科学与伪科学

注：机翻，未校。

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Science and Pseudo-Science

First published Wed Sep 3, 2008; substantive revision Thu May 20, 2021

The demarcation between science and pseudoscience is part of the larger task of determining which beliefs are epistemically warranted. This entry clarifies the specific nature of pseudoscience in relation to other categories of non-scientific doctrines and practices, including science denial(ism) and resistance to the facts. The major proposed demarcation criteria for pseudo-science are discussed and some of their weaknesses are pointed out. There is much more agreement on particular cases of demarcation than on the general criteria that such judgments should be based upon. This is an indication that there is still much important philosophical work to be done on the demarcation between science and pseudoscience.
科学和伪科学之间的界限是确定哪些信念在认识论上是有根据的更大任务的一部分。该条目阐明了伪科学相对于其他类别的非科学教义和实践的具体性质，包括科学否认（主义）和对事实的抵制。讨论了伪科学的主要拟议划分标准，并指出了它们的一些弱点。与此类判断应基于的一般标准相比，对特定划分案例的共识要多得多。这表明，在科学和伪科学之间的界限上，还有很多重要的哲学工作要做。

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1. The purpose of demarcations 1. 划界的目的

Demarcations of science from pseudoscience can be made for both theoretical and practical reasons (Mahner 2007, 516). From a theoretical point of view, the demarcation issue is an illuminating perspective that contributes to the philosophy of science in much the same way that the study of fallacies contributes to our knowledge of informal logic and rational argumentation. From a practical point of view, the distinction is important for decision guidance in both private and public life. Since science is our most reliable source of knowledge in a wide range of areas, we need to distinguish scientific knowledge from its look-alikes. Due to the high status of science in present-day society, attempts to exaggerate the scientific status of various claims, teachings, and products are common enough to make the demarcation issue pressing in many areas. The demarcation issue is therefore important in practical applications such as the following:
出于理论和实践原因，可以区分科学与伪科学（Mahner 2007,516）。从理论的角度来看，划分问题是一个具有启发性的观点，它对科学哲学的贡献与对谬误的研究对我们非正式逻辑和理性论证的理解的贡献大致相同。从实际的角度来看，这种区别对于私人和公共生活中的决策指导都很重要。由于科学是我们在广泛领域最可靠的知识来源，因此我们需要将科学知识与其相似之处区分开来。由于科学在当今社会的崇高地位，试图夸大各种主张、教义和产品的科学地位的企图非常普遍，这使得划界问题在许多领域都迫在眉睫。因此，划分问题在实际应用中非常重要，例如：

• Climate policy: The scientific consensus on ongoing anthropogenic climate change leaves no room for reasonable doubt (Cook et al. 2016; Powell 2019). Science denial has considerably delayed climate action, and it is still one of the major factors that impede efficient measures to reduce climate change (Oreskes and Conway 2010; Lewandowsky et al. 2019). Decision-makers and the public need to know how to distinguish between competent climate science and science-mimicking disinformation on the climate.
  气候政策：关于持续的人为气候变化的科学共识没有留下合理怀疑的余地（Cook 等人，2016 年;Powell 2019 年）。科学否认大大延迟了气候行动，它仍然是阻碍有效措施减少气候变化的主要因素之一（Oreskes 和 Conway，2010 年;Lewandowsky 等人，2019 年）。决策者和公众需要知道如何区分称职的气候科学和模仿科学的气候虚假信息。
• Environmental policies: In order to be on the safe side against potential disasters it may be legitimate to take preventive measures when there is valid but yet insufficient evidence of an environmental hazard. This must be distinguished from taking measures against an alleged hazard for which there is no valid evidence at all. Therefore, decision-makers in environmental policy must be able to distinguish between scientific and pseudoscientific claims.
  环境政策：为了安全应对潜在的灾难，当有有效但不足的环境危害证据时，采取预防措施可能是合法的。这必须与针对根本没有有效证据的所谓危险采取措施区分开来。因此，环境政策的决策者必须能够区分科学和伪科学的主张。
• Healthcare: Medical science develops and evaluates treatments according to evidence of their effectiveness and safety. Pseudoscientific activities in this area give rise to ineffective and sometimes dangerous interventions. Healthcare providers, insurers, government authorities and – most importantly – patients need guidance on how to distinguish between medical science and medical pseudoscience.
  医疗保健：医学根据其有效性和安全性的证据开发和评估治疗方法。该领域的伪科学活动导致了无效的、有时是危险的干预措施。医疗保健提供者、保险公司、政府机构，最重要的是，患者需要有关如何区分医学科学和医学伪科学的指导。
• Expert testimony: It is essential for the rule of law that courts get the facts right. The reliability of different types of evidence must be correctly determined, and expert testimony must be based on the best available knowledge. Sometimes it is in the interest of litigants to present non-scientific claims as solid science. Therefore courts must be able to distinguish between science and pseudoscience. Philosophers have often had prominent roles in the defence of science against pseudoscience in such contexts. (Pennock 2011)
  专家证词：法院正确处理事实对法治至关重要。必须正确确定不同类型证据的可靠性，专家证词必须基于现有的最佳知识。有时，将非科学的主张作为可靠的科学提出符合诉讼当事人的利益。因此，法院必须能够区分科学和伪科学。在这种情况下，哲学家在捍卫科学反对伪科学方面经常发挥重要作用。（彭诺克 2011 年）
• Science education: The promoters of some pseudosciences (notably creationism) try to introduce their teachings in school curricula. Teachers and school authorities need to have clear criteria of inclusion that protect students against unreliable and disproved teachings.
  科学教育：一些伪科学（特别是神创论）的推动者试图在学校课程中引入他们的教义。教师和学校当局需要有明确的包容标准，以保护学生免受不可靠和反驳的教义的影响。
• Journalism: When there is scientific uncertainty, or relevant disagreement in the scientific community, this should be covered and explained in media reports on the issues in question. Equally importantly, differences of opinion between on the one hand legitimate scientific experts and on the other hand proponents of scientifically unsubstantiated claims should be described as what they are. Public understanding of topics such as climate change and vaccination has been considerably hampered by organised campaigns that succeeded in making media portray standpoints that have been thoroughly disproved in science as legitimate scientific standpoints (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; Boykoff 2008). The media need tools and practices to distinguish between legitimate scientific controversies and attempts to peddle pseudoscientific claims as science.
  新闻：当科学界存在科学不确定性或相关分歧时，应在有关问题的媒体报道中予以报道和解释。同样重要的是，合法的科学专家和未经科学证实的主张的支持者之间的意见分歧应该被描述为他们是什么。公众对气候变化和疫苗接种等话题的理解受到了有组织的运动的极大阻碍，这些运动成功地使媒体将已在科学中彻底反驳的观点描绘成合法的科学立场（Boykoff 和 Boykoff 2004;Boykoff 2008 年）。媒体需要工具和实践来区分合法的科学争议和试图将伪科学主张兜售为科学的企图。

Attempts to define what we today call science have a long history, and the roots of the demarcation problem have sometimes been traced back to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (Laudan 1983). Cicero’s arguments for dismissing certain methods of divination in his De divinatione has considerable similarities with modern criteria for the demarcation of science (Fernandez-Beanato 2020). However it was not until the 20th century that influential definitions of science have contrasted it against pseudoscience. Philosophical work on the demarcation problem seems to have waned after Laudan’s (1983) much noted death certificate according to which there is no hope of finding a necessary and sufficient criterion of something as heterogeneous as scientific methodology. In more recent years, the problem has been revitalized. Philosophers attesting to its vitality maintain that the concept can be clarified by other means than necessary and sufficient criteria (Pigliucci 2013; Mahner 2013) or that such a definition is indeed possible although it has to be supplemented with discipline-specific criteria in order to become fully operative (Hansson 2013).
定义我们今天所说的科学的尝试由来已久，划分问题的根源有时可以追溯到亚里士多德的后验分析（Laudan 1983）。西塞罗在他的 De divinatione 中驳斥某些占卜方法的论点与现代科学划分标准有相当大的相似之处（Fernandez-Beanato 2020）。然而，直到 20 世纪，有影响力的科学定义才将其与伪科学进行了对比。在 Laudan（1983 年）广为人知的死亡证明之后，关于划界问题的哲学工作似乎已经减弱了，根据该证明，没有希望找到像科学方法这样异质的必要和充分的标准。近年来，这个问题又重新出现了。证明其生命力的哲学家坚持认为，除了必要和充分的标准之外，还可以通过其他方式来澄清这个概念（Pigliucci 2013;Mahner 2013），或者这样的定义确实是可能的，尽管它必须补充特定学科的标准才能完全发挥作用（Hansson 2013）。

2. The “science” of pseudoscience 2. 伪科学的“科学”

The Latin word “pseudoscientia” was used already in the first half of the 17th century in discussions about the relationship between religion and empirical investigations (Guldentops 2020, 288n). The oldest known use of the English word “pseudoscience” dates from 1796, when the historian James Pettit Andrew referred to alchemy as a “fantastical pseudo-science” (Oxford English Dictionary). The word has been in frequent use since the 1880s (Thurs and Numbers 2013). Throughout its history the word has had a clearly defamatory meaning (Laudan 1983, 119; Dolby 1987, 204). It would be as strange for someone to proudly describe her own activities as pseudoscience as to boast that they are bad science. Since the derogatory connotation is an essential characteristic of the word “pseudoscience”, an attempt to extricate a value-free definition of the term would not be meaningful. An essentially value-laden term has to be defined in value-laden terms. This is often difficult since the specification of the value component tends to be controversial.
拉丁语“pseudoscientia”早在 17 世纪上半叶就已经用于讨论宗教与实证研究之间的关系（Guldentops 2020,288n）。英语单词“pseudoscience”已知最古老的使用可以追溯到 1796 年，当时历史学家詹姆斯·佩蒂特·安德鲁 （James Pettit Andrew） 将炼金术称为“奇幻的伪科学”（牛津英语词典）。自 1880 年代以来，这个词一直被频繁使用（Thurs and Numbers 2013）。纵观其历史，这个词具有明显的诽谤含义（Laudan 1983， 119;杜比 1987， 204）。如果有人自豪地将自己的活动描述为伪科学，就像吹嘘它们是坏科学一样奇怪。由于贬义是“伪科学”一词的基本特征，因此试图摆脱该术语的无价值定义是没有意义的。一个本质上充满价值的术语必须用充满价值的术语来定义。这通常很困难，因为 value 组件的规范往往是有争议的。

This problem is not specific to pseudoscience, but follows directly from a parallel but somewhat less conspicuous problem with the concept of science. The common usage of the term “science” can be described as partly descriptive, partly normative. When an activity is recognized as science this usually involves an acknowledgement that it has a positive role in our strivings for knowledge. On the other hand, the concept of science has been formed through a historical process, and many contingencies influence what we call and do not call science. Whether we call a claim, doctrine, or discipline “scientific” depends both on its subject area and its epistemic qualities. The former part of the delimitation is largely conventional, whereas the latter is highly normative, and closely connected with fundamental epistemological and metaphysical issues.
这个问题并不是伪科学所特有的，而是直接源于与科学概念平行但不太明显的问题。“科学”一词的常见用法可以描述为部分描述性，部分规范性。当一项活动被认为是科学时，这通常涉及承认它在我们对知识的追求中发挥着积极作用。另一方面，科学的概念是通过历史过程形成的，许多偶发事件会影响我们所说的科学和不所谓的科学。我们是否称一个主张、教义或学科为“科学的”，既取决于它的主题领域，也取决于它的认识品质。划界的前一部分在很大程度上是约定俗成的，而后者是高度规范性的，并且与基本的认识论和形而上学问题密切相关。

Against this background, in order not to be unduly complex a definition of science has to go in either of two directions. It can focus on the descriptive contents, and specify how the term is actually used. Alternatively, it can focus on the normative element, and clarify the more fundamental meaning of the term. The latter approach has been the choice of most philosophers writing on the subject, and will be at focus here. It involves, of necessity, some degree of idealization in relation to common usage of the term “science”, in particular concerning the delimitation of the subject-area of science.
在这种背景下，为了不过于复杂，科学的定义必须朝着两个方向中的任何一个方向发展。它可以专注于描述性内容，并指定术语的实际使用方式。或者，它可以专注于规范性要素，并澄清该术语的更基本含义。后一种方法是大多数哲学家在撰写有关该主题的文章时的选择，这里将重点介绍。它必然涉及与“科学”一词的普遍用法有关的某种程度的理想化，特别是关于科学学科领域的划分。

The English word “science” is primarily used about the natural sciences and other fields of research that are considered to be similar to them. Hence, political economy and sociology are counted as sciences, whereas studies of literature and history are usually not. The corresponding German word, “Wissenschaft”, has a much broader meaning and includes all the academic specialties, including the humanities. The German term has the advantage of more adequately delimiting the type of systematic knowledge that is at stake in the conflict between science and pseudoscience. The misrepresentations of history presented by Holocaust deniers and other pseudo-historians are very similar in nature to the misrepresentations of natural science promoted by creationists and homeopaths.
英文单词“science”主要用于自然科学和其他被认为与它们相似的研究领域。因此，政治经济学和社会学被视为科学，而文学和历史研究通常不算。相应的德语单词“Wissenschaft”具有更广泛的含义，包括所有学术专业，包括人文学科。这个德语术语的优点是可以更充分地界定在科学与伪科学之间的冲突中处于利害关系的系统知识类型。大屠杀否认者和其他伪历史学家对历史的歪曲在本质上与创造论者和顺势论者所推动的对自然科学的歪曲非常相似。

More importantly, the natural and social sciences and the humanities are all parts of the same human endeavour, namely systematic and critical investigations aimed at acquiring the best possible understanding of the workings of nature, people, and human society. The disciplines that form this community of knowledge disciplines are increasingly interdependent. Since the second half of the 20th century, integrative disciplines such as astrophysics, evolutionary biology, biochemistry, ecology, quantum chemistry, the neurosciences, and game theory have developed at dramatic speed and contributed to tying together previously unconnected disciplines. These increased interconnections have also linked the sciences and the humanities closer to each other, as can be seen for instance from how historical knowledge relies increasingly on advanced scientific analysis of archaeological findings.
更重要的是，自然科学和社会科学以及人文科学都是人类努力的一部分，即旨在获得对自然、人类和人类社会运作的最佳理解的系统和批判性调查。构成这个知识学科社区的学科越来越相互依赖。自 20 世纪下半叶以来，天体物理学、进化生物学、生物化学、生态学、量子化学、神经科学和博弈论等综合学科以惊人的速度发展，并有助于将以前未关联的学科联系在一起。这些日益紧密的相互联系也使科学和人文学科彼此更加紧密地联系在一起，例如，从历史知识如何越来越依赖于对考古发现的高级科学分析中可以看出。

The conflict between science and pseudoscience is best understood with this extended sense of science. On one side of the conflict we find the community of knowledge disciplines that includes the natural and social sciences and the humanities. On the other side we find a wide variety of movements and doctrines, such as creationism, astrology, homeopathy, and Holocaust denialism that are in conflict with results and methods that are generally accepted in the community of knowledge disciplines.
科学与伪科学之间的冲突最好地通过这种扩展的科学意义来理解。在冲突的一方，我们发现了包括自然科学、社会科学和人文科学在内的知识学科社区。另一方面，我们发现各种各样的运动和教义，如神创论、占星术、顺势疗法和大屠杀否认主义，它们与知识学科社区普遍接受的结果和方法相冲突。

Another way to express this is that the demarcation problem has a deeper concern than that of demarcating the selection of human activities that we have for various reasons chosen to call “sciences”. The ultimate issue is “how to determine which beliefs are epistemically warranted” (Fuller 1985, 331). In a wider approach, the sciences are fact-finding practices, i.e., human practices aimed at finding out, as far as possible, how things really are (Hansson 2018). Other examples of fact-finding practices in modern societies are journalism, criminal investigations, and the methods used by mechanics to search for the defect in a malfunctioning machine. Fact-finding practices are also prevalent in indigenous societies, for instance in the forms of traditional agricultural experimentation and the methods used for tracking animal prey (Liebenberg 2013). In this perspective, the demarcation of science is a special case of the delimitation of accurate fact-finding practices. The delimitation between science and pseudoscience has much in common with other delimitations, such as that between accurate and inaccurate journalism and between properly and improperly performed criminal investigations (Hansson 2018).
另一种表达方式是，划界问题比划定我们出于各种原因选择称为“科学”的人类活动的选择更令人担忧。最终问题是“如何确定哪些信念在认识论上是有根据的”（Fuller 1985， 331）。从更广泛的角度来看，科学是事实调查实践，即旨在尽可能了解事物真实情况的人类实践（Hansson 2018）。现代社会事实调查实践的其他例子是新闻、刑事调查以及机械师用来搜索故障机器缺陷的方法。事实调查实践在土著社会也很普遍，例如以传统农业实验的形式和用于追踪动物猎物的方法（Liebenberg 2013）。从这个角度来看，科学的划分是准确事实调查实践划界的一个特例。科学和伪科学之间的界限与其他界限有很多共同之处，例如准确和不准确的新闻以及正确和不当进行的刑事调查之间的界限（Hansson 2018）。

3. The “pseudo” of pseudoscience 3. 伪科学的“伪”

3.1 Non-, un-, and pseudoscience 3.1 非科学、非科学和伪科学

The phrases “demarcation of science” and “demarcation of science from pseudoscience” are often used interchangeably, and many authors seem to have regarded them as equal in meaning. In their view, the task of drawing the outer boundaries of science is essentially the same as that of drawing the boundary between science and pseudoscience.
“Demarkation of science”和“Demarkation of science from pseudoscience”这两个短语经常互换使用，许多作者似乎认为它们在含义上是相等的。在他们看来，划定科学的外部界限的任务与划定科学和伪科学之间的界限的任务本质上是一样的。

This picture is oversimplified. All non-science is not pseudoscience, and science has non-trivial borders to other non-scientific phenomena, such as metaphysics, religion, and various types of non-scientific systematized knowledge. (Mahner (2007, 548) proposed the term “parascience” to cover non-scientific practices that are not pseudoscientific.) Science also has the internal demarcation problem of distinguishing between good and bad science.
这幅图画过于简单化了。所有非科学都不是伪科学，科学与其他非科学现象都有非平凡的边界，例如形而上学、宗教和各种类型的非科学系统化知识。（Mahner （2007， 548） 提出了“超科学”一词来涵盖非伪科学的非科学实践。科学还存在区分好科学和坏科学的内部划分问题。

A comparison of the negated terms related to science can contribute to clarifying the conceptual distinctions. “Unscientific” is a narrower concept than “non-scientific” (not scientific), since the former but not the latter term implies some form of contradiction or conflict with science. “Pseudoscientific” is in its turn a narrower concept than “unscientific”. The latter term differs from the former in covering inadvertent mismeasurements and miscalculations and other forms of bad science performed by scientists who are recognized as trying but failing to produce good science.
比较与科学相关的否定术语有助于澄清概念上的区别。“不科学”是一个比“非科学”（非科学）更狭义的概念，因为前者而不是后者意味着与科学的某种形式的矛盾或冲突。反过来，“伪科学”是一个比“不科学”更狭义的概念。后一个术语与前者的不同之处在于，它涵盖了无意中的测量错误和计算错误，以及由科学家进行的其他形式的不良科学研究，这些科学家被认为是在尝试但未能产生好的科学成果。

Etymology provides us with an obvious starting-point for clarifying what characteristics pseudoscience has in addition to being merely non- or un-scientific. “Pseudo-” (ψευδο-) means false. In accordance with this, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines pseudoscience as follows:
词源学为我们提供了一个明显的起点，可以澄清伪科学除了不仅仅是非科学或非科学之外还有什么特征。“伪-” （ψευδο-） 的意思是假的。据此，牛津英语词典 （OED） 对伪科学的定义如下：

“A pretended or spurious science; a collection of related beliefs about the world mistakenly regarded as being based on scientific method or as having the status that scientific truths now have.”
“一门假装或虚假的科学;关于世界的相关信念的集合，被错误地认为是基于科学方法或具有科学真理现在所具有的地位。

3.2 Non-science posing as science 3.2 伪装成科学的非科学

Many writers on pseudoscience have emphasized that pseudoscience is non-science posing as science. The foremost modern classic on the subject (Gardner 1957) bears the title Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science. According to Brian Baigrie (1988, 438), “[w]hat is objectionable about these beliefs is that they masquerade as genuinely scientific ones.” These and many other authors assume that to be pseudoscientific, an activity or a teaching has to satisfy the following two criteria (Hansson 1996):
许多关于伪科学的作者强调，伪科学是伪科学的非科学。关于该主题最重要的现代经典（Gardner 1957）的标题是《以科学之名的时尚与谬误》。根据 Brian Baigrie （1988， 438） 的说法，“这些信念令人反感的是，它们伪装成真正的科学信念。这些作者和许多其他作者都认为，要成为伪科学，一项活动或教学必须满足以下两个标准（Hansson 1996）：

• (1) it is not scientific, and 它不科学，而且

• (2) its major proponents try to create the impression that it is scientific. 它的主要支持者试图给人一种它是科学的印象。

The former of the two criteria is central to the concerns of the philosophy of science. Its precise meaning has been the subject of important controversies among philosophers, to be discussed below in Section 4. The second criterion has been less discussed by philosophers, but it needs careful treatment not least since many discussions of pseudoscience (in and out of philosophy) have been confused due to insufficient attention to it. Proponents of pseudoscience often attempt to mimic science by arranging conferences, journals, and associations that share many of the superficial characteristics of science, but do not satisfy its quality criteria. Naomi Oreskes (2019) called this phenomenon “facsimile science”. Blancke and coworkers (2017) called it “cultural mimicry of science”.
这两个标准中的前者是科学哲学关注的核心。它的确切含义一直是哲学家之间重要争论的主题，将在下面的第 4 节中讨论。哲学家们较少讨论第二个标准，但它需要仔细对待，尤其是因为许多关于伪科学的讨论（哲学内外）由于对它的关注不足而被混淆了。伪科学的支持者经常试图通过安排会议、期刊和协会来模仿科学，这些会议、期刊和协会具有科学的许多肤浅特征，但不符合其质量标准。Naomi Oreskes （2019） 将这种现象称为“摹本科学”。Blancke 及其同事 （2017） 称其为“科学的文化模仿”。

3.3 The doctrinal component 3.3 教义成分

An immediate problem with the definition based on (1) and (2) is that it is too wide. There are phenomena that satisfy both criteria but are not commonly called pseudoscientific. One of the clearest examples of this is fraud in science. This is a practice that has a high degree of scientific pretence and yet does not comply with science, thus satisfying both criteria. Nevertheless, fraud in otherwise legitimate branches of science is seldom if ever called “pseudoscience”. The reason for this can be clarified with the following hypothetical examples (Hansson 1996).
基于 （1） 和 （2） 的定义的一个直接问题是它太宽泛了。有些现象同时满足这两个标准，但通常不被称为伪科学。最明显的例子之一是科学中的欺诈。这是一种具有高度科学伪装但不符合科学的做法，因此满足这两个标准。然而，在其他合法的科学分支中的欺诈行为很少被称为“伪科学”。其原因可以通过以下假设示例（Hansson 1996）来阐明。

Case 1: A biochemist performs an experiment that she interprets as showing that a particular protein has an essential role in muscle contraction. There is a consensus among her colleagues that the result is a mere artefact, due to experimental error.
案例 1：一位生物化学家进行了一项实验，她将其解释为表明特定蛋白质在肌肉收缩中起着重要作用。她的同事们一致认为，由于实验错误，结果只是人为的产物。

Case 2: A biochemist goes on performing one sloppy experiment after the other. She consistently interprets them as showing that a particular protein has a role in muscle contraction not accepted by other scientists.
案例 2：一位生物化学家继续进行一个又一个草率的实验。她一直将它们解释为表明某种特定蛋白质在肌肉收缩中的作用，而其他科学家却没有接受。

Case 3: A biochemist performs various sloppy experiments in different areas. One is the experiment referred to in case 1. Much of her work is of the same quality. She does not propagate any particular unorthodox theory.
案例 3：生物化学家在不同领域进行各种草率的实验。一个是案例 1 中提到的实验。她的大部分作品都具有相同的质量。她不传播任何特定的非正统理论。

According to common usage, 1 and 3 are regarded as cases of bad science, and only 2 as a case of pseudoscience. What is present in case 2, but absent in the other two, is a deviant doctrine. Isolated breaches of the requirements of science are not commonly regarded as pseudoscientific. Pseudoscience, as it is commonly conceived, involves a sustained effort to promote standpoints different from those that have scientific legitimacy at the time.
根据通常的用法，1 和 3 被认为是坏科学的案例，只有 2 被认为是伪科学的案例。在案例 2 中存在但在其他两个案例中不存在的，是一个离经叛道的教义。孤立地违反科学要求通常不被视为伪科学。正如通常所设想的那样，伪科学涉及持续的努力，以促进与当时具有科学合法性的立场不同的立场。

This explains why fraud in science is not usually regarded as pseudoscientific. Such practices are not in general associated with a deviant or unorthodox doctrine. To the contrary, the fraudulent scientist is usually anxious that her results be in conformity with the predictions of established scientific theories. Deviations from these would lead to a much higher risk of disclosure.
这就解释了为什么科学中的欺诈通常不被视为伪科学。这种做法通常与偏离或非正统的教义无关。相反，欺诈科学家通常担心她的结果与既定科学理论的预测一致。偏离这些将导致更高的披露风险。

The term “science” has both an individuated and an unindividuated sense. In the individuated sense, biochemistry and astronomy are different sciences, one of which includes studies of muscle proteins and the other studies of supernovae. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines this sense of science as “a particular branch of knowledge or study; a recognized department of learning”. In the unindividuated sense, the study of muscle proteins and that of supernovae are parts of “one and the same” science. In the words of the OED, unindividuated science is “the kind of knowledge or intellectual activity of which the various ‘sciences‘ are examples”.
“科学”一词既有个性化也有非个性化。从个人意义上讲，生物化学和天文学是不同的科学，其中一门包括肌肉蛋白的研究，另一门包括超新星的研究。牛津英语词典 （OED） 将这种科学含义定义为“知识或研究的特定分支;公认的学习部门”。在非个体意义上，肌肉蛋白质的研究和超新星的研究是“同一”科学的一部分。用 OED 的话来说，非个体科学是“各种’科学’就是例子的那种知识或智力活动”。

Pseudoscience is an antithesis of science in the individuated rather than the unindividuated sense. There is no unified corpus of pseudoscience corresponding to the corpus of science. For a phenomenon to be pseudoscientific, it must belong to one or the other of the particular pseudosciences. In order to accommodate this feature, the above definition can be modified by replacing (2) by the following (Hansson 1996):
伪科学是个体化而不是非个体意义上的科学的对立面。没有与科学语料库相对应的统一伪科学语料库。一个现象要成为伪科学，它必须属于特定的伪科学之一。为了适应此功能，可以通过将 （2） 替换为以下内容来修改上述定义 （Hansson 1996）：

• (2′) it is part of a non-scientific doctrine whose major proponents try to create the impression that it is scientific. 它是非科学学说的一部分，其主要支持者试图制造它是科学的印象。

Most philosophers of science, and most scientists, prefer to regard science as constituted by methods of inquiry rather than by particular doctrines. There is an obvious tension between (2′) and this conventional view of science. This, however, may be as it should since pseudoscience often involves a representation of science as a closed and finished doctrine rather than as a methodology for open-ended inquiry.
大多数科学哲学家和大多数科学家都喜欢将科学视为由探究方法构成，而不是由特定的教条构成。（2′） 和这种传统的科学观之间存在明显的紧张关系。然而，这可能是应该的，因为伪科学通常涉及将科学表示为一种封闭的、已完成的教义，而不是一种开放式探究的方法。

3.4 A wider sense of pseudoscience 3.4 更广泛的伪科学

Sometimes the term “pseudoscience” is used in a wider sense than that which is captured in the definition constituted of (1) and (2′). Contrary to (2′), doctrines that conflict with science are sometimes called “pseudoscientific” in spite of not being advanced as scientific. Hence, Grove (1985, 219) included among the pseudoscientific doctrines those that “purport to offer alternative accounts to those of science or claim to explain what science cannot explain.” Similarly, Lugg (1987, 227–228) maintained that “the clairvoyant’s predictions are pseudoscientific whether or not they are correct”, despite the fact that most clairvoyants do not profess to be practitioners of science. In this sense, pseudoscience is assumed to include not only doctrines contrary to science proclaimed to be scientific but doctrines contrary to science tout court, whether or not they are put forward in the name of science. Arguably, the crucial issue is not whether something is called “science” but whether it is claimed to have the function of science, namely to provide the most reliable information about its subject-matter. To cover this wider sense of pseudoscience, (2′) can be modified as follows (Hansson 1996, 2013):
有时，“伪科学”一词的使用范围比 （1） 和 （2′） 定义的含义更广泛。与 （2′） 相反，与科学相冲突的学说有时被称为“伪科学”，尽管它们没有被提升为科学。因此，格罗夫 （1985， 219） 将那些“声称提供与科学不同的解释或声称解释科学无法解释的东西”的伪科学学说包括在内。同样，Lugg （1987， 227-228） 坚持认为“千里眼的预测无论是否正确都是伪科学的”，尽管大多数千里眼并不自称是科学的实践者。从这个意义上说，伪科学被假定不仅包括与科学相悖的被宣布为科学的教义，还包括与科学相悖的教义，无论它们是否以科学的名义提出。可以说，关键问题不在于某物是否被称为“科学”，而在于它是否声称具有科学的功能，即提供有关其主题的最可靠信息。为了涵盖这种更广泛的伪科学含义，（2′） 可以修改如下（Hansson 1996， 2013）：

• (2″) it is part of a doctrine whose major proponents try to create the impression that it represents the most reliable knowledge on its subject matter. 它是学说的一部分，其主要支持者试图给人一种印象，即它代表了关于其主题的最可靠知识。

Common usage seems to vacillate between the definitions (1)+(2′) and (1)+(2″); and this in an interesting way: In their comments on the meaning of the term, critics of pseudoscience tend to endorse a definition close to (1)+(2′), but their actual usage is often closer to (1)+(2″).
常见的用法似乎在定义 （1）+（2′） 和 （1）+（2“） 之间摇摆不定;而且以一种有趣的方式：在他们对术语含义的评论中，伪科学的批评者倾向于支持接近 （1）+（2′） 的定义，但他们的实际用法通常更接近 （1）+（2）。

The following examples serve to illustrate the difference between the two definitions and also to clarify why clause (1) is needed:
以下示例用于说明两个定义之间的差异，并阐明为什么需要第 （1） 条：

1. A creationist book gives a correct account of the structure of DNA.
   一本创造论的书对 DNA 的结构给出了正确的解释。
2. An otherwise reliable chemistry book gives an incorrect account of the structure of DNA.
   一本可靠的化学书对 DNA 的结构给出了不正确的描述。
3. A creationist book denies that the human species shares common ancestors with other primates.
   一本创造论的书否认人类物种与其他灵长类动物有共同的祖先。
4. A preacher who denies that science can be trusted also denies that the human species shares common ancestors with other primates.
   一个否认科学可以信任的传教士也否认人类物种与其他灵长类动物有共同的祖先。

(a) does not satisfy (1), and is therefore not pseudoscientific on either account. (b) satisfies (1) but neither (2′) nor (2″) and is therefore not pseudoscientific on either account. © satisfies all three criteria, (1), (2′), and (2″), and is therefore pseudoscientific on both accounts. Finally, (d) satisfies (1) and (2″) and is therefore pseudoscientific according to (1)+(2″) but not according to (1)+(2′). As the last two examples illustrate, pseudoscience and anti-science are sometimes difficult to distinguish. Promoters of some pseudosciences (notably homeopathy) tend to be ambiguous between opposition to science and claims that they themselves represent the best science.
（a） 不满足 （1），因此在任何一个方面都不是伪科学。（b） 满足 （1） 但既不满足 （2′） 也不满足 （2“） ，因此在任何一个方面都不是伪科学。（c） 满足所有三个标准，（1）、（2′） 和 （2“），因此在这两个方面都是伪科学的。最后，（d） 满足 （1） 和 （2“） ，因此根据 （1）+（2”） 是伪科学的，但根据 （1）+（2′） 不是。正如最后两个例子所说明的，伪科学和反科学有时很难区分。一些伪科学（尤其是顺势疗法）的推动者往往在反对科学和声称它们本身代表最好的科学之间模棱两可。

3.5 The objects of demarcation 3.5 标界对象

Various proposals have been put forward on exactly what elements in science or pseudoscience criteria of demarcation should be applied to. Proposals include that the demarcation should refer to a research program (Lakatos 1974a, 248–249), an epistemic field or cognitive discipline, i.e. a group of people with common knowledge aims, and their practices (Bunge 1982, 2001; Mahner 2007), a theory (Popper 1962, 1974), a practice (Lugg 1992; Morris 1987), a scientific problem or question (Siitonen 1984), and a particular inquiry (Kuhn 1974; Mayo 1996). It is probably fair to say that demarcation criteria can be meaningfully applied on each of these levels of description. A much more difficult problem is whether one of these levels is the fundamental level to which assessments on the other levels are reducible. However, it should be noted that appraisals on different levels may be interdefinable. For instance, it is not an unreasonable assumption that a pseudoscientific doctrine is one that contains pseudoscientific statements as its core or defining claims. Conversely, a pseudoscientific statement may be characterized in terms of being endorsed by a pseudoscientific doctrine but not by legitimate scientific accounts of the same subject area.
关于科学或伪科学的划分标准应该应用于哪些要素，已经提出了各种建议。建议包括划分应指一个研究项目（Lakatos 1974a，248-249），一个认识领域或认知学科，即一群具有共同知识目标的人，以及他们的实践（Bunge 1982,2001;Mahner 2007）、一种理论（Popper 1962、1974）、一种实践（Lugg 1992;Morris 1987）、科学问题或疑问 （Siitonen 1984） 和特定探究 （Kuhn 1974;Mayo 1996 年）。可以公平地说，划分标准可以有意义地应用于这些描述级别中的每一个。一个更困难的问题是，这些级别中的一个是否是其他级别的评估可以简化到的基本级别。但是，应该注意的是，不同级别的评估可能是可以相互定义的。例如，伪科学学说是以伪科学陈述作为其核心或定义性主张的学说，这并不是一个不合理的假设。相反，伪科学陈述的特征可能是被伪科学学说所认可，而不是被同一主题领域的合法科学描述所认可。

Derksen (1993) differs from most other writers on the subject in placing the emphasis in demarcation on the pseudoscientist, i.e. the individual person conducting pseudoscience. His major argument for this is that pseudoscience has scientific pretensions, and such pretensions are associated with a person, not a theory, practice or entire field. However, as was noted by Settle (1971), it is the rationality and critical attitude built into institutions, rather than the personal intellectual traits of individuals, that distinguishes science from non-scientific practices such as magic. The individual practitioner of magic in a pre-literate society is not necessarily less rational than the individual scientist in modern Western society. What she lacks is an intellectual environment of collective rationality and mutual criticism. “It is almost a fallacy of division to insist on each individual scientist being critically-minded” (Settle 1971, 174).
Derksen （1993） 与大多数其他关于该主题的作者不同，它强调划分伪科学家，即进行伪科学的个人。他对此的主要论点是，伪科学具有科学的自命不凡，而这种自命不凡与一个人有关，而不是与理论、实践或整个领域有关。然而，正如 Settle （1971） 所指出的，将科学与魔术等非科学实践区分开来的是制度中内置的理性和批判态度，而不是个人的个人智力特征。在未识字的社会中，个体魔法实践者不一定比现代西方社会中的个体科学家更理性。她缺乏的是一个集体理性和相互批评的知识环境。“坚持每个科学家都具有批判性思维几乎是一种分裂的谬误”（Settle 1971， 174）。

3.6 A time-bound demarcation 3.6 有时限的划分

Some authors have maintained that the demarcation between science and pseudoscience must be timeless. If this were true, then it would be contradictory to label something as pseudoscience at one but not another point in time. Hence, after showing that creationism is in some respects similar to some doctrines from the early 18th century, one author maintained that “if such an activity was describable as science then, there is a cause for describing it as science now” (Dolby 1987, 207). This argument is based on a fundamental misconception of science. It is an essential feature of science that it methodically strives for improvement through empirical testing, intellectual criticism, and the exploration of new terrain. A standpoint or theory cannot be scientific unless it relates adequately to this process of improvement, which means as a minimum that well-founded rejections of previous scientific standpoints are accepted. The practical demarcation of science cannot be timeless, for the simple reason that science itself is not timeless.
一些作者坚持认为，科学和伪科学之间的界限必须是永恒的。如果这是真的，那么在一个时间点给某件事贴上伪科学的标签，而不是另一个时间点，那将是自相矛盾的。因此，在证明神创论在某些方面类似于 18 世纪初的一些教义之后，一位作者坚持认为“如果这样的活动当时可以被描述为科学，那么现在有理由将其描述为科学”（杜比 1987,207）。这一论点基于对科学的根本误解。科学的一个基本特征是，它通过实证检验、智力批评和对新领域的探索有条不紊地寻求改进。除非一个立场或理论与这个改进过程充分相关，否则它不可能是科学的，这意味着至少要接受对先前科学立场的有根据的拒绝。科学的实际划分不可能是永恒的，原因很简单，科学本身并不是永恒的。

Nevertheless, the mutability of science is one of the factors that renders the demarcation between science and pseudoscience difficult. Derksen (1993, 19) rightly pointed out three major reasons why demarcation is sometimes difficult: science changes over time, science is heterogenous, and established science itself is not free of the defects characteristic of pseudoscience.
然而，科学的可变性是使科学和伪科学之间难以区分的因素之一。Derksen （1993， 19） 正确地指出了划分有时困难的三个主要原因：科学会随着时间的推移而变化，科学是异质的，以及既定科学本身并非没有伪科学的缺陷特征。

4. Alternative demarcation criteria 4. 替代划分标准

Philosophical discussions on the demarcation of pseudoscience have usually focused on the normative issue, i.e. the missing scientific quality of pseudoscience (rather than on its attempt to mimic science. One option is to base the demarcation on the fundamental function that science shares with other fact-finding processes, namely to provide us with the most reliable information about its subject-matter that is currently available. This could lead to the specification of critierion (1) from Section 3.2 as follows:
关于伪科学划分的哲学讨论通常集中在规范性问题上，即伪科学缺失的科学品质（而不是它试图模仿科学。一种选择是将划分建立在科学与其他事实调查过程共享的基本功能的基础上，即为我们提供关于其主题的当前可用的最可靠信息。这可能导致第 3.2 节中标准 （1） 的规范如下：

• (1′) it is at variance with the most reliable knowledge about its subject matter that is currently available. 它与目前可用的关于其主题的最可靠知识存在差异。

This definition has the advantages of (i) being applicable across disciplines with highly different methodologies and (ii) allowing for a statement to be pseudoscientific at present although it was not so in an earlier period (or, although less commonly, the other way around). (Hansson 2013) At the same time it removes the practical determination whether a statement or doctrine is pseudoscientific from the purview of armchair philosophy to that of scientists specialized in the subject-matter that the statement or doctrine relates to. Philosophers have usually opted for demarcation criteria that appear not to require specialized knowledge in the pertinent subject area.
这个定义的优点是 （i） 适用于方法截然不同的学科，并且 （ii） 允许一个陈述在目前是伪科学的，尽管在早期并非如此（或者，尽管不太常见，反之亦然）。（汉森 2013 年）同时，它消除了一个陈述或学说是否是伪科学的实际决定，从扶手椅哲学的职权范围到专门研究该陈述或学说所涉主题的科学家的职权范围。哲学家通常选择似乎不需要相关学科领域专业知识的划分标准。

4.1 The logical positivists 4.1 逻辑实证主义者

Around 1930, the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle developed various verificationist approaches to science. The basic idea was that a scientific statement could be distinguished from a metaphysical statement by being at least in principle possible to verify. This standpoint was associated with the view that the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification (see the section on Verificationism in the entry on the Vienna Circle). This proposal has often been included in accounts of the demarcation between science and pseudoscience. However, this is not historically quite accurate since the verificationist proposals had the aim of solving a distinctly different demarcation problem, namely that between science and metaphysics.
1930 年左右，维也纳圈的逻辑实证主义者发展了各种验证主义的科学方法。基本思想是，科学陈述与形而上学的陈述可以区分，至少在原则上是可以验证的。这种立场与这样一种观点有关，即命题的意义是它的验证方法。这个提议经常被包含在科学和伪科学之间的界限中。然而，这在历史上并不完全准确，因为验证主义者的提议旨在解决一个截然不同的划分问题，即科学和形而上学之间的划分问题。

4.2 Falsificationism 4.2 证伪主义

Karl Popper described the demarcation problem as the “key to most of the fundamental problems in the philosophy of science” (Popper 1962, 42). He rejected verifiability as a criterion for a scientific theory or hypothesis to be scientific, rather than pseudoscientific or metaphysical. Instead he proposed as a criterion that the theory be falsifiable, or more precisely that “statements or systems of statements, in order to be ranked as scientific, must be capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable observations” (Popper 1962, 39).
卡尔·波普尔将划分问题描述为“科学哲学中大多数基本问题的关键”（波普尔 1962,42）。他拒绝将可验证性作为科学理论或假设是科学的标准，而不是伪科学或形而上学的标准。相反，他提出理论是可证伪的，或者更准确地说，“为了被列为科学的陈述或陈述系统，必须能够与可能的或可以想象的观察相冲突”（波普尔 1962,39）。

Popper presented this proposal as a way to draw the line between statements belonging to the empirical sciences and “all other statements – whether they are of a religious or of a metaphysical character, or simply pseudoscientific” (Popper 1962, 39; cf. Popper 1974, 981). This was both an alternative to the logical positivists’ verification criteria and a criterion for distinguishing between science and pseudoscience. Although Popper did not emphasize the distinction, these are of course two different issues (Bartley 1968). Popper conceded that metaphysical statements may be “far from meaningless” (1974, 978–979) but showed no such appreciation of pseudoscientific statements.
波普尔提出这个提议，作为一种在属于实证科学的陈述和“所有其他陈述——无论它们是宗教的还是形而上学的，或者只是伪科学的陈述”之间划清界限的方法（波普尔 1962,39;参见波普尔 1974,981）。这既是逻辑实证主义者验证标准的替代方案，也是区分科学和伪科学的标准。虽然波普尔没有强调这种区别，但这当然是两个不同的问题（Bartley 1968）。波普尔承认，形而上学的陈述可能“远非毫无意义”（1974,978-979），但没有表现出对伪科学陈述的这种欣赏。

Popper’s demarcation criterion has been criticized both for excluding legitimate science (Hansson 2006) and for giving some pseudosciences the status of being scientific (Agassi 1991; Mahner 2007, 518–519). Strictly speaking, his criterion excludes the possibility that there can be a pseudoscientific claim that is refutable. According to Larry Laudan (1983, 121), it “has the untoward consequence of countenancing as ‘scientific’ every crank claim which makes ascertainably false assertions”. Astrology, rightly taken by Popper as an unusually clear example of a pseudoscience, has in fact been tested and thoroughly refuted (Culver and Ianna 1988; Carlson 1985). Similarly, the major threats to the scientific status of psychoanalysis, another of his major targets, do not come from claims that it is untestable but from claims that it has been tested and failed the tests.
波普尔的划分标准受到批评，因为它排除了合法的科学（Hansson 2006），也给了一些伪科学科学科学的地位（Agassi 1991;Mahner 2007， 518-519）。严格来说，他的标准排除了可能存在可反驳的伪科学主张的可能性。根据 Larry Laudan （1983， 121） 的说法，它“具有不愉快的后果，即支持每一个做出确定性错误断言的胡思乱想的主张都是’科学的’”。占星术被波普尔正确地视为伪科学的一个异常明显的例子，实际上已经被测试和彻底驳斥（Culver 和 Ianna 1988;Carlson 1985 年）。同样，对精神分析的科学地位的主要威胁，也是他的另一个主要目标，不是来自它无法测试的说法，而是来自它已经经过测试但未通过测试的说法。

Defenders of Popper have claimed that this criticism relies on an uncharitable interpretation of his ideas. They claim that he should not be interpreted as meaning that falsifiability is a sufficient condition for demarcating science. Some passages seem to suggest that he takes it as only a necessary condition (Feleppa 1990, 142). Other passages suggest that for a theory to be scientific, Popper requires (in addition to falsifiability) that energetic attempts are made to put the theory to test and that negative outcomes of the tests are accepted (Cioffi 1985, 14–16). A falsification-based demarcation criterion that includes these elements will avoid the most obvious counter-arguments to a criterion based on falsifiability alone.
波普尔的捍卫者声称，这种批评依赖于对他思想的不仁慈的解释。他们声称他不应该被解释为意味着可证伪性是划分科学的充分条件。一些段落似乎表明他将其视为一个必要条件（Feleppa 1990， 142）。其他段落表明，要使理论具有科学性，波普尔还要求（除了可证伪性之外）进行积极的尝试来检验理论，并接受测试的负面结果（Cioffi 1985,14-16）。包含这些要素的基于证伪的划分标准将避免对仅基于可证伪性的标准进行最明显的反驳。

However, in what seems to be his last statement of his position, Popper declared that falsifiability is a both necessary and a sufficient criterion. “A sentence (or a theory) is empirical-scientific if and only if it is falsifiable.” Furthermore, he emphasized that the falsifiability referred to here “only has to do with the logical structure of sentences and classes of sentences” (Popper [1989] 1994, 82). A (theoretical) sentence, he says, is falsifiable if and only if it logically contradicts some (empirical) sentence that describes a logically possible event that it would be logically possible to observe (Popper [1989] 1994, 83). A statement can be falsifiable in this sense although it is not in practice possible to falsify it. It would seem to follow from this interpretation that a statement’s status as scientific or non-scientific does not shift with time. On previous occasions he seems to have interpreted falsifiability differently, and maintained that “what was a metaphysical idea yesterday can become a testable scientific theory tomorrow; and this happens frequently” (Popper 1974, 981, cf. 984).
然而，在似乎是他对自己立场的最后一次陈述中，波普尔宣称可证伪性是一个既必要又充分的标准。“当且仅当一个句子（或理论）是可证伪的时，它才是实证科学的。”此外，他强调这里提到的可证伪性“只与句子的逻辑结构和句子的类别有关”（Popper [1989] 1994， 82）。他说，当且仅当一个（理论上的）句子在逻辑上与描述逻辑上可能观察到的事件的（经验）句子相矛盾时，它才是可证伪的（Popper [1989] 1994， 83）。从这个意义上说，一个陈述是可以证伪的，尽管在实践中不可能证伪它。从这种解释中似乎可以得出，一个陈述的科学或非科学状态不会随着时间的推移而改变。在以前的场合中，他似乎对可证伪性进行了不同的解释，并坚持认为“昨天是形而上学的想法明天可以成为可检验的科学理论;这种情况经常发生“（Popper 1974， 981， cf. 984）。

Logical falsifiability is a much weaker criterion than practical falsifiability. However, even logical falsifiability can create problems in practical demarcations. Popper once adopted the view that natural selection is not a proper scientific theory, arguing that it comes close to only saying that “survivors survive”, which is tautological. “Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research program” (Popper 1976, 168). This statement has been criticized by evolutionary scientists who pointed out that it misrepresents evolution. The theory of natural selection has given rise to many predictions that have withstood tests both in field studies and in laboratory settings (Ruse 1977; 2000).
逻辑可证伪性是一个比实际可证伪性弱得多的标准。然而，即使是逻辑上的可证伪性也会在实际划分中产生问题。波普尔曾经采用这样的观点，即自然选择不是一个合适的科学理论，他认为它几乎只说“幸存者生存”，这是同义词。“达尔文主义不是一个可检验的科学理论，而是一个形而上学的研究计划”（波普尔 1976,168）。这种说法受到了进化论科学家的批评，他们指出它歪曲了进化论。自然选择理论产生了许多预测，这些预测经得起实地研究和实验室环境的考验（Ruse 1977;2000）。

In a lecture in Darwin College in 1977, Popper retracted his previous view that the theory of natural selection is tautological. He now admitted that it is a testable theory although “difficult to test” (Popper 1978, 344). However, in spite of his well-argued recantation, his previous standpoint continues to be propagated in defiance of the accumulating evidence from empirical tests of natural selection.
1977 年在达尔文学院的一次讲座中，波普尔收回了他之前的观点，即自然选择理论是重复的。他现在承认这是一个可测试的理论，尽管“很难测试”（波普尔 1978,344）。然而，尽管他有充分的论证反驳，但他之前的观点继续被传播，无视自然选择的实证检验所积累的证据。

4.3 The criterion of puzzle-solving 4.3 解谜的标准

Thomas Kuhn is one of many philosophers for whom Popper’s view on the demarcation problem was a starting-point for developing their own ideas. Kuhn criticized Popper for characterizing “the entire scientific enterprise in terms that apply only to its occasional revolutionary parts” (Kuhn 1974, 802). Popper’s focus on falsifications of theories led to a concentration on the rather rare instances when a whole theory is at stake. According to Kuhn, the way in which science works on such occasions cannot be used to characterize the entire scientific enterprise. Instead it is in “normal science”, the science that takes place between the unusual moments of scientific revolutions, that we find the characteristics by which science can be distinguished from other activities (Kuhn 1974, 801).
托马斯·库恩 （Thomas Kuhn） 是众多哲学家之一，对他们来说，波普尔对分界问题的看法是他们发展自己思想的起点。库恩批评波普尔将“整个科学事业描述为仅适用于其偶尔的革命部分”（Kuhn 1974,802）。波普尔专注于证伪理论，导致他专注于整个理论处于危险之中的相当罕见的情况。根据库恩的说法，科学在这种场合的运作方式不能用来描述整个科学事业。相反，在“正常科学”中，即发生在科学革命的不寻常时刻之间的科学，我们发现了科学与其他活动区分开来的特征（Kuhn 1974,801）。

In normal science, the scientist’s activity consists in solving puzzles rather than testing fundamental theories. In puzzle-solving, current theory is accepted, and the puzzle is indeed defined in its terms. In Kuhn’s view, “it is normal science, in which Sir Karl’s sort of testing does not occur, rather than extraordinary science which most nearly distinguishes science from other enterprises”, and therefore a demarcation criterion must refer to the workings of normal science (Kuhn 1974, 802). Kuhn’s own demarcation criterion is the capability of puzzle-solving, which he sees as an essential characteristic of normal science.
在普通科学中，科学家的活动包括解决难题而不是测试基本理论。在解谜中，当前的理论被接受，而且这个谜题确实是用它的术语来定义的。在库恩看来，“这是正常的科学，其中没有发生卡尔爵士的那种测试，而不是最接近将科学与其他事业区分开来的非凡科学”，因此划分标准必须参考正常科学的运作方式（Kuhn 1974， 802）。库恩自己的划分标准是解谜能力，他认为这是正常科学的基本特征。

Kuhn’s view of demarcation is most clearly expressed in his comparison of astronomy with astrology. Since antiquity, astronomy has been a puzzle-solving activity and therefore a science. If an astronomer’s prediction failed, then this was a puzzle that he could hope to solve for instance with more measurements or adjustments of the theory. In contrast, the astrologer had no such puzzles since in that discipline “particular failures did not give rise to research puzzles, for no man, however skilled, could make use of them in a constructive attempt to revise the astrological tradition” (Kuhn 1974, 804). Therefore, according to Kuhn, astrology has never been a science.
库恩的划分观点在他对天文学与占星术的比较中得到了最清晰的表达。自古以来，天文学就是一项解谜活动，因此是一门科学。如果天文学家的预测失败了，那么这就是一个他可以希望通过更多的测量或理论调整来解决的难题。相比之下，占星家没有这样的谜题，因为在该学科中，“特定的失败不会引起研究谜题，因为没有人，无论多么熟练，都无法利用它们来建设性地尝试修改占星学传统”（Kuhn 1974， 804）。因此，根据库恩的说法，占星术从来都不是一门科学。

Popper disapproved thoroughly of Kuhn’s demarcation criterion. According to Popper, astrologers are engaged in puzzle solving, and consequently Kuhn’s criterion commits him to recognize astrology as a science. (Contrary to Kuhn, Popper defined puzzles as “minor problems which do not affect the routine”.) In his view Kuhn’s proposal leads to “the major disaster” of a “replacement of a rational criterion of science by a sociological one” (Popper 1974, 1146–1147).
波普尔完全不赞成库恩的划分标准。根据波普尔的说法，占星家从事解谜，因此库恩的标准要求他承认占星术是一门科学。（与 Kuhn 相反，Popper 将谜题定义为“不影响例程的小问题”。在他看来，库恩的提议导致了“用社会学标准取代科学的理性标准”（Popper 1974， 1146-1147）的“重大灾难”。

4.4 Criteria based on scientific progress 4.4 基于科学进步的标准

Popper’s demarcation criterion concerns the logical structure of theories. Imre Lakatos described this criterion as “a rather stunning one. A theory may be scientific even if there is not a shred of evidence in its favour, and it may be pseudoscientific even if all the available evidence is in its favour. That is, the scientific or non-scientific character of a theory can be determined independently of the facts” (Lakatos 1981, 117).
波普尔的划分标准涉及理论的逻辑结构。Imre Lakatos 将这一标准描述为“一个相当令人震惊的标准。即使没有一丝支持它的证据，一个理论也可能是科学的，即使所有可用的证据都对它有利，它也可能是伪科学的。也就是说，一个理论的科学或非科学性质可以独立于事实来确定“（Lakatos 1981,117）。

Instead, Lakatos (1970; 1974a; 1974b; 1981) proposed a modification of Popper’s criterion that he called “sophisticated (methodological) falsificationism”. On this view, the demarcation criterion should not be applied to an isolated hypothesis or theory, but rather to a whole research program that is characterized by a series of theories successively replacing each other. In his view, a research program is progressive if the new theories make surprising predictions that are confirmed. In contrast, a degenerating research programme is characterized by theories being fabricated only in order to accommodate known facts. Progress in science is only possible if a research program satisfies the minimum requirement that each new theory that is developed in the program has a larger empirical content than its predecessor. If a research program does not satisfy this requirement, then it is pseudoscientific.
相反，Lakatos （1970; 1974a; 1974b; 1981） 提出了对波普尔标准的修改，他称之为“复杂的（方法论的）证伪主义”。根据这种观点，划分标准不应该适用于一个孤立的假设或理论，而应该适用于以一系列理论相继相互取代为特征的整个研究计划。在他看来，如果新理论做出令人惊讶的预测并得到证实，那么研究计划就是进步的。相比之下，退化的研究计划的特点是捏造理论只是为了适应已知的事实。只有当研究计划满足最低要求时，科学的进步才有可能，即该计划中开发的每个新理论都比其前身具有更大的实证内容。如果一个研究项目不满足这个要求，那么它就是伪科学的。

According to Paul Thagard (1978, 228), a theory or discipline is pseudoscientific if it satisfies two criteria. One of these is that the theory fails to progress, and the other that “the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and disconfirmations”. A major difference between this approach and that of Lakatos is that Lakatos would classify a nonprogressive discipline as pseudoscientific even if its practitioners work hard to improve it and turn it into a progressive discipline. (In later work, Thagard has abandoned this approach and instead promoted a form of multi-criterial demarcation (Thagard 1988, 157-173).)
根据 Paul Thagard （1978， 228） 的说法，如果一个理论或学科满足两个标准，它就是伪科学的。其中之一是理论没有进步，另一个是“实践者社区很少尝试将理论发展为解决问题，不关心评估理论与其他理论的关系的尝试，并且在考虑确认和否定时有选择性”。这种方法与 Lakatos 方法之间的一个主要区别在于，Lakatos 会将非进步学科归类为伪科学，即使其实践者努力改进它并将其转变为进步学科。（在后来的工作中，Thagard 放弃了这种方法，而是推广了一种多标准划分的形式（Thagard 1988,157-173）。

In a somewhat similar vein, Daniel Rothbart (1990) emphasized the distinction between the standards to be used when testing a theory and those to be used when determining whether a theory should at all be tested. The latter, the eligibility criteria, include that the theory should encapsulate the explanatory success of its rival, and that it should yield testable implications that are inconsistent with those of the rival. According to Rothbart, a theory is unscientific if it is not testworthy in this sense.
与此类似，Daniel Rothbart （1990） 强调了测试理论时使用的标准和确定是否应该测试理论时使用的标准之间的区别。后者，即资格标准，包括该理论应概括其竞争对手的解释性成功，并且它应该产生与竞争对手不一致的可测试含义。根据罗斯巴特的说法，如果一个理论在这个意义上不值得检验，那么它就是不科学的。

George Reisch proposed that demarcation could be based on the requirement that a scientific discipline be adequately integrated into the other sciences. The various scientific disciplines have strong interconnections that are based on methodology, theory, similarity of models etc. Creationism, for instance, is not scientific because its basic principles and beliefs are incompatible with those that connect and unify the sciences. More generally speaking, says Reisch, an epistemic field is pseudoscientific if it cannot be incorporated into the existing network of established sciences (Reisch 1998; cf. Bunge 1982, 379).
George Reisch 提出，划分可以基于一门科学学科与其他科学充分整合的要求。各种科学学科具有很强的相互联系，这些联系基于方法、理论、模型的相似性等。例如，神创论不是科学的，因为它的基本原则和信仰与那些连接和统一科学的原则和信仰是不相容的。Reisch 说，更一般地说，如果一个认识论领域不能被纳入现有的既定科学网络，那么它就是伪科学的（Reisch 1998;参见 Bunge 1982,379）。

Paul Hoyninengen-Huene (2013) identifies science with systematic knowledge, and proposes that systematicity can be used as a demarcation criterion. However as shown by Naomi Oreskes, this is a problematic criterion, not least since some pseudosciences seem to satisfy it (Oreskes 2019).
Paul Hoyninengen-Huene （2013） 将科学与系统知识相提并论，并提出系统性可以作为划分标准。然而，正如 Naomi Oreskes 所表明的那样，这是一个有问题的标准，尤其是因为一些伪科学似乎满足它（Oreskes 2019）。

4.5 Epistemic norms 4.5 认识规范

A different approach, namely to base demarcation criteria on the value base of science, was proposed by sociologist Robert K. Merton ([1942] 1973). According to Merton, science is characterized by an “ethos”, i.e. spirit, that can be summarized as four sets of institutional imperatives. The first of these, universalism, asserts that whatever their origins, truth claims should be subjected to preestablished, impersonal criteria. This implies that the acceptance or rejection of claims should not depend on the personal or social qualities of their protagonists.
社会学家罗伯特·默顿 （Robert K. Merton） （[1942] 1973） 提出了一种不同的方法，即根据科学的价值基础来划分标准。根据默顿的说法，科学的特点是“精神”，即精神，可以概括为四组制度性要务。其中第一个是普遍主义，它断言，无论它们的起源如何，真理的主张都应该受到预先设定的、非个人化的标准的约束。这意味着接受或拒绝索赔不应取决于其主人公的个人或社会品质。

The second imperative, communism, says that the substantive findings of science are the products of social collaboration and therefore belong to the community, rather than being owned by individuals or groups. This is, as Merton pointed out, incompatible with patents that reserve exclusive rights of use to inventors and discoverers. The term “communism” is somewhat infelicitous; “communality” probably captures better what Merton aimed at.
第二个命令，共产主义，说科学的实质性发现是社会合作的产物，因此属于社区，而不是由个人或团体拥有。正如 Merton 指出的那样，这与为发明者和发现者保留专有使用权的专利不相容。“共产主义”这个词有点不恰当;“共同体性”可能更好地捕捉了默顿的目标。

His third imperative, disinterestedness, imposes a pattern of institutional control that is intended to curb the effects of personal or ideological motives that individual scientists may have. The fourth imperative, organized scepticism, implies that science allows detached scrutiny of beliefs that are dearly held by other institutions. This is what sometimes brings science into conflicts with religions and ideologies.
他的第三个当务之急，即无私，强加了一种制度控制模式，旨在遏制科学家个人可能具有的个人或意识形态动机的影响。第四个当务之急，有组织的怀疑主义，意味着科学允许对其他机构所珍视的信念进行超然的审查。这就是有时使科学与宗教和意识形态发生冲突的原因。

Merton described these criteria as belonging to the sociology of science, and thus as empirical statements about norms in actual science rather than normative statements about how science should be conducted (Merton [1942] 1973, 268). His criteria have often been dismissed by sociologists as oversimplified, and they have only had limited influence in philosophical discussions on the demarcation issue (Dolby 1987; Ruse 2000). Their potential in the latter context does not seem to have been sufficiently explored.
默顿将这些标准描述为属于科学社会学，因此是关于实际科学中规范的经验陈述，而不是关于科学应该如何进行的规范性陈述（Merton [1942] 1973， 268）。他的标准经常被社会学家认为过于简单化，而且它们在关于分界问题的哲学讨论中的影响有限（杜比 1987 年;Ruse 2000 年）。它们在后一种情况下的潜力似乎没有得到充分的探索。

4.6 Multi-criterial approaches 4.6 多标准方法

Popper’s method of demarcation consists essentially of the single criterion of falsifiability (although some authors have wanted to combine it with the additional criteria that tests are actually performed and their outcomes respected, see Section 4.2). Most of the other criteria discussed above are similarly mono-criterial, of course with Merton’s proposal as a major exception.
波普尔的划分方法基本上由可证伪性的单一标准组成（尽管一些作者希望将其与实际执行测试并尊重其结果的附加标准相结合，请参阅第 4.2 节）。上面讨论的大多数其他标准都同样是单一标准，当然，默顿的提案是一个主要的例外。

Most authors who have proposed demarcation criteria have instead put forward a list of such criteria. A large number of lists have been published that consist of (usually 5–10) criteria that can be used in combination to identify a pseudoscience or pseudoscientific practice. This includes lists by Langmuir ([1953] 1989), Gruenberger (1964), Dutch (1982), Bunge (1982), Radner and Radner (1982), Kitcher (1982, 30–54), Grove (1985), Thagard (1988, 157–173), Glymour and Stalker (1990), Derksen (1993, 2001), Vollmer (1993), Ruse (1996, 300–306) and Mahner (2007). Many of the criteria that appear on such lists relate closely to criteria discussed above in Sections 4.2 and 4.4. One such list reads as follows:
大多数提出划分标准的作者都提出了此类标准的清单。已经发布了大量列表，其中包含（通常为 5-10 个）标准，这些标准可以组合使用来识别伪科学或伪科学实践。这包括 Langmuir （[1953] 1989）、Gruenberger （1964）、Dutch （1982）、Bunge （1982）、Radner 和 Radner （1982）、Kitcher （1982， 30-54）、Grove （1985）、Thagard （1988， 157-173）、Glymour 和 Stalker （1990）、Derksen （1993， 2001）、Vollmer （1993）、Ruse （1996， 300-306） 和 Mahner （2007） 的名单。此类列表上显示的许多标准与上文第 4.2 节和第 4.4 节中讨论的标准密切相关。其中一份清单内容如下：

1. Belief in authority: It is contended that some person or persons have a special ability to determine what is true or false. Others have to accept their judgments.
   相信权威：有人认为某些人或某些人具有确定真假的特殊能力。其他人必须接受他们的判断。
2. Unrepeatable experiments: Reliance is put on experiments that cannot be repeated by others with the same outcome.
   不可重复的实验：依赖于无法被具有相同结果的其他人重复的实验。
3. Handpicked examples: Handpicked examples are used although they are not representative of the general category that the investigation refers to.
   精选示例：尽管精选示例并不代表调查所指的一般类别，但会使用精选示例。
4. Unwillingness to test: A theory is not tested although it is possible to test it.
   不愿意测试：尽管可以测试理论，但不会对其进行测试。
5. Disregard of refuting information: Observations or experiments that conflict with a theory are neglected.
   无视反驳信息：与理论相冲突的观察或实验被忽略。
6. Built-in subterfuge: The testing of a theory is so arranged that the theory can only be confirmed, never disconfirmed, by the outcome.
   内置诡计：理论的测试是如此安排的，以至于理论只能被结果证实，而不是被否定。
7. Explanations are abandoned without replacement. Tenable explanations are given up without being replaced, so that the new theory leaves much more unexplained than the previous one.
   解释被放弃，没有替换。站得住脚的解释被放弃了，没有被替换，因此新理论比前一个理论留下了更多的未解释。

Some of the authors who have proposed multicriterial demarcations have defended this approach as being superior to any mono-criterial demarcation. Hence, Bunge (1982, 372) asserted that many philosophers have failed to provide an adequate definition of science since they have presupposed that a single attribute will do; in his view the combination of several criteria is needed. Dupré (1993, 242) proposed that science is best understood as a Wittgensteinian family resemblance concept. This would mean that there is a set of features that are characteristic of science, but although every part of science will have some of these features, we should not expect any part of science to have all of them. Irzik and Nola (2011) proposed the use of this approach in science education.
一些提出多标准划分的作者为这种方法辩护，认为这种方法优于任何单一标准划分。因此，Bunge （1982， 372） 断言，许多哲学家未能提供科学的适当定义，因为他们预设了一个属性就可以了;在他看来，需要结合几个标准。Dupré （1993， 242） 提出，最好将科学理解为维特根斯坦的家族相似概念。这意味着有一组特征是科学的特征，但是尽管科学的每个部分都会具有其中一些特征，但我们不应该期望科学的任何部分具有所有这些特征。Irzik 和 Nola （2011） 提议在科学教育中使用这种方法。

However, a multicriterial definition of science is not needed to justify a multicriterial account of how pseudoscience deviates from science. Even if science can be characterized by a single defining characteristic, different pseudoscientific practices may deviate from science in widely divergent ways.
然而，不需要对科学进行多标准定义来证明伪科学如何偏离科学的多标准解释是合理的。即使科学可以用一个定义性特征来表征，不同的伪科学实践也可能以截然不同的方式偏离科学。

5. Two forms of pseudo-science 5. 伪科学的两种形式

Some forms of pseudoscience have as their main objective the promotion of a particular theory of their own, whereas others are driven by a desire to fight down some scientific theory or branch of science. The former type of pseudoscience has been called pseudo-theory promotion, and the latter science denial(ism) (Hansson 2017). Pseudo-theory promotion is exemplified by homeopathy, astrology, and ancient astronaut theories. The term “denial” was first used about the pseudo-scientific claim that the Nazi holocaust never took place. The phrase “holocaust denial” was in use already in the early 1980s (Gleberzon 1983). The term “climate change denial” became common around 2005 (e.g. Williams 2005). Other forms of science denial are relativity theory denial, tobacco disease denial, hiv denialism, and vaccination denialism.
一些形式的伪科学的主要目标是推广自己的特定理论，而另一些形式的伪科学则是为了对抗某些科学理论或科学分支。前一种类型的伪科学被称为伪理论推广，后一种类型的科学否定（主义）（Hansson 2017）。伪理论推广以顺势疗法、占星术和古代宇航员理论为例。“否认”一词最初用于纳粹大屠杀从未发生过的伪科学主张。“否认大屠杀”一词在 1980 年代初就已经在使用（Gleberzon 1983）。“否认气候变化”一词在 2005 年左右变得普遍（例如 Williams 2005）。其他形式的科学否认是相对论否认、烟草疾病否认、HIV 否认主义和疫苗接种否认主义。

Many forms of pseudoscience combine pseudo-theory promotion with science denialism. For instance, creationism and its skeletal version “intelligent design” are constructed to support a fundamentalist interpretation of Genesis. However, as practiced today, creationism has a strong focus on the repudiation of evolution, and it is therefore predominantly a form of science denialism.
许多形式的伪科学将伪理论推广与科学否定主义相结合。例如，神创论及其骨架版本的 “智能设计” 被构建为支持对创世记的原教旨主义解释。然而，正如今天的实践一样，神创论非常注重对进化论的否定，因此它主要是科学否定论的一种形式。

The most prominent difference between pseudo-theory promotion and science denial is their different attitudes to conflicts with established science. Science denialism usually proceeds by producing false controversies with legitimate science, i.e. claims that there is a scientific controversy when there is in fact none. This is an old strategy, applied already in the 1930s by relativity theory deniers (Wazeck 2009, 268–269). It has been much used by tobacco disease deniers sponsored by the tobacco industry (Oreskes and Conway 2010; Dunlap and Jacques 2013), and it is currently employed by climate science denialists (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; Boykoff 2008). However, whereas the fabrication of fake controversies is a standard tool in science denial, it is seldom if ever used in pseudo-theory promotion. To the contrary, advocates of pseudosciences such as astrology and homeopathy tend to describe their theories as conformable to mainstream science.
伪理论推广和科学否定之间最突出的区别是他们对与既定科学的冲突持不同态度。科学否定论通常通过与合法科学产生虚假的争论来进行，即声称存在科学争议，但实际上根本没有。这是一个古老的策略，在 1930 年代已经被相对论否定者应用（Wazeck 2009,268-269）。它已被烟草业赞助的烟草病否认者广泛使用（Oreskes 和 Conway 2010;Dunlap 和 Jacques 2013），目前被气候科学否定论者使用（Boykoff 和 Boykoff 2004;Boykoff 2008 年）。然而，虽然捏造虚假争议是否认科学的标准工具，但它很少甚至从未用于伪理论推广。相反，占星术和顺势疗法等伪科学的倡导者倾向于将他们的理论描述为符合主流科学。

6. Some related terms 6. 一些相关术语

6.1 Scepticism 6.1 怀疑

The term scepticism (skepticism) has at least three distinct usages that are relevant for the discussion on pseudoscience. First, scepticism is a philosophical method that proceeds by casting doubt on claims usually taken to be trivially true, such as the existence of the external world. This has been, and still is, a highly useful method for investigating the justification of what we in practice consider to be certain beliefs. Secondly, criticism of pseudoscience is often called scepticism. This is the term most commonly used by organisations devoted to the disclosure of pseudoscience. Thirdly, opposition to the scientific consensus in specific areas is sometimes called scepticism. For instance, climate science deniers often call themselves “climate sceptics”.
怀疑论（skepticism）一词至少有三种不同的用法，与伪科学的讨论有关。首先，怀疑主义是一种哲学方法，它通过对通常被认为是微不足道的主张提出怀疑来进行，例如外部世界的存在。这一直是，现在仍然是，一种非常有用的方法，用于研究我们在实践中认为是某些信念的合理性。其次，对伪科学的批评通常被称为怀疑论。这是致力于披露伪科学的组织最常用的术语。第三，反对特定领域的科学共识有时被称为怀疑论。例如，气候科学否定者经常称自己为“气候怀疑论者”。

To avoid confusion, the first of these notions can be specified as “philosophical scepticism”, the second as “scientific scepticism” or “defence of science”, and the third as “science denial(ism)”. Adherents of the first two forms of scepticism can be called “philosophical sceptics”, respectively “science defenders”. Adherents of the third form can be called “science deniers” or “science denialists”. Torcello (2016) proposed the term “pseudoscepticism” for so-called climate scepticism.
为避免混淆，这些概念中的第一个可以指定为“哲学怀疑主义”，第二个概念可以指定为“科学怀疑主义”或“科学辩护”，第三个概念可以指定为“科学否定主义”。前两种形式的怀疑论的拥护者可以被称为“哲学怀疑论者”，分别被称为“科学捍卫者”。第三种形式的追随者可以被称为“科学否定者”或“科学否定论者”。Torcello （2016） 提出了“伪怀疑论”一词，用于所谓的气候怀疑论。

6.2 Resistance to facts 6.2 对事实的抵抗

Unwillingness to accept strongly supported factual statements is a traditional criterion of pseudoscience. (See for instance item 5 on the list of seven criteria cited in Section 4.6.) The term “fact resistance” or “resistance to facts” was used already in the 1990s, for instance by Arthur Krystal (1999, p. 8), who complained about a “growing resistance to facts”, consisting in people being “simply unrepentant about not knowing things that do not reflect their interests”. The term “fact resistance” can refer to unwillingness to accept well-supported factual claims whether or not that support originates in science. It is particularly useful in relation to fact-finding practices that are not parts of science. (Cf. Section 2.)
不愿意接受有力支持的事实陈述是伪科学的传统标准。（例如，参见第 4.6 节中引用的七个标准列表中的第 5 项。“事实抵抗”或“对事实的抵抗”一词在 1990 年代就已经被使用，例如亚瑟·克里斯塔尔（Arthur Krystal，1999 年，第 8 页），他抱怨“对事实的抵抗越来越大”，包括人们“只是不悔改不知道不符合他们利益的事物”。“事实抵抗”一词可以指不愿意接受有充分依据的事实主张，无论该支持是否源自科学。它对于不属于科学一部分的事实调查实践特别有用。（参见第 2 节。

6.3 Conspiracy theories 6.3 阴谋论

Generally speaking, conspiracy theories are theories according to which there exists some type of secret collusion for any type of purpose. In practice, the term mostly refers to implausible such theories, used to explain social facts that have other, considerably more plausible explanations. Many pseudosciences are connected with conspiracy theories. For instance, one of the difficulties facing anti-vaccinationists is that they have to explain the overwhelming consensus among medical experts that vaccines are efficient. This is often done by claims of a conspiracy:
一般来说，阴谋论是存在某种类型的秘密勾结用于任何类型目的的理论。在实践中，这个词主要是指难以置信的此类理论，用于解释具有其他更合理解释的社会事实。许多伪科学都与阴谋论有关。例如，反疫苗主义者面临的困难之一是，他们必须解释医学专家之间压倒性的共识，即疫苗是有效的。这通常是通过声称阴谋来实现的：

At the heart of the anti-vaccine conspiracy movement [lies] the argument that large pharmaceutical companies and governments are covering up information about vaccines to meet their own sinister objectives. According to the most popular theories, pharmaceutical companies stand to make such healthy profits from vaccines that they bribe researchers to fake their data, cover up evidence of the harmful side effects of vaccines, and inflate statistics on vaccine efficacy. (Jolley and Douglas 2014)
反疫苗阴谋论运动的核心是，大型制药公司和政府正在掩盖有关疫苗的信息，以实现他们自己的险恶目标。根据最流行的理论，制药公司可以从疫苗中赚取如此可观的利润，以至于他们贿赂研究人员以伪造他们的数据，掩盖疫苗有害副作用的证据，并夸大疫苗功效的统计数据。（乔利和道格拉斯 2014 年）

Conspiracy theories have peculiar epistemic characteristics that contribute to their pervasiveness. (Keeley 1999) In particular, they are often associated with a type of circular reasoning that allows evidence against the conspiracy to be interpreted as evidence for it.
阴谋论具有特殊的认识特征，这导致了它们的普遍性。（基利 1999 年）特别是，它们通常与一种循环推理有关，这种推理允许将反对阴谋的证据解释为阴谋的证据。

6.4 Bullshit 6.4 胡说八道

The term “bullshit” was introduced into philosophy by Harry Frankfurt, who first discussed it in a 1986 essay (Raritan Quarterly Review) and developed the discussion into a book (2005). Frankfurt used the term to describe a type of falsehood that does not amount to lying. A person who lies deliberately chooses not to tell the truth, whereas a person who utters bullshit is not interested in whether what (s)he says is true or false, only in its suitability for his or her purpose. Moberger (2020) has proposed that pseudoscience should be seen as a special case of bullshit, understood as “a culpable lack of epistemic conscientiousness”.
“胡说八道”一词是由哈里·法兰克福 （Harry Frankfurt） 引入哲学的，他在 1986 年的一篇文章（拉里坦季刊评论）中首次讨论了它，并将该讨论发展成了一本书（2005 年）。法兰克福用这个词来描述一种不等于撒谎的谎言。一个说谎的人故意选择不说真话，而一个说废话的人对他所说的是真是假不感兴趣，只对它是否适合他或她的目的感兴趣。Moberger （2020） 提出，伪科学应该被视为胡说八道的特例，被理解为“可耻的缺乏认识意识”。

6.5 Epistemic relativism 6.5 认识相对主义

Epistemic relativism is a term with many meanings; the meaning most relevant in discussions on pseudoscience is denial of the common assumption that there is intersubjective truth in scientific matters, which scientists can and should try to approach. Epistemic relativists claim that (natural) science has no special claim to knowledge, but should be seen “as ordinary social constructions or as derived from interests, political-economic relations, class structure, socially defined constraints on discourse, styles of persuasion, and so on” (Buttel and Taylor 1992, 220). Such ideas have been promoted under different names, including “social constructivism”, the “strong programme”, “deconstructionism”, and “postmodernism”. The distinction between science and pseudoscience has no obvious role in epistemic relativism. Some academic epistemic relativists have actively contributed to the promotion of doctrines such as AIDS denial, vaccination denial, creationism, and climate science denial (Hansson 2020, Pennock 2010). However, the connection between epistemic relativism and pseudoscience is controversial. Some proponents of epistemic relativism have maintained that that relativism “is almost always more useful to the side with less scientific credibility or cognitive authority” (Scott et al. 1990, 490). Others have denied that epistemic relativism facilitates or encourages standpoints such as denial of anthropogenic climate change or other environmental problems (Burningham and Cooper 1999, 306).
认识相对主义是一个具有多种含义的术语;在关于伪科学的讨论中，最相关的含义是否认科学问题中存在主体间真理的普遍假设，科学家可以而且应该尝试接近这一点。认识相对论者声称，（自然）科学对知识没有特殊的要求，但应该被视为“普通的社会建构或源自利益、政治经济关系、阶级结构、社会定义的话语约束、说服方式等”（Buttel 和 Taylor 1992,220）。这些思想以不同的名称被推广，包括“社会建构主义”、“强势纲领”、“解构主义”和“后现代主义”。科学和伪科学之间的区别在认识相对主义中没有明显的作用。一些学术认识相对论者积极为推广艾滋病否认、疫苗接种否认、神创论和气候科学否认等学说做出了贡献（Hansson 2020，Pennock 2010）。然而，认识相对主义和伪科学之间的联系是有争议的。一些认识相对主义的支持者坚持认为，相对主义“几乎总是对科学可信度或认知权威性较低的一方更有用”（Scott et al. 1990， 490）。其他人否认认识相对主义促进或鼓励诸如否认人为气候变化或其他环境问题等观点（Burningham 和 Cooper 1999,306）。

7. Unity in diversity 7. 多元合一

Kuhn observed that although his own and Popper’s criteria of demarcation are profoundly different, they lead to essentially the same conclusions on what should be counted as science respectively pseudoscience (Kuhn 1974, 803). This convergence of theoretically divergent demarcation criteria is a quite general phenomenon. Philosophers and other theoreticians of science differ widely in their views on what science is. Nevertheless, there is virtual unanimity in the community of knowledge disciplines on most particular issues of demarcation. There is widespread agreement for instance that creationism, astrology, homeopathy, Kirlian photography, dowsing, ufology, ancient astronaut theory, Holocaust denialism, Velikovskian catastrophism, and climate change denialism are pseudosciences. There are a few points of controversy, for instance concerning the status of Freudian psychoanalysis, but the general picture is one of consensus rather than controversy in particular issues of demarcation.
库恩观察到，尽管他自己的和波普尔的划分标准截然不同，但它们在什么应该算作科学或伪科学方面得出了基本相同的结论（Kuhn 1974,803）。这种理论上不同的划分标准的趋同是一个相当普遍的现象。哲学家和其他科学理论家对科学的看法差异很大。尽管如此，知识学科社区在大多数特定的划分问题上几乎是一致的。例如，人们普遍认为神创论、占星术、顺势疗法、基尔利安摄影、占卜、UF论、古代宇航员理论、大屠杀否认论、维利科夫斯基灾难论和气候变化否认论都是伪科学。有一些争议点，例如关于弗洛伊德精神分析的地位，但总体情况是共识，而不是在特定划分问题上的争议。

It is in a sense paradoxical that so much agreement has been reached in particular issues in spite of almost complete disagreement on the general criteria that these judgments should presumably be based upon. This puzzle is a sure indication that there is still much important philosophical work to be done on the demarcation between science and pseudoscience.
从某种意义上说，这是自相矛盾的，尽管对这些判断可能基于的一般标准几乎完全存在分歧，但在特定问题上却达成了如此多的共识。这个谜题肯定地表明，在科学和伪科学之间的界限上，还有很多重要的哲学工作要做。

Philosophical reflection on pseudoscience has brought forth other interesting problem areas in addition to the demarcation between science and pseudoscience. Examples include related demarcations such as that between science and religion, the relationship between science and reliable non-scientific knowledge (for instance everyday knowledge), the scope for justifiable simplifications in science education and popular science, the nature and justification of methodological naturalism in science (Boudry et al 2010), and the meaning or meaninglessness of the concept of a supernatural phenomenon. Several of these problem areas have as yet not received much philosophical attention.
除了科学和伪科学之间的界限之外，对伪科学的哲学反思还带来了其他有趣的问题领域。例子包括相关的划分，例如科学与宗教之间的界限、科学与可靠的非科学知识（例如日常知识）之间的关系、科学教育和科普中合理简化的范围、科学方法论自然主义的性质和理由（Boudry 等人，2010 年），以及超自然现象概念的意义或无意义。其中几个问题领域尚未得到太多的哲学关注。

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• Culver, Roger and Ianna, Philip, 1988. Astrology: True or False, Buffalo: Prometheus Books.
• Derksen, A.A., 1993. “The seven sins of pseudoscience”, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 24: 17–42.
• –––, 2001. “The seven strategies of the sophisticated pseudoscience: a look into Freud’s rhetorical tool box”, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 32: 329–350.
• Dolby, R.G.A., 1987. “Science and pseudoscience: the case of creationism”, Zygon, 22: 195–212.
• Dunlap, Riley E., and Peter J. Jacques, 2013. “Climate change denial books and conservative think tanks: exploring the connection”, American Behavioral Scientist, 57(6): 699–731.
• Dupré, John, 1993. The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Dutch, Steven I, 1982. “Notes on the nature of fringe science”, Journal of Geological Education, 30: 6–13.
• Feleppa, Robert, 1990. “Kuhn, Popper, and the Normative Problem of Demarcation”, pp. 140–155 in Patrick Grim (ed.) Philosophy of Science and the Occult, 2nd edition, Albany: State University of New York Press.
• Fernandez-Beanato, Damian, 2020. “Cicero’s demarcation of science: A report of shared criteria”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (Part A), 83: 97–102.
• Frankfurt, Harry G., 2005. On Bullshit, Princeton: Princeton University Press; see also the essay with the same title in Raritan Quarterly Review, 6(2): 81–100.
• Fuller, Steve, 1985. “The demarcation of science: a problem whose demise has been greatly exaggerated”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 66: 329–341.
• Gardner, Martin, 1957. Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science, Dover 1957; expanded version of his In the Name of Science, 1952.
• Gleberzon, William, 1983. “Academic freedom and Holocaust denial literature: Dealing with infamy”, Interchange, 14(4): 62–69.
• Glymour, Clark and Stalker, Douglas, 1990. “Winning through Pseudoscience”, pp 92–103 in Patrick Grim (ed.) Philosophy of Science and the Occult, 2nd edition, Albany: State University of New York Press.
• Grove , J.W., 1985. “Rationality at Risk: Science against Pseudoscience”, Minerva, 23: 216–240.
• Gruenberger, Fred J., 1964. “A measure for crackpots”, Science, 145: 1413–1415.
• Guldentops, Guy, 2020. “Nicolaus Ellenbog’s ‘Apologia for the Astrologers’: A Benedictine’s View on Astral Determinism”, Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale, 62: 251–334.
• Hansson, Sven Ove, 1996. “Defining Pseudoscience”, Philosophia Naturalis, 33: 169–176.
• –––, 2006. “Falsificationism Falsified”, Foundations of Science, 11: 275–286.
• –––, 2013. “Defining pseudoscience and science”, pp. 61–77 in Pigliucci and Boudry (eds.) 2013.
• –––, 2017. “Science denial as a form of pseudoscience”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 63: 39–47.
• –––, 2018. “How connected are the major forms of irrationality? An analysis of pseudoscience, science denial, fact resistance and alternative facts”, Mètode Science Study Journal, 8: 125–131.
• –––, 2020. “Social constructivism and climate science denial”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 10: 37.
• Hoyninengen-Huene, Paul, 2013. Systematicity. The nature of science, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Irzik, Gürol, and Robert Nola, 2011. “A family resemblance approach to the nature of science for science education”, Science and Education, 20(7): 591–607.
• Jolley, Daniel, and Karen M. Douglas, 2014. “The effects of anti-vaccine conspiracy theories on vaccination intentions”, PloS One, 9(2): e89177.
• Keeley, Brian L., 1999. “Of Conspiracy Theories”, The Journal of Philosophy, 96(3): 109–126.
• Kitcher, Philip, 1982. Abusing Science. The Case Against Creationism, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Krystal, Arthur, 1999. “At Large and at Small: What Do You Know?”, American Scholar, 68(2): 7–13.
• Kuhn, Thomas S., 1974. “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?”, pp. 798–819 in P.A. Schilpp, The Philosophy of Karl Popper, The Library of Living Philosophers, vol xiv, book ii. La Salle: Open Court.
• Lakatos, Imre, 1970. “Falsification and the Methodology of Research program”, pp 91–197 in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1974a. “Popper on Demarcation and Induction”, pp. 241–273 in P.A. Schilpp, The Philosophy of Karl Popper (The Library of Living Philosophers, Volume 14, Book 1). La Salle: Open Court.
• –––, 1974b. “Science and pseudoscience”, Conceptus, 8: 5–9.
• –––, 1981. “Science and pseudoscience”, pp. 114–121 in S. Brown, et al. (eds.) Conceptions of Inquiry: A Reader, London: Methuen.
• Langmuir, Irving, [1953] 1989. “Pathological Science”, Physics Today, 42(10): 36–48.
• Laudan, Larry, 1983. “The demise of the demarcation problem”, in R.S. Cohan and L. Laudan (eds.), Physics, Philosophy, and Psychoanalysis, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 111–127.
• Lewandowsky, Stephan, Toby D. Pilditch, Jens K. Madsen, Naomi Oreskes, and James S. Risbey, 2019. “Influence and seepage: An evidence-resistant minority can affect public opinion and scientific belief formation”, Cognition, 188: 124–139.
• Liebenberg, L., 2013. The Origin of Science. The evolutionary roots of scientific reasoning and its implications for citizen science, Cape Town: CyberTracker.
• Lugg, Andrew, 1987. “Bunkum, Flim-Flam and Quackery: Pseudoscience as a Philosophical Problem”, Dialectica, 41: 221–230.
• –––, 1992. “Pseudoscience as nonsense”, Methodology and Science, 25: 91–101.
• Mahner, Martin, 2007. “Demarcating Science from Non-Science”, pp 515-575 in Theo Kuipers (ed.) Handbook of the Philosophy of Science: General Philosophy of Science – Focal Issues, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
• –––, 2013. “Science and pseudoscience. How to demarcate after the (alleged) demise of the demarcation problem”, pp. 29–43 in Pigliucci and Boudry (eds.) 2013.
• Mayo, Deborah G., 1996. “Ducks, rabbits and normal science: Recasting the Kuhn’s-eye view of Popper’s demarcation of science”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47: 271–290.
• Merton, Robert K., [1942] 1973. “Science and Technology in a Democratic Order”, Journal of Legal and Political Sociology, 1: 115–126, 1942; reprinted as “The Normative Structure of Science”, in Robert K. Merton, The Sociology of Science. Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 267–278.
• Moberger, Victor, 2020. “Bullshit, Pseudoscience and Pseudophilosophy”, Theoria, 86(5): 595–611.
• Morris, Robert L., 1987. “Parapsychology and the Demarcation Problem”, Inquiry, 30: 241–251.
• Oreskes, Naomi, 2019. “Systematicity is necessary but not sufficient: on the problem of facsimile science”, Synthese, 196(3): 881–905.
• Oreskes, Naomi and Erik M. Conway, 2010. Merchants of doubt: how a handful of scientists obscured the truth on issues from tobacco smoke to global warming, New York: Bloomsbury Press.
• Pennock, Robert T., 2010. “The postmodern sin of intelligent design creationism” Science and Education, 19(6–8): 757–778.
• –––, 2011. “Can’t philosophers tell the difference between science and religion?: Demarcation revisited”, Synthese, 178(2): 177–206.
• Pigliucci, Massimo, 2013. “The demarcation problem. A (belated) response to Laudan”, in Pigliucci and Boudry (eds.) 2013, pp. 9–28.
• Pigliucci, Massimo and Maarten Boudry (eds.), 2013. Philosophy of Pseudoscience. Reconsidering the demarcation problem. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
• Popper, Karl, 1962. Conjectures and refutations. The growth of scientific knowledge, New York: Basic Books.
• –––, 1974 “Reply to my critics”, in P.A. Schilpp, The Philosophy of Karl Popper (The Library of Living Philosophers, Volume XIV, Book 2), La Salle: Open Court, pp. 961–1197.
• –––, 1976. Unended Quest London: Fontana.
• –––, 1978. “Natural Selection and the Emergence of the Mind”, Dialectica, 32: 339–355.
• –––, [1989] 1994. “Falsifizierbarkeit, zwei Bedeutungen von”, pp. 82–86 in Helmut Seiffert and Gerard Radnitzky, Handlexikon zur Wissenschaftstheorie, 2nd edition, München: Ehrenwirth GmbH Verlag.
• Powell, James, 2019. “Scientists reach 100% consensus on anthropogenic global warming”, Bulletin of Science, Technlogy and Society, 37(4): 183–184.
• Radner, Daisie and Michael Radner, 1982. Science and Unreason, Belmont CA: Wadsworth.
• Reisch, George A., 1998. “Pluralism, Logical Empiricism, and the Problem of Pseudoscience”, Philosophy of Science, 65: 333–348.
• Rothbart, Daniel, 1990 “Demarcating Genuine Science from Pseudoscience”, in Patrick Grim, ed, Philosophy of Science and the Occult, 2nd edition, Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 111–122.
• Ruse, Michael, 1977. “Karl Popper’s Philosophy of Biology”, Philosophy of Science, 44: 638–661.
• –––, 2000. “Is evolutionary biology a different kind of science?”, Aquinas, 43: 251–282.
• Ruse, Michael (ed.), (1996). But is it science? The philosophical question in the creation/evolution controversy, Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
• Scott, P., Richards, E., and Martin, B., 1990. “Captives of controversy. The Myth of the Neutral Social Researcher in Contemporary Scientific Controversies”, Science, Technology, and Human Values, 15(4): 474–494.
• Settle, Tom, 1971. “The Rationality of Science versus the Rationality of Magic”, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 1: 173–194.
• Siitonen, Arto, 1984. “Demarcation of science from the point of view of problems and problem-stating”, Philosophia Naturalis, 21: 339–353.
• Thagard, Paul R., 1978. “Why Astrology Is a Pseudoscience”, Philosophy of Science Association (PSA 1978), 1: 223–234.
• –––, 1988. Computational Philosophy of Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Thurs, Daniel P. and Ronald L. Numbers, 2013. “Science, pseudoscience and science falsely so-called”, in Pigliucci and Boudry (eds.) 2013, pp. 121–144.
• Torcello, Lawrence, 2016. “The ethics of belief, cognition, and climate change pseudoskepticism: implications for public discourse”, Topics in Cognitive Science, 8: 19–48.
• Vollmer, Gerhard, 1993. Wissenschaftstheorie im Einsatz, Beiträge zu einer selbstkritischen Wissenschaftsphilosophie Stuttgart: Hirzel Verlag.
• Wazeck, Milena, 2009. Einsteins Gegner. Die öffentliche Kontroverse um die Relativitätstheorie in den 1920er Jahren. Frankfurt: campus.
• Williams, Nigel, 2005. “Heavyweight attack on climate-change denial”, Current Biology, 15(4): R109–R110.

Philosophically-informed Literature on Pseudosciences and Contested Doctrines

Anthroposophy

• Hansson, Sven Ove, 1991. “Is Anthroposophy Science?”, Conceptus 25: 37–49.
• Staudenmaier, Peter, 2014. Between Occultism and Nazism. Anthroposophy and the Politics of Race in the Fascist Era, Leiden: Brill.

Astrology

• James, Edward W, 1990. “On Dismissing Astrology and Other Irrationalities”, in Patrick Grim (ed.) Philosophy of Science and the Occult, 2nd edition, State University of New York Press, Albany, pp. 28–36.
• Kanitscheider, Bernulf, 1991. “A Philosopher Looks at Astrology”, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 16: 258–266.
• Thagard, Paul R., 1978. “Why Astrology Is a Pseudoscience”, Philosophy of Science Association (PSA 1978), 1: 223–234.

Climate science denialism

• McKinnon, Catriona, 2016. “Should We Tolerate Climate Change Denial?”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 40(1): 205–216.
• Torcello, Lawrence, 2016. “The Ethics of Belief, Cognition, and Climate Change Pseudoskepticism: Implications for Public Discourse”, Topics in Cognitive Science, 8(1): 19–48.

Creationism

• Kitcher, Philip, 1982. Abusing Science. The Case Against Creationism, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Lambert, Kevin, 2006. “Fuller’s folly, Kuhnian paradigms, and intelligent design”, Social Studies of Science, 36(6): 835–842.
• Pennock, Robert T., 2010. “The postmodern sin of intelligent design creationism”, Science and Education, 19(6–8): 757–778.
• –––, 2011. “Can’t philosophers tell the difference between science and religion?: Demarcation revisited”, Synthese, 178(2): 177–206.
• Ruse, Michael (ed.), 1996. But is it science? The philosophical question in the creation/evolution controversy, Prometheus Books.

Feng Shui

• Matthews, Michael R., 2019. Feng Shui: Teaching about science and pseudoscience, Springer.

Holocaust denial

• Lipstadt, Deborah E., 1993. Denying the Holocaust: the growing assault on truth and memory, New York : Free Press.

Parapsychology

• Edwards, Paul, 1996. Reincarnation: A Critical Examination, Amherst NY: Prometheus.
• Flew, Antony, 1980. “Parapsychology: Science or Pseudoscience”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 61: 100–114.
• Hales, Steven D., 2001. “Evidence and the afterlife”, Philosophia, 28(1–4): 335–346.

Psychoanalysis

• Boudry, Maarten, and Filip Buekens, 2011. “The epistemic predicament of a pseudoscience: Social constructivism confronts Freudian psychoanalysis”, Theoria, 77(2): 159–179.
• Cioffi, Frank, 1998. Freud and the Question of Pseudoscience. Chigago: Open Court.
• –––, 2013. “Pseudoscience. The case of Freud’s sexual etiology of the neuroses”, in Pigliucci and Boudry (eds.) 2013, pp. 321–340.
• Grünbaum, Adolf, 1979. “Is Freudian psychoanalytic theory pseudoscientific by Karl Popper’s criterion of demarcation?”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 16: 131–141.

Quackery and non–scientific medicine

• Jerkert, Jesper, 2013. “Why alternative medicine can be scientifically evaluated. Countering the evasions of pseudoscience”, in Pigliucci and Boudry (eds.) 2013, pp. 305–320.
• Smith, Kevin, 2012a. “Against homeopathy–a utilitarian perspective”, Bioethics, 26(8): 398–409.
• –––, 2012b. “Homeopathy is unscientific and unethical”, Bioethics, 26(9): 508–512.

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via：

• Science and Pseudo-Science

  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/