注：机翻，未校。
The Ethics of Belief
信仰的伦理学
First published Mon Jun 14, 2010; substantive revision Mon Mar 5, 2018 stanford.
The “ethics of belief” refers to a cluster of questions at the intersection of epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, and psychology.
“信仰伦理学”是指认识论、伦理学、心灵哲学和心理学交叉点上的一系列问题。
The central question in the debate is whether there are norms of some sort governing our habits of belief-formation, belief-maintenance, and belief-relinquishment. Is it ever or always morally wrong (or epistemically irrational, or practically imprudent) to hold a belief on insufficient evidence? Is it ever or always morally right (or epistemically rational, or practically prudent) to believe on the basis of sufficient evidence, or to withhold belief in the perceived absence of it? Is it ever or always obligatory to seek out all available epistemic evidence for a belief? Are there some ways of obtaining evidence that are themselves immoral, irrational, imprudent?
这场辩论的核心问题是，是否存在某种规范来管理我们的信仰形成、信仰维持和信仰放弃的习惯。在证据不足的基础上持有信念是否曾经或总是在道德上是错误的（或在认识论上是非理性的，或实际上是不明智的）？在有足够的证据基础上相信，还是在道德上或总是正确的（或在认识论上是理性的，或实际上是谨慎的），还是在感知到的缺乏证据的情况下拒绝相信？是否永远或总是必须为信仰寻找所有可用的认识论证据？是否有一些获取证据的方法本身就是不道德的、非理性的、轻率的？
Related questions have to do with the nature and structure of the norms involved, if any, as well as the source of their authority. Are they instrumental norms grounded in contingent ends that we set for ourselves? Are they categorical norms grounded in ends set for us by the very nature of our intellectual or moral capacities? Are there other options? And what are the objects of evaluation in this context—believers, beliefs, or both?
与此相关的问题与所涉规范的性质和结构有关，如果有的话，也与这些规范的权力来源有关。它们是否基于我们为自己设定的偶然目的而存在的工具性规范？它们是否基于我们的智力或道德能力的本质为我们设定的目标的绝对规范？还有其他选择吗？在这种情况下，评估的对象是什么——信徒、信仰，还是两者兼而有之？
Finally, assuming that there are norms of some sort governing belief-formation, what does that imply about the nature of belief? Does it imply that belief-formation is voluntary or under our control? If so, what sort of control is this? If not, then is talk of an ethics of belief even coherent?
最后，假设存在某种规范来管理信仰的形成，那么这对信仰的本质意味着什么？这是否意味着信仰的形成是自愿的或在我们的控制之下？如果是这样，这是什么样的控制？如果不是，那么关于信仰伦理的讨论是否连贯？
1. The Ethics of Belief: A brief history
- 信仰伦理学：简史
1.1 Origins of the debate
1.1 辩论的起源
The locus classicus of the ethics of belief debate is, unsurprisingly, the essay that christened it. “The Ethics of Belief” was published in 1877 by Cambridge mathematician and philosopher William Kingdon Clifford, in a journal called Contemporary Review. At the outset of the essay, Clifford defends the stringent principle that we are all always obliged to have sufficient evidence for every one of our beliefs. Indeed, the early sections of “The Ethics of Belief” are so stern that William James would later characterize Clifford as a “delicious enfant terrible” who defends doxastic self-control “with somewhat too much of robustious pathos in the voice” (1896, 8).
不出所料，信仰伦理学辩论的经典之作是给它命名的那篇文章。《信仰的伦理学》由剑桥数学家和哲学家威廉·金登·克利福德（William Kingdon Clifford）于1877年在一本名为《当代评论》的杂志上发表。在文章的开头，克利福德捍卫了一个严格的原则，即我们总是有义务为我们的每一个信仰提供足够的证据。事实上，《信仰伦理学》的早期部分是如此严厉，以至于威廉·詹姆斯后来将克利福德描述为一个“美味的可怕的婴儿”，他为教士制的自我控制辩护，“声音中带有太多强烈的悲怆”（1896,8）。
James’s more permissive view—initially a commentary on Clifford presented to the Philosophy Clubs of Yale and Brown, then published as “The Will to Believe” in 1896—has become a kind of companion piece, and together the two essays constitute the touchstone for later discussions.
詹姆斯更宽容的观点——最初是提交给耶鲁大学和布朗大学哲学俱乐部的对克利福德的评论，然后在1896年以《相信的意志》为名出版——已经成为一种姊妹篇，这两篇文章共同构成了后来讨论的试金石。
Clifford’s essay is chiefly remembered for two things: a story and a principle. The story is that of a shipowner who, once upon a time, was inclined to sell tickets for a transatlantic voyage. It struck him that his ship was rickety, and that its soundness might be in question. Knowing that repairs would be costly and cause significant delay, the shipowner managed to push these worries aside and form the “sincere and comfortable conviction that his vessel was thoroughly safe and seaworthy.” He sold the tickets, bade the passengers farewell, and then quietly collected the insurance money “when she went down in mid-ocean and told no tales” (1877, 70).
克利福德的文章主要因为两件事而被人们记住：一个故事和一个原则。这个故事讲述了一位船主的故事，曾几何时，他倾向于出售跨大西洋航行的船票。令他吃惊的是，他的船摇摇晃晃，它的坚固性可能值得怀疑。船东知道维修费用高昂并导致严重延误，因此设法将这些担忧放在一边，并形成了“真诚而舒适的信念，即他的船只完全安全和适航”。他卖掉了车票，向乘客告别，然后悄悄地收取了保险金，“当她在大洋中沉没，没有讲故事时”（1877,70）。
According to Clifford (who himself once survived a shipwreck, and so must have found this behavior particularly loathsome), the owner in the story was “verily guilty of the death of those men,” because even though he sincerely believed that the ship was sound, “he had no right to believe on such evidence as was before him.” Why did he have no such right? Because, says Clifford, “he had acquired his belief not by honestly earning it in patient investigation, but by stifling his doubts” (1877, 70). After making this diagnosis, Clifford changes the end of the story: the ship doesn’t meet a liquid demise, but rather arrives safe and sound into New York harbor. Does the new outcome relieve the shipowner of blame for his belief? “Not one jot,” Clifford declares: he is equally guilty—equally blameworthy—for believing something on insufficient evidence.
根据克利福德的说法（他本人曾经在海难中幸存下来，因此一定觉得这种行为特别令人厌恶），故事中的船主“确实对那些人的死感到内疚”，因为即使他真诚地相信这艘船是完好的，“他也无权相信他面前的证据。为什么他没有这样的权利？因为，克利福德说，“他不是通过诚实地在耐心的调查中获得信念，而是通过扼杀他的怀疑来获得他的信念”（1877,70）。在做出这一诊断后，克利福德改变了故事的结局：这艘船没有遇到液体死亡，而是安然无恙地抵达纽约港。新的结果是否减轻了船东对其信念的责任？“没有一句，”克利福德宣称：他同样有罪——同样应该受到指责——因为他在证据不足的情况下相信了某些东西。
Clifford goes on to cite our intuitive indictments of the shipowner—in both versions of the story—as grounds for his famous principle:
克利福德接着引用了我们对船东的直觉控诉——在故事的两个版本中——作为他那条著名原则的理由：
(Clifford’s Principle) “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”
（克利福德原理）“在任何时候、任何地方、任何人在证据不足的情况下相信任何事情都是错误的。”
Despite the synchronic character of his famous Principle, Clifford’s view is not merely that we must be in a certain state at the precise time at which we form a belief. Rather, the obligation always and only to believe on sufficient evidence governs our activities across time as well. With respect to most if not all of the propositions we consider as candidates for belief, says Clifford, we are obliged to go out and gather evidence, remain open to new evidence, and consider the evidence offered by others. The diachronic obligation here can be captured as follows:
尽管他的著名原则具有共时性特征，但克利福德的观点不仅仅是我们必须在形成信念的确切时间处于某种状态。相反，始终且仅相信足够证据的义务也支配着我们随着时间的推移进行的活动。克利福德说，对于我们认为可以相信的大多数命题（如果不是全部的话），我们有义务走出去收集证据，对新证据保持开放态度，并考虑其他人提供的证据。这里的历时义务可以概括为以下几点：
(Clifford’s Other Principle) “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to ignore evidence that is relevant to his beliefs, or to dismiss relevant evidence in a facile way.” (Van Inwagen 1996, 145)
（克利福德的另一原则）“无论何时何地，任何人忽视与他的信念相关的证据，或者轻率地摒弃相关证据，都是错误的。”（Van Inwagen 1996， 145）
There might be at least two kinds of diachronic obligation here: one governing how we form and hold beliefs over time, and the other governing how we relinquish or revise beliefs over time. If someone violates such a diachronic obligation by “purposely avoiding the reading of books and the company of men who call in question” his presuppositions, Clifford warns, then “the life of that man is one long sin against mankind” (1877, 77).
这里可能至少存在两种历时性义务：一种支配我们如何随着时间的推移形成和持有信仰，另一种支配我们如何随着时间的推移放弃或修改信仰。克利福德警告说，如果有人违反了这种历时性的义务，因为他的预设是“故意避免阅读书籍和与质疑的人为伍”，那么“这个人的生活就是对人类的长期罪恶”（1877,77）。
Despite the robustious pathos, it is not clear in the end that Clifford’s considered position is as extreme as these two principles make it sound. In the later part of his essay Clifford puts forward a view about what it is for evidence to be “sufficient” that suggests a more moderate stance. Still, the story about the shipowner together with the sternly-worded Principles turned Clifford into the iconic representative of a strict “Evidentialist” position in the ethics of belief—the position, roughly, that we are obliged to form beliefs always and only on the basis of sufficient evidence that is in our possession. (For more on the notion of “evidence” and the varieties of Evidentialism, see §4-§5 below).
尽管这其中充满了悲怆，但最终尚不清楚克利福德所考虑的立场是否像这两个原则听起来那样极端。在文章的后半部分，克利福德提出了一种关于什么是“充分”证据的观点，这表明了一种更温和的立场。尽管如此，关于船东的故事以及措辞严厉的原则使克利福德成为信仰伦理学中严格的“证据主义”立场的标志性代表——大致上，我们有义务始终且仅基于我们所拥有的足够证据形成信念。（有关“证据”概念和证据主义多样性的更多信息，请参阅下文第 4 -第 5 节）。
James’s Non-Evidentialist alternative to Clifford is far more permissive: it says that there are some contexts in which it is fine to form a belief even though we don’t have sufficient evidence for it, and even though we know that we don’t. In fact, James and many of his “pragmatist” followers claim that sometimes we are positively obliged to form beliefs on insufficient evidence, and that it would be a significant prudential, intellectual, or even moral failure to do otherwise. “Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds” (1896, 11).
詹姆斯对克利福德的非证据主义替代方案要宽容得多：它说，在某些情况下，即使我们没有足够的证据支持它，即使我们知道我们没有，也可以形成一种信念。事实上，雅各和他的许多“实用主义”追随者声称，有时我们积极地有义务在证据不足的基础上形成信念，否则这将是一个重大的审慎、智力甚至道德上的失败。“我们的热情本性不仅合法地可以，而且必须决定命题之间的选择，只要这是一个真正的选择，就其本质而言不能根据智力理由来决定”（1896,11）。
As permissive as this sounds, however, James is by no means writing a blank doxastic check. In “The Will to Believe” he lays out a series of strict conditions under which an “option” counts as “genuine” and believing without sufficient evidence is permitted or required. For instance, the option must be between “live” hypotheses—i.e. hypotheses that are “among the mind’s possibilities” (thus, belief in the ancient Greek gods is not a live option for us these days). There must also be no compelling evidence one way or the other, the option must be “forced” such that doing nothing also amounts to making a choice, and the option must concern a “momentous” issue. In the absence of those conditions, James reverts happily to a broadly Evidentialist picture (see Gale 1980, 1999, Kasser and Shah 2006, and Aikin 2014). (For more on the varieties of Non-Evidentialism, see §6 below).
然而，尽管这听起来很宽容，但詹姆斯绝不是在写一张空白的 doxastic 支票。在《相信的意志》一书中，他列出了一系列严格的条件，在这些条件下，“选择”算作“真实的”，在没有足够证据的情况下相信是允许或要求的。例如，选项必须介于“实时”假设之间——即“在心灵的可能性中”的假设（因此，对古希腊诸神的信仰现在对我们来说不是一个实时的选项）。也必须没有令人信服的证据，该选项必须是“被迫的”，以至于什么都不做也等于做出选择，并且该选项必须涉及一个“重大”问题。在沒有這些條件的情況下，James愉快地回到了廣泛的證據主義的圖景（見Gale 1980,1999，Kasser和Shah 2006，以及Aikin，2014）。（有关非证据主义种类的更多信息，请参阅下面的第 6 节）。
1.2 The ethics of belief before the 19th-century
1.2 19世纪之前的信仰伦理
The phrase may be of 19th-century coinage, but there were obviously ethics of belief well before Clifford and James. Descartes says in the Meditations that when forming a judgment, “it is clear by the natural light that perception of the intellect should always precede (praecedere semper debere) the determination of the will” (1641, 7:60). In the context of a search for certain knowledge (scientia), Descartes maintains, we have the obligation to withhold assent from all propositions whose truth we do not clearly and distinctly perceive (clear and distinct perceptions themselves, by contrast, will produce belief ineluctably). In other contexts, it may be both permissible and prudent to form a mere “opinion” (opinio) whose truth we do not clearly and distinctly perceive. Even then, however, we are obliged to have some sort of evidence before giving our assent. Thus Descartes advises Elizabeth that “though we cannot have certain demonstrations of everything, still we must take sides, and in matters of custom embrace the opinions that seem the most probable, so that we may never be irresolute when we need to act” (1645, 4:295, my emphasis).
这句话可能是 19 世纪的产物，但显然早在克利福德和詹姆斯之前就已经有了信仰伦理。笛卡尔在《沉思录》中说，在形成判断时，“从自然光可以清楚地看出，对智力的感知应该始终先于（praecedere semper debere）意志的确定”（1641,7：60）。笛卡尔坚持认为，在寻找某种知识（科学）的背景下，我们有义务不同意所有我们无法清晰和明确地感知到真理的命题（相比之下，清晰而独特的感知本身将不可避免地产生信念）。在其他情况下，仅仅形成一个“意见”（opinio）可能是允许的，也是谨慎的，因为我们无法清晰和清楚地认识到其真理。然而，即便如此，在表示同意之前，我们也有义务拥有某种证据。因此，笛卡尔建议伊丽莎白，“虽然我们不能对所有事情都有确切的证明，但我们仍然必须站在一边，在习俗问题上接受似乎最有可能的观点，这样当我们需要采取行动时，我们永远不会犹豫不决”（1645,4：295，我的强调）。
Locke’s ethics of belief is at least as strict: in the search for scientific knowledge as well as in all matters of “maximal concernment,” Locke says, it is to “transgress against our own light” either to believe on insufficient evidence, or to fail to proportion our degree of belief to the strength of the evidence. In his discussion of “Faith” in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke famously moralizes:
洛克的信仰伦理至少是严格的：洛克说，在寻求科学知识以及所有“最大关注”的问题上，都是“违背我们自己的光明”，要么相信证据不足，要么没有将我们的信仰程度与证据的强度相称。洛克在《论人类理解》一文中对“信仰”的讨论中，有一句著名的道德化的话：
He that believes without having any Reason for believing, may be in love with his own Fancies; but neither seeks Truth as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning Faculties he has given him, to keep him out of Mistake and Errour. (1690, 687)
一个毫无理由地相信的人，也许是爱上了自己的幻想；但他既不寻求他应该寻求的真理，也不顺从他的造物主，而造物主要他运用他所赋予他的辨别能力，使他远离错误和过失。(1690, 687)
To form a belief about important matters without possessing sufficient evidence—or to believe anything with a degree of firmness that is not proportioned to the strength of our evidence—is to misuse our faculties and court all manner of error. It is also, for Locke, to contravene the will of our “Maker.” Given his divine command theory of ethical rightness, it thus appears that such behavior will be morally as well as epistemically wrong.
在缺乏足够证据的情况下对重要事情形成信念——或者以与我们证据的强度不成比例的坚定程度来相信任何事情——都是滥用我们的能力并提出各种错误的诉讼。对洛克来说，这也是违背了我们“造物主”的意志。鉴于他的道德正确性神圣命令理论，因此，这种行为在道德上和认识论上似乎都是错误的。
By contrast, Blaise Pascal and Immanuel Kant anticipated James by emphasizing that there are some very important issues regarding which we do not and cannot have sufficient evidence one way or the other, but which deserve our firm assent (on practical grounds) nonetheless. (For more on Pascal and Kant on Non-Evidentialism, see §6.1 below).
相比之下，布莱斯·帕斯卡（Blaise Pascal）和伊曼纽尔·康德（Immanuel Kant）通过强调一些非常重要的问题来预测詹姆斯，这些问题我们没有也不可能以某种方式获得足够的证据，但仍然值得我们坚定地同意（基于实际理由）。（有关帕斯卡和康德关于非证据主义的更多信息，请参阅下面的§6.1）。
2. Doxastic Norms
- 信仰的规范
2.1 Kinds of norms: prudential, moral, epistemic
2.1 规范的种类：审慎的、道德的、认识的
This last point makes it clear that there may be different types of norms governing practices of belief-formation, and that these will correspond to different types of value. The ethicist of belief will thus need to specify the type of value she is invoking, why and how she thinks it can ground doxastic norms, whether it is the only kind of value that does that, and (if not) what the priority relations are between norms based in different kinds of value.
最后一点清楚地表明，可能存在不同类型的规范来管理信仰形成的实践，这些规范将对应于不同类型的价值。因此，信仰的伦理学家需要具体说明她所援引的价值类型，她为什么以及如何认为它可以为教条主义规范奠定基础，它是否是唯一能做到这一点的价值，以及（如果不是）基于不同价值的规范之间的优先关系是什么。
Clifford and Locke, as we have seen, claim that the issue of whether we have done our doxastic best is an epistemic one and also (given a few further premises) a moral one. James, on the other hand, focuses on the important role played by prudential value in the ethics of belief, saying in one passage that Clifford’s Principle not only puts us at “risk of losing the truth” and thus of violating an epistemic norm, but that it articulates an “insane logic”—an “absurdity” that guarantees prudential disaster (1896, 25). The general idea is that if something is beneficial, and believing that p will help us achieve, acquire, or actualize that thing, then it is prima facie prudent for us to believe that p. This will be true even if we lack sufficient evidence for the belief that p, and even if we are aware of that lack.
正如我们所看到的，克利福德和洛克声称，我们是否已经尽了最大的努力是一个认识论问题，并且（考虑到一些进一步的前提）也是一个道德问题。另一方面，詹姆斯则关注审慎价值在信仰伦理中发挥的重要作用，他在一段话中说，克利福德原则不仅使我们处于“失去真理的风险”，从而违反认识论规范，而且它表达了一种“疯狂的逻辑”——一种保证审慎灾难的“荒谬”（1896， 25）. 一般的想法是，如果某件事是有益的，并且相信 p 会帮助我们实现、获得或实现该事物，那么我们认为 p 是初步谨慎的。即使我们缺乏足够的证据来支持对 p 的信念，即使我们意识到这种缺乏，这也是正确的。
Consider for example someone who reads in the psychological literature that people are much more likely to survive a cancer diagnosis if they firmly believe that they will survive it. Upon being diagnosed with the disease himself, and in light of the fact that his goal is to survive, it will be prudent for this person to believe that he will survive, even if he knows that he (and his doctors) lack sufficient evidence for that belief. James refers to such cases as ones “where faith in a fact can help create the fact” (1896, 25).
例如，考虑一下某人在心理学文献中读到，如果人们坚信自己会从癌症诊断中幸存下来，那么他们更有可能在癌症诊断中幸存下来。一旦他自己被诊断出患有这种疾病，并且鉴于他的目标是生存这一事实，即使他知道他（和他的医生）缺乏足够的证据来支持这种信念，这个人相信他会生存是谨慎的。雅各将此类情况称为“对事实的信仰可以帮助创造事实”（1896,25）。
Someone might suggest that the patient’s knowledge that his “faith helps create the fact” itself counts as a kind of evidence in its favor. If this is right, then the case would not be in tension with Clifford’s Principle after all. But other cases can be used to make the same point: Pascal famously argues that it is required by prudential rationality that we believe in God, even though we lack sufficient evidence for that belief, and even though such belief would play no role in “creating” the fact that it describes (Pascal 1670).
有人可能会认为，病人知道他的“信仰有助于创造事实”本身就算是一种有利于它的证据。如果这是正确的，那么这个案子毕竟不会与克利福德原则相冲突。但其他案例也可以用来说明同样的观点：帕斯卡有一句名言：审慎理性要求我们相信上帝，即使我们缺乏足够的证据来支持这种信念，即使这种信念在“创造”它所描述的事实方面没有任何作用（帕斯卡1670）。
Here’s a non-religious example: suppose that you would like to retain a good relationship with your teenage son, and you are aware that this requires believing the best of him whenever possible. You also have some moderate but not compelling olfactory evidence that he is using drugs in the house when you are away (in response to your queries, he claims that he has recently taken up transcendental meditation, and that the funny smell when you come home is just incense). Suppose too that you know yourself well enough to know that your relationship with your son will be seriously damaged if you come to view him as a habitual drug-user. This suggests that you would violate a prudential norm if you go ahead and believe that he is. In other words, it is prudent, given your ends, to withhold belief about the source of the aroma altogether, or even to believe, if possible, that he is not smoking pot but rather burning incense in your absence.
這是一個非宗教的例子：假設你想與你湾大的兒子保持良好的關係，而你意識到這需要盡可能地相信他最好的一面。你也有一些适度但不令人信服的嗅觉证据表明，当你不在时，他在屋里吸毒（在回答你的询问时，他声称他最近进行了超然冥想，当你回家时，有趣的气味只是熏香）。也假设你足够了解自己，知道如果你开始将儿子视为习惯性吸毒者，你和儿子的关系将受到严重损害。这表明，如果你继续相信他是，你就会违反审慎规范。换言之，考虑到你的目的，明智的做法是完全不相信香气的来源，或者如果可能的话，甚至相信他不是在抽烟，而是在你不在的时候烧香。
On the other hand, if you regard the occasional use of recreational drugs as harmless fun that expresses a healthy contempt for overweening state authority (in some states, at least), then it might be prudent for you—confronted with the telltale odor—to form the belief that your son has indeed taken up the habit in question. Either way, the recommendation here aims at a kind of prudential or pragmatic value, and not at the truth per se. (For some recent arguments in favor of prudential evidence for belief, see Reisner 2008 and 2009; for arguments against, see Adler 2002 and Shah 2006).
另一方面，如果你认为偶尔使用娱乐性药物是一种无害的乐趣，表达了对过度的国家权威的蔑视（至少在某些州），那么面对这种明显的气味，你可能会谨慎地相信你的儿子确实已经养成了这种习惯。无论哪种方式，这里的建议旨在某种审慎或实用的价值，而不是真相本身。 （有关最近支持信仰审慎证据的一些论点，请参阅Reisner 2008和2009;有关反对的论点，请参阅Adler 2002和Shah 2006）。
2.2 Structures of norms: hypothetical vs. categorical
2.2 规范结构：假设与分类
In addition to being sorted according to the type of value involved, doxastic obligations can be sorted according to their structure. The main distinction here is between hypothetical and categorical structure.
除了根据所涉及的价值类型进行排序外，doxastic 义务还可以根据其结构进行排序。这里的主要区别在于假设结构和分类结构。
Prudential norms usually have a hypothetical structure: if you have prudential reason to survive the disease, and if believing that you are going to do so will help you achieve this end, then you have a prima facie obligation to believe that you are going to survive. Likewise, if you want to protect your relationship with your son, and if believing that he is deceiving you and taking drugs will damage your ability to trust him, then you are prima facie obliged to withhold that belief.
审慎规范通常有一个假设的结构：如果你有审慎的理由在疾病中幸存下来，并且如果相信你会这样做会帮助你实现这一目标，那么你就有初步的义务相信你会生存下来。同样，如果你想保护你和你儿子的关系，如果相信他在欺骗你和吸毒会损害你信任他的能力，那么你显然有义务拒绝这种信念。
Put more generally: if you have a prudential end E, and belief that p is likely to make E obtain, then you have a prima facie obligation to believe that p. The obligation will be particularly powerful (though still prima facie) if E cannot be achieved other than through belief that p, and if you are (or should be) aware of that fact. (For more on hypothetical norms generally, see Broome 1999 and Schroeder 2005)
更笼统地说：如果你有一个审慎的终点E，并且相信p可能使E得到，那么你就有表面上的义务去相信p。如果除了相信p之外无法实现E，并且如果您（或应该）意识到这一事实，那么该义务将特别强大（尽管仍然是初步证据）。（有关一般假设规范的更多信息，请参阅 Broome 1999 和 Schroeder 2005）
The structure of moral and epistemic norms can also be construed hypothetically in this way. The ends in question will presumably be doing the morally right thing or promoting the moral good, on the one hand, and acquiring significant knowledge or minimizing significant false belief, on the other (see Foley 1987). Achieving these ends clearly does involve an increase in well-being on most conceptions of the latter.
道德规范和认识规范的结构也可以以这种方式假设地解释。所讨论的目的大概是一方面做道德上正确的事情或促进道德上的善，另一方面获得重要的知识或尽量减少重要的错误信念（见Foley 1987）。显然，要实现这些目标，就大多数对后者的概念而言，确实涉及到幸福感的提高。
However, because these ends are putatively set for us not by a contingent act of will but rather by our nature as morally engaged, knowledge-seeking beings, some philosophers regard them as categorical rather than instrumental imperatives. In other words, they take these norms to say not merely that if we want to achieve various hypothetical ends, then we have the prima facie obligation to believe in such-and-such ways. Rather, the norms say that we do have these ends as a matter of natural or moral necessity, and thus that we prima facie ought to believe in such-and-such ways.
然而，由于这些目标不是由偶然的意志行为为我们设定的，而是由我们作为道德参与、寻求知识的生物的本性设定的，一些哲学家认为它们是绝对的，而不是工具性的命令。换言之，他们利用这些规范不仅仅是说，如果我们想要实现各种假设的目的，那么我们就有表面上的义务去相信这样那样的方式。相反，规范说，我们确实将这些目的作为自然或道德的需要而存在，因此，我们表面上应该以这样那样的方式信仰。
Note, however, that the most general prudential end—something like surviving, say—may be thought to have an equal claim to the title of a “necessary” end: it is set for us by our nature as living members of a species that has evolved through natural selection. And so by the same logic it might be taken to underwrite a categorical—albeit still prudential—norm of belief, especially in life-or-death cases such as that of the cancer diagnosis above.
然而，请注意，最普遍的审慎目的——比如生存——可能被认为与“必要”目的的称号具有同等的权利：它是我们的本性为我们设定的，因为我们是通过自然选择进化而来的物种的活生生的成员。因此，按照同样的逻辑，它可能被看作是一种绝对的——尽管仍然是审慎的——信仰规范，特别是在生死攸关的案例中，比如上面的癌症诊断。
2.3 Degrees of reflective access
2.3 反射度
So far the norms involved in the ethics of belief have been characterized without attention to reflective access requirements. A reflective access requirement has to do with the subject’s own reflective awareness of some of the relevant facts.
到目前为止，信仰伦理中涉及的规范的特征是没有注意反思性访问要求的。反思性访问要求与受试者自己对某些相关事实的反思意识有关。
In order to see how such requirements can play a role, consider the following prudential doxastic norm:
为了了解这些要求如何发挥作用，请考虑以下审慎的 信念的规范：
(A) If S has end E, and if S’s believing that p is likely to make E obtain, then S has a prima facie prudential obligation to believe that p.
(A) 如果 S 的结尾为 E，并且 S 认为 p 可能使 E 得到 E，则 S 有初步的审慎义务相信 p。
This is a purely objective or ‘unreflective’ account of the prudential obligation in question: it is simply concerned with whether the subject in fact has a certain end and whether in fact the belief that p is likely to lead to the accomplishment of that end. If (A) were the right way to articulate obligations in the ethics of belief, then we would have far more prima facie doxastic obligations than we realize.
这是对所讨论的审慎义务的纯粹客观或“非反思”的叙述：它只是关注主体实际上是否具有一定的目的，以及实际上是否相信p可能导致该目的的实现。如果（A）是在信仰伦理中阐明义务的正确方式，那么我们的表面上所承担的道德义务将比我们意识到的要多得多。
Reflective or ‘subjective’ components can be added to norms in order to make the results more plausible:
可以在规范中添加反思或“主观”成分，以使结果更可信：
(B) If S knows that she has an end E, and if S knows that believing that p is likely to make E obtain, then S has a prima facie prudential obligation to believe that p.
(B) 如果 S 知道她有一个目的 E，并且如果 S 知道相信 p 可能会使 E 得到，那么 S 有初步的审慎义务相信 p。
(B) is towards the top of the scale in terms of reflective access requirements: S has to know that he has E and that believing that p is likely to make E obtain . As a sufficient condition for having a doxastic obligation, it may be acceptable, but most ethicists of belief will not want to make the reflective knowledge necessary in order for there to be genuine prima facie prudential obligations.
(B) 在反射访问要求方面接近规模的顶端：S 必须知道他有 E，并且相信 p 可能会使 E 获得。作为承担 doxastic 义务的充分条件，它可能是可以接受的，但大多数信仰的伦理学家不希望为真正表面上的审慎义务提供必要的反思知识。
Intermediate positions would replace “knows” in one or both parts of the antecedent of (B) with something weaker: “is in a position to know,” “justifiably believes,” “is justified in believing,”, believes, and so on.
中间位置将用较弱的东西代替（B）前面的一个或两个部分的“知道”：“有能力知道”，“有理由相信”，“有理由相信”，等等。
Note that an ethicist of belief who wants to include a reflective access requirement in a doxastic norm would need to do so in a way that doesn’t generate an infinite regress. Note too that the norms we considered above govern the positive formation of belief. An account of the plausible conditions of reflective access may be somewhat different for norms of maintaining, suspending, and relinquishing belief (for suspending, see Tang 2015 and Perin 2015).
请注意，一个有信仰的伦理学家如果想在人道规范中包含反思性访问要求，就需要以一种不会产生无限倒退的方式这样做。还要注意的是，我们上面所考虑的规范支配着信仰的积极形成。对于维持、暂停和放弃信仰的规范，对反思访问的合理条件的描述可能有所不同（关于暂停，参见 Tang 2015 和 Perin 2015）。
2.4 Relations between doxastic norms
2.4 信念的规范之间的关系
Another closely-related debate has to do with the types of value that can generate doxastic norms and obligations. Value monists in the ethics of belief argue that only one type of value (usually some kind of epistemic value) can generate such norms. A prominent kind of monism, often called “veritism”, says that truth is the fundamental doxastic good: its value is not grounded in knowledge or anything else (see Pritchard 2011, Gardiner 2012, Ahlstrom-Vij 2013).
另一个密切相关的辩论与能够产生教条规范和义务的价值类型有关。信仰伦理学中的价值一元论者认为，只有一种类型的价值（通常是某种认识价值）才能产生这样的规范。一种突出的一元论，通常被称为“真理主义”，认为真理是基本的教义善：它的价值不基于知识或其他任何东西（参见Pritchard 2011，Gardiner 2012，Ahlstrom-Vij 2013）。
Other more permissive accounts go beyond the three types of value considered above—prudential, moral, and epistemic—to suggest that there are other types that can generate doxastic obligations as well. Perhaps there are aesthetic norms that guide us to beliefs that have some sort of aesthetic merit, or that make us qua subjects more beautiful in virtue of believing them. There may also be social norms that govern beliefs we form in our various communal roles (as lawyers, priests, psychiatrists, friends, parents, etc. (regarding the doxastic obligations of friends, see Keller 2004, Stroud 2006, and Aikin 2008)) and political norms that govern beliefs we form as citizens, subjects, voters, and so on (here see the second half of Matheson and Vitz 2014).
其他更宽容的叙述超越了上述三种类型的价值——审慎的、道德的和认识论的——表明还有其他类型的价值也可以产生 doxastic 义务。也许有一些审美规范可以引导我们走向具有某种审美价值的信念，或者由于相信它们而使我们成为更美丽的主体。也可能存在社会规范，这些规范支配着我们在各种公共角色中形成的信念（如律师、牧师、精神科医生、朋友、父母等（关于朋友的道德义务，见 Keller 2004、Stroud 2006 和 Aikin 2008））和政治规范，这些规范管理着我们作为公民、臣民、选民等形成的信念（这里见 Matheson 和 Vitz 2014 的后半部分）。
It’s an interesting and open question whether such aesthetic, social, or political norms could be cashed out in terms of epistemic, moral, and prudential norms (e.g. perhaps being someone’s lawyer or being someone’s friend underwrites certain moral or prudential norms of belief regarding his or her innocence). In any case, the three types of underlying value considered above are the ones most frequently discussed under the rubric of the “ethics of belief.”
这是一个有趣而开放的问题，这些审美、社会或政治规范是否可以在认识论、道德和审慎规范方面被兑现（例如，也许作为某人的律师或作为某人的朋友承担了关于他或她的清白的某些道德或审慎的信念规范）。无论如何，上面考虑的三种潜在价值是在“信仰伦理”的标题下最常讨论的。
Norms, and types of norms, can be related in different ways. According to the interpretation of Clifford presented above, there is a strong connection between the epistemic and the moral types: the fact that there is an epistemic norm to believe always and only on sufficient evidence entails that there is an analogous moral norm. The reasoning here seems to be as follows:
规范和规范的类型可以以不同的方式关联。根据上面提出的克利福德的解释，认识论和道德类型之间存在着强烈的联系：存在着一种认识论规范，即始终且仅在充分的证据下才相信，这意味着存在类似的道德规范。这里的推理似乎如下：
( P1 ) We have an epistemic obligation to possess sufficient evidence for all of our beliefs;
（ P1 ）我们在认识论上有义务为我们所有的信仰拥有足够的证据;
( P2 ) We have a moral obligation to uphold our epistemic obligations;
（ P2 ）我们有道德义务去维护我们的认识义务;
( C ) Thus, we have a moral obligation to possess sufficient evidence for all of our beliefs.
（C） 因此，我们有道德义务为我们所有的信仰提供足够的证据。
This formulation keeps the types of values distinct while still forging a link between them in the form of (P2). But of course we would need to find a sound sub-argument in favor of (P2) (see Dougherty 2014).
这种表述使值的类型保持不同，同时仍然以（P2）的形式在它们之间建立联系。但是，当然，我们需要找到一个支持（P2）的合理子论点（参见Dougherty 2014）。
In some places, Clifford seems simply to presume that epistemic duty is a species of ethical duty. That would make sense of why he thinks it just obvious that the shipowner is “equally guilty”—regardless of whether the ship sinks. Elsewhere Clifford defends (P2) by reference to our need to rely on the testimony of others in order to avoid significant harm and advance scientific progress. No belief is without effect, he claims: at the very least, believing on insufficient evidence (even with respect to an apparently very insignificant issue) is liable to lead to the lowering of epistemic standards in other more important contexts too. And that could, in turn, have bad moral consequences.
在某些地方，克利福德似乎只是简单地假设认识责任是一种道德责任。这就解释了为什么他认为船东“同样有罪”——无论船是否沉没，都是显而易见的。在其他地方，克利福德（P2）通过提到我们需要依赖他人的证词以避免重大伤害并推动科学进步。他声称，没有一种信仰是没有效果的：至少，相信证据不足（即使是对于一个显然非常微不足道的问题）也可能导致在其他更重要的背景下降低认识论标准。而这反过来又可能产生不良的道德后果。
Elsewhere still Clifford seems not to recognize a distinction between epistemic and moral obligations at all (see Van Inwagen 1996, Haack 1997, Wood 2002, and Zamulinski 2002 for further discussion of Clifford on this issue).
在其他地方，克利福德似乎根本没有认识到认识义务和道德义务之间的区别（参见Van Inwagen 1996，Haack 1997，Wood 2002和Zamulinski 2002，关于克利福德在这个问题上的进一步讨论）。
It was noted earlier that one way to read Locke is as arguing for ( P2 ) via the independent theoretical premise that God’s will for us is that we follow Evidentialist norms, together with a divine command theory of moral rightness (see Wolterstorff 1996). But Locke can also be read as primarily interested in defending ( P1 ) rather than ( P2 ) or ( C ) (see Brandt Bolton 2009).
前面已经指出，解读洛克的一种方式是通过独立的理论前提来论证（P2），即上帝对我们的旨意是我们遵循证据主义规范，以及道德正确性的神圣命令理论（见Wolterstorff 1996）。但洛克也可以被解读为主要对防守（P1）感兴趣，而不是（P2）或（C）（参见Brandt Bolton，2009）。
A virtue-theoretic approach, by contrast, might defend (P2) by claiming not that a particular unjustified belief causes moral harm, but rather that regularly ignoring our epistemic obligations is a bad intellectual habit, and that having a bad intellectual habits is a way of having a bad moral character (Zagzebski 1996, Roberts and Wood 2007).
相比之下，美德理论方法可能会辩护（P2），它不是声称特定的不合理的信念会导致道德伤害，而是声称经常忽视我们的认识义务是一种不良的智力习惯，而拥有不良的智力习惯是一种具有不良道德品质的方式（Zagzebski 1996，Roberts和Wood 2007）。
In addition to using theoretical arguments like these, ethicists of belief can connect doxastic norms by appealing to empirical data. If we discover through investigation that it is on the whole prudent to be morally good, then prudential norms may be able support some of the moral norms. Similarly, if we discover that following moral norms of belief reliably leads to the acquisition of knowledge, then there may be a track-record argument that goes from epistemic norms to moral norms (this would effectively be an empirical argument in support of (P2) above). And if we empirically find that adhering to epistemic norms also promotes the moral good, then there will be an argument from the moral to the epistemic.
除了使用诸如此类的理论论证外，信仰伦理学家还可以通过诉诸经验数据来连接教士教规规范。如果我们通过调查发现，从总体上看，道德上是好的是审慎的，那么审慎规范可能能够支持一些道德规范。同样，如果我们发现遵循信仰的道德规范可靠地导致知识的获取，那么可能存在从认识论规范到道德规范的跟踪记录论点（这实际上是支持上述（P2）的经验论点）。如果我们从经验上发现，遵守认识论规范也促进了道德上的善，那么就会有从道德到认识论的争论。
Finally, norms and types of norms can be in outright tension. The prudential norm recommending belief that your son is not smoking pot when you’re gone conflicts with the epistemic norm to follow your perceptual evidence. Likewise, the moral norm to believe the best of others is often tragically in tension with the epistemic norm to believe what the evidence supports, with the prudential norm to believe whatever it takes in order to get ahead, and so on.
最后，规范和规范类型可能处于完全的紧张状态。审慎规范建议相信你的儿子在你离开时没有抽烟，这与遵循你的感知证据的认识规范相冲突。同样，相信他人最好的一面的道德规范往往与相信证据支持的认识论规范以及为了取得成功而不惜一切代价的认识论规范以及审慎规范相冲突，等等。
Tension or conflict can also exist between doxastic obligations of a diachronic sort. The epistemic norm to gather as much evidence as possible may conflict with the prudential norm to believe in such a way as to save time and effort (example: the fastidious boss who never hires anyone until he has investigated a candidate’s entire past, called every reference, and confirmed every qualification). It also conflicts with the moral norm not to believe on the basis of evidence gathered in an immoral fashion (example: the doctor who gathers evidence about human diseases by performing inhumane experiments on prisoners).
在历时性的道德义务之间也可能存在紧张或冲突。收集尽可能多的证据的认识规范可能与以节省时间和精力的方式相信的审慎规范相冲突（例如：挑剔的老板在调查了候选人的整个过去、打电话给每一个推荐人并确认每一个资格之前从不雇用任何人）。它也与道德规范相冲突，即不相信以不道德方式收集的证据（例如：医生通过对囚犯进行不人道的实验来收集有关人类疾病的证据）。
Ethicists of belief who are not value monists often claim that there is a way of ordering norms or types of norms in terms of the relative strength or relative ease with which their claims on us can be defeated. This means that in a given situation there will be a determinate answer about what one ought to believe “all things considered.” Others argue, however, that at least some of the norms are incommensurable, and that in many cases there will simply be no answer to the question of what it is right to believe all things considered (Feldman 2000). Still others think that one category of norm collapses into another and that this can give us an all things considered conclusion (for discussion of whether epistemic rationality collapses into prudential rationality, for example, see Kelly 2003)
不是价值一元论者的信仰伦理学家经常声称，有一种方法可以根据相对强度或相对容易程度来对规范或规范类型进行排序，他们对我们的要求可以被击败。这意味着在特定情况下，对于一个人应该相信什么“所有考虑在内”，将有一个确定的答案。然而，其他人则认为，至少一些规范是不可比较的，在许多情况下，根本没有答案，即相信所有考虑过的事情是正确的（Feldman 2000）。还有一些人认为，一类规范会坍缩成另一类规范，这可以给我们一个考虑所有因素的结论（例如，关于认识理性是否崩溃为审慎理性的讨论，参见Kelly 2003）
In sum: a full-blown ethics of belief will say something about the axiological sources of the different types of norms, about the inferential relations between them, about their temporal range (synchronic/diachronic) and about what to do when norms conflict. (See Broome 1999 and Kolodny 2005)
总而言之：一个成熟的信仰伦理学将说明不同类型规范的价值论来源，它们之间的推理关系，它们的时间范围（共时性/历时性）以及当规范发生冲突时该怎么做。（见 Broome 1999 和 Kolodny 2005）
3. Belief, its Aims, and Our Control Over It
- 信仰、信仰的目标以及我们对信仰的控制
3.1 The nature of belief
3.1 信仰的本质
Questions about what belief is and how it is formed have typically played a marginal role in the ethics of belief debate. There is agreement among most analytic philosophers that belief is (roughly) a dispositional, affirmative attitude towards a proposition or state of affairs. To believe that p is to take it that p is true—to take it that the state of affairs described by the sentence “p” obtains. Note that this doesn’t mean that the subject explicitly believes the proposition that p is true, however, since the latter is a different and higher order belief (mere belief that p doesn’t require possession of the concept of “truth”, for instance, whereas the belief that p is true does). It is also widely agreed that the majority of our beliefs are not occurrent at any given time, and that belief comes in degrees of strength, confidence, or firmness.
关于信仰是什么以及它是如何形成的问题通常在信仰伦理学辩论中发挥了边缘作用。大多数分析哲学家都认为，信仰（大致上）是对命题或事态的一种倾向性、肯定的态度。相信 p 就是认为 p 是真的——认为“p”这句话所描述的事态得到了。请注意，这并不意味着主体明确相信p为真的命题，然而，因为后者是一种不同的、更高阶的信念（例如，仅仅相信p不需要拥有“真理”的概念，而相信p是真的）。人们还普遍认为，我们的大多数信念在任何特定时间都不是不变的，这种信念以力量、信心或坚定的程度而来。
After this, however, agreement breaks down. Representationalists regard beliefs as structures in the mind that represent the propositions they affirm—usually in something like a mental language (see Fodor 1975 and the entry on language of thought). Behavioralist-dispositionalists regard beliefs as dispositions to act in certain ways in certain circumstances (see Braithwaite 1932–1933). Eliminativists regard talk of “beliefs” as designating convenient fictions that we ascribe to people in folk psychology (see Churchland 1981 and the entry on eliminative materialism). Primitivists think of beliefs as basic mental states which do not admit of analysis. And so on. There is also a big controversy regarding whether the most fundamental concept here is of degrees of belief (or credences).
然而，在此之后，协议破裂了。表征主义者将信念视为心灵中的结构，这些结构代表了他们所肯定的命题——通常采用类似心理语言的东西（参见Fodor 1975和关于思想语言的条目）。行为主义倾向论者认为信念是在某些情况下以某种方式行事的倾向（见Braithwaite 1932-1933）。消除论者认为，“信仰”的讨论是指我们归因于民间心理学中人们的方便的虚构（参见Churchland 1981和关于消除唯物主义的条目）。原始主义者认为信念是基本的心理状态，不承认分析。等等。关于这里最基本的概念是否是信仰程度（或信仰）也存在很大的争议。
This disagreement about the nature of belief has (thus far at least) not been taken to impinge on the ethics of belief debate in significant ways. Of course, eliminativists and behavioralists will have to say that doxastic norms—if there are any—apply at bottom to non-doxastic states. Still, modulo those kinds of changes, these and other ontological analyses of belief seem compatible with many different accounts of its ethics.
这种关于信仰本质的分歧（至少到目前为止）还没有被看作是对信仰伦理辩论产生重大影响的。当然，消除主义者和行为主义者将不得不说，doxastic规范——如果有的话——在底层适用于非doxastic状态。尽管如此，对这些变化进行模数分析，这些和其他对信仰的本体论分析似乎与对其伦理学的许多不同描述是相容的。
3.2 The aim(s) of belief
3.2 信仰的目标
By contrast, theories about the aim or goal of belief typically have an immediate and substantive impact on conceptions of its ethics, and can be used, in particular, to answer questions about the relative importance of various norms, whether there are “all things considered” obligations in a given situation, and so on (see Velleman 2000, Wedgwood 2002, Steglich-Peterson 2009, and the essays in Chan 2013 for general discussion; see Côté-Bouchard forthcoming for a critique of the move from aim of belief to doxastic norm).
相比之下，关于信仰的目的或目标的理论通常对其伦理概念产生直接和实质性的影响，并且特别可以用来回答有关各种规范的相对重要性的问题，在特定情况下是否存在“所有考虑”的义务，等等（见Velleman 2000，Wedgwood 2002， Steglich-Peterson 2009 年，以及 Chan 2013 年的一般性讨论论文;见即将出版的Côté-Bouchard，对从信仰目标到教条规范的转变的批评）。
A few philosophers and psychologists argue that simply acquiring significant truth while avoiding significant falsehood is the only aim of belief, and thus that any doxastic obligations will be structured accordingly (see David 2001). Others argue that there are important aims in addition to, or even in lieu of, the aim of truth-acquisition—aims that can underwrite other doxastic norms (Velleman 2000, Sosa 2000, Sosa 2003, Gibbons 2013). A common candidate here, of course, is knowledge itself (see Williamson 2000, Pritchard 2007, Simion et al. 2016 and the entry on the value of knowledge), but some authors claim that justification (Adler 2002, Gibbons 2013) and/or doxastic “virtue” is the aim (Zagzebski 2004, Sosa 2011, Wright 2014), while still others plump for a more structurally complex aim such as “understanding” (Kvanvig 2003, Kvanvig 2009, Grimm 2012). (Note, though, that other authors argue that understanding doesn’t even involve belief (Hunter 1998; Dellsén forthcoming)).
一些哲学家和心理学家认为，简单地获得重要的真理，同时避免重要的谎言是信仰的唯一目标，因此，任何教条主义的义务都将相应地构建（见David 2001）。其他人则认为，除了获取真相的目标之外，甚至还有其他重要的目标——这些目标可以支撑其他教条规范（Velleman 2000，Sosa 2000，Sosa 2003，Gibbons 2013）。当然，这里的一个常见候选者是知识本身（参见 Williamson 2000， Pritchard 2007， Simion et al. 2016 和关于知识价值的条目），但一些作者声称，正当性（Adler 2002，Gibbons 2013）和/或 doxastic 的“美德”是目标（Zagzebski 2004，Sosa 2011，Wright 2014），而另一些人则追求结构更复杂的目标，例如“理解”（Kvanvig 2003， Kvanvig 2009，Grimm 2012）。（但请注意，其他作者认为理解甚至不涉及信仰（Hunter 1998;Dellsén 即将出版））。
As mentioned earlier, in cognitive science and evolutionary biology, it is often assumed that the aim of belief (as well as of almost every other process) is something like “survival.” There are ongoing disagreements, however, about the extent to which that is correct and, even if it is, whether it is necessarily or even contingently connected to the aim of truth-acquisition (Stich 1990, Plantinga 2002, Street 2006).
如前所述，在认知科学和进化生物学中，人们通常认为信念的目标（以及几乎所有其他过程的目标）都是“生存”之类的东西。然而，关于这种说法在多大程度上是正确的，以及即使是正确的，它是否必然或甚至与获取真相的目标有必然的联系，一直存在分歧（Stich 1990，Plantinga 2002，Street 2006）。
A very different kind of candidate for the aim of belief would be something like pleasure broadly-speaking, or perhaps “feeling at home in the world.” If one of these is the aim, then the norms it underwrites might at times lead away from truth. For example: suppose Smith is the sort of guy who feels great pleasure when he believes that everyone he knows thinks highly of him, and pleasure is an aim that underwrites a doxastic norm. Then Smith has a prima facie obligation to believe that his friend Jones thinks the world of him.
对于信仰的目标来说，一种非常不同的候选者是广义的快乐，或者可能是“在世界上感到宾至如归”。如果其中一个是目标，那么它所支撑的规范有时可能会偏离真理。例如：假设史密斯是那种当他相信他认识的每个人都对他有高度评价时会感到非常快乐的人，而快乐是支撑着教条主义规范的目标。那么，史密斯有表面上的义务去相信他的朋友琼斯对他的世界的看法是这样的。
This is clearly one of the places where debates about psychological strategies such as self-deception, “bad faith,” wish-fulfillment, “irony,” and the like become germane in the ethics of belief (see Wisdo 1991, Wisdo 1993, Mele 2001, Wood 2002, and the entry on self deception). If the aims of belief can plausibly be regarded as wide enough to include truth-neutral states such as pleasure or “feeling at home in the world,” and if these aims can underwrite genuine norms, then Evidentialism as characterized below clearly delivers a far-too-narrow characterization of its ethics.
这显然是关于心理策略的辩论的地方之一，如自我欺骗，“恶意”，愿望实现，“讽刺”等在信仰伦理中变得密切相关（参见Wisdo 1991，Wisdo 1993，Mele 2001，Wood 2002，以及关于自欺欺人的条目）。如果信仰的目标可以被合理地视为足够广泛，包括真理中立的状态，如快乐或“在世界上感到宾至如归”，并且如果这些目标可以支撑真正的规范，那么，如下所述的证据主义显然对其伦理学进行了过于狭隘的描述。
We have seen that our conception of the aim of belief can influence our conception of doxastic norms. But it can also affect the extent to which parallels can be drawn between the ethics of belief and the ethics of action generally. If one adopts “value monism” in the ethics of belief (whether it be veritism of some other kind of value), then there will be a strong parallel to monistic consequentialist theories in the ethics of action (DePaul 2001).
我们已经看到，我们对信仰目的的概念可以影响我们对教条规范的概念。但它也可能影响到信仰伦理和一般行动伦理之间的相似程度。如果一个人在信仰伦理学中采用“价值一元论”（无论是某种其他价值的真实主义），那么在行动伦理学中将有与一元论结果主义理论的强烈相似性（DePaul 2001）。
A remaining difference between consequentialism in epistemology and in ethics, however, is that a belief’s success at achieving its aim is typically evaluated by epistemologists all at once in the moment it is formed, whereas in the case of an action, subsequent consequences are relevant to the evaluation of its moral rightness, and many of these consequences won’t be known (if at all) until much later (for an extended comparison of these two kinds of consequentialism, see Briesen 2017). That said, it is possible to imagine a diachronic ethics of belief according to which truth is the sole aim of belief, but we evaluate particular beliefs not just on whether they are true but also on their ability to enable or produce the subsequent acquisition of other true beliefs.
然而，在认识论和伦理学中，结果主义之间的另一个区别是，一种信念在实现其目的方面的成功通常由认识论者在形成的那一刻立即被评估，而在行动的情况下，随后的后果与评估其道德正确性有关，其中许多后果直到很久以后才为人所知（如果有的话）（为了对这两种信念进行扩展比较。结果主义，见 Briesen 2017）。也就是说，我们可以想象一种历时性的信仰伦理学，根据这种伦理学，真理是信仰的唯一目标，但我们评估特定的信仰不仅看它们是否真实，还看它们能够或导致随后获得其他真实信仰的能力。
If we have a theory according to which the aim of belief is complex, however, then parallels to the ethics of action become more complicated. An ethicist of belief who holds that acquiring significant truth in the right way is the aim of belief, and analyzes the “rightness” of a belief-forming practice in terms of its ability to lead to truth, may find that the relevant parallel is to rule-consequentialism. By contrast, the view that the aim of belief is simply to believe in the right way, regardless of whether that “right way” reliably leads to signficant truth, looks like the analogue of a deontological position in ethics that emphasizes the intentional following of right principles rather than the achievement of some aim external to the act itself. Whether or not these parallels are illuminating, and whether a view in the ethics of belief constrains our options in the ethics of action, is still an open question (see Kornblith 1983, Dougherty 2014).
然而，如果我们有一种理论认为信仰的目标是复杂的，那么与行动伦理的相似之处就会变得更加复杂。一个信仰的伦理学家认为，以正确的方式获得重要的真理是信仰的目的，并分析了一种信念形成实践的“正确性”，即它导致了真理的能力，可能会发现相关的相似之处是规则结果主义。相比之下，认为信仰的目的只是以正确的方式信仰，而不管这种“正确的道路”是否可靠地导致重要的真理，这种观点看起来像是伦理学中一种道义论立场的类比，这种立场强调有意识地遵循正确的原则，而不是实现行为本身之外的某些目标。这些相似之处是否具有启发性，以及信仰伦理学的观点是否限制了我们在行动伦理学中的选择，仍然是一个悬而未决的问题（参见Kornblith 1983，Dougherty 2014）。
There are many other variations here. It seems possible to defend the view, for instance, that we ought only to believe on sufficient evidence—as the Evidentialists teach—but that our conception of the aims of belief might provide further and more determinate necessary conditions for permissible belief. It is also possible to argue that the aim of belief makes it the case that we have practical reasons for thinking that only epistemic reasons can license belief (Whiting 2014).
这里还有许多其他变体。例如，我们似乎可以为这样一种观点辩护，即我们只应该相信足够的证据——正如证据主义者所教导的那样——但我们对信仰目标的概念可能会为允许的信仰提供进一步和更确定的必要条件。也可以争辩说，信仰的目标使得我们有实际的理由认为只有认识论的原因才能许可信仰（Whiting 2014）。
Finally, it may be possible to defend the view that belief by its nature has no specific aim, but is rather a state that can constitute or lead to any number of different goods. If that is right, then we obviously cannot look to the aim of belief to underwrite an account of its ethics.
最后，也许可以捍卫这样一种观点，即信仰就其本质而言没有特定的目标，而是一种可以构成或导致任何数量不同商品的状态。如果這是正確的，那麼我們顯然不能指望信仰的目標來承諾對其倫理的說明。
3.3 Knowledge as the norm of belief
3.3 知识是信仰的规范
We have already seen that some theorists take knowledge to be the (or at least an) aim of belief. Some philosophers go further and say that knowledge is also the norm of belief - that is, that any belief that does not also count as knowledge is impermissible or irrational or vicious or defective. Put another way: knowing that p is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for permissibly (rationally, virtuously) believing that p.
我们已经看到，一些理论家将知识作为（或至少是）信仰的目标。一些哲学家更进一步说，知识也是信仰的规范——也就是说，任何不算作知识的信仰都是不被允许的、非理性的、恶毒的或有缺陷的。換句話說：知道p既是必要條件，也是充分條件，可以確受地（理性地，道德地）相信p。
One argument for the claim that knowledge is the norm of belief seeks to infer that result from the claim that knowledge is the aim of belief. The aim generates the norm, and any belief that fails to achieve the aim also fails to obey the norm. Perhaps the most prominent argument along these lines starts with the related claim that knowledge is the “norm of assertion ”—i.e., that we ought not assert a proposition if we don’t know it (see Williamson 2000). But if that’s the case, and if belief is the “inner” analogue of assertion, then it looks as though we also ought only to believe a proposition when the belief counts as knowledge. The debate then has to do with whether knowledge really is the norm of assertion, and, if so, whether “belief” is an inner analogue of assertion in such a way that the norm carries over (see Sutton 2005, Huemer 2007b, Bach 2008, Goldberg 2009).
“知识是信仰的规范”这一主张的一个论点试图从“知识是信仰的目的”这一主张中推断出这一结果。目标产生规范，任何未能实现目标的信念也未能遵守规范。也许沿着这些思路最突出的论点始于相关的主张，即知识是“断言的规范”——也就是说，如果我们不知道一个命题，我们就不应该断言它（见Williamson 2000）。但是，如果是这样的话，如果信念是断言的“内在”类似物，那么看起来我们也应该只相信一个命题，当信念算作知识时。因此，争论的焦点在于知识是否真的是断言的规范，如果是的话，“信仰”是否是断言的内在类似物，以至于规范得以延续（参见Sutton，2005，Huemer 2007b，Bach 2008，Goldberg 2009）。
One reason that this position can seem counterintuitive is that an important role that norms often play is that of guiding action. The principle that we should only believe what we know is not a very helpful action-guiding norm, since we often don’t know what we know (according to most epistemologists, at least). Of course, if I adopt this norm, and know that I don’t know that p, then I’ll see that I shouldn’t believe that p either (this negative formulation is what Williamson uses in 2000, 256). But, again, most epistemologists do not think we are typically able to tell, from the inside, whether we would know the proposition in question if we believed it. And yet that ability seems to be presupposed by the idea that this is an action-guiding norm. Another objection to the idea that knowledge is the norm of belief is more intuitive: knowledge seems to most of us like a different sort of accomplishment than belief, or even justified belief, or (after Gettier) even justified true belief. It is one thing to say that we acquire the concept of belief by looking at paradigm cases of knowledge and then subtracting different elements from them (for instance: “justified belief would be just like knowledge but without truth”). It is quite another to say that no belief can count as properly formed unless it also counts as knowledge (for more on all this, see Benton, Other Internet Resources)
这种立场似乎有悖常理的一个原因是，规范经常发挥的一个重要作用是指导行动。我们应该只相信我们所知道的原则并不是一个非常有用的行动指导规范，因为我们经常不知道我们所知道的（至少根据大多数认识论者的说法）。当然，如果我采用这个规范，并且知道我不知道那个p，那么我就会发现我也不应该相信那个p（这个否定的公式是威廉姆森在2000年，256页使用的）。但是，同样，大多数认识论者认为我们通常无法从内部判断，如果我们相信它，我们是否会知道所讨论的命题。然而，这种能力似乎是以这样一种观点为前提的，即这是一种行动指导规范。对“知识是信仰的规范”这一观点的另一个反对意见更为直观：对我们大多数人来说，知识似乎是一种不同于信仰的成就，甚至是合理的信仰，或者（在盖蒂尔之后）甚至是证明真实信仰的一种不同于信仰的成就。可以说，我们通过观察知识的范式案例，然后从中减去不同的元素来获得信仰的概念（例如：“合理的信仰就像知识一样，但没有真理”），这是一回事。说任何信仰都不能算作正确形成，除非它也算作知识，那就完全是另一回事了（有关所有这些的更多信息，请参阅Benton，其他互联网资源）
3.4 Belief-control
3.4 信念控制
A third foundational issue related to the nature of belief has to do with whether or not belief-formation is in some way voluntary or under the control of the will. This issue, too, has an effect on the ethics of belief. Many philosophers and psychologists have concluded that belief is a more or less involuntary response to perceived evidence. But if a behavior isn’t ‘up to us’ in any important sense, then it is hard to see how we could be responsible for performing it (see Alston 1989 for an influential argument along these lines).
与信仰本质有关的第三个基本问题与信仰的形成是否在某种程度上是自愿的还是在意志的控制下有关。这个问题也对信仰伦理产生了影响。许多哲学家和心理学家得出的结论是，信仰或多或少是对感知证据的非自愿反应。但是，如果一个行为在任何重要意义上都不是“取决于我们”，那么就很难看出我们如何负责执行它（参见Alston 1989，关于这些思路的有影响力的论点）。
In response to this “doxastic involuntarist” challenge , some philosophers argue that we do have direct control over at least some of our beliefs (Ginet 2001, Weatherson 2008), or that we at least have control over which beliefs are suspended or relinquished (Rott forthcoming). Others develop a kind of hybrid view that allows certain kinds of belief-formation to count as free and ‘up to us,’ even if they are also caused in us (see Steup 2000, Ryan 2003). Some explicitly reject any parallel between free will and free belief (Wagner forthcoming). Still others focus on the fact that we can be praised and blamed for beliefs (as well as actions) that are not under our control, even if there are no obligations on belief-formation. (Adams 1985, Hieronymi 2006, Southwood and Chuard 2009).
作为对这种“教士非自愿论”挑战的回应，一些哲学家认为，我们至少可以直接控制我们的一些信仰（Ginet 2001，Weatherson 2008），或者我们至少可以控制哪些信仰被暂停或放弃（Rott即将出版）。其他人则发展出一种混合观点，允许某些类型的信念形成被认为是自由的，并且“取决于我们”，即使它们也是在我们身上引起的（见Steup 2000，Ryan 2003）。一些人明确拒绝自由意志和自由信仰之间的任何相似之处（瓦格纳即将出版）。还有一些人关注这样一个事实，即即使没有建立信念的义务，我们也可以因为不受我们控制的信念（以及行为）而受到表扬和指责。（亚当斯 1985 年，希罗尼米 2006 年，Southwood 和 Chuard 2009 年）。
Yet another response, compatible with many of those list above, involves an account of indirect ways in which belief-formation counts as voluntary and thus susceptible to normative evaluation (e.g., Pascal 1670, Feldman 2000, Audi 2001, Yee 2002, Leon 2002, Audi 2008b). Another option is to take the doxastic involuntarist challenge to motivate a new focus on positive propositional attitudes that are by definition voluntary – “acceptances,” for instance (see Cohen 1992, Bratman 1992, Engel 2000, Audi 2008a, and §7 below). Finally, some ethicists of belief seek to argue that there are some obligations on direct belief-formation while also absorbing the putative empirical datum that much of it is not under the control of the will (see Feldman and Conee 1985, Feldman 2000, Adler 2005, Hieronymi 2006 and 2008).
然而，与上述许多回答相符的答复涉及对信念形成的间接方式的解释，在这种方式中，信念的形成被认为是自愿的，因此容易受到规范性评价（例如，Pascal 1670，Feldman 2000，Audi 2001，Yee 2002，Leon 2002，Audi 2008b）。另一种选择是接受 doxastic 非自愿论的挑战，以激发对积极命题态度的新关注，这些态度在定义上是自愿的——例如“接受”（参见 Cohen 1992、Bratman 1992、Engel 2000、Audi 2008a 和下面的 §7）。最后，一些信仰伦理学家试图争辩说，在直接信仰形成方面有一些义务，同时也吸收了假定的经验数据，即其中大部分不受意志的控制（见Feldman和Conee 1985，Feldman 2000，Adler 2005，Hieronymi 2006和2008）。
4. Evidentialism: an overview
- 证据主义：概述
4.1 Strict vs. moderate
4.1 严格与适度
Evidentialism of some sort is far and away the dominant ethic of belief among early modern and contemporary philosophers alike. The central principle, as mentioned earlier, is that one ought only to base one’s beliefs on relevant evidence (i.e. evidence that bears on the truth of the proposition) that is in one’s possession. Many Evidentialists (Locke, Hume, and Clifford, for example) add the condition that the amount of evidence in one’s possession must be proportioned to one’s degree of belief, and that one should only firmly believe on the basis of “sufficient” evidence (where “sufficient” involves the evidence being strong enough for the belief to count as knowledge if true). Some also add one of the reflective access requirements mentioned above: for instance, that we ought to know (or being a position to know, or justifiably believe, or be justified in believing) that we have evidence for the original belief or even that the amount of evidence we have is sufficient (for a survey of these positions and their critics, see the essays in Dougherty 2011).
某种证据主义在早期现代和当代哲学家中都是占主导地位的信仰伦理。如前所述，其核心原则是，一个人只应将自己的信念建立在自己所拥有的相关证据（即与命题的真实性有关的证据）之上。许多证据主义者（例如洛克、休谟和克利福德）增加了一个条件，即一个人拥有的证据数量必须与一个人的信仰程度成正比，并且一个人只能在“充分”证据的基础上坚定地相信（其中“充分”涉及证据足够强大，以至于如果信念是真实的，则算作知识）。有些还增加了上述反思性访问要求之一：例如，我们应该知道（或作为一个知道的立场，或有理由相信，或有理由相信）我们有原始信念的证据，或者甚至我们拥有的证据数量是足够的（对于这些立场及其批评者的调查， 参见 Dougherty 2011 中的文章）。
Once a principle along these lines has been chosen, the relative strictness of a given Evidentialist position will be a function of how many exceptions it allows. The strictest sort of Evidentialist—Clifford, at least on standard readings—says that the principle holds “always, everywhere, and for anyone” (though note, again, that Clifford himself qualifies this later in his essay). There are problems with such a strict position, however, including the threat of the infinite regress that arises if the strict Evidentialist also requires that we believe that we have sufficient evidence for all of our beliefs.
一旦选择了符合这些思路的原则，那么给定的证据主义立场的相对严格程度将取决于它允许多少例外。最严格的证据主义者——克利福德，至少在标准解读上是这样——说这个原则“总是、无处不在、对任何人”（尽管再次注意，克利福德本人在他的文章后面对此进行了限定）。然而，这种严格的立场存在问题，包括如果严格的证据主义者还要求我们相信我们有足够的证据来支持我们所有的信念，那么就会出现无限倒退的威胁。
In contrast, moderate Evidentialists take their principles to be exceptionable; thus they allow that there are some circumstances in which subjects are rationally permitted to form beliefs in the absence of sufficient evidence. They might hold that the Cliffordian view applies, say, to the beliefs formed by a military pilot about the location of a legitimate bombing target in the midst of a residential area, or the beliefs formed by a government health official regarding the efficacy of a pharmaceutical trial, at least insofar as these beliefs lead to morally or prudentially significant actions. But at the same time they might think it permissible to abandon these strict standards in ordinary contexts where not much is at stake—for instance, the everyday belief that there is still some milk in the fridge. If the number of exceptions is very large, then the position ends up looking more like one of the Non-Evidentialist positions described below. As a result, the boundary between a very moderate Evidentialism and full-blown Non-Evidentialism can be quite blurry.
相比之下，温和的证据主义者认为他们的原则是例外的;因此，他们允许在某些情况下，在没有足够证据的情况下，客观地允许受试者形成信念。他们可能会认为，克利福德的观点适用于军事飞行员对合法轰炸目标在居民区中的位置形成的信念，或者政府卫生官员对药物试验的有效性形成的信念，至少就这些信念导致道德或审慎的重要行动而言。但与此同时，他们可能认为在没有太多风险的普通情况下放弃这些严格的标准是允许的——例如，人们普遍认为冰箱里还有一些牛奶。如果异常的数量非常大，那么这个位置最终看起来更像是下面描述的非证据主义立场之一。因此，非常温和的证据主义和成熟的非证据主义之间的界限可能非常模糊。
As difficult as it is to defend strict or thoroughgoing Evidentialism, it is even harder to defend the view that Evidentialism is inappropriate in every domain. The cases of the pilot and the health official are ones in which the subject’s beliefs (largely as a result of the actions to which they lead) simply must, we think, meet some very high standards of evidence. Accordingly, at least some sort of moderate or context-specific Evidentialism seems overwhelmingly plausible.
尽管为严格或彻底的证据主义辩护是困难的，但要捍卫证据主义在每个领域都是不合适的观点就更难了。我们认为，在飞行员和卫生官员的案例中，受试者的信念（主要是由于他们所导致的行动）必须满足一些非常高的证据标准。因此，至少某种温和的或针对特定背景的证据主义似乎是压倒性的。
We have seen that the distinction between strict Evidentialism and moderate Evidentialism is quite sharp but that the line between moderate Evidentialism and Non-Evidentialism is rather blurry. Perhaps the best place to make a distinction between moderate Evidentialism and full-blown Non-Evidentialism is over whether a subject can be not only permitted but also obliged to form a belief on insufficient evidence (or, depending on the reflective access conditions, on what she takes to be insufficient evidence) in certain situations. An ethicist of belief who affirms this, it seems reasonable to say, has thereby abandoned even the most moderate form of Evidentialism and moved into the Non-Evidentialist camp (see §6 below).
我们已经看到，严格的证据主义和适度的证据主义之间的区别是相当明显的，但适度的证据主义和非证据主义之间的界限却相当模糊。也许区分温和的证据主义和成熟的非证据主义的最佳地方是，在某些情况下，一个主体是否不仅可以被允许，而且可以被迫形成对证据不足的信念（或者，根据反思访问条件，她认为证据不足）。一个有信仰的伦理学家，如果肯定这一点，似乎可以合理地说，他就这样放弃了甚至最温和的证据主义形式，转而进入了非证据主义的阵营（见下文第6节）。
4.2 Synchronic vs. diachronic
4.2 共时与历时
It was noted earlier that doxastic norms can be either synchronic or diachronic. Clifford’s Principle itself is articulated as a synchronic norm, but in the later portions of the “Ethics of Belief,” he is more concerned to articulate diachronic principles regarding evidence-collection and evidence-assessment. It is from these portions of his discussion that we get “Clifford’s Other Principle.”
前面已经指出，信念的规范可以是共时的，也可以是历时的。克利福德原则本身被表述为一种共时规范，但在“信仰伦理学”的后半部分，他更关心阐明关于证据收集和证据评估的历时性原则。正是从他讨论的这些部分，我们得到了“克利福德的其他原则”。
Many early ethicists of belief modeled their accounts on deontological ethical theories that tend to formulate principles synchronically. Recently, however, virtue epistemologists have emphasized what they take to be the diachronic character of our fundamental doxastic obligations, and suggest that synchronic principles requiring sufficient evidence for a belief at a time are plausibly viewed as underwritten by more fundamental diachronic principles enjoining the cultivation of virtuous intellectual character (Zagzebski 1996, Roberts and Wood 2007, Sosa 2007, Audi 2008b).
许多早期的信仰伦理学家将他们的叙述建立在道义论的伦理理论之上，这些道德理论倾向于同步制定原则。然而，最近，美德认识论者强调了他们认为我们基本的道德义务的历时性特征，并认为需要在某个时期为信仰提供足够证据的共时性原则被合理地视为由更基本的历时性原则所支撑，这些原则要求培养有道德的智力品格（Zagzebski 1996，Roberts和Wood 2007， 索萨 2007 年，奥迪 2008 年b）。
4.3 Evidence and its possession
4.3 证据及其持有
Crucial to any theory in the ethics of belief—and especially an Evidentialist theory—will be some account of the nature of evidence itself. Some philosophers construe evidence in terms of demonstrative proof, others in terms of objective and/or subjective probability, and others simply in terms of anything that belief is responsive to (see the entry on evidence). A fully articulate Evidentialism will also provide an account of how evidence supports belief (see the entry on the epistemic basing relation), and of what it is to have or possess such evidence.
对于信仰伦理学中的任何理论——尤其是证据主义理论——来说，至关重要的是对证据本身本质的一些解释。一些哲学家用证明来解释证据，另一些哲学家用客观和/或主观概率来解释证据，而另一些哲学家则简单地用信念对任何事物做出反应来解释（见关于证据的条目）。一个完全清晰的证据主义还将提供一个关于证据如何支持信念的解释（参见关于认识论基础关系的条目），以及拥有或拥有这些证据是什么。
It will also, perhaps, say something about whether there can be evidence (arguments) in favor of having a belief that p or bringing about the belief that p, in addition to evidence in favor of p itself (see Reisner 2008). It will presumably also have something to say about disagreement between epistemic peers, and the impact that such disagreement can have on our conception of the doxastic norms, especially if the disagreement is not based on a difference in evidence (van Inwagen 1996, Kelly 2005). Finally, it might take a stand on the more general issue of how higher-order evidence interacts with first-order evidence. For example: in the case of peer disagreement, knowing that a peer disagrees with you is a piece of higher-order evidence regarding your first-order belief.
也许，它还会说明是否有证据（论据）支持相信 p 或导致相信 p，此外还有支持 p 本身的证据（见 Reisner 2008）。据推测，它也对认识论同伴之间的分歧有话要说，以及这种分歧可能对我们对教条规范的概念产生的影响，特别是如果分歧不是基于证据的差异（van Inwagen 1996，Kelly 2005）。最后，它可能会对更高阶证据如何与一阶证据相互作用的更普遍的问题采取立场。例如：在同伴意见不合的情况下，知道同伴不同意你的观点是关于你的一阶信念的高阶证据。
With respect to reflective access conditions, it was noted earlier that Evidentialists cannot require that a rational subject always base beliefs on sufficient evidence that she knows or justifiably believes she has, for fear of an infinite regress. If that is correct, then another less demanding sort of principle must be in the offing, one according to which at least some beliefs can simply be held on the basis of sufficient evidence, regardless of whether the subject has any beliefs about that evidence.
关于反思性访问条件，前面已经指出，证据主义者不能要求理性的主体总是将信念建立在她知道或有理由相信她拥有的充分证据之上，因为害怕无限的倒退。如果這是正確的，那麼另一種要求較低的原則就必須出現，根據這種原則，至少可以簡單地在足夠的證據基礎上持有一些信念，而無論主體是否對這些證據有任何信念。
On the issue of evidence-possession generally: if we regard evidence as wholly constituted by mental states (experiences, beliefs, memories, etc.), then an account of what it is to “possess” evidence will be relatively straightforward—we must simply have these mental states. If evidence is not merely in the head, so to speak, then the possession condition in Evidentialist norms may turn out to be quite complex. What is our evidence for the belief that “it’s raining”? Is it our awareness or experience of something, such as the street’s being wet? Or is it simply the street’s being wet? When asked why we believe that it is raining, we typically say something like “because the street is wet.” Is this merely shorthand or does it say something about the nature of evidence? (For arguments that extra-mental facts in the world often constitute evidence, see McDowell 1994 and Ginsborg 2007; for further discussion see Williamson 2000 and Dancy 2000, ch.6).
关于一般的证据持有问题：如果我们认为证据完全由心理状态（经验、信仰、记忆等）构成，那么关于“拥有”证据是什么的解释将相对简单——我们必须简单地拥有这些心理状态。可以这么说，如果证据不仅仅是在头脑中，那么证据主义规范中的占有条件可能会变得相当复杂。我们有什么证据证明“下雨了”的信念？是我们对某事的意识或体验，例如街道被弄湿了吗？还是只是街道被弄湿了？当被问及为什么我们认为正在下雨时，我们通常会说“因为街道很湿”。这只是速记，还是说明了证据的性质？（关于世界上的心理外事实往往构成证据的论点，见McDowell 1994和Ginsborg 2007;进一步讨论见Williamson 2000和Dancy 2000，第6章）。
5. Varieties of Evidentialism
- 证据主义的多样性
In light of the fact that there are different types of value underwriting different types of obligation, there must also be different types of Evidentialism: prudential, epistemic, and moral at the very least.
鉴于存在不同类型的价值承保不同类型的义务这一事实，还必须有不同类型的证据主义：至少是审慎的、认识论的和道德的。
5.1 Prudential evidentialism
5.1 审慎证据主义
Strict prudential Evidentialism doesn’t enjoy much of a following; indeed, as with most strict forms of Evidentialism, it is hard to see how it could be motivated. Perhaps it is prudent in general to follow one’s evidence, but there will always be cases in which prudential considerations push in the direction of playing fast and loose with the evidence. Wouldn’t it be better for the grief-stricken widower to believe that his wife is enjoying life in heaven, or for the devoted spouse to fight off the belief that her husband is unfaithful, even though she regularly finds lipstick on his collar?
严格的审慎证据主义并没有得到太多的追随者;事实上，与大多数严格的证据主义形式一样，很难看出它是如何被激发的。也许一般来说，遵循证据是谨慎的，但总会有一些情况下，审慎的考虑会朝着快速和松散地利用证据的方向发展。对于悲痛欲绝的鳏夫来说，相信他的妻子正在享受天堂的生活，或者对于忠诚的配偶来说，即使她经常在他的衣领上发现口红，也要抵制她丈夫不忠的信念，这难道不是更好吗？
One move that the prudential Evidentialist can make in response to such objections is to adopt the doxastic analogue of rule consequentialism. Even if there are particular cases in which it is imprudent to follow one’s evidence, the general rule that one should believe on the basis of, and in proportion to, sufficient evidence in one’s possession produces the best distribution of prudential outcomes overall.
审慎的证据主义者在回应这种反对意见时可以采取的一个举措是采用规则结果主义的教条类比。即使在一些特定情况下，遵循自己的证据是不明智的，但人们应该根据自己所拥有的足够证据并与之相称地相信的一般规则，也会产生总体上审慎结果的最佳分布。
This kind of moderate prudential Evidentialism can handle a lot of common counterexamples, but there is still the concern that entire classes of beliefs—rather than individual instances—violate the principle and yet seem to produce more beneficial overall results. For instance, wouldn’t it be better all around if each of us were as a rule to think more highly of one another’s worth, intentions, and capacities than our evidence actually supports?
这种温和的审慎证据主义可以处理许多常见的反例，但仍然有人担心，整个信仰类别——而不是个别实例——违反了这一原则，但似乎产生了更有益的整体结果。例如，如果我们每个人都通常比我们的证据实际支持的更高度地看待彼此的价值、意图和能力，那不是更好吗？
In response, it might be claimed that the source of the prudential value of always believing on sufficient evidence is that it tends to result in our having knowledge. If that were right, then there would be a clear connection between prudential and epistemic norms (see §2.4 above and §5.3 below). The challenge for such a position, however, is to show that justification or knowledge adds something of genuine prudential value that mere true belief lacks.
作为回应，可能会声称，始终相信足够证据的审慎价值的来源是，它往往会导致我们拥有知识。如果这是正确的，那么审慎规范和认识规范之间将存在明显的联系（见上文第2.4节和下文第5.3节）。然而，这种立场的挑战在于表明，正当性或知识增加了一些真正的审慎价值，而这些价值仅仅是真正的信仰所缺乏的。
5.2 Moral evidentialism
5.2 道德证据主义
Strict moral Evidentialism is unlikely to be attractive to anyone but the most zealous Cliffordian. In its more moderate forms, however, moral Evidentialism is much more attractive and widespread. “You simply shouldn’t believe that about your friend!”—expressed in a context where the friend’s disloyalty is not conclusively supported by the evidence—sounds to many ears like the expression of a plausible moral obligation (see Wood 2002, ch. 1–3).
严格的道德证据主义不太可能对任何人有吸引力，除了最热心的克利福德主义者。然而，在其更温和的形式中，道德证据主义更具吸引力和广泛性。“你根本不应该相信你的朋友！”——在朋友的不忠诚没有得到证据确凿支持的情况下表达——在许多人看来，这听起来像是一种合理的道德义务的表达（见Wood 2002，第1-3章）。
Moral rightness and wrongness is analyzed in many different ways, of course; a moral Evidentialist will presumably either adopt one of those analyses and develop her position accordingly, or show that the ethics of belief swings free of debates between deontologists, consequentialists, virtue theorists, and the like. No matter which theory of moral rightness and wrongness she adopts, however, there will be the usual questions to settle about whether there are thresholds of harm beyond which Evidentialist principles are suspended, even in a deontological context, about whether the fundamental objects of moral appraisal in the doxastic context are acts or rules, and about whether there is a ‘unity’ to the moral as well as the intellectual virtues. Again, it is an open and interesting question whether these issues need to be dealt with differently in an ethics of belief than they are in an ethics of action.
当然，道德上的正确和错误是以许多不同的方式来分析的;一个道德证据主义者大概会采用其中一种分析并相应地发展她的立场，或者表明信仰伦理在道义论者、结果论者、美德理论家等之间没有辩论的情况下摇摆不定。然而，无论她采用哪种道德对错理论，都会有一些常见的问题需要解决，即是否存在伤害的门槛，超过这个门槛，证据主义原则就会被暂停，即使在道义论的背景下，关于在教条主义语境中道德评价的基本对象是行为还是规则，以及道德美德和智力美德是否存在“统一”。同样，这是一个开放而有趣的问题，这些问题是否需要在信仰伦理学和行动伦理学中以不同的方式处理。
5.3 Epistemic evidentialism
5.3 认识论证据主义
By far the most influential and widespread variety of Evidentialism is epistemic (see Chisholm 1957, Adler 2002, Conee and Feldman 2004, Shah 2006). The central thesis of epistemic Evidentialism is that the norms of evidence governing belief are somehow based in the nature and aims of theoretical reason itself. To believe on insufficient evidence is at bottom an epistemic failure—a failure to use our cognitive faculties in such a way that we are likely to acquire significant knowledge and avoid significant unjustified belief. Some philosophers in this tradition also defend Locke’s proportionality thesis according to which our degree of belief must be in proportion to the strength of our evidence (see White 2005).
到目前为止，最有影响力和最广泛的证据主义是认识论的（见Chisholm 1957，Adler 2002，Conee和Feldman 2004，Shah 2006）。认识论证据主义的中心论点是，支配信仰的证据规范在某种程度上基于理论理性本身的性质和目标。相信证据不足，从根本上说是一种认识论上的失败——未能以一种方式使用我们的认知能力，使我们有可能获得重要的知识并避免重大的不合理的信念。这一传统的一些哲学家也为洛克的相称性论点辩护，根据该论点，我们的信仰程度必须与我们证据的强度成正比（见White 2005）。
A major challenge facing proponents of epistemic Evidentialism is to find an adequate motivation for it: if there are not sufficient prudential or moral grounds for the obligation to believe on sufficient evidence, then what is the source of its normativity? In response to the challenge, epistemic Evidentialists take a number of different tacks. Some argue that the norms are underwritten by necessary, conceptual truths. On this view, the very concept of belief reveals that it is a truth-aimed attitude that is only properly formed on the basis of sufficient evidence in the possession of the subject. Thus an attitude that is not formed in this way is either not a genuine belief at all, or at best a deficient instance of it (see Adler 2002, Textor 2004).
认识论证据主义的支持者面临的一个主要挑战是找到适当的动机：如果没有足够的审慎或道德理由来相信充分证据的义务，那么其规范性的来源是什么？为了应对这一挑战，认识论证据主义者采取了许多不同的策略。一些人认为，这些规范是由必要的、概念性的事实所支撑的。根据这种观点，信仰的概念本身就揭示了它是一种以真理为目标的态度，只有在主体所拥有的充分证据的基础上才能正确地形成。因此，没有以这种方式形成的态度要么根本不是一种真正的信念，要么充其量是它的缺陷实例（见Adler 2002，Textor 2004）。
Other epistemic Evidentialists argue that doxastic norms arise not from analysis of the concept of belief, but rather from reflection on the fact that our belief-forming faculties are simply set up to be sensitive to evidence. The faculties of perception, memory, testimony, introspection, reasoning, and so on, typically generate beliefs on the basis of sufficient evidence, and we usually regard these faculties as malfunctioning, maladjusted, or misused when they generate beliefs in other ways. Pieces of apparent evidence—epistemic reasons, broadly-speaking—reliably provide us with important information about the world, and we have evolved to be sensitive to such reasons in our quest to survive and flourish.
其他认识论证据论者认为，教士论规范不是来自对信仰概念的分析，而是源于对这样一个事实的反思，即我们的信仰形成能力只是为了对证据敏感而设置的。知觉、记忆、见证、内省、推理等官能通常是在充分的证据基础上产生信念的，我们通常认为这些能力在以其他方式产生信念时是功能失调、适应不良或误用的。一些明显的证据——广义上的认识论原因——可靠地为我们提供了关于世界的重要信息，我们在寻求生存和繁荣的过程中已经进化到对这些原因敏感。
Note that the epistemic Evidentialist does not hold that the acquisition of significant truth—even truth that promotes survival—is the only relevant consideration in this region: our belief-forming faculties are not mere thermometers or motion-detectors. The idea is rather that, as evidence-sensitive believers, we don’t merely want to believe significant truths; rather, we want to have good grounds for taking propositions to be true, and to base our belief on those grounds (Feldman 2000; though again see David 2001). This putative fact is then taken to underwrite a norm: we ought to seek not just true belief but knowledge, or, more specifically, we ought to seek widespread significant knowledge without widespread significant error. To seek knowledge in this way is, among other things, to seek to have sufficient evidence for true beliefs and to base them on that evidence.
请注意，认识论证据主义者并不认为获得重要的真理——即使是促进生存的真理——是这个领域唯一相关的考虑因素：我们形成信念的能力不仅仅是温度计或运动检测器。这个想法是，作为对证据敏感的信徒，我们不仅想相信重要的真理;相反，我们希望有充分的理由将命题视为真，并将我们的信念建立在这些基础之上（Feldman 2000;尽管再次参见David 2001）。然后，这个假定的事实被用于支撑一个规范：我们不仅应该寻求真正的信仰，而且应该寻求知识，或者，更具体地说，我们应该寻求广泛的重要知识，而没有广泛的重大错误。以这种方式寻求知识，除其他外，就是寻求有足够的证据来支持真正的信仰，并将它们建立在这些证据之上。
Another kind of defense of epistemic Evidentialism says that the central Evidentialist principle—that we ought to believe on the basis of sufficient evidence that is in our possession—is not an analytic truth drawn from the concept of belief, and not a ‘functional norm’ arising from reflection on the way our faculties are set up or designed, but rather a synthetic principle that we simply rationally intuit in the course of reflecting on concepts and thought-experiments. This approach seems coherent and in some ways attractive, though it has not found many defenders in the literature.
另一种对认识论证据主义的辩护认为，核心的证据主义原则——我们应该根据我们所拥有的足够证据来相信——不是从信仰概念中得出的分析真理，也不是从对我们的能力设置或设计方式的反思中产生的“功能规范”， 而是一种综合原则，我们只是在反思概念和思想实验的过程中理性地直觉到这一点。这种方法似乎是连贯的，在某些方面很有吸引力，尽管它在文献中并没有找到很多辩护者。
6. Varieties of Non-Evidentialism
- 非证据主义的多样性
We have already seen that there are any number of ways in which one can fail to be a strict Evidentialist. One might hold, for instance, that belief need not always be based on evidence (though of course the moderate Evidentialist could agree with that), or that belief requires evidence but its degree needn’t be proportioned to the strength of the evidence, or that belief requires evidence but need not be based on that evidence, or that belief requires that there be evidence even if the subject doesn’t possess that evidence. No doubt there are other ways as well, and the question of whether a particular philosopher counts as an Evidentialist will ultimately hang on how Evidentialism itself is construed.
我们已经看到，有很多方法可以使一个人无法成为一个严格的证据主义者。例如，有人可能会认为，信念不必总是基于证据（当然，温和的证据主义者可能会同意这一点），或者信念需要证据，但其程度不必与证据的强度成正比，或者信念需要证据但不需要基于该证据，或者即使主体不具备该证据，该信念也要求存在证据。毫无疑问，还有其他方式，而某个哲学家是否算作证据主义者的问题最终将取决于证据主义本身是如何被解释的。
Most important for present purposes, however, is to note that the fact that someone is not a prudential Evidentialist, say, does not entail that she is a *Non-*Evidentialist for prudential reasons—or for any other reasons. Indeed, she might still be an Evidentialist, but for moral or epistemic rather than prudential reasons. As I will use the term, being a Non-Evidentialist with respect to a certain domain of beliefs requires, as a necessary condition, that one is not an Evidentialist of any sort about that domain of beliefs.
然而，就目前而言，最重要的是要注意，例如，某人不是审慎的证据主义者这一事实并不意味着她是出于审慎的原因或任何其他原因而成为非证据主义者。事实上，她可能仍然是一个证据主义者，但出于道德或认识论的原因，而不是审慎的原因。正如我将使用这个术语一样，作为一个关于某个信仰领域的非证据主义者，作为一个必要的条件，一个人不是关于那个信仰领域的任何形式的证据主义者。
I suggested earlier that a natural place to draw the line between moderate Evidentialists and Non-Evidentialists about a domain of beliefs rests on the question of whether belief on the basis of insufficient evidence is ever reasonably required. Are we ever obliged to believe, even in the absence of sufficient evidence? Strict and moderate Evidentialists will say no, Non-Evidentialists will say yes. Naturally, the reasons that motivate this putative requirement will be different according to different types of Non-Evidentialism. Here the focus will be on the three main types of Non-Evidentialism that are prevalent among contemporary philosophers: Practical Non-Evidentialism (which includes what is sometimes called “pragmatism”), Conservativism, and Fideism.
我早些时候提出，在温和的证据主义者和非证据主义者之间划清信仰领域界限的一个自然位置在于一个问题，即是否合理地需要基于证据不足的信仰。即使没有足够的证据，我们是否也有义务相信？严格和温和的证据主义者会说不，非证据主义者会说是。当然，根据不同类型的非证据主义，激发这一假定要求的原因会有所不同。在这里，重点将放在当代哲学家中流行的三种主要类型的非证据主义上：实践非证据主义（包括有时被称为“实用主义”）、保守主义和Fideism。
6.1 Practical non-evidentialism
6.1 实践非证据主义
As noted above, William James famously sniffs at the impracticable stringency of Clifford’s Principle, advocating instead the more liberal policy that we sometimes have the “right to believe” even when we lack sufficient evidence (and even when we know that we lack it). In places, James goes further and suggests that in certain cases—especially cases involving religious and moral belief—it is not merely permitted but positively commendable or even required that we believe on insufficient evidence.
如上所述，威廉·詹姆斯（William James）对克利福德原则的不切实际的严格性嗤之以鼻，转而主张更自由的政策，即即使我们缺乏足够的证据（即使我们知道我们缺乏它），我们有时也有“相信的权利”。在某些地方，雅各进一步指出，在某些情况下——尤其是涉及宗教和道德信仰的案件——我们相信证据不足不仅是允许的，而且是值得肯定的，甚至是必需的。
When I look at the religious question as it really puts itself to concrete men, and when I think of all the possibilities which both practically and theoretically it involves, then this command that we shall put a stopper on our heart, instincts, and courage, and wait—acting of course meanwhile more or less as if religion were not true—till doomsday, or till such time as our intellect and sense working together may have raked in evidence enough,—this command, I say, seems to me the queerest idol ever manufactured in the philosophic cave. (1896, 11)
当我看到宗教问题真正地把自己置于具体的人面前时，当我想到它实际上和理论上所涉及的所有可能性时，那么这个命令就是我们应该在我们的心灵、本能和勇气上加以阻止，等待——当然，与此同时，或多或少地表现得好像宗教不是真的一样——直到世界末日， 或者，直到我们的智力和理智一起工作可能已经收集到足够的证据时，——我说，这个命令在我看来是在哲学洞穴里制造的最奇怪的偶像。(1896, 11)
We saw earlier that there are difficult conceptual and psychological problems facing an ethics of belief that says, quite strictly, that we must always and only believe what is prudentially beneficial. Thus while pragmatism is sometimes characterized casually as the view that we should believe whatever “works,” most self-described pragmatists are very careful to specify the conditions under which a subject can reasonably depart from, ignore, or go beyond her evidence (see pragmatism). These conditions typically involve the absence of really compelling evidence; thus, as James reminds his reader, pragmatic belief is not simply wild-eyed believing “what you know ain’t true” (1896, 29). Pragmatists also typically require the existence of some sort of exigency or “passional” interest on the part of the subject that makes suspension of belief in that context impossible (or at least exceedingly ill-advised). We saw earlier how James defines a “genuine option” in an effort to specify these conditions.
我们之前已经看到，信仰伦理面临着困难的概念和心理问题，这种信仰伦理非常严格地说，我们必须始终并且只相信审慎有益的东西。因此，虽然实用主义有时被随意地描述为我们应该相信任何“有效”的观点，但大多数自称为实用主义者的人都非常小心地指定一个主体可以合理地偏离、忽略或超越她的证据的条件（见实用主义）。这些情况通常涉及缺乏真正令人信服的证据;因此，正如雅各提醒他的读者的那样，实用主义的信念不仅仅是盲目地相信“你所知道的不是真的”（1896,29）。实用主义者通常还要求主体存在某种紧迫性或“热情”的兴趣，这使得在这种情况下不可能暂停信仰（或者至少是极其不明智的）。我们之前已经看到雅各如何定义“真正的选择”，以试图指定这些条件。
The emphasis on the “primacy of the practical” in James was clearly anticipated by earlier ethicists of belief. Blaise Pascal famously argues in the Pensées that wager-like reasoning should lead us to set the goal of believing in God; thus his focus tends to be less on the moral or epistemic and more on the prudential motives for belief (Pascal 1670, Hájek 2003, Jordan 2006; see also the entries on Pascal, Pascal’s Wager, and pragmatic arguments and belief in God). For Immanuel Kant, by contrast, considerations that can justify belief (or faith) in the absence of sufficient theoretical evidence are typically (though not exclusively) moral. If, for instance, there is no sufficient evidence one way or the other for a certain proposition p (the proposition, say, that the human will is incompatibilistically free), and if one has set a moral end that requires one to take a stand on the truth of p, and if any evidence that one does have points in the direction of the truth of p, then one is permitted (and sometimes even required) to take p to be true. This ‘taking-to-be-true’ (German: ‘Fürwahrhalten’) is thereby justified on “moral” rather than “theoretical” grounds, and it counts as “belief” (Glaube) or “acceptance” (Annehmung) rather than “knowledge” (Wissen) (Kant 1781/1787, Chignell 2007).
雅各书中对“实践的首要性”的强调，是早期信仰伦理学家所清楚地预见到的。布莱斯·帕斯卡（Blaise Pascal）在《沉思录》中提出了一个著名的论点，即类似赌注的推理应该引导我们设定相信上帝的目标;因此，他的关注点往往较少于道德或认识论，而更多地关注信仰的审慎动机（Pascal 1670，Hájek 2003，Jordan 2006;另见关于Pascal，Pascal的赌注以及实用的论证和对上帝的信仰的条目）。相比之下，对于伊曼纽尔·康德来说，在缺乏足够的理论证据的情况下，可以证明信仰（或信仰）正当性的考虑通常是（尽管不完全是）道德的。例如，如果对于某个命题p（例如，人类意志在不可相容的自由这一命题）没有充分的证据，并且如果一个人设定了一个道德目的，要求一个人对p的真理采取立场，并且如果有任何证据表明一个人确实指向p的真理的方向， 然后允许（有时甚至要求）将 P 视为真。因此，这种“成为真实”（德语：“Fürwahrhalten”）是基于“道德”而不是“理论”理由的，它被视为“信仰”（Glaube）或“接受”（Annehmung）而不是“知识”（Wissen）（Kant 1781/1787，Chignell 2007）。
A convenient label that captures both broadly pragmatist and broadly Kantian theories is Practical Non-Evidentialism, where the pragmatic/prudential and the moral are the two main species of “practical” value (for more on moral reasons for belief and whether they count as evidence see Pace 2010; for a survey of the debate about pragmatic reasons for belief see Reisner 2017).
一个既包含广义实用主义理论又广泛康德理论的方便标签是实践非证据主义，其中实用/审慎和道德是“实践”价值的两个主要物种（有关信仰的道德原因以及它们是否算作证据的更多信息，请参阅Pace 2010;有关信仰的实用原因的辩论调查，请参阅Reisner 2017）。
6.2 Conservative non-evidentialism
6.2 保守的非证据主义
Conservatism (sometimes also called dogmatism, though the latter is usually thought to be a view about perceptual belief in particular; see Pryor 2000, White 2006) is the view that one is prima facie justified in believing that p if in fact one does believe that p (Harman 1986, Owens 2000). Another version of it says that one is prima facie justified in believing that p if it seems to one that p is true (Huemer 2007a) or at least perceptually seems to one that p is true (Pryor 2000). In order to be all things considered justified on either of these conservatisms, one must be aware of no undefeated defeaters for p. But the absence of undefeated defeaters for p, even if one is aware of it, is not positive evidence for p, and any “impulsional” urge towards p or seeming that p is true is not the kind of evidence that Evidentialists think we should seek (see Conee and Feldman 2004, ch. 3; for impulsional evidence see Plantinga 1993, 192). So on at least most accounts of what “evidence” is, conservatism is an important kind of Non-Evidentialism according to which some justified beliefs—the immediately justified ones—are not based on sufficient evidence.
保守主义（有时也被称为教条主义，尽管后者通常被认为是一种关于感性信仰的观点;参见Pryor 2000，White 2006）是这样一种观点，即如果一个人确实相信p，那么表面上有理由相信p（Harman 1986，Owens 2000）。它的另一个版本说，如果一个人认为p是真的（Huemer 2007a），或者至少在感知上认为p是真的（Pryor 2000），那么人们初步有理由相信p是真的。为了在这些保守主义中的任何一种上都被认为是合理的，人们必须意识到 p 没有不败的失败者。但是，即使人们意识到这一点，也没有不败的击败者对p来说也不是p的积极证据，任何对p的“冲动”冲动或看起来p是真的都不是证据主义者认为我们应该寻求的证据（见Conee和Feldman 2004，第3章;关于冲动证据，见Plantinga 1993， 因此，至少在大多数关于“证据”是什么的解释中，保守主义是一种重要的非证据主义，根据这种非证据主义，一些合理的信念——立即合理的信念——没有建立在足够的证据之上。
Conservatism is regarded by some philosophers as a useful tool against skepticism (Christensen 1994, Huemer 2007a), and its “dogmatic” flavor is sometimes made more palatable by combining it with various moderate or localized Evidentialisms. Thus, for example, conservatism about beliefs that go into the foundation of our knowledge structure (including beliefs about basic mathematical or moral truths) might very naturally be combined with a kind of Evidentialism about beliefs that are not in the foundation (for more on foundationalism in epistemology, see foundationalist theories of epistemic justification).
保守主义被一些哲学家视为反对怀疑主义的有用工具（Christensen 1994，Huemer 2007a），其“教条主义”的味道有时通过与各种温和或局部的证据主义相结合而变得更加可口。因此，例如，关于构成我们知识结构基础的信念的保守主义（包括关于基本数学或道德真理的信念）可能很自然地与一种关于不在基础中的信念的证据主义结合起来（有关认识论基础主义的更多信息，请参阅认识论基础论的基础主义理论）。
Note that conservatives need not say that any of the beliefs we have are infallible or incapable of being undermined. Indeed, they might be quite open to the fallibilist thought that our current justified beliefs can be defeated (either rebutted or undercut) by new evidence. So the view doesn’t promote belief that is “dogmatic” or “conservative”in some disparaging sense: it says merely that some beliefs that we have, or some “impelling” beliefs, needn’t be based on positive evidential (or practical) support in order to be justified (Harman 1986, Lycan 1988, Chisholm 1989, McGrath 2007).
请注意，保守派不必说我们所拥有的任何信念都是绝对正确的或无法被破坏的。事实上，他们可能对谬误主义的想法持相当开放的态度，即我们目前合理的信念可能会被新证据击败（反驳或削弱）。因此，这种观点并没有在某种贬低的意义上促进“教条主义”或“保守”的信仰：它只是说我们所拥有的某些信念，或一些“推动性”的信念，不需要基于积极的证据（或实际）支持才能被证明是合理的（Harman 1986，Lycan 1988，Chisholm 1989，McGrath 2007）。
6.3 Fideistic non-evidentialism
6.3 信仰主义的非证据主义
A third Non-Evidentialist position in the ethics of belief, similar to but distinct from dogmatism, is sometimes called fideism, though it needn’t have anything to do with religious doctrine in particular. According to the fideist, we can legitimately hold propositions on faith without having any evidence for them, without feeling impelled towards them, and even in the face of strong evidence against them (note that this is just one way of defining “fideism,” see the entry on fideism for others). Someone might hold on the basis of faith, for instance, that there has been at least one bodily resurrection at some point in the past, even though he has never witnessed such a thing first-hand, and his best scientific, testimonial, and everyday inductive evidence constitutes a powerful case against it.
信仰伦理学中的第三种非证据主义立场，与教条主义相似但又不同，有时被称为信仰主义，尽管它不需要特别与宗教教义有任何关系。根据信仰主义者的说法，我们可以合法地持有信仰上的命题，而没有任何证据支持它们，不会感到被它们所推动，甚至在面对反对它们的有力证据时（请注意，这只是定义“信仰主义”的一种方式，请参阅其他关于信仰主义的条目）。例如，有人可能会基于信仰坚持认为，在过去某个时候至少有过一次身体的复活，即使他从未亲眼目睹过这样的事情，而他最好的科学、见证和日常归纳证据构成了反对它的有力理由。
Fideism of this radical sort is not itself required by most religions, but is typically associated with religious thinkers like Tertullian in the ancient period (perhaps unfairly: see Sider 1980), and Kierkegaard (1846) in the modern (also perhaps unfairly: see Evans 1998). Apart from wearing its irrationality on its sleeve, fideism is vulnerable to psychological objections about the lack of direct control over belief. If belief just is an attitude that necessarily responds to perceived evidence with a positive ‘direction of fit,’ it is hard to see how a well-functioning subject could believe that p in the face of strong evidence that not-p. Consider someone who has normal sensory faculties and who, despite strong perceptual and testimonial evidence to the contrary, repeatedly declares—without claiming to have any hidden evidence—that there is, say, a huge abyss opening up in front of him. It would take a very long time for us to become convinced that he really believes that there is an abyss in front of him. But if, in the end, we are convinced by his actions and speech that he has this belief, and we know that his sensory faculties are functioning properly, then we will probably think the belief is the product of an undesirable and partly involuntary state such as self-deception, wish-fulfillment, or paranoia. We won’t think that he has simply chosen to believe.
这种激进的信仰本身并不是大多数宗教所必需的，但通常与古代的德尔图良等宗教思想家联系在一起（也许是不公平的：见Sider 1980），以及现代的克尔凯郭尔（1846）（也可能是不公平的：见Evans 1998）。除了将非理性挂在袖子上之外，信仰主义还容易受到关于缺乏对信仰的直接控制的心理反对意见的影响。如果信念只是一种态度，它必然以积极的“拟合方向”对感知到的证据做出反应，那么很难看出一个运作良好的主体在面对强有力的证据时如何相信p，而不是p。想想一个具有正常感官能力的人，尽管有强烈的感知和证明证据与之相反，但他一再宣称——没有声称有任何隐藏的证据——比如说，一个巨大的深渊在他面前敞开。我们需要很长一段时间才能确信他真的相信在他面前有一个深渊。但是，如果最后，我们通过他的行为和言语确信他有这种信念，并且我们知道他的感官能力运作正常，那么我们可能会认为这种信念是一种不受欢迎的和部分不自愿的状态的产物，例如自欺欺人、愿望实现或偏执狂。我们不会认为他只是选择相信。
A more moderate sort of fideism would say that we are permitted to form a “faith”-based belief only if the evidence regarding the proposition in question is not compelling either way, or is absent altogether. Only under those circumstances can we (directly or indirectly) make a “leap of faith” into belief (Adams 1987). Typically, however, those who have recommended “leaps of faith” have cited pragmatic or moral grounds for those leaps, and so given the taxonomy we have so far, they would ultimately count as practical non-Evidentialists rather than bona fide fideists.
一种更温和的信仰主义会说，只有当关于所讨论的命题的证据既不令人信服，或者完全不存在时，我们才被允许形成一种基于“信仰”的信仰。只有在这些情况下，我们才能（直接或间接地）将“信仰的飞跃”转化为信仰（Adams 1987）。然而，通常情况下，那些建议“信仰的飞跃”的人为这些飞跃引用了实用或道德的理由，因此，鉴于我们迄今为止的分类法，他们最终将被视为实际的非证据主义者，而不是真正的信仰主义者。
If, on the other hand, the claim is that in the complete absence of practical or theoretical reasons in favor, a subject is still permitted to adopt a certain belief, then the view seems to have abandoned aspirations to developing a principled position, and is no longer obviously an “ethics” of belief. This is not a knockdown argument against that kind of fideism, of course: it may be that such a fideist can give reasons to think that trying to formulate an ethics of belief is an ill-conceived project in the first place.
另一方面，如果这种说法是，在完全没有实际或理论上支持的理由的情况下，一个主体仍然被允许采用某种信念，那么这种观点似乎已经放弃了发展原则立场的愿望，并且不再明显地成为信仰的“伦理学”。當然，這並不是對那種信仰主義的否定論點：可能是這樣的信仰主義者可以提供理由認為，試圖制定信仰倫理首先就是一个考虑不周的計畫。
A final alternative for the fideist is to admit that he is not really focused on belief at all, but is rather trying to make room for another kind of positive propositional attitude that is not guided by evidence. Many philosophers and religious people who embrace the fideist label construe “faith” (Latin: fides) as something different from belief—hope, perhaps, or something like “acceptance” (see §7 and the entry on fideism). On such a conception, faith that p might very well be able rationally to co-exist in the same psychology with a lot of evidence for not-p.
对于信仰主义者来说，最后的选择是承认他根本不真正关注信仰，而是试图为另一种不受证据指导的积极命题态度腾出空间。许多接受信仰主义标签的哲学家和宗教人士将“信仰”（拉丁语：fides）解释为与信仰不同的东西——也许是希望，或者是“接受”之类的东西（见§7和关于信仰的条目）。在这样的概念上，相信p很可能能够理性地在同一心理学中共存，并且有很多证据证明non-p。
7. The ethics of acceptance
- 接受的道德规范
This last point shows that Evidentialism about belief—even of a strict and uncompromising sort—can be combined with Non-Evidentialism about some other positive, categorical propositional attitudes in order to make it seem less stern (see Audi 2008a for a list of possible meanings of “faith”). Perhaps the most prominent candidate here is acceptance conceived as a positive categorical attitude towards a proposition that is by definition voluntary and figures significantly in our deliberation, action, argumentation, and assertion. Some philosophers focus on the role that acceptance plays in scientific inquiry, theory-construction, and decision theory (van Fraasen 1984, Stalnaker 1987, Cohen 1992). Others focus on the role that it plays in ethical, juridical, religious, and everyday contexts (Bratman 1992, Cohen 1992, Alston 1996, Audi 2008a). A warning is in order here: acceptance is typically a technical notion and characterizations of its nature and ethics differ radically in the literature. There is also some dispute about whether acceptance is able to play the various roles that its advocates intend (Radford 1990, Maher 1990, Moore 1994).
最后一点表明，关于信仰的证据主义——即使是严格和不妥协的那种——可以与关于其他一些积极的、绝对的命题态度的非证据主义结合起来，以使其看起来不那么严厉（参见Audi 2008a，了解“信仰”的可能含义列表）。也许这里最突出的候选者是接受，它被设想为对一个命题的积极、绝对的态度，这个命题从定义上讲是自愿的，在我们的审议、行动、论证和断言中占有重要地位。一些哲学家关注接受在科学探究、理论建构和决策理论中的作用（van Fraasen 1984，Stalnaker 1987，Cohen 1992）。其他人则关注它在道德、法律、宗教和日常环境中所扮演的角色（Bratman 1992，Cohen 1992，Alston 1996，Audi 2008a）。这里需要警告的是：接受通常是一个技术概念，对其性质和道德的描述在文献中截然不同。关于接受是否能够发挥其倡导者所希望的各种作用也存在一些争议（Radford 1990，Maher 1990，Moore 1994）。
The ethicist of belief who wants to soften or supplement her view by appealing to some notion of permissible acceptance would need to say what acceptance is, how the two sorts of attitude differ, what sorts of norms govern each, and how they interact in a single subject. One of the main advantages of a hybrid view like this is that acceptance is usually taken to be by definition voluntary, and thus it is much easier to see how a genuine “ethics” (complete with praise and blame ascriptions) could be built around it. As we saw earlier, a notion of acceptance (as “faith”) is the sort of thing that a fideist might want to appeal to against those who say that one can’t just decide to believe that p in the face of strong opposing evidence. A moderate fideist, by contrast, might argue that we are only permitted to accept that p if we lack strong evidence about p either way. This is still consistent with our having weak evidence for not-p, and even a (weakly held) belief that not-p.
信仰伦理学家想要通过诉诸某种允许接受的概念来软化或补充她的观点，就需要说出什么是接受，两种态度如何不同，什么样的规范支配着它们，以及它们如何在一个主题中相互作用。像这样的混合观点的一个主要优点是，根据定义，接受通常被认为是自愿的，因此更容易看出如何围绕它建立真正的“道德”（包括赞美和责备）。正如我们之前所看到的，接受的概念（作为“信仰”）是信仰主义者可能想要诉诸的东西，反对那些说一个人不能在面对强有力的反对证据时决定相信那个p的人。相比之下，一个温和的信仰主义者可能会争辩说，只有当我们缺乏关于p的有力证据时，我们才被允许接受p。这仍然与我们拥有 not-p 的薄弱证据一致，甚至（弱持有的）信念认为 not-p。
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Other Internet Resources
- Benton, Matthew, Knowledge Norms…, entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Ethics of Belief…, PhilPapers site, maintained by Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, University of Aarhus.
via:
- The Ethics of Belief (SEP)
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-belief/
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