现象学：当代意识理论中的现象学

注：机翻，未校。

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Phenomenology 现象学

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

First published Sun Nov 16, 2003; substantive revision Mon Dec 16, 2013

Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object. An experience is directed toward an object by virtue of its content or meaning (which represents the object) together with appropriate enabling conditions.
现象学是从第一人称的角度研究意识结构的学科。体验的中心结构是它的意向性，它被指向某物，因为它是对某个对象的体验或关于某个对象的体验。体验是凭借其内容或意义（代表对象）以及适当的有利条件而指向对象的。

Phenomenology as a discipline is distinct from but related to other key disciplines in philosophy, such as ontology, epistemology, logic, and ethics. Phenomenology has been practiced in various guises for centuries, but it came into its own in the early 20th century in the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and others. Phenomenological issues of intentionality, consciousness, qualia, and first-person perspective have been prominent in recent philosophy of mind.
现象学作为一门学科，与哲学中的其他关键学科不同，但又与之相关，例如本体论、认识论、逻辑学和伦理学。几个世纪以来，现象学一直以各种形式进行实践，但在 20 世纪初，它在胡塞尔、海德格尔、萨特、梅洛-庞蒂等人的著作中崭露头角。意向性、意识、qualia 和第一人称视角的现象学问题在最近的心灵哲学中一直很突出。

1. What is Phenomenology? 1. 什么是现象学？

Phenomenology is commonly understood in either of two ways: as a disciplinary field in philosophy, or as a movement in the history of philosophy.
现象学通常以两种方式之一来理解：作为哲学中的一个学科领域，或作为哲学史上的一个运动。

The discipline of phenomenology may be defined initially as the study of structures of experience, or consciousness. Literally, phenomenology is the study of “phenomena”: appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience. Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced from the subjective or first person point of view. This field of philosophy is then to be distinguished from, and related to, the other main fields of philosophy: ontology (the study of being or what is), epistemology (the study of knowledge), logic (the study of valid reasoning), ethics (the study of right and wrong action), etc.
现象学这门学科最初可以定义为对经验或意识结构的研究。从字面上看，现象学是对“现象”的研究：事物的表象，或事物在我们的经验中出现的样子，或者我们体验事物的方式，从而事物在我们的经验中具有的意义。现象学研究从主观或第一人称角度体验的有意识体验。因此，这个哲学领域将与哲学的其他主要领域区分开来并与之相关：本体论（研究存在或是什么）、认识论（研究知识）、逻辑学（研究有效推理）、伦理学（研究正确和错误的行为）等。

The historical movement of phenomenology is the philosophical tradition launched in the first half of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, et al. In that movement, the discipline of phenomenology was prized as the proper foundation of all philosophy—as opposed, say, to ethics or metaphysics or epistemology. The methods and characterization of the discipline were widely debated by Husserl and his successors, and these debates continue to the present day. (The definition of phenomenology offered above will thus be debatable, for example, by Heideggerians, but it remains the starting point in characterizing the discipline.)
现象学的历史运动是 20 世纪上半叶由埃德蒙·胡塞尔、马丁·海德格尔、莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂、让-保罗·萨特等人开创的哲学传统。在那场运动中，现象学学科被推崇为所有哲学的适当基础——比如说，与伦理学、形而上学或认识论相对立。胡塞尔和他的继任者对这门学科的方法和特征进行了广泛的辩论，这些争论一直持续到今天。（因此，上面提供的现象学定义将是值得商榷的，例如，海德格尔主义者，但它仍然是描述这门学科的起点。

In recent philosophy of mind, the term “phenomenology” is often restricted to the characterization of sensory qualities of seeing, hearing, etc.: what it is like to have sensations of various kinds. However, our experience is normally much richer in content than mere sensation. Accordingly, in the phenomenological tradition, phenomenology is given a much wider range, addressing the meaning things have in our experience, notably, the significance of objects, events, tools, the flow of time, the self, and others, as these things arise and are experienced in our “life-world”.
在最近的心灵哲学中，“现象学”一词通常局限于对视觉、听觉等感官品质的描述：拥有各种感觉是什么感觉。然而，我们的体验通常比单纯的感觉更丰富。因此，在现象学传统中，现象学被赋予了更广泛的范围，涉及事物在我们的经验中的意义，特别是物体、事件、工具、时间的流动、自我和他人的意义，因为这些事物在我们的“生活世界”中产生和体验。

Phenomenology as a discipline has been central to the tradition of continental European philosophy throughout the 20th century, while philosophy of mind has evolved in the Austro-Anglo-American tradition of analytic philosophy that developed throughout the 20th century. Yet the fundamental character of our mental activity is pursued in overlapping ways within these two traditions. Accordingly, the perspective on phenomenology drawn in this article will accommodate both traditions. The main concern here will be to characterize the discipline of phenomenology, in a contemporary purview, while also highlighting the historical tradition that brought the discipline into its own.
现象学作为一门学科在整个 20 世纪一直是欧洲大陆哲学传统的核心，而心灵哲学则在整个 20 世纪发展起来的奥英美分析哲学传统中发展起来。然而，在这两个传统中，我们心理活动的基本特征是以重叠的方式追求的。因此，本文中得出的现象学观点将适应这两种传统。这里的主要关注点是在当代的范围内描述现象学学科的特征，同时也强调使该学科独树一帜的历史传统。

Basically, phenomenology studies the structure of various types of experience ranging from perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire, and volition to bodily awareness, embodied action, and social activity, including linguistic activity. The structure of these forms of experience typically involves what Husserl called “intentionality”, that is, the directedness of experience toward things in the world, the property of consciousness that it is a consciousness of or about something. According to classical Husserlian phenomenology, our experience is directed toward—represents or “intends”—things only through particular concepts, thoughts, ideas, images, etc. These make up the meaning or content of a given experience, and are distinct from the things they present or mean.
基本上，现象学研究各种类型经验的结构，从感知、思想、记忆、想象力、情感、欲望和意志到身体意识、具体行动和社会活动，包括语言活动。这些经验形式的结构通常涉及胡塞尔所说的“意向性”，即经验对世界上事物的直接性，意识的属性，即它是对某物或关于某物的意识。根据古典胡塞尔现象学，我们的经验仅通过特定的概念、思想、想法、图像等来指向——代表或“打算”——事物。这些构成了给定体验的意义或内容，与它们所呈现或意味着的事物不同。

The basic intentional structure of consciousness, we find in reflection or analysis, involves further forms of experience. Thus, phenomenology develops a complex account of temporal awareness (within the stream of consciousness), spatial awareness (notably in perception), attention (distinguishing focal and marginal or “horizonal” awareness), awareness of one’s own experience (self-consciousness, in one sense), self-awareness (awareness-of-oneself), the self in different roles (as thinking, acting, etc.), embodied action (including kinesthetic awareness of one’s movement), purpose or intention in action (more or less explicit), awareness of other persons (in empathy, intersubjectivity, collectivity), linguistic activity (involving meaning, communication, understanding others), social interaction (including collective action), and everyday activity in our surrounding life-world (in a particular culture).
我们在反思或分析中发现，意识的基本意向结构涉及进一步形式的体验。因此，现象学发展了对时间意识（在意识流中）、空间意识（特别是在感知中）、注意力（区分焦点和边缘或“水平”意识）、对自身经验的意识（在某种意义上是自我意识）、自我意识（自我意识）、处于不同角色的自我（如思考、行动等）、具身行动（包括对一个人的运动的动觉意识）、行动中的目的或意图（更多或不太明确）、对他人的意识（在同理心、主体间性、集体性）、语言活动（涉及意义、交流、理解他人）、社会互动（包括集体行动）以及我们周围生活世界中的日常活动（在特定文化中）。

Furthermore, in a different dimension, we find various grounds or enabling conditions—conditions of the possibility—of intentionality, including embodiment, bodily skills, cultural context, language and other social practices, social background, and contextual aspects of intentional activities. Thus, phenomenology leads from conscious experience into conditions that help to give experience its intentionality. Traditional phenomenology has focused on subjective, practical, and social conditions of experience. Recent philosophy of mind, however, has focused especially on the neural substrate of experience, on how conscious experience and mental representation or intentionality are grounded in brain activity. It remains a difficult question how much of these grounds of experience fall within the province of phenomenology as a discipline. Cultural conditions thus seem closer to our experience and to our familiar self-understanding than do the electrochemical workings of our brain, much less our dependence on quantum-mechanical states of physical systems to which we may belong. The cautious thing to say is that phenomenology leads in some ways into at least some background conditions of our experience.
此外，在不同的维度中，我们发现了意向性的各种基础或有利条件——可能性的条件——包括体现、身体技能、文化背景、语言和其他社会实践、社会背景和意向活动的背景方面。因此，现象学从有意识的经验引导到有助于赋予经验意向性的条件。传统的现象学侧重于经验的主观、实践和社会条件。然而，最近的心灵哲学特别关注经验的神经基础，即有意识的经验和心理表征或意向性如何以大脑活动为基础。这些经验基础中有多少属于现象学作为一门学科的范畴，这仍然是一个难题。因此，文化条件似乎比我们大脑的电化学工作更接近我们的经验和我们熟悉的自我理解，更不用说我们对我们可能属于的物理系统的量子力学状态的依赖了。谨慎地说，现象学至少在某种程度上导致了我们经验的一些背景条件。

2. The Discipline of Phenomenology 2. 现象学学科

The discipline of phenomenology is defined by its domain of study, its methods, and its main results.
现象学学科由其研究领域、方法和主要结果定义。

Phenomenology studies structures of conscious experience as experienced from the first-person point of view, along with relevant conditions of experience. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality, the way it is directed through its content or meaning toward a certain object in the world.
现象学研究从第一人称视角体验的有意识体验的结构，以及相关的经验条件。体验的中心结构是它的意向性，它通过其内容或意义被引导到世界上的某个对象。

We all experience various types of experience including perception, imagination, thought, emotion, desire, volition, and action. Thus, the domain of phenomenology is the range of experiences including these types (among others). Experience includes not only relatively passive experience as in vision or hearing, but also active experience as in walking or hammering a nail or kicking a ball. (The range will be specific to each species of being that enjoys consciousness; our focus is on our own, human, experience. Not all conscious beings will, or will be able to, practice phenomenology, as we do.)
我们都会经历各种类型的体验，包括感知、想象、思想、情感、欲望、意志和行动。因此，现象学的领域是包括这些类型（以及其他类型）的经验范围。经验不仅包括视觉或听觉等相对被动的经验，还包括行走、敲钉子或踢球等主动经验。（范围将特定于每个享受意识的生物物种;我们的重点是我们自己的、人类的经历。不是所有的有意识的生物都会或将能够像我们一样实践现象学。

Conscious experiences have a unique feature: we experience them, we live through them or perform them. Other things in the world we may observe and engage. But we do not experience them, in the sense of living through or performing them. This experiential or first-person feature—that of being experienced—is an essential part of the nature or structure of conscious experience: as we say, “I see / think / desire / do …” This feature is both a phenomenological and an ontological feature of each experience: it is part of what it is for the experience to be experienced (phenomenological) and part of what it is for the experience to be (ontological).
有意识的体验有一个独特的特点：我们体验它们，我们经历它们或执行它们。我们可以观察和参与世界上的其他事物。但我们并没有体验到它们，从生活或执行它们的意义上。这种体验或第一人称特征——被体验的特征——是有意识体验的性质或结构的重要组成部分：正如我们所说，“我看到/思考/渴望/做…”这个特征既是每个体验的现象学特征，也是本体论特征：它是经验被体验的一部分（现象学），也是经验所成为的（本体论）的一部分。

How shall we study conscious experience? We reflect on various types of experiences just as we experience them. That is to say, we proceed from the first-person point of view. However, we do not normally characterize an experience at the time we are performing it. In many cases we do not have that capability: a state of intense anger or fear, for example, consumes all of one’s psychic focus at the time. Rather, we acquire a background of having lived through a given type of experience, and we look to our familiarity with that type of experience: hearing a song, seeing a sunset, thinking about love, intending to jump a hurdle. The practice of phenomenology assumes such familiarity with the type of experiences to be characterized. Importantly, also, it is types of experience that phenomenology pursues, rather than a particular fleeting experience—unless its type is what interests us.
我们应该如何研究有意识的体验？我们反思各种类型的经历，就像我们经历它们一样。也就是说，我们从第一人称的角度出发。但是，我们通常不会在执行体验时对其进行描述。在许多情况下，我们没有这种能力：例如，一种强烈的愤怒或恐惧状态，在当时消耗了一个人所有的心理焦点。相反，我们获得了经历过某种特定类型经历的背景，我们期待我们对那种经历的熟悉程度：听到一首歌，看到日落，想着爱情，打算跳过一个障碍。现象学的实践假定了对要描述的经验类型的熟悉。同样重要的是，现象学追求的是经验类型，而不是特定的转瞬即逝的体验——除非我们感兴趣的是它的类型。

Classical phenomenologists practiced some three distinguishable methods. (1) We describe a type of experience just as we find it in our own (past) experience. Thus, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty spoke of pure description of lived experience. (2) We interpret a type of experience by relating it to relevant features of context. In this vein, Heidegger and his followers spoke of hermeneutics, the art of interpretation in context, especially social and linguistic context. (3) We analyze the form of a type of experience. In the end, all the classical phenomenologists practiced analysis of experience, factoring out notable features for further elaboration.
古典现象学家采用了三种可区分的方法。（1） 我们描述一种体验，就像我们在自己的（过去）体验中发现的那样。因此，胡塞尔和梅洛-庞蒂谈到了对生活经验的纯粹描述。（2） 我们通过将一种体验与上下文的相关特征联系起来来解释它。本着这种精神，海德格尔和他的追随者谈到了解释学，即在语境中解释的艺术，特别是社会和语言语境。（3） 我们分析一种体验的形式。最后，所有古典现象学家都对经验进行了分析，分辨出值得注意的特征以供进一步阐述。

These traditional methods have been ramified in recent decades, expanding the methods available to phenomenology. Thus: (4) In a logico-semantic model of phenomenology, we specify the truth conditions for a type of thinking (say, where I think that dogs chase cats) or the satisfaction conditions for a type of intention (say, where I intend or will to jump that hurdle). (5) In the experimental paradigm of cognitive neuroscience, we design empirical experiments that tend to confirm or refute aspects of experience (say, where a brain scan shows electrochemical activity in a specific region of the brain thought to subserve a type of vision or emotion or motor control). This style of “neurophenomenology” assumes that conscious experience is grounded in neural activity in embodied action in appropriate surroundings—mixing pure phenomenology with biological and physical science in a way that was not wholly congenial to traditional phenomenologists.
这些传统方法在近几十年来得到了发展，扩大了现象学可用的方法。因此：（4） 在现象学的逻辑语义模型中，我们指定了某种思维类型的真理条件（例如，我认为狗追猫的地方）或某种意图的满足条件（例如，我打算或将要跳过那个障碍）。（5） 在认知神经科学的实验范式中，我们设计的实证实验倾向于确认或反驳经验的各个方面（例如，脑部扫描显示大脑特定区域的电化学活动被认为服务于某种类型的视觉、情感或运动控制）。这种风格的“神经现象学”假设有意识的体验是基于在适当环境中具体行动中的神经活动——以一种与传统现象学家并不完全一致的方式将纯粹的现象学与生物和物理科学混合在一起。

What makes an experience conscious is a certain awareness one has of the experience while living through or performing it. This form of inner awareness has been a topic of considerable debate, centuries after the issue arose with Locke’s notion of self-consciousness on the heels of Descartes’ sense of consciousness (conscience, co-knowledge). Does this awareness-of-experience consist in a kind of inner observation of the experience, as if one were doing two things at once? (Brentano argued no.) Is it a higher-order perception of one’s mind’s operation, or is it a higher-order thought about one’s mental activity? (Recent theorists have proposed both.) Or is it a different form of inherent structure? (Sartre took this line, drawing on Brentano and Husserl.) These issues are beyond the scope of this article, but notice that these results of phenomenological analysis shape the characterization of the domain of study and the methodology appropriate to the domain. For awareness-of-experience is a defining trait of conscious experience, the trait that gives experience a first-person, lived character. It is that lived character of experience that allows a first-person perspective on the object of study, namely, experience, and that perspective is characteristic of the methodology of phenomenology.
使体验有意识的是一个人在经历或执行体验时对体验的某种意识。这种形式的内在意识一直是一个相当多的争论话题，几个世纪后，洛克的自我意识概念紧随笛卡尔的意识（良心、共同知识）之后。这种对经验的觉知是否包括对体验的一种内在观察，就好像一个人同时做两件事一样？（布伦塔诺认为没有。它是对一个人的心理运作的高阶感知，还是对一个人的心理活动的高阶思考？（最近的理论家提出了两者。还是另一种形式的固有结构？（萨特采取了这条路线，借鉴了布伦塔诺和胡塞尔。这些问题超出了本文的范围，但请注意，这些现象学分析的结果塑造了研究领域的特征和适合该领域的方法。因为经验的意识是有意识体验的一个决定性特征，这个特征赋予了经验第一人称的、活生生的特征。正是经验的这种生活特征，使得对研究对象，即经验，有第一人称的视角，而这种视角是现象学方法论的特征。

Conscious experience is the starting point of phenomenology, but experience shades off into less overtly conscious phenomena. As Husserl and others stressed, we are only vaguely aware of things in the margin or periphery of attention, and we are only implicitly aware of the wider horizon of things in the world around us. Moreover, as Heidegger stressed, in practical activities like walking along, or hammering a nail, or speaking our native tongue, we are not explicitly conscious of our habitual patterns of action. Furthermore, as psychoanalysts have stressed, much of our intentional mental activity is not conscious at all, but may become conscious in the process of therapy or interrogation, as we come to realize how we feel or think about something. We should allow, then, that the domain of phenomenology—our own experience—spreads out from conscious experience into semi-conscious and even unconscious mental activity, along with relevant background conditions implicitly invoked in our experience. (These issues are subject to debate; the point here is to open the door to the question of where to draw the boundary of the domain of phenomenology.)
有意识的经验是现象学的起点，但经验会消失在不那么明显的有意识现象中。正如胡塞尔和其他人所强调的，我们只是模糊地意识到注意力边缘或边缘的事物，我们只隐约地意识到我们周围世界中事物的更广阔的视野。此外，正如海德格尔所强调的，在实际活动中，如走路、敲钉子或说我们的母语，我们并没有明确地意识到我们习惯性的行动模式。此外，正如精神分析学家所强调的那样，我们的大部分有意识的心理活动根本不是有意识的，而是在治疗或审问的过程中，当我们开始意识到我们对某事的感受或想法时，可能会变得有意识的。因此，我们应该允许现象学的领域——我们自己的经验——从有意识的经验扩展到半有意识甚至无意识的心理活动，以及我们经验中隐含的相关背景条件。（这些问题有待商榷;这里的重点是为现象学领域的边界在哪里划定的问题打开大门。

To begin an elementary exercise in phenomenology, consider some typical experiences one might have in everyday life, characterized in the first person:
在开始现象学的基本练习之前，请考虑一个人在日常生活中可能遇到的一些典型经历，以第一人称为特征：

• I see that fishing boat off the coast as dusk descends over the Pacific.
  黄昏时分，我看到那艘渔船在太平洋上空降临。
• I hear that helicopter whirring overhead as it approaches the hospital.
  我听到那架直升机在接近医院时在头顶呼啸而过。
• I am thinking that phenomenology differs from psychology.
  我在想，现象学与心理学不同。
• I wish that warm rain from Mexico were falling like last week.
  我希望墨西哥的暖雨能像上周一样降下来。
• I imagine a fearsome creature like that in my nightmare.
  我在噩梦中想象着这样可怕的生物。
• I intend to finish my writing by noon.
  我打算在中午之前完成我的写作。
• I walk carefully around the broken glass on the sidewalk.
  我小心翼翼地绕着人行道上的碎玻璃走来走去。
• I stroke a backhand cross-court with that certain underspin.
  我用那种确定的下旋击打一个反手横场。
• I am searching for the words to make my point in conversation.
  我正在寻找在对话中表达我的观点的词语。

Here are rudimentary characterizations of some familiar types of experience. Each sentence is a simple form of phenomenological description, articulating in everyday English the structure of the type of experience so described. The subject term “I” indicates the first-person structure of the experience: the intentionality proceeds from the subject. The verb indicates the type of intentional activity described: perception, thought, imagination, etc. Of central importance is the way that objects of awareness are presented or intended in our experiences, especially, the way we see or conceive or think about objects. The direct-object expression (“that fishing boat off the coast”) articulates the mode of presentation of the object in the experience: the content or meaning of the experience, the core of what Husserl called noema. In effect, the object-phrase expresses the noema of the act described, that is, to the extent that language has appropriate expressive power. The overall form of the given sentence articulates the basic form of intentionality in the experience: subject-act-content-object.
以下是一些熟悉的经历类型的基本描述。每个句子都是现象学描述的简单形式，用日常英语阐明了所描述的经验类型的结构。主语“I”表示体验的第一人称结构：意向性从主体出发。动词表示所描述的有意活动的类型：感知、思想、想象等。至关重要的是意识对象在我们的体验中呈现或意图的方式，特别是我们看待、构想或思考对象的方式。直接宾语表达（“海岸外的那艘渔船”）表达了客体在体验中的呈现方式：体验的内容或意义，胡塞尔所说的 noema 的核心。实际上，宾语短语表达了所描述的行为的 noema，也就是说，在语言具有适当表达能力的范围内。给定句子的整体形式阐明了经验中意向性的基本形式：主语-行为-内容-客体。

Rich phenomenological description or interpretation, as in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty et al., will far outrun such simple phenomenological descriptions as above. But such simple descriptions bring out the basic form of intentionality. As we interpret the phenomenological description further, we may assess the relevance of the context of experience. And we may turn to wider conditions of the possibility of that type of experience. In this way, in the practice of phenomenology, we classify, describe, interpret, and analyze structures of experiences in ways that answer to our own experience.
丰富的现象学描述或解释，如胡塞尔、梅洛-庞蒂等人，将远远超过上述简单的现象学描述。但这种简单的描述带出了意向性的基本形式。当我们进一步解释现象学的描述时，我们可以评估经验背景的相关性。我们可以转向更广泛的条件，了解这种体验的可能性。通过这种方式，在现象学的实践中，我们以回应我们自身经验的方式对经验结构进行分类、描述、解释和分析。

In such interpretive-descriptive analyses of experience, we immediately observe that we are analyzing familiar forms of consciousness, conscious experience of or about this or that. Intentionality is thus the salient structure of our experience, and much of phenomenology proceeds as the study of different aspects of intentionality. Thus, we explore structures of the stream of consciousness, the enduring self, the embodied self, and bodily action. Furthermore, as we reflect on how these phenomena work, we turn to the analysis of relevant conditions that enable our experiences to occur as they do, and to represent or intend as they do. Phenomenology then leads into analyses of conditions of the possibility of intentionality, conditions involving motor skills and habits, background social practices, and often language, with its special place in human affairs.
在这种对经验的解释-描述性分析中，我们立即观察到我们正在分析熟悉的意识形式，即关于或关于这个或那个的有意识体验。因此，意向性是我们经验的突出结构，而现象学的大部分内容都是对意向性的不同方面的研究。因此，我们探索了意识流、持久的自我、具身的自我和身体行动的结构。此外，当我们反思这些现象是如何运作的时，我们转向对相关条件的分析，这些条件使我们的体验能够像它们一样发生，并像它们一样表现或打算。然后，现象学引导对意向性可能性的条件进行分析，涉及运动技能和习惯的条件，背景社会实践，以及通常在人类事务中具有特殊地位的语言。

3. From Phenomena to Phenomenology 3. 从现象到现象学

The Oxford English Dictionary presents the following definition: “Phenomenology. a. The science of phenomena as distinct from being (ontology). b. That division of any science which describes and classifies its phenomena. From the Greek phainomenon, appearance.” In philosophy, the term is used in the first sense, amid debates of theory and methodology. In physics and philosophy of science, the term is used in the second sense, albeit only occasionally.
《牛津英语词典》给出了以下定义：“现象学。一个。现象与存在不同的科学（本体论）。b.任何描述和分类其现象的科学的划分。来自希腊语 phainomenon，外表。在哲学中，这个词在理论和方法论的辩论中被用在第一种意义上。在物理学和科学哲学中，这个词有第二种含义，尽管只是偶尔使用。

In its root meaning, then, phenomenology is the study of phenomena: literally, appearances as opposed to reality. This ancient distinction launched philosophy as we emerged from Plato’s cave. Yet the discipline of phenomenology did not blossom until the 20th century and remains poorly understood in many circles of contemporary philosophy. What is that discipline? How did philosophy move from a root concept of phenomena to the discipline of phenomenology?
因此，就其根本含义而言，现象学是对现象的研究：从字面上看，是表象而不是现实。当我们从柏拉图的洞穴中走出来时，这种古老的区别启动了哲学。然而，现象学这门学科直到 20 世纪才蓬勃发展，并且在当代哲学的许多圈子中仍然知之甚少。那门学科是什么？哲学是如何从现象的根本概念转变为现象学学科的？

Originally, in the 18th century, “phenomenology” meant the theory of appearances fundamental to empirical knowledge, especially sensory appearances. The Latin term “Phenomenologia” was introduced by Christoph Friedrich Oetinger in 1736. Subsequently, the German term “Phänomenologia” was used by Johann Heinrich Lambert, a follower of Christian Wolff. Immanuel Kant used the term occasionally in various writings, as did Johann Gottlieb Fichte. In 1807, G. W. F. Hegel wrote a book titled Phänomenologie des Geistes (usually translated as Phenomenology of Spirit). By 1889 Franz Brentano used the term to characterize what he called “descriptive psychology”. From there Edmund Husserl took up the term for his new science of consciousness, and the rest is history.
最初，在 18 世纪，“现象学”是指对经验知识，尤其是感官表象至关重要的表象理论。拉丁语“Phenomenologia”是由 Christoph Friedrich Oetinger 于 1736 年提出的。随后，克里斯蒂安·沃尔夫 （Christian Wolff） 的追随者约翰·海因里希·兰伯特 （Johann Heinrich Lambert） 使用了德语术语“Phänomenologia”。伊曼纽尔·康德 （Immanuel Kant） 在各种著作中偶尔使用这个词，约翰·戈特利布·费希特 （Johann Gottlieb Fichte） 也是如此。1807 年，G. W. F. 黑格尔写了一本名为 Phänomenologie des Geistes 的书（通常翻译为《精神现象学》）。到 1889 年，弗朗茨·布伦塔诺 （Franz Brentano） 使用这个术语来描述他所谓的“描述心理学”。从那时起，埃德蒙·胡塞尔 （Edmund Husserl） 为他的新意识科学采用了这个术语，剩下的就是历史了。

Suppose we say phenomenology studies phenomena: what appears to us—and its appearing. How shall we understand phenomena? The term has a rich history in recent centuries, in which we can see traces of the emerging discipline of phenomenology.
假设我们说现象学研究现象：出现在我们面前的事物——以及它的出现。我们应该如何理解现象呢？这个词在近几个世纪里有着丰富的历史，从中我们可以看到现象学这一新兴学科的痕迹。

In a strict empiricist vein, what appears before the mind are sensory data or qualia: either patterns of one’s own sensations (seeing red here now, feeling this ticklish feeling, hearing that resonant bass tone) or sensible patterns of worldly things, say, the looks and smells of flowers (what John Locke called secondary qualities of things). In a strict rationalist vein, by contrast, what appears before the mind are ideas, rationally formed “clear and distinct ideas” (in René Descartes’ ideal). In Immanuel Kant’s theory of knowledge, fusing rationalist and empiricist aims, what appears to the mind are phenomena defined as things-as-they-appear or things-as-they-are-represented (in a synthesis of sensory and conceptual forms of objects-as-known). In Auguste Comte’s theory of science, phenomena (phenomenes) are the facts (faits, what occurs) that a given science would explain.
在严格的经验主义脉络中，出现在头脑面前的是感官数据或质量：要么是自己的感觉模式（现在在这里看到红色，感觉到这种痒痒的感觉，听到那种共鸣的低音）或世俗事物的感性模式，比如，花的样子和气味（约翰·洛克（John Locke）称之为事物的次要品质）。相反，在严格的理性主义脉络中，出现在头脑面前的是思想，理性形成的“清晰而独特的思想”（在勒内·笛卡尔的理想中）。在伊曼纽尔·康德（Immanuel Kant）的知识论中，融合了理性主义和经验主义的目标，在头脑中呈现的是被定义为事物的现象（在已知对象的感官和概念形式的综合中）。在奥古斯特·孔德的科学理论中，现象（现象）是给定科学将要解释的事实（既成事实，发生的事情）。

In 18th and 19th century epistemology, then, phenomena are the starting points in building knowledge, especially science. Accordingly, in a familiar and still current sense, phenomena are whatever we observe (perceive) and seek to explain.
因此，在 18 世纪和 19 世纪的认识论中，现象是构建知识，尤其是科学的起点。因此，在熟悉的和当前的意义上，现象是我们观察（感知）并试图解释的任何东西。

As the discipline of psychology emerged late in the 19th century, however, phenomena took on a somewhat different guise. In Franz Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), phenomena are what occur in the mind: mental phenomena are acts of consciousness (or their contents), and physical phenomena are objects of external perception starting with colors and shapes. For Brentano, physical phenomena exist “intentionally” in acts of consciousness. This view revives a Medieval notion Brentano called “intentional in-existence”, but the ontology remains undeveloped (what is it to exist in the mind, and do physical objects exist only in the mind?). More generally, we might say, phenomena are whatever we are conscious of: objects and events around us, other people, ourselves, even (in reflection) our own conscious experiences, as we experience these. In a certain technical sense, phenomena are things as they are given to our consciousness, whether in perception or imagination or thought or volition. This conception of phenomena would soon inform the new discipline of phenomenology.
然而，随着心理学学科在 19 世纪后期出现，现象呈现出某种不同的面貌。在弗朗茨·布伦塔诺 （Franz Brentano） 的《从实证立场看心理学》（1874 年）中，现象是发生在心灵中的东西：心理现象是意识行为（或其内容），而物理现象是从颜色和形状开始的外部感知对象。对布伦塔诺来说，物理现象“有意地”存在于意识行为中。这种观点恢复了布伦塔诺 （Brentano） 称之为“有意存在”的中世纪概念，但本体论仍未发展（存在于头脑中是什么，物理对象只存在于头脑中吗？更一般地说，现象是我们意识到的任何东西：我们周围的物体和事件、其他人、我们自己，甚至（在反思中）我们自己的意识体验，当我们体验这些时。在某种技术意义上，现象是它们被赋予我们意识的事物，无论是在感知、想象、思想还是意志中。这种现象概念很快就为现象学的新学科提供了信息。

Brentano distinguished descriptive psychology from genetic psychology. Where genetic psychology seeks the causes of various types of mental phenomena, descriptive psychology defines and classifies the various types of mental phenomena, including perception, judgment, emotion, etc. According to Brentano, every mental phenomenon, or act of consciousness, is directed toward some object, and only mental phenomena are so directed. This thesis of intentional directedness was the hallmark of Brentano’s descriptive psychology. In 1889 Brentano used the term “phenomenology” for descriptive psychology, and the way was paved for Husserl’s new science of phenomenology.
布伦塔诺将描述心理学与遗传心理学区分开来。遗传心理学寻找各种心理现象的原因，而描述心理学则定义和分类各种类型的心理现象，包括感知、判断、情绪等。根据布伦塔诺的说法，每一种心理现象或意识行为都是针对某个对象的，而且只有心理现象是如此指向的。这种意向性导向的论点是布伦塔诺描述心理学的标志。1889 年，布伦塔诺将“现象学”一词用于描述心理学，为胡塞尔的新现象学铺平了道路。

Phenomenology as we know it was launched by Edmund Husserl in his Logical Investigations (1900–01). Two importantly different lines of theory came together in that monumental work: psychological theory, on the heels of Franz Brentano (and also William James, whose Principles of Psychology appeared in 1891 and greatly impressed Husserl); and logical or semantic theory, on the heels of Bernard Bolzano and Husserl’s contemporaries who founded modern logic, including Gottlob Frege. (Interestingly, both lines of research trace back to Aristotle, and both reached importantly new results in Husserl’s day.)
我们所知道的现象学是由埃德蒙·胡塞尔 （Edmund Husserl） 在他的《逻辑研究》（1900-01 年）中提出的。在这部不朽的著作中，两种重要的不同理论路线结合在一起：继弗朗茨·布伦塔诺（Franz Brentano）之后的心理学理论（还有威廉·詹姆斯（William James），他的《心理学原理》（Principles of Psychology）于1891年问世，给胡塞尔留下了深刻的印象）;以及逻辑或语义理论，紧随伯纳德·博尔扎诺 （Bernard Bolzano） 和胡塞尔同时代的人（包括戈特洛布·弗雷格 （Gottlob Frege） 之后，他们创立了现代逻辑学。（有趣的是，这两条研究路线都可以追溯到亚里士多德，并且在胡塞尔的时代都取得了重要的新成果。

Husserl’s Logical Investigations was inspired by Bolzano’s ideal of logic, while taking up Brentano’s conception of descriptive psychology. In his Theory of Science (1835) Bolzano distinguished between subjective and objective ideas or representations (Vorstellungen). In effect Bolzano criticized Kant and before him the classical empiricists and rationalists for failing to make this sort of distinction, thereby rendering phenomena merely subjective. Logic studies objective ideas, including propositions, which in turn make up objective theories as in the sciences. Psychology would, by contrast, study subjective ideas, the concrete contents (occurrences) of mental activities in particular minds at a given time. Husserl was after both, within a single discipline. So phenomena must be reconceived as objective intentional contents (sometimes called intentional objects) of subjective acts of consciousness. Phenomenology would then study this complex of consciousness and correlated phenomena. In Ideas I (Book One, 1913) Husserl introduced two Greek words to capture his version of the Bolzanoan distinction: noesis and noema, from the Greek verb noéō (νοέω), meaning to perceive, think, intend, whence the noun nous or mind. The intentional process of consciousness is called noesis, while its ideal content is called noema. The noema of an act of consciousness Husserl characterized both as an ideal meaning and as “the object as intended”. Thus the phenomenon, or object-as-it-appears, becomes the noema, or object-as-it-is-intended. The interpretations of Husserl’s theory of noema have been several and amount to different developments of Husserl’s basic theory of intentionality. (Is the noema an aspect of the object intended, or rather a medium of intention?)
胡塞尔的《逻辑调查》受到博尔扎诺逻辑理想的启发，同时采用了布伦塔诺的描述心理学概念。在他的《科学论》（1835 年）中，博尔扎诺区分了主观和客观的想法或表征 （Vorstellungen）。实际上，博尔扎诺批评康德以及他之前的古典经验主义者和理性主义者未能进行这种区分，从而使现象仅仅是主观的。逻辑研究客观思想，包括命题，而这些命题又构成了客观理论，就像在科学中一样。相比之下，心理学将研究主观观念，即特定时间特定头脑中心理活动的具体内容（发生）。胡塞尔在这两方面都追求，在一个学科内。因此，现象必须被重新构想为主观意识行为的客观意向内容（有时称为意向对象）。然后，现象学将研究这种意识复合体和相关现象。在《思想 I》（第一卷，1913 年）中，胡塞尔引入了两个希腊词来捕捉他对博尔扎诺语区别的看法：noesis 和 noema，来自希腊语动词 noéō （νοέω），意思是感知、思考、打算，名词 nous 或 mind 的来源。意识的有意识过程称为 noesis，而其理想内容称为 noema。胡塞尔将意识行为的 noema 描述为理想的意义和“预期的对象”。因此，现象，或它所出现的物体，变成了 noema，或它所打算的物体。对胡塞尔的 noema 理论有多种解释，相当于胡塞尔意向性基本理论的不同发展。（noema 是对象预期的一个方面，还是更确切地说是意图的媒介？

For Husserl, then, phenomenology integrates a kind of psychology with a kind of logic. It develops a descriptive or analytic psychology in that it describes and analyzes types of subjective mental activity or experience, in short, acts of consciousness. Yet it develops a kind of logic—a theory of meaning (today we say logical semantics)—in that it describes and analyzes objective contents of consciousness: ideas, concepts, images, propositions, in short, ideal meanings of various types that serve as intentional contents, or noematic meanings, of various types of experience. These contents are shareable by different acts of consciousness, and in that sense they are objective, ideal meanings. Following Bolzano (and to some extent the platonistic logician Hermann Lotze), Husserl opposed any reduction of logic or mathematics or science to mere psychology, to how people happen to think, and in the same spirit he distinguished phenomenology from mere psychology. For Husserl, phenomenology would study consciousness without reducing the objective and shareable meanings that inhabit experience to merely subjective happenstances. Ideal meaning would be the engine of intentionality in acts of consciousness.
因此，对胡塞尔来说，现象学将一种心理学与一种逻辑相结合。它发展了一种描述性或分析性心理学，因为它描述和分析了主观心理活动或体验的类型，简而言之，意识行为。然而，它发展出一种逻辑——一种意义理论（今天我们说逻辑语义学）——因为它描述和分析意识的客观内容：想法、概念、图像、命题，简而言之，各种类型的理想意义，作为各种类型经验的意向性内容或概念意义。这些内容可以通过不同的意识行为来共享，从这个意义上说，它们是客观的、理想的意义。继博尔扎诺（在某种程度上是柏拉图主义逻辑学家赫尔曼·洛茨）之后，胡塞尔反对将逻辑、数学或科学简化为纯粹的心理学，即人们碰巧如何思考，并本着同样的精神将现象学与纯粹的心理学区分开来。对胡塞尔来说，现象学将研究意识，而不会将存在于经验中的客观和可共享的意义简化为仅仅是主观的偶然性。理想的意义将是意识行为中意向性的引擎。

A clear conception of phenomenology awaited Husserl’s development of a clear model of intentionality. Indeed, phenomenology and the modern concept of intentionality emerged hand-in-hand in Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1900–01). With theoretical foundations laid in the Investigations, Husserl would then promote the radical new science of phenomenology in Ideas I (1913). And alternative visions of phenomenology would soon follow.
一个清晰的现象学概念等待着胡塞尔发展出一个明确的意向性模型。事实上，现象学和现代意向性概念在胡塞尔的《逻辑研究》（1900-01）中齐头并进。在《研究》中奠定了理论基础后，胡塞尔随后在《思想 I》（1913 年）中推广了全新的现象学科学。现象学的另一种观点很快就会随之而来。

4. The History and Varieties of Phenomenology 4. 现象学的历史和种类

Phenomenology came into its own with Husserl, much as epistemology came into its own with Descartes, and ontology or metaphysics came into its own with Aristotle on the heels of Plato. Yet phenomenology has been practiced, with or without the name, for many centuries. When Hindu and Buddhist philosophers reflected on states of consciousness achieved in a variety of meditative states, they were practicing phenomenology. When Descartes, Hume, and Kant characterized states of perception, thought, and imagination, they were practicing phenomenology. When Brentano classified varieties of mental phenomena (defined by the directedness of consciousness), he was practicing phenomenology. When William James appraised kinds of mental activity in the stream of consciousness (including their embodiment and their dependence on habit), he too was practicing phenomenology. And when recent analytic philosophers of mind have addressed issues of consciousness and intentionality, they have often been practicing phenomenology. Still, the discipline of phenomenology, its roots tracing back through the centuries, came to full flower in Husserl.
现象学与胡塞尔一起形成自己的地位，就像认识论与笛卡尔一起形成一样，本体论或形而上学在柏拉图之后的亚里士多德也开始形成自己的地位。然而，现象学已经实践了许多世纪，无论有没有这个名字。当印度教和佛教哲学家反思在各种冥想状态中达到的意识状态时，他们是在实践现象学。当笛卡尔、休谟和康德描述感知、思想和想象的状态时，他们正在实践现象学。当布伦塔诺对各种心理现象进行分类（由意识的定向性定义）时，他正在实践现象学。当威廉·詹姆斯 （William James） 评估意识流中的各种心理活动（包括它们的体现和它们对习惯的依赖）时，他也在实践现象学。当最近的心灵分析哲学家解决意识和意向性问题时，他们往往是在实践现象学。尽管如此，现象学这门学科，其根源可以追溯到几个世纪，在胡塞尔那里得到了充分的开花结果。

Husserl’s work was followed by a flurry of phenomenological writing in the first half of the 20th century. The diversity of traditional phenomenology is apparent in the Encyclopedia of Phenomenology (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, Dordrecht and Boston), which features separate articles on some seven types of phenomenology. (1) Transcendental constitutive phenomenology studies how objects are constituted in pure or transcendental consciousness, setting aside questions of any relation to the natural world around us. (2) Naturalistic constitutive phenomenology studies how consciousness constitutes or takes things in the world of nature, assuming with the natural attitude that consciousness is part of nature. (3) Existential phenomenology studies concrete human existence, including our experience of free choice or action in concrete situations. (4) Generative historicist phenomenology studies how meaning, as found in our experience, is generated in historical processes of collective experience over time. (5) Genetic phenomenology studies the genesis of meanings of things within one’s own stream of experience. (6) Hermeneutical phenomenology studies interpretive structures of experience, how we understand and engage things around us in our human world, including ourselves and others. (7) Realistic phenomenology studies the structure of consciousness and intentionality, assuming it occurs in a real world that is largely external to consciousness and not somehow brought into being by consciousness.
胡塞尔的著作之后，在 20 世纪上半叶涌现出一系列现象学著作。传统现象学的多样性在《现象学百科全书》（Kluwer Academic Publishers，1997 年，多德雷赫特和波士顿）中显而易见，该百科全书分别介绍了大约七种类型的现象学。（1） 先验构成现象学研究物体如何在纯粹或先验意识中构成，撇开与我们周围自然世界的任何关系的问题。（2） 自然主义构成现象学研究意识如何在自然世界中构成或获取事物，以自然的态度假设意识是自然的一部分。（3） 存在主义现象学研究具体的人类存在，包括我们在具体情况下的自由选择或行动的经验。（4） 生成历史主义现象学研究在我们的经验中发现的意义是如何随着时间的推移在集体经验的历史过程中产生的。（5） 遗传现象学研究一个人自己的经验流中事物意义的起源。（6） 解释现象学研究经验的解释结构，我们如何理解和参与人类世界中我们周围的事物，包括我们自己和他人。（7） 现实现象学研究意识和意向性的结构，假设它发生在一个在很大程度上位于意识之外的现实世界中，而不是以某种方式由意识产生。

The most famous of the classical phenomenologists were Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. In these four thinkers we find different conceptions of phenomenology, different methods, and different results. A brief sketch of their differences will capture both a crucial period in the history of phenomenology and a sense of the diversity of the field of phenomenology.
最著名的古典现象学家是胡塞尔、海德格尔、萨特和梅洛-庞蒂。在这四位思想家身上，我们发现了不同的现象学概念、不同的方法和不同的结果。对他们差异的简要概述将捕捉到现象学历史上的关键时期和现象学领域的多样性。

In his Logical Investigations (1900–01) Husserl outlined a complex system of philosophy, moving from logic to philosophy of language, to ontology (theory of universals and parts of wholes), to a phenomenological theory of intentionality, and finally to a phenomenological theory of knowledge. Then in Ideas I (1913) he focused squarely on phenomenology itself. Husserl defined phenomenology as “the science of the essence of consciousness”, centered on the defining trait of intentionality, approached explicitly “in the first person”. (See Husserl, Ideas I, ¤¤33ff.) In this spirit, we may say phenomenology is the study of consciousness—that is, conscious experience of various types—as experienced from the first-person point of view. In this discipline we study different forms of experience just as we experience them, from the perspective of the subject living through or performing them. Thus, we characterize experiences of seeing, hearing, imagining, thinking, feeling (i.e., emotion), wishing, desiring, willing, and also acting, that is, embodied volitional activities of walking, talking, cooking, carpentering, etc. However, not just any characterization of an experience will do. Phenomenological analysis of a given type of experience will feature the ways in which we ourselves would experience that form of conscious activity. And the leading property of our familiar types of experience is their intentionality, their being a consciousness of or about something, something experienced or presented or engaged in a certain way. How I see or conceptualize or understand the object I am dealing with defines the meaning of that object in my current experience. Thus, phenomenology features a study of meaning, in a wide sense that includes more than what is expressed in language.
在他的《逻辑研究》（1900-01 年）中，胡塞尔概述了一个复杂的哲学体系，从逻辑到语言哲学，再到本体论（普遍性和整体部分的理论），再到意向性的现象学理论，最后到知识的现象学理论。然后在《思想 I》（1913 年）中，他直接关注现象学本身。胡塞尔将现象学定义为“关于意识本质的科学”，以意向性的决定性特征为中心，明确地“以第一人称”接近。（参见胡塞尔，《思想 I》，¤¤33ff。本着这种精神，我们可以说现象学是从第一人称的角度体验意识——即各种类型的意识体验——的研究。在这门学科中，我们从经历或执行它们的主体的角度研究不同形式的体验，就像我们体验它们一样。因此，我们描述了看、听、想象、思考、感觉（即情感）、愿望、渴望、意愿以及行动的体验，即行走、说话、烹饪、木匠等具身的意志活动。然而，不仅仅是对体验的任何描述都可以。对特定类型体验的现象学分析将以我们自己体验这种形式的有意识活动的方式为特色。我们熟悉的体验类型的主要特性是它们的意向性，它们是对某物的意识或关于某物的意识，某物以某种方式被体验或呈现或参与。我如何看待、概念化或理解我正在处理的对象，决定了我当前经验中该对象的意义。因此，现象学的特点是对意义的研究，从广义上讲，它包括的不仅仅是语言所表达的内容。

In Ideas I Husserl presented phenomenology with a transcendental turn. In part this means that Husserl took on the Kantian idiom of “transcendental idealism”, looking for conditions of the possibility of knowledge, or of consciousness generally, and arguably turning away from any reality beyond phenomena. But Husserl’s transcendental turn also involved his discovery of the method of epoché (from the Greek skeptics’ notion of abstaining from belief). We are to practice phenomenology, Husserl proposed, by “bracketing” the question of the existence of the natural world around us. We thereby turn our attention, in reflection, to the structure of our own conscious experience. Our first key result is the observation that each act of consciousness is a consciousness of something, that is, intentional, or directed toward something. Consider my visual experience wherein I see a tree across the square. In phenomenological reflection, we need not concern ourselves with whether the tree exists: my experience is of a tree whether or not such a tree exists. However, we do need to concern ourselves with how the object is meant or intended. I see a Eucalyptus tree, not a Yucca tree; I see that object as a Eucalyptus, with a certain shape, with bark stripping off, etc. Thus, bracketing the tree itself, we turn our attention to my experience of the tree, and specifically to the content or meaning in my experience. This tree-as-perceived Husserl calls the noema or noematic sense of the experience.
在《理念 I》中，胡塞尔以一种先验的转向来呈现现象学。在某种程度上，这意味着胡塞尔采用了康德的“先验唯心主义”惯用语，寻找知识或一般意识可能性的条件，并可以说是远离现象之外的任何现实。但胡塞尔的超验转向还涉及他对纪元方法的发现（来自希腊怀疑论者放弃信仰的概念）。胡塞尔提出，我们要实践现象学，通过“包围”我们周围自然世界存在的问题。因此，我们在反思中将注意力转向我们自己的意识体验的结构。我们的第一个关键结果是观察到，每个意识行为都是对某物的意识，即有意的或针对某物的意识。考虑一下我的视觉体验，我看到广场对面有一棵树。在现象学的反思中，我们不需要关心这棵树是否存在：我的经验是一棵树是否存在。然而，我们确实需要关注这个对象的含义或意图。我看到的是一棵桉树，而不是一棵丝兰树;我把那个物体看作是桉树，有一定的形状，树皮剥落了，等等。因此，将树本身括起来，我们将注意力转向我对树的体验，特别是我经验中的内容或意义。这种感知到的树，胡塞尔称之为 noema 或 noematic 体验。

Philosophers succeeding Husserl debated the proper characterization of phenomenology, arguing over its results and its methods. Adolf Reinach, an early student of Husserl’s (who died in World War I), argued that phenomenology should remain allied with a realist ontology, as in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Roman Ingarden, a Polish phenomenologist of the next generation, continued the resistance to Husserl’s turn to transcendental idealism. For such philosophers, phenomenology should not bracket questions of being or ontology, as the method of epoché would suggest. And they were not alone. Martin Heidegger studied Husserl’s early writings, worked as Assistant to Husserl in 1916, and in 1928 succeeded Husserl in the prestigious chair at the University of Freiburg. Heidegger had his own ideas about phenomenology.
胡塞尔之后的哲学家们就现象学的正确描述进行了辩论，对其结果和方法进行了争论。胡塞尔的早期学生阿道夫·赖纳赫（Adolf Reinach，死于第一次世界大战）认为现象学应该与现实主义本体论保持联盟，就像胡塞尔的《逻辑研究》一样。下一代波兰现象学家罗曼·英加登 （Roman Ingarden） 继续抵抗胡塞尔转向先验唯心主义。对于这样的哲学家来说，现象学不应该像纪元方法所暗示的那样，把存在或本体论的问题放在括号里。而且他们并不孤单。马丁·海德格尔研究胡塞尔的早期著作，1916 年担任胡塞尔的助手，并于 1928 年接替胡塞尔在弗莱堡大学担任著名的教席。海德格尔对现象学有自己的想法。

In Being and Time (1927) Heidegger unfurled his rendition of phenomenology. For Heidegger, we and our activities are always “in the world”, our being is being-in-the-world, so we do not study our activities by bracketing the world, rather we interpret our activities and the meaning things have for us by looking to our contextual relations to things in the world. Indeed, for Heidegger, phenomenology resolves into what he called “fundamental ontology”. We must distinguish beings from their being, and we begin our investigation of the meaning of being in our own case, examining our own existence in the activity of “Dasein” (that being whose being is in each case my own). Heidegger resisted Husserl’s neo-Cartesian emphasis on consciousness and subjectivity, including how perception presents things around us. By contrast, Heidegger held that our more basic ways of relating to things are in practical activities like hammering, where the phenomenology reveals our situation in a context of equipment and in being-with-others.
在《存在与时间》（1927）中，海德格尔展开了他对现象学的阐述。对海德格尔来说，我们和我们的活动总是“在世界上”，我们的存在就是在世界上的存在，所以我们不是通过把世界括起来来研究我们的活动，而是通过观察我们与世界上事物的语境关系来解释我们的活动和事物对我们的意义。事实上，对于海德格尔来说，现象学归结为他所谓的“基本本体论”。我们必须将存在与它们的存在区分开来，我们开始研究在我们自己的情况下存在的意义，在“Dasein”（在每种情况下，其存在都是我自己的存在）的活动中检查我们自己的存在。海德格尔抵制胡塞尔对意识和主观性的新笛卡尔式强调，包括感知如何呈现我们周围的事物。相比之下，海德格尔认为，我们与事物的更基本联系方式是在像敲击这样的实际活动中，现象学揭示了我们在设备背景下和与他人共存的处境。

In Being and Time Heidegger approached phenomenology, in a quasi-poetic idiom, through the root meanings of “logos” and “phenomena”, so that phenomenology is defined as the art or practice of “letting things show themselves”. In Heidegger’s inimitable linguistic play on the Greek roots, “ ‘phenomenology’ means …—to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.” (See Heidegger, Being and Time, 1927, ¦ 7C.) Here Heidegger explicitly parodies Husserl’s call, “To the things themselves!”, or “To the phenomena themselves!” Heidegger went on to emphasize practical forms of comportment or better relating (Verhalten) as in hammering a nail, as opposed to representational forms of intentionality as in seeing or thinking about a hammer. Much of Being and Time develops an existential interpretation of our modes of being including, famously, our being-toward-death.
在《存在与时间》中，海德格尔以一种近乎诗意的语气，通过“逻各斯”和“现象”的词根含义来探讨现象学，因此现象学被定义为“让事物显现自己”的艺术或实践。在海德格尔对希腊词根的独特语言游戏中，“'现象学’的意思是…——让从自身显示自己的事物，就像它从自身中表现出来一样。（见海德格尔，《存在与时间》，1927 年，¦ 7C。在这里，海德格尔明确地模仿了胡塞尔的呼唤，“对事物本身！”，或“对现象本身！海德格尔继续强调实际的举止形式或更好的联系 （Verhalten），如敲钉子，而不是视觉或思考锤子的意向性表征形式。《存在与时间》的大部分内容都对我们的存在模式进行了存在主义的解释，包括著名的我们向死亡的存在。

In a very different style, in clear analytical prose, in the text of a lecture course called The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927), Heidegger traced the question of the meaning of being from Aristotle through many other thinkers into the issues of phenomenology. Our understanding of beings and their being comes ultimately through phenomenology. Here the connection with classical issues of ontology is more apparent, and consonant with Husserl’s vision in the Logical Investigations (an early source of inspiration for Heidegger). One of Heidegger’s most innovative ideas was his conception of the “ground” of being, looking to modes of being more fundamental than the things around us (from trees to hammers). Heidegger questioned the contemporary concern with technology, and his writing might suggest that our scientific theories are historical artifacts that we use in technological practice, rather than systems of ideal truth (as Husserl had held). Our deep understanding of being, in our own case, comes rather from phenomenology, Heidegger held.
在名为《现象学的基本问题》（1927 年）的讲座文本中，海德格尔以一种截然不同的风格，以清晰的分析散文，将亚里士多德通过许多其他思想家的存在意义问题追溯到现象学问题。我们对存在及其存在的理解最终来自现象学。在这里，与本体论的经典问题的联系更加明显，并且与胡塞尔在《逻辑研究》中的愿景（海德格尔的早期灵感来源）相一致。海德格尔最具创新性的思想之一是他对存在的“基础”的概念，着眼于比我们周围的事物（从树木到锤子）更基本的存在模式。海德格尔质疑了当代对技术的关注，他的著作可能表明，我们的科学理论是我们在技术实践中使用的历史产物，而不是理想真理的系统（如胡塞尔所持有的）。海德格尔认为，就我们自己而言，我们对存在的深刻理解更像是来自现象学。

In the 1930s phenomenology migrated from Austrian and then German philosophy into French philosophy. The way had been paved in Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, in which the narrator recounts in close detail his vivid recollections of past experiences, including his famous associations with the smell of freshly baked madeleines. This sensibility to experience traces to Descartes’ work, and French phenomenology has been an effort to preserve the central thrust of Descartes’ insights while rejecting mind-body dualism. The experience of one’s own body, or one’s lived or living body, has been an important motif in many French philosophers of the 20th century.
在 1930 年代，现象学从奥地利哲学和德国哲学迁移到法国哲学。马塞尔·普鲁斯特 （Marcel Proust） 的《寻找失去的时间》（In Search of Lost Time） 为这条道路铺平了道路，其中叙述者详细讲述了他对过去经历的生动回忆，包括他对新鲜出炉的玛德琳蛋糕气味的著名联想。这种对经验的敏感性可以追溯到笛卡尔的工作，而法国现象学一直在努力保留笛卡尔见解的中心主旨，同时拒绝身心二元论。对自己的身体，或者一个人的活着或活着的身体的体验，一直是 20 世纪许多法国哲学家的一个重要主题。

In the novel Nausea (1936) Jean-Paul Sartre described a bizarre course of experience in which the protagonist, writing in the first person, describes how ordinary objects lose their meaning until he encounters pure being at the foot of a chestnut tree, and in that moment recovers his sense of his own freedom. In Being and Nothingness (1943, written partly while a prisoner of war), Sartre developed his conception of phenomenological ontology. Consciousness is a consciousness of objects, as Husserl had stressed. In Sartre’s model of intentionality, the central player in consciousness is a phenomenon, and the occurrence of a phenomenon just is a consciousness-of-an-object. The chestnut tree I see is, for Sartre, such a phenomenon in my consciousness. Indeed, all things in the world, as we normally experience them, are phenomena, beneath or behind which lies their “being-in-itself”. Consciousness, by contrast, has “being-for-itself”, since each consciousness is not only a consciousness-of-its-object but also a pre-reflective consciousness-of-itself (conscience de soi). Yet for Sartre, unlike Husserl, the “I” or self is nothing but a sequence of acts of consciousness, notably including radically free choices (like a Humean bundle of perceptions).
在小说《恶心》（Nausea，1936）中，让-保罗·萨特（Jean-Paul Sartre）描述了一段奇异的经历，主人公以第一人称写作，描述了普通物体如何失去意义，直到他在栗子树脚下遇到纯粹的存在，并在那一刻恢复了自己的自由感。在《存在与虚无》（1943 年，部分写于战俘时期）中，萨特发展了他的现象学本体论概念。正如胡塞尔所强调的，意识是对物体的意识。在萨特的意向性模型中，意识的中心参与者是一种现象，而现象的发生只是对对象的意识。对萨特来说，我看到的栗树就是我意识中的一种现象。事实上，正如我们通常所体验的那样，世界上的所有事物都是现象，在其之下或背后是它们的“自在之中”。相比之下，意识具有“为自己而存在”，因为每个意识不仅是其对象的意识，而且是自我的预反射意识（conscience de soi）。然而，对萨特来说，与胡塞尔不同，“我”或自我只不过是一系列意识行为，特别是包括彻底自由的选择（就像休米亚的感知束）。

For Sartre, the practice of phenomenology proceeds by a deliberate reflection on the structure of consciousness. Sartre’s method is in effect a literary style of interpretive description of different types of experience in relevant situations—a practice that does not really fit the methodological proposals of either Husserl or Heidegger, but makes use of Sartre’s great literary skill. (Sartre wrote many plays and novels and was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature.)
对萨特来说，现象学的实践是通过对意识结构的深思熟虑进行进行的。萨特的方法实际上是一种文学风格，对相关情境中不同类型的经验进行解释性描述——这种做法并不真正适合胡塞尔或海德格尔的方法论建议，而是利用了萨特伟大的文学技巧。（萨特写了许多戏剧和小说，并获得了诺贝尔文学奖。

Sartre’s phenomenology in Being and Nothingness became the philosophical foundation for his popular philosophy of existentialism, sketched in his famous lecture “Existentialism is a Humanism” (1945). In Being and Nothingness Sartre emphasized the experience of freedom of choice, especially the project of choosing one’s self, the defining pattern of one’s past actions. Through vivid description of the “look” of the Other, Sartre laid groundwork for the contemporary political significance of the concept of the Other (as in other groups or ethnicities). Indeed, in The Second Sex (1949) Simone de Beauvoir, Sartre’s life-long companion, launched contemporary feminism with her nuanced account of the perceived role of women as Other.
萨特在《存在与虚无》中的现象学成为他广受欢迎的存在主义哲学的哲学基础，这在他著名的演讲《存在主义是一种人文主义》（1945 年）中有所勾勒。在《存在与虚无》中，萨特强调了选择自由的体验，尤其是选择自我的项目，即一个人过去行为的决定模式。通过生动地描述他者的“外表”，萨特为他者概念的当代政治意义奠定了基础（就像在其他群体或种族中一样）。事实上，在《第二性》（The Second，1949）中，萨特的终生伴侣西蒙娜·德·波伏娃（Simone de Beauvoir）通过对女性作为他者的感知角色的细致入微的描述，开创了当代女权主义。

In 1940s Paris, Maurice Merleau-Ponty joined with Sartre and Beauvoir in developing phenomenology. In Phenomenology of Perception (1945) Merleau-Ponty developed a rich variety of phenomenology emphasizing the role of the body in human experience. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre, Merleau-Ponty looked to experimental psychology, analyzing the reported experience of amputees who felt sensations in a phantom limb. Merleau-Ponty rejected both associationist psychology, focused on correlations between sensation and stimulus, and intellectualist psychology, focused on rational construction of the world in the mind. (Think of the behaviorist and computationalist models of mind in more recent decades of empirical psychology.) Instead, Merleau-Ponty focused on the “body image”, our experience of our own body and its significance in our activities. Extending Husserl’s account of the lived body (as opposed to the physical body), Merleau-Ponty resisted the traditional Cartesian separation of mind and body. For the body image is neither in the mental realm nor in the mechanical-physical realm. Rather, my body is, as it were, me in my engaged action with things I perceive including other people.
1940 年代的巴黎，莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂 （Maurice Merleau-Ponty） 与萨特和波伏娃一起发展了现象学。在《感知现象学》（1945 年）中，梅洛-庞蒂发展了丰富多样的现象学，强调身体在人类经验中的作用。与胡塞尔、海德格尔和萨特不同，梅洛-庞蒂着眼于实验心理学，分析了在幻肢中感受到感觉的截肢者的报道经历。梅洛-庞蒂既拒绝了关注感觉和刺激之间相关性的联想主义心理学，也拒绝了关注在心灵中理性构建世界的理性心理学。（想想近几十年来实证心理学中的行为主义和计算主义的心理模型。相反，Merleau-Ponty 专注于“身体形象”，即我们对自己身体的体验及其在我们活动中的意义。梅洛-庞蒂扩展了胡塞尔对活体（而不是肉体）的描述，抵制了传统的笛卡尔式的身心分离。因为身体形象既不在心理领域，也不在机械物理领域。相反，我的身体可以说是我与我感知到的事物（包括其他人）的参与行动中的我。

The scope of Phenomenology of Perception is characteristic of the breadth of classical phenomenology, not least because Merleau-Ponty drew (with generosity) on Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre while fashioning his own innovative vision of phenomenology. His phenomenology addressed the role of attention in the phenomenal field, the experience of the body, the spatiality of the body, the motility of the body, the body in sexual being and in speech, other selves, temporality, and the character of freedom so important in French existentialism. Near the end of a chapter on the cogito (Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”), Merleau-Ponty succinctly captures his embodied, existential form of phenomenology, writing:
《知觉现象学》的范围是古典现象学广度的特点，尤其是因为梅洛-庞蒂（慷慨地）借鉴了胡塞尔、海德格尔和萨特，同时塑造了他自己的现象学创新观点。他的现象学论述了注意力在现象场中的作用、身体的体验、身体的空间性、身体的运动性、身体在性和言语中的作用、其他自我、时间性以及自由的特征在法国存在主义中非常重要。在关于 cogito 的一章（笛卡尔的“我思，故我在”）的结尾处，梅洛-庞蒂简洁地捕捉了他所体现的、存在主义的现象学形式，他写道：

Insofar as, when I reflect on the essence of subjectivity, I find it bound up with that of the body and that of the world, this is because my existence as subjectivity [= consciousness] is merely one with my existence as a body and with the existence of the world, and because the subject that I am, when taken concretely, is inseparable from this body and this world. [408]
就而言，当我反思主观性的本质时，我发现它与身体和世界的本质息息相关，这是因为我作为主观性[=意识]的存在与我作为身体的存在和世界的存在只是一体的，而且因为我是主体， 具体来说，就是离不开这个身体和这个世界。[408]

In short, consciousness is embodied (in the world), and equally body is infused with consciousness (with cognition of the world).
简而言之，意识是体现的（在世界上），同样身体也被注入了意识（对世界的认知）。

In the years since Husserl, Heidegger, et al. wrote, phenomenologists have dug into all these classical issues, including intentionality, temporal awareness, intersubjectivity, practical intentionality, and the social and linguistic contexts of human activity. Interpretation of historical texts by Husserl et al. has played a prominent role in this work, both because the texts are rich and difficult and because the historical dimension is itself part of the practice of continental European philosophy. Since the 1960s, philosophers trained in the methods of analytic philosophy have also dug into the foundations of phenomenology, with an eye to 20th century work in philosophy of logic, language, and mind.
自胡塞尔、海德格尔等人写作以来的几年里，现象学家们深入研究了所有这些经典问题，包括意向性、时间意识、主体间性、实践意向性以及人类活动的社会和语言背景。胡塞尔等人对历史文本的解释在这项工作中发挥了突出作用，这既因为文本丰富而困难，也因为历史维度本身就是欧洲大陆哲学实践的一部分。自 1960 年代以来，受过分析哲学方法训练的哲学家也深入研究了现象学的基础，着眼于 20 世纪的逻辑、语言和心灵哲学工作。

Phenomenology was already linked with logical and semantic theory in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Analytic phenomenology picks up on that connection. In particular, Dagfinn Føllesdal and J. N. Mohanty have explored historical and conceptual relations between Husserl’s phenomenology and Frege’s logical semantics (in Frege’s “On Sense and Reference”, 1892). For Frege, an expression refers to an object by way of a sense: thus, two expressions (say, “the morning star” and “the evening star”) may refer to the same object (Venus) but express different senses with different manners of presentation. For Husserl, similarly, an experience (or act of consciousness) intends or refers to an object by way of a noema or noematic sense: thus, two experiences may refer to the same object but have different noematic senses involving different ways of presenting the object (for example, in seeing the same object from different sides). Indeed, for Husserl, the theory of intentionality is a generalization of the theory of linguistic reference: as linguistic reference is mediated by sense, so intentional reference is mediated by noematic sense.
现象学在胡塞尔的《逻辑研究》中已经与逻辑和语义理论联系在一起。分析现象学抓住了这种联系。特别是，Dagfinn Føllesdal 和 J. N. Mohanty 探讨了胡塞尔的现象学和弗雷格的逻辑语义学之间的历史和概念关系（在弗雷格的“论意义和参照”中，1892 年）。对弗雷格来说，一个表达通过意义来指代一个物体：因此，两个表达（比如，“晨星”和“晚星”）可能指的是同一个物体（金星），但以不同的方式表达不同的意义。对胡塞尔来说，同样，一个经验（或意识行为）通过noema或noematic意义来意料或指代一个对象：因此，两个体验可能指代同一个对象，但具有不同的noematic意义，涉及呈现对象的不同方式（例如，从不同的侧面看同一个对象）。事实上，对胡塞尔来说，意向性理论是语言参照理论的推广：正如语言参照是由感觉介导的，因此意向性参照是由概念感介导的。

More recently, analytic philosophers of mind have rediscovered phenomenological issues of mental representation, intentionality, consciousness, sensory experience, intentional content, and context-of-thought. Some of these analytic philosophers of mind hark back to William James and Franz Brentano at the origins of modern psychology, and some look to empirical research in today’s cognitive neuroscience. Some researchers have begun to combine phenomenological issues with issues of neuroscience and behavioral studies and mathematical modeling. Such studies will extend the methods of traditional phenomenology as the Zeitgeist moves on. We address philosophy of mind below.
最近，心灵分析哲学家重新发现了心理表征、意向性、意识、感官体验、意向内容和思维语境的现象学问题。这些心灵分析哲学家中的一些可以追溯到威廉·詹姆斯 （William James） 和弗朗茨·布伦塔诺 （Franz Brentano） 对现代心理学起源的看法，而另一些则着眼于当今认知神经科学的实证研究。一些研究人员已经开始将现象学问题与神经科学、行为研究和数学建模问题结合起来。随着时代精神的发展，这些研究将扩展传统现象学的方法。我们在下面讨论心灵哲学。

5. Phenomenology and Ontology, Epistemology, Logic, Ethics 5. 现象学与本体论、认识论、逻辑学、伦理学

The discipline of phenomenology forms one basic field in philosophy among others. How is phenomenology distinguished from, and related to, other fields in philosophy?
现象学学科构成了哲学的一个基本领域。现象学与哲学中的其他领域有何区别和关联？

Traditionally, philosophy includes at least four core fields or disciplines: ontology, epistemology, ethics, logic. Suppose phenomenology joins that list. Consider then these elementary definitions of field:
传统上，哲学至少包括四个核心领域或学科：本体论、认识论、伦理学、逻辑学。假设现象学也加入了这个列表。那么考虑一下 field 的这些基本定义：

• Ontology is the study of beings or their being—what is.
  本体论是对存在或其存在——是什么的研究。
• Epistemology is the study of knowledge—how we know.
  认识论是对知识的研究——我们如何知道。
• Logic is the study of valid reasoning—how to reason.
  逻辑是对有效推理的研究——如何推理。
• Ethics is the study of right and wrong—how we should act.
  道德是一门关于对与错的研究——我们应该如何行动。
• Phenomenology is the study of our experience—how we experience.
  现象学是研究我们的经验——我们如何体验的。

The domains of study in these five fields are clearly different, and they seem to call for different methods of study.
这五个领域的研究领域明显不同，它们似乎需要不同的研究方法。

Philosophers have sometimes argued that one of these fields is “first philosophy”, the most fundamental discipline, on which all philosophy or all knowledge or wisdom rests. Historically (it may be argued), Socrates and Plato put ethics first, then Aristotle put metaphysics or ontology first, then Descartes put epistemology first, then Russell put logic first, and then Husserl (in his later transcendental phase) put phenomenology first.
哲学家有时争辩说，这些领域之一是“第一哲学”，这是最基本的学科，所有哲学或所有知识或智慧都依赖于它。从历史上看（可以说），苏格拉底和柏拉图把伦理学放在第一位，然后亚里士多德把形而上学或本体论放在第一位，然后笛卡尔把认识论放在第一位，然后罗素把逻辑放在第一位，然后胡塞尔（在他后来的先验阶段）把现象学放在第一位。

Consider epistemology. As we saw, phenomenology helps to define the phenomena on which knowledge claims rest, according to modern epistemology. On the other hand, phenomenology itself claims to achieve knowledge about the nature of consciousness, a distinctive kind of first-person knowledge, through a form of intuition.
考虑认识论。正如我们所看到的，根据现代认识论，现象学有助于定义知识所依赖的现象。另一方面，现象学本身声称通过一种直觉形式获得关于意识本质的知识，这是一种独特的第一人称知识。

Consider logic. As we saw, logical theory of meaning led Husserl into the theory of intentionality, the heart of phenomenology. On one account, phenomenology explicates the intentional or semantic force of ideal meanings, and propositional meanings are central to logical theory. But logical structure is expressed in language, either ordinary language or symbolic languages like those of predicate logic or mathematics or computer systems. It remains an important issue of debate where and whether language shapes specific forms of experience (thought, perception, emotion) and their content or meaning. So there is an important (if disputed) relation between phenomenology and logico-linguistic theory, especially philosophical logic and philosophy of language (as opposed to mathematical logic per se).
考虑逻辑。正如我们所看到的，意义的逻辑理论将胡塞尔带入了意向性理论，这是现象学的核心。一方面，现象学阐释了理想意义的意向性或语义力，而命题意义是逻辑理论的核心。但是逻辑结构是用语言表达的，要么是普通语言，要么是符号语言，如谓词逻辑、数学或计算机系统的语言。语言在何处以及是否塑造了特定形式的体验（思想、知觉、情感）及其内容或意义，这仍然是一个重要的争论问题。因此，现象学和逻辑语言学理论之间存在着重要的（如果有争议的）关系，特别是哲学逻辑和语言哲学（相对于数理逻辑本身）。

Consider ontology. Phenomenology studies (among other things) the nature of consciousness, which is a central issue in metaphysics or ontology, and one that leads into the traditional mind-body problem. Husserlian methodology would bracket the question of the existence of the surrounding world, thereby separating phenomenology from the ontology of the world. Yet Husserl’s phenomenology presupposes theory about species and individuals (universals and particulars), relations of part and whole, and ideal meanings—all parts of ontology.
考虑本体论。现象学研究（除其他外）意识的本质，这是形而上学或本体论的一个核心问题，也是导致传统身心问题的问题。胡塞尔的方法论将周围世界的存在问题括起来，从而将现象学与世界的本体论分开。然而，胡塞尔的现象学以关于物种和个体（普遍性和特殊性）、部分与整体的关系以及理想意义的理论为前提——这些都是本体论的一部分。

Now consider ethics. Phenomenology might play a role in ethics by offering analyses of the structure of will, valuing, happiness, and care for others (in empathy and sympathy). Historically, though, ethics has been on the horizon of phenomenology. Husserl largely avoided ethics in his major works, though he featured the role of practical concerns in the structure of the life-world or of Geist (spirit, or culture, as in Zeitgeist), and he once delivered a course of lectures giving ethics (like logic) a basic place in philosophy, indicating the importance of the phenomenology of sympathy in grounding ethics. In Being and Time Heidegger claimed not to pursue ethics while discussing phenomena ranging from care, conscience, and guilt to “fallenness” and “authenticity” (all phenomena with theological echoes). In Being and Nothingness Sartre analyzed with subtlety the logical problem of “bad faith”, yet he developed an ontology of value as produced by willing in good faith (which sounds like a revised Kantian foundation for morality). Beauvoir sketched an existentialist ethics, and Sartre left unpublished notebooks on ethics. However, an explicitly phenomenological approach to ethics emerged in the works of Emannuel Levinas, a Lithuanian phenomenologist who heard Husserl and Heidegger in Freiburg before moving to Paris. In Totality and Infinity (1961), modifying themes drawn from Husserl and Heidegger, Levinas focused on the significance of the “face” of the other, explicitly developing grounds for ethics in this range of phenomenology, writing an impressionistic style of prose with allusions to religious experience.
现在考虑伦理学。现象学可能通过分析意志、价值、幸福和对他人的关心（在同理心和同情心中）的结构，在伦理学中发挥作用。然而，从历史上看，伦理学一直处于现象学的地平线上。胡塞尔在他的主要著作中基本上避免了伦理学，尽管他强调了实际关注在生活世界或 Geist（精神或文化，如 Zeitgeist）的结构中的作用，他曾经发表过一门讲座，将伦理学（如逻辑学）置于哲学中的基本地位，表明同情现象学在建立伦理学基础方面的重要性。在《存在与时间》中，海德格尔声称在讨论从关怀、良心和内疚到“堕落”和“真实性”（所有具有神学回声的现象）时不追求伦理学。在《存在与虚无》中，萨特微妙地分析了“恶意”的逻辑问题，但他发展了一种价值本体论，这种本体论是由善意的意愿产生的（这听起来像是修正了康德的道德基础）。波伏娃勾勒出一种存在主义伦理学，而萨特留下了未发表的伦理学笔记本。然而，立陶宛现象学家埃曼努尔·列维纳斯 （Emannuel Levinas） 的作品中出现了一种明确的现象学伦理学方法，他在搬到巴黎之前在弗莱堡听过胡塞尔和海德格尔的演讲。在《整体与无限》（1961 年）中，列维纳斯修改了胡塞尔和海德格尔的主题，专注于他者“面孔”的意义，明确地为这一现象学领域的伦理学奠定了基础，写了一种带有宗教经验典故的印象派散文风格。

Allied with ethics are political and social philosophy. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were politically engaged in 1940s Paris, and their existential philosophies (phenomenologically based) suggest a political theory based in individual freedom. Sartre later sought an explicit blend of existentialism with Marxism. Still, political theory has remained on the borders of phenomenology. Social theory, however, has been closer to phenomenology as such. Husserl analyzed the phenomenological structure of the life-world and Geist generally, including our role in social activity. Heidegger stressed social practice, which he found more primordial than individual consciousness. Alfred Schutz developed a phenomenology of the social world. Sartre continued the phenomenological appraisal of the meaning of the other, the fundamental social formation. Moving outward from phenomenological issues, Michel Foucault studied the genesis and meaning of social institutions, from prisons to insane asylums. And Jacques Derrida has long practiced a kind of phenomenology of language, seeking social meaning in the “deconstruction” of wide-ranging texts. Aspects of French “poststructuralist” theory are sometimes interpreted as broadly phenomenological, but such issues are beyond the present purview.
与伦理学相辅相成的是政治和社会哲学。萨特和梅洛-庞蒂在 1940 年代的巴黎参与政治活动，他们的存在主义哲学（基于现象学）提出了一种基于个人自由的政治理论。萨特后来寻求将存在主义与马克思主义明确融合。尽管如此，政治理论仍然处于现象学的边界上。然而，社会理论更接近现象学本身。胡塞尔分析了生命世界和一般 Geist 的现象学结构，包括我们在社会活动中的作用。海德格尔强调社会实践，他发现社会实践比个人意识更原始。阿尔弗雷德·舒茨 （Alfred Schutz） 发展了一种社会世界现象学。萨特继续对他者的意义，即基本的社会形态进行现象学评估。米歇尔·福柯 （Michel Foucault） 从现象学问题向外发展，研究了从监狱到精神病院的社会制度的起源和意义。而雅克·德里达（Jacques Derrida）长期以来一直实践一种语言现象学，在对广泛文本的“解构”中寻求社会意义。法国“后结构主义”理论的各个方面有时被解释为广义的现象学，但这些问题超出了目前的范围。

Classical phenomenology, then, ties into certain areas of epistemology, logic, and ontology, and leads into parts of ethical, social, and political theory.
因此，古典现象学与认识论、逻辑学和本体论的某些领域联系在一起，并引向伦理、社会和政治理论的各个部分。

6. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind 6. 现象学和心灵哲学

It ought to be obvious that phenomenology has a lot to say in the area called philosophy of mind. Yet the traditions of phenomenology and analytic philosophy of mind have not been closely joined, despite overlapping areas of interest. So it is appropriate to close this survey of phenomenology by addressing philosophy of mind, one of the most vigorously debated areas in recent philosophy.
很明显，现象学在心灵哲学领域有很多话要说。然而，现象学的传统和心灵分析哲学的传统并没有紧密结合，尽管它们的兴趣领域重叠。因此，通过讨论心灵哲学来结束这项现象学调查是合适的，心灵哲学是近代哲学中争论最激烈的领域之一。

The tradition of analytic philosophy began, early in the 20th century, with analyses of language, notably in the works of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Then in The Concept of Mind (1949) Gilbert Ryle developed a series of analyses of language about different mental states, including sensation, belief, and will. Though Ryle is commonly deemed a philosopher of ordinary language, Ryle himself said The Concept of Mind could be called phenomenology. In effect, Ryle analyzed our phenomenological understanding of mental states as reflected in ordinary language about the mind. From this linguistic phenomenology Ryle argued that Cartesian mind-body dualism involves a category mistake (the logic or grammar of mental verbs—“believe”, “see”, etc.—does not mean that we ascribe belief, sensation, etc., to “the ghost in the machine”). With Ryle’s rejection of mind-body dualism, the mind-body problem was re-awakened: what is the ontology of mind vis-à-vis body, and how are mind and body related?
分析哲学的传统始于 20 世纪初对语言的分析，尤其是在戈特洛布·弗雷格、伯特兰·罗素和路德维希·维特根斯坦的著作中。然后在 The Concept of Mind （1949） 中，吉尔伯特·莱尔 （Gilbert Ryle） 对不同心理状态的语言进行了一系列分析，包括感觉、信念和意志。尽管莱尔通常被认为是普通语言的哲学家，但莱尔本人表示，《心智的概念》可以称为现象学。实际上，莱尔分析了我们对心理状态的现象学理解，这些理解反映在关于心灵的普通语言中。从这种语言现象学出发，莱尔认为笛卡尔的身心二元论涉及一个类别错误（心理动词的逻辑或语法——“相信”、“看到”等——并不意味着我们将信念、感觉等归于“机器中的幽灵”）。随着莱尔对身心二元论的拒绝，身心问题被重新唤醒：心与身体的本体论是什么，心灵和身体是如何关联的？

René Descartes, in his epoch-making Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), had argued that minds and bodies are two distinct kinds of being or substance with two distinct kinds of attributes or modes: bodies are characterized by spatiotemporal physical properties, while minds are characterized by properties of thinking (including seeing, feeling, etc.). Centuries later, phenomenology would find, with Brentano and Husserl, that mental acts are characterized by consciousness and intentionality, while natural science would find that physical systems are characterized by mass and force, ultimately by gravitational, electromagnetic, and quantum fields. Where do we find consciousness and intentionality in the quantum-electromagnetic-gravitational field that, by hypothesis, orders everything in the natural world in which we humans and our minds exist? That is the mind-body problem today. In short, phenomenology by any other name lies at the heart of the contemporary mind-body problem.
勒内·笛卡尔 （René Descartes） 在他划时代的《第一哲学沉思录》（1641 年）中指出，思想和身体是两种截然不同的存在或物质，具有两种截然不同的属性或模式：身体以时空物理属性为特征，而心灵以思维属性（包括视觉、感觉等）为特征。几个世纪后，现象学与布伦塔诺和胡塞尔一起发现，心理行为以意识和意向性为特征，而自然科学则发现物理系统以质量和力为特征，最终以引力、电磁场和量子场为特征。我们在量子-电磁-引力场中在哪里找到意识和意向性，根据假设，它对我们人类和我们的思想所在的自然世界中的一切进行排序？这就是今天的身心问题。简而言之，任何其他名称的现象学都是当代身心问题的核心。

After Ryle, philosophers sought a more explicit and generally naturalistic ontology of mind. In the 1950s materialism was argued anew, urging that mental states are identical with states of the central nervous system. The classical identity theory holds that each token mental state (in a particular person’s mind at a particular time) is identical with a token brain state (in that person’s brain at that time). A stronger materialism holds, instead, that each type of mental state is identical with a type of brain state. But materialism does not fit comfortably with phenomenology. For it is not obvious how conscious mental states as we experience them—sensations, thoughts, emotions—can simply be the complex neural states that somehow subserve or implement them. If mental states and neural states are simply identical, in token or in type, where in our scientific theory of mind does the phenomenology occur—is it not simply replaced by neuroscience? And yet experience is part of what is to be explained by neuroscience.
在 Ryle 之后，哲学家寻求一种更明确、更自然的心灵本体论。在 1950 年代，唯物主义被重新争论，敦促精神状态与中枢神经系统的状态相同。经典同一性理论认为，每个标记心理状态（在特定时间的特定人的头脑中）与标记的大脑状态（在那个人的大脑中）相同。相反，更强的唯物主义认为，每种类型的心理状态都与一种类型的大脑状态相同。但唯物主义与现象学并不相符。因为我们所体验的有意识的心理状态——感觉、思想、情绪——如何能简单地成为以某种方式服务或实施它们的复杂神经状态，这一点并不明显。如果心理状态和神经状态在标记或类型上是相同的，那么在我们的科学心智理论中，现象学发生在哪里——它不是简单地被神经科学所取代吗？然而，经验是神经科学要解释的一部分。

In the late 1960s and 1970s the computer model of mind set in, and functionalism became the dominant model of mind. On this model, mind is not what the brain consists in (electrochemical transactions in neurons in vast complexes). Instead, mind is what brains do: their function of mediating between information coming into the organism and behavior proceeding from the organism. Thus, a mental state is a functional state of the brain or of the human (or animal) organism. More specifically, on a favorite variation of functionalism, the mind is a computing system: mind is to brain as software is to hardware; thoughts are just programs running on the brain’s “wetware”. Since the 1970s the cognitive sciences—from experimental studies of cognition to neuroscience—have tended toward a mix of materialism and functionalism. Gradually, however, philosophers found that phenomenological aspects of the mind pose problems for the functionalist paradigm too.
在 1960 年代末和 1970 年代，计算机思维模型开始出现，功能主义成为占主导地位的思维模型。在这个模型中，思想不是大脑所包含的（巨大复合物中神经元的电化学交易）。相反，思想是大脑的作用：它们在进入有机体的信息和从有机体开始的行为之间起中介的作用。因此，精神状态是大脑或人类（或动物）有机体的功能状态。更具体地说，在功能主义的一个最喜欢的变体中，心智是一个计算系统：心智之于大脑，就像软件之于硬件一样;思想只是在大脑的 “湿件” 上运行的程序。自 1970 年代以来，认知科学——从认知的实验研究到神经科学——都倾向于唯物主义和功能主义的混合。然而，渐渐地，哲学家们发现，心灵的现象学方面也给功能主义范式带来了问题。

In the early 1970s Thomas Nagel argued in “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” (1974) that consciousness itself—especially the subjective character of what it is like to have a certain type of experience—escapes physical theory. Many philosophers pressed the case that sensory qualia—what it is like to feel pain, to see red, etc.—are not addressed or explained by a physical account of either brain structure or brain function. Consciousness has properties of its own. And yet, we know, it is closely tied to the brain. And, at some level of description, neural activities implement computation.
在 1970 年代初期，托马斯·内格尔 （Thomas Nagel） 在“成为蝙蝠是什么感觉？（1974）中，意识本身——尤其是拥有某种类型经验的主观特征——逃避了物理理论。许多哲学家强调，感觉质量——感觉到疼痛、看到红色等是什么感觉——并没有通过大脑结构或大脑功能的物理描述来解决或解释。意识有它自己的属性。然而，我们知道，它与大脑密切相关。而且，在某种程度上，神经活动实现计算。

In the 1980s John Searle argued in Intentionality (1983) (and further in The Rediscovery of the Mind (1991)) that intentionality and consciousness are essential properties of mental states. For Searle, our brains produce mental states with properties of consciousness and intentionality, and this is all part of our biology, yet consciousness and intentionality require a “first-person” ontology. Searle also argued that computers simulate but do not have mental states characterized by intentionality. As Searle argued, a computer system has a syntax (processing symbols of certain shapes) but has no semantics (the symbols lack meaning: we interpret the symbols). In this way Searle rejected both materialism and functionalism, while insisting that mind is a biological property of organisms like us: our brains “secrete” consciousness.
在 1980 年代，约翰·塞尔 （John Searle） 在 Intentionality （1983） 中（以及在 The Rediscovery of the Mind （1991） 中进一步指出，意向性和意识是心理状态的基本属性。对 Searle 来说，我们的大脑产生具有意识和意向性特性的精神状态，这都是我们生物学的一部分，但意识和意向性需要一个“第一人称”本体论。Searle 还认为，计算机模拟但不具有以意向性为特征的精神状态。正如 Searle 所说，计算机系统有语法（处理某些形状的符号），但没有语义（符号没有意义：我们解释符号）。通过这种方式，塞尔拒绝了唯物主义和功能主义，同时坚持认为心灵是像我们这样的有机体的生物属性：我们的大脑“分泌”意识。

The analysis of consciousness and intentionality is central to phenomenology as appraised above, and Searle’s theory of intentionality reads like a modernized version of Husserl’s. (Contemporary logical theory takes the form of stating truth conditions for propositions, and Searle characterizes a mental state’s intentionality by specifying its “satisfaction conditions”). However, there is an important difference in background theory. For Searle explicitly assumes the basic worldview of natural science, holding that consciousness is part of nature. But Husserl explicitly brackets that assumption, and later phenomenologists—including Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty—seem to seek a certain sanctuary for phenomenology beyond the natural sciences. And yet phenomenology itself should be largely neutral about further theories of how experience arises, notably from brain activity.
如上所述，对意识和意向性的分析是现象学的核心，而塞尔的意向性理论读起来就像胡塞尔的现代版本。（当代逻辑理论采取陈述命题的真值条件的形式，而 Searle 通过指定其“满足条件”来描述心理状态的意向性）。但是，背景理论存在重要差异。因为 Searle 明确假设了自然科学的基本世界观，认为意识是自然的一部分。但胡塞尔明确地将这一假设括起来，后来的现象学家——包括海德格尔、萨特、梅洛-庞蒂——似乎在自然科学之外为现象学寻找一个特定的避难所。然而，现象学本身对于关于经验如何产生的进一步理论，特别是来自大脑活动的理论，应该在很大程度上保持中立。

Since the late 1980s, and especially the late 1990s, a variety of writers working in philosophy of mind have focused on the fundamental character of consciousness, ultimately a phenomenological issue. Does consciousness always and essentially involve self-consciousness, or consciousness-of-consciousness, as Brentano, Husserl, and Sartre held (in varying detail)? If so, then every act of consciousness either includes or is adjoined by a consciousness-of-that-consciousness. Does that self-consciousness take the form of an internal self-monitoring? If so, is that monitoring of a higher order, where each act of consciousness is joined by a further mental act monitoring the base act? Or is such monitoring of the same order as the base act, a proper part of the act without which the act would not be conscious? A variety of models of this self-consciousness have been developed, some explicitly drawing on or adapting views in Brentano, Husserl, and Sartre. Two recent collections address these issues: David Woodruff Smith and Amie L. Thomasson (editors), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (2005), and Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (editors), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness (2006).
自 1980 年代末，尤其是 1990 年代末以来，各种从事心灵哲学工作的作家都专注于意识的基本特征，这最终是一个现象学问题。意识是否总是和本质上涉及自我意识，或者像布伦塔诺、胡塞尔和萨特所持有的意识一样（以不同的细节）？如果是这样，那么每一个意识行为要么包括或被那个意识的意识所包围。这种自我意识是否以内部自我监控的形式出现？如果是这样，那是否是一种更高层次的监控，其中每个意识行为都与另一个监控基本行为的心理行为相结合？或者，这种与基本行为相同的秩序的监控是行为的适当部分，没有它，行为就不是有意识的？这种自我意识的各种模型已经被开发出来，其中一些明确地借鉴或改编了布伦塔诺、胡塞尔和萨特的观点。最近的两本文集探讨了这些问题：David Woodruff Smith 和 Amie L. Thomasson（主编），《现象学和心灵哲学》（2005 年），以及 Uriah Kriegel 和 Kenneth Williford（主编），《意识的自我表征方法》（2006 年）。

The philosophy of mind may be factored into the following disciplines or ranges of theory relevant to mind:
心灵哲学可以分为以下与心灵相关的学科或理论范围：

1. Phenomenology studies conscious experience as experienced, analyzing the structure—the types, intentional forms and meanings, dynamics, and (certain) enabling conditions—of perception, thought, imagination, emotion, and volition and action.
   现象学研究作为经验的有意识体验，分析感知、思想、想象、情感、意志和行动的结构——类型、意向形式和意义、动态和（某些）有利条件。
2. Neuroscience studies the neural activities that serve as biological substrate to the various types of mental activity, including conscious experience. Neuroscience will be framed by evolutionary biology (explaining how neural phenomena evolved) and ultimately by basic physics (explaining how biological phenomena are grounded in physical phenomena). Here lie the intricacies of the natural sciences. Part of what the sciences are accountable for is the structure of experience, analyzed by phenomenology.
   神经科学研究作为各种心理活动（包括有意识体验）的生物基础的神经活动。神经科学将以进化生物学（解释神经现象如何进化）为框架，并最终以基础物理学（解释生物现象如何以物理现象为基础）为框架。这就是自然科学的复杂性。科学所负责的部分内容是现象学分析的经验结构。
3. Cultural analysis studies the social practices that help to shape or serve as cultural substrate of the various types of mental activity, including conscious experience, typically manifest in embodied action. Here we study the import of language and other social practices, including background attitudes or assumptions, sometimes involving particular political systems.
   文化分析研究有助于塑造或作为各种类型心理活动的文化基础的社会实践，包括通常表现在具体行动中的有意识体验。在这里，我们研究语言的输入和其他社会实践，包括背景态度或假设，有时涉及特定的政治制度。
4. Ontology of mind studies the ontological type of mental activity in general, ranging from perception (which involves causal input from environment to experience) to volitional action (which involves causal output from volition to bodily movement).
   心智本体论研究一般心理活动的本体论类型，从感知（涉及从环境到经验的因果输入）到意志行动（涉及从意志到身体运动的因果输出）。

This division of labor in the theory of mind can be seen as an extension of Brentano’s original distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology. Phenomenology offers descriptive analyses of mental phenomena, while neuroscience (and wider biology and ultimately physics) offers models of explanation of what causes or gives rise to mental phenomena. Cultural theory offers analyses of social activities and their impact on experience, including ways language shapes our thought, emotion, and motivation. And ontology frames all these results within a basic scheme of the structure of the world, including our own minds.
心智理论中的这种分工可以看作是布伦塔诺最初区分描述心理学和遗传心理学的延伸。现象学提供对心理现象的描述性分析，而神经科学（以及更广泛的生物学和最终的物理学）提供解释导致或引起心理现象的模型。文化理论分析了社会活动及其对体验的影响，包括语言塑造我们的思想、情感和动机的方式。本体论将所有这些结果构建在世界结构的基本方案中，包括我们自己的思想。

The ontological distinction among the form, appearance, and substrate of an activity of consciousness is detailed in D. W. Smith, Mind World (2004), in the essay “Three Facets of Consciousness”.
意识活动的形式、外观和基础之间的本体论区别在 D. W. Smith， Mind World （2004） 的文章“意识的三个方面”中进行了详细说明。

Meanwhile, from an epistemological standpoint, all these ranges of theory about mind begin with how we observe and reason about and seek to explain phenomena we encounter in the world. And that is where phenomenology begins. Moreover, how we understand each piece of theory, including theory about mind, is central to the theory of intentionality, as it were, the semantics of thought and experience in general. And that is the heart of phenomenology.
同时，从认识论的角度来看，所有这些关于心智的理论范围都是从我们如何观察、推理和寻求解释我们在世界上遇到的现象开始的。这就是现象学开始的地方。此外，我们如何理解每一项理论，包括关于心智的理论，是意向性理论的核心，可以说是一般的思想和经验的语义学。这就是现象学的核心。

7. Phenomenology in Contemporary Consciousness Theory 7. 当代意识理论中的现象学

Phenomenological issues, by any other name, have played a prominent role in very recent philosophy of mind. Amplifying the theme of the previous section, we note two such issues: the form of inner awareness that ostensibly makes a mental activity conscious, and the phenomenal character of conscious cognitive mental activity in thought, and perception, and action.
现象学问题，无论其他名称如何，在最近的心灵哲学中都发挥了突出的作用。为了扩大上一节的主题，我们注意到两个这样的问题：表面上使心理活动有意识的内在意识的形式，以及有意识的认知心理活动在思想、感知和行动中的现象特征。

Ever since Nagel’s 1974 article, “What Is It Like to be a Bat?”, the notion of what-it-is-like to experience a mental state or activity has posed a challenge to reductive materialism and functionalism in theory of mind. This subjective phenomenal character of consciousness is held to be constitutive or definitive of consciousness. What is the form of that phenomenal character we find in consciousness?
自从 Nagel 在 1974 年发表文章《成为蝙蝠是什么感觉》以来，体验精神状态或活动是什么样子的概念就对心智理论中的还原唯物主义和功能主义提出了挑战。意识的这种主观现象特征被认为是意识的构成性或决定性。我们在意识中发现的现象特征的形式是什么？

A prominent line of analysis holds that the phenomenal character of a mental activity consists in a certain form of awareness of that activity, an awareness that by definition renders it conscious. Since the 1980s a variety of models of that awareness have been developed. As noted above, there are models that define this awareness as a higher-order monitoring, either an inner perception of the activity (a form of inner sense per Kant) or inner consciousness (per Brentano), or an inner thought about the activity. A further model analyzes such awareness as an integral part of the experience, a form of self-representation within the experience. (Again, see Kriegel and Williford (eds.) (2006).)
一个突出的分析路线认为，心理活动的现象特征在于对该活动的某种形式的意识，这种意识根据定义使其具有意识。自 1980 年代以来，已经开发了各种关于这种意识的模型。如上所述，有一些模型将这种意识定义为一种更高层次的监控，要么是对活动的内在感知（康德的一种内在感觉形式）或内在意识（根据布伦塔诺），要么是关于活动的内在思考。另一个模型将这种意识分析为体验的一个组成部分，是体验中的一种自我表现形式。（同样，参见 Kriegel 和 Williford （eds.） （2006）。

A somewhat different model comes arguably closer to the form of self-consciousness sought by Brentano, Husserl, and Sartre. On the “modal” model, inner awareness of an experience takes the form of an integral reflexive awareness of “this very experience”. That form of awareness is held to be a constitutive element of the experience that renders it conscious. As Sartre put the claim, self-consciousness is constitutive of consciousness, but that self-consciousness is “pre-reflective”. This reflexive awareness is not, then, part of a separable higher-order monitoring, but rather built into consciousness per se. On the modal model, this awareness is part of the way the experience unfolds: subjectively, phenomenally, consciously. This model is elaborated in D. W. Smith (2004), Mind World, in the essay “Return to Consciousness” (and elsewhere).
一个稍微不同的模型可以说更接近布伦塔诺、胡塞尔和萨特所寻求的自我意识形式。在“模态”模型中，对体验的内在意识表现为对“正是这个体验”的整体反身意识。这种形式的意识被认为是使它有意识的体验的构成要素。正如萨特所说，自我意识是意识的组成部分，但这种自我意识是“前反思的”。因此，这种反身意识并不是可分离的高阶监控的一部分，而是内置于意识本身中。在模态模型中，这种意识是体验展开方式的一部分：主观地、现象上、有意识地。这个模型在 D. W. Smith （2004） 的 Mind World 一文“Return to Consciousness”（和其他地方）中进行了详细阐述。

Whatever may be the precise form of phenomenal character, we would ask how that character distributes over mental life. What is phenomenal in different types of mental activity? Here arise issues of cognitive phenomenology. Is phenomenality restricted to the “feel” of sensory experience? Or is phenomenality present also in cognitive experiences of thinking such-and-such, or of perception bearing conceptual as well as sensory content, or also in volitional or conative bodily action? These issues are explored in Bayne and Montague (eds.) (2011), Cognitive Phenomenology.
无论现象性特征的确切形式是什么，我们都会问这个特征在精神生活中是如何分布的。在不同类型的心理活动中什么是现象？这里出现了认知现象学的问题。现象性是否仅限于感官体验的“感觉”？或者，现象性是否也存在于思考某某的认知体验中，或带有概念和感官内容的感知中，或者也存在于意志或共生的身体行动中？这些问题在 Bayne 和 Montague （eds.） （2011） 的《认知现象学》中进行了探讨。

A restrictive view holds that only sensory experience has a proper phenomenal character, a what-it-is-like. Seeing a color, hearing a tone, smelling an odor, feeling a pain—these types of conscious experience have a phenomenal character, but no others do, on this view. A stringent empiricism might limit phenomenal experience to pure sensations, though Hume himself presumably recognized phenomenal “ideas” beyond pure sense “impressions”. A somewhat more expansive view would hold that perceptual experience has a distinctive phenomenal character even where sensation is informed by concepts. Seeing that yellow canary, hearing that clear Middle C on a Steinway piano, smelling the sharp odor of anise, feeling a pain of the jab of the doctor’s needle in receiving an injection—these types of conscious experience have a character of what-it-is-like, a character informed by conceptual content that is also “felt”, on this view. A Kantian account of conceptual-sensory experience, or “intuition”, would endorse a phenomenal character in these types of experience. Indeed, “phenomena”, in the Kantian idiom, are precisely things as they appear in consciousness, so of course their appearance has a phenomenal character.
一种限制性观点认为，只有感官体验才具有适当的现象特征，即它是什么样子。看到一种颜色，听到一种音调，闻到一种气味，感觉到一种痛苦——这些类型的意识体验具有非凡的特征，但在这种观点中，没有其他类型具有。严格的经验主义可能会将现象经验局限于纯粹的感觉，尽管休谟本人可能认识到超越纯粹感觉“印象”的现象“观念”。一个更广阔的观点会认为，即使感觉是由概念告知的，知觉体验也具有独特的现象特征。看到那只黄色的金丝雀，听到施坦威钢琴上清脆的中音 C，闻到茴香的刺鼻气味，感觉到医生在接受注射时针头刺痛——在这种观点中，这些类型的意识体验具有它是什么样子的特征，一种由概念内容所告知的特征，也是“感觉到的”。康德对概念-感官经验或“直觉”的描述，将认可这些类型经验中的现象特征。事实上，“现象”，在康德的成语中，恰恰是它们在意识中出现的事物，因此它们的出现当然具有现象性。

Now, a much more expansive view would hold that every conscious experience has a distinctive phenomenal character. Thinking that 17 is a prime number, thinking that the red in the sunset is caused by the sun’s light waves being bent by the atmosphere, thinking that Kant was more right than Hume about the grounds of knowledge, thinking that economic principles are also political—even such highly cognitive activities have a character of what-it-is-like to so think, according to this expansive view.
现在，一个更广阔的观点会认为，每一种意识体验都有一个独特的现象特征。认为 17 是一个质数，认为日落中的红色是由于太阳的光波被大气层弯曲造成的，认为康德在知识的基础上比休谟更正确，认为经济原则也是政治性的——即使是这样认知的活动也具有它是什么样子的性质， 根据这个广阔的观点。

Classical phenomenologists like Husserl and Merleau-Ponty surely assumed an expansive view of phenomenal consciousness. As noted above, the “phenomena” that are the focus of phenomenology were assumed to present a rich character of lived experience. Even Heidegger, while de-emphasizing consciousness (the Cartesian sin!), dwelt on “phenomena” as what appears or shows up to us (to “Dasein”) in our everyday activities such as hammering a nail. Like Merleau-Ponty, Gurwitsch (1964) explicitly studies the “phenomenal field”, embracing all that is presented in our experience. Arguably, for these thinkers, every type of conscious experience has its distinctive phenomenal character, its “phenomenology”—and the task of phenomenology (the discipline) is to analyze that character. Note that in recent debates the phenomenal character of an experience is often called its “phenomenology”—whereas, in the established idiom, the term “phenomenology” names the discipline that studies such “phenomenology”.
像胡塞尔和梅洛-庞蒂这样的古典现象学家肯定对现象意识采取了广阔的视野。如上所述，作为现象学关注点的“现象”被假定为呈现出生活经验的丰富特征。即使是海德格尔，虽然不强调意识（笛卡尔的罪恶），但仍然将“现象”视为在我们的日常活动（如敲钉子）中出现或向我们展示的东西（对“Dasein”）。与 Merleau-Ponty 一样，Gurwitsch （1964） 明确研究了“现象场”，包括我们经验中呈现的一切。可以说，对于这些思想家来说，每一种类型的意识体验都有其独特的现象特征，即它的“现象学”——而现象学（这门学科）的任务就是分析这种特征。请注意，在最近的辩论中，经验的现象特征通常被称为其“现象学”——而在既定的习语中，“现象学”一词将研究这种“现象学”的学科命名为“现象学”。

Since intentionality is a crucial property of consciousness, according to Brentano, Husserl, et al., the character of intentionality itself would count as phenomenal, as part of what-it-is-like to experience a given type of intentional experience. But it is not only intentional perception and thought that have their distinctive phenomenal characters. Embodied action also would have a distinctive phenomenal character, involving “lived” characters of kinesthetic sensation as well as conceptual volitional content, say, in the feel of kicking a soccer ball. The “lived body” is precisely the body as experienced in everyday embodied volitional action such as running or kicking a ball or even speaking. Husserl wrote at length about the “lived body” (Leib), in Ideas II, and Merleau-Ponty followed suit with rich analyses of embodied perception and action, in Phenomenology of Perception. In Bayne and Montague (eds.) (2011) see the article on conative phenomenology by Terence Horgan, and in Smith and Thomasson (eds.) (2005) see articles by Charles Siewert and Sean Kelly.
由于意向性是意识的一个关键属性，根据布伦塔诺、胡塞尔等人的说法，意向性本身的特征可以算作现象性，作为体验特定类型的意向性体验的一部分。但是，不仅仅是有意识的感知和思想具有其独特的现象特征。具体动作也将具有独特的现象特征，涉及动觉感觉的“活生生的”角色以及概念性的意志内容，例如，在踢足球的感觉中。“活着的身体”正是在日常具身的意志行为中体验到的身体，例如跑步或踢球，甚至说话。胡塞尔在《思想II》中详细描述了“活着的身体”（Leib），梅洛-庞蒂（Merleau-Ponty）紧随其后，在《知觉现象学》（Phenomenology of Perception）中对具身感知和行动进行了丰富的分析。在 Bayne 和 Montague （eds.） （2011） 中，参见 Terence Horgan 的关于共生现象学的文章，在 Smith 和 Thomasson （eds.） （2005） 中，参见 Charles Siewert 和 Sean Kelly 的文章。

But now a problems remains. Intentionality essentially involves meaning, so the question arises how meaning appears in phenomenal character. Importantly, the content of a conscious experience typically carries a horizon of background meaning, meaning that is largely implicit rather than explicit in experience. But then a wide range of content carried by an experience would not have a consciously felt phenomenal character. So it may well be argued. Here is a line of phenomenological theory for another day.
但现在问题仍然存在。意向性本质上涉及意义，所以问题出现了意义如何以现象性特征出现。重要的是，有意识体验的内容通常带有背景意义的视野，这意味着在体验中主要是隐含的而不是明确的。但是，体验所承载的广泛内容就不会具有有意识地感受到的非凡特征。所以，这很可能是有争议的。这是另一天的现象学理论。

Bibliography

Classical Texts

• Brentano, F., 1995, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Trans. Antos C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister, London and New York: Routledge. From the German original of 1874.

  Brentano’s development of descriptive psychology, the forerunner of Husserlian phenomenology, including Brentano’s conception of mental phenomena as intentionally directed and his analysis of inner consciousness distinguished from inner observation.

• Heidegger, M., 1962, Being and Time, Trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row. From the German original of 1927.

  Heidegger’s magnum opus, laying out his style of phenomenology and existential ontology, including his distinction between beings and their being, as well as his emphasis on practical activity.

• Heidegger, M., 1982, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Trans. by Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. From the German original of 1975. The text of a lecture course in 1927.

  Heidegger’s clearest presentation of his conception of phenomenology as fundamental ontology, addressing the history of the question of the meaning of being from Aristotle onward.

• Husserl, E., 2001, Logical Investigations. Vols. One and Two, Trans. J. N. Findlay. Ed. with translation corrections and with a new Introduction by Dermot Moran. With a new Preface by Michael Dummett. London and New York: Routledge. A new and revised edition of the original English translation by J. N. Findlay. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970. From the Second Edition of the German. First edition, 1900–01; second edition, 1913, 1920.

  Husserl’s magnum opus, laying out his system of philosophy including philosophy of logic, philosophy of language, ontology, phenomenology, and epistemology. Here are the foundations of Husserl’s phenomenology and his theory of intentionality.

• Husserl, E., 2001, The Shorter Logical Investigations. London and New York: Routledge.

  An abridged edition of the preceding.

• Husserl, E., 1963, Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson. New York: Collier Books. From the German original of 1913, originally titled Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book. Newly translated with the full title by Fred Kersten. Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1983. Known as Ideas I.

  Husserl’s mature account of transcendental phenomenology, including his notion of intentional content as noema.

• Husserl, E., 1989, Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy

  , Second Book. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. From the German original unpublished manuscript of 1912, revised 1915, 1928. Known as

  Ideas II.

  Detailed phenomenological analyses assumed in Ideas I, including analyses of bodily awareness (kinesthesis and motility) and social awareness (empathy).

• Merleau-Ponty, M., 2012, Phenomenology of Perception, Trans. Donald A. Landes. London and New York: Routledge. Prior translation, 1996, Phenomenology of Perception, Trans. Colin Smith. London and New York: Routledge. From the French original of 1945.

  Merleau-Ponty’s conception of phenomenology, rich in impressionistic description of perception and other forms of experience, emphasizing the role of the experienced body in many forms of consciousness.

• Sartre, J.-P., 1956, Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press. From the French original of 1943.

  Sartre’s magnum opus, developing in detail his conception of phenomenology and his existential view of human freedom, including his analysis of consciousness-of-consciousness, the look of the Other, and much more.

• Sartre, J.-P., 1964, Nausea. Trans. Lloyd Alexander. New York: New Directions Publishing. From the French original of 1938).

  A novel in the first person, featuring descriptions of how things are experienced, thereby illustrating Sartre’s conception of phenomenology (and existentialism) with no technical idioms and no explicit theoretical discussion.

Contemporary Studies

• Bayne, T., and Montague, M., (eds.), 2011, Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

  Essays debating the extend of phenomenal consciousness.

• Block, N., Flanagan, O., and Güzeldere, G. (eds.), 1997,The Nature of Consciusness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

  Extensive studies of aspects of consciousness, in analytic philosophy of mind, often addressing phenomenological issues, but with limited reference to phenomenology as such.

• Chalmers, D. (ed.), 2002, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

  Core readings in philosophy of mind, largely analytic philosophy of mind, sometimes addressing phenomenological issues, with some reference to classical phenomenology, including selections from Descartes, Ryle, Brentano, Nagel, and Searle (as discussed in the present article).

• Dreyfus, H., with Hall, H. (eds.), 1982, Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

  Studies of issues in Husserlian phenomenology and theory of intentionality, with connections to early models of cognitive science, including Jerry Fodor’s discussion of methodological solipsism (compare Husserl’s method of bracketing or epoché), and including Dagfinn Føllesdal’s article, “Husserl’s Notion of Noema” (1969).

• Fricke, C., and Føllesdal, D. (eds.), 2012,Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl: A Collection of Essays. Frankfurt and Paris: Ontos Verlag.

  Phenomenological studies of intersubjectivity, empathy, and sympathy in the works of Smith and Husserl.

• Kriegel, U., and Williford, K. (eds.), 2006, Self-Representational Approaches to Consciusness . Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

  Essays addressing the structure of self-consciousness, or consciousness-of-consciousness, some drawing on phenomenology explicitly.

• Mohanty, J. N., 1989, Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account. Oxford and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell.

  A study of structures of consciousness and meaning in a contemporary rendition of transcendental phenomenology, connecting with issues in analytic philosophy and its history.

• Mohanty, J. N., 2008, The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

  A detailed study of the development of Husserl’s philosophy and his conception of transcendental phenomenology.

• Mohanty, J. N., 2011, Edmund Husserl’s Freiburg Years: 1916–1938. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

  A close study of Husserl’s late philosophy and his conception of phenomenology involving the life-world.

• Moran, D., 2000, Introduction to Phenomenology. London and New York: Routledge.

  An extensive introductory discussion of the principal works of the classical phenomenologists and several other broadly phenomenological thinkers.

• Moran, D., 2005, Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology. Cambridge and Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press.

  A study of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.

• Parsons, Charles, 2012, From Kant to Husserl: Selected Essays, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

  Studies of historical figures on philosophy of mathematics, including Kant, Frege, Brentano, and Husserl.

• Petitot, J., Varela, F. J., Pachoud, B., and Roy, J.-M., (eds.), 1999, Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenmenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press (in collaboration with Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York).

  Studies of issues of phenomenology in connection with cognitive science and neuroscience, pursuing the integration of the disciplines, thus combining classical phenomenology with contemporary natural science.

• Searle, J., 1983, Intentionality. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

  Searle’s analysis of intentionality, often similar in detail to Husserl’s theory of intentionality, but pursued in the tradition and style of analytic philosophy of mind and language, without overtly phenomenological methodology.

• Smith, B., and Smith, D.W. (eds.), 1995, The Cambridge Companion to Husserl. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

  Detailed studies of Husserl’s work including his phenomenology, with an introduction to his overall philosophy.

• Smith, D. W., 2013, Husserl, 2nd revised edition. London and New York: Routledge. (1st edition, 2007).

  A detailed study of Husserl’s philosophical system including logic, ontology, phenomenology, epistemology, and ethics, assuming no prior background.

• Smith, D. W., and McIntyre, R., 1982, Husserl and Intentionality: a Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language

  . Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company (now Springer).

  A book-length development of analytic phenomenology, with an interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology, his theory of intentionality, and his historical roots, and connections with issues in logical theory and analytic philosophy of language and mind, assuming no prior background.

• Smith, D. W., and Thomasson, Amie L. (eds.), 2005, Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

  Essays integrating phenomenology and analytic philosophy of mind.

• Sokolowski, R., 2000, Introduction to Phenomenology. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

  A contemporary introduction to the practice of transcendental phenomenology, without historical interpretation, emphasizing a transcendental attitude in phenomenology.

• Tieszen, R., 2005, Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy of Mathematics. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

  Essays relating Husserlian phenomenology with issues in logic and mathematics.

• Tieszen, R., 2005, Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy of Mathematics. Cambridge and New York: Camabridge University Press.

  Essays relating Husserlian phenomenology with issues in logic and mathematics.

• Tieszen, R., 2011, After Gödel: Platonism and Rationalism in Mathematics and Logic. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

  A study of Gödel’s work in relation to, inter alia, Husserlian phenomenology in the foundations of logic and mathematics.

• Zahavi, D. (ed.), 2012, The Oxford Handbook on Contemporary Phenomenology. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

  A collection of contemporary essays on phenomenological themes (not primarily on historical figures).

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via：

• Phenomenology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/

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什么是现象学？—— 哲学中的科学

知乎 哲学小疯子

什么是现象学？作为西方哲学最前沿的的学术领域，它代表着西方两千年的哲学的 “巅峰”，也标志着西方两千年来哲学的 “终结”。现象学的思维方式让人们发现了一个全新的 “领域”，这个领域打破了 “科学” 和 “哲学” 的界限、让 “道德” 找到了现实的意义、让中西方文化实现了对话……

—— 科学与现象学之比较，方法和领域

首先，我们来看看什么是科学？或者再细化一点：“什么是物理学？什么是化学？什么是生物学？” 举例来说，面对一个活生生的人，站在物理学的角度看就是一堆原子的运动；站在化学的角度看，就是一堆元素的化学反应；站在生物学的角度看，就是一些组织器官的相互代谢。由此可见每门学科都有其特定的 “理论构架” 和相应的切入视角，而科学总的来说就是从理论化、概念化、系统化的角度来看待事物的一种方法，科学的 “领域” 就是由牛顿、$O_2$、阿拉伯数字等概念组成的领域。

那什么又是现象学呢？现象学与科学的方法 “相反”：**去理论化、概念化、系统化，去掉任何反思性概念杂质而返璞归真的对事物本身进行关照、描述，这就是现象学方法。**现象学方法很特别，这就好比要用概念来描述 “前概念” 的现象一样，可谓无相之相、无状之状，这就好比诗人想表达他当下所感之意境时只能借助诗词这种表达方式。现象学的 “领域” 是一个纯粹的领域，是一个不掺杂任何概念杂质的领域，但我们却又一直对这个领域有所 “领悟”，就好比诗人对意境的领悟。

—— 现象学方法：现象学还原介绍

让我们一步一步来走近现象学这个 “领域”，想要到达这个领域，我们必须要做的就是不断的去理论化、概念化、系统化，我们称这个过程为 “现象学还原”。可能直接进行现象学还原对很多人来说还很陌生，我们姑且先从 “心理学还原” 说起。

人不论想什么、做什么肯定都处于一种 “情绪” 或 “心情” 当中，朋友久别重逢时会感到激动，恋人分别时会感到悲伤、走向讲台时会感到紧张，无论做什么、想什么必定都处于一种 “情绪”、“心境” 当中，这就是心理学意义上的还原。比如看见一个人夸夸奇谈，从天文谈到地理，我们可以说他学识渊博、也可以说他很有见识。但站在心理学的角度看他，他不过就是宣泄心中的情感或压抑，这就是心理学意义上的还原，在这个过程中概念、语言被进一步压缩为一个情绪和心理问题。但要清楚，心理学不过也是一种理论构架，也是基于一定的概念化、系统化、抽象化方法建立起来的理论体系，还并不是 “事物” 本身，也是经过概念加工后而成的东西。如果将心理学所设定的概念去除，进一步追问事物本身。那我们就可以回到一个更原始的领域，也即是前概念、前语言、前逻辑的现象学领域，这就是现象学还原。

—— 现象学领域之描述，无相之相、无状之状

经过心理学还原，再经由现象学还原，我们就到达了现象学这块全新的领域。我们想要来描述现象学领域这种当下所感用固定的概念或理论体系就不再合适，就好比白居易所感之诗境 “人间四月芳菲尽，山寺桃花始盛开。” 不能被描述为 “四月份，山上因为海拔高，所以桃花比山下开得晚”。所以面对现象学领域，只能通过类似于 “诗歌” 这种意象性的描述方式，再或者说古人 “易经” 中乾、坤、艮、震这种象形思维、文字来描述，这个领域就是现象学的领域。

再举例来说，如果一个人看起很憔悴，西医就倾向于用概念化、系统化的语言来描述，比如他血糖好多、血压多高、功能指标是否正常，以这种概念化的数据来对其状态进行评定；而中医就与这种概念化的思维方式不同了，可以说中医更是一种现象学的思维方式。如果这人看起很憔悴，中医会说这人 “精 “、” 气” 不足，直接从起当下所感描述那人状态，而不是经过一系列抽象化、概念化的概念来描述那人的状态，中医的这些用语如精、气、神、血都不同于西医那种可量化、可实验的词语，更是一种当下化、在场化的现象学描述。

—— 由现象学反观科学、一切理论体系

**现象学领域是个开放的领域，从这个开放的领域我们可以建立各种概念体系包括现象学自身，这就就好比治病有中医和西医之分，面对自然规律有科学和易学之分。**就如我们走进一个房间感觉里面很压抑、很封闭，我们可以站在现象学的角度说这里缺乏 “生气”，也可以对这种感觉建立理论体系，说这房间哪里差点装饰物、哪里色彩搭配不好等等。又打个比方，有人问你：“你为什么愿意和你的爱人在一起？” 有人会说：“因为另一半无论成长背景、家庭、性格、长相都和我般配，所以我俩愿意在一起。” 这其实就是对恋爱感觉的理论建构了。如果站在现象学的角度来描述则是：“我和她在一起不累、感到高兴”。可见现象学就是这么一个 “原始” 的领域，其中不掺杂任何反思后概念杂质，仅仅从其原初、当下化、在场化来描述事实本身。

海德格尔把现象学方法用于 “存在” 创立了存在主义，伽达默尔把现象学方法用于 “文本解说” 创立了诠释学，大家不妨把现象学思维用于各个领域，相信会有意想不到的收获……

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via：

• 什么是现象学？—— 哲学中的科学 - 知乎 哲学小疯子 发布于 2018-06-21 22:09 ，编辑于 2018-06-21 22:09

  https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/37606740

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胡塞尔现象学和笛卡尔、康德

知乎 多特姚 北京大学 外国哲学博士

现象学作为 20 世纪哲学的一股思潮，影响深远。

最近在看小枫师的访谈，小枫师就提到了自己方法论的现象学内核。

“现代学” 不是一门 “学科”，而是社会理论中的一种思想行动，就像哲学中的现象学，显然不等于哲学 “学科”，或者，对哲学也还有别的理解，但现象学宣称，哲学应该是现象学的思想行动，这与分析哲学的哲学宣称没有分别。我所谓的 “现代学”，不过是说，社会理论应该是关于现代现象的思想行动，这种思想行动由具体的社会科学和人文科学各个学科的理论研究来支撑，但他自身不是其中的某一学科 (如社会学)。对于何谓社会理论，自然还有别的说法。比如西方马克思主义就把社会理论看作批判理论。社会理论即 “现代学”，只是我的理解而已。就思想的负担来讲，“现代学” 承载的的确比社会科学和人文科学各个学科所承负的多得多。这不是出于方法论或知识文献的考虑，而是出于思想行动的考虑。

……

我做学术思想史的方法论原则是，从现代性问题出发，以现象学的直观方法研究思想学术史。“带着问题学，活学活用”，这话对做学问一点不错，所谓切问近思。没有问题，研究思想学术史往往不得要领，我没有兴趣。无论中西方的思想学术史，我都是从问题出发。我钦佩的思想史家是洛维特、伯林，中国的思想史家是蒙文通、顾颉刚。尽管方法和思想立场不同，他们都是从问题出发，因而有所推进和发明。我对思想通史癖没有好感。有人问我，为何不写一部基督教思想史，我说，我会写，但不是通史 (包括断代通史)，而是点观史。思想学术史有如大海，我不想描绘大海的全景，而是要下海捞点东西。这必需先有自己的问题，不然就不知捞什么。

刘小枫 吴伯凡 | 关于《现代性社会理论绪论》的对谈

20 世纪有重大影响的欧陆哲学家或多或少都从胡塞尔那里偷师了一点现象学的方法，比如海德格尔和萨特，但他们也不是拿来就用，而是或多或少对现象学进行了改造，比如海德格尔的解释学现象学，只是意向性这个现象学的核心部分没有变。

现象学本身是一种方法，转化了形而上学传统的论题 “主客体二分 “，把这个问题变成了对象符不符合我们的意识。但这个对象和主体的互动，就不再是知觉刺激了，在胡塞尔那里，我们要通过还原的方法，把对象还原成一般本质、也就是 reell 的东西来被给予。

相对于康德，胡塞尔的路数更偏笛卡尔，笛卡尔通过普遍怀疑的方法要找出一个清晰自明的第一原则，也就是 “我思 “。Roughly speaking，胡塞尔对于笛卡尔的推进就是细化了这个” 我思 “的意识结构，除了笛卡尔的 ego 和 cogito，“先验自我”“我思” 胡塞尔加入了一个 cogitatum “我思之物”，cogitatum 作为 ego 的对应物，两者以 cogito 作为载体，三位一体，三者也是先验还原的最后结果，三者构成纯粹意识。

现象学的问题就在于如何使得我们主观构造的对象具有客观有效性。人的主观意识作为世界的一个部分如何能够同时又是整个世界的呈现的前提条件？

胡塞尔随后认识到这个悖论是由于没有对经验意识与先验意识进行严格区分造成的，而先验现象学还原的目的就是进行这种区分。

所以这个时候胡塞尔又是很康德式的，这个纯粹意识里的先验自我 ego/Ich 要作为经验意识的前提出现，相对于康德那里的先验统觉。虽然康德在《纯粹理性批判》里没有提到意向性，但是先验统觉作为 “自我” 和 “世界 / 对象 “的同一，已经有意向性的萌芽了。胡塞尔的” 先验自我 “通过悬搁 / 打括号的方式，悬置了所有” 自然态度 Einstellung“而来，这个” 先验自我 “是自我体验式的，本身要包含” 内容 “（在和生活世界的关系中取得内容)，而康德的” 先验自我 “是一个先天设定，仅仅作为形式主体出现。

最后碎碎念两句，《现象学的观念》五个讲座虽然很薄，但是好多东西都没涉及到，比如还原里的 eidetische Reduktion，还有后期的超越现象学（也就是跟康德类似的地方）

要读胡塞尔的话还是从 Ideen I 开始读起，篇幅比较长，但是核心观念都解释到了。

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via：

• 胡塞尔现象学和笛卡尔、康德 - 知乎 多特姚 北京大学 外国哲学博士 发布于 2020-03-01 23:22

  https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/110209019