不同时期的哲学家对宗教与道德进行的各种对比

注：机翻，未校。

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Religion and Morality

First published Wed Sep 27, 2006; substantive revision Thu Aug 8, 2019

From the beginning of the Abrahamic faiths and of Greek philosophy, religion and morality have been closely intertwined. This is true whether we go back within Greek philosophy or within Christianity and Judaism and Islam. The present entry will not try to step beyond these confines, since there are other entries on Eastern thought (see, for example, the entries on Ethics in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism and Chinese Ethics). The entry proceeds chronologically, giving greatest length to the contemporary period. It cannot, within the present compass, aspire to be comprehensive. But it will be able to describe the main options as they have occurred historically. The purpose of proceeding historically is to substantiate the claim that morality and religion have been inseparable until very recently, and that our moral vocabulary is still deeply infused with this history. Since there are historically so many different ways to see the relation, a purely schematic or typological account is not likely to succeed as well. The entry will not try to enter deeply into the ethical theories of the individual philosophers mentioned, since this encyclopedia already contains individual entries about them; it will focus on what they say about the relation between morality and religion.
从亚伯拉罕信仰和希腊哲学开始，宗教和道德就紧密地交织在一起。无论我们回到希腊哲学中，还是回到基督教、犹太教和伊斯兰教中，都是如此。本条目不会试图超越这些界限，因为还有其他关于东方思想的条目（例如，参见关于印度和藏传佛教中的伦理学和中国伦理学的条目）。该条目按时间顺序进行，为当代时期提供了最大的长度。在目前的指南针内，它不能期望是全面的。但它将能够描述历史上发生的主要选项。从历史角度出发的目的是为了证实这样一种说法，即道德和宗教直到最近一直是不可分割的，而且我们的道德词汇仍然深深地注入了这段历史。由于历史上有很多不同的方法来看待这种关系，纯粹的示意性或类型学描述也不太可能成功。该条目不会试图深入到所提到的个别哲学家的伦理理论中，因为这本百科全书已经包含了关于他们的个别条目;它将重点关注他们对道德与宗教之间关系的看法。

The term ‘morality’ as used in this entry will not be distinguished from ‘ethics.’ Philosophers have drawn various contrasts between the two at various times (Kant for example, and Hegel, and more recently R.M. Hare and Bernard Williams). But etymologically, the term ‘moral’ comes from the Latin mos, which means custom or habit, and it is a translation of the Greek ethos, which means roughly the same thing, and is the origin of the term ‘ethics’. In contemporary non-technical use, the two terms are more or less interchangeable, though ‘ethics’ has slightly more flavor of theory, and has been associated with the prescribed practice of various professions (e.g., medical ethics, etc.). In any case, this entry will assume that morality is a set of customs and habits that shape how we think about how we should live or about what is a good human life. The term ‘religion’ is much disputed. Again, we can learn from the etymology. The origin of the word is probably the Latin religare, to bind back. Not all uses of the term require reference to a divinity or divinities. But this entry will use the term so that there is such a reference, and a religion is a system of belief and practice that accepting a ‘binding’ relation to such a being or beings. This does not, however, give us a single essence of religion, since the conceptions of divinity are so various, and human relations with divinity are conceived so variously that no such essence is apparent even within Western thought. The ancient Greeks, for example, had many intermediate categories between full gods or goddesses and human beings. There were spirits (in Greek daimones) and spiritual beings like Socrates’s mysterious voice (daimonion) (Apology, 31d1–4, 40a2–c3). There were heroes who were offspring of one divine and one human parent. There were humans who were deified, like the kings of Sparta. This is just within the culture of ancient Greece. If we included Eastern religions in the scope of the discussion, the hope for finding a single essence of religion would recede further. Probably it is best to understand ‘religion’ as a term for a group of belief/practice amalgams with a family resemblance to each other, but no set of necessary and sufficient conditions tying them together (see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 65–7).
本条目中使用的术语“道德”不会与“伦理”区分开来。哲学家们在不同时期对两者进行了各种对比（例如康德和黑格尔，以及最近的R.M.黑尔和伯纳德·威廉姆斯）。但从词源上讲，“道德”一词来自拉丁语mos，意思是习俗或习惯，它是希腊ethos的翻译，意思大致相同，是“道德”一词的起源。在当代非技术性使用中，这两个术语或多或少可以互换，尽管“伦理学”的理论色彩略显，并且与各种职业（例如医学伦理学等）的规定实践相关联。无论如何，本文将假设道德是一套习俗和习惯，这些习俗和习惯塑造了我们如何思考我们应该如何生活或什么是美好的人类生活。“宗教”一词备受争议。同样，我们可以从词源中学习。这个词的起源可能是拉丁语 religare，意为束缚。并非该术语的所有用法都需要提及一个或多个神性。但是，本条目将使用该术语，以便存在这样的参考，而宗教是一种信仰和实践体系，它接受与这种存在或存在之间的“绑定”关系。然而，这并没有给我们一个单一的宗教本质，因为神性的概念是如此多样化，人类与神性的关系被构想得如此多样化，以至于即使在西方思想中也没有这种本质是显而易见的。例如，古希腊人有许多介于全神或女神和人类之间的中间类别。有灵（希腊语daimones）和灵性存在，如苏格拉底的神秘声音（daimonion）（道歉，31d1-4,40a2-c3）。有些英雄是一位神明和一位人类父母的后代。有些人类被神化了，就像斯巴达的国王一样。这只是在古希腊的文化中。如果我们把东方宗教纳入讨论范围，那么找到宗教单一本质的希望就会进一步消退。也许最好将“宗教”理解为一组信仰/实践混合体的术语，这些信仰/实践具有彼此的家庭相似性，但没有一套必要和充分的条件将它们联系在一起（参见维特根斯坦，《哲学研究》，65-7）。

1. Ancient Greek Philosophy 1. 古希腊哲学

We can start with the Greeks, and this means starting with Homer, a body of texts transmitted first orally and then written down in the seventh century BCE. So what does the relation between morality and religion look like in Homer? The first thing to say is that the gods and goddesses of the Homeric poems behave remarkably like the noble humans described in the same poems, even though the humans are mortal and the gods and goddesses immortal. Both groups are motivated by the desire for honor and glory, and are accordingly jealous when they receive less than they think they should while others receive more, and work ceaselessly to rectify this. The two groups are not however symmetrical, because the noble humans have the same kind of client relation to the divinities as subordinate humans do to them. There is a complex pattern that we might call ‘an honor-loop’ (see Mikalson, Honor Thy Gods). The divinities have their functions (in Greek, the word is the same as ‘honors’), such as Poseidon’s oversight of the sea, and humans seek their favor with ‘honor’, which we might here translate as ‘worship’. This includes, for example, sanctuaries devoted to them, dedications, hymns, dances, libations, rituals, prayers, festivals and sacrifices. In all of these the gods take pleasure, and in return they give ‘honor’ to mortals in the form of help or assistance, especially in the areas of their own expertise. There is a clear analogy with purely human client-relations, which are validated in the Homeric narrative, since the poems were probably originally sung at the courts of the princes who claimed descent from the heroes whose exploits make up the story. The gods and goddesses are not, however, completely at liberty. They too are accountable to fate or justice, as in the scene in the Iliad, where Zeus wants to save Hector, but he cannot because ‘his doom has long been sealed’ (Iliad, 22: 179).
我们可以从希腊人开始，这意味着从荷马开始，荷马是一系列首先口头传播的文本，然后在公元前七世纪写下来。那么在荷马史诗中，道德与宗教之间的关系是什么样的呢？首先要说的是，荷马史诗中的众神和女神的行为与同一首诗中描述的高贵人类非常相似，尽管人类是凡人的，而众神和女神是不朽的。这两个群体的动机都是对荣誉和荣耀的渴望，因此，当他们得到的比他们认为应该得到的少，而其他人得到的更多时，他们会嫉妒，并不断努力纠正这一点。然而，这两个群体并不是对称的，因为高贵的人类与神灵的关系与从属的人类对神灵的关系相同。有一种复杂的模式，我们可以称之为“荣誉循环”（参见Mikalson，Honor Thy Gods）。神灵有其功能（在希腊语中，这个词与“荣誉”相同），例如波塞冬对海洋的监督，人类以“荣誉”寻求他们的恩惠，我们在这里可以将其翻译为“崇拜”。例如，这包括献给他们的圣所、奉献、赞美诗、舞蹈、酒水、仪式、祈祷、节日和祭祀。在所有这些中，众神都感到高兴，作为回报，他们以帮助或援助的形式给予凡人“荣誉”，特别是在他们自己的专业领域。这与纯粹的人类客户关系有一个明显的类比，这在荷马式的叙述中得到了验证，因为这些诗可能最初是在王子的宫廷中唱的，这些王子声称自己是构成故事的英雄的后裔。然而，众神和女神并不是完全自由的。他们也要对命运或正义负责，就像《伊利亚特》中的场景一样，宙斯想拯救赫克托耳，但他不能，因为“他的厄运早已注定”（伊利亚特，22：179）。

It is sometimes said that the Presocratic philosophers come out of Homer by rejecting religion in favor of science. There is a grain of truth in this, for when Thales (who flourished around 580) is reported as saying ‘Water is the origin (or principle) of all things,’ this is different from saying, for example, that Tethys is mother of all the rivers, because it deletes the character of narrative or story (Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 983b20–8). When Anaximenes (around 545) talks of air as the primary element differing in respect of thinness and thickness, or Heraclitus explains all change as a pattern in the turnings of fire igniting in measures and going out in measures, they are not giving stories with plot-lines involving quasi-human intentions and frustrations (DK 13, A 5, DK 22, B 30). But it is wrong to say that they have left religion behind. Heraclitus puts this enigmatically by saying that the one and only wisdom does and does not consent to be called Zeus (DK 22, B 14). He is affirming the divinity of this wisdom, but denying the anthropomorphic character of much Greek religion. ‘To god all things are beautiful and good and just but humans suppose some things to be just and others unjust’ (DK 22, B 102). He ties this divine wisdom to the laws of a city, ‘for all human laws are nourished by the one divine law’ (DK 22, B 114), though he does not have confidence that ‘the many’ are capable of making law. The sophists, to whom Socrates responded, rejected this tie between human law and divine law and this was in part because of their expertise in rhetoric, by which they taught their students how to manipulate the deliberations of popular assemblies, and so change the laws to their own advantage. The most famous case is Protagoras (c. 490–21), who stated in the first sentence of his book Truth that ‘A human being is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not’ (Plato’s Theaetetus, 152a). Protagoras is not correctly seen here as skeptical about morality or religion. It is true that he claimed he was not in a position to know either the manner in which the gods are or are not (another translation is ‘that they are or are not’) or what they are like in appearance (DK 80, B 4). But as Plato (c. 430–347) presents him, he told the story that all humans have been given by the gods the gifts of shame and justice, so as to make possible the founding of cities; this is why each human is the measure. Even Thrasymachus, in the first book of Plato’s Republic, thinks of justice as the same thing amongst gods and humans (Republic, 388c). His view of what this justice is, namely the interest of the stronger, is disputed by Plato. But the claim that justice operates at both the divine and human levels is common ground.
有时有人说，前苏格拉底哲学家是通过拒绝宗教而支持科学而从荷马中走出来的。这其中有一定的道理，因为当泰勒斯（兴盛于580年左右）被报道说“水是万物的起源（或原则）”时，这与说特提斯是所有河流之母不同，因为它删除了叙述或故事的特征（亚里士多德的形而上学，983b20-8）。当阿那克西美尼（约545年）谈到空气是主要元素，在稀薄和厚度方面有所不同，或者赫拉克利特将所有变化解释为火在度量中点燃和在度量中熄灭的模式，他们并不是在讲述涉及准人类意图和挫折的情节线的故事（DK 13，A 5，DK 22， B 30）。但是，说他们已经抛弃了宗教是错误的。赫拉克利特神秘地指出，唯一的智慧同意和不同意被称为宙斯（DK 22，B 14）。他肯定了这种智慧的神性，但否认了许多希腊宗教的拟人化特征。“对上帝来说，万物都是美的、善的、公义的，但人类认为有些事情是公义的，有些是不公正的”（DK 22，B 102）。他将这种神圣的智慧与城市的律法联系在一起，“因为所有人类的律法都由一个神圣的律法滋养”（DK 22，B 114），尽管他不相信“许多人”能够制定法律。苏格拉底回应的诡辩家们拒绝了人类法则和神圣法则之间的这种联系，这在一定程度上是因为他们在修辞学方面的专业知识，他们通过修辞学教学生如何操纵民众集会的审议，从而改变法律以谋取自己的利益。最著名的例子是普罗泰戈拉（约490-21），他在《真理》一书的第一句话中说：“人是万物的尺度，它是什么，它不是什么”（柏拉图的Theaetetus，152a）。普罗泰戈拉在这里没有被正确地视为对道德或宗教的怀疑。的确，他声称他无法知道神的存在或不存在的方式（另一种翻译是“他们是或不是”），或者他们的外表是什么样子（DK 80，B 4）。但正如柏拉图（约430-347年）所介绍的那样，他讲述了这样一个故事，即众神赋予了所有人类耻辱和正义的礼物，以便使城市的建立成为可能;这就是为什么每个人都是衡量标准的原因。甚至色拉西马科斯在柏拉图的《理想国》的第一卷中，也认为正义在神和人类之间是一回事（《理想国》，388c）。柏拉图对这种正义是什么，即强者的利益的看法提出了异议。但是，正义在神性和人性层面上运作的说法是共同点。

Socrates (c. 470–399) in one of the early dialogues debates the nature of the holy with Euthyphro, who is a religious professional. Euthyphro is taking his own father to court for murder, and though ordinary Greek morality would condemn such an action as impiety, Euthyphro defends it on the basis that the gods behave in the same sort of way, according to the traditional stories. Socrates makes it clear that he does not believe these stories, because they attribute immorality to the gods. This does not mean, however, that he does not believe in the gods. He was observant in his religious practices, and he objects to the charge of not believing in the city’s gods that was one of the bases of the prosecution at his own trial. He points to the spirit who gives him commands about what not to do (Apology, 31d), and we learn later that he found it significant that this voice never told him to stop conducting his trial in the way that in fact led to his death (Ibid., 40a-c). Socrates interpreted this as an invitation from the gods to die, thus refuting the charge that, by conducting his trial in the way he did, he was guilty of theft – i.e., depriving the gods of his life that properly belonged to them (Phaedo, 62b). His life in particular was a service to god, he thought, because his testing of the wisdom of others was carrying out Apollo’s charge given by the oracle at Delphi, implicit in the startling pronouncement that he was the wisest man in Greece (Apology, 21a-d).
苏格拉底（约470-399年）在早期的对话之一中与宗教专业人士尤西弗罗（Euthyphro）辩论了神圣的本质。尤西弗罗以谋杀罪将自己的父亲告上法庭，尽管普通的希腊道德会谴责这种不虔诚的行为，但根据传统故事，尤西弗罗以众神的行为方式为由为其辩护。苏格拉底明确表示，他不相信这些故事，因为它们将不道德归咎于神。然而，这并不意味着他不相信神。他在宗教实践中是虔诚的，他反对不相信城市神灵的指控，这是他自己审判中起诉的依据之一。他指出那个给他命令不该做什么的圣灵（道歉，31d），我们后来了解到，他发现这个声音从未告诉他停止以实际上导致他死亡的方式进行审判，这很重要（同上，40a-c）。苏格拉底将此解释为众神对死亡的邀请，从而驳斥了这样一种指控，即他以自己的方式进行审判，他犯了盗窃罪——即剥夺了本应属于他们的神的生命（Phaedo，62b）。他认为，特别是他的生活是对上帝的侍奉，因为他对他人智慧的考验是在执行德尔斐神谕对阿波罗的指控，这暗示了他在希腊最聪明的人的惊人声明（道歉，21a-d）。

Socrates’s problem with the traditional stories about the gods gives rise to what is sometimes called ‘the Euthyphro dilemma’. If we try to define the holy as what is loved by all the gods (and goddesses), we will be faced with the question ‘Is the holy holy because it is loved by the gods, or do they love it because it is holy?’ (Euthyphro, 10a). Socrates makes it clear that his view is the second (though he does not argue for this conclusion in addressing this question, and he is probably relying on the earlier premise, at Euthyphro, 7c10f, that we love things because of the properties they have). (See Hare, Plato’s Euthyphro, on this passage.) But his view is not an objection to tying morality and religion together. He hints at the end of the dialogue (Euthyphro, 13de) that the right way to link them is to see that when we do good we are serving the gods well. Plato probably does not intend for us to construe the dialogues together as a single philosophical system, and we must not erase the differences between them. But it is significant that in the Theaetetus (176b), Socrates says again that our goal is to be as like the god as possible, and since the god is in no way and in no manner unjust, but as just as it is possible to be, nothing is more like the god than the one among us who becomes correspondingly as just as possible. In several dialogues this thought is connected with a belief in the immortality of the soul; we become like the god by paying attention to the immortal and best part of ourselves (e.g., Symposium, 210A-212B). The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is also tied to the doctrine of the Forms, whereby things with characteristics that we experience in this life (e.g., beauty) are copies or imitations of the Forms (e.g., The Beautiful-Itself) that we see without the distraction of the body when our souls are separated at death. The Form of the Good, according to the Republic, is above all the other Forms and gives them their intelligibility (as, by analogy, the sun gives visibility), and is (in a pregnant phrase) ‘on the other side of being’ (Republic, 509b). Finally, in the Laws (716b), perhaps Plato’s last work, the character called ‘the Athenian’ says that the god can serve for us in the highest degree as a measure of all things, and much more than any human can, whatever some people say; so people who are going to be friends with such a god must, as far as their powers allow, be like the gods themselves.
苏格拉底对关于神的传统故事的问题导致了有时被称为“Euthyphro困境”的问题。如果我们试图将圣洁定义为所有神（和女神）所爱的事物，我们将面临一个问题：“圣洁是圣洁的，因为它被众神所爱，还是因为他们爱它，因为它是圣洁的？（Euthyphro，10a）。苏格拉底明确表示，他的观点是第二种观点（尽管他在回答这个问题时并没有论证这个结论，而且他可能依赖于早期的前提，在Euthyphro，7c10f，即我们爱事物是因为它们具有的属性）。（参见哈尔，柏拉图的《欧西弗罗》，关于这段话。但他的观点并不反对将道德和宗教联系在一起。他在对话的结尾暗示（Euthyphro，13de），将它们联系起来的正确方法是看到，当我们行善时，我们是在很好地侍奉神。柏拉图可能并不打算让我们把对话一起解释为一个单一的哲学体系，我们不能抹去它们之间的差异。但重要的是，在Theaetetus（176b）中，苏格拉底再次说，我们的目标是尽可能地像神，因为神绝不是，也绝不是不公正的，而是尽可能地公正的，所以没有什么比我们中间的那个人更像神了，他尽可能地相应地变得像神。在几段对话中，这种思想与对灵魂不朽的信念有关;我们通过关注自己不朽和最好的部分而变得像神一样（例如，座谈会，210A-212B）。灵魂不朽的教义也与形式教义联系在一起，即我们在今生所经历的具有特征的事物（例如，美）是形式（例如，美本身）的复制品或模仿品，当我们的灵魂在死亡时分离时，我们在没有身体干扰的情况下看到这些形式。根据共和国的说法，善的形式高于所有其他形式，并赋予它们可理解性（如，通过类比，太阳赋予可见性），并且（在一个怀孕的短语中）“在存在的另一面”（共和国，509b）。最后，在也许是柏拉图的最后一部作品《法则》（716b）中，被称为“雅典人”的角色说，神可以在最高程度上为我们服务，作为万物的尺度，而且比任何人都能服务得多，无论某些人怎么说;因此，要与这样的神成为朋友的人，在他们的能力允许的范围内，必须像神本身一样。

This train of thought sees the god or gods as like a magnet, drawing us to be like them by the power of their goodness or excellence. In Plato’s Ion (533d), the divine is compared to a magnet to which is attached a chain of rings, through which the attraction is passed. This conception is also pervasive in Aristotle (384–22), Plato’s student for twenty years. In the Nicomachean Ethics, for example, the words ‘god’ and ‘divine’ occur roughly twice as often as the words ‘happiness’ and ‘happy’. This is significant, given that Aristotle’s ethical theory is (like Plato’s) ‘eudaimonist’ (meaning that our morality aims at our happiness). Mention of the divine is not merely conventional for Aristotle, but does important philosophical work. In the Eudemian Ethics (1249b5–22) he tells us that the goal of our lives is service and contemplation of the god. He thinks that we become like what we contemplate, and so we become most like the god by contemplating the god. Incidentally, this is why the god does not contemplate us; for this would mean becoming less than the god, which is impossible. As in Plato, the well-being of the city takes precedence over the individual, and this, too, is justified theologically. It is nobler and more divine to achieve an end for a city than for an individual (NE 1094b9–10). Aristotle draws a distinction between what we honor and what we merely commend (NE, 1101b10–35). There are six states for a human life, on a normative scale from best to worst: divine (which exceeds the merely human on the one extreme), virtuous (without wrongful desire), strong-willed (able to overcome wrongful desire), weak-willed (unable to do so), vicious and bestial (which exceeds the merely human on the other extreme, and which Aristotle says is mostly found among barbarians) (NE, 1145a15–22). The highest form of happiness, which he calls blessedness, is something we honor as we honor gods, whereas virtue we merely commend. It would be as wrong to commend blessedness as it would be to commend gods (NE, 1096a10–1097a15). Sometimes Aristotle uses the phrase ‘God or understanding’ (in Greek, nous) (e.g., Politics, 1287a27–32). The activity of the god, he says in the Metaphysics, is nous thinking itself (1074b34). The best human activity is the most god-like, namely thinking about the god and about things that do not change. Aristotle’s virtue ethics, then, needs to be understood against the background of these theological premises. He is thinking of the divine, to use Plato’s metaphor, as magnetic, drawing us, by its attractive power, to live the best kind of life possible for us. This gives him a defense against the charge sometimes made against virtue theories that they simply embed the prevailing social consensus into an account of human nature. Aristotle defines ethical virtue as lying in a mean between excess and defect, and the mean is determined by the person of practical wisdom (actually the male, since Aristotle is sexist on this point). He then gives a conventional account of the virtues such a person displays (such as courage, literally manliness, which requires the right amount of fear and confidence, between cowardice and rashness). But the virtuous person in each case acts ‘for the sake of the noble (or beautiful)’, and Aristotle continually associates the noble with the divine (e.g., NE, 1115b12).
这种思路将神或众神视为磁铁，通过他们的善良或卓越的力量吸引我们像他们一样。在柏拉图的《理想国》（533d）中，神被比作一块磁铁，磁铁上连接着一连串的环，吸引力通过这些环传递。这种观念在亚里士多德（384-22）中也很普遍，他是柏拉图二十年的学生。例如，在《尼各马可伦理学》中，“上帝”和“神圣”这两个词出现的频率大约是“幸福”和“幸福”这两个词的两倍。鉴于亚里士多德的伦理理论（如柏拉图的）“优生论”（意味着我们的道德以我们的幸福为目标），这一点很重要。对亚里士多德来说，提到神不仅仅是常规的，而且在哲学上也起到了重要的作用。在《欧德米亚伦理学》（1249b5-22）中，他告诉我们，我们生活的目标是服侍和沉思神。他认为我们变得像我们所思考的那样，因此我们通过沉思上帝而变得最像上帝。顺便说一句，这就是为什么神不考虑我们;因为这意味着变得不如上帝，这是不可能的。正如柏拉图一样，城市的福祉优先于个人，这在神学上也是合理的。为一个城市实现目的比为个人实现目的更崇高、更神圣（NE 1094b9-10）。亚里士多德区分了我们所尊重的和我们只是赞扬的（NE，1101b10-35）。人类生活有六种状态，从最好到最坏，按规范标准排列：神圣（在一个极端上超过仅仅是人类）、善良（没有错误的欲望）、坚强的（能够克服错误的欲望）、软弱的（不能这样做）、恶毒和兽性（在另一个极端上超过纯粹的人类，亚里士多德说这主要存在于野蛮人中）（NE， 1145a15-22）。幸福的最高形式，他称之为祝福，是我们尊重上帝的东西，而美德我们只是赞美。赞美祝福和赞美神一样是错误的（NE，1096a10-1097a15）。有时亚里士多德使用“上帝或理解”（希腊语，nous）一词（例如，政治，1287a27-32）。他在《形而上学》中说，神的活动本身就是无意识的思考（1074b34）。人类最好的活动是最像神的活动，即思考神和不变的事物。因此，亚里士多德的美德伦理学需要在这些神学前提的背景下来理解。用柏拉图的比喻来说，他认为神是磁性的，以其吸引人的力量吸引我们，让我们过上最适合我们的生活。这使他能够抵御有时针对美德理论的指控，即美德理论只是将流行的社会共识嵌入到对人性的描述中。亚里士多德将道德美德定义为介于过剩和缺陷之间的中庸之道，而中庸是由具有实践智慧的人（实际上是男性，因为亚里士多德在这一点上是性别歧视者）确定的。然后，他对这样的人所表现出的美德进行了传统的描述（例如勇气，字面上的男子气概，这需要适量的恐惧和信心，介于怯懦和鲁莽之间）。但是，在每种情况下，有德行的人都是“为了高贵（或美丽）而行动”，亚里士多德不断将高贵与神圣联系起来（例如，NE，1115b12）。

There are tensions in Aristotle’s account of virtue and happiness. It is not clear whether the Nicomachean Ethics has a consistent view of the relation between the activity of contemplation and the other activities of a virtuous life (see Hare, God and Morality, chapter 1, and Sarah Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, chapter 7). But the connection of the highest human state with the divine is pervasive in the text. One result of this connection is the eudaimonism mentioned earlier. If the god does not care about what is not divine (for this would be to become like what is not divine), the highest and most god-like human also does not care about other human beings except to the degree they contribute to his own best state. This degree is not negligible, since humans are social animals, and their well-being depends on the well-being of the families and cities of which they are members. Aristotle is not preaching self-sufficiency in any sense that implies we could be happy on our own, isolated from other human beings. But our concern for the well-being of other people is always, for him, contingent on our special relation to them. Within the highest kind of friendship ‘a friend is another self’, he says, and within such friendship we care about friends for their own sake, but if the friend becomes divine and we do not, then the friendship is over (NE, 1159a7). We therefore do not want our friends to become gods, even though that would be the best thing for them. Finally, Aristotle ties our happiness to our end (in Greek, telos); for humans, as for all living things, the best state is its own activity in accordance with the natural function that is unique to each species. For humans the best state is happiness, and the best activity within this state is contemplation (NE, 1178b17–23).
亚里士多德对美德和幸福的描述中存在着紧张关系。目前尚不清楚《尼各马可伦理学》是否对沉思活动与道德生活的其他活动之间的关系持一致的看法（参见Hare，God and Morality，第1章，以及Sarah Broadie，Ethics with Aristotle，第7章）。但是，最高的人类状态与神的联系在文本中是普遍存在的。这种联系的一个结果是前面提到的优生论。如果神不关心不是神的东西（因为这将变得像不神的东西），那么最高和最像神的人也不关心其他人，除非他们对自己最好的状态有贡献。这个程度是不可忽视的，因为人类是社会性动物，他们的福祉取决于他们所属的家庭和城市的福祉。亚里士多德并不是在任何意义上宣扬自给自足，这意味着我们可以靠自己快乐，与其他人隔离。但是，对他来说，我们对他人福祉的关心总是取决于我们与他们的特殊关系。他说，在最高级别的友谊中，“朋友是另一个自我”，在这种友谊中，我们关心朋友，因为他们自己，但如果朋友变得神圣而我们没有，那么友谊就结束了（NE，1159a7）。因此，我们不希望我们的朋友成为神，即使这对他们来说是最好的事情。最后，亚里士多德将我们的幸福与我们的目的联系在一起（在希腊语中，telos）;对于人类来说，就像对于所有生物一样，最好的状态是根据每个物种独特的自然功能进行自身活动。對於人類來說，最好的狀態是快樂，而這種狀態中最好的活動是沉思（NE，1178b17-23）。

The Epicureans and Stoics who followed Aristotle differed with each other and with him in many ways, but they agreed in tying morality and religion together. For the Epicureans, the gods do not care about us, though they are entertained by looking at our tragicomic lives (rather as we look at soap operas on television). We can be released from a good deal of anxiety, the Epicureans thought, by realizing that the gods are not going to punish us. Our goal should be to be as like the gods as we can, enjoying ourselves without interruption, but for us this means limiting our desires to what we can obtain without frustration. They did not mean that our happiness is self-interested in any narrow sense, because they held that we can include others in our happiness by means of our sympathetic pleasures. The Stoics likewise tied the best kind of human life, for them the life of the sage, to being like the divine. The sage follows nature in all his desires and actions, and is thus the closest to the divine. One of the virtues he will have is ‘apathy’ (in Greek apatheia), which does not mean listlessness, but detachment from wanting anything other than what nature, or the god, is already providing. Like the Epicureans, the Stoics had an argument against any narrow self-interest, but this time based on their conception of right reason which is directed by the law common to all, ‘which pervades everything and is the same as Zeus, lord of the ordering of all that exists’ (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers, VII 88. For the views of the Epicureans and Stoics about morality and religion, see Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness, chapters 5 and 7.)
追随亚里士多德的伊壁鸠鲁学派和斯多葛学派在许多方面彼此不同，也与亚里士多德不同，但他们在将道德和宗教联系在一起方面达成了一致。对于伊壁鸠鲁学派来说，众神并不关心我们，尽管他们通过观看我们的悲喜剧生活来娱乐（就像我们在电视上看肥皂剧一样）。伊壁鸠鲁学派认为，我们可以通过意识到众神不会惩罚我们来从大量的焦虑中解脱出来。我們的目標應該是盡可能地像神一樣，不间斷地享受自己，但對我們來說，這意味著將我們的慾望限制在我們可以獲得的東西上，而沒有挫折。他们并不是说我们的幸福在任何狭义上都是自私自利的，因为他们认为我们可以通过我们的同情快乐来将他人纳入我们的幸福中。斯多葛学派同样将人类最好的生活，对他们来说，圣人的生命，与像神一样联系在一起。圣人在他的所有欲望和行为中都遵循自然，因此最接近神。他将拥有的美德之一是“冷漠”（希腊语中的冷漠），这并不意味着无精打采，而是脱离了对自然或神已经提供的东西以外的任何东西的渴望。像伊壁鸠鲁学派一样，斯多葛学派反对任何狭隘的利己主义，但这一次是基于他们的正确理性概念，这种理性概念是由所有人共同的法则指导的，“它渗透到一切事物中，与宙斯一样，宙斯是所有存在的秩序的主宰”（第欧根尼·拉尔提乌斯，《哲学家的生活》，VII 88。关于伊壁鸠鲁派和斯多葛派关于道德和宗教的观点，见朱莉娅·安娜斯，《幸福的道德》，第5章和第7章。

2. The Hebrew Bible And The New Testament 2. 希伯来圣经和新约

The second line of thought to be traced in this entry starts with the Hebrew Bible and continues with the Greek scriptures called by Christians ‘The New Testament’. Morality and religion are connected in the Hebrew Bible primarily by the category of God’s command. Such commands come already in the first chapter of Genesis. God created by command, for example ‘Let there be light’ (Gen. 1:3). Then, after the creation of animals, God gives the command, ‘Be fruitful and multiply’, and repeats the command to the humans he creates in the divine image (Gen. 1:22). In the second chapter God tells Adam that he is free to eat from any tree in the garden, but he must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. When Eve and Adam disobey and eat of that fruit, they are expelled from the garden. There is a family of concepts here that is different from what we met in Greek philosophy. God is setting up a kind of covenant by which humans will be blessed if they obey the commands God gives them. Human disobedience is not explained in the text, except that the serpent says to Eve that they will not die if they eat the fruit, but will be like God, knowing good and evil, and Eve sees the fruit as good for food and pleasing to the eye and desirable for gaining wisdom. After they eat, Adam and Eve know that they are naked, and are ashamed, and hide from God. There is a turning away from God and from obedience to God that characterizes this as a ‘fall into sin’. As the story goes on, and Cain kills Abel, evil spreads to all the people of the earth, and Genesis describes the basic state as a corruption of the heart (6:9). This idea of a basic orientation away from or towards God and God’s commands becomes in the Patristic period of early Christianity the idea of a will. There is no such idea in Plato or Aristotle, and no Greek word that the English word ‘will’ properly translates.
本条目要追溯的第二条思路从希伯来圣经开始，然后继续到被基督徒称为“新约”的希腊经文。在希伯来圣经中，道德和宗教主要是通过上帝命令的类别联系在一起的。这样的命令已经在创世记的第一章中出现。上帝是由命令创造的，例如“要有光”（创世记1：3）。然后，在创造动物之后，上帝发出命令，“要生养众多”，并向他按照上帝的形象创造的人类重复这个命令（创世记1：22）。在第二章中，上帝告诉亚当，他可以自由地吃伊甸园里任何树上的果子，但他不能吃分别善恶树上的果子。当夏娃和亚当不服从并吃了那果子时，他们就被逐出伊甸园。這裡有一系列概念，與我們在希臘哲學中遇到的不同。上帝正在建立一种盟约，如果人类服从上帝给他们的命令，他们就会得到祝福。经文中没有解释人类的悖逆，只是蛇对夏娃说，如果他们吃了果子，他们就不会死，而是会像上帝一样，知道善恶，夏娃认为果子是有益的食物，赏心悦目，是获得智慧的可取之物。吃完饭后，亚当和夏娃知道他们赤身裸体，感到羞愧，躲避上帝。有一种背离上帝和顺服上帝的转变，将其描述为“堕落犯罪”。随着故事的进行，该隐杀死了亚伯，邪恶蔓延到地球上的所有人，创世记将基本状态描述为心灵的败坏（6：9）。这种远离或朝向上帝和上帝命令的基本取向的想法，在早期基督教的教父时期变成了意志的概念。柏拉图或亚里士多德没有这样的想法，也没有希腊词可以正确翻译英语单词“will”。

In the Pentateuch, the story continues with Abraham, and God’s command to leave his ancestral land and go to the land God promised to give him and his offspring (Gen. 17:7–8). Then there is the command to Abraham to kill his son, a deed prevented at the last minute by the provision of a ram instead (Gen. 22:11–14). Abraham’s great grandchildren end up in Egypt, because of famine, and the people of Israel suffer for generations under Pharaoh’s yoke. Under Moses the people are finally liberated, and during their wanderings in the desert, Moses receives from God the Ten Commandments, in two tables or tablets (Exod. 20:1–17, 31:18). The first table concerns our obligations to God directly, to worship God alone and keep God’s name holy, and keep the Sabbath. The second table concerns our obligations to other human beings, and all of the commands are negative (do not kill, commit adultery, steal, lie, or covet) except for the first, which tells us to honor our fathers and mothers. God’s commands taken together give us the law (on some lists there are 613 mitzvot, Hebrew for ‘commands’.) One more term belongs here, namely ‘kingdom’. The Greeks had the notion of a kingdom, under a human king (though the Athenians were in the classical period suspicious of such an arrangement). But they did not have the idea of a kingdom of God, though there is something approaching this in some of the Stoics. This idea is explicable in terms of law, and is introduced as such in Exodus in connection with the covenant on Mt. Sinai. The kingdom is the realm in which the laws obtain.
在摩西五经中，故事继续讲述亚伯拉罕，以及上帝命令离开他祖先的土地，去上帝应许赐给他和他的后裔的土地（创世记17：7-8）。然后是命令亚伯拉罕杀死他的儿子，这一行为在最后一刻被提供一只公羊阻止了（创世记22：11-14）。由于饥荒，亚伯拉罕的曾孙最终来到埃及，以色列人民世世代代都在法老的枷锁下受苦。在摩西的领导下，人们终于获得了解放，当他们在旷野中流浪时，摩西从上帝那里得到了十诫，放在两张桌子或一块板上（出埃及记20：1-17,31：18）。第一张表直接涉及我们对上帝的义务，单单敬拜上帝，守上帝的名圣洁，守安息日。第二张表格涉及我们对他人的义务，除了第一条命令外，所有命令都是负面的（不要杀戮、通奸、偷窃、撒谎或贪婪），它告诉我们要孝敬我们的父母。上帝的命令加在一起给了我们律法（在一些名单上有613 mitzvot，希伯来语是“命令”的意思）。这里还有一个术语，即“王国”。希腊人有一个王国的概念，在人类国王的统治下（尽管雅典人在古典时期对这种安排持怀疑态度）。但是他们没有神的国度的概念，尽管在一些斯多葛学派中有一些接近这一点的东西。这个想法在法律上是可以解释的，并且在出埃及记中与西奈山的盟约有关时被引入。国度是法律获得的领域。

This raises a question about the extent of this realm. The Ten Commandments are given in the context of a covenant with the people of Israel, though there are references to God’s intention to bless the whole world through this covenant. The surrounding laws in the Pentateuch include prescriptions and proscriptions about ritual purity and sacrifice and the use of the land that seem to apply to this particular people in this particular place. But the covenant that God makes with Noah after the flood is applicable to the whole human race, and universal scope is explicit in the Wisdom books, which make a continual connection between how we should live and how we were created as human beings. For example, in Proverbs 8 Wisdom raises her voice to all humankind, and says that she detests wickedness, which she goes on to describe in considerable detail. She says that she was the artisan at God’s side when God created the world and its inhabitants. Judaism distinguishes seven ‘Noahide’ laws given to Noah before the covenant with Abraham.
这就提出了一个关于这个领域范围的问题。十诫是在与以色列人立约的背景下给出的，尽管其中提到上帝打算通过这个约祝福全世界。摩西五经中周围的律法包括关于仪式、纯洁和献祭以及土地使用的规定和禁令，这些似乎适用于这个特定地方的这个特定民族。但是，上帝在洪水之后与挪亚所立的约，是适用于全人类的，而普世的范围在智慧书中是明确的，它们在我们应该如何生活和我们作为人类如何被造之间建立了持续的联系。例如，在箴言 8 中，智慧向全人类发出了她的声音，并说她憎恶邪恶，她继续相当详细地描述了这一点。她说，当上帝创造世界及其居民时，她是上帝身边的工匠。犹太教区分了在与亚伯拉罕立约之前赐给挪亚的七条“挪亚海德”律法。

In the writings which Christians call ‘The New Testament’ the theme of God’s commands is recapitulated. Jesus sums up the commandments under two, the command to love God with all one’s heart and soul and mind (see Deuteronomy 6:5), and the command to love the neighbor as the self (see Leviticus 19:18). The first of these probably sums up the first ‘table’ of the Ten Commandments to Moses, and the second sums up the second. The New Testament is unlike the Hebrew Bible, however, in presenting a narrative about a man who is the perfect exemplification of obedience and who has a life without sin. New Testament scholars disagree about the extent to which Jesus actually claimed to be God, but the traditional interpretation is that he did make this claim; in any case the Christian doctrine is that we can see in his life the clearest possible revelation in human terms both of what God is like and at the same time of what our lives ought to be like. In the ‘Sermon on the Mount’ (Matthew 5–7) Jesus issues a number of radical injunctions. He takes the commandments inside the heart; for example, we are required not merely not to murder, but not to be angry, and not merely not to commit adultery, but not to lust (see Ezekiel 11:19, ‘I will give them a heart of flesh, that they may walk in my statutes.’) We are told, if someone strikes us on the right cheek, to turn to him also the left. Jesus tells us to love our enemies and those who hate and persecute us, and in this way he makes it clear that the love commandment is not based on reciprocity (Matt 5:43–48; Luke 6:27–36). Finally, when he is asked ‘Who is my neighbor?’, he tells the story (Luke 10) of a Samaritan (traditional enemies of the Jews) who met a wounded Jew he did not know by the side of the road, was moved with compassion, and went out of his way to meet his needs; Jesus commends the Samaritan for being ‘neighbor’ to the wounded traveler.
在基督徒称之为“新约”的著作中，我们概括了上帝命令的主题。耶稣将诫命归纳为两条，一条是全心全意爱神的命令（见申命记6：5），另一条是爱人如己的命令（见利未记19：18）。其中第一个可能总结了摩西十诫的第一个“表”，第二个总结了第二个。然而，新约圣经与希伯来圣经不同，它讲述了一个人是顺服的完美典范，他过着无罪的生活。新约学者对耶稣实际上在多大程度上声称自己是上帝存在分歧，但传统的解释是他确实提出了这个主张;无论如何，基督教的教义是，我们可以在他的生活中看到最清晰的启示，从人类的角度来看，既关于上帝是什么样的，同时也是关于我们的生活应该是什么样子。在“登山宝训”（马太福音5-7）中，耶稣发出了一些激进的禁令。他把诫命放在心里;例如，我们被要求不仅不要杀人，而且要不要发怒，不仅要不犯奸淫，还要不要（见以西结书11：19，“我要赐给他们肉心，使他们可以遵行我的律例。我们被告知，如果有人打我们的右脸颊，也要转向他的左脸颊。耶稣告诉我们要爱我们的敌人和那些憎恨和迫害我们的人，通过这种方式，他清楚地表明爱的诫命不是基于互惠的（马太福音5：43-48;路加福音6：27-36）。最后，当他被问到“谁是我的邻居？”时，他讲述了一个撒玛利亚人（犹太人的传统敌人）的故事（路加福音10章），他在路边遇到了一个他不认识的受伤的犹太人，被怜悯所感动，并竭尽全力满足他的需要;耶稣称赞撒玛利亚人是受伤旅行者的“邻居”。

The theme of self-sacrifice is clearest in the part of the narrative that deals with Jesus’ death. This event is understood in many different ways in the New Testament, but one central theme is that Jesus died on our behalf, an innocent man on behalf of the guilty. Jesus describes the paradigm of loving our neighbors as the willingness to die for them. This theme is connected with our relationship to God, which we violate by disobedience, but which is restored by God’s forgiveness through redemption. In Paul’s letters especially we are given a three-fold temporal location for the relation of morality to God’s work on our behalf. We are forgiven for our past failures on the basis of Jesus’ sacrifice (Rom. 3:21–26). We are reconciled now with God through God’s adoption of us in Christ (Rom. 8:14–19). And we are given the hope of future progress in holiness by the work of the Holy Spirit (Rom. 5:3–5). All of this theology requires more detailed analysis, but this is not the place for it.
自我牺牲的主题在叙述中处理耶稣之死的部分最为明显。这一事件在新约中以许多不同的方式被理解，但一个中心主题是耶稣为我们而死，一个无辜的人代表有罪的人而死。耶稣将爱我们的邻居的范式描述为愿意为他们而死。这个主题与我们与上帝的关系有关，我们因悖逆而违反了这种关系，但通过上帝的救赎的宽恕而恢复了这种关系。特别是在保罗的书信中，我们被赋予了道德与上帝为我们所做的工作的关系的三个时间位置。基于耶稣的牺牲，我们过去的失败得到了宽恕（罗马书3：21-26）。我们现在通过神在基督里收养我们而与神和好了（罗马书8：14-19）。藉着圣灵的工作，我们被赐予了未来在圣洁方面进步的希望（罗马书5：3-5）。所有这些神学都需要更详细的分析，但这不是它的地方。

There is a contrast between the two traditions I have so far described, namely the Greek and the Judeo-Christian. The idea of God that is central in Greek philosophy is the idea of God attracting us, like a kind of magnet, so that we desire to become more like God, though there is a minority account by Socrates of receiving divine commands. In the Jewish and Christian scriptures, the notion of God commanding us is central. It is tempting to simplify this contrast by saying that the Greeks favor the good, in their account of the relation of morality and religion, and the Judeo-Christian account favors the right or obligation. It is true that the notion of obligation makes most sense against the background of command. But the picture is over-simple because the Greeks had room in their account for the constraint of desire; thus the temperate or brave person in Aristotle’s picture has desires for food or sex or safety that have to be disciplined by the love of the noble. On the other side, the Judeo-Christian account adds God’s love to the notion of God’s command, so that the covenant in which the commands are embedded is a covenant by which God blesses us, and we are given a route towards our highest good which is union with God.
到目前为止，我所描述的两种传统之间存在着对比，即希腊传统和犹太教-基督教传统。在希腊哲学中，上帝的概念是上帝吸引我们，就像一种磁铁一样，使我们渴望变得更像上帝，尽管苏格拉底有少数人关于接受神圣命令的叙述。在犹太教和基督教的经文中，上帝命令我们的概念是核心。很容易简化这种对比，说希腊人在他们对道德和宗教关系的叙述中偏爱善，而犹太教-基督教的叙述则偏爱权利或义务。诚然，在命令的背景下，义务的概念最有意义。但这个图景过于简单，因为希腊人在他们的解释中为欲望的约束留出了空间;因此，在亚里士多德的笔下，温和或勇敢的人对食物、性或安全的渴望，必须由高贵的爱来约束。另一方面，犹太教和基督教的记载将上帝的爱添加到上帝命令的概念中，因此，包含命令的盟约是上帝祝福我们的盟约，我们被赋予了一条通往最高利益的道路，即与上帝的结合。

3. The Middle Ages 3. 中世纪

The rest of the history to be described in this entry is a cross-fertilization of these two traditions or lines of thought. In the patristic period, or the period of the early Fathers, it was predominantly Plato and the Stoics amongst the Greek philosophers whose influence was felt. The Eastern and Western parts of the Christian church split during the period, and the Eastern church remained more comfortable than the Western with language about humans being deified (in Greek theosis). In the Western church, Augustine (354–430) emphasized the gap between the world we are in as resident aliens and our citizenship in the heavenly Jerusalem, and even in our next life the distance between ourselves and God. He describes in the Confessions the route by which his heart or will, together with his understanding, moved from paganism through Neo-Platonism to Christianity. The Neo-Platonists (such as Plotinus, 205-270) taught a world-system of emanation, whereby the One (like Plato’s Form of the Good) flowed into Intellect (the realm of the Forms) and from there into the World-Soul and individual souls, where it encountered the realm of bodies, from where it returned to itself (‘the flight of the alone to the alone’). Augustine accepted that the Platonists taught, like the beginning of the prologue of John, that the Word (in Greek, logos) is with God and is God, since the Intellect is the mediating principle between the One and the Many (John 1:1–5). Augustine held that Plato had asserted that the supreme good, possession of which alone gives us blessedness, is God, ‘and therefore (Plato) thought that to be a philosopher is to be a lover of God.’ (De Civ. Dei VIII.8). But the Platonists did not teach, like the end of John’s prologue, that the Word is made flesh in Jesus Christ, and so they did not have access to the way to salvation revealed in Christ or God’s grace to us through Christ’s death. Nonetheless, it is surprising how far Augustine can go in rapprochement. The Forms, he says, are in the mind of God and God uses them in the creation of the world. Human beings were created for union with God, but they have the freedom to turn towards themselves instead of God. If they turn to God, they can receive divine illumination through a personal intuition of the eternal standards (the Forms). If they turn towards themselves, they will lose the sense of the order of creation, which the order of their own loves should reflect. Augustine gives primacy to the virtue of loving what ought to be loved, especially God. In his homily on I John 4:8, he says, ‘Love and do what you will.’ But this is not a denial of the moral law. He held that humans who truly love God will also act in accord with the other precepts of divine and moral law; though love not merely fulfills the cardinal virtues (wisdom, justice, courage and temperance) but transforms them by supernatural grace.
本条目中要描述的其余历史是这两种传统或思路的交叉融合。在教父时期，或早期教父时期，主要是柏拉图和斯多葛学派在希腊哲学家中受到了影响。在此期间，基督教会的东部和西部分裂，东方教会比西方教会更舒适地使用关于人类被神化的语言（在希腊神学中）。在西方教会中，奥古斯丁（354-430）强调了我们作为外来居民所处的世界与我们在天上的耶路撒冷的公民身份之间的差距，甚至在我们的来世，我们自己与上帝之间的距离。他在《忏悔录》中描述了他的心灵或意志，连同他的理解，从异教通过新柏拉图主义转向基督教的路线。新柏拉图主义者（如普罗提努斯，205-270）教导了一种散发的世界体系，通过这个体系，“一”（如柏拉图的“善的形式”）流入智力（“形式”的领域），并从那里进入世界灵魂和个体灵魂，在那里它遇到身体的领域，从那里它回到自身（“孤独到孤独的飞行”）。奥古斯丁承认，柏拉图主义者教导，就像约翰福音序言的开头一样，道（在希腊语中，logos）与上帝同在，是上帝，因为智力是一与多之间的中介原则（约翰福音1：1-5）。奥古斯丁认为，柏拉图曾断言，只有拥有它才能给我们带来祝福的至高无上的善是上帝，“因此（柏拉图）认为，成为哲学家就是爱上帝。“（《公民条例》第八章第8节）。但是柏拉图主义者没有像约翰福音序言的结尾那样教导说，道是在耶稣基督里道成肉身的，因此他们没有机会获得在基督里启示的救恩之路，也没有机会通过基督的死给我们得到上帝给我们的恩典。尽管如此，令人惊讶的是，奥古斯丁能在和解方面走多远。他说，这些形式在上帝的心中，上帝在创造世界时使用它们。人类被造是为了与上帝结合，但他们有转向自己而不是上帝的自由。如果他们转向上帝，他们可以通过个人对永恒标准（形式）的直觉获得神圣的光照。如果他们转向自己，他们将失去对创造秩序的感觉，而他们自己的爱的秩序应该反映出来。奥古斯丁把爱应该被爱的东西，尤其是上帝——的美德放在首位。在他关于约翰一书 4：8 的讲道中，他说：“爱人，做你想做的事。但这并不是对道德法则的否定。他认为，真正爱上帝的人也会按照神圣和道德律法的其他戒律行事;虽然爱不仅满足了基本的美德（智慧、正义、勇气和节制），而且通过超自然的恩典改变了它们。

The influence of Augustine in the subsequent history of ethics resulted from the fact that it was his synthesis of Christianity (the official religion of the Roman Empire after 325) and Greek philosophy that survived the destruction of the Western Roman Empire, especially in the monasteries where the texts were still read. Boethius (c. 480–524) gave us the definition of the concept of ‘person’ that has been fundamental to ethical theory. To understand this, we need to go back into the history of the development of the doctrine of the Trinity. The church had to explain how the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit could be distinct and yet not three different gods. They used, in Latin, the term persona, which means ‘role’ but which was also used by the grammarians to distinguish what we call ‘first person, second person and third person’ pronouns and verb-forms. The same human being can be first person ‘I’, second person ‘you’, and third person ‘he’ or ‘she’, depending on the relations in which he or she stands. The doctrine of the Trinity comes to be understood in terms of three persons, one God, with the persons standing in different relations to each other. But then this term ‘person’ is also used to understand the relation of the second person’s divinity to his humanity. The church came to talk about one person with two natures, the person standing under the natures. This had the merit of not making either the humanity or the divinity less essential to who Jesus was. Plato and Aristotle did not have any term that we can translate ‘person’ in the modern sense, as someone (as opposed to something) that stands under all his or her attributes. Boethius, however, defines ‘person’ as ‘individual substance of rational nature,’ a key step in the introduction of our present concept.
奥古斯丁在随后的伦理学史中的影响是由于他对基督教（325年后罗马帝国的官方宗教）和希腊哲学的综合，在西罗马帝国的毁灭中幸存下来，特别是在仍然阅读文本的修道院中。波伊提乌斯（约480-524年）为我们提供了“人”概念的定义，这个概念一直是伦理学理论的基础。要理解这一点，我们需要回到三位一体教义的发展历史。教会必须解释圣父、圣子和圣灵如何是不同的，但不是三个不同的神。在拉丁语中，他们使用了“persona”一词，意思是“角色”，但语法学家也使用它来区分我们所说的“第一人称、第二人称和第三人称”代词和动词形式。同一个人可以是第一人称“我”，第二人称“你”，第三人称“他”或“她”，这取决于他或她所处的关系。三位一体的教义开始被理解为三个位格，一个是神，这两个位格彼此之间处于不同的关系中。但是，“位格”这个词也被用来理解第二个人的神性与他的人性之间的关系。教会开始谈论一个人具有两种本性，即站在本性之下的人。这样做的好处是，既没有使人性，也没有使神性对耶稣是谁变得不那么重要。柏拉图和亚里士多德没有任何术语，我们可以将现代意义上的“人”翻译为站在他或她的所有属性之下的人（而不是某物）。然而，波伊修斯将“人”定义为“理性的个体实体”，这是引入我们当前概念的关键步骤。

In the West knowledge of most of Aristotle’s texts was lost, but not in the East. They were translated into Syriac, and Arabic, and eventually (in Muslim Spain) into Latin, and re-entered Christian Europe in the twelfth century accompanied by translations of the great Arabic commentaries. In the initial prophetic period of Islam (CE 610–32) the Qur’an was given to Mohammad, who explained it and reinforced it through his own teachings and practices. The notion of God’s (Allah’s) commands is again central, and our obedience to these commands is the basis of our eventual resurrection. Disputes about political authority in the period after Mohammad’s death led to the split between Sunnis and Shiites. Within Sunni Muslim ethical theory in the Middle Ages two major alternative ways developed of thinking about the relation between morality and religion. The first, the Mu’tazilite, was given its most developed statement by ‘Abd al-Jabbar from Basra (d. 1025). ‘Abd al-Jabbar defines a wrongful act as one that deserves blame, and holds that the right and wrong character of acts is known immediately to human reason, independently of revelation. These standards that we learn from reason apply also to God, so that we can use them to judge what God is and is not commanding us to do. He also teaches that humans have freedom, in the sense of a power to perform both an act and its opposite, though not at the same time. (For Mu’tazilite ethical theory, see Sophia Vasalou, Moral Agents and Their Deserts: The Character of Mu’tazilite Ethics and George Hourani, Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of ‘Abd al-Jabbar.) The second alternative was taught by al-Ashari (d. 935), who started off as a Mu’tazilite, but came to reject their view. He insists that God is subject to none and to no standard that can fix bounds for Him. Nothing can be wrong for God, who sets the standard of right and wrong. This means that ‘if God declared lying to be right, it would be right, and if He commanded it, none could gainsay Him’ (The Theology of al-Ash’ari, 169-70). With respect to our freedom, he holds that God gives us only the power to do the act (not its opposite) and this power is simultaneous to the act and does not precede it. A figure contemporary with al-Ashari, but in some ways intermediate between Mu’tazilites and Asharites, is al-Maturidi of Samarqand (d. 944). He holds that because humans have the tendency in their nature towards ugly or harmful actions as well as beautiful or beneficial ones, God has to reveal to us by command what to pursue and what to avoid. He also teaches that God gives us two different kinds of power, both the power simultaneous with the act (which is simply to do the act) and the power preceding the act (to choose either the act or its opposite). (For the work of al-Maturidi, see Ulrich Rudolph, Al-Maturidi and Sunni Theology in Samarkand.)
在西方，亚里士多德的大部分文本的知识都丢失了，但在东方却没有。他们被翻译成叙利亚语和阿拉伯语，最终（在穆斯林西班牙）被翻译成拉丁语，并在十二世纪重新进入基督教欧洲，并伴随着伟大的阿拉伯评论的翻译。在伊斯兰教最初的预言时期（公元610-32年），古兰经被交给了穆罕默德，穆罕默德通过自己的教义和实践来解释并加强它。真主（安拉）的命令的概念再次成为中心，我们对这些命令的服从是我们最终复活的基础。穆罕默德死后关于政治权威的争端导致了逊尼派和什叶派之间的分裂。在中世纪的逊尼派穆斯林伦理理论中，发展了两种主要的替代方式来思考道德与宗教之间的关系。第一个是穆塔齐利特人，由巴士拉的阿卜杜勒·贾巴尔（卒于 1025 年）发表了最成熟的声明。阿卜杜勒·贾巴尔将不法行为定义为应受责备的行为，并认为行为的正确性和错误性是人类理性立即知道的，与启示无关。我们从理性中学到的这些标准也适用于上帝，因此我们可以用它们来判断上帝是什么，而不是命令我们做什么。他还教导说，人类拥有自由，从某种意义上说，人类拥有一种能力，可以执行一种行为及其相反的行为，尽管不是同时进行。（关于穆塔齐利特伦理学理论，参见索菲亚·瓦萨卢（Sophia Vasalou）的《道德代理人及其沙漠：穆塔齐利特伦理学的特征》（Moral Agents and Their Deserts： The Character of Mu’tazilite Ethics）和乔治·胡拉尼（George Hourani）的《伊斯兰理性主义：阿卜杜勒·贾巴尔的伦理学》（Islamic Rationalism： The Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar）。第二种选择是由 al-Ashari（卒于 935 年）教授的，他最初是 Mu’tazilite，但后来拒绝了他们的观点。他坚持认为，上帝不受任何约束，也不受任何可以为他设定界限的标准的约束。对于设定对与错标准的上帝来说，没有什么是错的。这意味着“如果上帝宣布说谎是正确的，那将是正确的，如果他命令撒谎，没有人能得罪他”（《阿什阿里神学》，169-70）。关于我们的自由，他认为上帝只赋予我们做这个行为的能力（而不是它的对立面），而这种能力是与行为同时发生的，而不是在行为之前。与阿沙里同时代的人物是撒马尔罕的马图里迪（al-Maturidi，卒于 944 年），但在某些方面介于穆塔齐利特人和阿沙里人之间。他认为，因为人类的本性中既有丑陋或有害的行为，也有美丽或有益的行为的倾向，所以上帝必须通过命令向我们揭示要追求什么和避免什么。他还教导说，上帝赐予我们两种不同的能力，一种是与行为同时发生的能力（简单地做这个行为），另一个是行为之前的能力（选择行为或相反的行为）。（关于马图里迪的著作，见乌尔里希·鲁道夫（Ulrich Rudolph），《撒马尔罕的马图里迪和逊尼派神学》（Al-Maturidi and Sunni Theology in Samarkand）。

Medieval reflection within Judaism about morality and religion has, as its most significant figure, Maimonides (d. 1204) who was born in Muslim Spain, and was familiar with much of the Muslim discussion of these questions. The Guide of the Perplexed was written for young men who had read Aristotle and were worried about the tension between the views of the philosopher and their faith. Maimonides teaches that we do indeed have some access just as human beings to the rightness and wrongness of acts; but what renders conforming to these standards obligatory is that God reveals them in special revelation. The laws are obligatory whether we understand the reasons for them or not, but sometimes we do see how it is beneficial to obey, and Maimonides is remarkably fertile in providing such reasons.
中世纪犹太教内部对道德和宗教的反思，其中最重要的人物是迈蒙尼德（卒于 1204 年），他出生于穆斯林西班牙，熟悉穆斯林对这些问题的大部分讨论。《困惑者指南》是为读过亚里士多德著作的年轻人写的，他们担心哲学家的观点和他们的信仰之间的紧张关系。迈蒙尼德教导说，我们确实像人类一样，有一些机会了解行为的正确性和错误性;但是，使遵守这些标准成为强制性的，是上帝在特别的启示中启示它们。无论我们是否理解法律的原因，法律都是强制性的，但有时我们确实看到遵守法律是多么有益，迈蒙尼德在提供这些理由方面非常丰富。

The reentry of Aristotle into Europe caused a rebirth (a ‘renaissance’), but it also gave rise to a crisis, because it threatened to undermine the harmony established from the time of Augustine between the authority of reason, as represented by Greek philosophy, and the authority of faith, as represented by the doctrines of the Christian church. There were especially three ‘errors of Aristotle’ that seemed threatening: his teaching that the world was eternal, his apparent denial of personal immortality, and his denial of God’s active agency in the world. (See, for example, Bonaventure, In Hexaemeron, VI.5 and In II Sent., lib. II, d.1, pars 1, a.1, q.2.) These three issues (‘the world, the soul, and God’) become in one form or another the focus of philosophical thought for the next six centuries.
亚里士多德重新进入欧洲导致了重生（“文艺复兴”），但也引发了一场危机，因为它有可能破坏自奥古斯丁时代以来建立的和谐，即希腊哲学所代表的理性权威和基督教会教义所代表的信仰权威。特别是亚里士多德的三个“错误”似乎具有威胁性：他教导世界是永恒的，他明显否认个人不朽，以及他否认上帝在世界上的积极能动性。（例如，参见Bonaventure， In Hexaemeron， VI.5和In II Sent.， lib.II， d.1， pars 1， a.1， q.2.）这三个问题（“世界、灵魂和上帝”）以一种或另一种形式成为未来六个世纪哲学思想的焦点。

Thomas Aquinas (c. 1224–74) undertook the project of synthesis between Aristotle and Christianity, though his version of Christianity was already deeply influenced by Augustine, and so by Neo-Platonism. Aquinas, like Aristotle, emphasized the ends (vegetative, animal and typically human) given to humans in the natural order. He described both the cardinal virtues and the theological virtues of faith, hope and love, but he did not feel the tension that current virtue ethicists sometimes feel between virtue and the following of rules or principles. The rules governing how we ought to live are known, some of them by revelation, some of them by ordinary natural experience and rational reflection. But Aquinas thought these rules consistent in the determination of our good, since God only requires us to do what is consistent with our own good. Aquinas’s theory is eudaimonist; ‘And so the will naturally tends towards its own last end, for every man naturally wills beatitude. And from this natural willing are caused all other willings, since whatever a man wills, he wills on account of the end.’ (Summa Theologiae I, q.60. a.2) God’s will is not exercised by arbitrary fiat; but what is good for some human being can be understood as fitting for this kind of agent, in relation to the purpose this agent intends to accomplish, in the real environment of the action, including other persons individually and collectively. The principles of natural moral law are the universal judgments made by right reasoning about the kinds of actions that are morally appropriate and inappropriate for human agents. They are thus, at least in principle and at a highly general level, deducible from human nature. Aquinas held that reason, in knowing these principles, is participating in the eternal law, which is in the mind of God (Summa Theologiae I, q.91. a.2). Aquinas was not initially successful in persuading the church to embrace Aristotle. In 1277 the Bishop of Paris condemned 219 propositions (not all Thomist), including the thesis that a person virtuous in Aristotle’s terms ‘is sufficiently disposed for eternal happiness.’ But in the Counter-Reformation, the synthesis which Aquinas achieved became authoritative in Roman Catholic education.
托马斯·阿奎那（Thomas Aquinas，约1224-74年）承担了亚里士多德和基督教之间的综合项目，尽管他的基督教版本已经深受奥古斯丁的影响，因此也受到新柏拉图主义的影响。阿奎那和亚里士多德一样，强调在自然秩序中赋予人类的目的（植物人、动物和典型的人类）。他描述了信仰、希望和爱的基本美德和神学美德，但他没有感受到现在的美德伦理学家有时在美德和遵循规则或原则之间所感受到的紧张关系。管理我们应该如何生活的规则是已知的，其中一些是通过启示，其中一些是通过普通的自然经验和理性反思。但阿奎那认为这些规则在确定我们的善时是一致的，因为上帝只要求我们做符合我们自己利益的事情。阿奎那的理论是优生论;“因此，意志自然而然地趋向于它自己的最后结局，因为每个人都自然而然地有八福的意志。从这种自然的意愿中，产生了所有其他的意愿，因为无论一个人愿意什么，他都会因目的而愿意。“（《神学大全》I，q.60.a.2）上帝的旨意不是通过任意的命令来行使的;但是，对某些人有益的东西可以被理解为适合于这种代理人，就这种代理人打算在行动的真实环境中实现的目的而言，包括其他人个人和集体。自然道德法则的原则是通过正确的推理做出的普遍判断，这些判断是关于人类主体在道德上适合和不适合的行为类型。因此，至少在原则上，在高度普遍的层面上，它们是可以从人性中推导出来的。阿奎那认为，理性在了解这些原则时，就参与了永恒的法则，而永恒法则存在于上帝的心意中（Summa Theologiae I， q.91. a.2）。阿奎那最初并没有成功地说服教会接受亚里士多德。1277 年，巴黎主教谴责了 219 个命题（并非全部是托马斯主义命题），其中包括亚里士多德所说的有道德的人“足以获得永恒的幸福”的论点。但在反宗教改革中，阿奎那所取得的综合成为罗马天主教教育的权威。

Aquinas was a Dominican friar. The other major order of friars, the Franciscan, had its own school of philosophy, starting with Bonaventure (c. 1217–74), who held that while we can learn from both Plato and Aristotle, and both are also in error, the greater error is Aristotle’s. One other major figure from this tradition is John Duns Scotus (literally John from Duns, the Scot, c. 1266–1308), and there are three significant differences between him and Aquinas on the relation between morality and religion. First, Scotus is not a eudaimonist. He takes a double account of motivation from Anselm (1033–1109), who made the distinction between two affections of the will, the affection for advantage (an inclination towards one’s own happiness and perfection) and the affection for justice (an inclination towards what is good in itself independent of advantage) (Anselm, De Concordia 3.11, 281:7–10; De Casu Diaboli 12, 255:8–11). Original sin is a ranking of advantage over justice, which needs to be reversed by God’s assistance before we can be pleasing to God. Scotus says that we should be willing to sacrifice our own happiness for God if God were to require this. Second, he does not think that the moral law is self-evident or necessary. He takes the first table to be necessary, since it derives (except for the ‘every seventh day’ provision of the command about the Sabbath) from the necessary principle that God is to be loved. But the second table is contingent, though fitting our nature, and God could prescribe different commands even for human beings (Ord. I, dist. 44). One of his examples is the proscription on theft, which applies only to beings with property, and so not necessarily to human beings (since they are not necessarily propertied). God also gives dispensation from the commands, according to Scotus, for example the command to Abraham to kill Isaac (Ord III, suppl. Dist. 37). Third, Scotus denied the application of teleology to non-intentional nature, and thus departed from the Aristotelian and Thomist view. This does not mean that we have no natural end or telos, but that this end is related to the intention of God in the same way a human artisan intends his or her products to have a certain purpose (see Hare 2006, chapter 2).
阿奎那是多米尼加修道士。另一个主要的修道士团体，方济各会，有自己的哲学流派，从博纳文图尔（约1217-74）开始，他们认为虽然我们可以向柏拉图和亚里士多德学习，而且两者都有错误，但更大的错误是亚里士多德的。这一传统的另一位主要人物是约翰·邓斯·斯科特斯（John Duns Scotus，字面意思是来自苏格兰邓斯的约翰，约 1266-1308 年），他和阿奎那在道德与宗教之间的关系上有三个显着差异。首先，司各特不是优生论者。他从安瑟伦（1033-1109）那里对动机进行了双重解释，他区分了两种意志的情感，对利益的热爱（对自己的幸福和完美的倾向）和对正义的热爱（对本身独立于利益的善的倾向）（Anselm，De Concordia 3.11,281：7-10;De Casu Diaboli 12,255：8-11）。原罪是优势凌驾于公义之上的等级，需要通过上帝的帮助来扭转这种地位，我们才能讨上帝的喜悦。司各特说，如果上帝需要这样做，我们应该愿意为上帝牺牲自己的幸福。其次，他不认为道德法则是不言而喻的或必要的。他认为第一张桌子是必要的，因为它（除了关于安息日的命令“每七天”的规定）来自上帝应该被爱的必要原则。但第二张表格是偶然的，虽然符合我们的本性，上帝甚至可以为人类规定不同的命令（Ord. I， dist. 44）。他的一个例子是禁止盗窃，它只适用于有财产的人，因此不一定适用于人类（因为他们不一定是有财产的）。根据司各都的说法，上帝也给予了命令的豁免，例如对亚伯拉罕的命令，要杀死以撒（Ord III， suppl. Dist. 37）。第三，司各特否认目的论对非意向性的应用，从而背离了亚里士多德和托马斯主义的观点。这并不意味着我们没有自然的目的或目的，而是这个目的与上帝的意图有关，就像人类工匠希望他或她的产品具有某种目的一样（见Hare 2006，第2章）。

4. Modern Philosophy 4. 现代哲学

Europe experienced a second Renaissance when scholars fled Constantinople after its capture by the Muslims in 1453, and brought with them Greek manuscripts that were previously inaccessible. In Florence Marsilio Ficino (1433–99) identified Plato as the primary ancient teacher of wisdom, and (like Bonaventure) cited Augustine as his guide in elevating Plato in this way. His choice of Plato was determined by the harmony he believed to exist between Plato’s thought and the Christian faith, and he set about making Latin translations of all the Platonic texts so that this wisdom could be available for his contemporaries who did not know Greek. He was also the first Latin translator of Plotinus, the Neo-Platonist.
欧洲经历了第二次文艺复兴，当时学者们在君士坦丁堡于 1453 年被穆斯林占领后逃离君士坦丁堡，并带来了以前无法接触到的希腊手稿。在佛罗伦萨，马西利奥·菲奇诺（Marsilio Ficino，1433-99 年）将柏拉图确定为主要的古代智慧导师，并（像博纳文图尔一样）引用奥古斯丁作为他以这种方式提升柏拉图的指南。他选择柏拉图的原因在于他认为柏拉图的思想与基督教信仰之间存在的和谐，他着手将所有柏拉图文本翻译成拉丁文，以便为不懂希腊语的同时代人提供这种智慧。他也是新柏拉图主义者普罗提努斯的第一位拉丁语翻译者。

Many of the central figures in the Reformation were humanists in the Renaissance sense (where there is no implication of atheism). But there is also a fundamental similarity in the way the relation between morality and religion is conceived between Scotus and the two Reformers Martin Luther (1483–1546) and John Calvin (1509–64), though neither of them make the distinctions about natural law that Scotus (the ‘subtle doctor’) does. Luther says ‘What God wills is not right because he ought or was bound so to will; on the contrary, what takes place must be right, because he so wills.’ (Bondage of the Will, Works, pp. 195–6). Calvin says ‘God’s will is so much the highest rule of righteousness that whatever he wills, by the very fact that he wills it, must be considered righteous’ (Institutes 3. 23. 2). The historical connection between Scotus and the Reformers can be traced through William of Ockham (d. 1349) and Gabriel Biel (1410–95). The Counter-Reformation in Roman Catholic Europe, on the other hand, took the work of Aquinas as authoritative for education. Francisco de Suarez (1548–1617) claimed that the precepts of natural law can be distinguished into those (like ‘Do good and avoid evil’) which are known immediately and intuitively by all normal human beings, those (like ‘Do no injury to anyone’) which require experience and thought to know them, but which are then self-evident, and those (like ‘Lying is always immoral’) which are not self-evident but can be derived from the more basic precepts (De Legibus, 2. 7. 5). However, Suarez accepted Scotus’s double account of motivation.
宗教改革中的许多核心人物都是文艺复兴时期意义上的人文主义者（文艺复兴时期没有无神论的暗示）。但是，司各特与两位改革家马丁·路德（Martin Luther，1483-1546）和约翰·加尔文（John Calvin，1509-64）在道德与宗教之间的关系上也存在着根本的相似之处，尽管他们都没有像司各特（“微妙的医生”）那样对自然法进行区分。路德说：“上帝的旨意是不对的，因为他应该或被束缚在上帝的旨意之上;相反，所发生的事必须是正确的，因为他是这样做的。“（《意志的束缚》，《作品》，第195-6页）。加尔文说：“上帝的旨意是公义的最高规则，无论他愿意做什么，只要他愿意，就必须被认为是公义的”（《研究所》第3章。23. 2).斯科特斯和改革家之间的历史联系可以追溯到奥卡姆的威廉（卒于 1349 年）和加布里埃尔·比尔（1410-95 年）。另一方面，罗马天主教欧洲的反宗教改革将阿奎那的著作视为教育的权威。弗朗西斯科·德·苏亚雷斯（Francisco de Suarez，1548-1617 年）声称，自然法的戒律可以分为所有正常人都能立即直观地知道的戒律（如“行善避恶”），需要经验和思想才能知道它们，但随后是不言而喻的戒律，以及那些不言而喻但可以从更基本的戒律中得出的戒律（如“撒谎总是不道德的”）。Legibus， 2.7. 5).然而，苏亚雷斯接受了斯科特斯的双重动机解释。

The next two centuries in European philosophy can be described in terms of two lines of development, rationalism and empiricism, both of which led, in different ways, to the possibility of a greater detachment of ethics from theology. The history of rationalism from René Descartes (1596–1650) to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) is a history of re-establishing human knowledge on the foundation of rational principles that could not be doubted, after modern science started to shake the traditional foundations supported by the authority of Greek philosophy and the church. Descartes was not primarily an ethicist, but he located the source of moral law (surprisingly for a rationalist) in God’s will. The most important rationalist in ethics was Benedict de Spinoza (1623–77). He was a Jew, but was condemned by his contemporary faith community as unorthodox. Like Descartes, he attempted to duplicate the methods of geometry in philosophy. Substance, according to Spinoza, exists in itself and is conceived through itself (Ethics, I, def. 3); it is consequently one, infinite, and identical with God (Ethics, I, prop. 15). There is no such thing as natural law, since all events in nature (‘God or Nature’) are equally natural. Everything in the universe is necessary, and there is no free will, except in as far as Spinoza is in favor of calling someone free who is led by reason ( Ethics, I, prop. 32). Each human mind is a limited aspect of the divine intellect. On this view (which has its antecedent in Stoicism) the human task is to move towards the greatest possible rational control of human life. Leibniz was, like Descartes, not primarily an ethicist. He said, however, that ‘the highest perfection of any thinking being lies in careful and constant pursuit of true happiness’ (New Essays on Human Understanding, XXI, 51). The rationalists were not denying the centrality of God in human moral life, but their emphasis was on the access we have through the light of reason rather than through sacred text or ecclesiastical authority.
接下来的两个世纪，欧洲哲学可以用两条发展路线来描述，即理性主义和经验主义，这两条路线都以不同的方式导致了伦理学与神学更大程度分离的可能性。从勒内·笛卡尔（René Descartes，1596-1650）到戈特弗里德·威廉·莱布尼茨（Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz，1646-1716）的理性主义历史，是一部在现代科学开始动摇由希腊哲学和教会权威支持的传统基础之后，在理性原则的基础上重建人类知识的历史，这种理性原则是毋庸置疑的。笛卡尔主要不是伦理学家，但他将道德法则的来源（对于理性主义者来说令人惊讶）定位在上帝的意志中。伦理学中最重要的理性主义者是本尼迪克特·德·斯宾诺莎（1623-77）。他是犹太人，但被他的当代信仰社区谴责为非正统。像笛卡尔一样，他试图在哲学中复制几何学的方法。根据斯宾诺莎的说法，物质存在于自身中，并通过自身被构想出来（伦理学，I，def.3）;因此，它是一体的，无限的，与上帝相同（伦理学，I，prop.15）。没有自然法则这样的东西，因为自然界中的所有事件（“上帝或自然”）都是同样自然的。宇宙中的一切都是必要的，没有自由意志，除非斯宾诺莎赞成称一个被理性引导的自由人（伦理学，I，prop.32）。每个人的思想都是神圣智力的一个有限方面。根据这种观点（这种观点在斯多葛主义中有其前身），人类的任务是朝着对人类生活的最大可能的理性控制迈进。莱布尼茨和笛卡尔一样，主要不是伦理学家。然而，他说，“任何思想的最高完美在于谨慎和不断地追求真正的幸福”（《人类理解新论文集》，XXI，51）。理性主义者并不否认上帝在人类道德生活中的中心地位，但他们强调的是，我们可以通过理性之光而不是通过神圣的文本或教会权威来获得。

After Leibniz there was in Germany a long-running battle between the rationalists and the pietists, who tried to remain true to the goals of the Lutheran Reformation. Examples of the two schools are Christian Wolff (1679–1754) and Christian August Crusius (1715–75), and we can understand Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), like his teacher Martin Knutzen (1713–51), as trying to mediate between the two. Wolff was a very successful popularizer of the thought of Leibniz, but fuller in his ethical system. He took from Leibniz the principle that we will always select what pleases us most, and the principle that pleasure is the apprehension of perfection, so that the amount of pleasure we feel is proportional to the amount of perfection we intuit (New Essays on Human Understanding, XXI, 41). He thought we are obligated to do what will make us and our condition, or that of others, more perfect, and this is the law of nature that would be binding on us even if (per impossible) God did not exist. He saw no problem about the connection between virtue and happiness, since both of them result directly from our perfection, and no problem about the connection between virtue and duty, since a duty is simply an act in accordance with law, which prescribes the pursuit of perfection. His views were offensive to the pietists, because he claimed that Confucius already knew (by reason) all that mattered about morality, even though he did not know anything about Christ. Crusius by contrast accepted Scotus’s double theory of motivation, and held that there are actions that we ought to do regardless of any ends we have, even the end of our own perfection and happiness. It is plausible to see here the origin of Kant’s categorical imperative. But he also added a third motivation, what he called ‘the drive of conscience’ which is ‘the natural drive to recognize a divine moral law’ (“A Guide to Rational Living,” Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, §132, 574). His idea was that we have within us this separate capacity to recognize divine command and to be drawn towards it out of a sense of dependence on the God who prescribes the command to us, and will punish us if we disobey (though our motive should not be to avoid punishment) (Ibid., §135).
在莱布尼茨之后，德国的理性主义者和虔诚主义者之间发生了一场旷日持久的斗争，他们试图忠于路德宗教改革的目标。这两个学派的例子是克里斯蒂安·沃尔夫（Christian Wolff，1679-1754）和克里斯蒂安·奥古斯特·克鲁修斯（Christian August Crusius，1715-75），我们可以理解伊曼纽尔·康德（Immanuel Kant，1724-1804），就像他的老师马丁·克努岑（Martin Knutzen，1713-51）一样，试图在两者之间调解。沃尔夫是莱布尼茨思想的非常成功的普及者，但他的道德体系更加完整。他从莱布尼茨那里继承了这样一个原则，即我们总是会选择最让我们高兴的东西，以及这样一个原则，即快乐是对完美的理解，因此我们感受到的快乐量与我们直觉的完美量成正比（《人类理解新论文集》，XXI，41）。他认为我们有义务做一些事情，使我们和我们的状况，或他人的状况更加完美，这是自然法则，即使（几乎不可能）上帝不存在，也会对我们具有约束力。他认为美德和幸福之间的联系没有问题，因为两者都直接源于我们的完美，而美德和义务之间的联系也没有问题，因为义务只是根据法律规定的一种行为，它规定了对完美的追求。他的观点冒犯了虔诚主义者，因为他声称孔子已经（通过理性）知道所有关于道德的事情，尽管他对基督一无所知。相比之下，克鲁修斯接受了司各特的双重动机理论，并认为无论我们有任何目的，甚至是我们自己的完美和幸福的终点，我们都应该采取一些行动。从这里可以看出康德的绝对命令的起源是有道理的。但他也增加了第三个动机，他称之为“良心的驱动力”，即“认识神圣道德法则的自然驱动力”（“理性生活指南”，从蒙田到康德的道德哲学，§132,574）。他的想法是，我们内在有一种独立的能力，可以识别神圣的命令，并出于对上帝的依赖感而被吸引到它，上帝向我们规定了命令，如果我们不服从，我们将惩罚我们（尽管我们的动机不应该是为了逃避惩罚）（同上，§135）。

The history of empiricism in Britain from Hobbes to Hume is also the history of the attempt to re-establish human knowledge, but not from above (from indubitable principles of reason) but from below (from experience and especially the experience of the senses). Thomas Hobbes (1588–1649) said that all reality is bodily (including God), and all events are motions in space. Willing, then, is a motion, and is merely the last act of desire or aversion in any process of deliberation. His view is that it is natural, and so reasonable, for each of us to aim solely at our own preservation or pleasure. In the state of nature, humans are selfish, and their lives are ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’, a war of all against all (Leviathan, Ch. 13). The first precept of the law of nature is then for each of us, pursuing our own interest, ‘to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of attaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war.’ (Ibid., Ch. 14). The second precept is that each of us should be willing to lay down our natural rights to everything to the extent that others are also willing, and Hobbes concludes with the need to subordinate ourselves to a sovereign who alone will be able to secure peace. The second and longest portion of Leviathan is devoted to religion, where Hobbes argues for the authority of Scripture (‘God’s word’), which he thinks is needed for the authority of law. He argues for the authority in the interpretation of Scripture to be given to that same earthly sovereign, and not to competing ecclesiastical authorities (whose competition had been seen to exacerbate the miseries of war both in Britain and on the continent) (Ibid., Ch. 33).
从霍布斯到休谟，英国的经验主义历史也是试图重建人类知识的历史，但不是从上面（从不容置疑的理性原则），而是从下面（从经验，特别是感官经验）开始。托马斯·霍布斯（Thomas Hobbes，1588-1649）说，所有的现实都是身体（包括上帝），所有事件都是空间中的运动。因此，愿意是一种动议，只是任何审议过程中的最后愿望或厌恶行为。他的观点是，我们每个人都只以自己的保护或快乐为目标，这是自然的，也是合理的。在自然状态下，人类是自私的，他们的生命是“孤独的、贫穷的、肮脏的、野蛮的和短暂的”，是一场所有人对所有人的战争（利维坦，第 13 章）。因此，自然法则的首要原则是我们每个人在追求自己的利益时，“在他希望达到和平的范围内，努力追求和平;当他得不到它时，他可以寻求和使用战争的一切帮助和好处。“（同上，第14章）。第二条戒律是，我们每个人都应该愿意放弃我们对一切事物的自然权利，只要其他人也愿意，霍布斯总结说，我们需要服从一个只有他才能确保和平的主权者。《利维坦》的第二部分也是最长的部分是关于宗教的，霍布斯在那里为圣经的权威（“上帝的话语”）辩护，他认为法律的权威是必要的。他主张在解释《圣经》时，应该把权力赋予同一位地上的君主，而不是赋予相互竞争的教会权威（他们的竞争被认为加剧了英国和欧洲大陆的战争苦难）（同上，第33章）。

John Locke (1632–1704) followed Hobbes in deriving morality from our need to live together in peace given our natural discord, but he denied that we are mechanically moved by our desires. He agreed with Hobbes in saying that moral laws are God’s imposition, but disagreed by making God’s power and benevolence both necessary conditions for God’s authority in this respect (Treatises, IV. XIII. 3). He also held that our reason can work out counsels or advice about moral matters; but only God’s imposition makes law (and hence obligation), and we only know about God’s imposition from revelation (The Reasonableness of Christianity, 62–5). He therefore devoted considerable attention to justifying our belief in the reliability of revelation.
约翰·洛克（John Locke，1632-1704）追随霍布斯（Hobbes）的脚步，从我们需要和平共处的需要中得出道德，因为我们天生的不和谐，但他否认我们被我们的欲望机械地驱动。他同意霍布斯的观点，即道德法则是上帝强加的，但不同意将上帝的力量和仁慈作为上帝在这方面权威的必要条件（论文，IV。十三、3）。他还认为，我们的理性可以就道德问题提出建议或建议;但只有上帝的强加才能制定法律（因此也是义务），我们只从启示中知道上帝的强加（基督教的合理性，62-5）。因此，他花了相当多的精力来证明我们对启示可靠性的信念。

The deists (e.g., William Wollaston, 1659–1724) believed that humans can reason from their experience of nature to the existence and some of the attributes of God, that special revelation is accordingly unnecessary, that God does not intervene in human affairs (after creation) and that the good life for humans finds adequate guidance in philosophical ethics. Frances Hutcheson (1694–1746) was not a deist, but does give a reading of the sort of guidance involved here. He distinguished between objects that are naturally good, which excite personal or selfish pleasure, and those that are morally good, which are advantageous to all persons affected. He took himself to be giving a reading of moral goodness as agape, the Greek word for the love of our neighbor that Jesus prescribes. This love is benevolence, Hutcheson said, and it is formulated in the principle ‘That Action is best, which procures the greatest Happiness for the greatest Numbers’ (Inquiry II, III, VIII). Because these definitions of natural and moral good produce a possible gap between the two, we need some way to believe that morality and happiness are coincident. Hutcheson thought that God has given us a moral sense for this purpose (Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, II). This moral sense responds to examples of benevolence with approbation and a unique kind of pleasure, and benevolence is the only thing it responds to, as it were the only signal it picks up. It is, like Scotus’s affection for justice, not confined to our perception of advantage. The result of our having moral sense is that when intending the good of others, we ‘undesignedly’ end up promoting our own greatest good as well because we end up gratifying ourselves along with others. God shows benevolence by first making us benevolent and then giving us this moral sense that gets joy from the approbation of our benevolence. To contemporary British opponents of moral sense theory, this seemed too rosy or benign a picture; our joy in approving benevolence is not enough to make morality and happiness coincident. We need also obligation and divine sanction.
自然神论者（例如，威廉·沃拉斯顿，1659-1724）认为，人类可以从他们对自然的体验中推理到上帝的存在和某些属性，因此不需要特殊的启示，上帝不干预人类事务（在创造之后），人类的美好生活在哲学伦理学中找到了充分的指导。弗朗西斯·哈奇森（Frances Hutcheson，1694-1746）不是自然神论者，但确实解读了这里涉及的那种指导。他区分了自然善良的物体，它们激发了个人或自私的快乐，以及那些道德上善良的物体，这些物体对所有受影响的人都有利。他以为自己是在解读道德上的良善，称其为agape，这是耶稣规定的希腊词，意思是爱我们的邻居。哈奇森说，这种爱就是仁慈，它是根据“行动是最好的，为最伟大的人带来最大的幸福”（调查II，III，VIII）的原则来制定的。因为这些对自然和道德善的定义在两者之间产生了可能的差距，我们需要某种方式来相信道德和幸福是一致的。哈奇森认为，上帝为此目的赋予了我们道德感（《论激情的性质和行为》，II）。这种道德感以一种赞许和一种独特的快乐来回应仁慈的例子，而仁慈是它唯一回应的东西，因为它是它接收到的唯一信号。就像司各特对正义的热爱一样，它并不局限于我们对优势的感知。我们具有道德感的结果是，当我们打算为他人谋福利时，我们“无意中”最终也促进了我们自己最大的利益，因为我们最终与他人一起满足自己。上帝通过首先使我们仁慈，然后赋予我们这种道德感来表明仁慈，这种道德感从我们的仁慈的认可中获得喜乐。对于当代英国道德感理论的反对者来说，这似乎是一幅过于乐观或良性的画面;我们因赞许仁慈而感到喜悦，并不足以使道德和幸福重合。我们还需要义务和神圣的认可。

Joseph Butler (1692–1752, Bishop of Bristol and then of Durham) held that God’s goodness consists in benevolence, in wanting us to be happy, and that we should want the same for each other. He made the important point that something can be good for an agent because it is what he wants without this meaning that the content of what he wants has anything to do with himself (Fifteen Sermons, 126–27).
约瑟夫·巴特勒（Joseph Butler，1692-1752，布里斯托尔主教，然后是达勒姆主教）认为，上帝的良善在于仁慈，希望我们快乐，我们应该希望彼此也一样。他提出了一个重要的观点，即某件事对代理人有好处，因为这是他想要的，而没有这意味着他想要的内容与他自己有任何关系（十五篇布道，126-27）。

David Hume (1711–76) is the first figure in this narrative who can properly be attached to the Enlightenment, though this term means very different things in Scotland, in France and in Germany. Hume held that reason cannot command or move the human will. Since morals clearly do have an influence on actions and affections, ‘it follows that they cannot be derived from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already proved, can never have any such influence’ (Treatise III.1). For Hume an action, or sentiment, or character, is virtuous or vicious ‘because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind’ (Ibid., III.2). The denial of motive power to reason is part of his general skepticism. He accepted from Locke the principle that our knowledge is restricted to sense impressions from experience and logically necessary relations of ideas in advance of experience (in Latin, a priori). From this principle he derived more radical conclusions than Locke had done. For example, we cannot know about causation or the soul. The only thing we can know about morals is that we get pleasure from the thought of some things and pain from the thought of others. Since the idea of morality implies something universal, there must be some sentiment of sympathy or (he later says) humanity, which is common to all human beings, and which ‘recommends the same object to general approbation’ (Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, IX. I. 221). Hume thought we could get conventional moral conclusions from these moral sentiments, which nature has fortunately given us. He was also skeptical about any attempt to derive conclusions containing ‘ought’ from premises containing only ‘is’, though scholars debate about the scope of the premises he is talking about here. Probably he included premises about God’s will or nature or action. This does not mean he was arguing against the existence of God. He thought (like Calvin) that we cannot rely on rational proofs of God’s existence, even though humans have what Calvin called a sense of the divine and Human called ‘true religion’. But Hume never identified himself as an atheist, though he had opportunity in the atheist circles he frequented in Paris, and his Dialogues on Natural Religion end with the sentiment that ‘to be a philosophical skeptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian’ (Dialogues, part XII, penultimate paragraph). Some scholars take this remark (like similar statements in Hobbes) as purely ironic, but this goes beyond the evidence.
大卫·休谟（David Hume，1711-76 年）是这个故事中第一个可以正确地与启蒙运动联系在一起的人物，尽管这个词在苏格兰、法国和德国的含义非常不同。休谟认为，理性不能指挥或推动人的意志。由于道德显然确实对行为和情感有影响，“因此，它们不能从理性中得出;这是因为，正如我们已经证明的那样，单靠理性永远无法产生任何这样的影响“（论文III.1）。对休谟来说，一种行为、一种情感或一种性格，是善良的或恶毒的，“因为它的观点会引起某种特定的快乐或不安”（同上，III.2）。对理性动力的否定是他普遍怀疑的一部分。他从洛克那里接受了这样一个原则，即我们的知识仅限于从经验中感知印象和先于经验的逻辑上必要的思想关系（在拉丁语中，是先验的）。从这个原则出发，他得出的结论比洛克所做的更激进。例如，我们无法了解因果关系或灵魂。关于道德，我们唯一能知道的是，我们从对某些事物的思考中获得快乐，从对其他事物的思考中获得痛苦。既然道德观念意味着某种普遍的东西，那么就必须有某种同情或（他后来说）人性的情感，这是全人类共同的，并且“建议普遍认可同一对象”（《道德原则调查》，IX.I.221）。休谟认为我们可以从这些道德情操中得到传统的道德结论，幸运的是，大自然给了我们这些道德情操。他还对任何试图从仅包含“是”的前提中得出包含“应该”的结论的尝试持怀疑态度，尽管学者们对他在这里谈论的前提的范围存在争议。可能他包括了关于上帝的旨意、本质或行动的前提。这并不意味着他在反对上帝的存在。他认为（像加尔文一样）我们不能依赖理性的证据来证明上帝的存在，即使人类具有加尔文所说的神圣感和人类所谓的“真正的宗教”。但休谟从未认为自己是无神论者，尽管他在巴黎经常光顾的无神论圈子里有机会，他的《自然宗教对话录》以这样一种观点结束，即“在一个文学家中，成为一个哲学怀疑论者，是成为一个健全的、有信仰的基督徒的第一步，也是最重要的一步”（《对话》，第十二部分， 倒数第二段）。一些学者认为这句话（就像霍布斯的类似陈述一样）纯粹是讽刺，但这超出了证据的范围。

The Enlightenment in France had a more anti-clerical flavor (in part because of the history of Jansenism, unique to France), and for the first time in this narrative we meet genuine atheists, such as Baron d’Holbach (1723–89) who held not only that morality did not need religion, but that religion, and especially Christianity, was its major impediment. François-Marie Voltaire (1694-1778) was, especially towards the end of his life, opposed to Christianity, but not to religion in general (Letters of Voltaire and Frederick the Great, letter 156). He accepted from the English deists the idea that what is true in Christian teachings is the core of human values that are universally true in all religions, and (like the German rationalists) he admired Confucius. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) said, famously, that mankind is born free, but everywhere he is in chains (The Social Contract, Ch. 1). This supposes a disjunction between nature and contemporary society, and Rousseau held that the life of primitive human beings was happy inasmuch as they knew how to live in accordance with their own innate needs; now we need some kind of social contract to protect us from the corrupting effects of society upon the proper love of self. Nature is understood as the whole realm of being created by God, who guarantees its goodness, unity, and order. Rousseau held that we do not need any intermediary between us and God, and we can attain salvation by returning to nature in this high sense and by developing all our faculties harmoniously. Our ultimate happiness is to feel ourselves at one with the system that God created.
法国的启蒙运动具有更多的反教权色彩（部分原因是法国独有的詹森主义的历史），在这个叙述中，我们第一次遇到了真正的无神论者，例如霍尔巴赫男爵（Baron d’Holbach，1723-89），他不仅认为道德不需要宗教，而且宗教，尤其是基督教，是其主要障碍。弗朗索瓦·玛丽·伏尔泰（François-Marie Voltaire，1694-1778）在他生命的最后阶段，反对基督教，但并不反对一般的宗教（伏尔泰和腓特烈大帝的书信，第156封信）。他从英国自然神论者那里接受了这样一种观点，即基督教教义中的真实性是人类价值观的核心，而人类价值观在所有宗教中都是普遍正确的，并且（像德国理性主义者一样）他钦佩孔子。让-雅克·卢梭（Jean-Jacques Rousseau，1712-78）说过一句名言，即人类生而自由，但到处都受到枷锁的束缚（《社会契约论》，第1章）。这假定了自然与当代社会之间的脱节，卢梭认为原始人类的生活是幸福的，因为他们知道如何按照自己的先天需求生活;现在我们需要某种社会契约来保护我们免受社会对自我正确爱的腐败影响。自然被理解为上帝创造的整个领域，上帝保证它的善良、统一和秩序。卢梭认为，我们与上帝之间不需要任何中介，我们可以通过在这种崇高的意义上回归自然并和谐地发展我们所有的能力来获得救赎。我们最终的幸福是感觉到自己与上帝创造的系统合而为一。

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is the most important figure of the Enlightenment in Germany, but his project is different in many ways from those of his French contemporaries. He was brought up in a pietist Lutheran family, and his system retains many features from, for example, Crusius. But he was also indebted through Wolff to Leibniz. Moreover, he was ‘awoken from his dogmatic slumbers’ by reading Hume, though Kant is referring here to Hume’s attack on causation, not his ethical theory (Prolegomena, 4:260). Kant’s mature project was to limit human knowledge ‘in order to make room for faith’ (KrV, B xxx). He accepted from Hume that our knowledge is confined within the limits of possible sense experience, but he did not accept skeptical conclusions about causation or the soul. Reason is not confined, in his view, to the same limits as knowledge, and we are rationally required to hold beliefs about things as they are in themselves, not merely things as they appear to us. In particular, we are required to believe in God, freedom and immortality. These are three ‘postulates of practical reason’, required to make rational sense of the fact of moral obligation, the fact that we are under the moral law (the ‘categorical imperative’) that requires us to will the maxim of an action (the prescription of the action together with the reason for it) as a universal law (removing any self-preference) and to treat humanity in any person as always at the same time an end and never merely as a means (Groundwork, 4.421, 429). Kant thought that humans have to be able to believe that morality in this demanding form is consistent in the long run with happiness (both their own and that of the people they affect by their actions), if they are going to be able to persevere in the moral life without rational instability. He did not accept the three traditional theoretical arguments for the existence of God (though he was sympathetic to a modest version of the teleological argument). But the practical argument was decisive for him, though he held that it was possible to be morally good without being a theist, despite such a position being rationally unstable.
伊曼纽尔·康德（Immanuel Kant，1724-1804 年）是德国启蒙运动中最重要的人物，但他的计划在许多方面与同时代的法国人不同。他在一个虔诚的路德会家庭中长大，他的系统保留了许多特征，例如克鲁修斯。但他也通过沃尔夫欠了莱布尼茨的债。此外，通过阅读休谟，他“从教条主义的沉睡中醒来”，尽管康德在这里指的是休谟对因果关系的攻击，而不是他的伦理学理论（Prolegomena，4：260）。康德的成熟计划是限制人类的知识，“以便为信仰腾出空间”（KrV，B xxx）。他从休谟那里接受了我们的知识被限制在可能的感官经验的范围内，但他不接受关于因果关系或灵魂的怀疑结论。在他看来，理性并不局限于与知识相同的限制，我们理性地被要求对事物本身持有信念，而不仅仅是它们在我们看来的事物。特别是，我们被要求相信上帝、自由和不朽。这是三个“实践理性的假设”，需要理性地理解道德义务的事实，即我们处于道德法则（“绝对命令”）之下，道德法则要求我们将行动的格言（行动的规定及其原因）视为普遍法则（消除任何自我偏好），并始终同时将任何人的人性视为目的，而不是永远仅仅作为一种手段（Groundwork，4.421,429）。康德认为，如果人类能够在道德生活中坚持不懈而没有理性的不稳定，那么他们就必须能够相信，从长远来看，这种苛刻形式的道德与幸福（包括他们自己的幸福以及他们的行为所影响的人们的幸福）是一致的。他不接受关于上帝存在的三个传统理论论证（尽管他对目的论论证的温和版本表示同情）。但实际的论点对他来说是决定性的，尽管他认为，尽管这种立场在理性上是不稳定的，但即使不是有神论者，也可以在道德上是好的。

In Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason he undertook the project of using moral language in order to translate the four main themes of Biblical revelation (accessible only to particular people at particular times) into the revelation to Reason (accessible to all people at all times). This does not mean that he intended to reduce Biblical faith to morality, though some scholars have taken him this way. The translated versions of Creation, Fall, Redemption and Second Coming are as follows (see Hare 1996): Humans have an initial predisposition to the good, which is essential to them, but is overlaid with a propensity to evil, which is not essential to them. Since they are born under ‘the Evil Maxim’ that subordinates duty to happiness, they are unable by their own devices to reverse this ranking, and require ‘an effect of grace’ (Religion, 6.53). Providence ushers in progress (though not continuous) towards an ‘ethical commonwealth’ in which we together make the moral law our own law, by appropriating it as authoritative for our own lives (this is what Kant means by ‘autonomy’) (Religion, 6.98–99; Groundwork, 4.433–34).
在《纯粹理性边界内的宗教》一书中，他开展了使用道德语言的项目，以便将《圣经》启示的四个主要主题（只有特定时间的特定人才能接触到）转化为理性的启示（所有人在任何时候都能接触到）。这并不意味着他打算将《圣经》的信仰简化为道德，尽管一些学者已经把他带到了这个方向。《创造、堕落、救赎和第二次来临》的翻译版本如下（见Hare 1996）：人类最初倾向于向善，这对他们来说是必不可少的，但与邪恶的倾向相覆盖，这对他们来说并不是必不可少的。由于他们出生在“邪恶的格言”下，这种格言将责任置于幸福之下，他们无法通过自己的手段来扭转这一排名，并且需要“恩典的效果”（宗教，6.53）。普罗维登斯（Providence）引领了迈向“道德共同体”的进展（尽管不是连续的），在这个共同体中，我们共同使道德法则成为我们自己的法律，将其作为我们自己生活的权威（这就是康德所说的“自治”的意思）（宗教，6.98-99;基础工作，4.433-34）。

A whole succession of Kant’s followers tried to ‘go beyond’ Kant by showing that there was finally no need to make the separation between our knowledge and the thing-in-itself beyond our knowledge. One key step in departing from the surviving influence in Kant of Lutheran pietism was taken by Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), who identified (as Kant did not) the will of the individual with the infinite Ego which is ordering the universe morally. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) accomplished a somewhat similar end by proposing that we should make the truth of ideas relative to their original historical context against the background of a history that is progressing towards a final stage of ‘absolute knowledge’, in which Spirit (in German Geist, which means also ‘mind’) understands that reality is its own creation and there is no ‘beyond’ for it to know. Hegel is giving a philosophical account of the Biblical notion of all things returning to God, ‘so that God may be all in all.’ (I Cor. 15:28) In this world-history, Hegel located the Reformation as ‘the all-enlightening sun’ of the bright day that is our modern time (The Philosophy of History, 412). He thought that Geist moves immanently through human history, and that the various stages of knowledge are also stages of freedom, each stage producing first its own internal contradiction, and then a radical transition into a new stage. The stage of absolute freedom will be one in which all members freely by reason endorse the organic community and the concrete institutions in which they actually live (Phenomenology, BB, VI, B, III).
康德的一连串追随者试图通过表明最终没有必要将我们的知识和事物本身之间的分离超越我们的知识来“超越”康德。约翰·戈特利布·费希特（Johann Gottlieb Fichte，1762-1814）在摆脱路德宗虔诚主义在康德中幸存的影响的一个关键步骤，他将个人的意志与无限的自我联系起来，这种自我在道德上对宇宙进行排序。乔治·威廉·弗里德里希·黑格尔（Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel，1770-1831）在某种程度上达到了类似的目的，他提出，我们应该在历史的背景下，相对于它们的原始历史背景来看待思想的真理，在这个历史背景下，精神（在德语Geist中，也意味着“心灵”）明白现实是它自己的创造物，没有“超越”供它知道。黑格尔对《圣经》中万物回归上帝的概念进行了哲学性的解释，“这样上帝就可以成为万有的。（哥林多前书 15：28）在《世界史》中，黑格尔将宗教改革定位为我们现代光明白昼的“全能的太阳”（《历史哲学》，412）。他认为，盖斯特在人类历史中有着内在的运动，知识的各个阶段也是自由的阶段，每个阶段首先产生自己的内在矛盾，然后彻底过渡到一个新阶段。绝对自由的阶段将是所有成员通过理性自由地认可有机社区和他们实际生活的具体机构的阶段（现象学，BB，VI，B，III）。

One of Hegel’s opponents was Arthur Schopenhauer (1799–1860), the philosopher of pessimism. Schopenhauer thought that Hegel had strayed from the Kantian truth that there is a thing-in-itself beyond appearance, and that the Will is such a thing. He differed from Kant, however, in seeing the Will as the source of all our endless suffering, a blind striving power without ultimate purpose or design (The World as Will and Representation, §56 p. 310 and §57 p. 311). It is, moreover, one universal Will that underlies the wills of all separate individuals. The intellect and its ideas are simply the Will’s servant. On this view, there is no happiness for us, and our only consolation is a (quasi-Buddhist) release from the Will to the limited extent we can attain it, especially through aesthetic enjoyment.
黑格尔的反对者之一是悲观主义哲学家亚瑟·叔本华（Arthur Schopenhauer，1799-1860）。叔本华认为黑格尔已经偏离了康德的真理，即在表象之外存在着一个自身存在的东西，而意志就是这样的东西。然而，他与康德的不同之处在于，他将意志视为我们所有无尽痛苦的根源，一种没有最终目的或设计的盲目追求力量（The World as Will and Representation， §56， p. 310 and §57， p. 311）。此外，它是一种普遍的意志，是所有独立个体的意志的基础。智力及其思想只是意志的仆人。根据这种观点，我们没有幸福，我们唯一的安慰是在我们可以达到的有限程度上从意志中释放出来，特别是通过审美享受。

Hegel’s followers split into what are sometimes called ‘Right Hegelians’ and ‘Left Hegelians’ (or ‘Young Hegelians’). Right Hegelians promoted the generally positive view of the Prussian state that Hegel expressed in the Philosophy of Right. Left Hegelians rejected it, and with it the Protestant Christianity which they saw as its vehicle. In this way Hegel’s peculiar way of promoting Christianity ended up causing its vehement rejection by thinkers who shared many of his social ideals. David Friedrich Strauss (1808–74) wrote The Life of Jesus Critically Examined, launching the historical-critical method of Biblical scholarship with the suggestion that much of the Biblical account is myth or ‘unconscious invention’ that needs to be separated out from the historical account. Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach (1804–72) wrote The Essence of Christianity in which he pictured all religion as the means by which ‘man projects his being into objectivity, and then again makes himself an object to this projected image of himself’ (The Essence of Christianity, 30). Feuerbach thought religion resulted from humanity’s alienation from itself, and philosophy needed to destroy the religious illusion so that we could learn to love humankind and not divert this love onto an imaginary object. Karl Marx (1818–83) followed Feuerbach in this diagnosis of religion, but he was interested primarily in social and political relations rather than psychology. He became suspicious of theory (for example Hegel’s), on the grounds that theory is itself a symptom of the power structures in the societies that produce it. “Theory,” Marx writes, “is realized in a people only in so far as it is a realization of the people’s needs” (“Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” Early Writings, 252). And ‘ideologies’ and ‘religion,’ he believes, arise from “conditions that require [these] illusions” (Ibid., 244). Marx returned to Hegel’s thoughts about work revealing to the worker his value through what the worker produces, but Marx argues that under capitalism the worker was alienated from this product because other people owned both the product and the means of producing it. Marx urged that the only way to prevent this was to destroy the institution of private property (“Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,” Early Writings, 348). Thus he believed, like Hegel, in progress through history towards freedom, but he thought it would take Communist revolution to bring this about.
黑格尔的追随者分裂为有时被称为“右黑格尔派”和“左派黑格尔派”（或“青年黑格尔派”）。右派黑格尔主义者提倡黑格尔在《权利哲学》中表达的对普鲁士国家的普遍积极看法。左派黑格尔主义者拒绝了它，随之而来的是他们认为是其载体的新教基督教。这样一来，黑格尔推广基督教的独特方式最终引起了与他的许多社会理想相同的思想家的强烈反对。大卫·弗里德里希·施特劳斯（David Friedrich Strauss，1808-74 年）写了《耶稣的生平批判性审视》，开创了圣经学术的历史批判方法，认为圣经的大部分记载是神话或“无意识的发明”，需要从历史记载中分离出来。路德维希·安德烈亚斯·费尔巴哈（Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach，1804-72）在《基督教的本质》（The Essence of Christianity）一书中，他将所有宗教描绘成“人将自己的存在投射到客观性中，然后再次使自己成为这种投射的自我形象的对象”（《基督教的本质》，30）。费尔巴哈认为宗教产生于人类与自身的疏离，哲学需要摧毁宗教幻觉，这样我们才能学会爱人类，而不是将这种爱转移到一个想象的物体上。卡尔·马克思（Karl Marx，1818-83 年）追随费尔巴哈对宗教的诊断，但他主要对社会和政治关系感兴趣，而不是心理学。他开始对理论（例如黑格尔的理论）产生怀疑，理由是理论本身就是产生理论的社会中权力结构的症状。马克思写道，“理论只有在实现人民需要的时候，才能在一个民族中实现”（《黑格尔权利哲学批判》，《早期著作》，第252页）。他认为，“意识形态”和“宗教”源于“需要[这些]幻想的条件”（同上，第244页）。马克思回到了黑格尔的思想，即工作通过工人生产的产品向工人揭示了他的价值，但马克思认为，在资本主义制度下，工人与这种产品疏远了，因为其他人既拥有产品又拥有生产它的手段。马克思认为，防止这种情况的唯一方法就是摧毁私有财产制度（“经济和哲学手稿”，早期著作，348）。因此，他像黑格尔一样，相信在历史上走向自由是进步的，但他认为只有共产主义革命才能实现这一点。

A very different response to Hegel (and Kant) is found in the work of Søren Kierkegaard (1813–55), a religious thinker who started, like Hegel and Kant, from Lutheranism. Kierkegaard mocked Hegel constantly for presuming to understand the whole system in which human history is embedded, while still being located in a particular small part of it. On the other hand, he used Hegelian categories of thought himself, especially in his idea of the aesthetic life, the ethical life and the religious life as stages through which human beings develop by means of first internal contradiction and then radical transition. Kierkegaard’s relation with Kant was problematic as well. In Either/Or he caricatured Kant’s ethical thought (as well as Hegel’s) in the person of Judge William, who is stuck within the ethical life and has not been able to reach the life of faith. On the other hand, his own description of the religious life is full of echoes of Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Kierkegaard wrote most of his work pseudonymously, taking on the names of characters who lived the lives he describes. In the aesthetic life the goal is to keep at bay the boredom that is constantly threatening, and this requires enough distance from one’s projects that one is not stuck with them but can flit from engagement to engagement without pain (Either/Or, II. 77). This life deconstructs, because it requires (in order to sustain interest) the very commitment that it also rejects. The transition is accomplished by making a choice for one’s life as a whole from a position that is not attached to any particular project, a radical choice that requires admitting the aesthetic life has been a failure. In this choice one discovers freedom, and thus the ethical life (Either/Or, II. 188). But this life too deconstructs, because it sets up the goal of living by a demand, the moral law, that is higher than we can live by our own human devices. Kierkegaard thought we have to realize that God is (contrary to Fichte) ‘another’ (Sickness unto Death xi 128), with whom we have to relate, and whose assistance is necessary even for the kind of repentance that is the transition into the religious life. He also suggested that within the religious life, there is a ‘repetition’ of the aesthetic life and the ethical life, though in a transformed version.
在索伦·克尔凯郭尔（Søren Kierkegaard，1813-55 年）的著作中发现了对黑格尔（和康德）截然不同的回应，他是一位宗教思想家，与黑格尔和康德一样，都是从路德教开始的。克尔凯郭尔不断嘲笑黑格尔，因为他假定理解了人类历史所嵌入的整个体系，同时仍然处于其中的一小部分。另一方面，他本人也运用了黑格尔的思想范畴，特别是在他的审美生活、伦理生活和宗教生活的思想中，他把审美生活、伦理生活和宗教生活看作是人类先是内在矛盾，然后是根本过渡而发展的阶段。克尔凯郭尔与康德的关系也存在问题。在《非此即彼》中，他以威廉法官的身份讽刺了康德的伦理思想（以及黑格尔的伦理思想），威廉法官被困在伦理生活中，无法达到信仰的生活。另一方面，他自己对宗教生活的描述充满了康德的宗教在纯粹理性边界内的回声。克尔凯郭尔的大部分作品都是以假名写成的，采用了过着他所描述的生活的人物的名字。在审美生活中，目标是保持不断威胁的无聊，这需要与一个人的项目保持足够的距离，这样一个人就不会被它们困住，而是可以在没有痛苦的情况下从一个参与到另一个参与（非此即彼，II.77）。这种生活解构了，因为它需要（为了维持兴趣）它也拒绝的承诺。这种转变是通过从一个不依附于任何特定项目的立场上对自己的整个生活做出选择来实现的，这是一个激进的选择，需要承认审美生活是失败的。在这种选择中，人们发现了自由，从而发现了道德生活（非此即彼，II.188）。但是这种生活也解构了，因为它设定了一个目标，即按照一种要求，即道德法则生活，这种要求比我们自己通过人类的手段所能生活要高。克尔凯郭尔认为我们必须认识到，上帝（与费希特相反）是“另一个”（《至死的疾病》习128），我们必须与他建立联系，即使对于过渡到宗教生活的那种忏悔，他的帮助也是必要的。他还认为，在宗教生活中，审美生活和道德生活存在着“重复”，尽管是经过改造的。

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) was the son of a Lutheran pastor in Prussia. He was trained as a classical philologist, and his first book, The Birth of Tragedy, was an account of the origin and death of ancient Greek tragedy. Nietzsche was deeply influenced by Schopenhauer, especially his view of the will (which Nietzsche called ‘the Will to Power’), and was first attracted and then repelled by Wagner, who was also one of Schopenhauer’s disciples. The breaking point seems to have been Wagner’s Parsifal. Nietzsche by this time was opposed to orthodox Christianity and was promoting Ancient Greece instead, and he thought that Wagner was betraying his integrity by using an ‘anti-Greek’ Christian story for the opera. Nietzsche saw clearly the intimate link between Christianity and the ethical theories of his predecessors in Europe, especially Kant. In On the Genealogy of Morals, he says, ‘The advent of the Christian God, as the maximum god attained so far, was therefore accompanied by the maximum feeling of guilty indebtedness on earth. Presuming we have gradually entered upon the reverse course, there is no small probability that with the irresistible decline of faith in the Christian God, there is now also a considerable decline in mankind’s feeling of guilt’ (On the Genealogy of Morals, 90–1). This is the ‘death of God’ which Nietzsche announced, and which he predicted would also be the end of Kantian ethics (The Gay Science, §108, 125, 343). It is harder to know what Nietzsche was for, than what he was against. This is partly an inheritance from Schopenhauer, who thought any system of constructive ethical thought a delusion. But Nietzsche clearly admired the Ancient Greeks, and thought we would be better off with a ‘master’ morality like theirs, rather than a ‘slave’ morality like Christianity. ‘Mastery over himself also necessarily gives him mastery over circumstances, over nature, and over all more short-willed and unreliable creatures’ (Genealogy, 59-60). By this last clause, he meant mastery over other people, and the model of this mastery is the ‘overman’ who is free of the resentment by the weak of the strong that Nietzsche thought lay at the basis of Christian ethics.
弗里德里希·尼采（Friedrich Nietzsche，1844-1900 年）是普鲁士一位路德会牧师的儿子。他接受过古典语言学家的培训，他的第一本书《悲剧的诞生》讲述了古希腊悲剧的起源和死亡。尼采深受叔本华的影响，尤其是他的意志观（尼采称之为“权力意志”），先是被瓦格纳吸引，然后被瓦格纳排斥，瓦格纳也是叔本华的弟子之一。转折点似乎是瓦格纳的帕西法尔。此时的尼采反对正统基督教，转而宣传古希腊，他认为瓦格纳在歌剧中使用“反希腊”的基督教故事背叛了他的正直。尼采清楚地看到了基督教与他的欧洲前辈，特别是康德的伦理理论之间的密切联系。在《论道德的谱系》中，他说：“基督教的上帝，作为迄今为止所达到的最高神的出现，因此伴随着地球上最大的罪恶感。假设我们已经逐渐走上了相反的道路，那么随着对基督教上帝的信仰的不可抗拒的下降，现在人类的罪恶感也大大下降了“（《道德的谱系》，90-1）。这就是尼采宣布的“上帝的死亡”，他预言这也将是康德伦理学的终结（《同性恋科学》，§108,125,343）。知道尼采是为了什么，比知道他反对什么更难。这在一定程度上是从叔本华那里继承下来的，叔本华认为任何建设性的伦理思想体系都是错觉。但尼采显然钦佩古希腊人，并认为我们最好有像他们那样的“主人”道德，而不是像基督教那样的“奴隶”道德。“对自己的掌控也必然使他对环境、对自然以及所有意志更短暂、更不可靠的生物的掌控”（家谱，59-60）。他所说的最后一句话，是指对他人的掌握，而这种掌握的模式是“超人”，他摆脱了尼采认为是基督教伦理基础的弱者对强者的怨恨。

To return to Britain, Hume had a number of successors who accepted the view (which Hume took from Hutcheson) that our fundamental obligation is to work for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Four are especially significant. William Paley (1743–1805) thought he could demonstrate that morality derived from the will of God and required promoting the happiness of all, that happiness was the sum of pleasures, and that we need to believe that God is the final granter of happiness if we are to sustain motivation to do what we know we ought to do (The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, II. 4). Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) rejected this theological context. His grounds were radically empiricist, that the only ‘real’ entities are publicly observable, and so do not include God (or, for that matter, right or time or relations or qualities). He thought he could provide a scientific calculus of pleasures, where the unit that stays constant is the minimum state of sensibility that can be distinguished from indifference. He thought we could then separate different ‘dimensions’ in which these units vary, such as intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity (how soon the pleasures will come), fecundity (how many other pleasures this pleasure will produce) and purity. Discarding the theological context made moral motivation problematic, for why should we expect (without God) more units of pleasure for ourselves by contributing to the greater pleasure of others? Bentham’s solution was to hope that law and social custom could provide individuals with adequate motives through the threat of social sanctions, and that what he called ‘deontology’ (which is personal or private morality) could mobilize hidden or long-range interests that were already present but obscure.
回到英国后，休谟有许多继任者接受了这样一种观点（休谟从哈奇森那里学到了这种观点），即我们的基本义务是为大多数人的最大幸福而工作。有四个因素尤为重要。威廉·佩利（William Paley，1743-1805）认为他可以证明道德源于上帝的意志，需要促进所有人的幸福，幸福是快乐的总和，我们需要相信上帝是幸福的最终授予者，如果我们要保持动力去做我们知道我们应该做的事情（道德和政治哲学原理， 二. 4）.杰里米·边沁（Jeremy Bentham，1748-1832）拒绝了这种神学背景。他的理由是激进的经验主义，认为唯一的“真实”实体是可以公开观察的，因此不包括上帝（或者，就此而言，权利或时间或关系或品质）。他认为他可以提供一个关于快乐的科学演算，其中保持不变的单位是可以与冷漠区分开来的最低感性状态。他认为我们可以分离出这些单位变化的不同“维度”，例如强度、持续时间、确定性、亲和性（快乐将很快到来）、繁殖力（这种快乐将产生多少其他快乐）和纯洁度。抛弃神学背景使道德动机成为问题，因为我们为什么要期望（没有上帝）通过为他人带来更大的快乐来为自己提供更多的快乐呢？边沁的解决方案是希望法律和社会习俗可以通过社会制裁的威胁为个人提供充分的动机，而他所谓的“道义论”（即个人或私人道德）可以动员已经存在但模糊不清的隐藏或长期利益。

John Stuart Mill (1806–73) was raised on strict utilitarian principles by his father, a follower of Bentham. Unlike Bentham, however, Mill accepted that there are qualitative differences in pleasures simply as pleasures, and he thought that the higher pleasures were those of the intellect, the feelings and imagination, and the moral sentiments. He observed that those who have experienced both these and the lower pleasures, tend to prefer the former. At the age of twenty he had a collapse and a prolonged period of ‘melancholy’. He realized that his education had neglected the culture or cultivation of feelings, of which hope is a primary instance (Autobiography, 1. 84). In his Three Essays on Religion (published posthumously in 1874) he returned to the idea of hope, saying that ‘the indulgence of hope with regard to the government of the universe and the destiny of man after death, while we recognize as a clear truth that we have no ground for more than a hope, is legitimate and philosophically defensible’; without such hope, we are kept down by ‘the disastrous feeling of “not worth while”’ (Three Essays 249–50). Mill did not believe, however, that God was omnipotent, given all the evil in the world, and he insisted, like Kant, that we have to be God’s co-workers, not merely passive recipients of God’s assistance.
约翰·斯图亚特·穆勒（John Stuart Mill，1806-73 年）由他的父亲（边沁的追随者）按照严格的功利主义原则抚养长大。然而，与边沁不同的是，密尔承认，仅仅作为快乐，快乐之间存在着质的差异，他认为更高的快乐是智力、感情和想象力以及道德情操的快乐。他观察到，那些既经历过这些快乐又经历过较低层次快乐的人，往往更喜欢前者。二十岁时，他崩溃了，并长期处于“忧郁”状态。他意识到，他的教育忽视了感情的培养或培养，而希望是其中的一个主要例子（自传，1：84）。在他的《宗教三篇论文》（1874年死后出版）中，他回到了希望的概念，他说：“对宇宙的治理和人死后的命运的希望的放纵，虽然我们承认这是一个明确的真理，我们没有理由超过希望，但这是合法的，在哲学上是可以辩护的”;没有这样的希望，我们就会被“'不值得’的灾难性感觉”所压制“（《三篇诗集》249-50）。然而，密尔并不相信上帝是全能的，考虑到世界上所有的邪恶，他坚持认为，像康德一样，我们必须成为上帝的同事，而不仅仅是上帝援助的被动接受者。

Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) in Methods of Ethics distinguished three methods: Intuitionism (which is, roughly, the common sense morality that some things, like deliberate ingratitude to a benefactor, are self-evidently wrong in themselves independently of their consequences), Egoistic Hedonism (the view that self-evidently an individual ought to aim at a maximum balance of happiness for herself, where this is understood as the greatest balance of pleasure over pain), and Utilitarianism or Universalistic Hedonism, (the view that self-evidently she ought to aim at the maximum balance of happiness for all sentient beings present and future, whatever the cost to herself). Of these three, he rejected the first, on the grounds that no concrete ethical principles are self-evident, and that when they conflict (as they do) we have to take consequences into account in order to decide how to act. But Sidgwick found the relation between the other two methods much more problematic. Each principle separately seemed to him self-evident, but when taken together they seems to be mutually inconsistent. He considered two solutions, psychological and metaphysical. The psychological solution was to bring in the pleasures and pains of sympathy, so that if we do good to all we end up (because of these pleasures) making ourselves happiest. Sidgwick rejected this on the basis that sympathy is inevitably limited in its range, and we feel it most towards those closest to us, so that even if we include sympathetic pleasures and pains under Egoism, it will tend to increase the divergence between Egoistic and Utilitarian conduct, rather than bring them closer together. The metaphysical solution was to bring in a god who desires the greatest total good of all living things, and who will reward and punish in accordance with this desire. Sidgwick recognized this as a return to the utilitarianism of Paley (Compare Methods of Ethics, II. 1, 2 and IV. 4, 5). He thought this solution was both necessary and sufficient to remove the contradiction in ethics. But this was only a reason to accept it, if in general it is reasonable to accept certain principles (such as the Uniformity of Nature) which are not self-evident and which cannot be proved, but which bring order and coherence into a central part of our thought. Sidgwick did not commit himself to an answer to this, one way or the other.
亨利·西奇威克（Henry Sidgwick，1838-1900）在《伦理学方法》中区分了三种方法：直觉主义（粗略地说，这是一种常识性的道德观念，即有些事情，例如故意对恩人的忘恩负义，本身就不言而喻地是错误的，而与它们的后果无关），利己主义享乐主义（不言而喻的观点，即个人应该为自己争取最大的幸福平衡， 这被理解为快乐与痛苦的最大平衡），以及功利主义或普遍主义的享乐主义，（不言而喻的观点是，无论她自己付出什么代价，她都应该以现在和未来所有有情众生的最大幸福平衡为目标）。在这三者中，他拒绝了第一种，理由是没有具体的道德原则是不言而喻的，而且当它们发生冲突时（正如它们确实如此），我们必须考虑后果，以便决定如何行动。但西奇威克发现其他两种方法之间的关系问题要大得多。在他看来，每个原则都是不言而喻的，但当它们放在一起时，它们似乎是相互矛盾的。他考虑了两种解决方案，心理学和形而上学。心理上的解決方案是帶來同情的快樂和痛苦，因此，如果我們對所有人做好事，我們最終會（因為這些快樂）使自己最快樂。西奇威克拒绝了这一点，理由是同情的范围不可避免地是有限的，而我们对最亲近的人最有同情心，因此，即使我们在利己主义下包括同情的快乐和痛苦，它也会倾向于增加利己主义和功利主义行为之间的分歧，而不是使它们更接近。形而上学的解决方案是引入一个上帝，他渴望所有生物中最大的全部利益，并将根据这种愿望进行奖励和惩罚。西奇威克认为这是对佩利功利主义的回归（《比较伦理学方法》，II.1,2和IV.4,5）。他认为这种解决方案对于消除道德上的矛盾既是必要的，也是充分的。但是，这只是接受它的理由，如果总的来说，接受某些原则（例如自然的统一性）是合理的，这些原则不是不言自明的，无法证明的，但是，这些原则将秩序和连贯性带入了我们思想的中心部分。西奇威克并没有承诺以一种或另一种方式回答这个问题。

5. Contemporary Philosophy 5. 当代哲学

In the twentieth century professional philosophy in the West divided up into two streams, sometimes called ‘Analytic’ and ‘Continental’, and there were periods during which the two schools lost contact with each other. Towards the end of the century, however, there were more philosophers who could speak the languages of both traditions. The beginning of the analytic school is sometimes located with the rejection of a neo-Hegelian idealism by G.E. Moore (1873-1958). One way to characterize the two schools is that the Continental school continued to read and be influenced by Hegel, and the Analytic school (with some exceptions) did not. Another way to make the distinction is geographical; the analytic school is located primarily in Britain, Scandinavia and N. America, and the continental school in the rest of Europe, in Latin America and in certain schools in N. America.
在二十世纪，西方的专业哲学分为两个流派，有时被称为“分析”和“大陆”，在此期间，这两个流派彼此失去了联系。然而，到了本世纪末，有更多的哲学家会说两种传统的语言。分析学派的开端有时位于G.E.摩尔（1873-1958）对新黑格尔唯心主义的拒绝。对这两个学派进行描述的一种方式是，大陆学派继续阅读黑格尔并受到黑格尔的影响，而分析学派（除了一些例外）则没有。区分的另一种方法是地理;分析学校主要位于英国、斯堪的纳维亚半岛和北美，大陆学校位于欧洲其他地区、拉丁美洲和北美的某些学校。

We will start with some figures from the Continental school, and then move to the analytic (which is this writer’s own). Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) was initially trained as a theologian, and wrote his dissertation on what he took to be a work of Duns Scotus. He took an appointment under Edmund Husserl (1855–1938) at Freiburg, and was then appointed to succeed him in his chair. Husserl’s program of ‘phenomenology’ was to recover a sense of certainty about the world by studying in exhaustive detail the cognitive structure of appearance. Heidegger departed from Husserl in approaching Being through a focus on ‘Human Being’ (in German Dasein) concerned above all for its fate in an alien world, or as ‘anxiety’ (Angst) towards death (see Being and Time I. 6). In this sense he is the first existentialist, though he did not use the term. Heidegger emphasized that we are ‘thrown’ into a world that is not ‘home’, and we have a radical choice about what possibilities for ourselves we will make actual. Heidegger drew here from Kierkegaard, and he is also similar in describing the danger of falling back into mere conventionality, what Heidegger calls ‘the They’ (das Man). On the other hand he is unlike Kierkegaard in thinking of traditional Christianity as just one more convention making authentic existence more difficult. In Heidegger, as in Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, it is hard to find a positive or constructive ethics. Heidegger’s position is somewhat compromised, moreover, by his initial embrace of the Nazi party. In his later work he moved increasingly towards a kind of quasi-religious mysticism. His Romantic hatred of the modern world and his distrust of system-building led to the espousal of either silence or poetry as the best way to be open to the ‘something’ (sometimes he says ‘the earth’) which reveals itself only as ‘self-secluding’ or hiding itself away from our various conceptualizations. He held the hope that through poetry, and in particular the poetry of Hölderlin, we might be able to still sense something of the unknown god who appears ‘as the one who remains unknown,’ who is quite different from the object of theology or piety, but who can bring us back to the Being we have long lost sight of (Poetry, Language, Thought, 222).
我们将从大陆学派的一些数字开始，然后转向分析（这是笔者自己的）。马丁·海德格尔（Martin Heidegger，1889-1976 年）最初接受过神学家的培训，并撰写了他认为是邓斯·司各图斯 （Duns Scotus） 作品的论文。他在弗莱堡接受了埃德蒙·胡塞尔（Edmund Husserl，1855-1938）的任命，然后被任命接替他的职位。胡塞尔的“现象学”计划是通过详尽地研究表象的认知结构来恢复对世界的确定性。海德格尔与胡塞尔不同，通过关注“人”（德语Dasein）来接近存在，首先关注的是“人”在外来世界中的命运，或者是对死亡的“焦虑”（Angst）（见“存在与时间I.6”）。从这个意义上说，他是第一个存在主义者，尽管他没有使用这个词。海德格尔强调，我们被“扔进”了一个不是“家”的世界，我们有一个激进的选择，即我们将为自己创造什么样的可能性。海德格尔从克尔凯郭尔那里汲取灵感，他在描述陷入纯粹的传统性的危险方面也相似，海德格尔称之为“他们”（das Man）。另一方面，他与克尔凯郭尔不同，他认为传统基督教只是一种使真实存在更加困难的习俗。在海德格尔那里，就像在尼采和叔本华那里一样，很难找到一种积极的或建设性的伦理学。此外，海德格尔的立场在某种程度上由于他最初对纳粹党的拥护而受到损害。在他后来的作品中，他越来越倾向于一种准宗教的神秘主义。他对现代世界的浪漫主义憎恨和对制度建设的不信任，导致他支持沉默或诗歌，认为这是向“某物”（有时他说“地球”）敞开心扉的最佳方式，而“某物”只是“自我隔离”或隐藏在我们各种概念化之外。他希望通过诗歌，特别是荷尔德林的诗歌，我们可能仍然能够感觉到未知的神的某些东西，他“作为未知的那个人”出现，他与神学或虔诚的对象完全不同，但他可以将我们带回我们长期以来忽视的存在（诗歌， 语言，思想，222）。

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-80) did use the label ‘existentialist’, and said that ‘Existentialism is nothing else than an attempt to draw all the consequences of a coherent atheist position’ (Existentialism and Human Emotions, 51). He denied (like Scotus) that the moral law could be deduced from human nature, but this was because (unlike Scotus) he thought that we give ourselves our own essences by the choices we make. His slogan was, ‘Existence precedes essence’ (Ibid., 13). ‘Essence’ is here the defining property of a thing, and Sartre gave the example of a paper cutter, which is given its definition by the artisan who makes it. Sartre said that when people believed God made human beings, they could believe humans had a God-given essence; but now that we do not believe this, we have realized that humans give themselves their own essences (‘First of all, man exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and, only afterwards, defines himself.’ Ibid., 15). On this view there are no outside commands to appeal to for legitimation, and we are condemned to our own freedom. Sartre thought of human beings as trying to be God (on a Hegelian account of what God is), even though there is no God. This is an inevitably fruitless undertaking, which he called ‘anguish’. Moreover, we inevitably desire to choose not just for ourselves, but for the world. We want, like God, to create humankind in our own image, ‘If I want to marry, to have children, even if this marriage depends solely on my own circumstances or passion or wish, I am involving all humanity in monogamy and not merely myself. Therefore, I am responsible for myself and for everyone else. I am creating a certain image of man of my own choosing. In choosing myself, I choose man’ (Ibid., 18). To recognize that this project does not make sense is required by honesty, and to hide this from ourselves is ‘bad faith’. One form of bad faith is to pretend that there is a God who is giving us our tasks. Another is to pretend that there is a ‘human nature’ that is doing the same thing. To live authentically is to realize both that we create these tasks for ourselves, and that they are futile.
让-保罗·萨特（Jean-Paul Sartre，1905-80）确实使用了“存在主义者”的标签，并说“存在主义只不过是试图得出连贯的无神论立场的所有后果”（《存在主义与人类情感》，51）。他否认（像司各特一样）道德法则可以从人性中推导出来，但这是因为（与司各特不同）他认为我们通过所做的选择赋予了自己自己本质。他的口号是，“存在先于本质”（同上，13）。在这里，“本质”是事物的定义属性，萨特举了切纸刀的例子，它的定义是由制造它的工匠给出的。萨特说，当人们相信上帝创造了人类时，他们就可以相信人类具有上帝赋予的本质;但现在我们不相信这一点，我们已经意识到人类赋予自己自己本质（“首先，人存在，出现，出现在现场，然后才定义自己。 同上，15）。根据这种观点，没有外部命令可以诉诸合法化，我们被谴责为自己的自由。萨特认为人类试图成为上帝（根据黑格尔对上帝是什么的解释），即使没有上帝。这是一项不可避免的徒劳无功的工作，他称之为“痛苦”。此外，我们不可避免地渴望不仅为自己选择，而且为世界选择。我们希望像上帝一样，按照我们自己的形象创造人类，“如果我想结婚，生孩子，即使这种婚姻完全取决于我自己的环境或激情或愿望，我也是在让全人类参与一夫一妻制，而不仅仅是我自己。因此，我对自己和其他人负责。我正在创造我自己选择的某种人的形象。在选择我自己时，我选择了人“（同上，18）。认识到这个项目没有意义是诚实的要求，而向我们隐瞒这一点是“恶意”。一种形式的恶意是假装有一位上帝在给我们任务。另一种是假装有一种“人性”在做同样的事情。要真实地生活，就要意识到我们为自己创造了这些任务，而且它们是徒劳的。

The twentieth century also saw, within Roman Catholicism, forms of Christian Existentialism and new adaptations of the system of Thomas Aquinas. Gabriel Marcel (1889–1973), like Heidegger, was concerned with the nature of Being as it appears to human being, but he tried to show that there are experiences of love, joy, hope and faith which, as understood from within, give us reason to believe in an inexhaustible Presence, which is God. Jacques Maritain (1882–1973) developed a form of Thomism that retained the natural law, but regarded ethical judgment as not purely cognitive but guided by pre-conceptual affective inclinations. He gave more place to history than traditional Thomism did, allowing for development in the human knowledge of natural law, and he defended democracy as the appropriate way for human persons to attain freedom and dignity. The notion of the value of the person and the capacities given to persons by their creator was at the center of the ‘personalism’ of Pope John Paul II’s The Acting Person (1979), influenced by Max Scheler (1874–1928).
二十世纪，在罗马天主教内部，还出现了基督教存在主义的形式和对托马斯·阿奎那体系的新改编。加布里埃尔·马塞尔（Gabriel Marcel，1889-1973）和海德格尔一样，关注的是人类所看到的存在的本质，但他试图表明，存在着爱、喜悦、希望和信仰的体验，正如从内部理解的那样，让我们有理由相信一个取之不尽、用之不竭的存在，那就是上帝。雅克·马里坦（Jacques Maritain，1882-1973）发展了一种托马斯主义形式，它保留了自然法则，但认为道德判断不是纯粹的认知，而是由前概念的情感倾向指导。他比传统的托马斯主义更多地重视历史，允许人类对自然法则的知识进行发展，他捍卫民主是人类获得自由和尊严的适当途径。人的价值和创造者赋予人的能力的概念是教皇约翰·保罗二世（1979）的《表演者》（1979）的“个人主义”的核心，受到马克斯·舍勒（Max Scheler，1874-1928）的影响。

Natural law theory has been taken up and modified more recently by three philosophers who write in a style closer to the analytic tradition, John Finnis, Alastair MacIntyre and Jean Porter. Finnis holds that our knowledge of the fundamental moral truths is self-evident, and so is not deduced from human nature. His Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980) was a landmark in integrating the modern vocabulary and grammar of rights into the tradition of Natural Law. MacIntyre, who has been on a long journey back from Marxism to Thomism, holds that we can know what kind of life we ought to live on the basis of knowing our natural end, which he now identifies in theological terms. In After Virtue (1981) he is still influenced by a Hegelian historicism, and holds that the only way to settle rival knowledge claims is to see how successfully each can account for the shape taken by its rivals. A different account of natural law is found in Porter, who in Nature as Reason (2005) retains the view that our final motivation is our own happiness and perfection, but rejects the view that we can deduce absolute action-guiding moral principles from human nature. Another contemporary school is virtue ethics, for example Philippa Foot in Natural Goodness (2001) and Rosalind Hursthouse in On Virtue Ethics (1999). They are not Roman Catholic but they are strongly influenced by Aristotle and Aquinas. They emphasize the notion of virtue which belongs to human nature just as bees have stings. Hursthouse ends her book by saying that we have to hold onto the hope that we can live together, not at each other’s expense, a hope which she says used to be called belief in (God’s) Providence (On Virtue Ethics, 265). One final contribution to be mentioned here is Linda Zagzebski’s Divine Motivation Theory (2004) which proposes, as an alternative to divine command theory, that we can understand all moral normatively in terms of the notion of a good emotion, and that God’s emotions are the best exemplar. We will return to the rebirth of divine command theory at the end of this entry.
最近，三位哲学家以更接近分析传统的风格写作，他们采用并修改了自然法理论，他们分别是约翰·芬尼斯（John Finnis），阿拉斯泰尔·麦金太尔（Alastair MacIntyre）和让·波特（Jean Porter）。芬尼斯认为，我们对基本道德真理的认识是不言而喻的，因此不是从人性中推导出来的。他的《自然法与自然权利》（1980年）是将现代权利词汇和语法融入自然法传统的里程碑。麦金太尔从马克思主义回到托马斯主义，他坚持认为，我们可以在了解我们的自然目的的基础上知道我们应该过什么样的生活，他现在用神学术语来确定这一点。在《美德之后》（After Virtue，1981）中，他仍然受到黑格尔历史主义的影响，并认为解决相互竞争的知识主张的唯一方法是看每种知识主张如何成功地解释其竞争对手所采取的形式。波特对自然法则有不同的描述，他在《作为理性的自然》（Nature as Reason，2005）中保留了这样一种观点，即我们的最终动机是我们自己的幸福和完美，但拒绝从人性中推断出绝对的行动指导道德原则的观点。另一个当代学派是美德伦理学，例如Philippa Foot在Nature Goodness（2001）和Rosalind Hursthouse在On Virtue Ethics（1999）中。他们不是罗马天主教徒，但他们受到亚里士多德和阿奎那的强烈影响。他们强调美德的概念，这种美德属于人性，就像蜜蜂会蜇人一样。赫斯特豪斯在她的书的结尾说，我们必须抱有希望，即我们可以共同生活，而不是以彼此为代价，她说这种希望过去被称为对（上帝的）天意的信仰（《论美德伦理学》，265）。这里要提到的最后一个贡献是琳达·扎格泽布斯基（Linda Zagzebski）的神圣动机理论（2004年），该理论提出，作为神圣命令理论的替代方案，我们可以从良好情感的概念的角度规范地理解所有道德，而上帝的情感是最好的例子。我们将在这篇文章的最后回到神圣命令理论的重生。

Michel Foucault (1926–84) followed Nietzsche in aspiring to uncover the ‘genealogy’ of various contemporary forms of thought and practice (he was concerned, for example, with our treatment of sexuality and mental illness), and how relations of power and domination have produced ‘discourses of truth’ (“Truth and Power,” Power, 131). In his later work he described four different aspects of the ‘practice of the self’: We select the desires, acts, and thoughts that we attend to morally, we recognize ourselves as morally bound by some particular ground, e.g., divine commands, or rationality, or human nature, we transform ourselves into ethical subjects by some set of techniques, e.g., meditation or mortification or consciousness-raising, and finally, we propose a ‘telos’ or goal, the way of life or mode of being that the subject is aiming at, e.g., self-mastery, tranquility or purification. Foucault criticized Christian conventions that tend to take morality as a juristic and often universal code of laws, and to ignore the creative practice of self-making. Even if Christian and post-Christian moralists turn their attention to self-expression, he thought they tend to focus on the confession of truth about oneself, a mode of expression which is historically linked to the church and the modern psycho-sciences. Foucault preferred stressing our freedom to form ourselves as ethical subjects, and develop ‘a new form of right’ and a ‘non-disciplinary form of power’ (“Disciplinary Power and Subjection,” Power, 242). He did not, however, tell us much more about what these new forms would be like.
米歇尔·福柯（Michel Foucault，1926-84）追随尼采，致力于揭示各种当代思想和实践形式的“谱系”（例如，他关注我们对性和精神疾病的处理），以及权力和统治的关系如何产生“真理话语”（“真理与权力”，鲍尔，131）。在他后来的作品中，他描述了“自我实践”的四个不同方面：我们选择我们道德上关注的欲望、行为和思想，我们认识到自己在道德上受到某些特定基础的束缚，例如，神圣的命令，或理性，或人性，我们通过某种技术将自己转变为道德主体， 例如，禅修、殉葬或提高意识，最后，我们提出了一个“telos”或目标，即主题所针对的生活方式或存在方式，例如，自我控制、宁静或净化。福柯批评了基督教的习俗，这些习俗倾向于将道德视为一种法律规范，而且往往是普遍的法典，而忽视了自我创造的创造性实践。即使基督教和后基督教的道德家将注意力转向自我表达，他认为他们倾向于关注对自己的真相的忏悔，这种表达方式在历史上与教会和现代心理科学有关。福柯更倾向于强调我们作为伦理主体塑造自己的自由，并发展“一种新的权利形式”和“非学科形式的权力”（“规训权力与服从”，权力，242）。然而，他没有告诉我们更多关于这些新形式会是什么样子的信息。

Jürgen Habermas (1929-) proposed a ‘communicative ethics’ that develops the Kantian element in Marxism (The Theory of Communicative Action, Vols. I and II). By analyzing the structure of communication (using speech-act theory developed in analytic philosophy) he lays out a procedure that will rationally justify norms, though he does not claim to know what norms a society will adopt by using this procedure. The two ideas behind this procedure are that norms are valid if they receive the consent of all the affected parties in unconstrained practical communication, and if the consequences of the general observance of the norms (in terms of how each person’s interests are affected) are acceptable to all. Habermas thinks he fulfills in this way Hegel’s aim of reconciling the individual and society, because the communication process extends individuals beyond their private perspectives in the process of reaching agreement. Religious convictions need to be left behind when entering the public square, on this scheme, because they are not communicable in the way the procedure requires. In recent work he has modified this position, by recognizing that certain religious forms require their adherents to speak in an explicitly religious way when advancing their prescriptions for public life, and it is discriminatory to try to prevent their doing so.
尤尔根·哈贝马斯（Jürgen Habermas，1929-）提出了一种“交际伦理学”，该伦理学发展了马克思主义中的康德元素（《交际行动理论》，Vols.I和II）。通过分析交流的结构（使用在分析哲学中发展起来的言语行为理论），他提出了一个程序，该程序将合理地证明规范的合理性，尽管他并不声称知道使用这个程序将采用什么规范。这一程序背后的两个想法是，如果规范在不受限制的实际沟通中得到所有受影响方的同意，并且如果普遍遵守规范的后果（就每个人的利益如何受到影响而言）是所有人都能接受的，那么规范就是有效的。哈贝马斯认为他以这种方式实现了黑格尔关于个人与社会的调和目的，因为在达成协议的过程中，交流过程超越了个人的私人视角。在这个计划中，当进入公共广场时，宗教信仰需要被抛在脑后，因为它们无法按照程序要求的方式进行交流。在最近的工作中，他改变了这一立场，认识到某些宗教形式要求其信徒在推进他们的公共生活处方时以明确的宗教方式说话，而试图阻止他们这样做是歧视性的。

Within contemporary Jewish ethics mention should be made of Martin Buber (1878–1965) and Emmanuel Levinas (1906–95). Buber’s form of existentialism emphasized the I-You relationship, which exists not only between human beings but (out of that) between human beings and God. When we reject I-You relationship, we return to I-It relations, governed by our impositions of our own conceptualizations on objects. Buber said these two relations are exhaustive. ‘There is no I as such but only the I of the basic word I-You and the I of the basic word I-It.’ (I and Thou, 54). Levinas studied under Husserl, and knew Heidegger, whose work he first embraced and then rejected. His focus, like Buber’s, was on the ‘ethics of the Other’, and he held that the face of the Other makes a demand on us even before we recognize our freedom to accept it or reject it. To meet the Other is to have the idea of Infinity (Ethics and Infinity, 90–1).
在当代犹太伦理学中，应该提到马丁·布伯（Martin Buber，1878-1965）和伊曼纽尔·莱维纳斯（Emmanuel Levinas，1906-95）。布伯的存在主义形式强调“我-你”的关系，这种关系不仅存在于人与人之间，而且存在于人与上帝之间。当我们拒绝“我-你”的关系时，我们又回到了“我-你”的关系，受我们把自己的概念化强加给对象的支配。布伯说，这两种关系是详尽无遗的。“没有这样的我，只有基本词I-You的I和基本词I-It的I。”“（我和你，54）。列维纳斯在胡塞尔的指导下学习，并认识海德格尔，他首先接受了海德格尔的作品，然后拒绝了海德格尔的作品。和布伯一样，他的关注点是“他者的伦理”，他认为，甚至在我们认识到我们接受或拒绝它的自由之前，他者的面孔就对我们提出了要求。遇见他者就是拥有无限的概念（伦理与无限，90-1）。

We are sometimes said to live now in a ‘post-modern’ age. This term is problematic in various ways. As used within architectural theory in the 1960’s and 1970’s it had a relatively clear sense. There was a recognizable style that either borrowed bits and pieces from styles of the past, or mocked the very idea (in modernist architecture) of essential functionality. In philosophy, the term is less clearly definable. It combines a distaste for ‘meta-narratives’ and a rejection of any form of foundationalism. The effect on philosophical thinking about the relation between morality and religion is two-fold. On the one hand, the modernist rejection of religion on the basis of a foundationalist empiricism is itself rejected. This makes the current climate more hospitable to religious language than it was for most of the twentieth century. But on the other hand, the distaste for over-arching theory means that religious meta-narratives are suspect to the same degree as any other, and the hospitality is more likely to be towards bits and pieces of traditional theology than to any theological system as a whole. Habermas uses the term ‘post-secular age’ to describe our current condition, in which the secularization hypothesis (that religion was destined to wither away under the impact of science and education) has apparently failed.
我们有时被说成现在生活在一个“后现代”时代。这个术语在很多方面都是有问题的。正如在 1960 年代和 1970 年代的建筑理论中使用的那样，它具有相对清晰的含义。有一种可识别的风格，要么借鉴了过去风格的点点滴滴，要么嘲笑了（在现代主义建筑中）基本功能的概念。在哲学中，这个术语的定义不太明确。它结合了对“元叙事”的厌恶和对任何形式的基础主义的拒绝。对道德与宗教之间关系的哲学思考的影响是双重的。一方面，现代主义在基础主义经验主义基础上对宗教的拒绝本身就被拒绝了。这使得目前的气候比二十世纪的大部分时间更适合宗教语言。但另一方面，对总体理论的厌恶意味着，宗教元叙事与其他任何元叙事一样受到怀疑，而且这种热情好客更可能是针对传统神学的零碎部分，而不是针对任何神学体系的整体。哈贝马斯使用“后世俗时代”一词来描述我们目前的状况，其中世俗化假说（宗教注定要在科学和教育的影响下消亡）显然已经失败。

Mention should be made of some movements that are not philosophical in a professional sense, but are important in understanding the relation between morality and religion. Liberation theology, of which a leading spokesman from Latin America is Gustavo Gutiérrez (1928-), has attempted to reconcile the Christian gospel with a commitment (influenced by Marxist categories) to revolution to relieve the condition of the oppressed. The civil rights movement (drawing heavily on Exodus), feminist ethics, animal liberation, environmental ethics, and the gay rights and children’s rights movements have shown special sensitivity to the moral status of some particular oppressed class. The leadership of some of these movements has been religiously committed, while the leadership of others has not. At the same time, the notion of human rights, or justified claims by every human being, has grown in global reach, partly through the various instrumentalities of the United Nations. There has, however, been less consensus on the question of how to justify human rights. There are theological justifications, deriving from the image of God in every human being, or the command to love the neighbor, or the covenant between God and humanity (see Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs, chapter 16). Whether there is a non-theological justification is not yet clear. Finally, there has also been a burst of activity in professional ethics, such as medical ethics, engineering ethics, and business ethics. This has not been associated with any one school of philosophy rather than another. The connection of religion with these developments has been variable. In some cases (e.g., medical ethics) the initial impetus for the new sub-discipline was strongly influenced by theology, and in other cases not.
值得一提的是，有些运动在专业意义上不是哲学性的，但在理解道德与宗教之间的关系方面却很重要。解放神学，其中拉丁美洲的主要发言人是古斯塔沃·古铁雷斯（Gustavo Gutiérrez，1928-），他试图调和基督教福音与对革命的承诺（受马克思主义类别的影响），以减轻被压迫者的状况。民权运动（大量借鉴《出埃及记》）、女权主义伦理、动物解放、环境伦理、同性恋权利和儿童权利运动，都对某些特定被压迫阶级的道德地位表现出特别的敏感性。其中一些运动的领导是虔诚的，而另一些运动的领导则没有。与此同时，人权的概念，或每个人的正当要求，在一定程度上通过联合国的各种工具，已经扩大到全球范围。然而，在如何为人权辩护的问题上，人们的共识较少。有一些神学的论据，来自上帝在每个人身上的形象，或者爱邻舍的命令，或者上帝与人类之间的盟约（见沃尔特斯托夫，《正义：对与错》，第16章）。是否存在非神学的称义尚不清楚。最后，在医学伦理、工程伦理、商业伦理等职业道德方面也出现了爆发式的活动。这与任何一个哲学流派都没有联系，而是与另一个哲学流派有关。宗教与这些事态发展之间的联系是可变的。在某些情况下（例如，医学伦理学），新分支学科的最初动力受到神学的强烈影响，而在其他情况下则不是。

The origin of analytic philosophy can be associated with G.E. Moore. His Principia Ethica (1903) can be regarded as the first major ethical document of the school. He was strongly influenced by Sidgwick at Cambridge, but rejected Sidgwick’s negative views about intuitionism. He thought that intrinsic goodness was a real property of things, even though (like the number two) it does not exist in time and is not the object of sense experience. He explicitly aligned himself here with Plato and against the class of empiricist philosophers, ‘to which most Englishmen have belonged’ (Principia Ethica, 162). His predecessors, Moore thought, had almost all committed the error, which he called ‘the naturalistic fallacy,’ of trying to define this value property by identifying it with a non-evaluative property. For example, they proposed that goodness is pleasure, or what produces pleasure. But whatever non-evaluative property we try to say goodness is identical to, we will find that it remains an open question whether that property is in fact good. For example, it makes sense to ask whether pleasure or the production of pleasure is good. This is true also if we propose a supernatural property to identify with goodness, for example the property of being commanded by God. It still makes sense to ask whether what God commands is good. This question cannot be the same as the question ‘Is what God commands what God commands?’ which is not still an open question. Moore thought that if these questions are different, then the two properties, goodness and being commanded by God, cannot be the same, and to say (by way of a definition) that they are the same is to commit the fallacy. Intrinsic goodness, Moore said, is a simple non-natural property (i.e., neither natural nor supernatural) and indefinable. He thought we had a special form of cognition that he called ‘intuition,’ which gives us access to such properties. By this he meant that the access was not based on inference or argument, but was self-evident (though we could still get it wrong, just as we can with sense-perception). He thought the way to determine what things had positive value intrinsically was to consider what things were such that, if they existed by themselves in isolation, we would yet judge their existence to be good.
分析哲学的起源可以与G.E.摩尔有关。他的《伦理学原理》（1903年）可以看作是该校第一部重要的伦理文献。他在剑桥大学受到西奇威克的强烈影响，但拒绝了西奇威克关于直觉主义的负面观点。他认为内在的善是事物的真正属性，即使（像数字二一样）它不存在于时间中，也不是感官体验的对象。他在这里明确地与柏拉图结盟，反对“大多数英国人都属于的经验主义哲学家阶层”（Principia Ethica，162）。摩尔认为，他的前辈们几乎都犯了一个错误，他称之为“自然主义谬误”，即试图通过将其与非评价属性等同起来来定义这种价值属性。例如，他们提出善是快乐，或者说产生快乐的东西。但是，无论我们试图说善与非评价性属性是相同的，我们都会发现，这种属性是否实际上是好的仍然是一个悬而未决的问题。例如，问问快乐或快乐的产生是否是好的是有道理的。如果我们提出一种超自然的属性来与良善相等同，例如被上帝命令的属性，也是如此。问问上帝的命令是否是好的仍然有意义。这个问题不能等同于“上帝的命令是上帝的命令吗？”这个问题，这仍然是一个悬而未决的问题。摩尔认为，如果这些问题是不同的，那么良善和被上帝命令这两个属性就不可能相同，而说它们（通过定义）是相同的就是犯了谬误。摩尔说，内在的善良是一种简单的非自然属性（即既不是自然的也不是超自然的），并且是无法定义的。他认为我们有一种特殊的认知形式，他称之为“直觉”，它使我们能够获得这些属性。他的意思是，这种访问不是基于推论或论证，而是不言而喻的（尽管我们仍然可能弄错，就像我们处理感官知觉一样）。他认为，确定哪些事物具有内在的积极价值的方法是考虑哪些事物是这样的，如果它们单独存在，我们仍然会判断它们的存在是好的。

At Cambridge Moore was a colleague of Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951). Russell was not primarily a moral philosopher, but he expressed radically different views at different times about ethics. In 1910 he agreed with Moore that goodness (like roundness) is a quality that belongs to objects independently of our opinions, and that when two people differ about whether a thing is good, only one of them can be right. By 1922 he was holding an error theory (like that of John Mackie, 1917–81) that although we mean by ‘good’ an objective property in this way, there is in fact no such thing, and hence all our value judgments are strictly speaking false (“The Element of Ethics,” Philosophical Essays). Then by 1935 he had dropped also the claim about meaning, holding that value judgments are expressions of desire or wish, and not assertions at all. Wittgenstein’s views on ethics are enigmatic and subject to wildly different interpretations. In the Tractatus (which is about logic) he says at the end, ‘It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)’ (Tractatus, 6.421). Perhaps he means that the world we occupy is good or bad (and happy or unhappy) as a whole, and not piece-by-piece. Wittgenstein (like Nietzsche) was strongly influenced by Schopenhauer’s notion of will, and by his disdain for ethical theories that purport to be able to tell one what to do and what not to do. The Tractatus was taken up by the Logical Positivists, though Wittgenstein himself was never a Logical Positivist. The Logical Positivists held a ‘verificationist’ theory of meaning, that assertions can be meaningful only if they can in principle be verified by sense experience or if they are tautologies (for example, ‘All bachelors are unmarried men.’) This seems to leave ethical statements (and statements about God) meaningless, and indeed that was the deliberately provocative position taken by A.J. Ayer (1910–89). Ayer accepted Moore’s arguments about the naturalistic fallacy, and since Moore’s talk of ‘non-natural properties’ seemed to Ayer just nonsense, he was led to emphasize and analyze further the non-cognitive ingredient in evaluation which Moore had identified. Suppose I say to a cannibal, ‘You acted wrongly in eating your prisoner.’ Ayer thought I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, ‘You ate your prisoner.’ I am, rather, evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, ‘You ate your prisoner’ in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks (Language, Truth and Logic, 107–8).
在剑桥，摩尔是伯特兰·罗素（1872-1970）和路德维希·维特根斯坦（1889-1951）的同事。罗素主要不是一个道德哲学家，但他在不同时期对伦理学表达了截然不同的观点。1910年，他同意摩尔的观点，即善（如圆度）是一种独立于我们的观点而属于物体的品质，当两个人对一个事物是否好的看法存在分歧时，他们中只有一个人可能是对的。到1922年，他持有一个错误理论（如约翰·麦凯（John Mackie，1917-81）认为，尽管我们以这种方式所说的“善”是指客观属性，但实际上并不存在这样的事情，因此，严格来说，我们所有的价值判断都是错误的（“伦理学的要素”，哲学论文）。然后到1935年，他也放弃了关于意义的主张，认为价值判断是欲望或愿望的表达，而不是断言。维特根斯坦的伦理学观点是神秘的，并且受到截然不同的解释。在《逻辑学》中，他在最后说：“很明显，道德是无法用语言表达的。道德是超验的。（伦理学和美学是一回事。（Tractatus，6.421）。也许他的意思是，我们所处的世界是整体的好是坏（快乐或不快乐），而不是一块一块的。维特根斯坦（和尼采一样）深受叔本华意志概念的影响，以及他对道德理论的蔑视，这些理论声称能够告诉一个人该做什么和不该做什么。《逻辑实证论者》被逻辑实证主义者所接受，尽管维特根斯坦本人从来都不是逻辑实证主义者。逻辑实证主义者持有一种“验证主义”的意义理论，即只有当断言原则上可以通过感官经验得到验证，或者它们是重言式（例如，“所有单身汉都是未婚男人”）时，断言才有意义。这似乎使伦理陈述（以及关于上帝的陈述）毫无意义，事实上，这就是A.J.艾尔（A.J. Ayer，1910-89）故意采取的挑衅立场。艾尔接受了摩尔关于自然主义谬误的论点，由于摩尔关于“非自然属性”的谈论在艾尔看来只是无稽之谈，他被引导去强调并进一步分析摩尔所确定的评估中的非认知成分。假设我对一个食人者说，'你吃你的囚犯是错误的。艾尔认为我没有多说什么，只是简单地说了一句，'你吃了你的囚犯。相反，我是在表达我对它的道德上的不赞成。就好像我以一种奇特的恐怖语气说，“你吃掉了你的囚犯”，或者加上一些特殊的感叹号来写它（语言、真理和逻辑，107-8）。

The emotivist theory of ethics had its most articulate treatment in Ethics and Language by Charles Stevenson (1908–79). Stevenson was a positivist, but also the heir of John Dewey (1859–1952) and the American pragmatist tradition. Dewey had rejected the idea of fixed ends for human beings, and stressed that moral deliberation occurs in the context of competition within a person between different ends, none of which can be assumed permanent. He criticized theories that tried to derive moral principles from self-certifying reason, or intuition, or cosmic forms, or divine commands, both because he thought there are no self-certifying faculties or self-evident norms, and because the alleged derivation disguises the actual function of the principles as devices for social action. Stevenson applied this emphasis to the competition between people with different ends, and stressed the role of moral language as a social instrument for persuasion (Ethics and Language, Ch. 5). On his account, normative judgments express attitudes and invite others to share these attitudes, but they are not strictly speaking true or false.
情感主义的伦理学理论在查尔斯·史蒂文森（Charles Stevenson，1908-79）的《伦理学与语言》中得到了最清晰的论述。史蒂文森是一位实证主义者，也是约翰·杜威（John Dewey，1859-1952）和美国实用主义传统的继承人。杜威拒绝了人类固定目的的概念，并强调道德审议发生在一个人内部不同目的之间的竞争的背景下，这些目标都不能被认为是永久的。他批评了一些理论，这些理论试图从自我证明的理性、直觉、宇宙形式或神圣的命令中推导出道德原则，这既是因为他认为没有自我证明的能力或不言而喻的规范，也因为所谓的推导掩盖了原则作为社会行动工具的实际功能。史蒂文森将这种强调应用于具有不同目的的人之间的竞争，并强调道德语言作为说服社会工具的作用（《伦理与语言》，第5章）。在他看来，规范性判断表达了态度并邀请其他人分享这些态度，但严格来说，它们并不是真的或错的。

Wittgenstein did not publish any book after the Tractatus, but he wrote and taught; and after his death Philosophical Investigations was published in 1953. The later thought of Wittgenstein bears a similar relation to the Tractatus as Heidegger bears to Husserl. In both cases the quest for a kind of scientific certainty was replaced by the recognition that science is itself just one language, and not in many cases prior by right. The later Wittgenstein employed the notion of different ‘forms of life’ in which different ‘language games’ including those of religion are at home (Philosophical Investigation, §7, 19, 373). In Oxford there was a parallel though distinct development centering round the work of John Austin (1911–60). Austin did not suppose that ordinary language was infallible, but he did think that it preserved a great deal of wisdom that had passed the test of centuries of experience, and that traditional philosophical discussion had ignored this primary material. In How to do Things with Words (published posthumously) Austin labeled ‘the descriptive fallacy’ the mistake of thinking that all language is used to perform the act of describing or reporting, and he attributed the discovery of this fallacy to Kant (How to do Things with Words, 3).
维特根斯坦在《Tractatus》之后没有出版任何书籍，但他写作和教学;他死后，《哲学研究》于1953年出版。维特根斯坦后来的思想与《论语》的关系与海德格尔与胡塞尔的关系相似。在这两种情况下，对某种科学确定性的追求都被承认科学本身只是一种语言所取代，在许多情况下，科学并不是先于正确的。后来的维特根斯坦采用了不同“生活形式”的概念，其中不同的“语言游戏”，包括宗教的游戏（哲学研究，§7,19,373）。在牛津大学，以约翰·奥斯汀（John Austin，1911-60）的工作为中心，有一个平行但不同的发展。奥斯汀并不认为普通语言是绝对正确的，但他确实认为它保留了大量的智慧，这些智慧已经通过了几个世纪的经验的考验，而传统的哲学讨论忽略了这一主要材料。在《How to Do Things with Words》（死后出版）中，奥斯汀将“描述性谬误”称为一种错误，即认为所有语言都用于执行描述或报告的行为，他将这种谬误的发现归因于康德（How to Do Things with Words，3）。

R.M. Hare (1919–2002) took up the diagnosis of this fallacy, and proposed a ‘universal prescriptivism’ which attributed three characteristics to the language of morality. First, it is prescriptive, which is to say that moral judgments express the will in a way analogous to commands. This preserves the emotivist insight that moral judgment is different from assertion, but does not deny the role of rationality in such judgment. Second, moral judgment is universalizable. This is similar to the formula of Kant’s categorical imperative that requires that we be able to will the maxims of our actions as universal laws. Third, moral judgment is overriding. This means that moral prescriptions legitimately take precedence over any other normative prescriptions. In Moral Thinking (1981) Hare claimed to demonstrate that utilitarianism followed from these three features of morality, though he excluded ideals (in the sense of preferences for how the world should be independently of the agent’s concurrent desires or experience) from the scope of this argument. God enters in two ways into this picture. First, Hare proposed a figure he calls ‘the archangel’ who is the model for fully critical (as opposed to intuitive) moral thinking, having full access to all the relevant information and complete impartiality between the affected parties. Hare acknowledge that since archangels (e.g., Lucifer) are not reliably impartial in this way, it is really God who is the model. Second, we have to be able to believe (as Kant argued) that the universe sustains morality in the sense that it is worthwhile trying to be morally good. Hare thought that this requires something like a belief (he called it a ‘blik’) in the operation of Providence (“The Simple Believer,” Essays on Religion and Education, appendix, 37–9).
R.M. Hare（1919-2002）对这一谬误进行了诊断，并提出了一种“普遍规定主义”，将三个特征归因于道德语言。首先，它是规定性的，也就是说，道德判断以类似于命令的方式表达意志。这保留了情感主义的洞察力，即道德判断不同于断言，但并不否认理性在这种判断中的作用。第二，道德判断是普遍化的。这类似于康德的绝对命令公式，该公式要求我们能够将我们行动的格言作为普遍法则。第三，道德判断是压倒一切的。这意味着道德规定合法地优先于任何其他规范规定。在《道德思考》（1981）中，黑尔声称证明了功利主义源于道德的这三个特征，尽管他将理想（在对世界应该如何独立于主体的同时欲望或经验的偏好的意义上）排除在这个论证的范围之外。上帝以两种方式进入这幅画。首先，黑尔提出了一个他称之为“大天使”的人物，他是完全批判（而不是直觉）道德思考的典范，可以完全访问所有相关信息，并在受影响的各方之间完全公正。野兔承认，由于大天使（例如路西法）以这种方式并不能可靠地公正，因此真正的榜样是上帝。其次，我们必须能够相信（正如康德所论证的那样），宇宙在某种意义上维持着道德，即努力在道德上是好的是值得的。黑尔认为，这需要一种类似信仰的东西（他称之为“闪电”），在普罗维登斯的运作中（“简单的信徒”，宗教与教育论文集，附录，37-9）。

The most important opponent of utilitarianism in the twentieth century was John Rawls (1921–2005). In his Theory of Justice (1971) he gave, like Hare, an account of ethics heavily indebted to Kant. But he insisted that utilitarianism does not capture the Kantian insight that each person is an end in himself or herself, because it ‘does not take seriously the distinction between persons’ (Theory of Justice, 22). He constructed the thought experiment of the ‘Original Position’ in which individuals imagine themselves not knowing what role in society they are going to play or what endowments of talent or material wealth they possess, and agree together on what principles of justice they will accept. Rawls thought it important that substantive conceptions of the good life were left behind in moving to the Original Position, because he was attempting to provide an account of justice that people with competing visions of the good could agree to in a pluralist society. Like early Habermas he included religions under this prohibition. In Political Liberalism (1993) he conceded that the procedure of the Original Position is itself ideologically constrained, and he moved to the idea of an overlapping consensus: Kantians can accept the idea of justice as fairness (which the procedure describes) because it realizes autonomy, utilitarians because it promotes overall utility, Christians because it is part of divine law, etc. But even here Rawls wanted to insist that adherents of the competing visions of the good leave their particular conceptions behind in public discourse and justify the policies they endorse on grounds that are publicly accessible. He described this as the citizen’s duty of civility (Political Liberalism, iv).
二十世纪功利主义最重要的反对者是约翰·罗尔斯（1921-2005）。在他的《正义论》（1971）中，他像黑尔一样，对道德学进行了大量依赖的叙述，这在很大程度上归功于康德。但他坚持认为，功利主义并没有抓住康德式的洞察力，即每个人都是他或她自己的目的，因为它“没有认真对待人与人之间的区别”（《正义论》，22）。他构建了“原始位置”的思想实验，在这个实验中，个人想象自己不知道自己将在社会中扮演什么角色，也不知道自己拥有什么样的才能或物质财富，并就他们将接受的正义原则达成一致。罗尔斯认为，在转向原始位置时，必须留下关于美好生活的实质性概念，因为他试图提供一种正义的描述，使对善有不同看法的人们可以在多元社会中达成一致。像早期的哈贝马斯一样，他将宗教纳入这一禁令。在《政治自由主义》（Political Liberalism，1993）一书中，他承认“原始立场”的程序本身在意识形态上受到限制，他转向了重叠共识的观点：康德主义者可以接受正义作为公平的概念（程序所描述的），因为它实现了自主性，功利主义者因为它促进了整体效用，基督徒因为它是神圣法则的一部分， 等。但即便如此，罗尔斯也想坚持认为，那些相互竞争的善的愿景的拥护者在公共话语中抛弃了他们的特定观念，并以公众可以理解的理由为他们所支持的政策辩护。他将此描述为公民的文明义务（政治自由主义，iv）。

The section of this entry on the continental school discussed briefly the topic of postmodernism. Within analytic philosophy the term is less prevalent. But both schools live in the same increasingly global cultural context. In this context we can reflect on the two main disqualifiers of the project of relating morality intimately to religion that seemed to emerge in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The first disqualifier was the prestige of natural science, and the attempt to make it foundational for all human knowledge. The various empiricist, verificationist, and reductionist forms of foundationalism have not yet succeeded, and even within modern philosophy there has been a continuous resistance to them. This is not to say they will not succeed in the future (for example we may discover a foundation for ethics in the theory of evolution), but the confidence in their future success has waned. Moreover, the secularization hypothesis seems to have been false, as mentioned earlier. Certainly parts of Western Europe are less attached to traditional institutional forms of religion. But taking the world as a whole, religion seems to be increasing in influence rather than declining as the world’s educational standards improve. The second main disqualifier was the liberal idea (present in the narrative of this entry from the time of the religious wars in Europe) that we need a moral discourse based on reason and not religion in order to avoid the hatred and bloodshed that religion seems to bring with it. Here the response to Rawls has been telling. It seems false that we can respect persons and at the same time tell them to leave their fundamental commitments behind in public discourse, and it seems false also that some purely rational but still action-guiding component can be separated off from these competing substantive conceptions of the good (see Wolterstorff, “An Engagement with Rorty”.) It is true that religious commitment can produce the deliberate targeting of civilians in a skyscraper. But the history of the twentieth century suggests that non-religious totalitarian regimes have at least as much blood on their hands. Perhaps the truth is, as Kant saw, that people under the Evil Maxim will use any available ideology for their purposes. Progress towards civility is more likely if Muslims, Christians, Jews, (and Buddhists and Hindus) are encouraged to enter ‘the public square’ with their commitments explicit, and see how much common ethical ground there in fact is. This writer has done some of this discussion, and found the common ground surprisingly extensive, though sometime common language disguises significant differences. Progress seems more likely in this way than by trying to construct a neutral philosophical ground that very few people actually accept.
本文关于大陆学派的部分简要讨论了后现代主义的话题。在分析哲学中，这个词不太普遍。但两所学校都生活在同样日益全球化的文化背景下。在这种背景下，我们可以反思似乎在19世纪和20世纪出现的将道德与宗教紧密联系起来的项目的两个主要不合格因素。第一个不合格的因素是自然科学的声望，以及试图让它成为所有人类知识的基础。各种经验主义、验证主义和还原论形式的基础主义还没有成功，甚至在现代哲学内部也一直存在着对它们的抵制。这并不是说他们将来不会成功（例如，我们可能会在进化论中发现伦理学的基础），但对他们未来成功的信心已经减弱。此外，如前所述，世俗化假说似乎是错误的。当然，西欧的部分地区不太依附于传统的宗教制度形式。但从整个世界来看，随着世界教育水平的提高，宗教的影响力似乎在增加，而不是下降。第二个主要的否定因素是自由主义思想（存在于欧洲宗教战争时期的本条目的叙述中），即我们需要一种基于理性而不是宗教的道德话语，以避免宗教似乎带来的仇恨和流血事件。在这里，对罗尔斯的回应很能说明问题。我们可以尊重人，同时告诉他们在公共话语中抛弃他们的基本承诺，这似乎是错误的，而且似乎也是错误的，一些纯粹理性但仍然指导行动的组成部分可以从这些相互竞争的实质性善的概念中分离出来（参见沃尔特斯托夫，“与罗蒂的接触”）。诚然，宗教承诺可能导致在摩天大楼中蓄意以平民为目标。但二十世纪的历史表明，非宗教极权主义政权的手上至少沾满了同样多的鲜血。也许事实是，正如康德所看到的，在邪恶格言下的人们会利用任何可用的意识形态来达到他们的目的。如果鼓励穆斯林、基督教徒、犹太人（以及佛教徒和印度教徒）带着明确的承诺进入“公共广场”，看看那里实际上有多少共同的道德基础，那么向文明迈进的可能性就更大。笔者已经做了一些这样的讨论，发现共同点令人惊讶地广泛，尽管有时共同的语言掩盖了显着的差异。以这种方式取得进步似乎比试图构建一个很少有人真正接受的中立哲学基础更有可能。

One recent development in analytic ethical theory has been a revival of divine command theory parallel to the revival of natural law theory that I have already described. A pioneer in this revival was Philip Quinn’s Divine Command and Moral Requirements (1978). He defended the theory against the usual objections (one, deriving from Plato’s Euthyprho, that it makes morality arbitrary, and the second, deriving from a misunderstanding of Kant, that it is inconsistent with human autonomy), and proposed that we understand the relation between God and moral rightness causally, rather than analyzing the terms of moral obligation as meaning ‘commanded by God’. Though we could stipulate such a definition, it would make it obscure how theists and non-theists could have genuine moral discussion, as they certainly seem to do. Robert M. Adams, in a series of articles and then in Finite and Infinite Goods (1999), first separates off the good (which he analyzes Platonically in terms of imitating the ultimate good, which is God) and the right. He then defends a divine command theory of the right by arguing that obligation is always obligation to someone, and God is the most appropriate person, given human limitations. John Hare, In God and Morality (2007) and Divine Command (2015), defends a version of the theory that derives from God’s sovereignty and defends the theory against the objection that obedience to divine command itself requires justification. He also compares Christian, Jewish and Muslim accounts of divine command. Thomas L. Carson’s Value and the Good Life (2000) argues that normative theory needs to be based on an account of rationality, and then proposes that a divine-preference account of rationality is superior to all the available alternatives. An objection to divine command theory is mounted by Mark Murphy’s An Essay on Divine Authority (2002) and God and Moral Law (2012) on the grounds that divine command only has authority over those persons that have submitted themselves to divine authority, but moral obligation has authority more broadly. William Wainwright’s Religion and Morality defends the claim that divine command theory provides a more convincing account of moral obligation than any virtue-based theory, including Zagzebski’s divine motivation theory, discussed earlier. Finally, C. Stephen Evans, in Kierkegaard’s Ethics of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (2004) and God and Moral Obligation(2013) articulates both in Kierkegaard and in its own right a divine command theory that is argued to be superior to all the main alternative non-theist accounts of the nature and basis of moral obligation.
分析伦理学理论最近的一个发展是神圣命令理论的复兴，与我已经描述过的自然法理论的复兴平行。菲利普·奎因（Philip Quinn）的《神圣的命令和道德要求》（1978年）是这场复兴的先驱。他为这一理论辩护，反对通常的反对意见（一种意见来源于柏拉图的《理想国论》，认为道德使道德具有任意性，第二种意见源于对康德的误解，认为它与人类的自主性不一致），并建议我们从因果关系上理解上帝与道德正确性之间的关系，而不是将道德义务的术语分析为“上帝命令”的意思。虽然我们可以规定这样的定义，但它会使有神论者和非有神论者如何进行真正的道德讨论变得模糊不清，正如他们似乎确实所做的那样。 罗伯特·亚当斯（Robert M. Adams）在一系列文章中，然后在《有限和无限的商品》（1999）中，首先将善分开（他从模仿终极善的角度进行了柏拉图式的分析， 这是上帝）和权利。然后，他为权利的神圣命令理论辩护，认为义务始终是对某人的义务，鉴于人类的局限性，上帝是最合适的人。约翰·黑尔（John Hare）在《上帝与道德》（2007年）和《神圣命令》（2015年）中，为源自上帝主权的理论版本辩护，并为该理论辩护，反对服从神圣命令本身需要称义的反对意见。他还比较了基督教、犹太教和穆斯林对神圣命令的记载。托马斯·卡森（Thomas L. Carson，2000）的《价值与美好生活》（Value and the Good Life）认为，规范理论需要建立在对理性的解释之上，然后提出，对理性的神圣偏好解释优于所有可用的替代方案。马克·墨菲（Mark Murphy）的《关于神圣权威的论文》（An Essay on Divine Authority，2002年）和《上帝与道德法则》（God and Moral Law，2012年）对神的命令理论提出了反对意见，理由是神的命令只对那些服从神权的人有权威，但道德义务的权威范围更广。威廉·温赖特（William Wainwright）的《宗教与道德》（Religion and Morality）捍卫了这样一种说法，即神圣命令理论比任何基于美德的理论（包括前面讨论过的扎格泽布斯基的神圣动机理论）都更令人信服地描述了道德义务。最后，C.斯蒂芬·埃文斯（C. Stephen Evans）在克尔凯郭尔的《爱的伦理学：神圣的命令和道德义务》（2004年）和《上帝与道德义务》（2013年）中，既在克尔凯郭尔的著作中也以其本身的权利阐述了一种神圣命令理论，该理论被认为优于所有关于道德义务的性质和基础的主要替代性非有神论解释。

To conclude this entry, the revival of interest in divine command theory, when combined with the revival of natural law theory I already discussed, shows evidence that the attempt to connect morality closely to religion is undergoing a robust recovery within professional philosophy.
总而言之，对神圣命令理论的兴趣的复兴，与我已经讨论过的自然法理论的复兴相结合，表明有证据表明，将道德与宗教紧密联系起来的尝试正在专业哲学中经历强劲的复苏。

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