《Relational inductive biases, deep learning, and graph networks》图网络 论文解读

（后续还会补充）

研究背景

机器学习界有三个主要学派，符号主义（Symbolicism）、连接主义（Connectionism）、行为主义（Actionism）。

符号主义的起源，注重研究知识表达和逻辑推理。经过几十年的研究，目前这一学派的主要成果，一个是贝叶斯因果网络，另一个是知识图谱。

贝叶斯因果网络的旗手是 Judea Pearl 教授，2011年的图灵奖获得者。但是据说 2017年 NIPS 学术会议上，老爷子演讲时，听众寥寥。2018年，老爷子出版了一本新书，“The Book of Why”，为因果网络辩护，同时批判深度学习缺乏严谨的逻辑推理过程。而知识图谱主要由搜索引擎公司，包括谷歌、微软、百度推动，目标是把搜索引擎，由关键词匹配，推进到语义匹配。

连接主义的起源是仿生学，用数学模型来模仿神经元。Marvin Minsky 教授因为对神经元研究的推动，获得了1969年图灵奖。把大量神经元拼装在一起，就形成了深度学习模型，深度学习的旗手是 Geoffrey Hinton 教授。深度学习模型最遭人诟病的缺陷，是不可解释。

行为主义把控制论引入机器学习，最著名的成果是强化学习。强化学习的旗手是 Richard Sutton 教授。近年来Google DeepMind 研究员，把传统强化学习，与深度学习融合，实现了 AlphaGo，战胜当今世界所有人类围棋高手。

DeepMind 之前发表的这篇论文，提议把传统的贝叶斯因果网络和知识图谱，与深度强化学习融合，并梳理了与这个主题相关的研究进展。

正文

《Relational inductive biases, deep learning, and graph networks》

《关系归纳偏置、深度学习和图网络》

DeepMind联合谷歌大脑、MIT等机构27位作者发表重磅论文，提出“图网络”（Graph network），将端到端学习与归纳推理相结合，有望解决深度学习无法进行关系推理的问题。

在论文里，作者探讨了如何在深度学习结构（比如全连接层、卷积层和递归层）中，使用关系归纳偏置（relational inductive biases），促进对实体、对关系，以及对组成它们的规则进行学习。

他们提出了一个新的AI模块——图网络（graph network），是对以前各种对图进行操作的神经网络方法的推广和扩展。图网络具有强大的关系归纳偏置，为操纵结构化知识和生成结构化行为提供了一个直接的界面。

作者还讨论了图网络如何支持关系推理和组合泛化，为更复杂、可解释和灵活的推理模式打下基础。

Abstract	摘要
Artificial intelligence (AI) has undergone a renaissance recently, making major progress in key domains such as vision, language, control, and decision-making. This has been due, in part, to cheap data and cheap compute resources, which have t the natural strengths of deep learning. However, many defining characteristics of human intelligence, which developed under much different pressures, remain out of reach for current approaches. In particular, generalizing beyond one's experiences -- a hallmark of human intelligence from infancy -- remains a formidable challenge for modern AI.	人工智能最近经历了一场复兴，在视觉、语言、控制和决策等关键领域取得了重大进展。取得这些进展的部分原因是由于廉价的数据和计算资源，它们符合深度学习的天然优势。然而，在不同压力下发展起来的人类智力，其许多决定性特征对于目前的方法而言仍是触不可及的。特别是，超越经验的泛化能力——人类智力从幼年开始发展的标志——仍然是现代人工智能面临的巨大挑战。
The following is part position paper, part review, and part unification. We argue that combinatorial generalization must be a top priority for AI to achieve human-like abilities, and that structured representations and computations are key to realizing this objective. Just as biology uses nature and nurture cooperatively, we reject the false choice between "hand-engineering" and "end-to-end" learning, and instead advocate for an approach which benefits from their complementary strengths. We explore how using relational inductive biases within deep learning architectures can facilitate learning about entities, relations, and rules for composing them. We present a new building block for the AI toolkit with a strong relational inductive bias--the graph network--which generalizes and extends various approaches for neural networks that operate on graphs, and provides a straightforward interface for manipulating structured knowledge and producing structured behaviors. We discuss how graph networks can support relational reasoning and combinatorial generalization, laying the foundation for more sophisticated, interpretable, and flexible patterns of reasoning.	本论文包含部分新研究、部分回顾和部分统一结论。我们认为组合泛化是人工智能实现与人类相似能力的首要任务，而结构化表示和计算是实现这一目标的关键。正如生物学把自然与人工培育相结合，我们摒弃「手动设计特征」与「端到端」学习二选一的错误选择，而是倡导一种利用它们互补优势的方法。我们探索在深度学习架构中使用关系归纳偏置如何有助于学习实体、关系以及构成它们的规则。我们为具有强烈关系归纳偏置的 AI 工具包提出了一个新构造块——图网络（Graph Network），它泛化并扩展了各种对图进行操作的神经网络方法，并为操作结构化知识和产生结构化行为提供了直接的界面。我们讨论图网络如何支持关系推理和组合泛化，为更复杂的、可解释的和灵活的推理模式奠定基础。

介绍

A key signature of human intelligence is the ability to make "infinite use of finite means" (Humboldt, 1836; Chomsky, 1965), in which a small set of elements (such as words) can be productively composed in limitless ways (such as into new sentences). This reflects the principle of combinatorial generalization, that is, constructing new inferences, predictions, and behaviors from known building blocks. Here we explore how to improve modern AI's capacity for combinatorial generalization by biasing learning towards structured representations and computations, and in particular, systems that operate on graphs.	人类智能的一个关键特征是“无限使用有限方法”的能力(Humboldt，1836; Chomsky，1965)，其中一小部分元素(如单词)可以以无限的方式(如新句子)有效地组合在一起。这反映了组合归纳的原则，即从已知的构建块构造新的推论、预测和行为。在这里，我们探讨如何通过将学习向结构化的表示和计算，特别是在图上计算的模式，来提高现代人工智能的组合推广能力。
Humans' capacity for combinatorial generalization depends critically on our cognitive mechanisms for representing structure and reasoning about relations. We represent complex systems as compositions of entities and their interactions1 (Navon, 1977; McClelland and Rumelhart, 1981; Plaut et al., 1996; Marcus, 2001; Goodwin and Johnson-Laird, 2005; Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2008), such as judging whether a haphazard stack of objects is stable (Battaglia et al., 2013). We use hierarchies to abstract away from fine-grained differences, and capture more general commonalities between representations and behaviors (Botvinick, 2008; Tenenbaum et al., 2011), such as parts of an object, objects in a scene, neighborhoods in a town, and towns in a country. We solve novel problems by composing familiar skills and routines (Anderson, 1982), for example traveling to a new location by composing familiar procedures and objectives, such as  “travel by airplane",  “to San Diego",  “eat at", and  “an Indian restaurant". We draw analogies by aligning the relational structure between two domains and drawing inferences about one based on corresponding knowledge about the other (Gentner and Markman, 1997; Hummel and Holyoak, 2003).	人类的组合概括能力主要取决于我们表达结构和推理关系的认知机制。我们将复杂系统表示为实体及其相互作用的组合(Navon, 1977; McClelland 和Rumelhart,1981;Plaut 等人 .,1996;Marcus,2001; Goodwin 和Johnson-Laird,2005;Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2008)，比如判断一个不规则的物体堆栈是否稳定(Battaglia 等人.， 2013)。我们使用层次结构来抽象细粒度差异，并捕获表示和行为之间更一般的共性(Botvinick, 2008;Tenenbaum 等人.， 2011)，比如一个物体的一部分，一个场景中的物体，一个城镇的社区，一个国家的城镇。我们通过编写熟悉的技能和惯例来解决新奇的问题(Anderson, 1982)，例如通过编写熟悉的程序和目标去一个新的地方旅行，如“乘飞机旅行”、“到圣地亚哥旅行”、“在那里吃饭”和“一家印度餐馆”。我们通过将两个域之间的关系结构对齐，并基于对另一个域的相应知识对其中一个域进行推断来进行类比(Gentner和Markman, 1997; Hummel和Holyoak,2003)。
Kenneth Craik's  "The Nature of Explanation" (1943), connects the compositional structure of the world to how our internal mental models are organized: ...[a human mental model] has a similar relation-structure to that of the process it imitates. By `relation-structure' I do not mean some obscure non-physical entity which attends the model, but the fact that it is a working physical model which works in the same way as the process it parallels... physical reality is built up, apparently, from a few fundamental types of units whose properties determine many of the properties of the most complicated phenomena, and this seems to afford a sufficient explanation of the emergence of analogies between mechanisms and similarities of relation-structure among these combinations without the necessity of any theory of objective universals. (Craik, 1943, page 51-55)	Kenneth Craik的《自然的本质》(The Nature of Explanation)(1943)将世界的成分结构与我们的内在心理模型的组织方式联系在一起: …[人类心理模型]与它所模仿的过程有相似的关系结构。我所说的“关系结构”，并不是指某个模糊的非物理实体会出现在模型中，而是说它是一个可以工作的物理模型，其工作方式与它所对应的过程是一样的……建立物理现实,显然,从几个基本类型的单位属性确定的许多属性最复杂的现象,这似乎承受足够的解释机制和相似性之间的类比的出现relation-structure在这些组合没有任何客观的共性理论的必要性。(1943年Craik 51-55页)
That is, the world is compositional, or at least, we understand it in compositional terms. When learning, we either fit new knowledge into our existing structured representations, or adjust the structure itself to better accommodate (and make use of) the new and the old (Tenenbaum et al., 2006; Griffiths et al., 2010; Ullman et al., 2017).	也就是说，世界是有成分的，或者