# Set-UID实验

//csdn博客目前暂时不再更新了，有兴趣请访问我的技术博客-晓的博客：zhangxiaolong.org

1.  Figure out why "passwd", "chsh", "su", and "sudo" commands need to be Set-UIDprograms. What will happen if they are not? If you are not familiar with these programs, you should first learn what they can do by reading their manuals. Please copy these commands to your owndirectory; the copies will not be Set-UID programs. Run the copied programs, and observe whathappens.

图 1

图 2

由图1，图2所示：拷贝到/home/seed下的passwd程序，没有了root权限，这样就没有了修改密码的权限。同样chsh su等等同样的道理。

2.  Run Set-UID shell programs in Linux, and describe and explain your observations.

(a) Login as root, copy /bin/zsh to /tmp, and make it a set-root-uid program with permission4755. Then login as a normal user, and run /tmp/zsh. Will you get root privilege? Please describe your observation. If you cannot find /bin/zsh in your operating system, please use the following command to install it:_ Note: in our pre-built Ubuntu VM image, zsh is already installed.

su

yum install zsh

For Ubuntu

$su Password: (enter root password) apt-get install zsh 图 3 由图3示，可以获得root权限 (b) Instead of copying /bin/zsh, this time, copy /bin/bash to /tmp, make it a set-root-uidprogram. Run /tmp/bash as a normal user. will you get root privilege? Please describe andexplain your observation. 图 4 由图4示获得不了root权限，，从实验中可以看出/bin/bash有某种内在的保护机制可以阻止Set-UID机制的滥用。 3. (Setup for the rest of the tasks) As you can find out from the previous task, /bin/bash has certainbuilt-in protection that prevent the abuse of the Set-UID mechanism. To see the life before such aprotection scheme was implemented, we are going to use a different shell program called /bin/zsh.In some Linux distributions (such as Fedora and Ubuntu), /bin/sh is actually a symbolic linkto /bin/bash. To use zsh, we need to link /bin/sh to /bin/zsh. The following instructionsdescribe how to change the default shell to zsh.$ su

# cd /bin

# rm sh

# ln -s zsh sh

图 5

4. The PATH environment variable.The system(const char *cmd) library function can be used to execute a command withina program. The way system(cmd) works is to invoke the /bin/sh program, and then let theshell program to execute cmd. Because of the shell program invoked, calling system() within aSet-UID program is extremely dangerous. This is because the actual behavior of the shell programcan be affected by environment variables, such as PATH; these environment variables are under user’scontrol. By changing these variables, malicious users can control the behavior of the Set-UIDprogram.The Set-UID program below is supposed to execute the /bin/ls command; however, the programmeronly uses the relative path for the ls command, rather than the absolute path:

int main()

{

system("ls");

return 0;

}

(a) Can you let this Set-UID program (owned by root) run your code instead of /bin/ls? If you can, is your code running with the root privilege? Describe and explain your observations.

图 6

（1）首先以root权限编译如下程序，并将该程序设置为SUID。
int main()
{
system("ls");
return 0;
}

（2）拷贝sh到/tmp，并命名为ls。
（3）修改环境变量为/tmp。
（4）运行root用户编写的SUID程序。

(b) Now, change /bin/sh so it points back to /bin/bash, and repeat the above attack. Can youstill get the root privilege? Describe and explain your observations.

5. The difference between system() and execve(). Before you work on this task,please make sure that /bin/sh is pointed to /bin/zsh.Background: Bob works for an auditing agency, and he needs to investigate a company for a suspectedfraud. For the investigation purpose, Bob needs to be able to read all the files in the company’sUnix system; on the other hand, to protect the integrity of the system, Bob should not be able tomodify any file. To achieve this goal, Vince, the superuser of the system, wrote a special set-root-uidprogram (see below), and then gave the executable permission to Bob. This program requires Bob totype a file name at the command line, and then it will run /bin/cat to display the specified file.Since the program is running as a root, it can display any file Bob specifies. However, since the programhas no write operations, Vince is very sure that Bob cannot use this special program to modify any file.

#include <string.h>

#include <stdio.h>

#include <stdlib.h>

int main(int argc, char *argv[])

{

char *v[3];

if(argc < 2) {

return 1;

}

v[0] = "/bin/cat"; v[1] = argv[1]; v[2] = 0;

/* Set q = 0 for Question a, and q = 1 for Question b */

int q = 0;

if (q == 0){

char *command = malloc(strlen(v[0]) + strlen(v[1]) + 2);

sprintf(command, "%s %s", v[0], v[1]);

system(command);

}

else execve(v[0], v, 0);

return 0 ;

}

(a)    Set q = 0 in the program. This way, the program will use system() to invoke the command.Is this program safe? If you were Bob, can you compromise the integrity of the system? Fo rexample, can you remove any file that is not writable to you? (Hint: remember that system()actually invokes /bin/sh, and then runs the command within the shell environment. We havetried the environment variable in the previous task; here let us try a different attack. Please pay attention to the special characters used in a normal shell environment).

图 7

(b) Set q = 1 in the program. This way, the program will use execve() to invoke the command.Do your attacks in task (a) still work? Please describe and explain your observations.

图 8

6. The LD PRELOAD environment variable.

To make sure Set-UID programs are safe from the manipulation of the LD PRELOAD environmentvariable, the runtime linker (ld.so) will ignore this environment variable if the program is aSet-UID root program, except for some conditions. We will figure out what these conditions are inthis task.

(a) Let us build a dynamic link library. Create the following program, and name it mylib.c. Itbasically overrides the sleep() function in libc:

#include <stdio.h>

void sleep (int s)

{

printf("I am not sleeping!\n");

}

(b) We can compile the above program using the following commands (in the -W1 argument, thethird character is one, not ; in the -lc argment, the second character is ):

% gcc -fPIC -g -c mylib.c

% gcc -shared -W1,-soname,libmylib.so.1 \

-o libmylib.so.1.0.1 mylib.o –lc

(d) Finally, compile the following program myprog (put this program in the same directory as libmylib.so.1.0.1):

/* myprog.c */

int main()

{

sleep(1);

return 0;

}

Please run myprog under the following conditions, and observe what happens. Based on your observations,tell us when the runtime linker will ignore the LD PRELOAD environment variable, andexplain why.

_ Make myprog a regular program, and run it as a normal user.

图 9

_ Make myprog a Set-UID root program, and run it as a normal user.

图 10

_ Make myprog a Set-UID root program, and run it in the root account.

图 11

图 12

图 13

_ Make myprog a Set-UID user1 program (i.e., the owner is user1, which is another user account),and run it as a different user (not-root user).

7. Relinquishing privileges and cleanup.

To be more secure, Set-UID programs usually call setuid() system call to permanently relinquishtheir root privileges. However, sometimes, this is not enough. Compile the following program,and make the program a set-root-uid program. Run it in a normal user account, and describe what youhave observed. Will the file /etc/zzz be modified? Please explain your observation.

#include <stdio.h>

#include <stdlib.h>

#include <sys/types.h>

#include <sys/stat.h>

#include <fcntl.h>

void main()

{ int fd;

/* Assume that /etc/zzz is an important system file,

and it is owned by root with permission 0644 */

fd = open("/etc/zzz", O_RDWR | O_APPEND);

/* Simulate the tasks conducted by the program */

sleep(1);

/* After the task, the root privileges are no longer needed,

it’s time to relinquish the root privileges permanently. */

setuid(getuid()); /* getuid() returns the real uid */

if (fork()) { /* In the parent process */

close (fd);

exit(0);

} else { /* in the child process */

/* Now, assume that the child process is compromised, malicious

attackers have injected the following statements

into this process */

write (fd, "Malicious Data", 14);

close (fd);

}

}

图 14

图 15

图 16

• 写评论