电子投票算法
The promise of a more automated world has inspired innovation in high technology, delivering higher efficiency and cost savings. This is accomplished through electronic means with the use of computer systems. While it makes sense for most processes, especially in the manufacturing and tech industry, it is actually not a good idea for others. One of those processes which I think it is not a good idea is for electronic voting.
更加自动化的世界的前景激发了高科技的创新，带来了更高的效率和成本节省。 这是通过使用计算机系统以电子方式实现的。 尽管对于大多数流程(特别是在制造业和科技行业)有意义，但实际上对于其他流程而言并不是一个好主意。 我认为这不是一个好主意的过程之一是电子投票。
了解投票过程 (Understanding The Voting Process)
When you vote, you are exercising your right as a citizen of a country or member of an organization. It is a fundamental right that is part of a process of electing officials to a position. It is also very personal since each person can only vote once. It is, therefore, a one-to-one relationship (1:1) in which a vote that is cast is final. A voter cannot change their vote once it has been committed to the system. Your vote should not be revealed to the public by the polling station or by any agency or a third party, though it is your choice to reveal who you voted for. Voters are also not allowed to vote twice, using their identity.
投票时，您是在行使作为国家公民或组织成员的权利。 这是一项基本权利，是选举官员职位的一部分。 这也是非常个人的，因为每个人只能投票一次。 因此，这是一对一关系(1：1)，其中进行的表决是最终表决。 一旦提交给系统，选民就无法更改其投票。 尽管您可以选择公开投票的人，但是投票站，任何机构或第三方都不应向公众公开您的投票。 选民也不得使用自己的身份投票两次。
When you vote, you are normally asked to verify your identity. The majority of identity verification is done by presenting a government-issued ID (e.g. passport, voter card, driver license). This should show a photograph of the voter's face and the validity of the issuer of the ID in the form of a seal or stamp. There are no digital identity systems that can replace this system at the moment (as of this writing), so the staff checking at the voting precinct must verify the documents manually.
当您投票时，通常会要求您验证您的身份。 大多数身份验证是通过出示政府签发的身份证件(例如护照，选民证，驾驶执照)来完成的。 这应该以图章或图章的形式显示选民的面部照片和身份证发行人的有效性。 目前(截至撰写本文时)，尚没有任何数字身份系统可以替代此系统，因此在投票区检查的工作人员必须手动验证文件。
If you reside in the US, your eligibility to vote requires you to be a US citizen, at least 18 years of age and then there are other requirements based on state laws. Voters also cannot have a felony conviction or record, be a permanent resident (e.g. Greencard holder, Refugee, etc.) or be mentally incapacitated (depends on state laws). These are the requirements that will need to be verified and putting it all into an electronic system seems to make the most sense. First, it would lessen voter registration time since a registered voter can just present their card or show a valid form of authorization once they arrive at the voting booth. Second, it makes it more efficient since the voter can vote immediately without having to go through a verification process.
如果您居住在美国，那么您的投票资格要求您是至少18岁的美国公民，然后根据州法律还有其他要求。 选民也不能被重罪定罪或记录，不能成为永久居民(例如绿卡持有人，难民等)或精神上无行为能力(取决于州法律)。 这些都是需要验证的要求，将其全部放入电子系统似乎是最有意义的。 首先，这将减少选民的注册时间，因为一旦注册选民到达投票站，他们便可以出示其证件或出示有效的授权书。 其次，它使效率更高，因为选民可以立即投票，而不必经过验证过程。
Each state has its own requirements, that also includes voter registration. For example, some states require a photo ID while others do not. There is no consistent process so it depends on each state’s laws for voting. At times a voter can vote without presenting an ID, but they will have to sign a form to confirm their identity. They will then be asked to later show proof of their identity, and if none can be produced, their ballot will not count.
每个州都有自己的要求，其中还包括选民登记。 例如， 某些州要求提供带照片的身份证，而其他州则不需要 。 没有一致的程序，因此投票取决于每个州的法律。 有时，选民可以在不出示身份证的情况下进行投票，但他们必须签署一份表格以确认其身份。 然后，他们将被要求出示其身份证明，如果无法出示，则其选票将不予计算。
So far it seems ideal to make voting electronic. Currently, the US does not allow online voting of any sort for federal and state elections. This could change in the future when identity verification becomes fully digital and electronic. At the moment it still requires the physical presence of the voter at the polling station (where votes are cast).
到目前为止，使投票电子化似乎是理想的。 当前，美国不允许对联邦和州选举进行任何形式的在线投票。 当身份验证变成全数字和电子形式时，这种情况将来可能会改变。 目前，它仍然需要投票人在投票站的实际存在(在这里进行投票)。
即时，无纸化和便捷 (Instant, Paperless And Convenient)
One of the reasons to go electronic is it makes everything instant. It is also paperless and convenient, the perfect pitch for why to convert any process into an electronic system. This works fine for document management, conveyor belt automation, payment processing, and other business processes. Its benefits include cutting costs, saving time and increasing revenue. When you try to do that for a voting system, it seems to be ideal … on paper.
采用电子技术的原因之一是它可以使一切瞬间完成。 它还无纸且方便，是为什么要将任何过程转换为电子系统的理想选择。 这对于文档管理，传送带自动化，付款处理和其他业务流程非常有效。 它的好处包括削减成本，节省时间和增加收入。 当您尝试对投票系统执行此操作时，它似乎是理想的……纸面上。
Governments and organizations that plan on deploying electronic voting systems consider the amount they can potentially save, and at the same time make the process more streamlined and efficient. Voters will no longer need to enter voting booths since they can conveniently vote from the comfort of their location, using an app on their smartphone. The votes are then instantly tabulated and stored in a database, allowing immediate access to the results. Since the votes are stored directly in a database, there is no more need for paper, eliminating the costs of printing vote ballots and staff to handle the counting of the votes.
计划部署电子投票系统的政府和组织会考虑可能节省的金额，同时使流程更加简化和高效。 选民将不再需要进入投票站，因为他们可以使用智能手机上的应用轻松地在自己舒适的位置进行投票。 然后立即将选票制成表格并将其存储在数据库中，以便立即访问结果。 由于选票直接存储在数据库中，因此不再需要纸张，从而消除了打印选票和工作人员点票的成本。
I am not saying electronic voting systems won’t work. Developing and deploying these systems are not a big problem. The software tools for developers are widely available, including open-source code. The infrastructure is also there, via the Internet. They will work, but there is much more concern in that regard. It needs more vetting and guarantees to ensure confidence.
我并不是说电子投票系统不起作用。 开发和部署这些系统并不是一个大问题。 面向开发人员的软件工具广泛可用，包括开放源代码。 通过互联网，基础设施也在那里。 它们将起作用，但是在这方面有更多的关注。 它需要更多的审查和保证以确保信心。
电子投票的风险 (The Risks Of Electronic Voting)
If you are already aware at this point as to why I don’t think electronic voting is a good idea, then you understand the risks. There are many since it is going to be electronic and online. The threats to the system will be cyber in nature. When you put a system online, the threat vectors are plenty since public data networks like the Internet have no built-in security layer. That means due diligence is required of the developer to secure the system the best way they can, and sometimes even that can fail.
如果您现在已经知道为什么我认为电子投票不是一个好主意，那么您就可以理解其中的风险。 有很多，因为它将是电子的和在线的。 该系统的威胁将是网络性的。 当您将系统置于联机状态时，由于互联网之类的公共数据网络没有内置的安全层，因此威胁向量很多。 这意味着开发人员需要尽职调查，才能以最佳方式保护系统，有时甚至会失败。
One of the most likely threats to electronic voting is identity theft. If there is no proven digital identity management system in place, what prevents a bad actor from spoofing someone’s identity and using it to vote? People can also be careless and not secure their own identity online. For example, if the access to online voting is a simple website that requires username/password, you are leaving the front door open to various sorts of attacks. Hackers can guess passwords, especially if its as easy to guess as “password”. Don’t be surprised if people don’t actually use strong passwords, because in many hacking cases that was how the hacker was able to access a victim’s personal online account.
电子投票最可能的威胁之一就是身份盗用 。 如果没有经过验证的数字身份管理系统，那么什么可以阻止不良行为者欺骗某人的身份并使用其投票？ 人们也可能粗心大意，无法在线保护自己的身份。 例如，如果要访问在线投票是一个简单的网站，需要用户名/密码，那么您将面临各种攻击。 黑客可以猜测密码，特别是如果密码与“密码”一样容易猜测的话。 如果人们实际上没有使用强密码，也不要感到惊讶，因为在许多黑客案件中，黑客都是通过这种方式来访问受害者的个人在线帐户的。
Users install different apps on their smartphones and computers. Some of these apps can be malware. These apps are disguised as legitimate software applications, but in reality, they are more malicious. Some malware will unleash a virus with a payload that could wipe out the contents in storage. Others try to steal passwords using keyloggers that record keystrokes from the user’s login. A hacker can then take control of the voter’s smartphone and use it to vote online. This is one of the greatest risks of using electronic voting systems.
用户在其智能手机和计算机上安装不同的应用程序。 其中一些应用程序可能是恶意软件 。 这些应用程序伪装成合法的软件应用程序，但实际上，它们更加恶意。 一些恶意软件会释放带有有效载荷的病毒，这种有效载荷可能会破坏存储中的内容。 其他人则尝试使用键盘记录器来窃取密码，该键盘记录器记录用户登录时的击键。 然后，黑客可以控制选民的智能手机并使用它进行在线投票。 这是使用电子投票系统的最大风险之一。
Another problem is network congestion or denial of service attacks (DOS). Also called a distributed denial-of-service attack or DDOS, it can be orchestrated by bad actors to congest a server. When used against a server where voters can vote online, all the attackers need to do is target this server and prevent voters from accessing it. This is a terrible scenario on election day when a server cannot be accessed for electronic voting. More sinister attacks could include DDOS attacks that aim to crash a server.
另一个问题是网络拥塞或拒绝服务攻击(DOS) 。 也称为分布式拒绝服务攻击或DDOS，它可能由不良参与者精心策划以使服务器拥塞。 当针对可让选民在线投票的服务器时，攻击者所要做的只是将目标服务器定为目标，并阻止选民访问它。 当选举日无法访问服务器进行电子投票时，这是一个可怕的情况。 更多险恶的攻击可能包括旨在使服务器崩溃的DDOS攻击。
It has already been proven that bugs can affect any electronic system. An example of this was the 2020 Iowa Caucus vote reporting app, which had an epic fail. As part of the electronic voting process, a smartphone app was developed for reporting the counted votes that come from a precinct. This assists the staff who would otherwise need to do it manually. Bugs in the code were identified, “according to many reports” (there is a suspicion here), and it prevented a timely vote count from taking place. That is intolerable at this stage of a very important event like the Iowa Caucus. Shouldn’t the software developers have been more pro-active at making sure the system works before it was deployed? It is all about testing and quality assurance, something all production software must undergo to guarantee its reliability and efficiency. What if a system has a bug that mistakenly interpreted a click for a vote to the opposition candidate the voter did not wish for? That is going to be a huge problem.
已经证明错误可以影响任何电子系统。 这方面的一个例子是2020年爱荷华州核心小组投票报告应用程序 ，该应用程序出现了重大失败。 作为电子投票过程的一部分，开发了一个智能手机应用程序，用于报告来自选区的计数投票。 这可以帮助原本需要手动完成工作的人员。 确定了代码中的错误，“根据许多报告”(这里有怀疑)，并且阻止了及时的计数。 在爱荷华州核心小组等非常重要的活动的现阶段，这是无法忍受的。 在开发系统之前，软件开发人员是否应该更加主动地确保系统正常运行？ 一切都与测试和质量保证有关，所有生产软件都必须经过这些保证以保证其可靠性和效率。 如果系统中存在一个错误，错误地将点击解释为对选民不希望的反对党候选人投票，该怎么办？ 那将是一个巨大的问题。
What could be even worse, is the manipulation of the system by bad actors. If the software company that developed the system for the Iowa Caucus had a hidden agenda or vested interests, they can manipulate the system in ways that the public would not know. With a lack of transparency, any system can hide malicious intentions, allowing for results to be changed or rigged to favor other candidates. This is, of course, a worst-case scenario when you have an electronic system that is highly centralized, non-regulated and not transparent enough.
更糟糕的是，不良行为者对系统的操纵 。 如果为爱荷华州核心小组开发该系统的软件公司有隐藏的议程或既得利益，他们可以以公众不知道的方式操纵该系统。 由于缺乏透明度，任何系统都可以隐藏恶意意图，从而允许更改结果或操纵结果以偏向其他候选人。 当然，当您的电子系统高度集中，不受监管且不够透明时，这是最坏的情况。
Finally, electronic systems are always prone to getting hacked. Bad actors now include state-sponsored hackers who can attempt to break into an electronic voting system to influence the outcome of an election. This is the inherent problem when you put a system online that is accessible by everyone, and that includes your hackers. Something that is as critical to a state’s sovereignty as voting should not have to face that risk at all, even with the strictest cybersecurity policies. All it takes is one vulnerability on the system and the hackers are in.
最后，电子系统总是容易被黑客入侵 。 现在，不良行为者包括政府资助的黑客，他们可能试图闯入电子投票系统以影响选举结果。 当您使每个人都可以访问的系统(包括黑客)联机时，这是固有的问题。 即使采用最严格的网络安全政策，对国家主权至关重要的事情也绝不会像投票那样完全面对这种风险。 它所需要的只是系统上的一个漏洞，而黑客也处于其中。
拟议的解决方案 (Proposed Solutions)
Some would argue that electronic voting can always be successful if the developers have strenuously tested the system against cybersecurity threats and logical conditions. You can do all the testing you want, but when it comes to election day and it has a flaw, things will fall apart. No matter how many hours of testing you do on a system, if any condition arises that has not been addressed in development, the result will likely be a failure.
有人会认为，如果开发人员针对网络安全威胁和逻辑条件进行了严格的测试，则电子投票始终可以取得成功。 您可以进行所需的所有测试，但是到选举日，它有缺陷时，事情就会崩溃。 无论您在系统上进行多少小时的测试，如果出现开发中未解决的任何情况，结果都可能是失败的。
Currently, online systems that deal with transactions like payments use security tokens to log a user’s session. This token is valid for a certain time period. It is also only available for that session and cannot be used on another device. When the time limit is reached, the token expires and will require the user to log in again with their credentials. This aims to protect and secure the link to prevent data eavesdropping and the visibility of unencrypted data. These can be applied to electronic voting as well.
当前，处理诸如支付之类的交易的在线系统使用安全令牌来记录用户的会话。 该令牌在特定时间段内有效。 它也仅适用于该会话，不能在其他设备上使用。 达到时间限制后，令牌将过期，并且将要求用户使用其凭据再次登录。 这旨在保护和保护链接，以防止数据窃听和未加密数据的可见性。 这些也可以应用于电子投票。
It may still be fooled by hackers since they can always impersonate the user. If anyone gains physical access to the user’s smartphone along with their credentials, the system would really have no way of knowing if that is the voter or not. This is where biometrics comes into play. By requiring voters to activate the app with their fingerprint or other physical attribute using a retina scan or facial recognition, another layer of security is added.
由于黑客始终可以冒充用户，因此它仍然可能被黑客欺骗。 如果有人获得了对用户智能手机及其凭据的物理访问权，那么该系统实际上将无法知道那是否是投票者。 这就是生物识别技术发挥作用的地方。 通过要求选民使用视网膜扫描或面部识别功能以其指纹或其他物理属性来激活应用程序，添加了另一层安全保护。
Users will also be required to use MFA (Multi-Factor Authentication). This requires not just a username/password, but a randomly generated code from an online authenticator. This code is then used to gain access to the system. These codes are not pre-determined, they are totally random in nature and generated by a credible source. This makes it much harder for anyone who knows a user’s password from accessing their online account, including that for voting.
还将要求用户使用MFA(多重身份验证) 。 这不仅需要用户名/密码，还需要从在线身份验证器中随机生成的代码。 然后，使用此代码来访问系统。 这些代码不是预先确定的，它们本质上是完全随机的，并且是由可靠来源生成的。 对于知道用户密码的任何人来说，访问其在线帐户(包括用于投票的密码)都会变得更加困难。
A more sound proposal is to use a blockchain to secure an online vote. Blockchains cryptographically secure data, preventing bad actors from manipulating or tampering with votes. The blockchain has been successful so far in the use of cryptocurrency, as the provenance layer that verifies transactions in public, decentralized and trustless systems. It has been proposed for voting systems as well.
一个更合理的建议是使用区块链来确保在线投票。 区块链以加密方式保护数据，防止不良行为者操纵或篡改选票。 到目前为止，区块链作为一种来源层，可以验证加密的公共，去中心化和不信任系统中的交易，因此在使用加密货币方面已经取得了成功。 也已经提出用于投票系统 。
我仍然怀疑 (I Am Still Skeptical)
You can prove me wrong, but I am still skeptical of electronic voting systems, despite proposed solutions. There are many risk factors that can affect an electronic system, but we use them anyway. We go online to make payments on bills, submit personal data for loan applications, purchase items online and even update our medical records for health insurance claims. These are all personal and confidential, just like with voting. In voting, however, when we vote, our ballot should not trace back to us, but rather ensure the secrecy of our vote.
您可以证明我错了，但是尽管提出了解决方案，但我仍然对电子投票系统持怀疑态度。 有许多可能影响电子系统的风险因素，但是我们还是要使用它们。 我们在线上支付账单，提交个人数据以进行贷款申请，在线购买商品，甚至更新我们的医疗记录以获取健康保险索赔。 这些都是个人和机密的，就像投票一样。 但是，在投票时，当我们投票时， 我们的选票不应追溯到我们身上，而应确保投票的机密性。
It will not make sense to use a blockchain, specifically a public one. This is because blockchains were meant to be both transparent and immutable, not just immutable. A vote should be confidential, therefore no one should be able to know who you voted for. There can be repercussions against an individual because of the candidate they voted for. You cannot expect people to just accept things without emotions at work. That is just human nature. Voters are allowed to tell people who they voted for, that is their right. There will be consequences for some, so it is best to keep the results of any vote secret and confidential. A public blockchain will do a horrible job in that regard. Unless the blockchain uses privacy features, no one should know who you voted for.
使用区块链，特别是公共区块链没有意义。 这是因为区块链本来应该是透明且不可变的，而不仅仅是不可变的。 投票应该是机密的，因此没有人应该知道您投票给谁。 可能会因为他们投票的候选人而对个人产生影响。 您不能指望人们在工作中没有情绪就接受事情。 那只是人的本性。 允许选民告诉人们他们选谁，这是他们的权利。 这将对某些人产生后果，因此最好对任何投票结果保密。 在这方面，公共区块链将做得很糟糕。 除非区块链使用隐私功能 ，否则没人会知道您投票给谁。
Blockchains, since they are also permissionless and trustless, can encourage bad actors since anyone can enter the system. Now another solution to this would be a digital identity for voters on a blockchain to prevent identity spoofing or theft. Why would you want to associate your digital identity with your vote? Once again that violates privacy because the digital identity can be traced to whom you voted for. Blockchains, for the most part, are not anonymous, they are pseudonymous. That means a public address that is associated with a digital identity can be traced back to an individual.
区块链由于也是未经许可和不信任的 ，因此可以鼓励不良行为者，因为任何人都可以进入系统。 现在，另一种解决方案将是为区块链上的选民提供数字身份，以防止身份欺骗或盗窃。 您为什么要将自己的数字身份与投票联系起来？ 再次侵犯隐私权，因为可以追踪到您投票给谁的数字身份。 Blockchains，在大多数情况下，不是匿名的 ，他们是笔名 。 这意味着可以将与数字身份关联的公共地址追溯到个人。
Just imagine if everyone’s vote was available to the public. Third-party research firms will have a field day gathering information on who voted for who and use this for targeted ads and more nefarious activities. It can also be used by the opposition to target voters to flip. Your co-worker who you often disagree with can find out later on that you voted for someone they are vehemently against. This can spark more conflict that really makes relationships more toxic. The right to privacy and making confidential decisions will be affected.
试想一下，如果所有人都能投票给公众。 第三方研究公司将在野外活动日收集有关谁投票支持谁的信息，并将其用于针对性广告和更邪恶的活动。 反对派也可以用它来攻击选民。 您经常不同意的同事会在以后发现，您投票赞成他们强烈反对的人。 这会引发更多的冲突，这实际上会使人际关系变得更加有害。 隐私权和机密决定权将受到影响。
So why is voting not ideal for an electronic system update? It has to do with trust. It requires trust to do the activities we do online. We can contest electronic payments and confirm the validity of personal data. This is because we trust our bank, credit card provider, online merchants, and payment processors. Your vote once it is cast can no longer be contested or validated after the fact. With electronic voting, are we really sure we can trust the company that is running it? If it was controlled by the state, can we trust them to handle things in a fair and unbiased manner? We do not know for a fact that no one will attempt to manipulate votes. Putting votes in an electronic system in digital format makes it even easier than ever to tamper with. Appearing in person and casting a vote is far more reliable and reassuring than electronic voting, where there is a greater risk of manipulation and hacking.
那么为什么投票对于电子系统更新来说并不理想？ 它与信任有关 。 进行在线活动需要信任。 我们可以对电子付款提出质疑，并确认个人数据的有效性。 这是因为我们信任我们的银行，信用卡提供商，在线商家和付款处理方。 事实一经表决，您的投票一经表决即无法再进行辩论或验证。 通过电子投票，我们真的确定我们可以信任运营它的公司吗？ 如果它是由国家控制的，我们可以信任他们以公正，公正的方式处理事情吗？ 我们不知道没有人会试图操纵选票。 以数字格式在电子系统中投票比以往任何时候都更加容易进行篡改。 亲自出席并进行投票比电子投票更加可靠和令人放心，因为电子投票有更大的被操纵和黑客攻击的风险。
最后的想法 (Final Thoughts)
There are no guarantees that an electronic voting system will work reliably. The utmost concern is the cybersecurity aspect since it will be online operating over a public data network. Even if it requires a VPN for more secure and private communication, the system itself is in question. Will the system fairly accept every vote and not manipulate the results? Such systems are also prone to attacks from “black hat” groups and state-sponsored hackers.
不能保证电子投票系统将可靠运行。 最为关注的是网络安全方面，因为它将通过公共数据网络在线运行。 即使它需要VPN来实现更安全和私有的通信，系统本身也是一个问题。 系统会公平地接受每一个投票，而不操纵结果吗？ 这样的系统还容易受到“黑帽”组织和国家资助的黑客的攻击。
With electronic voting, it may actually encourage rather than minimize electoral fraud. Voting systems have to prove they won’t allow voters to vote twice, that the voter is truly who they claim to be, that another person cannot vote in place of a registered voter, etc. There are so many factors to consider, forgetting about one can open the system up to critical errors. Any vulnerability in software and hardware can also lead to attacks that can compromise the system. The DEFCON hacking convention “Voting Village” demonstrates how easy it can be to hack a voting machine connected online.
通过电子投票，它实际上可能鼓励而不是最小化选举欺诈。 投票系统必须证明他们不允许选民进行两次投票，该选民确实是他们声称的真实身份，另一个人不能代替已注册的选民进行投票等。要考虑的因素太多了，忘记了可以使系统出现严重错误。 软件和硬件中的任何漏洞也可能导致可能危害系统的攻击。 DEFCON黑客大会 “ Voting Village”展示了黑客攻击在线连接的投票机有多么容易。
At the moment, voting is still a manual process. They can still be controversial, but it seems likely that even if it moves toward an electronic system the controversy won’t go away. It has more to do with politics. The good thing about the current voting process is that it preserves the privacy of the citizen’s choice. There is a paper trail of votes, but it doesn’t reveal who the person voted for. With electronic systems, this information can be recorded and used against you.
目前，投票仍是手动过程。 它们仍然是有争议的，但是，即使它朝着电子系统发展，争议似乎也不会消失。 它更多地与政治有关。 当前投票过程的好处是，它保留了公民选择的隐私。 有纸质的投票记录，但没有透露该人投票的对象。 使用电子系统，可以记录这些信息并对您使用。
Perhaps someday electronic voting will be reliable and guaranteed. It should preserve the privacy of an individual’s vote and not keep track of who they voted for. It should also have contingency measures against system failures and cybersecurity. The system must be operated by a non-biased organization that do not have any agenda or vested interests. Using a cryptographically secure decentralized system might be ideal, but once again it should not be biased. At the moment we just can’t guarantee that nothing wrong will happen and that we can trust whoever is in control of the system. I believe that more trust is needed for this to become accepted.
也许有一天，电子投票将是可靠和有保证的。 它应该保留个人投票的隐私权，而不应跟踪他们投票的对象。 它还应具有针对系统故障和网络安全的应急措施。 该系统必须由没有任何议程或既得利益的公正组织来运行。 使用加密安全的分散系统可能是理想的选择，但同样不要偏见。 目前，我们不能保证不会发生任何错误，并且我们可以信任控制系统的任何人。 我认为，需要更多的信任才能被接受。
Note: The views expressed are the opinion of the author. Always DYOR to verify facts.
注：表达的观点是作者的观点。 总是DYOR验证事实。
电子投票算法
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