无人驾驶 ai算法_质疑AI是否具有意图以及这对无人驾驶汽车意味着什么

无人驾驶 ai算法

Dr. Lance Eliot, AI Insider

AI Insider的Lance Eliot博士

[Ed. Note: For reader’s interested in Dr. Eliot’s ongoing business analyses about the advent of self-driving cars, see his online Forbes column: https://forbes.com/sites/lanceeliot/]

[编辑 注意:如果读者对Eliot博士正在进行的有关自动驾驶汽车问世的业务分析感兴趣,请参阅他的在线《福布斯》专栏: https //forbes.com/sites/lanceeliot/ ]

There are various ways in which someone might express their intent or intentions. In some instances, a person expresses their intent directly, while in other cases they appear to be avoiding being pinned down on their intentions and are trying to toss the intent onto the shoulders of someone or something else.

有人可以通过多种方式表达自己的意图或意图。 在某些情况下,一个人直接表达了自己的意图,而在另一些情况下,他们似乎正在避免被自己的意图所束缚,并试图将意图抛在某人或其他东西的肩膀上。

When we express our intent, there is no particular reason to necessarily believe that it is true per se.

当我们表达我们的意图时,没有特别的理由必须相信它本身就是真的。

A person can tell you their intentions and yet be lying through their teeth.

一个人可以告诉您他们的意图,但仍在说谎。

Or, a person can offer their intentions and genuinely believe that they are forthcoming in their indication, and yet it might be entirely fabricated and concocted as a kind of rationalization after-the-fact.

或者,一个人可以提供自己的意图,并真正相信他们的预兆即将到来,但它可能是事后合理化的一种完全捏造和炮制的行为。

Consider too that a person might be offering acrid cynical remarks, for which their intention is buried or hidden within their words, and you accordingly need to somehow decipher or tease out the real meaning of their quips.

也要考虑一个人可能会提出刻薄的玩世不恭的言论,为此他们的意图被掩盖或隐藏在他们的言语中,因此,您需要以某种方式解读或弄清他们打趣的真实含义。

There is also the straightforward possibility that the person is utterly clueless about their intention, and thus are unable to precisely state what their intent is.

还有一种直接的可能性,就是这个人对自己的意图一无所知,因此无法精确地说明他们的意图。

And so on.

等等。

This naturally leads us to contemplate what intent or intention purports to consist of.

这自然使我们考虑了意图组成的意图或意图。

The common definition of intent or intention is that it involves the act of determining something that you want and plan to do, and usually emphasizes that the effort of “intent” encompasses mentally determining upon some action or result.

意图或意图的通用定义是,它涉及确定您想要和计划做的事情的行为,通常强调“意图”的工作包括从精神上确定某些行动或结果。

By referring to the mind or mental processing, the word “intent” opens quite a Pandora’s box.

通过提及思想或心理处理过程,“意图”一词打开了潘多拉盒子。

Simply stated, there is no ironclad way to know what someone’s mind contains or did contain.

简而言之,没有铁定的方式知道某人的思想包含或确实包含什么。

We do not have any means to directly and fully interrogate the brain and have it showcase to us the origins of thoughts and how they came to exist. Our brains and our minds are locked away in our skulls, and the only path to figuring out what is going on consists of poking around from the outside or marginally so from the inside.

我们没有任何直接和全面询问大脑的手段,无法向我们展示思想的起源以及它们如何存在。 我们的大脑和大脑被锁在头骨中,弄清楚正在发生的事情的唯一途径是从外面或从内部稍稍戳一戳。

Now, yes, you can try using an MRI and other techniques to try and gauge the electromagnetic or biochemical activity of the brain, but be clear that this is a far cry from being able to connect-the-dots directly and be able to definitively indicate that this thought or that thought was derived from these neurons and those neurons.

现在,是的,您可以尝试使用MRI和其他技术来尝试测量大脑的电磁或生物化学活动,但是请注意,这与能够直接连接点并能够确定性相距甚远表明这个想法或那个想法源自这些神经元和这些神经元。

We have not yet reversed engineered the brain sufficiently to make those kinds of uncontestable proclamations.

我们还没有对大脑进行足够的逆向工程,以做出那些无可争辩的声明。

Overall, one could even argue that the whole concept of intent and intentions is somewhat obtuse and perhaps a construct of what we want to believe about our actions. Some would say that we want to believe that we do things for a reason, and therefore we offer that there is this thing called “intent” and thus it offers a rational explanation for what otherwise might be nothing of the kind.

总的来说,甚至可以说意图和意图的整个概念有些晦涩难懂,也许是我们想要相信自己的行为的一种建构。 有人会说我们想相信我们做某事是有原因的,因此我们提供了一个叫做“意图”的东西,因此它为否则可能是一类的事情提供了合理的解释。

For those that relish debating about the topic of free will, perhaps none of us have any capability of intent and we are all pre-programmed to carry out acts, none of which relates to any personal intent and we are simply acting as puppets on a string.

对于那些津津乐道于自由意志话题的人们,也许我们每个人都没有任何意图能力,而且我们都已被预先编程以进行行为,而这些行为都与个人意图无关,而我们只是在扮演一个人偶。串。

More On The Nature Of Intentions

更多关于意图的本质

I don’t want to go too far off the rails here but did want to mention the philosophical viewpoint that intent might not exist in any ordinary manner and we cannot assume as such that it does.

我不想在这里走得太远,但我想提及一种哲学观点,即意图可能不会以任何普通方式存在,我们不能以此为假设。

Since we are on a roll here about thinking widely, there is a handy catchphrase about intent from George Bernard Shaw that offers additional food for thought: “We know there is intention and purpose in the universe, because there is intention and purpose in us.”

由于我们在这里进行广泛的思考,因此乔治·伯纳德·肖(George Bernard Shaw)给出了一个关于意图的方便的惯用语,它为我们提供了更多的思考空间:“我们知道宇宙中存在意图和目的,因为我们中存在意图和目的。 ”

Notice that this is quite reassuring, namely that since we generally believe that there is intention within us, ergo this somehow implies that there is an intention in the universe, and therefore we can remain sanguine and be comforted that everything has a meaning and intention (though some might counterargue that the universe and we are all completely random and purposeless).

请注意,这是相当令人放心的,即由于我们通常认为我们内在存在意图,因此,以某种方式犯错就意味着宇宙中存在意图,因此我们可以保持乐观并感到欣慰,凡事都有含义和意图(尽管有些人可能会反驳说,宇宙和我们都是完全随机且毫无目的的)。

While we are teetering on the edge of this precipice, let’s keep going.

当我们在悬崖峭壁上摇摇欲坠时,让我们继续前进。

Maybe intent and intention is a cover-up for the acts of humanity.

意图和意图也许是对人类行为的掩盖。

If you do something adverse, the intent might be a means to placate others about your dastardly deed and act as a distractor from the act committed.

如果您做了不利的事情,那么此意图可能是一种使他人安抚您的卑鄙行为,并成为干扰所犯行为的手段。

On the other hand, maybe your act was well-intended, yet it led to something adverse, inadvertently and not by design, therefore your intention ought to be given due weight and consideration.

另一方面,也许您的举动是出于本意,但它却导致了不利的,无意的和非故意的事情,因此应适当考虑和考虑您的意图。

Time to quote another fascinating insight about intent, this one by the revered George Washington: “A man’s intentions should be allowed in some respects to plead for his actions.”

是时候引用人们对意图的另一种令人着迷的见解了,这是受尊敬的乔治·华盛顿(George Washington)的观点:“在某些方面,应该允许一个人的意图为自己的行为辩护。”

Note that Washington’s quote refers to man’s intentions, but we can reasonably allow the meaning to include all of mankind, making the quote to encompass both men and women, restated as a person’s intentions should be allowed in some respects to plead for their actions.

请注意,华盛顿的报价是指人类的意图,但我们可以合理地允许该含义包括全人类,使报价涵盖男性和女性,并重申这一点,因为在某些方面应该允许一个人的意图为自己的行为辩护。

Overall, mankind certainly seems to have accepted the stark and generally unchallenged belief that there are intentions and that those intentions are crucial to the acts we undertake.

总体而言,人类似乎肯定已经接受了有意图的鲜明和普遍的,不受挑战的信念,这些意图对我们所采取的行动至关重要。

That being the case, what else has intentions?

既然如此,还有什么意图?

Does your beloved pet dog or cat have intentions?

您心爱的宠物狗或猫有意图吗?

Do all animals have intentions of one kind or another?

所有动物都具有一种或另一种意图吗?

There is an acrimonious debate about the idea that animals can form intentions.

关于动物可以形成意图的观点引起了激烈的争论。

Some say that it is the case that they do, while others contend that they quite obviously cannot do so. The usual basis for arguing that animals cannot have intentions is that they mentally are too limited and that only humans have the mental capacity to form intent or intentions. Be careful making that brash claim to any dog or cat lover.

有人说他们确实是这样做的,而另一些人则说他们很显然不能这样做。 争论动物不能有意图的通常依据是,它们在精神上过于局限,只有人类才具有形成意图的心理能力。 请谨慎对待任何爱狗或爱猫的人。

Can a toaster have an intention?

烤面包机有意图吗?

I ask because the other day, my toaster burnt my toast.

我问,因为前几天,我的烤面包机烧了我的面包。

Did the toaster do so intentionally, or was it an unintentional act?

烤面包机是故意这样做的,还是无意的举动?

You might be irked at such a question and immediately recoil that the toaster obviously lacks any semblance of intent. It is merely a mindless machine that makes toast.

您可能会对这样的问题感到不高兴,并立即后退,以致烤面包机显然缺乏任何意图。 它仅仅是一台无意的机器,可以烤面包。

There isn’t any there, there.

那里没有任何东西。

Without the ingredient or essential component of mental processing, you would seem to be hard-pressed to ascribe intent to something so ordinary and mechanical.

如果没有心理处理的要素或必要组成部分,您似乎很难将意图归因于如此普通而机械的事物。

This brings us to a most intriguing twist and the intended focus of this discussion, namely, where does AI fit into this murky matter of intent and intention.

这给我们带来了一个最有趣的转折,也是本次讨论的预期焦点,即,人工智能在这个模糊的意图和意图问题中适合何处。

AI systems are increasingly becoming a vital part of our lives.

人工智能系统正日益成为我们生活中至关重要的部分。

There are AI systems that do life-impacting diagnoses of X-ray charts and seem to discern whether there is disease present. There are AI systems that decide whether you can get a car loan that you wanted to obtain. Etc.

有一些AI系统可以对X射线图进行影响生命的诊断,并且似乎可以识别是否存在疾病。 有AI系统可以决定您是否可以获得想要获得的汽车贷款。 等等。

Is AI more akin to humans and therefore able to form intent, or is AI more similar to a toaster and unable to have any substance of intent?

AI是否更类似于人类并因此能够形成意图,或者AI更类似于烤面包机并且无法具有意图的实质?

Lest you think this is an entirely abstract point and not worthy of real-world attention, consider the legal ramifications of whether AI can form intent and whether this is noteworthy or not.

为避免您认为这是一个完全抽象的观点而不值得现实世界关注,请考虑AI是否可以形成意图以及这是否值得注意的法律后果。

In our approach to jurisprudence, we give a tremendous amount of importance to intent, sometimes referred to as scienter in legal circles, and criminal law makes use of intent to ascertain the nature of the crime that can be assigned and the penalty that might ride with the crime undertaken.

在我们的法学研究方法中,我们非常重视意图,有时在法学界被称为科学家,刑法利用意图来确定可以分配的犯罪的性质以及可能受到的惩罚。犯罪。

A toaster that goes awry will hopefully be a mildly adverse consequence (I can choose to eat the burnt toast or toss it into the trash), while if an AI system that can drive a car goes awry, the result can be catastrophic.

发生故障的烤面包机可能会带来轻微的不良后果(我可以选择吃烤面包或将其扔进垃圾桶),而如果可以驱动汽车的AI系统出现故障,那么后果可能是灾难性的。

Using AI for the driving of cars is a life-or-death instance of AI that is emerging for use in our daily lives.

使用AI驾驶汽车是AI的生死攸关的实例,它正在日常生活中使用。

When you see a car going down the street and there isn’t a human driver at the wheel, you are tacitly accepting the belief that the AI can drive the car and will not suddenly veer into a crowd of pedestrians or plow into a car ahead of it.

当您看到一辆汽车在街上行驶时,没有人在驾驶时,您就默契接受了AI可以驾驶汽车,不会突然转向人群和行车的想法。它的。

You might counter-argue that the same can be said of human drivers, whereby when a human driver is at the wheel, you likewise are accepting the belief that the human will not suddenly ram into pedestrians or other cars.

您可能会反驳说,对于人类驾驶员也可以这样说,即当驾驶员在方向盘上时,您同样会接受这样一种信念,即人类不会突然撞向行人或其他汽车。

If the human did so, we’d all be quickly looking for intent.

如果人类这样做了,我们都会Swift寻找意图。

Can we do the same for AI driving systems in terms of the actions that they undertake, and does it make sense to even try to ascertain such AI-based intent?

就AI驾驶系统所做的动作而言,我们可以做同样的事情吗,甚至试图确定这种基于AI的意图是否有意义?

Today’s question then is this: As an example of AI and intent, do we expect AI-based true self-driving cars to embody intention and if so, what does it consist of and how would we know that it exists?

那么今天的问题是: 作为AI和意图的一个例子,我们是否期望基于AI的真正自动驾驶汽车体现意图?如果是,意图由意图组成,我们如何知道它的存在?

The Levels Of Self-Driving Cars

无人驾驶汽车的水平

True self-driving cars are ones where the AI drives the car entirely on its own and there isn’t any human assistance during the driving task.

真正的自动驾驶汽车是指AI完全自行驾驶汽车,并且在驾驶过程中不需要任何人工协助。

These driverless vehicles are considered a Level 4 and Level 5, while a car that requires a human driver to co-share the driving effort is usually considered at a Level 2 or Level 3. The cars that co-share the driving task are described as being semi-autonomous, and typically contain a variety of automated add-on’s that are referred to as ADAS (Advanced Driver-Assistance Systems).

这些无人驾驶车辆被认为是4级和5级,而要求驾驶员共同分担驾驶努力的汽车通常被认为是2级或3级。共同分担驾驶任务的汽车被描述为:是半自治的,通常包含称为ADAS(高级驾驶员辅助系统)的各种自动化附加组件。

There is not yet a true self-driving car at Level 5, which we don’t yet even know if this will be possible to achieve, and nor how long it will take to get there.

5级还没有真正的自动驾驶汽车,我们甚至都不知道这是否有可能实现,以及到达那里需要多长时间。

Meanwhile, the Level 4 efforts are gradually trying to get some traction by undergoing very narrow and selective public roadway trials, though there is controversy over whether this testing should be allowed per se (we are all life-or-death guinea pigs in an experiment taking place on our highways and byways, some point out).

同时,尽管是否应允许进行这种测试本身存在争议(我们都是实验中的有生命或有生命的豚鼠),但4级研究人员正在通过非常狭窄和选择性的公共道路试验逐渐尝试吸引一些关注。指出在我们的高速公路和小路上发生)。

Since semi-autonomous cars require a human driver, the adoption of those types of cars won’t be markedly different from driving conventional vehicles, so there’s not much new per se to cover about them on this topic (though, as you’ll see in a moment, the points next made are generally applicable).

由于半自动驾驶汽车需要人工驾驶,因此这类汽车的采用与传统汽车的驾驶方式没有明显不同,因此,在这个主题上,它们本身并没有太多新的内容要报道(尽管您会看到暂时,接下来提出的要点通常适用)。

For semi-autonomous cars, it is important that the public needs to be forewarned about a disturbing aspect that’s been arising lately, namely that despite those human drivers that keep posting videos of themselves falling asleep at the wheel of a Level 2 or Level 3 car, we all need to avoid being misled into believing that the driver can take away their attention from the driving task while driving a semi-autonomous car.

对于半自动驾驶汽车,重要的是必须预先警告公众有关最近出现的令人不安的方面,即尽管有那些人类驾驶员不断发布自己在2级或3级汽车的方向盘上睡着的视频, ,我们所有人都需要避免被误导以为驾驶员在驾驶半自动驾驶汽车时可以将注意力从驾驶任务上移开。

You are the responsible party for the driving actions of the vehicle, regardless of how much automation might be tossed into a Level 2 or Level 3.

您是车辆驾驶行为的负责方,无论可能将多少自动化投入2级或3级。

For Level 4 and Level 5 true self-driving vehicles, there won’t be a human driver involved in the driving task.

对于4级和5级真正的自动驾驶汽车,不会有人类驾驶员参与驾驶任务。

All occupants will be passengers.

所有乘客均为乘客。

The AI is doing the driving.

AI正在驾驶。

Let’s return to the discussion about intent.

让我们回到有关意图的讨论。

Is the AI that can perform self-driving the same as a toaster?

可以执行自动驾驶的AI与烤面包机一样吗?

Intuitively, we might right away proffer that the AI is not at all like a toaster and that making such a callous suggestion undercuts what the AI is accomplishing in being able to drive a car.

直观地讲,我们可能会立即提出AI根本不像烤面包机,提出这样冷酷的建议削弱了AI在驾驶汽车方面的成就。

Before we dig further into this aspect, I’d like to set the record straight about the AI that can drive a car.

在我们进一步探讨这一方面之前,我想先就可以驾驶汽车的AI进行记录。

Some assume that the AI needed to drive a car must be sentient, able to “think” and perform mental processing on an equivalent basis of humans. So far, that’s not the case, and it seems that we’ll be able to have AI-based self-driving cars without crossing over into the vaunted singularity (the singularity is considered the moment or occurrence of having AI that transforms from being everyday computational and becoming sentient, having the same unspecified and ill-understood spark that mankind seems to have).

有些人认为驾驶汽车所需的AI必须具有感知力,能够“思考”并在人类的同等基础上进行心理处理。 到目前为止,情况并非如此,似乎我们将能够拥有基于AI的自动驾驶汽车,而无需跨越夸口的奇点(这种奇点被认为是AI发生的时刻或发生的时刻,它已经从日常转变为计算和变得有情调,具有人类似乎所拥有的相同的未明确和未被理解的火花)。

For the moment, remove sentience from this discussion as to the capabilities of AI, and assume that the AI being depicted is computer-based and has not yet achieved human-like equivalency of intelligence. If AI does someday arrive at the singularity, presumably we would need to have an altogether new dialogue about intent, since at that point the AI would be apparently the “same” as human intelligence in one manner or another and the role of intent in its actions would rightfully come onto the table, for sure.

目前,从讨论中删除关于AI功能的看法,并假设所描绘的AI是基于计算机的,并且尚未实现类似人的智能等效性。 如果人工智能有一天会达到奇点,那么大概我们将需要就意图进行一次全新的对话,因为在那一点上,人工智能显然将以一种或另一种方式与人类智能“相同”,并且意图在其作用中将扮演可以肯定的是,所有动作都会正确地出现在桌子上。

Consider then these forms of intent:

然后考虑以下意图形式:

  1. Inscrutable Intent

    难以理解的意图
  2. Explicated Intent

    意图明确
  3. AI Developer Intent

    AI开发人员意图
  4. Inserted Intent

    插入意图
  5. Induced Intent

    诱导意图
  6. Emergent Intent

    紧急意图

Elaborating Each Of the Forms Of Intent

详细说明每种意图

Let’s start with the notion of inscrutable intent.

让我们从难以理解的意图的概念开始。

It could be that the AI system has an intent, and yet we have no means to figure out what the intent is.

AI系统可能具有意图,但是我们没有办法弄清楚意图是什么。

For example, the use of Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Learning (DL) oftentimes uses large-scale artificial neural networks (ANNs), which are essentially computer-based simulations of somewhat along the lines of what we believe brains do, though the ML/DL of today is extremely simplistic in comparison and not at all akin to the complexities of the human brain.

例如,机器学习(ML)和深度学习(DL)的使用通常会使用大规模的人工神经网络(ANN),它们实质上是基于计算机的模拟,有些类似于我们认为大脑的行为,尽管如今的ML / DL与之相比非常简单,完全不同于人脑的复杂性。

In any case, the ML/DL is essentially a mathematical model that is computationally being performed, out of which there is not necessarily any logical basis to explain the inner workings. There are just calculations and arithmetic’s taking place. As such, it is generally considered “inscrutable” if there is no ready means to translate this into something meaningful in words and sentences that would constitute an articulated indication of intent.

在任何情况下,ML / DL本质上都是一个正在通过计算执行的数学模型,其中没有必要有任何逻辑基础来解释内部工作原理。 只是在进行计算和算术运算。 因此,如果没有现成的手段将其翻译成有意义的词和句子,而这些词和句子将构成意图的明确指示,则通常被认为是“难以理解的”。

Next, consider explicated intent.

接下来,考虑简单的意图。

Some believe that we might be able to do a type of translation of what is happening inside the AI system, and as such, there is a rising call for XAI, known as explainable AI. This is AI that in one fashion or another has been designed and developed to explain what it is doing, and thus one might say that could showcase explicated intent.

有人认为我们可能能够对AI系统内部发生的事情进行某种类型的翻译,因此,人们对XAI的呼声越来越高,这被称为可解释AI。 这是一种以一种或另一种方式设计和开发的AI,用于解释它在做什么,因此有人可能说这可以展示出明确的意图。

Many argue that you can just drop the whole worry about AI intention and look instead at the AI developer that crafted the AI.

许多人争辩说,您可以完全不用担心AI的意图,而应该关注制作AI的AI开发人员。

Since AI is a human-created effort, the human or humans that put it together are the intenders, and therefore the intention of the AI is found within the intentions of those humans.

由于AI是人为创造的努力,因此将AI放在一起的一个或多个人都是计划者,因此,在这些人的意图之内可以找到AI的意图。

The difficulty with this human-only as intention source is that the human developer might have crafted AI that goes beyond what the AI developer had in mind.

这种仅以人类为意图的来源的困难在于,人类开发人员可能制作的AI超出了AI开发人员的想法。

What do we do when the AI morphs in some manner and no longer abides by what the original human developers intended?

当AI以某种方式变形并且不再遵守原始人类开发人员的意图时,我们该怎么办?

You could argue that no matter what the AI does or becomes, the human developers are still responsible and thus they cannot escape the intention hunt simply by raising their arms and protesting that the AI went beyond their intended aims.

您可能会争辩说,无论AI做什么或变成什么,人类开发人员仍然有责任,因此他们不能仅仅通过举起手臂并抗议AI超出了预期目标来逃脱意图狩猎。

This takes us to the next form of intent, inserted intent.

这将我们带到下一种意图形式,即插入意图。

Essentially, when AI developers craft an AI system, there is an embodiment of “intent” into the computational encoding.

本质上,当AI开发人员设计AI系统时,在计算编码中就有“意图”的体现。

When writing code in say Python or Java or LISP, you could reasonably make the case that the code itself is a reflection of the intent that the human had in their mind. Likewise, even with ML/DL, you could argue that the nature of how the ANN’s are set up and trained is a reflection of the intention of the human developers and therefore the structure leaves a kind of trace or residue which reflects intent.

当使用Python或Java或LISP编写代码时,您可以合理地认为代码本身反映了人们的想法。 同样,即使使用ML / DL,您也可以辩解说,如何设置和训练ANN的本质反映了人类开发人员的意图,因此该结构留下了某种痕迹或残渣,反映了意图。

Induced intent consists of the AI itself using the foundational intent that was implanted by the human developers and deriving new intent on top of that cornerstone. I do not want to suggest this is some anthropomorphic amalgamation. More simply stated, the code or underlying structure changes, and as such the presumption of underlying intent changes too.

诱导意图由AI本身组成,它使用人类开发人员植入的基础意图,并在该基础之上推导新意图。 我不想暗示这是一些拟人化的合并。 简而言之,代码或底层结构会发生变化,因此底层意图的假设也会发生变化。

Finally, the utmost of the induced intent consists of emergent intent, the next level beyond induced, as it were. In the case of emergent intent, the “intent” of the AI becomes relatively far removed from any initial intent that was either inserted or induced and seemingly becomes more semi-independent in appearance.

最后,最大程度的诱导意图由紧急意图构成,超出诱导意图的下一个层次。 在出现紧急意图的情况下,AI的“意图”与插入或诱导的任何初始意图相比都相去甚远,并且看起来在外观上更加半独立。

For AI in self-driving cars, some critics point out we do not have as yet any standardized means to identify what the AI intent consists of, other than to resort to asking the AI developers what they did or by trying to scrutinize byzantine code.

对于自动驾驶汽车中的AI而言,一些批评家指出,除了诉诸于问问AI开发人员他们做了什么或通过仔细检查拜占庭代码之外,我们还没有任何标准化的方法来识别AI的意图。

I’ve predicted that once AI self-driving cars become more prevalent, we will begin to see more and more lawsuits that seek redress when an AI self-driving car gets into a car crash or other car incident.

我已经预测,一旦AI自动驾驶汽车变得更加普遍,当AI自动驾驶汽车发生车祸或其他车祸时,我们将开始看到越来越多的诉讼在寻求补救。

You can readily bet that the notion of intent is going to be raised.

您可以轻易打赌,意图的概念将被提出。

Right now, the matter remains open-ended.

目前,此事仍未解决。

Conclusion

结论

If you strictly adhere to the assumption that intent is a mental activity or form of mental processing, you can presumably stand on that high ground and assert that the AI of today is not akin at all to human mental prowess.

如果严格遵守意图是精神活动或心理处理形式的假设,那么您大概可以站在这个高地上,断言当今的AI根本与人类的智力无济于事。

On the other hand, if you are willing to stretch the notion of mental processing to encompass the AI systems of today, it does seem to open the door to questions about intent.

另一方面,如果您愿意扩展心理处理的概念以涵盖当今的AI系统,那么似乎确实为有关意图的问题打开了大门。

Intent is a multi-faceted topic, ranging across many disciplines including AI, neuroscience, cognitive science, psychology, sociology, law, and other domains. One aspect that seems clear cut is that the question of intent and how it relates to AI will continue to be intentionally a matter of great and vital concern.

意图是一个多方面的主题,涉及多个学科,包括人工智能,神经科学,认知科学,心理学,社会学,法律和其他领域。 显而易见的一个方面是,意图问题及其与AI的关系将继续有意成为一个重大而重要的问题。

For free podcast of this story, visit: http://ai-selfdriving-cars.libsyn.com/website

有关此故事的免费播客,请访问: http : //ai-selfdriving-cars.libsyn.com/website

The podcasts are also available on Spotify, iTunes, iHeartRadio, etc.

播客还可以在Spotify,iTunes,iHeartRadio等上获得。

More info about AI self-driving cars, see: www.ai-selfdriving-cars.guru

有关AI自动驾驶汽车的更多信息,请参见: www.ai-selfdriving-cars.guru

To follow Lance Eliot on Twitter: https://twitter.com/@LanceEliot

要在Twitter上关注Lance Eliot: https//twitter.com/@LanceEliot

For his Forbes.com blog, see: https://forbes.com/sites/lanceeliot/

有关他的Forbes.com博客,请访问: https//forbes.com/sites/lanceeliot/

For his AI Trends blog, see: www.aitrends.com/ai-insider/

有关他的AI趋势博客,请访问: www.aitrends.com/ai-insider/

For his Medium blog, see: https://medium.com/@lance.eliot

有关其Medium博客,请访问: https : //medium.com/@lance.eliot

For Dr. Eliot’s books, see: https://www.amazon.com/author/lanceeliot

有关艾略特博士的书,请参见: https : //www.amazon.com/author/lanceeliot

Copyright © 2020 Dr. Lance B. Eliot

版权所有©2020 Lance B.Eliot博士

翻译自: https://medium.com/@lance.eliot/questioning-whether-ai-can-have-intent-and-what-this-means-for-self-driving-cars-2e2fe8fbec75

无人驾驶 ai算法

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