues for the epistemological relevance of knowledge how and knowledge that; using the example of the act of balance involved in riding a bicycle, he suggests that the theoretical knowledge of the physics involved in maintaining a state of balance cannot substitute for the practical knowledge of how to ride, and that it is important to understand how both are established and grounded. This position is essentially Ryle’s, who argued that a failure to acknowledge the distinction between “knowledge that” and “knowledge how” leads to infinite regress.
伯特兰·罗素（Bertrand Russell）在他的论文《论表示》和后来的著作《哲学问题》（Problems of Philosophy）中，对“描述知识”和“熟人知识”之间的区别给予了极大的关注。吉尔伯特·莱尔（Gilbert Ryle）在《心灵的概念》（The Concept of Mind）中同样受到人们的赞誉，使人们更加关注“知道怎么做”和“知道那个”之间的区别。在《个人知识》中，迈克尔·波兰尼（Michael Polanyi）论证了知识、如何以及知识的认识论相关性;他以骑自行车时涉及的平衡行为为例，提出维持平衡状态所涉及的物理学理论知识不能替代如何骑行的实践知识，并且重要的是要理解两者是如何建立和基础的。这一立场基本上是莱尔的立场，他认为，不承认“知道”和“知道如何”之间的区别会导致无限的倒退。

One of the most important distinctions in epistemology is between what can be known a priori (independently of experience) and what can be known a posteriori (through experience). The terms originate from the Analytic methods of Aristotle’s Organon, and may be roughly defined as follows:[19]
认识论中最重要的区别之一是先验可以知道的东西（独立于经验）和可以先验知道的东西（通过经验）。这些术语起源于亚里士多德的Organon的分析方法，大致定义如下：[19]

• A priori knowledge is knowledge that is known independently of experience (that is, it is non-empirical, or arrived at before experience, usually by reason). It will henceforth be acquired through anything that is independent from experience.
  先验知识是独立于经验而已知的知识（也就是说，它是非经验性的，或者是在经验之前获得的，通常是通过理性得出的）。从此以后，它将通过任何独立于经验的东西来获得。
• A posteriori knowledge is knowledge that is known by experience (that is, it is empirical, or arrived at through experience).
  后验知识是通过经验而知道的知识（也就是说，它是经验的，或通过经验得出的）。

Belief

信仰

One of the core concepts in epistemology is belief. A belief is an attitude that a person holds regarding anything that they take to be true.[20] For instance, to believe that snow is white is comparable to accepting the truth of the proposition “snow is white”. Beliefs can be occurrent (e.g. a person actively thinking “snow is white”), or they can be dispositional (e.g. a person who if asked about the color of snow would assert “snow is white”). While there is not universal agreement about the nature of belief, most contemporary philosophers hold the view that a disposition to express belief B qualifies as holding the belief B.[20]
认识论的核心概念之一是信仰。信念是一个人对他们认为真实的任何事情所持有的一种态度。[20]例如，相信雪是白色的，就等于接受“雪是白色的”这个命题的真理。信念可以是隐蔽的（例如，一个人积极地思考“雪是白色的”），也可以是性格的（例如，如果一个人被问及雪的颜色，他会断言“雪是白色的”）。雖然對於信仰的本質並沒有普遍的一致，但大多數現代哲學家認為，表達信仰B的傾向符合持有信仰B的資格[20]。

There are various different ways that contemporary philosophers have tried to describe beliefs, including as representations of ways that the world could be (Jerry Fodor), as dispositions to act as if certain things are true (Roderick Chisholm), as interpretive schemes for making sense of someone’s actions (Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson), or as mental states that fill a particular function (Hilary Putnam).[20] Some have also attempted to offer significant revisions to our notion of belief, including eliminativists about belief who argue that there is no phenomenon in the natural world which corresponds to our folk psychological concept of belief (Paul Churchland) and formal epistemologists who aim to replace our bivalent notion of belief (“either I have a belief or I don’t have a belief”) with the more permissive, probabilistic notion of credence (“there is an entire spectrum of degrees of belief, not a simple dichotomy between belief and non-belief”).[20][21]
当代哲学家试图以各种不同的方式描述信仰，包括作为世界可能的方式的表示（杰里·福多），作为行为好像某些事情是真实的倾向（罗德里克·奇斯霍尔姆），作为理解某人行为的解释方案（丹尼尔·丹尼特和唐纳德·戴维森），或作为填补特定功能的精神状态（希拉里·普特南）。[20] 一些人还试图对我们的信仰概念进行重大修正，包括关于信仰的消除论者，他们认为自然界中没有一种现象符合我们的民间心理学信仰概念（保罗·丘奇兰）和正式的认识论者，他们旨在用更宽容的信仰取代我们的二价信仰概念（“要么我有信仰，要么我没有信仰”）， 可信度的概率概念（“信仰有各种各样的程度，而不是信仰和不相信之间的简单二分法”）。[20][21]

While belief plays a significant role in epistemological debates surrounding knowledge and justification, it also has many other philosophical debates in its own right. Notable debates include: “What is the rational way to revise one’s beliefs when presented with various sorts of evidence?”; “Is the content of our beliefs entirely determined by our mental states, or do the relevant facts have any bearing on our beliefs (e.g. if I believe that I’m holding a glass of water, is the non-mental fact that water is H2O part of the content of that belief)?”; “How fine-grained or coarse-grained are our beliefs?”; and “Must it be possible for a belief to be expressible in language, or are there non-linguistic beliefs?”[20]
虽然信仰在围绕知识和理由的认识论辩论中发挥着重要作用，但它本身也有许多其他哲学辩论。值得注意的辩论包括：“当面对各种证据时，修改一个人的信念的理性方法是什么？“我们信仰的内容是否完全由我们的心理状态决定，或者相关事实是否与我们的信仰有任何关系（例如，如果我相信我拿着一杯水，那么水是H2O的非心理事实是否是该信仰内容的一部分）？“我们的信仰有多细粒度还是粗粒度？”;“以及”一种信念必须有可能用语言表达，还是存在非语言性的信念？[20]

Truth

真理

Truth is the property or state of being in accordance with facts or reality.[22] On most views, truth is the correspondence of language or thought to a mind-independent world. This is called the correspondence theory of truth. Among philosophers who think that it is possible to analyze the conditions necessary for knowledge, virtually all of them accept that truth is such a condition. There is much less agreement about the extent to which a knower must know why something is true in order to know. On such views, something being known implies that it is true. However, this should not be confused for the more contentious view that one must know that one knows in order to know (the KK principle).[2]
真理是符合事实或现实的属性或存在状态。[22]在大多数观点中，真理是语言或思想与一个思想独立的世界的对应关系。这就是所谓的真理对应理论。在那些认为可以分析知识所必需的条件的哲学家中，几乎所有人都接受真理就是这样一个条件。关于知道者必须知道为什么某事是真实的才能知道的程度，人们的共识要少得多。根据这种观点，已知某些事物意味着它是真实的。然而，这不应与更具争议性的观点相混淆，即一个人必须知道一个人知道才能知道（KK 原则）。[2]

Epistemologists disagree about whether belief is the only truth-bearer. Other common suggestions for things that can bear the property of being true include propositions, sentences, thoughts, utterances, and judgments. Plato, in his Gorgias, argues that belief is the most commonly invoked truth-bearer.[23]
认识论者对于信仰是否是唯一的真理承载者存在分歧。对于可以具有真实属性的事物，其他常见的建议包括命题、句子、思想、话语和判断。柏拉图在他的《高尔吉亚篇》中认为，信仰是最常被援引的真理承载者。[23]

Many of the debates regarding truth are at the crossroads of epistemology and logic.[22] Some contemporary debates regarding truth include: How do we define truth? Is it even possible to give an informative definition of truth? What things are truth-bearers and are therefore capable of being true or false? Are truth and falsity bivalent, or are there other truth values? What are the criteria of truth that allow us to identify it and to distinguish it from falsity? What role does truth play in constituting knowledge? And is truth absolute, or is it merely relative to one’s perspective?[22]
许多关于真理的辩论都处于认识论和逻辑学的十字路口。[22] 一些关于真理的当代辩论包括：我们如何定义真理？甚至有可能给出一个关于真理的信息性定义吗？哪些事情是真理的承载者，因此能够是真的还是假的？真假是二价的，还是有其他的真值？真理的标准是什么，使我们能够识别它并将其与虚假区分开来？真理在构成知识中扮演什么角色？真理是绝对的，还是仅仅相对于一个人的观点而言？[22]

Justification

理由

As the term “justification” is used in epistemology, a belief is justified if one has good reason for holding it. Loosely speaking, justification is the reason that someone holds a rationally admissible belief, on the assumption that it is a good reason for holding it. Sources of justification might include perceptual experience (the evidence of the senses), reason, and authoritative testimony, among others. Importantly however, a belief being justified does not guarantee that the belief is true, since a person could be justified in forming beliefs based on very convincing evidence that was nonetheless deceiving.
正如认识论中使用“正当性”一词一样，如果一个人有充分的理由持有信念，那么它就是正当的。粗略地说，理由是某人持有理性上可接受的信念的原因，前提是这是持有这种信念的充分理由。称义的来源可能包括知觉经验（感官的证据）、理性和权威的证词等。然而，重要的是，一个信念是合理的并不能保证这个信念是真实的，因为一个人可以根据非常令人信服的证据形成信念，但这些证据仍然具有欺骗性。

In Plato’s Theaetetus, Socrates considers a number of theories as to what knowledge is, first excluding merely true belief as an adequate account. For example, an ill person with no medical training, but with a generally optimistic attitude, might believe that he will recover from his illness quickly. Nevertheless, even if this belief turned out to be true, the patient would not have known that he would get well since his belief lacked justification. The last account that Plato considers is that knowledge is true belief “with an account” that explains or defines it in some way. According to Edmund Gettier, the view that Plato is describing here is that knowledge is justified true belief. The truth of this view would entail that in order to know that a given proposition is true, one must not only believe the relevant true proposition, but must also have a good reason for doing so.[24] One implication of this would be that no one would gain knowledge just by believing something that happened to be true.[25]
在柏拉图的《理想国哲学史》中，苏格拉底考虑了许多关于知识是什么的理论，首先排除了仅仅作为充分解释的真实信仰。例如，一个没有接受过医学培训的病人，但总体上持乐观态度，可能认为他会很快从疾病中恢复过来。然而，即使这种信念被证明是正确的，病人也不会知道他会好起来，因为他的信念缺乏理由。柏拉图考虑的最后一个解释是，知识是真正的信仰，“有一个解释”以某种方式解释或定义它。根据埃德蒙·盖蒂尔（Edmund Gettier）的说法，柏拉图在这里描述的观点是，知识是合理的真实信仰。这种观点的真理意味着，为了知道一个给定的命题是真的，一个人不仅必须相信相关的真命题，而且还必须有充分的理由这样做。[24]这句话的一个含义是，没有人会仅仅通过相信碰巧是真实的事情来获得知识。[25]

Edmund Gettier’s famous 1963 paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, popularized the claim that the definition of knowledge as justified true belief had been widely accepted throughout the history of philosophy.[26] The extent to which this is true is highly contentious, since Plato himself disavowed the “justified true belief” view at the end of the Theaetetus.[27][1] Regardless of the accuracy of the claim, Gettier’s paper produced major widespread discussion which completely reoriented epistemology in the second half of the 20th century, with a newfound focus on trying to provide an airtight definition of knowledge by adjusting or replacing the “justified true belief” view. Today there is still little consensus about whether any set of conditions succeeds in providing a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, and many contemporary epistemologists have come to the conclusion that no such exception-free definition is possible.[27] However, even if justification fails as a condition for knowledge as some philosophers claim, the question of whether or not a person has good reasons for holding a particular belief in a particular set of circumstances remains a topic of interest to contemporary epistemology and is unavoidably linked to questions about rationality.[27]
埃德蒙·盖蒂尔（Edmund Gettier）在1963年发表的著名论文《正当的真信仰是知识吗？》普及了这样一种说法，即将知识定义为正当的真正信仰，在整个哲学史上已被广泛接受。[26]这在多大程度上是正确的是非常有争议的，因为柏拉图本人在Theaetetus的结尾否认了“合理的真实信仰”的观点。[27][1] 无论这一说法的准确性如何，盖蒂尔的论文都引发了广泛的讨论，这些讨论在20世纪下半叶完全重新定位了认识论，新的关注点是试图通过调整或取代“合理的真实信念”观点来提供一个密不透风的知识定义。今天，对于任何一组条件是否成功地为知识提供了一套必要和充分的条件，仍然几乎没有达成共识，许多当代认识论者得出的结论是，这种无例外的定义是不可能的。[27]然而，即使像一些哲学家所声称的那样，正当性不能作为知识的条件，一个人是否有充分的理由在特定的情况下持有特定的信念，这个问题仍然是当代认识论感兴趣的话题，并且不可避免地与关于理性的问题联系在一起。[27]

Internalism and Externalism

内在主义与外在主义

A central debate about the nature of justification is a debate between epistemological externalists on the one hand and epistemological internalists on the other. While epistemic externalism first arose in attempts to overcome the Gettier problem, it has flourished in the time since as an alternative way of conceiving of epistemic justification. The initial development of epistemic externalism is often attributed to Alvin Goldman, although numerous other philosophers have worked on the topic in the time since.[27]
关于正当性本质的中心辩论是认识论的外在论者和认识论的内在论者之间的辩论。虽然认识论外在主义最初是在试图克服盖蒂尔问题时出现的，但自那以后，它作为一种构想认识论理由的替代方式而蓬勃发展。认识论外在主义的最初发展通常归因于阿尔文·戈德曼（Alvin Goldman），尽管此后许多其他哲学家都在研究这个话题。[27]

Externalists hold that factors deemed “external”, meaning outside of the psychological states of those who gain knowledge, can be conditions of justification. For example, an externalist response to the Gettier problem is to say that for a justified true belief to count as knowledge, there must be a link or dependency between the belief and the state of the external world. Usually, this is understood to be a causal link. Such causation, to the extent that it is “outside” the mind, would count as an external, knowledge-yielding condition. Internalists, on the other hand, assert that all knowledge-yielding conditions are within the psychological states of those who gain knowledge.
外在主义者认为，被视为“外部”的因素，即在获得知识的人的心理状态之外的因素，可以成为正当的条件。例如，外在主义者对盖蒂尔问题的回应是，要使一个合理的真实信念算作知识，信念与外部世界的状态之间必须存在联系或依赖关系。通常，这被理解为因果关系。这种因果关系，在某种程度上是“在”心灵之外的，将被视为一种外在的、产生知识的条件。另一方面，内在主义者断言，所有产生知识的条件都在获得知识的人的心理状态之内。

Though unfamiliar with the internalist/externalist debate himself, many point to René Descartes as an early example of the internalist path to justification. He wrote that because the only method by which we perceive the external world is through our senses, and that, because the senses are not infallible, we should not consider our concept of knowledge infallible. The only way to find anything that could be described as “indubitably true”, he advocates, would be to see things “clearly and distinctly”.[28] He argued that if there is an omnipotent, good being who made the world, then it’s reasonable to believe that people are made with the ability to know. However, this does not mean that man’s ability to know is perfect. God gave man the ability to know but not with omniscience. Descartes said that man must use his capacities for knowledge correctly and carefully through methodological doubt.[29]
尽管勒内·笛卡尔本人并不熟悉内在主义/外在主义的辩论，但许多人指出勒内·笛卡尔（René Descartes）是内在主义辩护之路的早期例子。他写道，因为我们感知外部世界的唯一方法是通过我们的感官，而且，由于感官不是绝对可靠的，我们不应该认为我们的知识概念是绝对可靠的。他主张，找到任何可以被描述为“无疑真实”的东西的唯一方法就是“清晰而鲜明地”看待事物。[28]他认为，如果有一个全能的、善良的存在创造了世界，那么有理由相信人们是具有认知能力的。然而，这并不意味着人的认知能力是完美的。上帝赋予人类认知的能力，但不是全知全能的能力。笛卡尔说过，人必须通过方法论的怀疑，正确而谨慎地使用他的知识能力。[29]

The dictum “Cogito ergo sum” (I think, therefore I am) is also commonly associated with Descartes’ theory. In his own methodological doubt—doubting everything he previously knew so he could start from a blank slate—the first thing that he could not logically bring himself to doubt was his own existence: “I do not exist” would be a contradiction in terms. The act of saying that one does not exist assumes that someone must be making the statement in the first place. Descartes could doubt his senses, his body, and the world around him—but he could not deny his own existence, because he was able to doubt and must exist to manifest that doubt. Even if some “evil genius” were deceiving him, he would have to exist to be deceived. This one sure point provided him with what he called his Archimedean point, in order to further develop his foundation for knowledge. Simply put, Descartes’ epistemological justification depended on his indubitable belief in his own existence and his clear and distinct knowledge of God.[30]
格言“Cogito ergo sum”（我认为，因此我是）也通常与笛卡尔的理论联系在一起。在他自己的方法论怀疑中——怀疑他以前所知道的一切，以便他可以从一张白纸开始——他无法逻辑地让自己怀疑的第一件事是他自己的存在：“我不存在”在术语上是一个矛盾。说一个不存在的行为假设必须首先有人做出声明。笛卡尔可以怀疑他的感官、他的身体和他周围的世界——但他不能否认自己的存在，因为他能够怀疑，而且必须存在才能表现出这种怀疑。即使某个“邪恶的天才”在欺骗他，他也必须存在才能被欺骗。这个确定的点为他提供了他所谓的阿基米德点，以进一步发展他的知识基础。简单地说，笛卡尔的认识论理由取决于他对自己存在的不容置疑的信念和他对上帝的清晰而独特的认识。[30]

Defining Knowledge – The Gettier Problem

定义知识 – 盖蒂尔问题

Overview

概述

An Euler diagram representing a version of the traditional definition of knowledge that is adapted to the Gettier problem. This problem gives us reason to think that not all justified true beliefs constitute knowledge. / Illustration by Dominic Mayers, Wikimedia Commons

Edmund Gettier is best known for his 1963 paper entitled “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, which called into question the common conception of knowledge as justified true belief.[31] In just two and a half pages, Gettier argued that there are situations in which one’s belief may be justified and true, yet fail to count as knowledge. That is, Gettier contended that while justified belief in a true proposition is necessary for that proposition to be known, it is not sufficient.
埃德蒙·盖蒂尔（Edmund Gettier）最出名的是他1963年的论文，题为“有理由的正确信仰是知识吗？”，该论文质疑了将知识视为有理由的真实信仰的普遍概念。[31]在短短两页半的篇幅中，盖蒂尔认为，在某些情况下，一个人的信仰可能是合理和真实的，但却不能算作知识。也就是说，盖蒂尔认为，虽然对一个真实命题的合理信念是了解该命题的必要条件，但这还不够。

According to Gettier, there are certain circumstances in which one does not have knowledge, even when all of the above conditions are met. Gettier proposed two thought experiments, which have become known as Gettier cases, as counterexamples to the classical account of knowledge.[27] One of the cases involves two men, Smith and Jones, who are awaiting the results of their applications for the same job. Each man has ten coins in his pocket. Smith has excellent reasons to believe that Jones will get the job (the head of the company told him); and furthermore, Smith knows that Jones has ten coins in his pocket (he recently counted them). From this Smith infers: “The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.” However, Smith is unaware that he also has ten coins in his own pocket. Furthermore, it turns out that Smith, not Jones, is going to get the job. While Smith has strong evidence to believe that Jones will get the job, he is wrong. Smith therefore has a justified true belief that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket; however, according to Gettier, Smith does not know that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, because Smith’s belief is “…true by virtue of the number of coins in Jones’s pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith’s pocket, and bases his belief… on a count of the coins in Jones’s pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.”[31]: 122  These cases fail to be knowledge because the subject’s belief is justified, but only happens to be true by virtue of luck. In other words, he made the correct choice (believing that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket) for the wrong reasons. Gettier then goes on to offer a second similar case, providing the means by which the specifics of his examples can be generalized into a broader problem for defining knowledge in terms of justified true belief.
根据盖蒂尔的说法，在某些情况下，即使满足上述所有条件，人们也没有知识。盖蒂尔提出了两个思想实验，它们被称为盖蒂尔案例，作为经典知识叙述的反例。[27]其中一个案件涉及两名男子，史密斯和琼斯，他们正在等待同一职位的申请结果。每个人的口袋里都有十个硬币。史密斯有充分的理由相信琼斯会得到这份工作（公司负责人告诉他）;此外，史密斯知道琼斯的口袋里有十个硬币（他最近数过它们）。由此，史密斯推断：“得到这份工作的人口袋里有十个硬币。然而，史密斯并不知道他自己的口袋里还有十个硬币。此外，事实证明，史密斯，而不是琼斯，将得到这份工作。虽然史密斯有强有力的证据相信琼斯会得到这份工作，但他错了。因此，史密斯有理由相信，将得到这份工作的人口袋里有十个硬币;然而，根据盖蒂尔的说法，史密斯并不知道将获得这份工作的人口袋里有十个硬币，因为史密斯的信念是“…凭借琼斯口袋里的硬币数量，虽然史密斯不知道史密斯口袋里有多少硬币，但根据他的信念…在琼斯口袋里的硬币上数一数，他错误地认为琼斯就是会得到这份工作的人。[31]： 122 这些情况不能成为知识，因为主体的信念是有道理的，而只是由于运气而恰好是真实的。换句话说，他做出了正确的选择（相信得到这份工作的人口袋里有十个硬币），原因错误。然后，盖蒂尔继续提供了第二个类似的案例，提供了一种方法，通过这些例子的细节可以被概括为一个更广泛的问题，即根据合理的真实信念来定义知识。

There have been various notable responses to the Gettier problem. Typically, they have involved substantial attempts to provide a new definition of knowledge that is not susceptible to Gettier-style objections, either by providing an additional fourth condition that justified true beliefs must meet to constitute knowledge, or proposing a completely new set of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. While there have been far too many published responses for all of them to be mentioned, some of the most notable responses are discussed below.
对于Gettier问题，已经有各种值得注意的回应。通常，它们都涉及大量的尝试，以提供一种新的知识定义，而这种定义不容易受到盖蒂尔式的反对意见的影响，要么通过提供额外的第四个条件，即有理由的真正信念必须满足才能构成知识，要么提出一套全新的必要和充分的知识条件。虽然已发表的回应太多，无法一一列举，但下文将讨论一些最值得注意的回应。

“No False Premises” Response

“无虚假处所”回应

One of the earliest suggested replies to Gettier, and perhaps the most intuitive ways to respond to the Gettier problem, is the “no false premises” response, sometimes also called the “no false lemmas” response. Most notably, this reply was defended by David Malet Armstrong in his 1973 book, Belief, Truth, and Knowledge.[32] The basic form of the response is to assert that the person who holds the justified true belief (for instance, Smith in Gettier’s first case) made the mistake of inferring a true belief (e.g. “The person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket”) from a false belief (e.g. “Jones will get the job”). Proponents of this response therefore propose that we add a fourth necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge, namely, “the justified true belief must not have been inferred from a false belief”.
最早建议的对 Gettier 的回复之一，也许是对 Gettier 问题最直观的回应方式，是“无假前提”的回复，有时也称为“无虚假引理”的回复。最值得注意的是，大卫·马莱特·阿姆斯特朗（David Malet Armstrong）在他1973年出版的《信仰、真理和知识》（Belief， Truth， and Knowledge）一书中为这一回答辩护。[32]回应的基本形式是断言，持有正当真实信念的人（例如，盖蒂尔的第一个案例中的史密斯）犯了一个错误，即从错误的信念（例如，“琼斯会得到这份工作”）推断出一个真实的信念（例如，“将得到这份工作的人，他的口袋里有十个硬币”）。因此，这种回应的支持者建议我们为知识增加第四个必要和充分的条件，即“有理由的真实信念必须不是从错误的信念中推断出来的”。

This reply to the Gettier problem is simple, direct, and appears to isolate what goes wrong in forming the relevant beliefs in Gettier cases. However, the general consensus is that it fails.[27] This is because while the original formulation by Gettier includes a person who infers a true belief from a false belief, there are many alternate formulations in which this is not the case. Take, for instance, a case where an observer sees what appears to be a dog walking through a park and forms the belief “There is a dog in the park”. In fact, it turns out that the observer is not looking at a dog at all, but rather a very lifelike robotic facsimile of a dog. However, unbeknownst to the observer, there is in fact a dog in the park, albeit one standing behind the robotic facsimile of a dog. Since the belief “There is a dog in the park” does not involve a faulty inference, but is instead formed as the result of misleading perceptual information, there is no inference made from a false premise. It therefore seems that while the observer does in fact have a true belief that her perceptual experience provides justification for holding, she does not actually know that there is a dog in the park. Instead, she just seems to have formed a “lucky” justified true belief.[27]
对 Gettier 问题的回答简单、直接，似乎隔离了在 Gettier 案例中形成相关信念时出现的问题。然而，普遍的共识是它失败了。[27]这是因为，虽然盖蒂尔的原始表述包括了一个从错误信念中推断出真实信念的人，但有许多替代的表述并非如此。举个例子，一个观察者看到一个似乎是一只狗在公园里走动的东西，并形成“公园里有一只狗”的信念。事实上，事实证明，观察者根本不是在看狗，而是一个非常逼真的狗的机器人复制品。然而，观察者不知道的是，公园里实际上有一只狗，尽管它站在一只狗的机器人复制品后面。由于“公园里有一只狗”的信念并不涉及错误的推断，而是由于误导性的感知信息而形成的，因此没有从错误的前提做出的推断。因此，虽然观察者实际上确实相信她的知觉经验为持有提供了理由，但她实际上并不知道公园里有一只狗。相反，她似乎只是形成了一种“幸运”的、有理有据的真实信念。[27]

Reliabilist Response

可靠性回应

Reliabilism has been a significant line of response to the Gettier problem among philosophers, originating with work by Alvin Goldman in the 1960s. According to reliabilism, a belief is justified (or otherwise supported in such a way as to count towards knowledge) only if it is produced by processes that typically yield a sufficiently high ratio of true to false beliefs. In other words, this theory states that a true belief counts as knowledge only if it is produced by a reliable belief-forming process. Examples of reliable processes include standard perceptual processes, remembering, good reasoning, and introspection.[33]
可靠性主义是哲学家对盖蒂尔问题的重要回应，起源于阿尔文·戈德曼（Alvin Goldman）在1960年代的工作。根据可靠性主义，只有当一种信念是由通常产生足够高的真假信念比例的过程产生的时，它才是合理的（或以其他方式支持，从而计入知识）。换句话说，该理论指出，只有当真正的信念是由可靠的信念形成过程产生的时，它才算是知识。可靠过程的例子包括标准的感知过程、记忆、良好的推理和内省。[33]

One commonly discussed challenge for reliabilism is the case of Henry and the barn façades.[27] In this thought experiment, a man, Henry, is driving along and sees a number of buildings that resemble barns. Based on his perception of one of these, he concludes that he is looking at a barn. While he is indeed looking at a barn, it turns out that all of the other barn-like buildings he saw were façades. According to the challenge, Henry does not know that he has seen a barn, despite his belief being true, and despite his belief having been formed on the basis of a reliable process (i.e. his vision), since he only acquired his reliably formed true belief by accident.[34] In other words, since he could have just as easily been looking at a barn façade and formed a false belief, the reliability of perception in general does not mean that his belief wasn’t merely formed luckily, and this luck seems to preclude him from knowledge.[27]
一个经常讨论的可靠性挑战是亨利和谷仓立面的情况。[27]在这个思想实验中，一个名叫亨利的男人开车时，看到一些类似谷仓的建筑物。根据他对其中一个的感知，他得出结论，他正在看一个谷仓。虽然他确实在看一个谷仓，但事实证明，他看到的所有其他类似谷仓的建筑都是立面。根据挑战，亨利不知道他看到了一个谷仓，尽管他的信念是真实的，尽管他的信念是在一个可靠的过程（即他的愿景）的基础上形成的，因为他只是偶然获得了他可靠形成的真实信念。[34]換句話說，既然他本可以輕易地看到谷厭的外幫並形成一個錯誤的信念，那麼一般的知覺可靠性並不意味著他的信念不僅僅是偶然形成的，而這種運氣似乎使他無法知識。[27]

Infallibilist Response

无误的回应

One less common response to the Gettier problem is defended by Richard Kirkham, who has argued that the only definition of knowledge that could ever be immune to all counterexamples is the infallibilist definition.[35] To qualify as an item of knowledge, goes the theory, a belief must not only be true and justified, the justification of the belief must necessitate its truth. In other words, the justification for the belief must be infallible.
理查德·柯克汉姆（Richard Kirkham）为盖蒂尔问题的一个不太常见的回应进行了辩护，他认为唯一可以不受所有反例影响的知识定义是无误定义。[35]理论认为，要符合知识的资格，信仰不仅必须是真实的和正当的，而且信仰的正当性必须具有其真理性。换言之，这种信念的理由必须是无误的。

While infallibilism is indeed an internally coherent response to the Gettier problem, it is incompatible with our everyday knowledge ascriptions. For instance, as the Cartesian skeptic will point out, all of my perceptual experiences are compatible with a skeptical scenario in which I am completely deceived about the existence of the external world, in which case most (if not all) of my beliefs would be false.[29][36] The typical conclusion to draw from this is that it is possible to doubt most (if not all) of my everyday beliefs, meaning that if I am indeed justified in holding those beliefs, that justification is not infallible. For the justification to be infallible, my reasons for holding my everyday beliefs would need to completely exclude the possibility that those beliefs were false. Consequently, if a belief must be infallibly justified in order to constitute knowledge, then it must be the case that we are mistaken in most (if not all) instances in which we claim to have knowledge in everyday situations.[37] While it is indeed possible to bite the bullet and accept this conclusion, most philosophers find it implausible to suggest that we know nothing or almost nothing, and therefore reject the infallibilist response as collapsing into radical skepticism.[36]
虽然无误论确实是对盖蒂尔问题的内在连贯的回应，但它与我们日常的知识归因是不相容的。例如，正如笛卡尔怀疑论者所指出的那样，我所有的知觉经验都与一种怀疑的情景相容，在这种情景中，我对外部世界的存在完全被欺骗了，在这种情况下，我的大部分（如果不是全部）信念都是错误的。[29][36] 从中得出的典型结论是，我有可能怀疑我的大部分（如果不是全部）日常信念，这意味着如果我确实有理由持有这些信念，那么这种理由并不是绝对正确的。为了使这个理由准确无误，我持有日常信仰的理由需要完全排除这些信仰是错误的可能性。因此，如果一个信念必须是无误的，才能构成知识，那么，在我们声称在日常情况下拥有知识的大多数（如果不是全部）情况下，我们一定是错误的。[37]虽然确实有可能咬紧牙关接受这一结论，但大多数哲学家认为，认为我们一无所知或几乎一无所知，因此拒绝无误论的回应是难以置信的，因为它会陷入激进的怀疑主义。[36]

Indefeasibility Condition

不可撤销性条件

Another possible candidate for the fourth condition of knowledge is indefeasibility. Defeasibility theory maintains that there should be no overriding or defeating truths for the reasons that justify one’s belief. For example, suppose that person S believes he saw Tom Grabit steal a book from the library and uses this to justify the claim that Tom Grabit stole a book from the library. A possible defeater or overriding proposition for such a claim could be a true proposition like, “Tom Grabit’s identical twin Sam is currently in the same town as Tom.” When no defeaters of one’s justification exist, a subject would be epistemologically justified.
第四个知识条件的另一个可能的候选者是不可剥夺性。可行性理论认为，不应该因为证明一个人的信仰的理由而压倒或击败真理。例如，假设这个人 S 认为他看到汤姆·格拉比特从图书馆偷了一本书，并以此来证明汤姆·格拉比特从图书馆偷了一本书的说法是合理的。这种说法的一个可能的失败者或压倒一切的命题可能是一个真实的命题，例如“汤姆·格拉比特的同卵双胞胎山姆目前与汤姆在同一个城镇。当一个人的正当性没有失败者存在时，一个主体就会在认识论上被证明是正当的。

In a similar vein, the Indian philosopher B.K. Matilal drew on the Navya-Nyāya fallibilist tradition to respond to the Gettier problem. Nyaya theory distinguishes between know p and know that one knows p—these are different events, with different causal conditions. The second level is a sort of implicit inference that usually follows immediately the episode of knowing p (knowledge simpliciter). The Gettier case is examined by referring to a view of Gangesha Upadhyaya (late 12th century), who takes any true belief to be knowledge; thus a true belief acquired through a wrong route may just be regarded as knowledge simpliciter on this view. The question of justification arises only at the second level, when one considers the knowledge-hood of the acquired belief. Initially, there is lack of uncertainty, so it becomes a true belief. But at the very next moment, when the hearer is about to embark upon the venture of knowing whether he knows p, doubts may arise. “If, in some Gettier-like cases, I am wrong in my inference about the knowledge-hood of the given occurrent belief (for the evidence may be pseudo-evidence), then I am mistaken about the truth of my belief—and this is in accordance with Nyaya fallibilism: not all knowledge-claims can be sustained.”[38]
同样，印度哲学家B.K.马蒂拉尔（B.K. Matilal）借鉴了纳维亚-尼亚亚谬误主义传统来回应盖蒂尔问题。Nyaya 理论区分了知道 p 和知道知道 p——它们是不同的事件，具有不同的因果条件。第二层次是一种隐含推理，通常紧接在知道p（知识简化器）之后。Gettier案通过引用Gangesha Upadhyaya（12世纪末）的观点来研究，他认为任何真正的信仰都是知识;因此，从这种观点来看，通过错误途径获得的真正信念可能只是被视为知识的简单化。辩解的问题只出现在第二个层次上，当人们考虑获得的信仰的知识性时。最初，缺乏不确定性，因此它成为一种真正的信念。但是在下一刻，当听者即将开始了解他是否知道p的冒险时，可能会产生怀疑。“如果在某些类似盖蒂尔的案例中，我对给定的神秘信念的知识性的推断是错误的（因为证据可能是伪证据），那么我对我的信仰的真实性就错了——这符合尼亚亚谬误论：并非所有的知识主张都可以成立。”[38]

Tracking Condition

跟踪条件

Robert Nozick has offered a definition of knowledge according to which S knows that P if and only if:
罗伯特·诺齐克（Robert Nozick）提出了一个知识定义，根据该定义，当且仅当，S 知道 P：

• P is true; P 为真;
• S believes that P; S 相信 P;
• if P were false, S would not believe that P;
  如果 P 为假，则 S 不会相信 P;
• if P were true, S would believe that P.[39]
  如果 P 为真，S会相信 P.[39]

Nozick argues that the third of these conditions serves to address cases of the sort described by Gettier. Nozick further claims this condition addresses a case of the sort described by D.M. Armstrong:[40] A father believes his daughter is innocent of committing a particular crime, both because of faith in his baby girl and (now) because he has seen presented in the courtroom a conclusive demonstration of his daughter’s innocence. His belief via the method of the courtroom satisfies the four subjunctive conditions, but his faith-based belief does not. If his daughter were guilty, he would still believe her innocence, on the basis of faith in his daughter; this would violate the third condition.
诺齐克认为，这些条件中的第三个条件用于解决盖蒂尔所描述的那种情况。诺齐克进一步声称，这种情况解决了D.M.阿姆斯特朗所描述的那种情况：[40]一位父亲认为他的女儿在犯下特定罪行方面是无辜的，这既是因为对他的女婴的信仰，也是因为他在法庭上看到了他女儿无罪的确凿证据。他通过法庭的方法的信仰满足了四个虚拟条件，但他的基于信仰的信仰却没有。如果他的女儿有罪，他仍然会基于对女儿的信仰而相信她的清白;这将违反第三个条件。

The British philosopher Simon Blackburn has criticized this formulation by suggesting that we do not want to accept as knowledge beliefs which, while they “track the truth” (as Nozick’s account requires), are not held for appropriate reasons. He says that “we do not want to award the title of knowing something to someone who is only meeting the conditions through a defect, flaw, or failure, compared with someone else who is not meeting the conditions.”[41] In addition to this, externalist accounts of knowledge, such as Nozick’s, are often forced to reject closure in cases where it is intuitively valid.
英国哲学家西蒙·布莱克本（Simon Blackburn）批评了这种说法，他建议我们不想接受那些虽然“追踪真理”（如诺齐克的叙述所要求的那样）但并非出于适当原因而持有的知识信念。他说，“我们不想把知道某事的头衔授予那些只是通过缺陷、缺陷或失败而满足条件的人，而不是那些没有满足条件的人。[41]除此之外，外部主义的知识描述，如诺齐克的，往往被迫拒绝在直觉上有效的情况下拒绝封闭。

An account similar to Nozick’s has also been offered by Fred Dretske, although his view focuses more on relevant alternatives that might have obtained if things had turned out differently. Views of both the Nozick variety and the Dretske variety have faced serious problems suggested by Saul Kripke.[27]
弗雷德·德雷茨克（Fred Dretske）也提供了与诺齐克类似的描述，尽管他的观点更多地集中在如果事情变得不同的情况下可能获得的相关替代方案。索尔·克里普克（Saul Kripke）提出的诺齐克（Nozick）品种和德雷茨克（Dretske）品种的观点都面临着严重的问题。[27]

Knowledge-First Response

知识优先的回应

Timothy Williamson has advanced a theory of knowledge according to which knowledge is not justified true belief plus some extra conditions, but primary. In his book Knowledge and its Limits, Williamson argues that the concept of knowledge cannot be broken down into a set of other concepts through analysis—instead, it is sui generis. Thus, according to Williamson, justification, truth, and belief are necessary but not sufficient for knowledge. Williamson is also known for being one of the only philosophers who take knowledge to be a mental state;[42] most epistemologists assert that belief (as opposed to knowledge) is a mental state. As such, Williamson’s claim has been seen to be highly counterintuitive.[43]
蒂莫西·威廉姆森（Timothy Williamson）提出了一种知识理论，根据该理论，知识不是合理的，真正的信仰加上一些额外的条件，而是主要的。威廉姆森在他的《知识及其局限性》一书中认为，知识的概念不能通过分析分解为一组其他概念，相反，它是自成一格的。因此，根据威廉姆森的说法，称义、真理和信仰是必要的，但对知识来说还不够。威廉姆森还以为数不多的将知识视为心理状态的哲学家之一而闻名。[42]大多数认识论者断言，信仰（而不是知识）是一种心理状态。因此，威廉姆森的说法被认为非常违反直觉。[43]

Casual Theory and Naturalized Epistemology

偶然理论与自然化认识论

In an earlier paper that predates his development of reliabilism, Alvin Goldman writes in his “Causal Theory of Knowing” that knowledge requires a causal link between the truth of a proposition and the belief in that proposition. A similar view has also been defended by Hilary Kornblith in Knowledge and its Place in Nature, although his view is meant to capture an empirical scientific conception of knowledge, not an analysis of the everyday concept “knowledge”.[44] Kornblith, in turn, takes himself to be elaborating on the naturalized epistemology framework first suggested by W.V.O. Quine.
阿尔文·戈德曼（Alvin Goldman）在他的“认识的因果理论”（Causal Theory of Knowing）中写道，知识需要命题的真实性和对该命题的信念之间存在因果关系。希拉里·科恩布利斯（Hilary Kornblith）在《知识及其在自然中的地位》一书中也捍卫了类似的观点，尽管他的观点旨在捕捉一种实证的科学知识概念，而不是对日常概念“知识”的分析。[44]反过来，科恩布利斯认为自己是在详细阐述由W.V.O.奎因首次提出的自然化认识论框架。

Defining Knowledge – The Value Problem

定义知识——价值问题

Overview

概述

Plato in his academy, drawing after a painting by Swedish painter Carl Johan Wahlbom. / Image via Wikimedia Commons

We generally assume that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. If so, what is the explanation? A formulation of the value problem in epistemology first occurs in Plato’s Meno. Socrates points out to Meno that a man who knew the way to Larissa could lead others there correctly. But so, too, could a man who had true beliefs about how to get there, even if he had not gone there or had any knowledge of Larissa. Socrates says that it seems that both knowledge and true opinion can guide action. Meno then wonders why knowledge is valued more than true belief and why knowledge and true belief are different. Socrates responds that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because it is tethered or justified. Justification, or working out the reason for a true belief, locks down true belief.[45]
我们通常认为知识比单纯的信仰更有价值。如果是这样，解释是什么？认识论中价值问题的表述首先出现在柏拉图的《美诺篇》中。苏格拉底向梅诺指出，一个知道通往拉里萨的路的人可以正确地引导其他人到那里。但是，一个对如何到达那里有真正信念的人也是如此，即使他没有去过那里或对拉里萨一无所知。苏格拉底说，似乎知识和真实的观点都可以指导行动。然后，梅诺想知道为什么知识比真正的信仰更受重视，以及为什么知识和真正的信仰是不同的。苏格拉底回答说，知识比单纯的真正信仰更有价值，因为它是被束缚的或合理的。称义，或找出真正信仰的原因，锁定了真正的信仰。[45]

The problem is to identify what (if anything) makes knowledge more valuable than mere true belief, or that makes knowledge more valuable than a mere minimal conjunction of its components, such as justification, safety, sensitivity, statistical likelihood, and anti-Gettier conditions, on a particular analysis of knowledge that conceives of knowledge as divided into components (to which knowledge-first epistemological theories, which posit knowledge as fundamental, are notable exceptions).[46] The value problem re-emerged in the philosophical literature on epistemology in the twenty-first century following the rise of virtue epistemology in the 1980s, partly because of the obvious link to the concept of value in ethics.[47]
问题在于，在对知识的特定分析中，确定是什么（如果有的话）使知识比单纯的真实信念更有价值，或者使知识比仅仅是其组成部分的最小结合更有价值，例如理由、安全性、敏感性、统计可能性和反盖蒂尔条件，这种分析将知识视为被划分为多个组成部分（知识优先的认识论理论， 将知识视为基础的，是值得注意的例外）。[46]随着1980年代美德认识论的兴起，价值问题在21世纪的认识论哲学文献中再次出现，部分原因是与伦理学中的价值概念有着明显的联系。[47]

Virtue Epistemology

美德认识论

In contemporary philosophy, epistemologists including Ernest Sosa, John Greco, Jonathan Kvanvig,[48] Linda Zagzebski, and Duncan Pritchard have defended virtue epistemology as a solution to the value problem. They argue that epistemology should also evaluate the “properties” of people as epistemic agents (i.e. intellectual virtues), rather than merely the properties of propositions and propositional mental attitudes.
在当代哲学中，包括欧内斯特·索萨（Ernest Sosa）、约翰·格列柯（John Greco）、乔纳森·克万维格（Jonathan Kvanvig）[48]、琳达·扎格泽布斯基（Linda Zagzebski）和邓肯·普里查德（Duncan Pritchard）在内的认识论者都为美德认识论辩护，认为这是解决价值问题的方法。他们认为，认识论还应该评估人们作为认识主体（即智力美德）的“属性”，而不仅仅是命题和命题心理态度的属性。

The value problem has been presented as an argument against epistemic reliabilism by Linda Zagzebski, Wayne Riggs, and Richard Swinburne, among others. Zagzebski analogizes the value of knowledge to the value of espresso produced by an espresso maker: “The liquid in this cup is not improved by the fact that it comes from a reliable espresso maker. If the espresso tastes good, it makes no difference if it comes from an unreliable machine.”[49] For Zagzebski, the value of knowledge deflates to the value of mere true belief. She assumes that reliability in itself has no value or disvalue, but Goldman and Olsson disagree. They point out that Zagzebski’s conclusion rests on the assumption of veritism: all that matters is the acquisition of true belief.[50]
琳达·扎格泽布斯基（Linda Zagzebski）、韦恩·里格斯（Wayne Riggs）和理查德·斯威本（Richard Swinburne）等人将价值问题作为反对认识依赖主义的论据提出。Zagzebski 将知识的价值比作浓缩咖啡机生产的浓缩咖啡的价值：“这个杯子里的液体并没有因为它来自可靠的浓缩咖啡机而得到改善。如果浓缩咖啡味道不错，那么如果它来自不可靠的机器，那就没有区别了。[49]对于扎格泽布斯基来说，知识的价值下降到仅仅是真正信仰的价值。她认为可靠性本身没有价值或贬值，但高盛和奥尔森不同意。他们指出，扎格泽布斯基的结论建立在真理主义的假设之上：重要的是获得真正的信仰。[50]

To the contrary, they argue that a reliable process for acquiring a true belief adds value to the mere true belief by making it more likely that future beliefs of a similar kind will be true. By analogy, having a reliable espresso maker that produced a good cup of espresso would be more valuable than having an unreliable one that luckily produced a good cup because the reliable one would more likely produce good future cups compared to the unreliable one.
相反，他们认为，获得真正信仰的可靠过程通过使未来类似信仰更有可能是真实的，从而为纯粹的真实信仰增加了价值。以此类推，拥有一个可靠的浓缩咖啡机来生产一杯好的浓缩咖啡比拥有一个不可靠的咖啡机幸运地生产出一杯好咖啡更有价值，因为与不可靠的咖啡相比，可靠的咖啡机更有可能生产出好的未来杯子。

The value problem is important to assessing the adequacy of theories of knowledge that conceive of knowledge as consisting of true belief and other components. According to Kvanvig, an adequate account of knowledge should resist counterexamples and allow an explanation of the value of knowledge over mere true belief. Should a theory of knowledge fail to do so, it would prove inadequate.[51]
价值问题对于评估知识理论的充分性非常重要，这些知识理论认为知识是由真正的信仰和其他组成部分组成的。根据Kvanvig的说法，对知识的充分描述应该抵制反例，并允许解释知识的价值，而不仅仅是真正的信仰。如果一种知识理论不能做到这一点，那它将被证明是不够的。[51]

One of the more influential responses to the problem is that knowledge is not particularly valuable and is not what ought to be the main focus of epistemology. Instead, epistemologists ought to focus on other mental states, such as understanding.[52] Advocates of virtue epistemology have argued that the value of knowledge comes from an internal relationship between the knower and the mental state of believing.[46]
对这个问题的一个更有影响力的回应是，知识并不是特别有价值，也不是认识论的主要焦点。相反，认识论者应该关注其他心理状态，例如理解。[52]美德认识论的倡导者认为，知识的价值来自认识者和相信的心理状态之间的内在关系。[46]

Acquiring Knowledge

获取知识

Sources

来源

There are many proposed sources of knowledge and justified belief which we take to be actual sources of knowledge in our everyday lives. Some of the most commonly discussed include perception, reason, memory, and testimony.[3][6]
在日常生活中，有许多建议的知识来源和合理的信念，我们认为它们是知识的实际来源。一些最常讨论的问题包括感知、理性、记忆和证词。[3][6]

A priori–a posteriori Distinction

先验-后验的区别

As mentioned above, epistemologists draw a distinction between what can be known a priori (independently of experience) and what can only be known a posteriori (through experience). Much of what we call a priori knowledge is thought to be attained through reason alone, as featured prominently in rationalism. This might also include a non-rational faculty of intuition, as defended by proponents of innatism. In contrast, a posteriori knowledge is derived entirely through experience or as a result of experience, as emphasized in empiricism. This also includes cases where knowledge can be traced back to an earlier experience, as in memory or testimony.[19]
如上所述，认识论者区分了可以先验地知道的东西（独立于经验）和只能先验地知道的东西（通过经验）。我们所称的先验知识，大部分被认为只能通过理性获得，这在理性主义中表现得尤为突出。这也可能包括一种非理性的直觉能力，正如先天论的支持者所捍卫的那样。与此相反，正如经验主义所强调的那样，后验知识完全是通过经验或经验的结果而获得的。这也包括知识可以追溯到早期经验的情况，例如在记忆或证词中。[19]

A way to look at the difference between the two is through an example. Bruce Russell gives two propositions in which the reader decides which one he believes more. Option A: All crows are birds. Option B: All crows are black. If you believe option A, then you are a priori justified in believing it because you don’t have to see a crow to know it’s a bird. If you believe in option B, then you are posteriori justified to believe it because you have seen many crows therefore knowing they are black. He goes on to say that it doesn’t matter if the statement is true or not, only that if you believe in one or the other that matters.[19]
了解两者之间差异的一种方法是通过一个示例。布鲁斯·罗素（Bruce Russell）给出了两个命题，读者决定他更相信哪一个。选项A：所有的乌鸦都是鸟。选项B：所有乌鸦都是黑色的。如果你相信选项A，那么你就有理由相信它，因为你不必看到乌鸦就知道它是一只鸟。如果你相信选项B，那么你就有理由相信它，因为你见过很多乌鸦，因此知道它们是黑色的。他接着说，这句话是真是假并不重要，重要的是你是否相信一个或另一个。[19]

The idea of a priori knowledge is that it is based on intuition or rational insights. Laurence BonJour says in his article “The Structure of Empirical Knowledge”,[53] that a “rational insight is an immediate, non-inferential grasp, apprehension or ‘seeing’ that some proposition is necessarily true.” (3) Going back to the crow example, by Laurence BonJour’s definition the reason you would believe in option A is because you have an immediate knowledge that a crow is a bird, without ever experiencing one.
先验知识的概念是它基于直觉或理性洞察力。劳伦斯·邦乔尔（Laurence BonJour）在他的文章《经验知识的结构》（The Structure of Empirical Knowledge）[53]中说，“理性的洞察力是一种直接的、非推理性的掌握、理解或’看到’某个命题必然是正确的。（3）回到乌鸦的例子，根据劳伦斯·邦乔尔（Laurence BonJour）的定义，你会相信选项A的原因是，你立即知道乌鸦是一只鸟，而从未经历过。

Evolutionary psychology takes a novel approach to the problem. It says that there is an innate predisposition for certain types of learning. “Only small parts of the brain resemble a tabula rasa; this is true even for human beings. The remainder is more like an exposed negative waiting to be dipped into a developer fluid”.[54]
进化心理学对这个问题采取了一种新颖的方法。它说，某些类型的学习有一种与生俱来的倾向。“只有大脑的一小部分类似于白板;即使对人类来说也是如此。其余部分更像是一个暴露的负片，等待被浸入显影液中”。[54]

Analytic-Synthetic Distinction

分析-综合的区别

The analytic–synthetic distinction was first proposed by Immanuel Kant. / Image via Wikimedia Commons

Immanuel Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, drew a distinction between “analytic” and “synthetic” propositions. He contended that some propositions are such that we can know they are true just by understanding their meaning. For example, consider, “My father’s brother is my uncle.” We can know it is true solely by virtue of our understanding in what its terms mean. Philosophers call such propositions “analytic”. Synthetic propositions, on the other hand, have distinct subjects and predicates. An example would be, “My father’s brother has black hair.” Kant stated that all mathematical and scientific statements are analytic priori propositions because they are necessarily true but our knowledge about the attributes of the mathematical or physical subjects we can only get by logical inference.
伊曼纽尔·康德（Immanuel Kant）在他的《纯粹理性批判》中区分了“分析”和“综合”命题。他认为，有些命题是这样的，我们只要理解它们的含义就可以知道它们是真的。例如，考虑一下，“我父亲的兄弟是我的叔叔。我们仅凭我们对其术语含义的理解就可以知道它是真实的。哲学家们称这些命题为“分析”。另一方面，合成命题具有不同的主语和谓语。一个例子是，“我父亲的兄弟有一头黑发。康德指出，所有的数学和科学陈述都是分析性的先验命题，因为它们必然是正确的，但我们关于数学或物理主体属性的知识，我们只能通过逻辑推理来获得。

While this distinction is first and foremost about meaning and is therefore most relevant to the philosophy of language, the distinction has significant epistemological consequences, seen most prominently in the works of the logical positivists.[55] In particular, if the set of propositions which can only be known a posteriori is coextensive with the set of propositions which are synthetically true, and if the set of propositions which can be known a priori is coextensive with the set of propositions which are analytically true (or in other words, which are true by definition), then there can only be two kinds of successful inquiry: Logico-mathematical inquiry, which investigates what is true by definition, and empirical inquiry, which investigates what is true in the world. Most notably, this would exclude the possibility that branches of philosophy like metaphysics could ever provide informative accounts of what actually exists.[19][55]
虽然这种区分首先是关于意义的，因此与语言哲学最相关，但这种区分具有重大的认识论后果，这在逻辑实证主义者的著作中最为突出。[55] 特别是，如果只能在后验中知道的命题集合与综合上为真的命题集是共宽的，如果可以先验地知道的命题集与分析上为真（或者换句话说，根据定义为真的命题集）是共广的， 那么，成功的探究只能有两种：逻辑-数学探究，它通过定义来研究什么是真实的，以及经验探究，它研究世界上什么是真实的。最值得注意的是，这将排除像形而上学这样的哲学分支对实际存在的东西提供信息性描述的可能性。[19][55]

The American philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine, in his paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, famously challenged the analytic-synthetic distinction, arguing that the boundary between the two is too blurry to provide a clear division between propositions that are true by definition and propositions that are not. While some contemporary philosophers take themselves to have offered more sustainable accounts of the distinction that are not vulnerable to Quine’s objections, there is no consensus about whether or not these succeed.[56]
美国哲学家威拉德·范·奥曼·奎因（Willard Van Orman Quine）在他的论文《经验主义的两个教条》中，对分析-综合的区分提出了著名的挑战，认为两者之间的界限太模糊，无法在定义上正确的命题和不真实的命题之间提供明确的划分。虽然一些当代哲学家认为自己已经提供了更可持续的关于这种区别的解释，这些解释不易受到奎因的反对，但对于这些解释是否成功，还没有达成共识。[56]

Science as Knowledge Acquisition

作为知识获取的科学

Science is often considered to be a refined, formalized, systematic, institutionalized form of the pursuit and acquisition of empirical knowledge. As such, the philosophy of science may be viewed variously as an application of the principles of epistemology or as a foundation for epistemological inquiry.
科学通常被认为是追求和获取经验知识的一种精致的、形式化的、系统的、制度化的形式。因此，科学哲学可以被看作是认识论原则的应用，或者是认识论探究的基础。

The Regress Problem

回归问题

Overview

概述

Many epistemologists studying justification have attempted to argue for various types of chains of reasoning that can escape the regress problem.
许多研究正当性的认识论者试图论证各种类型的推理链，这些推理链可以逃避回归问题。

Foundationalism

基础主义

Foundationalists respond to the regress problem by asserting that certain “foundations” or “basic beliefs” support other beliefs but do not themselves require justification from other beliefs. These beliefs might be justified because they are self-evident, infallible, or derive from reliable cognitive mechanisms. Perception, memory, and a priori intuition are often considered possible examples of basic beliefs.
基础主义者对倒退问题的回应是断言，某些“基础”或“基本信念”支持其他信念，但其本身并不需要其他信念的证明。这些信念可能是合理的，因为它们是不言而喻的、无误的，或者源自可靠的认知机制。知觉、记忆和先验直觉通常被认为是基本信念的可能例子。

The chief criticism of foundationalism is that if a belief is not supported by other beliefs, accepting it may be arbitrary or unjustified.[58]
对基础主义的主要批评是，如果一种信仰没有得到其他信仰的支持，那么接受它可能是武断的或不合理的。[58]

Coherentism

连贯性

Another response to the regress problem is coherentism, which is the rejection of the assumption that the regress proceeds according to a pattern of linear justification. To avoid the charge of circularity, coherentists hold that an individual belief is justified circularly by the way it fits together (coheres) with the rest of the belief system of which it is a part. This theory has the advantage of avoiding the infinite regress without claiming special, possibly arbitrary status for some particular class of beliefs. Yet, since a system can be coherent while also being wrong, coherentists face the difficulty of ensuring that the whole system corresponds to reality. Additionally, most logicians agree that any argument that is circular is, at best, only trivially valid. That is, to be illuminating, arguments must operate with information from multiple premises, not simply conclude by reiterating a premise.
对回归问题的另一种回应是相干主义，即拒绝回归按照线性证明模式进行的假设。為了避免循環性的指控，連貫論者認為，個人信念在循環上是合理的，因為它與它所屬於其一部分的信仰體系的其他部分相合（連結）。这种理论的优点是避免了无限的倒退，而又不要求对某些特定类别的信仰具有特殊的、可能是任意的地位。然而，由于一个系统可以是连贯的，但也可能是错误的，因此连贯论者面临着确保整个系统与现实相对应的困难。此外，大多数逻辑学家都认为，任何循环的论点充其量只是微不足道的有效性。也就是说，为了具有启发性，论点必须与来自多个前提的信息一起运作，而不是简单地通过重申一个前提来得出结论。

Nigel Warburton writes in Thinking from A to Z that “[c]ircular arguments are not invalid; in other words, from a logical point of view there is nothing intrinsically wrong with them. However, they are, when viciously circular, spectacularly uninformative.”[59]
奈杰尔·沃伯顿（Nigel Warburton）在《从A到Z的思考》中写道：“无意义的论点并非无效;换句话说，从逻辑的角度来看，它们本质上没有任何问题。然而，当它们恶性循环时，却非常缺乏信息。[59]

Infinitism

无限论

An alternative resolution to the regress problem is known as “infinitism”. Infinitists take the infinite series to be merely potential, in the sense that an individual may have indefinitely many reasons available to them, without having consciously thought through all of these reasons when the need arises. This position is motivated in part by the desire to avoid what is seen as the arbitrariness and circularity of its chief competitors, foundationalism and coherentism. The most prominent defense of infinitism has been given by Peter Klein.[60]
回归问题的另一种解决方案被称为“无限式”。无限论者认为无穷级数仅仅是潜力，从某种意义上说，一个人可能无限地有许多理由可供他们使用，而在需要时却没有有意识地思考所有这些原因。这一立场的部分动机是希望避免其主要竞争对手的任意性和循环性，即基础主义和连贯性。彼得·克莱因（Peter Klein）对无限论最突出的辩护。[60]

Foundherentism

创立主义

An intermediate position, known as “foundherentism”, is advanced by Susan Haack. Foundherentism is meant to unify foundationalism and coherentism. Haack explains the view by using a crossword puzzle as an analogy. Whereas, for example, infinitists regard the regress of reasons as taking the form of a single line that continues indefinitely, Haack has argued that chains of properly justified beliefs look more like a crossword puzzle, with various different lines mutually supporting each other.[61] Thus, Haack’s view leaves room for both chains of beliefs that are “vertical” (terminating in foundational beliefs) and chains that are “horizontal” (deriving their justification from coherence with beliefs that are also members of foundationalist chains of belief).
苏珊·哈克（Susan Haack）提出了一种被称为“创立主义”的中间立场。创立主义旨在统一基础主义和连贯主义。Haack 通过使用填字游戏作为类比来解释这一观点。例如，无限论者认为理性的倒退是一条无限期持续的线的形式，而哈克则认为，正确合理的信念链看起来更像是填字游戏，各种不同的线相互支持。[61]因此，哈克的观点为“垂直”的信念链（终止于基础信念）和“水平”的信念链（从与也是基础主义信念链成员的信念的一致性中得出其正当性）留下了空间。

Philosophical Skepticism 哲学怀疑论

Overview

概述

Epistemic skepticism questions whether knowledge is possible at all. Generally speaking, skeptics argue that knowledge requires certainty, and that most or all of our beliefs are fallible (meaning that our grounds for holding them always, or almost always, fall short of certainty), which would together entail that knowledge is always or almost always impossible for us.[62] Characterizing knowledge as strong or weak is dependent on a person’s viewpoint and their characterization of knowledge.[62]
认识论怀疑论质疑知识是否可能。一般来说，怀疑论者认为知识需要确定性，而我们的大部分或所有信念都是错误的（这意味着我们持有它们的理由总是或几乎总是缺乏确定性），这将共同意味着知识对我们来说总是或几乎总是不可能。[62] 将知识描述为强或弱取决于一个人的观点和他们对知识的描述。[62]

Much of modern epistemology is derived from attempts to better understand and address philosophical skepticism.[63]
现代认识论的大部分内容都源于更好地理解和解决哲学怀疑主义的尝试。[63]

Pyrrhonism Pyrrhonism

皮洛洪主义

Pyrrho of Elis, marble head, Roman copy, Archaeological Museum of Corfu. / Photo by Zde, Wikimedia Commons

One of the oldest forms of epistemic skepticism can be found in Agrippa’s trilemma (named after the Pyrrhonist philosopher Agrippa the Skeptic) which demonstrates that certainty can not be achieved with regard to beliefs.[64] Pyrrhonism dates back to Pyrrho of Elis from the 4th century BCE, although most of what we know about Pyrrhonism today is from the surviving works of Sextus Empiricus.[64]
认识论怀疑主义的最古老的形式之一可以在阿格里帕的三难困境中找到（以皮洛宗哲学家阿格里帕怀疑论者的名字命名），它表明在信仰方面无法实现确定性。[64] Pyrrhonism 可以追溯到公元前 4 世纪的 Elis 的 Pyrrho，尽管我们今天对 Pyrrhonism 的大部分了解都来自 Sextus Empiricus 的幸存作品。[64]

Pyrrhonists claim that for any argument for a non-evident proposition, an equally convincing argument for a contradictory proposition can be produced. Pyrrhonists do not dogmatically deny the possibility of knowledge, but instead point out that beliefs about non-evident matters cannot be substantiated.
皮洛洪主义者声称，对于一个不明显的命题的任何论证，都可以产生一个同样令人信服的矛盾命题的论证。皮洛洪主义者并没有教条地否认知识的可能性，而是指出，关于非显而易见的事物的信念是无法得到证实的。

Cartesian Skepticism

笛卡尔怀疑论

The Cartesian evil demon problem, first raised by René Descartes, supposes that our sensory impressions may be controlled by some external power rather than the result of ordinary veridical perception.[65] In such a scenario, nothing we sense would actually exist, but would instead be mere illusion. As a result, we would never be able to know anything about the world, since we would be systematically deceived about everything. The conclusion often drawn from evil demon skepticism is that even if we are not completely deceived, all of the information provided by our senses is still compatible with skeptical scenarios in which we are completely deceived, and that we must therefore either be able to exclude the possibility of deception or else must deny the possibility of infallible knowledge (that is, knowledge which is completely certain) beyond our immediate sensory impressions.[66]
笛卡尔的邪魔问题首先由勒内·笛卡尔提出，它假设我们的感官印象可能受到某种外部力量的控制，而不是普通的真实感知的结果。[65]在这种情况下，我们感觉到的任何东西实际上都不存在，而只是幻觉。结果，我们永远无法了解这个世界的任何事情，因为我们会在所有事情上被系统性地欺骗。通常从邪魔怀疑主义中得出的结论是，即使我们没有被完全欺骗，我们的感官提供的所有信息仍然与我们完全被欺骗的怀疑情景兼容，因此我们必须能够排除欺骗的可能性，否则必须否认无误知识的可能性（即， 知识，这是完全确定的）超越了我们直接的感官印象。[66]

While the view that no beliefs are beyond doubt other than our immediate sensory impressions is often ascribed to Descartes, he in fact thought that we can exclude the possibility that we are systematically deceived, although his reasons for thinking this are based on a highly contentious ontological argument for the existence of a benevolent God who would not allow such deception to occur.[65]
虽然笛卡尔经常认为，除了我们的直接感官印象之外，没有任何信仰是毋庸置疑的，但事实上，他认为我们可以排除我们被系统性欺骗的可能性，尽管他这样认为的理由是基于一个极具争议的本体论论证，即存在一个仁慈的上帝，他不会允许这种欺骗发生。[65]

Responses to Philosophical Skepticism

对哲学怀疑主义的回应

Epistemological skepticism can be classified as either “mitigated” or “unmitigated” skepticism. Mitigated skepticism rejects “strong” or “strict” knowledge claims but does approve weaker ones, which can be considered “virtual knowledge”, but only with regard to justified beliefs. Unmitigated skepticism rejects claims of both virtual and strong knowledge.[62] Characterizing knowledge as strong, weak, virtual or genuine can be determined differently depending on a person’s viewpoint as well as their characterization of knowledge.[62] Some of the most notable attempts to respond to unmitigated skepticism include direct realism, disjunctivism, common sense philosophy, pragmatism, fideism, and fictionalism.[67]‘
认识论怀疑主义可以被归类为“减轻”或“未减轻”的怀疑主义。减轻的怀疑主义拒绝“强”或“严格”的知识主张，但确实认可较弱的知识主张，这些主张可以被认为是“虚拟知识”，但仅限于合理的信念。毫不掩饰的怀疑主义拒绝了虚拟知识和强大知识的主张。[62] 将知识描述为强、弱、虚拟或真实，可以根据一个人的观点以及他们对知识的描述而以不同的方式确定。[62] 一些最引人注目的尝试是对毫不妥协的怀疑主义的回应，包括直接现实主义、分离主义、常识哲学、实用主义、信仰主义和虚构主义。[67]‘

Schools of Thought in Epistemology

认识论的思想流派

Empiricism

经验主义

David Hume, one of the most staunch defenders of empiricism. / Image courtesy National Galleries of Scotland, Wikimedia Commons

Empiricism is a view in the theory of knowledge which focuses on the role of experience, especially experience based on perceptual observations by the senses, in the generation of knowledge.[68] Certain forms exempt disciplines such as mathematics and logic from these requirements.[69]
经验主义是知识理论中的一种观点，它侧重于经验，特别是基于感官的知觉观察的经验在知识生成中的作用。[68] 某些形式免除了数学和逻辑等学科的这些要求。[69]

There are many variants of empiricism, including British empiricism, logical empiricism, phenomenalism, and some versions of common sense philosophy. Most forms of empiricism give epistemologically privileged status to sensory impressions or sense data, although this plays out very differently in different cases. Some of the most famous historical empiricists include John Locke, David Hume, George Berkeley, Francis Bacon, John Stuart Mill, Rudolf Carnap, and Bertrand Russell.
经验主义有许多变体，包括英国经验主义、逻辑经验主义、现象主义和一些版本的常识哲学。大多数形式的经验主义在认识论上赋予感官印象或感官数据特权地位，尽管这在不同的情况下表现得非常不同。一些最著名的历史经验主义者包括约翰·洛克、大卫·休谟、乔治·伯克利、弗朗西斯·培根、约翰·斯图亚特·穆勒、鲁道夫·卡尔纳普和伯特兰·罗素。

Rationalism

合理主义

Rationalism is the epistemological view that reason is the chief source of knowledge and the main determinant of what constitutes knowledge. More broadly, it can also refer to any view which appeals to reason as a source of knowledge or justification. Rationalism is one of the two classical views in epistemology, the other being empiricism. Rationalists claim that the mind, through the use of reason, can directly grasp certain truths in various domains, including logic, mathematics, ethics, and metaphysics. Rationalist views can range from modest views in mathematics and logic (such as that of Gottlob Frege) to ambitious metaphysical systems (such as that of Baruch Spinoza).
理性主义是一种认识论观点，认为理性是知识的主要来源，也是构成知识的主要决定因素。更广泛地说，它也可以指任何诉诸理性作为知识或理由来源的观点。理性主义是认识论中的两种经典观点之一，另一种是经验主义。理性主义者声称，通过使用理性，心灵可以直接掌握各个领域的某些真理，包括逻辑、数学、伦理学和形而上学。理性主义观点的范围可以从数学和逻辑的适度观点（如戈特洛布·弗雷格的观点）到雄心勃勃的形而上学体系（如巴鲁克·斯宾诺莎的观点）。

Some of the most famous rationalists include Plato, René Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, and Gottfried Leibniz.
一些最著名的理性主义者包括柏拉图、勒内·笛卡尔、巴鲁克·斯宾诺莎和戈特弗里德·莱布尼茨。

Skepticism

怀疑论

Skepticism is a position that questions the possibility of human knowledge, either in particular domains or on a general level.[63] Skepticism does not refer to any one specific school of philosophy, but is rather a thread that runs through many epistemological debates. Ancient Greek skepticism began during the Hellenistic period in philosophy, which featured both Pyrrhonism (notably defended by Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus) and Academic skepticism (notably defended by Arcesilaus and Carneades).
怀疑主义是一种质疑人类知识可能性的立场，无论是在特定领域还是在一般层面上。[63] 怀疑主义并不是指任何一个特定的哲学流派，而是贯穿许多认识论辩论的一条线索。古希腊怀疑主义始于哲学的希腊化时期，其特点是皮洛洪主义（主要由皮洛和塞克斯图斯·恩皮里库斯辩护）和学术怀疑主义（主要由阿尔塞西劳斯和卡内阿德斯辩护）。

Among ancient Indian philosophers, skepticism was notably defended by the Ajñana school and in the Buddhist Madhyamika tradition. In modern philosophy, René Descartes’ famous inquiry into mind and body began as an exercise in skepticism, in which he started by trying to doubt all purported cases of knowledge in order to search for something that was known with absolute certainty.[70]
在古印度哲学家中，怀疑论得到了阿吉纳纳学派和佛教中观传统的特别辩护。在现代哲学中，勒内·笛卡尔（René Descartes）对身心的著名探究始于怀疑主义的练习，在这种探究中，他首先试图怀疑所有所谓的知识案例，以寻找绝对确定地知道的东西。[70]

Pragmatism

实用主义

Pragmatism is an empiricist epistemology formulated by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, which understands truth as that which is practically applicable in the world. Pragmatists often treat “truth” as the final outcome of ideal scientific inquiry, meaning that something cannot be true unless it is potentially observable. Peirce formulates the maxim: ‘Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.’[71] This suggests that we are to analyse ideas and objects in the world for their practical value.
实用主义是由查尔斯·桑德斯·皮尔斯、威廉·詹姆斯和约翰·杜威提出的一种经验主义认识论，它将真理理解为在世界上实际适用的真理。实用主义者经常将“真理”视为理想科学探究的最终结果，这意味着除非某些东西有可能被观察到，否则它不可能是真实的。皮尔斯（Peirce）提出了一句格言：“考虑一下我们构想我们的构想对象所具有的效果，这些效果可能会产生实际影响。那么，我们对这些效果的概念就是我们对物体的全部概念。[71]这表明我们要分析世界上的思想和物体的实用价值。

This is in contrast to any correspondence theory of truth that holds that what is true is what corresponds to an external reality. William James suggests that through a pragmatist epistemology, theories “become instruments, not answers to enigmas in which we can rest.”[72]
这与任何真理对应理论形成鲜明对比，后者认为真实的是与外部现实相对应的。威廉·詹姆斯（William James）认为，通过实用主义的认识论，理论“成为工具，而不是我们可以休息的谜团的答案”。[72]

Contemporary versions of pragmatism have been most notably developed by Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. Rorty proposed that values were historically contingent and dependent upon their utility within a given historical period,[73] Contemporary philosophers working in pragmatism are called neopragmatists, and also include Nicholas Rescher, Robert Brandom, Susan Haack, and Cornel West.
实用主义的当代版本最引人注目的是理查德·罗蒂（Richard Rorty）和希拉里·普特南（Hilary Putnam）。罗蒂提出，价值观在历史上是偶然的，并取决于它们在特定历史时期内的效用，[73]从事实用主义的当代哲学家被称为新实用主义者，还包括尼古拉斯·雷舍尔、罗伯特·布兰德、苏珊·哈克和康奈尔·韦斯特。

Naturalized Epistemology

归化认识论

In certain respects an intellectual descendant of pragmatism, naturalized epistemology considers the evolutionary role of knowledge for agents living and evolving in the world.[74] It de-emphasizes the questions around justification and truth, and instead asks, empirically, how reliable beliefs are formed and the role that evolution played in the development of such processes. It suggests a more empirical approach to the subject as a whole, leaving behind philosophical definitions and consistency arguments, and instead using psychological methods to study and understand how “knowledge” is actually formed and is used in the natural world. As such, it does not attempt to answer the analytic questions of traditional epistemology, but rather replace them with new empirical ones.[75]
在某些方面，作为实用主义的知识后裔，自然化的认识论考虑了知识对在世界上生活和进化的主体的进化作用。[74]它不再强调围绕正当性和真理的问题，而是从经验的角度询问可靠的信念是如何形成的，以及进化在这些过程的发展中所扮演的角色。它提出了一种更加实证的方法来看待这个主题，抛弃了哲学定义和一致性论点，而是使用心理学方法来研究和理解“知识”是如何在自然界中实际形成和使用的。因此，它并不试图回答传统认识论的分析问题，而是用新的实证问题来取代它们。[75]

Naturalized epistemology was first proposed in “Epistemology Naturalized”, a seminal paper by W.V.O. Quine.[74] A less radical view has been defended by Hilary Kornblith in Knowledge and its Place in Nature, in which he seeks to turn epistemology towards empirical investigation without completely abandoning traditional epistemic concepts.[44]
归化认识论最早是在W.V.O.奎因的开创性论文《归化的认识论》中提出的。[74]希拉里·科恩布利斯（Hilary Kornblith）在《知识及其在自然中的地位》中捍卫了一种不那么激进的观点，他试图在不完全放弃传统认识论概念的情况下将认识论转向实证研究。[44]

Feminist Epistemology

女权主义认识论

Feminist epistemology is a subfield of epistemology which applies feminist theory to epistemological questions. It began to emerge as a distinct subfield in the 20th century. Prominent feminist epistemologists include Miranda Fricker (who developed the concept of epistemic injustice), Donna Haraway (who first proposed the concept of situated knowledge), Sandra Harding, and Elizabeth Anderson.[76] Harding proposes that feminist epistemology can be broken into three distinct categories: Feminist empiricism, standpoint epistemology, and postmodern epistemology.
女权主义认识论是认识论的一个子领域，它将女权主义理论应用于认识论问题。它在 20 世纪开始成为一个独特的子领域。著名的女权主义认识论者包括米兰达·弗里克（Miranda Fricker）（她提出了认识论不公正的概念）、唐娜·哈拉维（Donna Haraway）（她首先提出了位置知识的概念）、桑德拉·哈丁（Sandra Harding）和伊丽莎白·安德森（Elizabeth Anderson）。[76] 哈丁提出，女权主义认识论可以分为三个不同的类别：女权主义经验主义、立场认识论和后现代认识论。

Feminist epistemology has also played a significant role in the development of many debates in social epistemology.[77]
女权主义认识论在社会认识论的许多辩论的发展中也发挥了重要作用。[77]

Epistemic Relativism

认识相对主义

Epistemic relativism is the view that what is true, rational, or justified for one person need not be true, rational, or justified for another person. Epistemic relativists therefore assert that while there are relative facts about truth, rationality, justification, and so on, there is no perspective-independent fact of the matter.[78] Note that this is distinct from epistemic contextualism, which holds that the meaning of epistemic terms vary across contexts (e.g. “I know” might mean something different in everyday contexts and skeptical contexts). In contrast, epistemic relativism holds that the relevant facts vary, not just linguistic meaning. Relativism about truth may also be a form of ontological relativism, insofar as relativists about truth hold that facts about what exists vary based on perspective.[78]
认识相对主义是这样一种观点，即对一个人来说是真实的、合理的或合理的，对另一个人来说不一定是真实的、理性的或合理的。因此，认识论相对论者断言，虽然存在关于真理、理性、正当性等的相对事实，但没有独立于观点的事实。[78] 请注意，这与认识论语境主义不同，认识论语境主义认为认识论术语的含义因语境而异（例如，“我知道”在日常语境和怀疑语境中可能意味着不同的东西）。相比之下，认识相对主义认为相关事实各不相同，而不仅仅是语言意义。关于真理的相对主义也可能是本体论相对主义的一种形式，因为关于真理的相对主义者认为，关于存在的事实会根据观点而变化。[78]

Epistemic Constructivism

认识建构主义

Constructivism is a view in philosophy according to which all “knowledge is a compilation of human-made constructions”,[79] “not the neutral discovery of an objective truth”.[80] Whereas objectivism is concerned with the “object of our knowledge”, constructivism emphasizes “how we construct knowledge”.[81] Constructivism proposes new definitions for knowledge and truth, which emphasize intersubjectivity rather than objectivity, and viability rather than truth. The constructivist point of view is in many ways comparable to certain forms of pragmatism.[82]
建构主义是一种哲学观点，根据这种观点，所有“知识都是人为建构的汇编”，[79]“不是客观真理的中立发现”。[80]客观主义关注的是“我们知识的对象”，而建构主义则强调“我们如何建构知识”。[81]建构主义为知识和真理提出了新的定义，强调主体间性而不是客观性，以及生存能力而不是真理。建构主义的观点在许多方面可以与某些形式的实用主义相媲美。[82]

Epistemic Idealism

认识唯心主义

Idealism is a broad term referring to both an ontological view about the world being in some sense mind-dependent and a corresponding epistemological view that everything we know can be reduced to mental phenomena. First and foremost, “idealism” is a metaphysical doctrine. As an epistemological doctrine, idealism shares a great deal with both empiricism and rationalism. Some of the most famous empiricists have been classified as idealists (particularly Berkeley), and yet the subjectivism inherent to idealism also resembles that of Descartes in many respects. Many idealists believe that knowledge is primarily (at least in some areas) acquired by a priori processes, or that it is innate—for example, in the form of concepts not derived from experience.[83] The relevant theoretical concepts may purportedly be part of the structure of the human mind (as in Kant’s theory of transcendental idealism), or they may be said to exist independently of the mind (as in Plato’s theory of Forms).
唯心主义是一个广义的术语，既指一种关于世界在某种意义上依赖于心灵的本体论观点，也指一种相应的认识论观点，即我们所知道的一切都可以归结为心理现象。首先，“唯心主义”是一种形而上学的学说。作为一种认识论学说，唯心主义与经验主义和理性主义都有很多共同之处。一些最著名的经验主义者被归类为唯心主义者（尤其是贝克莱），但唯心主义固有的主观主义在许多方面也与笛卡尔相似。许多唯心主义者认为，知识主要是（至少在某些领域）通过先验过程获得的，或者它是与生俱来的——例如，以不是从经验中衍生出来的概念的形式。[83]相关的理论概念可能被认为是人类心灵结构的一部分（如康德的先验唯心主义理论），或者它们可以说是独立于心灵而存在的（如柏拉图的形式理论）。

Some of the most famous forms of idealism include transcendental idealism (developed by Immanuel Kant), subjective idealism (developed by George Berkeley), and absolute idealism (developed by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Friedrich Schelling).
一些最著名的唯心主义形式包括先验唯心主义（由伊曼纽尔·康德发展）、主观唯心主义（由乔治·伯克利发展）和绝对唯心主义（由乔治·威廉·弗里德里希·黑格尔和弗里德里希·谢林发展）。

Bayesian Epistemology

贝叶斯认识论

Bayesian epistemology is a formal approach to various topics in epistemology that has its roots in Thomas Bayes’ work in the field of probability theory. One advantage of its formal method in contrast to traditional epistemology is that its concepts and theorems can be defined with a high degree of precision. It is based on the idea that beliefs can be interpreted as subjective probabilities. As such, they are subject to the laws of probability theory, which act as the norms of rationality.
贝叶斯认识论是认识论中各种主题的正式方法，其根源在于托马斯·贝叶斯在概率论领域的工作。与传统的认识论相比，其形式化方法的一个优点是其概念和定理可以高度精确地定义。它基于这样一种观点，即信念可以被解释为主观概率。因此，它们受概率论定律的约束，概率论定律充当理性规范。

These norms can be divided into static constraints, governing the rationality of beliefs at any moment, and dynamic constraints, governing how rational agents should change their beliefs upon receiving new evidence. The most characteristic Bayesian expression of these principles is found in the form of Dutch books, which illustrate irrationality in agents through a series of bets that lead to a loss for the agent no matter which of the probabilistic events occurs. Bayesians have applied these fundamental principles to various epistemological topics but Bayesianism does not cover all topics of traditional epistemology.[84][85][86][87]
这些规范可以分为静态约束和动态约束，前者控制着任何时候信念的合理性，后者则控制着理性主体在收到新证据后应如何改变他们的信念。这些原则最具特色的贝叶斯表达以荷兰书籍的形式出现，这些书籍通过一系列赌注来说明代理人的非理性，无论发生哪种概率事件，这些赌注都会导致代理人的损失。贝叶斯学派将这些基本原则应用于各种认识论主题，但贝叶斯主义并未涵盖传统认识论的所有主题。[84][85][86][87]

Indian Pramana

印度标准

Indian schools of philosophy, such as the Hindu Nyaya and Carvaka schools, and the Jain and Buddhist philosophical schools, developed an epistemological tradition independently of the Western philosophical tradition called “pramana”. Pramana can be translated as “instrument of knowledge” and refers to various means or sources of knowledge that Indian philosophers held to be reliable. Each school of Indian philosophy had their own theories about which pramanas were valid means to knowledge and which were unreliable (and why).[88] A Vedic text, Taittirīya Āraṇyaka (c. 9th–6th centuries BCE), lists “four means of attaining correct knowledge”: smṛti (“tradition” or “scripture”), pratyakṣa (“perception”), aitihya (“communication by one who is expert”, or “tradition”), and anumāna (“reasoning” or “inference”).[89][90]
印度哲学流派，如印度教 Nyaya 和 Carvaka 学派，以及耆那教和佛教哲学流派，发展了一种独立于西方哲学传统的认识论传统，称为“pramana”。Pramana 可以翻译为“知识工具”，指的是印度哲学家认为可靠的各种知识手段或来源。每个印度哲学流派都有自己的理论，关于哪些 pramanas 是获取知识的有效手段，哪些是不可靠的（以及为什么）。[88] 吠陀文本 Taittirīya Āraṇyaka（约公元前 9-6 世纪）列出了“获得正确知识的四种方法”：smṛti（“传统”或“经文”）、pratyakṣa（“感知”）、aitichya（“专家交流”或“传统”）和 anumāna（“推理”或“推理”）。[89][90]

In the Indian traditions, the most widely discussed pramanas are: Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāṇa (inference), Upamāṇa (comparison and analogy), Arthāpatti (postulation, derivation from circumstances), Anupalabdi (non-perception, negative/cognitive proof) and Śabda (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts). While the Nyaya school (beginning with the Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama, between 6th-century BCE and 2nd-century CE[91][92]) were a proponent of realism and supported four pramanas (perception, inference, comparison/analogy and testimony), the Buddhist epistemologists (Dignaga and Dharmakirti) generally accepted only perception and inference. The Carvaka school of materialists only accepted the pramana of perception, and hence were among the first empiricists in the Indian traditions.[93] Another school, the Ajñana, included notable proponents of philosophical skepticism.
在印度传统中，讨论最广泛的 pramanas 是：Pratyakṣa（感知）、Anumāṇa（推理）、Upamāṇa（比较和类比）、Arthāpatti（假设、从环境推导）、Anupalabdi（非感知、否定/认知证明）和 Śabda（话语，过去或现在可靠专家的证词）。虽然 Nyaya 学派（始于公元前 6 世纪至公元 2 世纪之间的 Gotama 的 Nyāya 经[91][92]）是现实主义的支持者，并支持四个 pramanas（感知、推理、比较/类比和见证），但佛教认识论者（Dignaga 和 Dharmakirti）通常只接受感知和推理。卡瓦卡唯物主义者学派只接受知觉的普拉马纳，因此是印度传统中最早的经验主义者之一。[93] 另一个学派，Ajñana，包括哲学怀疑主义的著名支持者。

The theory of knowledge of the Buddha in the early Buddhist texts has been interpreted as a form of pragmatism as well as a form of correspondence theory.[94] Likewise, the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakirti has been interpreted both as holding a form of pragmatism or correspondence theory for his view that what is true is what has effective power (arthakriya).[95][96] The Buddhist Madhyamika school’s theory of emptiness (shunyata) meanwhile has been interpreted as a form of philosophical skepticism.[97]
在早期的佛教典籍中，佛陀的知识理论被解释为实用主义的一种形式，也是一种对应理论的形式。[94]同样，佛教哲学家达摩基提（Dharmakirti）也被解释为持有某种形式的实用主义或对应理论，因为他的观点认为真实的就是具有有效力量的（arthakriya）。[95][96]与此同时，佛教中观学派的空性理论（shunyata）被解释为一种哲学怀疑主义。[97]

The main contribution to epistemology by the Jains has been their theory of “many sided-ness” or “multi-perspectivism” (Anekantavada), which says that since the world is multifaceted, any single viewpoint is limited (naya – a partial standpoint).[98] This has been interpreted as a kind of pluralism or perspectivism.[99][100] According to Jain epistemology, none of the pramanas gives absolute or perfect knowledge since they are each limited points of view.
耆那教徒对认识论的主要贡献是他们的“多面性”或“多视角主义”（Anekantavada）理论，该理论认为，由于世界是多面的，任何单一的观点都是有限的（naya – 部分立场）。[98]这被解释为一种多元主义或透视主义。[99][100] 根据耆那教的认识论，没有一个般若能提供绝对或完美的知识，因为它们都是有限的观点。

Domains of Inquiry in Epistemology

认识论中的探究领域

Social Epistemology

社会认识论

Social epistemology deals with questions about knowledge in contexts where our knowledge attributions cannot be explained by simply examining individuals in isolation from one another, meaning that the scope of our knowledge attributions must be widened to include broader social contexts.[101] It also explores the ways in which interpersonal beliefs can be justified in social contexts.[101] The most common topics discussed in contemporary social epistemology are testimony, which deals with the conditions under which a belief “x is true” which resulted from being told “x is true” constitutes knowledge; peer disagreement, which deals with when and how I should revise my beliefs in light of other people holding beliefs that contradict mine; and group epistemology, which deals with what it means to attribute knowledge to groups rather than individuals, and when group knowledge attributions are appropriate.
社会认识论在一些情况下处理有关知识的问题，在这些情境中，我们的知识归因不能通过简单地孤立地检查个人来解释，这意味着我们的知识归因的范围必须扩大，以包括更广泛的社会背景。[101] 它还探讨了在社会背景下可以证明人际信念的方式。[101] 当代社会认识论中讨论的最常见的主题是证词，它涉及因被告知“x 是真的”而产生的信念构成知识的条件;同伴分歧，涉及我应该何时以及如何根据其他人持有与我相矛盾的信念来修改我的信念;以及群体认识论，它涉及将知识归因于群体而不是个人意味着什么，以及何时群体知识归因是合适的。

Formal Epistemology

形式认识论

Formal epistemology uses formal tools and methods from decision theory, logic, probability theory and computability theory to model and reason about issues of epistemological interest.[102] Work in this area spans several academic fields, including philosophy, computer science, economics, and statistics. The focus of formal epistemology has tended to differ somewhat from that of traditional epistemology, with topics like uncertainty, induction, and belief revision garnering more attention than the analysis of knowledge, skepticism, and issues with justification.
形式认识论使用来自决策理论、逻辑、概率理论和可计算性理论的形式工具和方法来对认识论感兴趣的问题进行建模和推理。[102] 该领域的工作涉及多个学术领域，包括哲学、计算机科学、经济学和统计学。正式认识论的重点往往与传统认识论的重点有所不同，不确定性、归纳和信念修正等主题比知识分析、怀疑主义和正当性问题更受关注。

Metaepistemology

元认识论

Metaepistemology is the metaphilosophical study of the methods, aims, and subject matter of epistemology.[103] In general, metaepistemology aims to better understand our first-order epistemological inquiry. Some goals of metaepistemology are identifying inaccurate assumptions made in epistemological debates and determining whether the questions asked in mainline epistemology are the right epistemological questions to be asking.
元认识论是对认识论的方法、目的和主题的形而上学的元哲学研究。[103] 总的来说，元认识论旨在更好地理解我们的一阶认识论探究。元认识论的一些目标是识别认识论辩论中做出的不准确假设，并确定主流认识论中提出的问题是否是正确的认识论问题。

Appendix

Endnotes

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