modsecurity内存泄露_ModSecurity存在旁路漏洞

ModSecurity存在旁路漏洞，不过貌似只影响到Windows系统(ASP、ASP.NET)，使用Linux/UNIX系统的朋友可以松口气～～～

下面是具体信息：

========================================================================

ModSecurity (Core Rules) HPP Filter Bypass Vulnerability

========================================================================

Affected Software : ModSecurity <= 2.5.9 using ModSecurity Core Rules <= 2.5-1.6.1

Author : Lavakumar Kuppan - lavakumar[dot]in[at]gmail[dot]com

Advisory URL : http://www.lavakumar.com

Severity : High

Local/Remote : Remote

[Vulnerability Details]

Modsecurity is an Open source Web Application firewall which runs as an Apache

module. It has a comprehensive set of rules called 'ModSecurity Core Rules' for common web application

attacks like SQL Injection, Cross-Site Scripting etc.

It is possible to bypass the ModSecurity Core Rules due to the difference in behaviour

of ModSecurity and ASP/ASP.NET applications in handling duplicate HTTP GET/POST/Cookie

parameters. Using duplicate parameters has been termed as HTTP Parameter Pollution by Luca Carettoni

and Stefano Di Paola.

When multiple GET/POST/Cookie parameters of the same name are passed in the HTTP request

to ASP and ASP.NET applications they are treated as an array collection.

This leads to the values being concatenated with a comma inbetween them.

For example when the following query is sent to the server:

-----------------------------

POST /index.aspx?a=1&a=2

Host: www.example.com

Cookie: a=5; a=6

Content-Length: 7

a=3&a=4

-----------------------------

The server side interpretation of this data is as follows:

Request.Params["a"] --> "1,2,3,4,5,6" ( if "a" was registered as a server-side control ) (ASP.NET Only)

Request.Params["a"] --> "1,2,5,6" ( if "a" was not registered as a server-side control ) (ASP.NET Only)

Request.QueryString["a"] --> "1,2" (ASP and ASP.NET)

Request.Form["a"] --> "3,4" (ASP and ASP.NET)

This behaviour is unique to ASP and ASP.NET applications and ModSecurity does not interpret this data in the

same way. When dealt with multiple parameters of the same name ModSecurity matches the value of each instance

of the parameter seperately against its rule base. Incase of the above example ModSecurity would run '1' against

the rule set first then '2' and so on till '6'.

Since data is interpreted differently by the Web Application and the Firewall this produces intresting possibilities

for a filter bypass scenario.

This theory was tested against the SQL Injection rule base of ModSecurity Core Rules and was found to bypass the

default-enabled rule set successfully.

The following request is blocked by ModSecurity as this matches its Generic SQL Injection Attack rule.

http://example.com/search.aspx?value=select 1,2,3 from table

ModSecurity Interpretation:

value = select 1,2,3 from table

Web Application Interpretation:

value = select 1,2,3 from table

However the same payload can be sent to the server by splitting it using duplicate parameters like below.

http://example.com/search.aspx?value=select 1&value=2,3 from table

ModSecurity Interpretation:

value = select 1

value = 2,3 from table

Web Application Interpretation:

value select 1,2,3 from table

The attack can be made more flexible by using the inline comment feature in MS SQL servers.

http://example.com/search.aspx?value=select/*&value=*/1,2,3/*&value=*/from/*&value=*/table

ModSecurity Interpretation:

value=select/*

value=*/1,2,3/*

value=*/from/*

value=*/table

Web Application Interpretation:

value = select/*,*/1,2,3/*,*/from/*,*/table

This technique could possibly be extended to exploit other types of Web Application vulnerabilities as well.

Refer the whitepaper 'Split and Join' (see references) for more details on this attack.

[Fix Information]

N/A

[References]

http://www.lavakumar.com/Split_and_Join.pdf

http://www.owasp.org/images/b/ba/AppsecEU09_CarettoniDiPaola_v0.8.pdf

[Legal Notices]

The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the

time of publishing based on currently available information.

This information is provided as-is, as a free service to the community.

There are no warranties with regard to this information.

The author does not accept any liability for any direct,

indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of,

or reliance on, this information.

Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this alert,

provided that the content is not altered in any way, except

reformatting, and that due credit is given.

This vulnerability has been disclosed in accordance with the RFP

Full-Disclosure Policy v2.0, available at:

http://www.wiretrip.net/rfp/policy.html