历史即进化 | 经济史与进化社会科学的碰撞

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History as evolution ${}^✩$

历史即进化

Nathan Nunn

${}^a$ Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, United States

${}^b$ Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Toronto, ON, Canada

内森・努恩 a,b

a 美国马萨诸塞州剑桥市哈佛大学

b 加拿大多伦多市加拿大高级研究院（CIFAR）

3.1 Introduction

3.1 引言

To many economic historians, the benefit of an evolutionary perspective for studying economic history or long - term economic growth may seem limited. Evolution is typically viewed as only being relevant in well - defined subfields within economics that study the importance of genetics for economic outcomes. In this chapter, I will argue that an evolutionary perspective can provide useful insights that are widely relevant for the study of economic history and long - run economic growth. My goal is to bridge the divide between research done within the field of economic history and that done within the evolutionary social sciences – i.e., evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, and particularly evolutionary anthropology.
对于许多经济史学家而言，从进化的视角研究经济史或长期经济增长，其益处似乎有限。通常人们认为，进化仅在经济学中特定的子领域才具有相关性，这些子领域研究遗传学对经济结果的重要性。在本章中，我将论证，进化视角能提供广泛适用于经济史和长期经济增长研究的有用见解。我的目标是弥合经济史领域与进化社会科学（即进化生物学、进化心理学，尤其是进化人类学）研究之间的差距。

The aspect of evolutionary research that is the most relevant for economic history is the study of cultural evolution. This line of inquiry is motivated by a desire to better understand human psychology, human societies, human behavior, and their evolution over time. The first contributions were theoretical, consisting of studies that adapted and extended models from evolutionary biology and applied them to cultural evolution (e.g., Cavalli - Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985).
进化研究中与经济史最为相关的方面是文化进化研究。这一研究方向源于人们想要更好地理解人类心理、人类社会、人类行为及其随时间演变的愿望。最初的贡献是理论性的，包括对进化生物学模型进行调整和扩展，并将其应用于文化进化的研究（例如，卡瓦利 - 斯福尔扎和费尔德曼，1981 年；博伊德和里彻森，1985 年）。

I begin the chapter by first providing a conceptual and theoretical overview of culture and its evolution. An important part of this is to describe the theory and evidence behind the benefits of culture. This, in turn, explains why culture is ubiquitous and why it is such a central part of human decision making. The first benefit is that by relying on traditions that are passed down over generations, culture allows individuals to make decisions efficiently in complex environments where figuring out the optimal action with certainty is costly or even impossible. As long as a society’s environment is fairly stable over time, then reliance on evolved cultural traditions is an effective strategy. The second benefit of cultural evolution arises from the fact that it is cumulative. Culture allows societies to build an evolved body of knowledge that is greater than any single individual could learn within their lifetime or fit within their mind. By taking as given the cultural wisdom of previous generations, societies do not need to ‘reinvent the wheel’ and instead can focus their efforts on adding to and improving upon the existing body of culturally - accumulated knowledge of the society.
在本章开头，我首先对文化及其演变进行概念和理论概述。其中一个重要部分是描述文化益处背后的理论和证据。这反过来又解释了为什么文化无处不在，以及为什么它是人类决策的核心部分。文化的第一个益处是，通过依赖代代相传的传统，文化使个体能够在复杂环境中高效决策，在这些环境中，确定最优行动的成本高昂，甚至是不可能的。只要一个社会的环境在一段时间内相当稳定，那么依赖进化而来的文化传统就是一种有效的策略。文化进化的第二个益处在于它的累积性。文化使社会能够积累起比任何个人在其一生中所能学到或在其头脑中所能容纳的更多的知识。通过接受前几代人的文化智慧，社会无需 “重新发明轮子”，而是可以将精力集中在丰富和改进社会现有的文化积累知识上。

After describing the conceptual foundations of cultural evolution and its benefits, I then turn to a series of examples aimed at showing how an evolutionary perspective of human behavior can provide insight into the study of economics in general and economic history in particular. I do this in three ways. The first is to show that the differences between evolutionary thinking and traditional economic thinking are often much smaller than one might think. There are many cases where the same logic, the same evidence, and similar narratives are developed, but using different terminology, empirical methods, and data. I hope to make these commonalities more apparent.
在描述了文化进化的概念基础及其益处之后，我接着会给出一系列例子，旨在展示人类行为的进化视角如何为一般经济学研究，尤其是经济史研究提供深刻见解。我将从三个方面展开。第一，表明进化思维与传统经济思维之间的差异往往比人们想象的要小得多。在许多情况下，相同的逻辑、相同的证据和相似的叙述被提出，但使用了不同的术语、实证方法和数据。我希望能让这些共性更加明显。

The second is to highlight cases where insights from the evolutionary literature can be used by economic historians to gain a better understanding of certain historical processes. Using a few cases that have become apparent to me over the years, I discuss how evolutionary insights, such as environmental mismatch, the collective brain, cumulative improvements, kludges, group - level selection, sexual dimorphism, and reproduction strategies provide a deeper understanding of a diverse set of aspects of human history, including human capital, innovation, warfare, state formation, cooperation, social structure, gender roles, kinship, social structure, path dependence, and comparative economic development. To me, these are the most obvious examples of the insights that emerge from an evolutionary perspective. However, my sense is also that they are just the tip of the iceberg.
第二，强调经济史学家可以利用进化文献中的见解，更好地理解某些历史进程。通过我多年来留意到的几个案例，我将探讨进化视角的见解，如环境错配、集体大脑、累积改进、拼凑、群体选择、性别二态性和生殖策略等，如何帮助人们更深入地理解人类历史的各个方面，包括人力资本、创新、战争、国家形成、合作、社会结构、性别角色、亲属关系、社会结构、路径依赖和比较经济发展。对我来说，这些是进化视角下最明显的见解示例。然而，我也觉得它们只是冰山一角。

The third is to highlight cases in which historical research within economics has contributed to the cultural evolution literature. As I will discuss, a sizeable and quickly growing area of research within economics, that takes a historical (and often cultural) perspective, has been successful at contributing, both theoretically and empirically, to evolutionary fields outside of economics.
第三，突出经济学领域的历史研究对文化进化文献的贡献。正如我将讨论的，经济学领域中一个规模可观且迅速发展的研究方向，即从历史（通常也是文化）的角度进行研究，在理论和实证方面都成功地为经济学以外的进化领域做出了贡献。

I now turn to the first step in this process, which is to describe the mechanisms that form the foundation of the benefits of culture.
现在我进入这一过程的第一步，即描述构成文化益处基础的机制。

3.2 The benefits of cultural evolution

3.2 文化进化的益处

The standard definition of ‘culture’ from evolutionary anthropology defines culture as the knowledge, technology, values, beliefs, and norms that can be transmitted across generations and between individuals (e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 1985). There are numerous examples of cultural traits that vary by context: religious/supernatural beliefs, views about morality, norms about giving and cooperation, gender norms, food preferences, taboos, and traditions and skills regarding farming, house - building, hunting, etc.
进化人类学对 “文化” 的标准定义是，文化是可以在代际间和个体间传播的知识、技术、价值观、信仰和规范（例如，博伊德和里彻森，1985 年）。文化特征因环境而异的例子有很多：宗教 / 超自然信仰、道德观念、给予与合作的规范、性别规范、食物偏好、禁忌，以及农业、建筑、狩猎等方面的传统和技能。

An important question is the extent to which cultural values affect our behavior. Within economics, this is not something that we take for granted. When one views human behavior from the traditional economic perspective of ‘rationality’, a series of questions arise. Why does culture exist? Why would someone be influenced by what they are told by their teachers, their parents, friends, church leaders, celebrities, etc.? Why wouldn’t individuals just figure out what is best by using some form of rational calculus? For example, if cheating, stealing, or lying yields a higher payoff, then why would someone be influenced by the fact that religious leaders, parents, teachers, or friends might tell them that this behavior is wrong and should be avoided? These are important questions. To understand the logic behind culture and why it affects our behavior, I now turn to a theoretical literature where culture is not taken as given, but its influence is derived endogenously. An important contribution of this class of models is that they show how and why culture is beneficial and, therefore, why it emerges and guides our behavior.
一个重要的问题是文化价值观在多大程度上影响我们的行为。在经济学领域，这并非我们可以想当然的事情。当人们从传统经济学的 “理性” 视角看待人类行为时，一系列问题就会出现。文化为什么存在？为什么有人会受到老师、父母、朋友、宗教领袖、名人等所说的话的影响呢？为什么个人不通过某种理性计算来找出最佳选择呢？例如，如果作弊、偷窃或说谎能带来更高的回报，那么为什么有人会受到宗教领袖、父母、老师或朋友说这种行为是错误的且应该避免的观点的影响呢？这些都是重要的问题。为了理解文化背后的逻辑以及它为什么影响我们的行为，我现在转向一类理论文献，在这些文献中，文化不是被视为既定的，而是其影响是内生推导出来的。这类模型的一个重要贡献在于，它们展示了文化如何以及为何有益，进而解释了文化为何出现并指导我们的行为。

3.2.1 Cultural evolution saves on information costs

3.2.1 文化进化节省信息成本

To understand the primary benefits of culture, one must first recognize an important fact: As human beings, we have cognitive limits. Acquiring and processing information is not free; it has an opportunity cost. In the face of these limits, we have developed culture and cultural learning, and with them cultural values and beliefs. These serve as tools that are “fast and frugal” and allow us to make decisions more efficiently than if we were an economist’s traditional version of ‘rational’ (e.g., Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Todd and Gigerenzer Peter, 1999).
要理解文化的主要益处，首先必须认识到一个重要事实：作为人类，我们存在认知局限。获取和处理信息并非没有成本，它存在机会成本。面对这些局限，我们发展出了文化和文化学习，以及与之相伴的文化价值观和信仰。这些都充当了 “快速且节省” 的工具，使我们能够比按照经济学家传统定义的 “理性” 方式更高效地做出决策（例如，吉仁泽和戈尔茨坦，1996 年；托德和吉仁泽・彼得，1999 年）。

3.2.1.1 Theory

3.2.1.1 理论

The formal theory behind culture and its evolution has been thoroughly developed in the cultural evolution literature and began with seminal models by Boyd and Richerson (1985) and Rogers (1988) among others. The authors model situations where an action must be made in a setting without perfect (costless) certainty. The payoff of each action depends on the environment, which is variable. Individuals can either collect information and figure out the optimal action on their own or they can rely on the traditions that have evolved up until the previous generation. They do this by copying the action of a person from the previous generation. In other words, their behavior is determined by cultural values that are learned from the prior generation.
文化及其进化背后的正式理论在文化进化文献中得到了深入发展，始于博伊德和里彻森（1985 年）、罗杰斯（1988 年）等人的开创性模型。这些作者构建模型，模拟在没有完美（无成本）确定性的环境中必须做出行动的情况。每个行动的回报取决于多变的环境。个体要么自己收集信息并找出最优行动，要么依赖上一代传承下来的传统。他们通过模仿上一代人的行动来做到这一点。换句话说，他们的行为是由从上一代学到的文化价值观决定的。

The models show that, under fairly general conditions, we should observe the presence of culture i.e., decision - making based on socially - transmitted cultural values. There are two primary benefits that culture provides over rationality. First, culture - based decision - making provides a quick and easy way to make decisions. To the extent that rational decision - making (narrowly defined) requires costs due to information acquisition or cognitive processing, then acting on one’s transmitted cultural traditions and values saves on these costs. The second benefit is that relying on culture allows for cumulative learning. By following the culture of the previous generations, individuals do not have to reinvent the wheel and re - learn everything that has already been figured out during the history of the society in question. For example, if the society has already learned how to effectively hunt, which plants are not poisonous, and what rituals and beliefs help the society to exist in harmony, then taking these as given and trying to improve upon them may be a better strategy than having individuals try to figure these things out again.
这些模型表明，在相当普遍的条件下，我们应该能观察到文化的存在，即基于社会传播的文化价值观进行决策。与理性决策相比，文化决策有两个主要优势。第一，基于文化的决策提供了一种快速简便的决策方式。在理性决策（狭义定义）因信息获取或认知处理而需要成本的情况下，依据传承的文化传统和价值观行动可以节省这些成本。第二，依赖文化有助于累积学习。通过遵循前几代人的文化，个体无需重新发明轮子，也无需重新学习社会历史中已经弄清楚的所有事情。例如，如果一个社会已经学会了如何有效狩猎、哪些植物无毒，以及哪些仪式和信仰有助于社会和谐共处，那么将这些视为既定事实并尝试改进，可能比让个体重新去弄清楚这些事情更好。

I now present a simple model that focuses on the first of the two benefits and shows how culture can emerge in equilibrium. Following this, I discuss the second benefit of culture, the fact that it is cumulative, in Section 3.2.2.
现在我将展示一个简单的模型，该模型聚焦于上述两个益处中的第一个，展示文化如何在均衡状态下出现。在此之后，我将在 3.2.2 节中讨论文化的第二个益处，即它的累积性。

For a related paper within economics, see Bisin and Verdier (2001a). The models are very similar, except that what we think of as a reliance on culture/tradition in the description below they interpret (and model) as imperfect empathy on the part of the parents.
关于经济学领域的一篇相关论文，可参见比辛和韦迪耶（2001a）。这些模型非常相似，只是在下面的描述中，我们所认为的对文化 / 传统的依赖，他们解释（并建模）为父母的不完全共情。

The model is taken from Giuliano and Nunn (2021) and reproduces the basic logic of Rogers (1988), which is one of the first and simplest models of this aspect of cultural evolution. The players of the game consist of a continuum of members of a society. Each period, a new generation is born and the previous generation dies. When a player is born, they make a once - and - for - all choice of two possible actions, which we denote $a$ and $b$ . Which of the two actions yields a higher payoff depends on the state of the world (i.e., the environment), which can be either $A$ or $B$ . If the state is $A$ , then action $a$ yields the payoff $\beta>0$ and action $b$ yields a payoff of $-\beta$ . If the state is $B$ , then action $a$ yields a payoff of $-\beta$ and action $b$ yields the payoff $\beta>0$ . Thus, in each state, one of the two actions is better than the other.
该模型取自朱利亚诺和纳恩（2021），再现了罗杰斯（1988）的基本逻辑，这是最早且最简单的文化进化这一方面的模型之一。博弈的参与者是一个社会中连续的成员群体。每个时期，新一代诞生，上一代消亡。当一个参与者出生时，他们要在两个可能的行动中做出一次性选择，我们将其标记为 $a$ 和 $b$ 。这两个行动中哪个能产生更高的回报取决于世界的状态（即环境），环境可能是 $A$ 或 $B$ 。如果状态是 $A$ ，那么行动 $a$ 产生的回报为 $\beta>0$ ，行动 $b$ 产生的回报为 $-\beta$ 。如果状态是 $B$ ，那么行动 $a$ 产生的回报为 $-\beta$ ，行动 $b$ 产生的回报为 $\beta>0$ 。因此，在每种状态下，两个行动中有一个比另一个更好。

In each period, with probability $\Delta \in [0,1]$ , there is a shock that results in a new draw of the state of the environment. It is equally likely that the draw results in the new environment being in state $A$ or state $B$ . The state of the world is unknown to the players. However, as I explain below, it is possible to engage in learning (at a cost) to determine the state of the world.
在每个时期，以概率 $\Delta \in [0,1]$ 会发生一次冲击，导致环境状态重新抽取。新环境处于状态 $A$ 或状态 $B$ 的可能性相等。参与者不知道世界的状态。然而，正如我下面将解释的，人们可以通过学习（需要付出成本）来确定世界的状态。

There are two potential types of players. Each uses a different method to choose their action. The first type, “Traditionalists ( $T$ ),” value tradition and place strong importance on the actions of the previous generation. They choose their action by following the action of a randomly chosen person from the previous generation. Thus, the model allows for both vertical and oblique transmission. The second type, “Non - Traditionalists ( $NT$ ),” do not value tradition and ignore the actions of the previous generation. They obtain the optimal action with certainty for the current period, but there is a cost of learning, $\kappa \in (0, \beta)$ . Thus, although the cost is positive, it is assumed to be fairly modest. Let $x$ denote the proportion of the population that is a traditionalist.
有两种潜在类型的参与者。他们各自使用不同的方法选择行动。第一种类型是 “传统主义者（ $T$ ）”，他们重视传统，非常看重上一代人的行动。他们通过模仿上一代中随机选择的一个人的行动来做出自己的选择。因此，该模型既允许垂直传播，也允许斜向传播。第二种类型是 “非传统主义者（ $NT$ ）”，他们不重视传统，忽视上一代人的行动。他们能确定当前时期的最优行动，但需要付出学习成本 $\kappa \in (0, \beta)$ 。因此，尽管成本是正的，但假设其相当低。用 $x$ 表示传统主义者在人口中的比例。

I now turn to the payoffs of both types of players, starting with the non - traditionalists. In each generation, they incur the cost $\kappa$ to learn the optimal action. This action is chosen and they obtain $\beta$ . Therefore, the payoff to a non - traditionalist is given by:
现在我来计算两种类型参与者的回报，先从非传统主义者开始。在每一代中，他们要付出成本 $\kappa$ 来学习最优行动。选择该行动后，他们获得回报 $\beta$ 。因此，非传统主义者的回报为：
$\Pi^{NT}=\beta-\kappa .$

To calculate the expected payoff of a traditionalist, consider the following sequence of possibilities, each of which results in a traditionalist choosing the right action for her environment, thus, receiving $\beta$ . First, a traditionalist copies a non - traditionalist from the previous generation; and the environment did not experience a shock between the last and current generation. Since the non - traditionalist from the previous generation chose the action that was optimal in her environment and since a shock did not occur, then this action will also be optimal in the current environment and the traditionalist receives $\beta$ . This scenario occurs with probability $x)(1-\Delta)$ . Second, a traditionalist copies a traditionalist from the previous generation, who had copied a non - traditionalist from the previous generation. No shocks occurred during this time. The traditionalist receives $\beta$ and this occurs with probability $x)(1-\Delta)^{2}$ . Third, a traditionalist copies a traditionalist, who copied a traditionalist, who copied a non - traditionalist. No shocks occurred during this time. This occurs with probability $x^{2}(1 - x)(1-\Delta)^{3}$ .
为了计算传统主义者的预期回报，考虑以下一系列可能性，每一种可能性都会使传统主义者为其所处环境选择正确的行动，从而获得 $\beta$ 的回报。第一，一个传统主义者模仿上一代的非传统主义者，并且上一代到当前这一代之间环境没有发生冲击。由于上一代的非传统主义者选择了适合其环境的最优行动，且没有发生冲击，那么这个行动在当前环境中也是最优的，传统主义者获得 $\beta$ 回报。这种情况发生的概率为 $x)(1-\Delta)$ 。第二，一个传统主义者模仿上一代的传统主义者，而这个上一代的传统主义者又模仿了上一代的非传统主义者，在此期间没有发生冲击。传统主义者获得 $\beta$ 回报，这种情况发生的概率为 $x)(1-\Delta)^{2}$ 。第三，一个传统主义者模仿一个模仿了另一个模仿非传统主义者的传统主义者，在此期间没有发生冲击。这种情况发生的概率为 $x^{2}(1 - x)(1-\Delta)^{3}$ 。

One can continue this sequence of possibilities infinitely. The sum of the probabilities is given by $\sum_{t = 1}^{\infty} x^{t - 1}(1 - x)(1-\Delta)^{t}$ . With probability equal to one minus this sum, a traditionalist does not necessarily obtain the correct action. In these cases, there has been at least one shock to the environment.
这个可能性序列可以无限延续下去。这些概率的总和为 $\sum_{t = 1}^{\infty} x^{t - 1}(1 - x)(1-\Delta)^{t}$ 。传统主义者以概率 $1$ 减去这个总和不一定能获得正确的行动。在这些情况下，自最近一次模仿非传统主义者以来，环境至少发生了一次冲击。

since the most recent non - traditionalist was copied. Because the consequence of a shock is an equal probability of being in either state, a traditionalist still has a 50% chance of receiving $\beta$ , a 50% chance of receiving $-\beta$ , and her expected payoff is 0. Putting this together, and using the formula for an infinite geometric sequence gives:
由于冲击的结果是处于两种状态的概率相等，传统主义者仍然有 50% 的机会获得 $\beta$ ，50% 的机会获得 $-\beta$ ，其预期回报为 $0$ 。综合起来，并使用无穷等比数列公式可得：
$\Pi^{T}=\frac {\beta (1 - x)(1-\Delta)}{1 - x (1-\Delta)}$

The payoffs to traditionalists and non - traditionalists as a function of the proportion of traditionalists in the society, $x$ , are shown in Fig. 3.1. The expected payoff of a traditionalist, $\Pi^{T}$ , is decreasing in $x$ . Intuitively, as the fraction of traditionalists increases, it is less likely that a traditionalist will copy a non - traditionalist who is more likely to have chosen the correct action. At the extreme, where everyone in the population is a traditionalist ( $(x = 1)$ ), each traditionalist copies another traditionalist and the expected payoff is 0.
在这里插入图片描述
传统主义者和非传统主义者的回报作为社会中传统主义者比例 $x$ 的函数，如图 3.1 所示。传统主义者的预期回报 $\Pi^{T}$ 随 $x$ 的增加而减少。直观地说，随着传统主义者比例的增加，传统主义者模仿非传统主义者（非传统主义者更有可能选择正确行动）的可能性就越小。在极端情况下，当所有人都是传统主义者（ $(x = 1)$ ），每个传统主义者都复制另一个传统主义者，预期收益为 0。

3.3 Insights from a recognition of history as evolution

3.3 从将历史视为进化中获得的洞见

现在我来讨论进化框架如何为经济学提供一系列相关洞见。在此需要先提出几点注意事项。尽管我将这些洞见分小节进行了整理，但各小节的观点并非必然相互关联。这些应被视为我在同时研读文化进化和经济史文献时获得的不同见解。此外，我绝不认为下面描述的见解和联系是完整的，甚至也不认为它们具有代表性。我觉得，从经济学中更具进化视角的角度来看，这些不过是未来富有成果的观点和研究的冰山一角。

3.3.1 Environmental mismatch

3.3.1 环境错配

在这里插入图片描述
文化进化的一个重要后果是可能导致环境错配。为了理解这一点，我们回到罗杰斯（1988）的模型。在该模型中，文化的益处在于节省信息获取成本。然而，代价是当环境发生变化时，传统主义者（即那些依据文化进行决策的人）不会像非传统主义者那样迅速地选择适应环境变化的行动。如图 3.2 所示，该图展示了社会中所选择的行动如何对 0 到 1 期之间世界状态的变化做出反应。图中呈现了不同的路径，每条路径对应着一个传统主义者均衡比例不同的社会（这是由潜在的 $\Delta$ 差异导致的）。可以看出，传统主义者较少（ $x^{*}$ 较低）的社会对环境变化的反应更快、更充分。

In the model, many individuals continue to choose the old action after the state changes. This is an example of environmental mismatch. These individuals are choosing an action that is optimal for a past environment but not for the current environment. When actions are chosen based on culture, episodes of mismatch can occur.
在模型中，状态变化后许多个体仍继续选择旧的行动，这就是环境错配的一个例子。这些个体选择的行动对过去的环境来说是最优的，但对当前环境并非如此。当依据文化来选择行动时，就可能出现错配的情况。

The most well - known examples of mismatch are actually from evolutionary biology. One is sea turtles. The mothers leave the ocean, come to shore, and bury their eggs on sandy beaches. Once the sea turtles hatch, they need to make their way back to the ocean. They have evolved a method that allows them to do this simply. After they are born, at night, they head directly towards any bright light. In their natural environment, the only bright light is the reflection of the moon off of the water. By moving in the direction of the moon’s reflection, sea turtles are able to navigate towards the water (Ehrenfeld and Carr, 1967). This evolved mechanism worked extremely well until the environment changed. In the modern world, where cities and freeways with bright lights are often located next to beaches, this biological heuristic works less well. Instead of heading towards the ocean, baby turtles move towards city lights which are in the opposite direction of the ocean (Salmon et al., 1995).
This is an example of mismatch. A trait that worked well in the environment in which it evolved works poorly in the current environment.
海龟是最著名的环境错配例子之一，这类例子实际上多源于进化生物学。海龟妈妈离开海洋，爬上海滩，在沙滩上产卵。小海龟孵化后，需要回到大海。它们进化出了一种简单的导航方法。出生后，在夜间，它们会径直朝着任何亮光前进。在它们的自然环境中，唯一的亮光就是月光在水面的反射。朝着月光反射的方向移动，海龟就能游向大海（埃伦菲尔德和卡尔，1967）。在环境发生变化之前，这种进化而来的机制一直运作得非常好。在现代社会，城市和高速公路的亮光常常出现在海滩附近，这种生物学启发式方法就不那么有效了。小海龟不再游向海洋，而是朝着与海洋相反方向的城市灯光爬去（萨尔蒙等人，1995）。这就是环境错配的例子，一种在其进化环境中效果良好的特征，在当前环境中却表现不佳。

At the other extreme, where everyone is a non - traditionalist ( $x = 0$ ), a (mutant) traditionalist will copy the correct action from someone in the previous generation and as long as there was not a shock to the environment between the two generations, she will obtain the right action. Thus, with probability $1-\Delta$ , a traditionalist’s payoff is $\beta$ . If, on the other hand, the environment did change, which occurs with probability $\Delta$ , then there is an equal probability that the environment is in either state and the expected payoff is $0$ . Therefore, the expected payoff to a traditionalist when $x = 0$ is $\beta (1-\Delta)$ .
在另一个极端情况下，当所有人都是非传统主义者（ $x = 0$ ）时，一个（突变的）传统主义者会从上一代的某人那里复制正确的行动，并且只要两代人之间环境没有发生冲击，她就会获得正确的行动。因此，传统主义者有 $\Delta$ 的概率获得收益 $\beta$ 。另一方面，如果环境发生了变化（发生概率为 $\Delta$ ），那么环境处于两种状态的概率相等，预期收益为 $0$ 。所以，当 $x = 0$ 时，传统主义者的预期收益为 $\beta (1-\Delta)$ 。

In an equilibrium with both types present, the expected payoffs to both types must be equal. In an equilibrium with only one type, its average payoff must be no less than that of the other type. Thus, the equilibrium proportion of traditionalists $x^{*}$ is given by:
在两种类型都存在的均衡中，两种类型的预期收益必须相等。在只有一种类型的均衡中，其平均收益必须不低于另一种类型。因此，传统主义者的均衡比例 $x^{*}$ 由下式给出：
$x^{*}= \begin {cases}\frac {\kappa-\Delta \beta}{\kappa (1-\Delta)} & \text {if } \Delta \in\left [0, \frac {\kappa}{\beta}\right] \\ 0 & \text {if } \Delta \in\left [\frac {\kappa}{\beta}, 1\right]\end {cases} \tag {3.1}$

From Fig. 3.1, it is clear that under fairly general conditions ( $\kappa>\Delta \beta$ ), traditionalists are present in society. Their emergence is due to the benefit of cultural transmission, which provides a fairly accurate way of making decisions at a low cost.
从图 3.1 中可以明显看出，在相当普遍的条件下（ $\kappa>\Delta \beta$ ），社会中存在传统主义者。他们的出现是由于文化传播的益处，文化传播提供了一种低成本且相当准确的决策方式。

It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium is stable under the standard assumption that the relative payoffs of types affect their fitness and/or survival. Formally, this can be modeled using the standard replicator dynamic (e.g., Gintis, 1997). In the polymorphic equilibrium, where both types are present, a small perturbation of $x>x^{*}$ causes the payoff of traditionalists to be lower than that of non - traditionalists and $x$ will decrease until $x^{*}$ is reached. If $x<x^{*}$ , the payoff of traditionalists is higher than that of non - traditionalists, and $x$ will increase until $x^{*}$ is reached. In the monomorphic equilibrium with $x^{*}=0$ , a perturbation of $x>x^{*}$ causes the payoff of traditionalists to be lower than that of non - traditionalists and $x$ will decrease until there is convergence to $x^{*}$ .
在标准假设下，即不同类型的相对收益会影响其适应性和 / 或生存能力，很容易证明该均衡是稳定的。正式地，可以使用标准的复制者动态模型（例如，金蒂斯，1997）进行建模。在多态均衡中，当两种类型都存在时， $x>x^{*}$ 的一个小扰动会导致传统主义者的收益低于非传统主义者， $x$ 将下降直至达到 $x^{*}$ 。如果 $x<x^{*}$ ，传统主义者的收益高于非传统主义者， $x$ 将增加直至达到 $x^{*}$ 。在 $x^{*}=0$ 的单态均衡中， $x>x^{*}$ 的一个扰动会导致传统主义者的收益低于非传统主义者， $x$ 将下降直至收敛到 $x^{*}$ 。

3.2.1.2 Evidence

3.2.1.2 证据

In the model, the presence of culture in equilibrium is due to the benefit of cultural transmission, which provides a fairly accurate way of making decisions at a low cost. Anthropologists have documented numerous real - world examples of functional cultural traits being followed despite the population not knowing their benefits. One of the best - known examples is the alkali processing of maize, which is the traditional method of preparing maize in many parts of Latin America. During the process, dried maize is boiled in a mixture of water and limestone or ash, before being mashed into a dough called ‘masa’. Although it was unknown at the time, putting limestone, or ash in the water before boiling prevents pellagra, a disease resulting from niacin deficiency, which is common in diets that consist primarily of maize. The alkaline solution that is created when limestone or ash is added increases the body’s absorption of niacin (Katz et al., 1974).
在模型中，均衡状态下文化的存在是由于文化传播的益处，它提供了一种低成本且相当准确的决策方式。人类学家记录了许多现实世界中的例子，人们遵循功能性文化特征，但并不知道其益处。最著名的例子之一是玉米的碱处理，这是拉丁美洲许多地方传统的玉米制备方法。在这个过程中，干玉米在水和石灰石或灰烬的混合物中煮沸，然后捣成面团，称为 “masa”。虽然当时人们并不知道，但在煮玉米前在水中加入石灰石或灰烬可以预防糙皮病，这是一种由烟酸缺乏引起的疾病，在以玉米为主食的饮食中很常见。加入石灰石或灰烬后产生的碱性溶液可以增加人体对烟酸的吸收（卡茨等人，1974）。

Another example of the benefits of culture and tradition is documented in Billing and Sherman (1998). The authors examine data for 43 spices from 4,578 meat - based recipes in 93 cookbooks from 36 countries. They document several empirical regularities that are consistent with the use of spices as antimicrobials even though this benefit was unknown. They show that spices that are more commonly used are the ones that are more antimicrobial. Societies in hotter climates tend to use more antimicrobial spices. Spices are used in ways, and in combinations, that appear to maximize their antimicrobial properties. For example, onions are not effective unless they are cooked and cilantro is not effective if it is cooked. In most recipes, onions are cooked and cilantro is not. Another example is chili powder (e.g., red pepper, onion, garlic, cumin, etc.), which contains a combination of spices that generates complementarities and maximizes their effectiveness.
比林和谢尔曼（1998）记录了另一个文化和传统益处的例子。作者研究了来自 36 个国家 93 本烹饪书中 4578 个以肉类为主的食谱中使用的 43 种香料的数据。他们记录了一些经验规律，这些规律与香料作为抗菌剂的使用相一致，尽管人们当时并不知道这一益处。他们发现，使用更普遍的香料抗菌性更强。气候较热地区的社会倾向于使用更多抗菌香料。香料的使用方式和组合似乎能最大化其抗菌特性。例如，洋葱不煮熟就没有效果，香菜煮熟后就没有效果。在大多数食谱中，洋葱是煮熟的，而香菜则不煮。另一个例子是辣椒粉（如红椒、洋葱、大蒜、孜然等），它含有多种香料的组合，产生互补作用，最大化了它们的功效。

Another well - known example of a tradition with unknown benefits is from the Naskapi, an indigenous First Nations society who traditionally lived on land that today is in Quebec, Newfoundland and Labrador (Speck, 1935). The primary form of subsistence of the Naskapi was caribou hunting. Deciding where to hunt was an important decision. The hunters would like to hunt in the locations where the caribou are. By contrast, the caribou would like to avoid the locations where the hunters are. Effectively, this is a two - dimension version of the game “matching pennies.” We know that in such a game, the only Nash equilibrium is a mixed strategy equilibrium where one randomly chooses each direction with equal probability. The difficulty is that human beings are notoriously bad at randomizing and instead would tend to follow certain patterns, which could be detected by the Caribou. The Naskapi developed a ritual that they undertook prior to hunting expeditions. They would put the shoulder blade of a caribou in the fire. It would then burn and crack and the patterns of these told the hunters where they should hunt. Although this was unknown, the ritual was effective because it provided a method to randomly select the location of the next hunting expedition.
另一个关于未知益处传统的著名例子来自纳斯卡皮人，这是一个第一民族原住民社会，传统上生活在今天魁北克、纽芬兰和拉布拉多的土地上（斯佩克，1935）。纳斯卡皮人的主要生存方式是猎捕驯鹿。决定去哪里狩猎是一个重要决策。猎人希望在驯鹿所在的地方狩猎，而驯鹿则希望避开猎人所在的地方。实际上，这是一个二维版的 “猜硬币” 游戏。我们知道，在这样的游戏中，唯一的纳什均衡是混合策略均衡，即参与者随机选择每个方向的概率相等。困难在于，人类随机选择的能力很差，反而倾向于遵循某些模式，而这些模式可能会被驯鹿察觉。纳斯卡皮人在狩猎探险前会进行一种仪式。他们会把驯鹿的肩胛骨放在火上烤。肩胛骨会燃烧并裂开，其裂纹图案会告诉猎人应该去哪里狩猎。虽然当时人们并不知道，但这个仪式是有效的，因为它提供了一种随机选择下一次狩猎地点的方法。

The basic logic described above has been tested and confirmed in numerous studies. One clear prediction of the model above, which is common to most models in the literature, is that we should observe a stronger reliance on culture and tradition when the environment is more stable. This is because evolved traditions are more likely to still be useful in the current environment. Within the evolutionary literature, this prediction has been tested using experimental tools (Galef and Whiskin, 2004; McElreath et al., 2005; Toelch et al., 2009).
上述基本逻辑在众多研究中得到了检验和证实。上述模型（与文献中的大多数模型一样）的一个明确预测是，当环境更稳定时，我们应该观察到人们对文化和传统的更强依赖。这是因为进化而来的传统在当前环境中更有可能仍然有用。在进化文献中，这一预测已通过实验工具进行了检验（加莱夫和惠斯金，2004；麦克尔雷思等人，2005；特尔奇等人，2009）。

Most recently, the prediction that tradition and cultural persistence should be weaker in more unstable environments was tested by Giuliano and Nunn (2021). The study uses paleoclimatic data, combined with information on the historical locations of ethnic groups, to construct estimates of the variability of the ancestral environment across generations for ethnic groups and countries. They find that ancestral climatic stability is associated with greater self - reported importance placed on tradition, and more persistence in cultural traits over time, including among the descendants of immigrants to the United States and the Indigenous populations of the United States and Canada.
最近，朱利亚诺和纳恩（2021）检验了在更不稳定环境中传统和文化持续性应该更弱的预测。该研究使用古气候数据，结合有关族群历史分布的信息，来估计不同族群和国家历代祖先环境的变化程度。他们发现，祖先所处气候的稳定性与人们自我报告的对传统的重视程度更高相关，并且随着时间的推移，文化特征的持续性更强，这一现象在美国移民后代以及美国和加拿大的原住民群体中也存在。

3.2.2 Cultural evolution is cumulative

3.2.2 文化进化具有累积性

3.2.2.1 Theory

3.2.2.1 理论

An important characteristic of the model discussed above, which has long been recognized in the literature, is that, in the long - run, regardless of the extent to which culture is present, the society - wide payoff is $\beta-\kappa$ . This is contrary to the conventional wisdom that humans are more successful than other animals because we have culture, which leads to greater group - level success (Henrich, 2016). Subsequent theoretical work has shown that this characteristic of Rogers’ model is not due to its simplicity. Instead, it is general and found in a large class of models where the only benefit of culture is to save on individual - level information acquisition (Boyd and Richerson, 1995, 2005).
上述讨论的模型有一个重要特征，在文献中早已被认识到，即从长远来看，无论文化存在的程度如何，社会的总收益都是 $\beta-\kappa$ 。这与传统观点相悖，传统观点认为人类比其他动物更成功是因为我们拥有文化，而文化会带来更大的群体层面的成功（亨里奇，2016）。随后的理论研究表明，罗杰斯模型的这一特征并非因其简单性，而是普遍存在于一类模型中，在这类模型中，文化的唯一益处是节省个体层面的信息获取成本（博伊德和里彻森，1995，2005）。

This has led to an emphasis on ‘cumulative cultural evolution’ as a key benefit of culture. It is related to the benefit of information acquisition, highlighted in the model above but conceptually distinct. To put it simply (and to use multiple clichés), an important benefit of culture is that it means that we do not have to ‘reinvent the wheel’ and that we can ‘stand on the shoulders of giants.’ We can take as given the knowledge or traditions of the previous generation, without necessarily understanding them fully, and build on them, continuing the process of incremental cultural innovation.
这导致人们强调 “累积文化进化” 是文化的关键益处。它与上述模型中强调的信息获取益处相关，但在概念上又有所不同。简单来说（用一些俗语），文化的一个重要益处是意味着我们不必 “重新发明轮子”，并且我们可以 “站在巨人的肩膀上”。我们可以接受上一代人的知识或传统，而不必完全理解它们，并在此基础上继续进行渐进式的文化创新。

To see the logic of this, consider the following variant of the model above, which is detailed in Boyd and Richerson (1985, 1995). The setup is the same except there is a continuum of states. As before, in each period, there is a probability that the environment switches to a new state. There is also a continuum of behaviors, with one behavior yielding the highest payoff for each possible state. In addition, the payoff of a behavior in a particular state is decreasing in the distance from the state’s optimal behavior. We will see examples below, but concretely one can think of the behavior as being the technology used to build tools or houses, or strategies used to forage for food or hunt for game. The further one deviates from the optimal strategy or technology, the lower is one’s expected payoff.
为了理解其中的逻辑，考虑上述模型的一个变体，该变体在博伊德和里彻森（1985，1995）中有详细阐述。模型设定与之前相同，只是状态是连续的。和之前一样，在每个时期，环境都有一定概率切换到新状态。行为也是连续的，对于每个可能的状态，都有一种行为能产生最高收益。此外，在特定状态下，一种行为的收益随着与该状态最优行为的距离增加而减少。下面我们会看到具体例子，具体来说，可以将行为视为用于制造工具或建造房屋的技术，或者是用于觅食或狩猎的策略。与最优策略或技术的偏差越大，预期收益就越低。

Unlike the model above, it is now assumed that all individuals can modify their behavior by learning. Individuals start with an initial guess and then through costly trial and error modify their behavior. Following the same logic as above, there are two types: traditionalists and non - traditionalists. Traditionalists adopt the behavior of a randomly chosen individual from the previous generation and use this as the starting point from which they experiment. By contrast, non - traditionalists ignore the behavior from the previous generation and use a fixed behavior as their starting point and they always acquire the optimal behavior given the current state. Relative to non - traditionalists, traditionalists invest much less in changing their behavior and thus they improve upon their initial behavior much less than a non - traditionalist.
与上述模型不同的是，现在假设所有个体都可以通过学习来修改自己的行为。个体从一个初始猜测开始，然后通过代价高昂的试错来修改行为。遵循与上述相同的逻辑，存在两种类型：传统主义者和非传统主义者。传统主义者采用上一代随机选择的个体的行为，并以此作为实验的起点。相比之下，非传统主义者忽略上一代的行为，以固定行为作为起点，并且总是根据当前状态获得最优行为。相对于非传统主义者，传统主义者在改变行为上投入较少，因此他们对初始行为的改进比非传统主义者少得多。

3.3 Insights from a recognition of history as evolution

3.3 从将历史视为进化中获得的洞见

I now turn to a discussion of how an evolutionary framework provides a range of insights relevant for economics. At this point, a few caveats are in order. Although I have organized these insights into subsections, the ideas do not necessarily flow from one subsection to the next. These should be thought of as disparate insights that have come to me from reading the cultural evolution and economic history literature in tandem. In addition, in no way do I think that the insights and connections described below are complete or even representative. My sense is that they are still just the tip of the iceberg in terms of fruitful ideas and research that will emerge from a more evolutionary perspective within economics.
现在我来讨论进化框架如何为经济学提供一系列相关洞见。在此需要先提出几点注意事项。尽管我把这些洞见分小节进行了整理，但各小节的观点并非必然相互关联。这些应被视为我在同时研读文化进化和经济史文献时获得的不同见解。此外，我绝不认为下面描述的见解和联系是完整的，甚至也不认为它们具有代表性。我觉得，从经济学中更具进化视角的角度来看，这些不过是未来富有成果的观点和研究的冰山一角。

3.3.1 Environmental mismatch

3.3.1 环境错配

An important consequence of cultural evolution is that it can result in environmental mismatch. To see this, we return to the model of Rogers (1988). In the model, the benefit of culture is that it saves on information acquisition costs. However, the cost is that when the environment changes, traditionalists (i.e., those who rely on culture for decision making) do not choose actions that respond as quickly to the environment as non - traditionalists do. To see this, consider Fig. 3.2, which shows how the actions chosen in society respond to a change in the state of the world that occurs between periods 0 and 1. Different paths are reported, each for a society with a different equilibrium proportion of traditionalists (which is due to differences in the underlying $\Delta$ ). As shown, societies with fewer traditionalists (low $x^{*}$ ) respond more quickly and more fully to a change in the environment.
文化进化的一个重要后果是可能导致环境错配。为理解这一点，我们回到罗杰斯（1988）的模型。在该模型中，文化的益处在于节省信息获取成本。然而，代价是当环境发生变化时，传统主义者（即那些依据文化进行决策的人）不会像非传统主义者那样迅速地选择适应环境变化的行动。如图 3.2 所示，该图展示了社会中所选择的行动如何对 0 到 1 期之间世界状态的变化做出反应。图中呈现了不同的路径，每条路径对应着一个传统主义者均衡比例不同的社会（这是由潜在的 $\Delta$ 差异导致的）。可以看出，传统主义者较少（ $x^{*}$ 较低）的社会对环境变化的反应更快、更充分。

The most well - known examples of mismatch are actually from evolutionary biology. One is sea turtles. The mothers leave the ocean, come to shore, and bury their eggs on sandy beaches. Once the sea turtles hatch, they need to make their way back to the ocean. They have evolved a method that allows them to do this simply. After they are born, at night, they head directly towards any bright light. In their natural environment, the only bright light is the reflection of the moon off of the water. By moving in the direction of the moon’s reflection, sea turtles are able to navigate towards the water (Ehrenfeld and Carr, 1967). This evolved mechanism worked extremely well until the environment changed. In the modern world, where cities and freeways with bright lights are often located next to beaches, this biological heuristic works less well. Instead of heading towards the ocean, baby turtles move towards city lights which are in the opposite direction of the ocean (Salmon et al., 1995). This is an example of mismatch. A trait that worked well in the environment in which it evolved works poorly in the current environment.
最著名的环境错配例子实际上来自进化生物学。以海龟为例，海龟妈妈离开海洋，上岸并在沙滩上产卵。小海龟孵化后，需要回到海洋。它们进化出了一种简单的导航方式，出生后在夜间，会径直朝着任何亮光前进。在自然环境中，唯一的亮光就是月光在水面的反射，朝着月光反射的方向移动，海龟就能游向大海（埃伦菲尔德和卡尔，1967）。这种进化而来的机制一直运作得很好，直到环境发生了变化。在现代社会，城市和高速公路的亮光常常出现在海滩附近，这种生物学启发式方法就不那么有效了。小海龟不再游向海洋，而是朝着与海洋相反方向的城市灯光爬去（萨尔蒙等人，1995）。这就是环境错配的例子，一种在其进化环境中效果良好的特征，在当前环境中却表现不佳。

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Another commonly cited example is the dodo bird (raphus cucullatus), which is a bird that lived on the Island of Mauritius. A sketch of the bird from 1626 is shown in Fig. 3.3. Because of a scarcity of berries and other food during certain times of the year, dodo birds developed accumulations of fat on their bodies. They lost the ability to fly but developed a keen sense of smell that allowed them to track down the limited amounts of berries that existed during seasonal scarcity. Because there were no predators on the islands, they didn’t develop special strategies to hide or protect their eggs. In all, they were well - adapted to their environment (Claessens et al., 2015; Gold et al., 2016). However, after human contact, predators like pigs, rats, and dogs were brought to the islands. The unprotected eggs and the flightless birds did not fare well and the species soon became extinct.
另一个常被引用的例子是渡渡鸟（Raphus cucullatus），它生活在毛里求斯岛。图 3.3 展示了 1626 年绘制的渡渡鸟素描。由于一年中某些时候浆果和其他食物稀缺，渡渡鸟身体积累了脂肪。它们失去了飞行能力，但嗅觉变得敏锐，能够找到季节性短缺时有限的浆果。因为岛上没有捕食者，它们也没有进化出保护蛋的特殊策略。总体而言，它们非常适应所处的环境（克莱森斯等人，2015；戈尔德等人，2016 ）。然而，人类来到岛上后，带来了猪、老鼠和狗等捕食者。没有保护的蛋和不会飞的渡渡鸟难以生存，该物种很快就灭绝了。

The notion of mismatch provides a framework that provides a deeper understanding of recent empirical findings from the historical economics literature. For example, the finding that Africa’s slave trades reduced contemporary levels of trust from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), combined with the evidence that increased trust is associated with higher incomes at both the country - and individual - level (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Butler et al., 2016), suggests that the current levels of trust within Africa may be suboptimal. They may have been well - suited to the 400 - year period of intensive slave raiding that the continent experienced, but they are likely lower than optimal in the current environment.
环境错配的概念为深入理解历史经济学文献中的近期实证发现提供了一个框架。例如，纳恩和万切孔（2011）发现非洲奴隶贸易降低了当代的信任水平，再结合在国家和个人层面上，信任度提高与收入增加相关的证据（阿尔甘和卡于克，2010；巴特勒等人，2016），这表明非洲目前的信任水平可能并非最优。这些信任水平可能曾很好地适应了非洲大陆经历的长达 400 年的密集奴隶掠夺时期，但在当前环境下，它们很可能低于最优水平。

One of the nicest historical examples of mismatch is from Avner Greif’s (1989, 1993, 1994) studies of the Maghribi and Genoese merchants of the Medieval Mediterranean. One group, the Maghribi traders, were Jewish traders who had migrated from Baghdad to Tunis and had adopted the values of Muslim society. They began trading in the early 11th Century. According to Greif, their merchant - agent relationships relied on information sharing. If an agent cheated a merchant, then no other merchants would hire the agent. This created a form of collective punishment, which required information sharing and the formation of dense information networks. The other group of traders in the region at the time were traders from Genoa, who did not engage in the same form of collective punishment of cheating agents. Instead, they were highly individualistic and did not engage in information sharing. The wage that had to be paid to keep an agent from cheating was lower in the collectivist regime of the Maghribi than under the individualistic regime of the Genoese.
环境错配在历史上一个很好的例子来自阿夫纳・格雷夫（1989、1993、1994）对中世纪地中海地区马格里布和热那亚商人的研究。马格里布商人是一群从巴格达迁移到突尼斯并接受了穆斯林社会价值观的犹太商人，他们在 11 世纪初开始从事贸易活动。据格雷夫所述，他们的商人和代理人关系依赖于信息共享。如果一个代理人欺骗了一个商人，那么其他商人就不会再雇佣这个代理人。这就形成了一种集体惩罚机制，需要信息共享并建立密集的信息网络。当时该地区的另一群商人是热那亚商人，他们不会对欺骗行为的代理人进行同样形式的集体惩罚。相反，他们高度个人主义，不进行信息共享。在马格里布集体主义制度下，为防止代理人作弊所需支付的工资比热那亚个人主义制度下要低。

From the early 11th to 12th Centuries, trade between Spain and Constantinople expanded significantly. In response, the Genoese expanded by creating new merchant - agent relationships with non - Genoese. A consequence of this is that formal organizations and legal practices developed to facilitate these forms of cross - group exchange. The institutions that emerged were helpful for longer - term economic development (Greif, 1994). By contrast, the Maghribi, because of the equilibrium they were in, could only expand by creating new merchant - agent relationships within their own group. Thus, more formal institutional structures did not develop and commerce continued to rely on informal enforcement mechanisms such as social norms of group punishment.
11 世纪初到 12 世纪，西班牙和君士坦丁堡之间的贸易显著扩张。作为回应，热那亚人通过与非热那亚人建立新的商人和代理人关系来扩大业务。这导致了正式组织和法律实践的发展，以促进这种跨群体的交换形式。新出现的制度对长期经济发展很有帮助（格雷夫，1994）。相比之下，马格里布人由于所处的均衡状态，只能通过在自己群体内建立新的商人和代理人关系来实现扩张。因此，更正式的制度结构没有发展起来，商业活动继续依赖于诸如群体惩罚的社会规范等非正式执行机制。

Another example of mismatch is highlighted by the recent study by Alesina et al. (2013a), which measures perceptions of intergenerational mobility in Sweden, Italy, France, the U.K., and the United States. The authors find that the sample from the United States has, by far, the most optimistic perceptions of the amount of economic mobility in their country. This is particularly striking since the United States has the lowest mobility of the countries studied. In addition, for the other countries, the measures of perceived mobility and actual mobility are pretty similar. For the United States, perceived mobility is far from actual mobility. Thus, the United States appears to be a clear outlier in terms of its perceptions about mobility.
阿莱西纳等人（2013a）最近的一项研究突出了另一个环境错配的例子，该研究衡量了瑞典、意大利、法国、英国和美国对代际流动性的认知。作者发现，美国的样本对本国经济流动性的认知最为乐观。鉴于美国在所研究国家中实际流动性最低，这一发现尤为引人注目。此外，在其他国家，感知到的流动性和实际流动性的衡量结果相当相似。而在美国，感知到的流动性与实际流动性相差甚远。因此，美国在对流动性的认知方面显然是个例外。

While this has yet to be studied thoroughly, the origins of this misperception are most likely due to the fact that in the 19th Century, the United States was a settler economy with very high levels of mobility, and much higher than other comparable countries, like Great Britain, at the time (Long and Ferrie, 2013). It was likely this environment that generated some of the values and beliefs that are particularly American, such as a belief in the American Dream (anyone can make it if they work hard enough), a desire to have limited government, and a limited set of policies that economically support the population and/or redistribute income, such as universal health care or high - quality public schooling. While other factors are clearly important, such as the history of race relations, a key determinant of these beliefs is likely the high mobility experienced in the U.S. historically. While these beliefs may have been accurate and well - suited for the historical setting, it is less clear that they are well - suited to the current environment.
虽然这一误解的根源尚未得到充分研究，但很可能是因为在 19 世纪，美国是一个移民经济国家，具有很高的流动性，比当时其他可比国家（如英国）高得多（朗和费里，2013）。很可能正是这种环境孕育了一些美国特有的价值观和信念，比如对美国梦的信仰（只要足够努力，任何人都能成功）、对有限政府的渴望，以及一套有限的经济支持和 / 或再分配政策（如全民医保或高质量的公立教育）。虽然其他因素显然也很重要，比如种族关系的历史，但这些信念的一个关键决定因素可能是美国历史上的高流动性。虽然这些信念可能在历史背景下是准确且合适的，但它们是否适合当前环境就不那么确定了。

Viewing the world through the lens of mismatch also generates insights that are important for policy. One example of this is the recent paper by Heller et al. (2017), which examines the effectiveness of a series of interventions from 2009 to 2015 aimed at improving the outcomes of disadvantaged youth from Chicago. One was a one - year program called ‘Becoming a Man’ (BAM), which was developed by the Chicago nonprofit Youth Guidance. The other was a version of the same program that was stretched out over two years. The programs comprised 2,740 and 2,064 randomly - chosen youth, respectively. Both versions of the program had significant effects. They reduced total arrests by 28–35%, arrests for violent crime by 45–50%, and arrests for other crimes by 37–43%. The authors also found persistent effects on schooling outcomes: graduation rates increased by 6–9 percentage points. The third program had many of the same elements of BAM but was implemented among high - risk juvenile arrestees by the Cook County, Illinois Juvenile Treatment Detention Center. This program was also very successful, reducing readmission rates to the detention center by 21%.
从环境错配的角度看待世界也能为政策制定带来重要见解。海勒等人（2017）最近的一篇论文就是一个例子，该论文研究了 2009 年至 2015 年一系列旨在改善芝加哥弱势青年状况的干预措施的有效性。其中一个是由芝加哥非营利组织青年指导中心开发的为期一年的 “成为男子汉”（BAM）项目。另一个是同样项目的两年期版本。这两个项目分别随机选取了 2740 名和 2064 名年轻人。两个版本的项目都取得了显著成效，总逮捕率降低了 28 - 35%，暴力犯罪逮捕率降低了 45 - 50%，其他犯罪逮捕率降低了 37 - 43%。作者还发现这些项目对学业成果有持续影响：毕业率提高了 6 - 9 个百分点。第三个项目包含 BAM 的许多相同要素，由伊利诺伊州库克县青少年治疗拘留中心针对高风险少年犯实施。这个项目也非常成功，将拘留中心的再犯率降低了 21%。

The authors also study potential mechanisms that could explain the results. They find that the evidence points to one aspect of the interventions being particularly important. To understand the mechanism, we must first recognize that much of our behavior is driven by automatic impulses – what Daniel Kahneman (2011) calls ‘system 1’. (For cultural economists and those studying cultural evolution, system 1 is closely associated with transmitted cultural values and beliefs.) This is also true for the youth in the programs, who are from distressed neighborhoods where being aggressive and fighting is often necessary to save one’s reputation. However, these automatic responses, although generally adaptive to the youth’s environment, may not be the best response in many situations, like in school. The programs helped students develop the mental tools necessary to switch from an automatic reaction based on system 1 responses to one that is more thoughtful, takes into account the specifics of the situation, and relies on system 2 thinking, which is more slow and deliberative. According to the authors, a key consequence of the experiments is that they teach “a greater sense of occasion” (Heller et al., 2017, p. 6).
作者们还研究了能够解释这些结果的潜在机制。他们发现，有证据表明干预措施中的一个方面尤为重要。为了理解这一机制，我们首先必须认识到，我们的许多行为是由自动冲动驱动的 —— 丹尼尔・卡尼曼（2011）将其称为 “系统 1”。（对于文化经济学家和研究文化进化的人来说，系统 1 与传承下来的文化价值观和信仰密切相关。）参与项目的年轻人也是如此，他们来自贫困社区，在那里，为了维护自己的声誉，好斗和打架往往是必要的。然而，这些自动反应虽然通常适应年轻人所处的环境，但在许多情况下，比如在学校里，可能并不是最佳反应。这些项目帮助学生培养了必要的思维工具，使他们能够从基于系统 1 反应的自动反应，转变为更具思考性、考虑到具体情况并依赖系统 2 思维的反应，系统 2 思维更加缓慢且深思熟虑。作者认为，这些实验的一个关键成果是，它们培养了 “更强的情境意识”（海勒等人，2017，第 6 页）。

This example illustrates that one solution to cultural mismatch is to attempt to reduce the reliance of decision - making on the cultural trait. In this case, there was a reduction in the reliance on system 1 and an increase in the use of system 2. The study also provides an excellent example of how knowing the cultural and psychological roots of behavior can help design policy that can effectively improve the actions and outcomes of those involved.
这个例子说明，解决文化错配问题的一种方法是尝试减少决策对文化特质的依赖。在这个案例中，对系统 1 的依赖减少了，而系统 2 的使用增加了。该研究还提供了一个很好的例子，表明了解行为的文化和心理根源，有助于制定能够有效改善相关人员行为和结果的政策。

Another example of mismatch and its implications for policy is explored in the recent study by Bursztyn et al. (2020). The authors study Saudi Arabia, a setting that is much less supportive of female employment outside of the home than the rest of the world. The authors study a sample of 500 college - educated, married men, aged 18–35, from the city of Riyadh. Participants were divided into groups of 30 individuals from the same neighborhood. They were then asked whether or not they agree that “women should be allowed to work outside the home,” as well as their guess about the number of members of their group who hold this view. The authors found that individuals systematically underestimated the support for women working outside the home. This mismatch between beliefs of the norms held by others and actual norms in the population can be understood as a form of mismatch. Within Saudi Arabia, in recent decades beliefs about women’s work have been changing. Thus, beliefs about norms, which evolved in a previous environment, are not accurate in the current setting.
布尔施泰因等人（2020）最近的一项研究探讨了另一个文化错配的例子及其对政策的影响。作者研究了沙特阿拉伯的情况，与世界其他地区相比，沙特对女性外出工作的支持程度要低得多。作者对来自利雅得市的 500 名年龄在 18 - 35 岁、受过大学教育的已婚男性进行了研究。参与者被分成每组 30 人的小组，来自同一社区。然后，他们被问及是否同意 “女性应该被允许外出工作”，以及他们对小组中持这种观点的人数的猜测。作者发现，人们系统性地低估了对女性外出工作的支持程度。这种对他人所持规范的认知与人群中实际规范之间的差异，可以被理解为一种文化错配。在沙特阿拉伯，近几十年来人们对女性工作的观念一直在变化。因此，在之前环境中形成的规范观念，在当前环境中并不准确。

The authors then test whether the perceived and actual norms of others can be more closely aligned by providing participants with information about the survey - based self - reported beliefs of others within their group. For a randomly - selected half of the sample, this was done. They find that the information provision increased the likelihood that participants signed their wives up for a job - matching service, and that their wives had applied for a job or had interviewed for a job 3–5 months after the experiment. Not surprisingly, the effects are greater for those who had larger initial misperceptions. Thus, the study documents the presence of mismatch and shows how information provision can reduce its severity.
然后，作者测试了通过向参与者提供小组内其他人基于调查的自我报告信念信息，是否能使他们对他人规范的认知与实际规范更接近。他们随机选取了一半的样本进行了此项操作。研究发现，提供信息增加了参与者为妻子报名求职匹配服务的可能性，并且在实验 3 - 5 个月后，他们的妻子更有可能申请工作或参加面试。不出所料，对于初始认知偏差较大的人，这种影响更大。因此，该研究证明了文化错配的存在，并展示了信息提供如何减轻其严重程度。

3.3.1.1 Endogenous mismatch

3.3.1.1 内生性错配

Recent research on the origins of the Industrial Revolution can be viewed through the lens of mismatch where the change in the environment is endogenous to the strength of tradition in society. To see this, we again return to the model from Rogers (1988). In the model, the stability of the environment $\Delta$ was exogenously given. However, in reality, there are many examples of the external environment – such as economic conditions, politics, technology, etc. – being determined by human actions. Further, the rate of technological innovation, economic growth, and political change, itself, can be endogenous to the tradition in society.
近期关于工业革命起源的研究，可以从环境错配的角度来看待，其中环境的变化是由社会传统的强弱内生决定的。为了理解这一点，我们再次回到罗杰斯（1988）的模型。在该模型中，环境的稳定性 $\Delta$ 是外生给定的。然而，在现实中，有很多例子表明外部环境（如经济状况、政治、技术等）是由人类行为决定的。此外，技术创新率、经济增长和政治变革本身也可能取决于社会传统。

Joel Mokyr (2018), in his book Culture of Growth, argues that a crucial determinant of the 18th Century Industrial Revolution in Western Europe was the novel belief that it was acceptable for younger generations to question the wisdom of the previous generations. This change in thinking resulted in a cultural belief that it is possible and desirable to understand how the natural world works. This, in turn, resulted in innovation and knowledge creation, which created the productivity gains of the Industrial Revolution. Mokyr (2018) argues that the presence of this new cultural trait – a weakening of the importance placed on traditional ways of thinking – was present in Western Europe but not China, which explains why, despite similar levels of economic development, the Industrial Revolution did not occur in China. He argues that “the heavy hand of the respect for the ‘ancients’ was felt through much of Chinese history” (p. 298). According to his argument, a weakening of tradition, and the resulting cultural change, are key determinants of the Industrial Revolution and the World’s current economic prosperity.
乔尔・莫基尔（2018）在他的《增长的文化》一书中认为，18 世纪西欧工业革命的一个关键决定因素是一种新的观念，即年轻一代质疑前几代人的智慧是可以接受的。这种思维转变产生了一种文化信念，即理解自然世界的运作方式既是可能的，也是值得追求的。这反过来又导致了创新和知识创造，从而带来了工业革命的生产力提升。莫基尔（2018）认为，这种新的文化特征（即对传统思维方式重视程度的减弱）在西欧存在，但在中国却不存在，这就解释了为什么尽管当时中国和西欧的经济发展水平相似，但工业革命却没有在中国发生。他指出，“在中国历史的大部分时间里，都能感受到对‘古人’的尊崇所带来的沉重影响”（第 298 页）。根据他的观点，传统的弱化以及由此产生的文化变革，是工业革命和当今世界经济繁荣的关键决定因素。

Within this model, this means that in addition to instability $\Delta$ affecting tradition $x^{*}$ , tradition $x^{*}$ can also affect instability $\Delta$ . We can extend the Rogers model to incorporate this mechanism by assuming that the rate of change $\Delta$ is decreasing in the proportion of traditionalists in the economy $x$ : $\Delta (x)$ and $\Delta'(x)<0$ .
在这个模型中，这意味着除了环境不稳定性 $\Delta$ 影响传统主义者的比例 $x^{*}$ 之外，传统主义者的比例 $x^{*}$ 也会影响环境不稳定性 $\Delta$ 。我们可以扩展罗杰斯模型以纳入这一机制，假设变化率 $\Delta$ 随着经济中传统主义者比例 $x$ 的增加而降低： $\Delta (x)$ 且 $\Delta'(x)<0$ 。

We can also add technological progress to the model by altering the payoffs such that the payoff to a matching state and action is $\pi+\beta$ (rather than $\beta$ ) and to a mismatching state and action is $\pi-\beta$ (rather than $-\beta$ ), where $\pi$ can be thought of as the level of technology in the society. Following the logic of Mokyr (2018), assume that increases in $\pi$ occur as a by - product of the information acquisition of non - traditionalists. Therefore, the growth of $\pi$ is a decreasing function of the proportion of traditionalists in the economy: $\frac {\dot {\pi}}{\pi}(x)$ and $\frac {\dot {\pi}'}{\pi}(x)<0$ . Further, assume that instability is driven solely by technological innovation and, therefore, instability is increasing in the rate of technological change: $\Delta (\frac {\dot {\pi}}{\pi}(x))$ and $\Delta'(\frac {\dot {\pi}}{\pi}(x))>0$ . From this it follows that instability $\Delta$ is a decreasing function of the prevalence of tradition $x$ in society: $\Delta (x)$ and $\Delta'(x)<0$ .
我们还可以通过改变收益来将技术进步纳入模型，使得状态和行动匹配时的收益为 $\pi+\beta$ （而不是 $\beta$ ），状态和行动不匹配时的收益为 $\pi-\beta$ （而不是 $-\beta$ ），这里的 $\pi$ 可以被视为社会的技术水平。按照莫基尔（2018）的逻辑，假设 $\pi$ 的增加是非传统主义者获取信息的副产品。因此， $\pi$ 的增长是经济中传统主义者比例的减函数： $\frac {\dot {\pi}}{\pi}(x)$ 且 $\frac {\dot {\pi}'}{\pi}(x)<0$ 。进一步假设不稳定性完全由技术创新驱动，因此不稳定性随着技术变化率的增加而增加： $\Delta (\frac {\dot {\pi}}{\pi}(x))$ 且 $\Delta'(\frac {\dot {\pi}}{\pi}(x))>0$ 。由此可知，不稳定性 $\Delta$ 是社会中传统盛行程度 $x$ 的减函数： $\Delta (x)$ 且 $\Delta'(x)<0$ 。

This setting gives rise to multiple stable equilibria. To see this, first consider an equilibrium where the proportion of traditionalists is high. As a consequence, there is little technological change and the environment is stable. Because of the stability of the environment, the relative benefit of tradition is high, which sustains the high proportion of traditionalists. Thus, such an equilibrium is stable. Second, consider an equilibrium where the proportion of traditionalists is low (even zero). In such an equilibrium, there is a lot of trial - and - error learning, which generates rapid technological change and a highly unstable environment. This in turn results in a relatively low benefit of tradition, which sustains the low proportion of traditionalists. Thus, such an equilibrium is also stable.
这种设定会产生多个稳定均衡。首先考虑传统主义者比例较高的均衡状态。在这种情况下，技术变化很少，环境稳定。由于环境稳定，传统的相对益处较高，这维持了传统主义者的高比例。因此，这样的均衡是稳定的。其次，考虑传统主义者比例较低（甚至为零）的均衡状态。在这种均衡中，存在大量的试错学习，这会带来快速的技术变革和高度不稳定的环境。这反过来又导致传统的益处相对较低，从而维持了传统主义者的低比例。因此，这样的均衡也是稳定的。

To see this more formally, recall the payoffs of the two types:
为了更正式地说明这一点，回顾两种类型的收益：

$\Pi^{T}=\pi+\frac {\beta (1 - x)(1-\Delta)}{1 - x (1-\Delta)}$

$\Pi^{NT}=\pi+\beta-\kappa .$

Assume that the probability that there is no shock in a generation, $1-\Delta$ , is given by the following function: $1-\Delta (x)=x^{\theta}$ for $\theta \in [0,1]$ . With this, the expected payoff of a traditionalist then becomes:
假设一代人中没有冲击的概率 $1-\Delta$ 由以下函数给出： $1-\Delta (x)=x^{\theta}$ ，其中 $\theta \in [0,1]$ 。由此，传统主义者的预期收益变为：

$\Pi^{T}=\pi+\frac {\beta (1 - x) x^{\theta}}{1 - x^{\theta + 1}} .$

The payoffs of the two types are shown in Fig. 3.4 for the case where $\theta=\frac {1}{2}$ . The payoffs to non - traditionalists remain unchanged since they do not depend on $\Delta$ . The payoffs to traditionalists are now increasing in the proportion of traditionalists $x$ . This is because the higher the proportion of traditionalists in the economy, the less innovation, the more stable the environment, and the greater the benefits of tradition. From the figure it is also clear that the level of technology, $\pi$ , does not affect the equilibrium. This is because $\pi$ affects the payoffs of both types symmetrically and additively.
两种类型的收益在 $\theta=\frac {1}{2}$ 的情况下如图 3.4 所示。非传统主义者的收益保持不变，因为它们不依赖于 $\Delta$ 。现在传统主义者的收益随着传统主义者比例 $x$ 的增加而增加。这是因为经济中传统主义者的比例越高，创新越少，环境越稳定，传统的益处就越大。从图中还可以明显看出，技术水平 $\pi$ 不影响均衡。这是因为 $\pi$ 对两种类型的收益影响是对称且可加的。

在这里插入图片描述

The figure also shows that, with endogenous $\Delta$ , there can be multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium, $x^{*}=1$ . Since the proportion of traditionalists is high, economic growth is low, and the environment is stable. This can be thought of as a traditional low - growth equilibrium. In the other equilibrium, $x^{*}=0$ , since the proportion of traditionalists is low, there is rapid economic growth, and the environment is more dynamic. In the figure, $x^{B}$ denotes the boundary of the basins of attraction of the two equilibria. Any initial population distribution of traditionalists greater than $x^{B}$ eventually converges to the $x^{*}=1$ equilibrium. Initial population distributions less than $x^{B}$ converge to the $x^{*}=0$ equilibrium.
该图还表明，在 $\Delta$ 是内生的情况下，可能存在多个均衡。在一个均衡中， $x^{*}=1$ 。由于传统主义者比例高，经济增长缓慢，环境稳定。这可以被视为传统的低增长均衡。在另一个均衡中， $x^{*}=0$ ，由于传统主义者比例低，经济增长迅速，环境更具活力。图中 $x^{B}$ 表示两个均衡吸引域的边界。任何初始传统主义者比例大于 $x^{B}$ 的群体最终都会收敛到 $x^{*}=1$ 的均衡状态。初始传统主义者比例小于 $x^{B}$ 的群体则会收敛到 $x^{*}=0$ 的均衡状态。

A necessary condition for multiple equilibria to arise is that the cost of information acquisition, $\kappa$ , must be sufficiently high; namely, $\kappa>\frac {\beta \theta}{1+\theta}$ . If this is not satisfied, then the equilibrium with $x^{*}=0$ is unique. Intuitively, if acquiring information is sufficiently easy, then traditionalists are not present in equilibrium.
出现多个均衡的一个必要条件是信息获取成本 $\kappa$ 必须足够高，即 $\kappa>\frac {\beta \theta}{1+\theta}$ 。如果不满足这一条件，那么 $x^{*}=0$ 的均衡是唯一的。直观地说，如果获取信息足够容易，那么均衡中就不会有传统主义者。

Mokyr’s description of the industrial revolution is one where society transitioned out of the $x^{*}=1$ equilibrium, which featured no (or little) information acquisition and strong importance placed on following the beliefs and actions of previous generations. Because of the strong reliance on tradition, the external environment was stable, which meant that reliance on tradition was efficient.
莫基尔对工业革命的描述是，社会从 $x^{*}=1$ 的均衡状态中转变出来，在这种均衡状态下，几乎没有（或很少）信息获取，并且非常重视遵循前几代人的信仰和行动。由于对传统的强烈依赖，外部环境是稳定的，这意味着对传统的依赖是有效的。

In this setting, a society transitioning from the former to the latter equilibrium requires a reduction in the number of traditionalists below $x^{B}$ . Once this occurs, economic growth increases and the environment becomes less stable, which further reduces the benefits to tradition.
在这种情况下，一个社会要从前一种均衡状态转变到后一种均衡状态，需要将传统主义者的数量减少到 $x^{B}$ 以下。一旦发生这种情况，经济增长会加快，环境会变得不那么稳定，这进一步降低了传统的益处。

3.3.2 Education and cultural evolution

3.3.2 教育与文化进化

I now turn to a discussion of how cultural evolution provides a deeper and more realistic understanding of education, human capital, and innovation. To see this, I return to the definition of culture. Within the cultural evolution literature, the standard definition is something like: “[culture is] the transmission from one generation to the next, via teaching and imitation, of knowledge, values, and other factors that influence behavior. Cultural transmission may have a variety of structures…For example, parents may enculturate their offspring or peers may enculturate each other.” (Boyd and Richerson, 1985, p. 2). This definition is very similar to the standard definition that has emerged in the field of historical development and cultural economics. For example, Guiso et al. (2006) define culture as “customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation.” (p. 23).
现在我来讨论文化进化如何为教育、人力资本和创新提供更深入、更现实的理解。为了说明这一点，我们回到文化的定义。在文化进化文献中，标准定义大致是：“文化是通过教导和模仿，在代际之间传递的知识、价值观以及其他影响行为的因素。文化传播可能有多种结构…… 例如，父母可能会向子女传授文化，同龄人之间也可能相互传授文化。”（博伊德和里彻森，1985，第 2 页）。这个定义与历史发展和文化经济学领域中出现的标准定义非常相似。例如，吉索等人（2006）将文化定义为 “种族、宗教和社会群体代代相传且基本不变的习惯信仰和价值观”（第 23 页）。

At first glance, the two definitions of culture appear essentially identical, which is not surprising since the cultural economics literature builds upon the cultural evolution literature. Both definitions describe the transmission of values and beliefs from one generation to the next. A small but important difference is that “knowledge” and its transmission is mentioned in the definition of Boyd and Richerson (1985) but not Guiso et al. (2006). This is actually an important difference in how culture is defined in the two fields. Within economics, the accumulation and transmission of knowledge within or across generations is not culture. That is human capital. When I first came across the definition from evolutionary anthropology, my immediate reaction was likely the same as your reaction now. Knowledge and technology are conceptually very different from culture. They are examples of human capital and not of culture. But, I have come to realize that, in general, the difference is not clear and making a conceptual distinction between the two is often problematic and not particularly helpful.
乍一看，这两个文化定义基本相同，这并不奇怪，因为文化经济学文献是建立在文化进化文献基础之上的。两个定义都描述了价值观和信仰在代际之间的传递。一个细微但重要的区别是，博伊德和里彻森（1985）的定义中提到了 “知识” 及其传递，而吉索等人（2006）的定义中没有。这实际上是两个领域对文化定义的一个重要差异。在经济学中，知识在代内或代际之间的积累和传递不属于文化范畴，而是人力资本。当我第一次看到进化人类学的这个定义时，我的第一反应可能和你现在的反应一样。知识和技术在概念上与文化截然不同，它们是人力资本的例子，而非文化的例子。但是，我逐渐意识到，一般来说，这种区别并不明显，对二者进行概念区分往往存在问题，而且并没有特别大的帮助。

Take the example of how to create arrows that are used for hunting. Henrich (2016) describes this process for the indigenous hunter - gatherers of Tierra del Fuego. This production process is relatively simple, requiring only fourteen steps and six material inputs. Henrich (2016, p. 107) describes some of the steps and I quote him directly:
以制作用于狩猎的箭头为例。亨里奇（2016）描述了火地岛土著狩猎采集者的制作过程。这个制作过程相对简单，只需要 14 个步骤和 6 种材料。亨里奇（2016，第 107 页）描述了其中一些步骤，我直接引用他的话：

The process begins by selecting the wood for the shaft, which preferably comes from chaura, a bushy, evergreen shrub. Though strong and light, this wood is a nonintuitive choice since the gnarled branches require extensive straightening. (Why not start with straighter branches?)
制作过程从选择箭杆的木材开始，最好选用查乌拉树的木材，这是一种茂密的常绿灌木。这种木材虽然坚固且轻便，但并不是一个直观的选择，因为其多节的树枝需要大量的拉直处理。（为什么不选用更直的树枝呢？）

The wood is heated, straightened with the craftsman’s teeth, and eventually finished with a scraper. Then, using a preheated and grooved stone, the craftsman presses the shaft into the grooves and rubs it back and forth, pressing it down with a piece of fox skin. The fox skin becomes impregnated with the dust, which prepares it for the polishing stage. (Does it have to be fox skin?)
将木材加热，用工匠的牙齿拉直，最后用刮刀进行修整。然后，工匠用一块预热且带凹槽的石头，将箭杆压入凹槽并来回摩擦，用一块狐狸皮压住箭杆。狐狸皮会沾上灰尘，这为抛光阶段做好了准备。（必须用狐狸皮吗？）
Bits of pitch, gathered from the beach, are chewed and mixed with ash. (What if you don’t include ash?)
从海滩收集的小块沥青被咀嚼后与灰烬混合。（如果不加入灰烬会怎样？）
The mixture is then applied to both ends of a heated shaft, which must then be coated with white clay. (What about red clay? Do you have to heat it?) This prepares the ends for the fletching and arrowhead.
然后将混合物涂抹在加热后的箭杆两端，接着必须用白粘土覆盖。（用红粘土怎么样？必须加热吗？）这为安装箭羽和箭头做好了准备。
Two feathers are used for the fletching, preferably from the left wing of the bird, and vice versa for the lefties. (Does this really matter?)
用两根羽毛做箭羽，最好取自鸟的左翼，左撇子则相反。（这真的重要吗？）
The feathers are lashed to the shaft with sinews from the back of the guanaco, after they are smoothed and thinned with water and saliva. (Why not sinews from the fox that I had to kill for the aforementioned skin?)
羽毛用羊驼背部的筋腱绑在箭杆上，在这之前，筋腱要用水和唾液进行打磨和削薄。（为什么不用为了得到前面提到的狐狸皮而杀死的狐狸的筋腱呢？）

Learning how to successfully create arrowheads requires years of apprenticing. The knowledge, much of which is tacit, is taught over an extended period of time and much of it is codified in terms of tradition. The underlying mechanics and reasons that a certain feather is used or a certain type of wood is used are not understood. Instead, the learning is of culture and traditions. In this case, culture is synonymous with knowledge and human capital.
学习如何成功制作箭头需要多年的学徒生涯。这些知识大多是隐性的，需要长时间传授，而且很多都以传统的形式编纂下来。人们并不理解为什么使用某种羽毛或某种木材的潜在原理和原因。相反，学习的是文化和传统。在这种情况下，文化与知识和人力资本是同义的。

There are numerous examples where the accumulation of human capital is really cultural transmission – i.e., information and knowledge that is transferred through cultural learning. Such examples are also present within the economics literature, although this is often referred to as ‘tacit knowledge’ acquisition rather than cultural transmission. One example is the famous case of Desh Garments, where as part of a 1980 joint - venture agreement between South Korea’s Daewoo and Bangladesh’s Desh garments, 130 workers from Desh garments were brought to a Daewoo garment plant located in Busan, South Korea (Easterly, 2001). This episode of cultural transmission had a dramatic effect on garment production in Bangladesh. Annual production increased from 43,000 shirts in 1980 to 2.3 million in 1987. Of the 130 Desh workers who had traveled to South Korea, 115 of them left Desh garments to start their own garment companies at some point in the 1980s.
有很多例子表明，人力资本的积累实际上就是文化传播，即通过文化学习传递的信息和知识。经济学文献中也有这样的例子，尽管这通常被称为 “隐性知识” 获取，而非文化传播。一个著名的例子是德什服装公司的案例。1980 年，作为韩国大宇和孟加拉国德什服装公司合资协议的一部分，130 名德什服装公司的工人被带到韩国釜山的大宇服装厂（伊斯特利，2001）。这一文化传播事件对孟加拉国的服装生产产生了巨大影响。年产量从 1980 年的 4.3 万件衬衫增加到 1987 年的 230 万件。在前往韩国的 130 名德什工人中，有 115 人在 20 世纪 80 年代的某个时候离开德什服装公司，创办了自己的服装公司。

Another example, but in a more controlled setting is from an experiment that intentionally varied the amount of cultural transmission to textile firms in India (Bloom et al., 2013, 2020). The authors study 17 firms that comprise 28 medium - sized (100 - 1,000 employees) family - owned textile plants, located in Maharashtra, India. Fourteen of the 28 plants received five months of extensive management consulting, which was valued at $250,000. The consulting was intended to improve management and operations within the plants. They found that in the months following the study, the treatment resulted in fewer defects, inventory savings, and higher total factor productivity. Nine years after treatment, they found that although about half of the previously adopted management improvements had been abandoned, the treated plants still were much more productive than the non - treatment plants. In addition, they found additional forms of cultural transmission. The practices had fully spread to non - treatment plants (even those not involved in the experiment at all) that belonged to the same company (i.e., firm) as a treatment plant. Thus, cultural knowledge was transmitted fully within the company.
另一个例子是在更可控的环境下进行的实验，该实验有意改变印度纺织公司的文化传播程度（布鲁姆等人，2013，2020）。作者研究了 17 家公司，这些公司由位于印度马哈拉施特拉邦的 28 家中型（100 - 1000 名员工）家族式纺织厂组成。28 家工厂中有 14 家接受了为期 5 个月、价值 25 万美元的广泛管理咨询服务。该咨询旨在改善工厂的管理和运营。他们发现，在研究后的几个月里，这种处理减少了缺陷、节省了库存，并提高了全要素生产率。在处理 9 年后，他们发现虽然之前采用的管理改进措施约有一半已被放弃，但接受处理的工厂仍然比未接受处理的工厂生产率高得多。此外，他们还发现了其他形式的文化传播。这些实践完全传播到了与接受处理的工厂属于同一家公司（即企业）的未处理工厂（甚至包括那些根本未参与实验的工厂）。因此，文化知识在公司内部得到了充分传播。

A theoretical model of such processes of cultural transmission was developed by Henrich (2004b). To anthropologists, the model is one of cultural transmission. To economists, it is one of human capital accumulation. In the model, in each period there is a role model. Depending on the setting, this person could be a master craftsman, the village sage, or even a professor of economics. There are $N$ pupils who learn from the role model, who is the most prolific and highly skilled individual of their generation. After learning from this teacher, the cultural knowledge /human capital of the pupils is determined from a draw from a distribution. The person with the highest draw then becomes the next role model who conveys their knowledge to the next generation.
亨里奇（2004b）开发了一个关于这种文化传播过程的理论模型。对人类学家来说，这个模型是关于文化传播的。对经济学家来说，它是关于人力资本积累的。在这个模型中，每个时期都有一个榜样。根据不同的背景，这个人可以是一位工匠大师、村里的智者，甚至是一位经济学教授。有 $N$ 个学生向这位榜样学习，榜样是他们这一代中最多产、技能最高的人。学生向这位老师学习后，他们的文化知识 / 人力资本由从一个分布中抽取的值决定。抽到最高值的人随后成为下一个榜样，将自己的知识传授给下一代。

Let $z_{i}$ denote the level of cultural knowledge and human capital of individual $i$ . The role model’s $z$ is denoted $z_{max}$ and is shown by the vertical line in Fig. 3.5. Also shown is the probability distribution of draws of $z$ . In the original model, it is assumed that the distribution is Gumbel $(\alpha, \beta)$ , but subsequent studies find that the predictions hold for a large class of distributions (Vaesen, 2012). Because the role model is the individual with the highest skill in the previous generation, as shown in Fig. 3.5, each student’s $z_{i}$ tends to be lower than that of the role model.

在这里插入图片描述

用 $z_{i}$ 表示个体 $i$ 的文化知识和人力资本水平。榜样的 $z$ 值表示为 $z_{max}$ ，如图 3.5 中的垂直线所示。图中还显示了 $z$ 的抽取概率分布。在原始模型中，假设该分布为冈贝尔分布 $(\alpha, \beta)$ ，但随后的研究发现，该模型的预测对于一大类分布都成立（瓦森，2012）。因为榜样是上一代中技能最高的个体，如图 3.5 所示，每个学生的 $z_{i}$ 往往低于榜样的 $z_{max}$ 。

Because the frontier of knowledge of the next generation, measured by the $z_{max}$ , is governed by the maximum draw of $z$ in that generation, a larger population (and therefore more draws), will result in a higher level of skill for the role model. For the Gumbel distribution, the level of skill of the role model is given by
因为下一代的知识前沿（由 $z_{max}$ 衡量）由该代中 $z$ 的最大抽取值决定，所以人口越多（因此抽取次数越多），榜样的技能水平就越高。对于冈贝尔分布，榜样的技能水平由下式给出：

$z_{max }=\alpha+\beta (\gamma+\ln N),$

where $\gamma$ is the Euler - Mascheroni constant, which is approximately 0.5772. In addition, the growth in the average level of human capital in the economy is given by
其中 $\gamma$ 是欧拉 - 马歇罗尼常数，约为 0.5772。此外，经济中人力资本平均水平的增长由下式给出：

$\Delta \overline {z}=-\alpha+\beta (\gamma+\ln N) .$

In other words, for sustained knowledge growth (or cumulative cultural evolution), the population has to be sufficiently large. In addition, if the population is below a threshold size, then it can experience technological regress. Henrich (2004b) uses these predictions to explain the technological regress observed in Tasmania after it was separated from Australia due to the rising sea levels during the Holocene glacial retreat.
换句话说，为了实现持续的知识增长（或累积文化进化），人口必须足够多。此外，如果人口数量低于某个阈值，就可能出现技术倒退。亨里奇（2004b）用这些预测来解释全新世冰川消退后，塔斯马尼亚岛与澳大利亚分离后出现的技术倒退现象。

The important point here is that a model of cultural evolution is isomorphic to a model of human capital accumulation. In this sense, given that human capital has been at the core of our discipline for centuries, it turns out that we have been believers in culture all along.
这里的重点是，文化进化模型与人力资本积累模型是同构的。从这个意义上说，鉴于几个世纪以来人力资本一直是我们学科的核心，事实证明我们一直都认可文化的重要性。

3.3.2.1 Innovation and the collective brain

3.3.2.1 创新与集体大脑

To drive home the similarity of cultural transmission and knowledge accumulation, both empirically and theoretically, I will compare two ways of thinking about knowledge. One will be familiar to the reader and is at the center of endogenous growth theory. The other, which will be less familiar, is from evolutionary anthropology and emphasizes the fact that knowledge creation occurs through a process of cumulative cultural evolution and cultural transmission.
为了从经验和理论两方面深入说明文化传播和知识积累的相似性，我将对比两种关于知识的思考方式。一种读者可能较为熟悉，它是内生增长理论的核心。另一种则相对陌生，源自进化人类学，强调知识创造是通过累积文化进化和文化传播过程实现的。

As a conceptual framework to aid in the discussion, consider the following setting. Society has a population of size $L$ . Assume that the fraction $\gamma$ of the population $L$ is exposed to a role model and thus has the opportunity to innovate. For those with this opportunity, innovation occurs with probability $\mu$ . The extent to which an innovation diffuses into the aggregate economy (e.g., through social learning or cultural transmission), which raises knowledge growth $\frac {\dot {A}}{A}$ , is increasing in the connectivity and cohesiveness of the population $\theta$ . Thus, knowledge growth is given by:
作为辅助讨论的概念框架，请考虑以下设定。社会人口规模为 $L$ 。假设人口 $L$ 中有 $\gamma$ 比例的人接触到榜样，因此有机会进行创新。对于有此机会的人，创新发生的概率为 $\mu$ 。一项创新扩散到整体经济中的程度（例如，通过社会学习或文化传播）会促进知识增长 $\frac {\dot {A}}{A}$ ，且这种扩散程度随着人口的连通性和凝聚力 $\theta$ 的增加而提高。因此，知识增长由下式给出：

$\frac {\dot {A}}{A}=\gamma \mu \theta L . \tag {3.2}$

This is a highly - simplified version of an endogenous growth model with scale effects (meaning that the rate of innovation is increasing in the population size). However, it can also be interpreted as a representation of the notion of the ‘collective brain’ from evolutionary anthropology (Muthukrishna and Henrich, 2016). (I return to a detailed discussion of this concept below.)
这是一个高度简化的具有规模效应的内生增长模型（即创新率随人口规模增加而上升）。然而，它也可以被解释为进化人类学中 “集体大脑” 概念的一种体现（穆图克里什纳和亨里奇，2016）。（下面我会详细讨论这个概念。）

Research within the field of economics has tended to focus on two terms in Eq. (3.2). The first is population size, $L$ . The (initially surprising) prediction that the rate of technological change should be increasing in the size of the population, $L$ , was famously tested and confirmed by Kremer (1993). The second area of focus has been on the level of human capital (e.g., health or education) which is an important determinant of $\mu$ (Mankiw et al., 1992).
经济学领域的研究往往聚焦于公式（3.2）中的两个变量。第一个是人口规模 $L$ 。克雷默（1993）对 “技术变革率应随人口规模 $L$ 的增加而上升” 这一（起初令人惊讶的）预测进行了著名的检验并证实了它。第二个关注领域是人力资本水平（例如，健康或教育），它是 $\mu$ 的一个重要决定因素（曼昆等人，1992）。

While research within cultural evolution has recognized the importance of scale effects (e.g., Derex et al., 2013), it has also emphasized the importance of parameters associated with cultural transmission of ideas; namely the amount of connectivity and social learning within a population: $\gamma$ and $\theta$ . The parameter $\gamma$ captures aspects of a society that influence the extent to which all individuals are able to participate in the innovative process. Inclusivity can be along the lines of gender, socioeconomic status, race, ethnicity, place of birth, etc. The parameter $\theta$ can be thought of as capturing how cohesive or connected a population is, which facilitates the diffusion of existing knowledge and the creation of new innovations. Within the literature, this is viewed as the first - order determinant of a society’s success. As Joseph Henrich (2004b, p. 214) puts it: “If you want to have cool technology, it’s better to be social than smart.” The focus on these determinants of aggregate knowledge, which are inherently social, has been developed within a conceptual framework called the ‘collective brain’ (Muthukrishna and Henrich, 2016). Within this framework, the key to knowledge creation is cumulative cultural evolution and social learning. This is what effectively allows humans to have access to a larger repertoire of knowledge and technology that could ever fit into any one individual’s brain. This larger network of knowledge is our ‘collective brain’.
虽然文化进化领域的研究已经认识到规模效应的重要性（例如，德雷克斯等人，2013），但它也强调了与思想文化传播相关参数的重要性；即人口内部的连通性和社会学习程度： $\gamma$ 和 $\theta$ 。参数 $\gamma$ 体现了社会中影响所有个体参与创新过程程度的因素。包容性可以体现在性别、社会经济地位、种族、民族、出生地等方面。参数 $\theta$ 可以被视为反映人口的凝聚力或连通性，它有助于现有知识的传播和新创新的产生。在相关文献中，这被视为社会成功的首要决定因素。正如约瑟夫・亨里奇（2004b，第 214 页）所说：“如果你想要拥有酷炫的技术，善于社交比聪明更重要。” 对这些本质上属于社会范畴的总体知识决定因素的关注，是在一个称为 “集体大脑” 的概念框架内展开的（穆图克里什纳和亨里奇，2016）。在这个框架中，知识创造的关键是累积文化进化和社会学习。正是这些因素有效地使人类能够接触到比任何个人大脑所能容纳的更多的知识和技术。这个更大的知识网络就是我们的 “集体大脑”。

This perspective provides insight into findings from recent research within economics that seeks to understand the determinants of innovation within the United States. Bell et al. (2019) use data from 1.2 million inventors linked to tax records to document the determinants of innovation within the United States, paying particular attention to factors related to the childhood environment. They document significant variation across the United States, with the U.S. South having particularly low levels of innovation. While a modest portion of this is explained by educational attainment, they find other factors to be even more important, including race, gender, and parental income. Interestingly, these effects are most pronounced for the most highly educated children, suggesting that education may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for innovation. There appears to be a missing ingredient that is
这种视角为理解经济学领域近期关于美国创新决定因素的研究发现提供了思路。贝尔等人（2019）利用与税务记录相关联的 120 万发明家的数据，记录了美国创新的决定因素，特别关注与童年环境相关的因素。他们发现美国各地存在显著差异，美国南部的创新水平尤其低。虽然教育程度可以解释其中一部分差异，但他们发现其他因素更为重要，包括种族、性别和父母收入。有趣的是，这些影响在受教育程度最高的孩子身上最为明显，这表明教育可能是创新的必要条件，但不是充分条件。似乎存在一个缺失的因素，它

Interestingly, this prediction was also confirmed by anthropologists who found a strong positive relationship between population size and the number and complexity of pre - industrial marine tools across Polynesian islands (Kine and Boyd, 2010).
有趣的是，人类学家也证实了这一预测。他们发现，在波利尼西亚群岛，人口规模与前工业时代海洋工具的数量和复杂程度之间存在很强的正相关关系（基内和博伊德，2010）。

needed beyond education and one that is correlated with observables like race, income, or residential location.
是除教育之外所必需的，并且与种族、收入或居住地点等可观测因素相关。

The study then attempts to better understand this missing ingredient. Although they do not use this terminology, the patterns they find are exactly those that are predicted by models of the ‘collective brain’ that feature cumulative cultural evolution. They find that the children of inventors are more likely to be inventors themselves. This itself is not particularly surprising, but they also find that the innovation of the children tends to occur within the same fine - grained technology class as their father. The most likely explanation for this is role - model effects and the transfer of cultural knowledge from fathers to sons. The evidence is not consistent with this being the intergenerational transmission of more general human capital or knowledge which is more relevant for certain technology classes. Child innovation plummets drastically within technology classes that are only one or two classes away from those of the parents’ innovations, which is consistent with specific knowledge being transmitted from parents to children.
该研究随后试图更好地理解这个缺失的因素。虽然他们没有使用这个术语，但他们发现的模式与以累积文化进化为特征的 “集体大脑” 模型所预测的完全一致。他们发现，发明家的孩子更有可能成为发明家。这本身并不特别令人惊讶，但他们还发现，孩子的创新往往发生在与父亲相同的细分技术领域内。对此最可能的解释是榜样效应以及文化知识从父亲向儿子的传递。现有证据并不支持这是更普遍的人力资本或与某些技术领域更相关的知识的代际传递。在与父母创新领域仅相差一两个类别的技术领域中，孩子的创新率急剧下降，这与特定知识从父母传递给孩子的观点相符。

These findings may be surprising when one is working within the traditional view of innovation in economics, where an innovator is tinkering in their garage and comes up with a new invention. However, the collective - brain framework has cumulative culture and social learning at its core. Because innovation is social and cumulative, it will not occur unless an individual is exposed to ideas, beliefs, values, and mental models taught by another individual. Since vertical transmission of culture from parents to children is the core mode of cultural transmission, it is not surprising that a child’s ability to innovate depends on the cultural knowledge of their parents. As Muthukrishna and Henrich (2016, p. 4) put it: “The most basic structure of the collective brain is the family. Young cultural learners first gain access to their parents, and possibly a range of alloparents (aunts, grandfathers, etc.).”
在经济学传统的创新观点中，创新者在车库里捣鼓然后想出新发明，从这个角度看，这些发现可能令人惊讶。然而，集体大脑框架的核心是累积文化和社会学习。因为创新具有社会性和累积性，除非个体接触到他人传授的思想、信仰、价值观和思维模式，否则创新不会发生。由于文化从父母到孩子的垂直传播是文化传播的核心模式，所以孩子的创新能力取决于父母的文化知识也就不足为奇了。正如穆图克里什纳和亨里奇（2016，第 4 页）所说：“集体大脑最基本的结构是家庭。年轻的文化学习者首先接触到他们的父母，也可能接触到一系列代理父母（阿姨、祖父等）。”

Bell et al. (2019) also test for the importance of another form of cultural transmission – oblique transmission – although the authors do not use this terminology and instead refer to this as transmission from “parents’ coworkers to children.” They calculate the patent rate among workers in the father’s (NAICS 6 - digit) industry of employment. They find that the rate of innovation in their father’s industry of employment is strongly predictive of child innovation as an adult. In addition, they also find that, here too, the child’s innovation tends to occur within the same technology class as the innovation of the parents’ coworkers.
贝尔等人（2019）还测试了另一种文化传播形式 —— 斜向传播的重要性，尽管作者没有使用这个术语，而是将其称为 “父母的同事向孩子” 的传播。他们计算了父亲（北美产业分类系统 6 位数代码）所在行业工人的专利率。他们发现，父亲所在行业的创新率能够强烈预测孩子成年后的创新情况。此外，他们还发现，在这种情况下，孩子的创新也倾向于发生在与父母同事创新相同的技术领域内。

Although the paper does not have a theoretical framework, the authors’ conceptualization of the mechanisms at play is described as follows: “the data point to mechanisms such as transmission of specific human capital, access to networks that help children pursue a certain subfield, acquisition of information about certain careers, or role - model effects.” (Bell et al., 2019, pp. 688–689). In other words, the authors are describing a model of the collective brain, where knowledge and innovation occur through cumulative cultural evolution and social learning.
虽然这篇论文没有理论框架，但作者对所起作用机制的概念描述如下：“数据指向诸如特定人力资本的传递、接触有助于孩子进入特定子领域的网络、获取某些职业信息或榜样效应等机制。”（贝尔等人，2019，第 688 - 689 页）。换句话说，作者描述的是一个集体大脑模型，在这个模型中，知识和创新是通过累积文化进化和社会学习发生的。

Complementary evidence for the importance of social learning for innovation can be found in a recent study by Andrews (2019) that looks at the effects of U.S. prohibition against alcohol in the early 20th Century. Recognizing the importance of bars, taverns, and saloons for building network connections that facilitated knowledge flow, he estimates the effects that prohibition, which legally penalized these establishments, had on inventive activity as measured by patenting rates. He finds that after the imposition of state - level prohibition, previously wet counties had 8–18% fewer patents per year relative to consistently dry counties. Thus, removing these locations of connectivity had sizeable detrimental effects on innovative activity.
安德鲁斯（2019）最近的一项研究为社会学习对创新的重要性提供了补充证据。该研究考察了 20 世纪初美国禁酒令的影响。他认识到酒吧、酒馆和沙龙对于建立促进知识流动的网络连接的重要性，因此估计了禁酒令（从法律上对这些场所进行处罚）对以专利率衡量的发明活动的影响。他发现，在州级禁酒令实施后，之前不禁酒的县每年的专利数量比一直禁酒的县少 8 - 18% 。因此，消除这些连通性场所对创新活动产生了重大的不利影响。

The logic of cultural evolution, and its connection with technology, innovation, and productivity, helps us to understand the long - term permanent effects of historical events that (temporarily) reduced a population’s inclusiveness. An example is slavery within the United States, where a large proportion of the population was restricted from basic rights and freedoms. Even following the abolition of slavery, intimidation, violence, fear, and discriminatory policies were used to further exclude Americans of African descent. The relationship between slavery and long - term underdevelopment has been well - documented (e.g., Mitchener and McLean, 2003; Nunn, 2008). More specific to the mechanisms of cultural evolution and innovation, Cook (2014) studies the effects of race riots and lynching on the patent rates of African Americans. According to her estimates, these acts of violence reduced African American patenting by 15% annually between 1882 and 1940. This is a sizeable effect and its persistence is a likely determinant for the racial differences in innovation documented by Bell et al. (2019). According to the logic of the ‘collective brain’, when a group is excluded or discouraged from participating in cumulative knowledge creation, this decreases innovation not only in the current period but also in all future periods.
文化进化的逻辑及其与技术、创新和生产力的联系，有助于我们理解那些（暂时）降低人口包容性的历史事件的长期永久性影响。美国的奴隶制就是一个例子，在奴隶制时期，很大一部分人口被剥夺了基本权利和自由。即使在奴隶制废除后，恐吓、暴力、恐惧和歧视性政策仍被用来进一步排挤非裔美国人。奴隶制与长期不发达之间的关系已有充分记录（例如，米切纳和麦克莱恩，2003；纳恩，2008）。更具体地从文化进化和创新的机制来看，库克（2014）研究了种族骚乱和私刑对非裔美国人专利率的影响。据她估计，在 1882 年至 1940 年间，这些暴力行为使非裔美国人的专利申请量每年减少 15% 。这是一个相当大的影响，其持续性很可能是贝尔等人（2019）所记录的创新种族差异的一个决定因素。根据 “集体大脑” 的逻辑，当一个群体被排除在累积知识创造之外或被阻止参与其中时，这不仅会降低当前时期的创新，还会影响所有未来时期的创新。

A potentially important factor affecting a society’s level of connection and cohesion – $\theta$ in Eq. (3.2) – is generalized trust. There is a strong positive relationship between generalized trust and per capita income. This is found whether one looks across countries, U.S. states, or European regions, and has shown to be causal (Algan and Cahuc, 2010, 2013). We also know that part of the effect of trust on income is due to the effect of trust on innovation and knowledge creation. Micro - level evidence for this is found in a recent study by Nguyen (2018) that studies the CEOs of 3,598 public firms in the United States. She collects information on the ancestry of the CEO and of all inventors within the firm and finds that across firms, innovation is more rapid and of higher quality if the CEO is from a place with higher levels of trust in general and with higher levels of trust in the ancestral origins of the inventors in the firm.
一个可能影响社会连通性和凝聚力水平（公式（3.2）中的 $\theta$ ）的重要因素是普遍信任。普遍信任与人均收入之间存在很强的正相关关系。无论是跨国、跨美国各州还是跨欧洲地区进行研究，都能发现这种关系，而且已证实它们之间存在因果联系（阿尔甘和卡于克，2010 年；2013 年）。我们也知道，信任对收入的部分影响源于信任对创新和知识创造的作用。阮（2018 年）最近对美国 3598 家上市公司的首席执行官进行的一项研究为这一点提供了微观层面的证据。她收集了首席执行官的祖籍信息以及公司内部所有发明家的信息，发现从各公司情况来看，如果首席执行官来自普遍信任水平较高的地区，且对公司发明家祖籍地的信任程度也较高，那么公司的创新速度会更快，质量也更高。

The economic benefits of trust raise the question of why all countries do not have higher levels of trust than they do. One explanation for this is that historical events can have persistent adverse effects on trust (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Alsan and Wanamaker, 2018; Lowes and Montero, 2017). Alternatively, societies may be stuck in ‘distrust traps,’ where economic activity is low because trust is low which maintains low levels of trust (Guiso et al., 2008).
信任带来的经济益处引发了一个问题，即为什么并非所有国家都拥有更高水平的信任。对此的一种解释是，历史事件会对信任产生持久的负面影响（纳恩和万切孔，2011 年；阿尔桑和瓦纳梅克，2018 年；洛伊斯和蒙特罗，2017 年）。另一种解释是，社会可能陷入 “不信任陷阱”，即由于信任度低，经济活动不活跃，而这又反过来维持了低信任水平（吉索等人，2008 年）。

A third explanation for this is more subtle and stems from the fact that the positive relationship between trust and income is only found at the society level – e.g., regions or countries. When one looks at the individual level, the relationship is actually not positive and monotonic but hump - shaped (Butler et al., 2016). That is, too high a level of trust is associated with less, and not more, income. Thus, while high levels of trust are associated with better outcomes at the society level, this is not necessarily the case at the individual level. This suggests that trust, like other prosocial cultural traits, is subject to a trade - off between what is optimal for the individual and what is optimal for society.
第三种解释更为微妙，源于这样一个事实：信任与收入之间的正相关关系只在社会层面（如地区或国家层面）存在。从个体层面来看，这种关系实际上并非正相关且单调递增，而是呈倒 U 型（巴特勒等人，2016 年）。也就是说，过高的信任水平与较少而非更多的收入相关。因此，虽然在社会层面，高信任水平与更好的结果相关，但在个体层面却不一定如此。这表明，信任与其他亲社会文化特质一样，面临着个体最优与社会最优之间的权衡。

Another example of the connection between models of the collective brain and research in economic history can be found in studies of international contact and migration, which can be thought of as ways to increase the size, diversity, and connectivity of the collective brain. Consistent with theory, immigration has been shown empirically to be associated with higher incomes, more innovation, and stronger international business connections, in the short - , medium - , and long - runs (Burchardi et al., 2019; Sequeira et al., 2020). The effects that connectivity can have on economic activity were recently studied by Campante and Yanagizawa - Drott (2018), who document a strong effect of the presence of direct flights between cities on foreign ownership links between these locations.
集体大脑模型与经济史研究之间联系的另一个例子体现在对国际交往和移民的研究中，国际交往和移民可以被视为扩大集体大脑规模、增加其多样性和连通性的方式。与理论相符，实证研究表明，移民在短期、中期和长期都与更高的收入、更多的创新以及更紧密的国际商业联系相关（布尔查迪等人，2019 年；塞奎拉等人，2020 年）。坎潘特和柳泽 - 德罗特（2018 年）最近研究了连通性对经济活动的影响，他们发现城市之间直飞航班的存在对这些地方之间的外资所有权联系有很强的影响。

3.3.3 How and why history matters

3.3.3 历史如何以及为何重要

As we have noted, an important aspect of cultural evolution is that it is cumulative. As with biological evolution, the benefit of any possible mutation (and what the optimal next improvement is) depends on the current state of the organism and the environment. In addition, progress must be made in a series of incremental steps (one is not able to jump to a completely different configuration), and each incremental step has to be one that improves the well - being (i.e., fitness) of the organism.
正如我们所指出的，文化进化的一个重要方面是它具有累积性。与生物进化一样，任何可能的突变所带来的益处（以及下一步的最优改进方向）取决于生物体的当前状态和所处环境。此外，进步必须通过一系列渐进的步骤来实现（无法直接跃迁至完全不同的状态），而且每一个渐进步骤都必须能提高生物体的福祉（即适应性）。

To convey the basic logic of this, Richard Dawkins (1996) in his well - known book Climbing Mount Improbable uses the analogy of climbing hills and mountains. One’s location on a slope is the product of a set of cumulative and incremental steps. An additional requirement in an evolutionary setting is that one is only able to move uphill. Since elevation represents the payoff or fitness of an organism, the next step is only taken (i.e., the change is made) if it results in an improvement and moves you uphill. Thus, one is not able to move downhill.
为了阐述这一基本逻辑，理查德・道金斯（1996 年）在其著名著作《攀登不可能的山峰》中使用了爬山的类比。一个人在山坡上的位置是一系列累积和渐进步骤的结果。在进化的情境中，还有一个额外的要求，即只能向上移动。由于海拔高度代表生物体的收益或适应性，只有当下一步能带来改进并使你向更高处移动时，才会迈出这一步（即做出改变）。因此，不能向下移动。

An example of this process is shown in Fig. 3.6, which provides a visual metaphor of the evolution of the eye drawn by neurobiologist Michael F. Land (Dawkins, 1996, p. 195). The figure shows a series of peaks, which represent groupings of the types of eyes that have developed in various parts of the animal kingdom. It is estimated that eyes have independently evolved between forty and sixty times (Dawkins, 1996, p. 139). The figure shows numerous peaks, the heights of which provide some sense of how well - functioning the eyes are. The lower peaks represent the presence of photocells that detect light by capturing photons with a pigment and translating them into nerve impulses. The highest ranges are the most complex eyes found in the animal kingdom that provide fine - grained and precise sight.

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图 3.6 展示了这一过程的一个例子，该图是神经生物学家迈克尔・F・兰德绘制的眼睛进化的可视化隐喻（道金斯，1996 年，第 195 页）。图中显示了一系列山峰，代表动物王国不同部分进化出的不同类型眼睛的集合。据估计，眼睛已经独立进化了 40 到 60 次（道金斯，1996 年，第 139 页）。图中有许多山峰，山峰的高度在一定程度上反映了眼睛的功能完善程度。较低的山峰代表存在能通过色素捕获光子并将其转化为神经冲动来检测光线的光电池。最高的山峰代表动物王国中最复杂的眼睛，能够提供精细和精确的视力。

Two types of peaks are shown: those on the left that represent compound eyes and those on the right representing camera - type eyes. Camera eyes are the eyes that evolved among many mammals including humans. They comprise light - sensitive photocells forming a cup, a pinhole, and a lens (or a curved mirror, denoted by lower peaks). Another completely different type of eye is the compound eye, which is common among insects, crustaceans, and some worms. The main difference here is in how photocells are organized to receive photons. With camera eyes, photocells are organized as if on the inside of a cup backed by an opaque screen so that they look inwards to each other. By contrast, with compound eyes, the photocells are placed on the outside of the cup, causing them to look outwards in different directions.
图中展示了两种类型的山峰：左边的代表复眼，右边的代表摄像头式眼睛。摄像头式眼睛是包括人类在内的许多哺乳动物进化出的眼睛类型。它们由形成杯状的光敏光电池、一个针孔和一个透镜（或一个较低山峰所代表的曲面镜）组成。另一种完全不同类型的眼睛是复眼，常见于昆虫、甲壳类动物和一些蠕虫中。它们的主要区别在于光电池接收光子的组织方式。摄像头式眼睛的光电池就像排列在一个由不透明屏幕支撑的杯子内部，彼此向内看。相比之下，复眼的光电池则放置在杯子的外部，使它们能朝不同方向向外看。

In Fig. 3.6, the peaks represent different equilibrium outcomes or effective steady states. It is only at these peaks that there are no additional steps to be taken. No additional movement can put one further up a slope. The compound eye peaks are drawn to be lower than the camera eyes. This is because compound eyes are not able to see in as much detail as camera eyes unless they are extremely large. For example, for humans to see as well with a compound eye as with our camera eye, the compound eye would have to be 24 meters in diameter (Dawkins, 1996, p. 181).
在图 3.6 中，山峰代表不同的均衡结果或有效稳定状态。只有在这些山峰上，才没有额外的步骤可走。任何额外的移动都无法使生物体向更高的山坡移动。复眼的山峰被绘制得比摄像头式眼睛的山峰低。这是因为除非复眼非常大，否则其无法像摄像头式眼睛那样看清细节。例如，如果人类要用复眼获得与摄像头式眼睛一样好的视力，复眼的直径必须达到 24 米（道金斯，1996 年，第 181 页）。

Now imagine that one is at one of the compound - eye peaks in Fig. 3.6. Can one move to one of the even higher peaks within the camera - type eye mountain range? The answer is no. This would require one to move downhill which is not allowed with evolution. Effectively, there is a valley between the two peaks that cannot be crossed.
现在想象一下，一个生物体位于图 3.6 中复眼的某个山峰上。它能移动到摄像头式眼睛山脉中更高的山峰上吗？答案是否定的。这需要向下移动，而这在进化中是不被允许的。实际上，两座山峰之间有一个无法跨越的山谷。

To see why the ‘no - downhill’ rule has bite, let’s consider a concrete example. One characteristic of camera eyes is that the image that is formed is upside down. With compound eyes, the image is right - side up. Thus, if an organism that had compound eyes evolved to have camera eyes, its image - processing nervous apparatus would no longer match its eyes and it would be worse off. Such an innovation would not survive. The only way that a switch could be made is if an animal completely lost its image - processing nervous apparatus so that with a switch from compound to camera eyes the organism is no worse off.
为了理解 “不能向下移动” 这一规则的重要性，让我们考虑一个具体的例子。摄像头式眼睛的一个特点是形成的图像是倒立的，而复眼形成的图像是正立的。因此，如果一个拥有复眼的生物体进化出摄像头式眼睛，其图像处理神经器官将不再与眼睛匹配，这会使其情况变得更糟。这样的创新无法留存下来。实现这种转变的唯一方法是动物完全失去其图像处理神经器官，这样在从复眼转变为摄像头式眼睛时，生物体的情况才不会变糟。

The analogy of climbing mountains is overly simplistic since it has reduced evolution to three dimensions. In reality, fitness and payoffs depend on many factors, resulting in a setting with very high dimensionality. However, the analogy still provides important insights into path dependence and why sometimes it is very difficult to undo the consequences of previous paths.
爬山的类比过于简单化，因为它将进化简化为三维。实际上，适应性和收益取决于许多因素，导致现实情况具有很高的维度。然而，这个类比仍然为路径依赖以及为何有时很难消除先前路径的影响提供了重要的见解。

I now turn from biological evolution to historical or cultural evolution. As I will show, the same logic applies. Consider an example drawn from a stylized model by Nunn (2007). The model features two cultural types, those who produce and those who engage in predation, stealing from those who produce. Each type has a bundle of cultural traits, including accumulated experience, that supports the activity. The model assumes that each period a thief can steal from at most one producer and producers can only be robbed once. There is perfect information and no search costs. If a producer is robbed, the thief steals a fraction $q$ of the producer’s output, which is given by $A$ . We let $x$ denote the fraction of the population with a culture of theft.
现在我从生物进化转向历史或文化进化。正如我将展示的，同样的逻辑也适用。考虑纳恩（2007 年）的一个简化模型中的例子。该模型有两种文化类型，一种是生产者，另一种是掠夺者，掠夺者从生产者那里偷窃。每种类型都有一系列文化特质，包括积累的经验，来支持其活动。模型假设每个时期一个小偷最多只能从一个生产者那里偷窃，且生产者只会被抢劫一次。信息是完全的，且没有搜寻成本。如果一个生产者被抢劫，小偷会偷走生产者产出（用 $A$ 表示）的 $q$ 比例。我们用 $x$ 表示具有盗窃文化的人口比例。

The payoffs to the two cultural traits are shown in Fig. 3.7a for different values of $x$ . Despite the extreme simplicity of the setting, the model yields multiple equilibria, which are denoted in Fig. 3.7a by $x_{0}^{*}$ , $x_{B}^{*}$ and $x_{1}^{*}$ . When $x = 0$ , the payoff to the cultural trait of hard work is greater than to the trait of theft and this is an equilibrium, $x_{0}^{*}$ . Here, the only cultural trait that exists is one of hard work. There are also two additional equilibria, where both cultural traits exist, and the payoffs to the two traits are equal, $x_{B}^{*}$ and $x_{1}^{*}$ .

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图 3.7a 展示了不同 $x$ 值下两种文化特质的收益情况。尽管模型设定非常简单，但它产生了多个均衡，在图 3.7a 中用 $x_{0}^{*}$ 、 $x_{B}^{*}$ 和 $x_{1}^{*}$ 表示。当 $x = 0$ 时，努力工作这种文化特质的收益大于盗窃特质的收益，这是一个均衡状态，即 $x_{0}^{*}$ 。在这种情况下，唯一存在的文化特质是努力工作。还有另外两个均衡状态，在这两个状态下两种文化特质都存在，且两种特质的收益相等，即 $x_{B}^{*}$ 和 $x_{1}^{*}$ 。

Now consider the fact that cultural evolution is cumulative and that only innovations that improve one’s payoff are adopted. That is, you can only ‘walk uphill’. Such a restriction can be micro - founded by assuming that in each period each individual, with some probability $\alpha$ , has an experience that potentially changes their cultural values.
现在考虑文化进化具有累积性，并且只有能提高个人收益的创新才会被采纳这一事实。也就是说，只能 “向上走”。这种限制可以通过微观假设来解释，即假设每个时期每个个体都有一定概率 $\alpha$ 经历一次可能改变其文化价值观的事件。

As part of this experience, the individual learns the cultural value and payoff of another randomly chosen individual and compares it to their own. If the other person has a different cultural value and a higher payoff is observed, the individual adopts that value with a probability that is equal to $\gamma$ times the difference between the payoffs. As shown by Gintis (1997), given these assumptions one finds that cultural traits grow over time if and only if their average payoffs are higher than the average payoff in the whole population. That is, cultural traits that tend to do better than average grow and those that tend to do worse shrink. Within the model of Nunn (2007), the cultural evolution is given by:
作为这次经历的一部分，个体了解另一个随机选择的个体的文化价值观和收益，并将其与自己的进行比较。如果另一个人具有不同的文化价值观，且其收益更高，那么个体就会以等于 $\gamma$ 乘以收益差值的概率采纳该价值观。正如金蒂斯（1997）所示，在这些假设下，人们发现文化特质会随着时间的推移而发展，当且仅当其平均收益高于整个人口的平均收益。也就是说，表现优于平均水平的文化特质会发展壮大，而表现较差的文化特质则会逐渐萎缩。在纳恩（2007）的模型中，文化进化由下式给出：

$\frac {\dot {x}}{x}=\alpha \gamma\left\{\Pi^{R}(x)-\overline {\Pi}(x)\right\}, \tag {3.3}$

where $\bar {\Pi}(x)$ is the average payoff for the whole population, i.e., $\Pi^{R}(x)+(1 - x) \Pi^{E}(x)$ .
其中 $\bar {\Pi}(x)$ 是整个人口的平均收益，即 $\Pi^{R}(x)+(1 - x) \Pi^{E}(x)$ 。

Given this dynamic, which formalizes the notion that cultural evolution is incremental and cumulative, a number of insights emerge. The first is that one of the three Nash equilibria above is unstable. This is the equilibrium marked $x^{B}$ . It is straightforward to verify that a slight change in $x$ either above or below $x^{B}$ will generate movements in $x$ away from this equilibrium. Thus, $x^{B}$ is not a peak, but actually a valley that divides two peaks.
考虑到这种动态变化，它将文化进化是渐进和累积的概念形式化，由此产生了一些深刻见解。首先，上述三个纳什均衡中有一个是不稳定的。这就是标记为 $x^{B}$ 的均衡。很容易验证， $x$ 在 $x^{B}$ 之上或之下的微小变化都会导致 $x$ 偏离这个均衡。因此， $x^{B}$ 不是一个峰值，实际上是一个将两个峰值分开的谷底。

The second insight the model offers is a deeper understanding of why it is so hard for a society stuck in a socially - suboptimal equilibrium to switch to another more socially - beneficial equilibrium. Consider a society, in equilibrium $x_{1}^{*}$ . This could describe the low - income situation in many developing countries. Here, average payoffs are comparatively low. Everyone is optimizing. In other words, those at this peak cannot climb any higher. Just as developing countries can see the wealth of rich countries, those at this peak see another higher peak far off in the distance. However, they are not able to get there. Doing so would require individuals to move downhill, adopting behaviors that make them worse off. In this case, this is switching from rent - seeking to production. In popular media, and even journal articles, one regularly observes writers asking the question “why do poor countries stay poor?” Without an evolutionary perspective, particularly one rooted in cultural evolution, this question may appear as a puzzle. However, with this perspective, the reason for this is clear and the question itself seems kind of odd.
该模型提供的第二个见解是，它让我们更深入地理解了为什么陷入社会次优均衡的社会很难转向另一个对社会更有益的均衡。考虑处于均衡状态 $x_{1}^{*}$ 的社会，这可以描述许多发展中国家的低收入状况。在这种情况下，平均收益相对较低。每个人都在进行优化。换句话说，处于这个 “峰值” 的人们无法再提升自己的收益。就像发展中国家能看到富裕国家的财富一样，处于这个 “峰值” 的人们能看到远处另一个更高的 “峰值”。然而，他们却无法到达那里。要做到这一点，个体需要 “向下走”，采取会让自己情况更糟的行为。在这种情况下，就是从寻租转向生产。在大众媒体甚至学术期刊文章中，人们经常看到作者提出 “为什么穷国一直很穷？” 这个问题。如果没有进化的视角，尤其是基于文化进化的视角，这个问题可能看起来像是一个谜题。然而，从这个视角来看，原因很清楚，这个问题本身似乎也有点奇怪了。

Another insight that emerges involves the importance of history. What determines which equilibrium of the two a society is located in? The answer in this setting is history. This is due to the cumulative and incremental nature of evolution. To see this, consider two examples. The first is one where there is stability such that no parameters change over the history of the society. In such a setting, the long - run equilibrium is determined by the value of $x$ during the very first time period, $x_{0}$ . This uniquely determines the equilibrium in the long - run. If $x_{0}<x_{B}$ , then in the long - run the equilibrium is the socially optimal equilibrium where $x = x_{0}^{*}$ . If $x_{0}>x_{B}$ , then the long - run equilibrium is the socially suboptimal one where $x = x_{1}^{*}$ . Thus, history, meaning the historical conditions of a society, can matter for long - term outcomes. Within an evolutionary framework, this fact is obvious. Rather than asking ‘why history matters?’, we should ask ‘why wouldn’t history matter?’.
另一个出现的见解涉及历史的重要性。是什么决定了一个社会处于这两种均衡中的哪一种呢？在这个设定中，答案是历史。这是由于进化的累积性和渐进性。为了说明这一点，考虑两个例子。第一个例子是社会历史中没有参数发生变化的稳定情况。在这种情况下，长期均衡由第一个时期的 $x$ 值，即 $x_{0}$ 决定。这唯一地决定了长期均衡。如果 $x_{0}<x_{B}$ ，那么长期均衡是社会最优均衡，此时 $x = x_{0}^{*}$ 。如果 $x_{0}>x_{B}$ ，那么长期均衡是社会次优均衡，此时 $x = x_{1}^{*}$ 。因此，历史，即一个社会的历史条件，会对长期结果产生影响。在进化框架内，这个事实是显而易见的。我们不应该问 “为什么历史很重要？”，而应该问 “为什么历史不重要呢？”。

Next, consider a scenario where the parameters of the model change. Fig. 3.7b shows the effects of a temporary historical event that reduces the payoffs of those who engage in production relative to those who steal. As shown, the payoffs are tilted so much that the $x_{0}^{*}$ equilibrium disappears leaving a unique equilibrium, denoted $x_{2}^{*}$ where a high proportion of the population has a culture of theft. For a society initially in the $x_{0}^{*}$ equilibrium, over time, in accordance with cultural evolution governed by Eq. (3.3), those with a culture of work slowly adopt a culture of theft. This occurs as the society converges to the $x_{2}^{*}$ equilibrium. In other words, the change in the environment caused one of the two peaks to disappear leaving a path upwards to a single peak that is relatively low.
接下来，考虑模型参数发生变化的情况。图 3.7b 展示了一个临时历史事件的影响，该事件降低了生产者相对于盗窃者的收益。如图所示，收益倾斜程度如此之大，以至于 $x_{0}^{*}$ 均衡消失，只剩下一个唯一的均衡，记为 $x_{2}^{*}$ ，在这个均衡中，很大比例的人口具有盗窃文化。对于一个最初处于 $x_{0}^{*}$ 均衡的社会来说，随着时间的推移，根据公式（3.3）所描述的文化进化过程，具有工作文化的人会慢慢接受盗窃文化。这是因为社会正在趋向于 $x_{2}^{*}$ 均衡。换句话说，环境的变化导致两个 “峰值” 中的一个消失，只留下一条通向相对较低 “峰值” 的上升路径。

Even if the episode is short - lived and the society has not fully converged to the new equilibrium, as long as the culture of theft has become sufficiently prevalent by the end of the episode, i.e., $x>x^{B}$ , then the temporary event will have permanently moved the society from the equilibrium where everyone has a culture of work, $x_{0}^{*}$ , to one where most of the population has a culture of theft, $x_{1}^{*}$ . Returning again to the analogy, if the trek upwards towards the low peak has progressed sufficiently, even after the high peak returns, it is impossible to get to it. This is because it would require first going downhill to then climb back up. All that can be done is to continue upwards to the smaller peak.
即使这个事件是短期的，并且社会尚未完全达到新的均衡，但只要在事件结束时盗窃文化已经足够盛行，即 $x>x^{B}$ ，那么这个临时事件就会永久性地将社会从人人都具有工作文化的均衡状态 $x_{0}^{*}$ ，转变为大多数人口具有盗窃文化的均衡状态 $x_{1}^{*}$ 。再次回到爬山的类比，如果朝着较低 “峰值” 的攀登已经进行到一定程度，即使较高的 “峰值” 再次出现，也无法到达它了。这是因为这需要先下山再爬上去。现在所能做的就是继续朝着较小的 “峰值” 前进。

This example illustrates another way in which historical events can matter, even if the event is only temporary. Nunn (2007) argues that such a sequence of events potentially explains the long - term effects that colonialism and the slave trade appear to have had on many African societies.
这个例子说明了历史事件即便只是临时性的，也会产生重要影响的另一种方式。纳恩（2007）认为，这样一系列事件可能解释了殖民主义和奴隶贸易对许多非洲社会似乎产生的长期影响。

3.3.3.1 Kludges

3.3.3.1 拼凑物

In the example above, when one is to the right of $x_{B}$ movement towards the lower - peaked equilibrium $x_{1}^{*}$ as individuals switch from production to theft is making those who switch better off. They are optimizing. However, each subsequent step in this direction is making things worse as one moves further away from the higher peak. The further one moves up the path towards the low peak, the harder it is to get back to the high peak (even if one were allowed to move downhill).
在上述例子中，当个体位于 $x_{B}$ 右侧，朝着较低 “峰值” 的均衡状态 $x_{1}^{*}$ 移动（即从生产转向盗窃）时，做出转变的个体境况会变好，他们在进行优化。然而，朝着这个方向的每一步都会让情况变得更糟，因为这会使个体离更高的 “峰值” 越来越远。一个人沿着通往低 “峰值” 的路径走得越远，就越难回到高 “峰值”（即使允许向下移动）。

Such situations have been termed ‘kludges.’ A commonly cited example of a kludge is the bony flatfish (e.g., Dawkins, 1986, 1996). The ancestors of the flatfish used to swim vertically in the ocean. At some point in their evolutionary history, the fish began living on the ocean floor, lying on one side, leaving one eye looking directly at the sand. Over time and through evolutionary processes, the eye migrated to the top of the head so that the two eyes were on one side of the fish and looking up (Friedman, 2008). An example of the modern flatfish is shown in Fig. 3.8, which is the first drawing in Norman’s (1934) collection of flatfish sketches. This incremental innovation solved an inefficiency given the situation at the time but resulted in a design that was suboptimal overall. If one were to completely redesign the bony flatfish, one would have the fish lie on its stomach so that neither eye would be in the ground and symmetry could be maintained. The more the flatfish evolved to its current form, the further away from this ideal it became.

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这种情况被称为 “拼凑物”。一个常被引用的拼凑物例子是硬骨比目鱼（例如，道金斯，1986 年；1996 年）。比目鱼的祖先曾经在海洋中垂直游动。在其进化历程的某个阶段，这种鱼开始生活在海底，侧身躺着，一只眼睛直接对着沙子。随着时间的推移和进化过程，它的眼睛移到了头顶，这样两只眼睛就都在鱼的一侧并向上看（弗里德曼，2008 年）。图 3.8 展示了现代比目鱼的样子，这是诺曼（1934 年）比目鱼素描集中的第一幅画。这种渐进式的创新解决了当时的一个低效问题，但从整体上看，却导致了一个并非最优的设计。如果要完全重新设计硬骨比目鱼，人们会让它腹部朝下躺着，这样两只眼睛都不会接触地面，还能保持对称。比目鱼越进化成现在的样子，就离这个理想状态越远。

Although the insight this provides for the social sciences is still under - explored, there are a few studies within economics that attempt to make progress in this direction. One is a theoretical analysis by Ely (2011), who provides a formal framework to understand kludges, which he defines as “an improvement upon a highly complex system that solves an inefficiency but in a piecemeal fashion and without addressing the deep - rooted underlying problem…the kludge itself – because it makes sense only in the presence of the disease it is there to treat – intensifies the internal inefficiency, necessitating either further kludges in the future or else eventually a complete revolution.” (p. 211)
尽管这种现象为社会科学提供的见解仍有待深入探索，但经济学领域已有一些研究尝试在这个方向取得进展。其中之一是伊利（2011 年）的理论分析，他提供了一个正式的框架来理解拼凑物，他将其定义为 “对高度复杂系统的一种改进，这种改进以零碎的方式解决了一个低效问题，但没有解决深层次的根本问题…… 拼凑物本身 —— 因为它只有在存在需要治疗的问题时才有意义 —— 加剧了内部的低效，这就需要在未来进行更多的拼凑，或者最终进行一场彻底的变革。”（第 211 页）

A subsequent paper takes a more applied approach and uses the notion of kludges to better understand the evolution of laws or policies (Kawai et al., 2018). The paper models the emergence of kludges in policy in a world with two political parties. In this setting, when a new political party comes into power, they can add or remove previous rules in an incremental manner. An interesting aspect of the model is that rules can be deleted. That is, it is possible to move ‘downhill’. However, the model shows how despite this ability, the political parties choose not to move ‘downhill’ removing old rules, but instead only choose to add new rules. This occurs because as policies become more complex – i.e., with a longer path of rules being added on – the rules become entangled in one another. And so removing an unfavorable rule involves also removing favorable rules if they are entangled. Thus, when policy complexity is high, there is entanglement and a bias towards adding rather than deleting rules, generating further additions and complexity.
随后的一篇论文采用了更具应用性的方法，利用拼凑物的概念来更好地理解法律或政策的演变（川合等人，2018 年）。这篇论文在一个有两个政党的世界中对政策中拼凑物的出现进行了建模。在这种设定下，当一个新政党上台时，他们可以逐步添加或删除以前的规则。该模型一个有趣的方面是规则可以被删除，也就是说可以 “向下移动”。然而，模型显示，尽管有这种能力，政党却选择不 “向下移动” 删除旧规则，而是只选择添加新规则。这是因为随着政策变得更加复杂 —— 即添加的规则越来越多 —— 规则之间会相互纠缠。因此，如果要删除一条不利的规则，可能也会删除与之纠缠的有利规则。所以，当政策复杂性较高时，就会出现规则纠缠的情况，并且会存在一种偏向，即倾向于添加规则而非删除规则，这就导致了更多的规则添加和政策的进一步复杂化。

The model shows that even in settings that are different from that of biological evolution where one can undo innovations, in equilibrium, the environment mirrors biological evolution and kludges emerge. Interestingly, the theory shows that policy is more likely to exhibit kludges if political power is balanced, electoral terms are short, and legislative frictions are high, which are all characteristics of the U.S. political system. The model also predicts that with a kludged public policy, the policy outcomes are moderate, which is also consistent with the reality of the United States.
该模型表明，即使在与生物进化不同的环境中（在这种环境中创新可以被撤销），在均衡状态下，环境也会反映出生物进化的特征，拼凑物依然会出现。有趣的是，该理论指出，如果政治权力平衡、选举任期短且立法摩擦大，政策就更有可能表现出拼凑物的特征，而这些都是美国政治系统的特点。该模型还预测，在拼凑的公共政策下，政策结果会比较温和，这也与美国的现实情况相符。

There are many examples of cultural evolution that can be described as kludges. Consider the issue of paternity certainty. While men can create multiple children during a short period of time, women have biological limits on how quickly they can have children. Thus, the main concern for women is to ensure that the father of her children invests in them sufficiently. That is, she does not want him to employ a strategy where he is choosing quantity over quality. The concern of a potential father is that he may invest heavily in a child thinking that it is his but it may not be. For biological reasons, while a woman is certain that a child is her offspring, there is much less certainty for men. If there is sufficient paternity uncertainty, then he will be less likely to invest in his mate’s child.
文化进化中有许多例子可被视为 “拼凑物”。以亲子确定性问题为例，男性在短时间内可以生育多个孩子，而女性的生育速度则受到生理限制。因此，女性主要关心的是确保孩子的父亲对孩子有足够的投入。也就是说，她不希望父亲采取重数量轻质量的策略。而准父亲所担心的是，他可能会在误以为某个孩子是自己的情况下对其大量投入，但实际上孩子可能并非亲生。由于生理原因，女性可以确定孩子是自己的后代，而男性的确定性则低得多。如果亲子不确定性较高，那么男性就不太可能对配偶的孩子进行投资。

This is a fundamental issue related to reproductive success that is driven by the nature of reproduction and the biological differences between men and women. The existing evidence indicates that societies came up with different innovations to improve upon this. Much like Dawkins’ (1996) analogy of reaching peaks by climbing uphill one step at a time, different societies climbed different hills; customs and traditions evolved that served to improve upon this issue.
这是一个与生殖成功相关的基本问题，由生殖的本质以及男女之间的生理差异所驱动。现有证据表明，各个社会想出了不同的创新方法来改善这种情况。就像道金斯（1996）所比喻的那样，要一步一步爬山才能到达山顶，不同的社会选择了不同的 “山峰” 去攀登，逐渐形成了各种习俗和传统来解决这个问题。

Among certain groups, matrilineal kinship developed. Here kinship is traced through the women. Men belong to the lineage of their sisters and mother and children belong to the lineage of their mother. This means that a father does not belong to the same lineage as his children. The children belong to their mother’s lineage and their father belongs to his mother and sister’s lineage. Because of this, the father is not the most important male adult in a child’s life and he is not the one providing primary financial support. The people who fill this role are the mother’s brothers (i.e., the child’s maternal uncles). The logic behind this is that with paternity uncertainty, there is no guarantee that the father is genetically related to a child. However, it is certain that the mother’s brother is related to the child. The child came from their mother and so is related to her. The mother and her brother came from the same mother and so they are related. Thus, the child must be related to their uncle. By contrast, there is no guarantee that the child is related to their father.
在某些群体中，发展出了母系亲属制度。在这种制度下，亲属关系通过女性来追溯。男性属于其姐妹和母亲的家族，孩子则属于母亲的家族。这意味着父亲与孩子不属于同一血统。孩子属于母亲的家族，而父亲属于他母亲和姐妹的家族。因此，父亲在孩子的生活中不是最重要的成年男性，也不是主要的经济支柱。承担这一角色的是母亲的兄弟（即孩子的舅舅）。背后的逻辑是，在亲子关系不确定的情况下，无法保证父亲与孩子有基因上的联系。然而，可以确定的是母亲的兄弟与孩子是有血缘关系的。孩子来自母亲，所以与母亲有血缘关系，母亲和她的兄弟来自同一个母亲，所以他们也有血缘关系，因此孩子必定与舅舅有血缘关系。相比之下，无法保证孩子与父亲有血缘关系。

Thus, one innovation in the face of paternity uncertainty is matrilineal kinship, where family/clan membership is traced through women. The results of such an innovation are far - reaching and can be difficult to undo. In this case, it is natural that family members live in close proximity to one another, and, thus, there is matrilocality, where the nuclear family lives near the woman’s family.
因此，面对亲子不确定性的一种创新是母系亲属制度，即通过女性来确定家庭 / 氏族成员身份。这种创新的影响深远且难以改变。在这种情况下，家庭成员自然会彼此相邻而居，于是就出现了从母居，即核心家庭住在女方家庭附近。

An alternative incrementally - designed set of innovations that has emerged is as follows. Rather than having matrilineal kinship, a society has patrilineal kinship. Lineage is traced through the father’s line. At the time of marriage, the wife leaves her lineage and joins her husband’s lineage. Due to the tendency of lineages to live within close proximity, patrilocality develops where families live close to the husband’s parents.
另一种逐步形成的创新方案是父系亲属制度。在这种制度下，家族血统通过父亲一方来追溯。结婚时，妻子离开自己的家族，加入丈夫的家族。由于家族成员倾向于聚居，就形成了从父居，即家庭住在丈夫父母附近。

This then presents another problem. If daughters leave their parent’s lineage and move away from them when they are married, what incentive is there for the parents to invest resources in raising someone who they will never see again and no longer be part of their family after marriage? The incremental innovation that emerged to overcome this issue is bridewealth, where a sizeable transfer of resources is made from the husband’s family to the wife’s family at marriage. This is given as a gift of appreciation and incentivizes the parents’ investment in their daughter even knowing that she will not be a member of the family in the future. The practice of bridewealth is common in patrilineal societies but not in matrilineal societies.
但这又带来了另一个问题。如果女儿在婚后离开自己的家族并远离父母，那么父母有什么动力去投入资源养育一个婚后就再也见不到、也不再属于自己家族的人呢？为解决这个问题而出现的渐进式创新是彩礼习俗，即在结婚时，男方家庭向女方家庭进行大量的资源转移。这被视为一种表达感激的礼物，激励父母即便知道女儿婚后不再是自己家族的一员，仍愿意对女儿进行投资。彩礼习俗在父系社会中很常见，但在母系社会中却不多见。

The two evolved solutions to the problem of paternity uncertainty and paternal investment in children are very different and take societies along different paths with a different set of incremental improvements. There is evidence that one path may be better than the other. Lowes (2018) finds that within matrilineal households, due to the greater empowerment of women, children are healthier and more educated. Thus, it is plausible that this evolutionary path is better for fitness. However, once society has progressed down the patrilineal path, jumping to the matrilineal equilibrium is no easy task. This would involve undoing existing customs, leading to a lower payoff to then be able to travel along the matrilineal path. One would need to undo bridewealth, patrilocality, and fundamentally alter society’s perception of kinship.
这两种针对亲子不确定性和父亲对孩子投资问题而演变出的解决方案截然不同，使社会走上了不同的发展道路，各自有着不同的渐进式改进方式。有证据表明，其中一条道路可能比另一条更好。洛伊斯（2018）发现，在母系家庭中，由于女性权力更大，孩子更健康，受教育程度也更高。因此，从适应性的角度来看，这条进化道路可能更好。然而，一旦社会走上了父系道路，要转向母系均衡并非易事。这需要摒弃现有习俗，而这会降低收益，之后才能走上母系道路。人们需要废除彩礼、从父居习俗，并从根本上改变社会对亲属关系的认知。

This is potentially an example of a kludge. As the cultural innovations accumulate, the society is locked in more and more deeply into a suboptimal equilibrium. The case for a kludge among patrilineal societies is particularly strong for those who have developed additional cultural innovations that are harmful to women but are meant to resolve the issue of paternity uncertainty. As has been documented, in societies that practice nomadic pastoralism, where men are often absent for long periods of time, the problem of paternity uncertainty is particularly acute. In these societies, it appears as if additional innovations are required. It is not possible to move ‘downhill’ and then back ‘uphill’ to the higher matrilineal ‘peak’. Instead one must continue upward on the existing path.
这可能是一个 “拼凑物” 的例子。随着文化创新的积累，社会越来越深陷于次优均衡之中。对于那些发展出了对女性有害但旨在解决亲子不确定性问题的额外文化创新的父系社会来说，它们是 “拼凑物” 的情况尤为明显。有文献记载，在实行游牧畜牧业的社会中，男性经常长时间不在家，亲子不确定性问题尤为严重。在这些社会中，似乎还需要更多的创新。但人们无法 “下山” 再 “上山” 到达更高的母系 “山峰”，而只能沿着现有道路继续向上走。

As documented in Becker (2019), female genital cutting and infibulation developed as customs that helped husbands ensure greater paternity certainty. With these extreme forms of female circumcision, sex becomes painful, reducing the temptation to have sexual relations outside of the marriage, even when the husband is away for extended periods of time. In other parts of the world, other customs emerged that also served the purpose of controlling women’s autonomy and sexuality, such as the veil or burqa, restrictions on women’s mobility, and limits on the decisions that women could make.
正如贝克尔（2019）所记载的，女性割礼和阴部扣锁习俗的形成是为了帮助丈夫确保更高的亲子确定性。通过这些极端的女性割礼形式，性行为会变得痛苦，从而减少了女性在丈夫长期不在时发生婚外性行为的诱惑。在世界其他地区，还出现了其他旨在控制女性自主权和性行为的习俗，如面纱或罩袍、限制女性行动以及限制女性决策等。

3.3.4 Group - level selection

3.3.4 群体选择

Our discussion up to this point has implicitly assumed that the success of a cultural trait depends on the well - being of the individuals with the trait. However, historically a big part of cultural evolution occurs through the rise and fall of societies. In other words, the fate of individuals and their success is as much tied to the success of their community as to their own relative success within the community. Thus, what may also be important for the adoption of cultural traits is how they affect the society as a whole. This is called group - level selection and is often used as one explanation for why prosocial cultural traits (ones that are costly for the individual but beneficial for the group), like altruism or proclivity to cooperate, can emerge (Henrich, 2004a; Richerson et al., 2016).
到目前为止，我们的讨论隐含着一个假设，即一种文化特质的成功取决于拥有该特质的个体的福祉。然而，从历史上看，文化进化的很大一部分是通过社会的兴衰实现的。换句话说，个体的命运及其成功，既与他们在社区内的相对成功有关，也与所在社区的成功紧密相连。因此，对于文化特质的采纳而言，它们对整个社会的影响可能同样重要。这被称为群体选择，它常被用来解释为什么亲社会的文化特质（对个体来说成本高昂，但对群体有益，如利他主义或合作倾向）能够出现（亨里奇，2004a；里彻森等人，2016）。

This insight has the potential to improve our understanding of the historical process, particularly at the society level. To see this, recall the famous quote from Charles Tilly (1990) that “war made the state, and the state made war” (p. 42). While generally not viewed in this light, Tilly’s famous argument that war lies at the heart of the economic rise of Europe is actually an argument about group - level selection. Those groups, namely states, with characteristics that were beneficial were able to outcompete other states with less beneficial characteristics. He writes that “states having access to a combination of large rural populations, capitalists, and relatively commercialized economies won out…their form of state became the predominant one in Europe. Eventually European states converged on that form: the nation states.” (p. 15).
这一见解有助于我们更好地理解历史进程，尤其是在社会层面。回想一下查尔斯・蒂利（1990）的名言：“战争造就了国家，国家发动了战争”（第 42 页）。虽然人们通常不会从这个角度看待，但蒂利关于战争是欧洲经济崛起核心因素的著名论点，实际上是一个关于群体选择的论点。那些具有有利特征的群体，即国家，能够战胜其他特征不那么有利的国家。他写道：“那些拥有大量农村人口、资本家和相对商业化经济的国家胜出…… 它们的国家形式在欧洲占据主导地位。最终，欧洲国家都趋向于这种形式：民族国家。”（第 15 页）

While recent studies have examined the effects of warfare within the European context on taxation, urbanization, and state formation (e.g., Gennaioli and Voth, 2015; Dincecco and Onorato, 2017), group - level selection has yet to be examined, even though the famous Tilly effect can be interpreted through this lens. With the formation of groups, such as villages, kingdoms, empires, or nation - states, the well - being of the citizens of each entity are intricately connected. If a kingdom is conquered, everyone in the kingdom is conquered. Thus, warfare and interstate conflict are a form of group - level competition.
虽然近期的研究考察了欧洲背景下战争对税收、城市化和国家形成的影响（例如，真纳伊奥利和沃思，2015；丁塞科和奥诺拉托，2017），但群体选择这一因素尚未得到研究，尽管著名的蒂利效应可以从这个角度进行解读。随着村庄、王国、帝国或民族国家等群体的形成，每个实体中公民的福祉紧密相连。如果一个王国被征服，那么王国中的每个人都被征服。因此，战争和国家间冲突是一种群体层面的竞争。

This is important because this, in turn, leads to group - level selection. When an individual’s survival is, to a large extent, determined by the success of the group rather than their own success, then cultural traits that are not individually optimal but are socially beneficial can arise. An example of such a trait is altruism. Giving to others when they are in need reduces one’s material well - being. However, if everyone in society does this, then the society will be better off. Of course, just because traits are socially beneficial does not mean they will arise in equilibrium. This depends on the trade - offs between group - level benefits and individual - level costs. The stronger group - level selection is, the more likely it is that the former prevails over the latter (Henrich, 2004a).
这一点很重要，因为它反过来会导致群体选择。当个体的生存在很大程度上取决于群体的成功而非自身的成功时，那些对个体并非最优但对社会有益的文化特质就可能出现。利他主义就是这样一种特质。在他人需要时给予帮助会降低自己的物质福祉。然而，如果社会中的每个人都这样做，那么整个社会会变得更好。当然，仅仅因为某些特质对社会有益，并不意味着它们会在均衡状态下出现。这取决于群体层面的利益与个体层面的成本之间的权衡。群体选择的力量越强，前者就越有可能战胜后者（亨里奇，2004a）。

The prediction that arises from the framework of group - level selection is that, all else equal, conflict should be associated with more prosocial traits (i.e., traits that are individually costly but socially beneficial). Several recent studies have stumbled across the finding that conflict appears to be associated with higher levels of prosociality and greater social cohesion. This was confirmed in a recent meta - analysis Bauer et al. (2016). The finding is counter - intuitive if one expects that conflict would cause the breakdown of social capital. However, viewed through the lens of intergroup competition, these relationships make perfect sense. Evolutionary theory predicts an association between conflict and prosocial behavior if conflict activates prosocial psychology which is particularly beneficial in that setting due to group - level selection forces.
从群体选择框架得出的预测是，在其他条件相同的情况下，冲突应该与更多亲社会特质（即对个体成本高昂但对社会有益的特质）相关。最近的几项研究偶然发现，冲突似乎与更高水平的亲社会性和更强的社会凝聚力有关。鲍尔等人（2016）最近的一项元分析证实了这一点。如果人们认为冲突会导致社会资本的瓦解，那么这一发现似乎有悖直觉。然而，从群体间竞争的角度来看，这些关系就完全说得通了。进化理论预测，如果冲突激发了亲社会心理，而这种心理在群体选择力量的作用下在那种情境中特别有益，那么冲突与亲社会行为之间就会存在关联。

Another explanation for the relationship comes from very recent research in social psychology that emphasizes the effect that ‘threat’ has on the extent to which norms are adhered to (i.e., on the ‘tightness’ of norms). According to Gelfand (2018), external threat increases the importance of norm following and therefore tightness increases. If conflict is a form of threat and society’s baseline norms are ones of cooperation and prosociality towards in - group members, then past experience with conflict will lead to greater prosociality. Consistent with this interpretation, subsequent research by Henrich et al. (2019) shows that past experience with conflict is associated with greater religiosity, which can be interpreted as a tightening of traditional norms. The study uses a survey of 1,709 individuals from three post - conflict societies: Uganda, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan. They find that conflict exposure is associated with an increased likelihood of identifying as Christian or Muslim and with more frequent participation in religious gatherings and rituals.
对这种关系的另一种解释来自社会心理学领域的最新研究，该研究强调 “威胁” 对人们遵守规范程度（即规范的 “严格性”）的影响。根据格尔凡德（2018）的研究，外部威胁会增加遵守规范的重要性，从而使规范更加严格。如果冲突是一种威胁形式，且社会的基本规范是对群体内成员的合作和亲社会行为规范，那么过去的冲突经历会导致更高程度的亲社会行为。与这一解释相符，亨里奇等人（2019）随后的研究表明，过去的冲突经历与更高的宗教信仰程度相关，这可以被解释为传统规范的强化。该研究对来自乌干达、塞拉利昂和塔吉克斯坦这三个冲突后社会的 1709 名个体进行了调查。他们发现，经历冲突与个体更有可能认同自己为基督徒或穆斯林，以及更频繁地参加宗教集会和仪式相关。

A case study illustrating the logic of group - level competition is provided by Nunn and Sanchez de la Sierra (2017). The authors describe recent events in a village in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The village had a history of being regularly pillaged by a Hutu militia group called the FDLR. The raiding and pillaging had occurred multiple times per year for well over a decade. This was until 2012 when an elderly man in the village, through a dream, learned how to bulletproof the people of the village by having them undertake a specific ritual. Beliefs in bulletproofing are common in the region and are connected to traditional religious beliefs. As is common, this form of bulletproofing came with conditions that had to be followed for the protection to work. Thus, if someone who had been known to have been bulletproofed died, then it must be the case that they did not follow the necessary conditions. Due to the bulletproofing, the villagers, particularly the young men, were able to fight back when they were attacked. Over the course of multiple years, the FDLR eventually gave up trying to attack the village and concentrated their efforts elsewhere. For the first time in over a decade, the village had been liberated.
纳恩和桑切斯・德拉・西耶拉（2017）提供了一个案例研究，阐释了群体层面竞争的逻辑。作者描述了刚果民主共和国东部一个村庄的近期事件。这个村庄长期遭受一个名为卢民主力量（FDLR）的胡图族民兵组织的定期掠夺。十多年来，每年都要遭受多次袭击和抢劫。直到 2012 年，村里的一位老人通过梦境得知，让村民进行一种特殊仪式可以让他们拥有 “防弹” 能力。在该地区，对 “防弹” 的信仰很普遍，并且与传统宗教信仰相关。通常情况下，这种 “防弹” 方式有必须遵循的条件才能生效。因此，如果一个被认为有 “防弹” 能力的人死亡，就一定是因为他们没有遵循必要条件。由于这种 “防弹” 信仰，村民们，尤其是年轻男性，在遭受袭击时能够进行反击。经过多年，卢民主力量最终放弃了对这个村庄的袭击，转而将精力集中到其他地方。十多年来，这个村庄首次获得了解放。

In their analysis, Nunn and Sanchez de la Sierra (2017) try to understand these events. They interpret the production function of producing the village’s freedom as one with team production, meaning there are strong complementarities to effort. As is well known, the equilibrium level of effort is lower than is socially optimal in such settings. Beliefs in bulletproofing serve to reduce the perceived cost of effort and to raise the equilibrium level of effort so that it is closer to the socially - optimal level. Thus, these beliefs, even if false, are beneficial for society. However, this benefit does not guarantee the existence of such beliefs. As discussed above, socially - beneficial traits that are individually suboptimal only arise with strong group - level selection. The authors argue that the Eastern DRC, which has experienced decades of sustained conflict, is a setting where group - level selection is expected to be strong. Thus, in their setting, conflict generated group - level competition, which resulted in bulletproofing beliefs, which although individually suboptimal are socially beneficial. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that beliefs about bulletproofing appear to be common in many conflict - ridden areas, not only in the contemporary period but also historically (Kamarck, 2009, ch. 4; Sinclair - Thomas and Challis, 2017).
在分析中，纳恩和桑切斯・德拉・西耶拉（2017）试图理解这些事件。他们将村庄获得自由的过程视为一种团队生产的生产函数，这意味着人们的努力之间存在很强的互补性。众所周知，在这种情况下，均衡努力水平低于社会最优水平。“防弹” 信仰有助于降低人们对努力成本的感知，并提高均衡努力水平，使其更接近社会最优水平。因此，这些信仰即使是错误的，对社会也是有益的。然而，这种益处并不能保证这些信仰的存在。正如上文所讨论的，对社会有益但对个体并非最优的特质，只有在强大的群体选择作用下才会出现。作者认为，刚果民主共和国东部经历了数十年的持续冲突，是一个群体选择作用预计很强的环境。因此，在他们所研究的情境中，冲突引发了群体层面的竞争，进而产生了 “防弹” 信仰，这种信仰虽然对个体并非最优，但对社会有益。这一解释与 “防弹” 信仰在许多冲突地区（不仅在当代，历史上也是如此）似乎都很普遍的事实相符（卡马克，2009，第 4 章；辛克莱 - 托马斯和查利斯，2017）。

The best evidence for whether historical warfare would have been significant enough to generate group - level selection is from a recent study by Samuel Bowles (2009). In it, he takes a historical perspective and asks whether the group - level selective pressures due to intergroup conflict during Late Pleistocene and early Holocene could have been strong enough to affect the evolution of prosocial cultural traits. The study combines models of group - level selection, archaeological data from the period, and ethnographic data from contemporary hunter - gatherers. It finds that the levels of mortality associated with intergroup warfare would have been sizeable enough to have a large effect on prosocial traits, promoting behaviors that while individually costly would have been beneficial for the group overall.
关于历史上的战争是否足以产生群体选择的最佳证据，来自塞缪尔・鲍尔斯（2009）最近的一项研究。在该研究中，他从历史的角度出发，探究晚更新世和早全新世时期群体间冲突带来的群体选择压力是否足够强大，从而影响亲社会文化特质的进化。这项研究结合了群体选择模型、该时期的考古数据以及当代狩猎采集者的民族志数据。研究发现，与群体间战争相关的死亡率足够高，足以对亲社会特质产生重大影响，促进那些虽然对个体来说代价高昂，但对群体整体有益的行为。

While the examples discussed to this point have focused on warfare as the source of group - level competition, the exact same logic applies to competition that occurs through market forces. While this form of competition might not be particularly important for studying cultural evolution over the course of human history, it is highly relevant for the field of economics where markets are central. One of the few pieces of research along these lines is the recent study by Francois et al. (2018), which examines selection arising from firm competition. They begin by first showing a relationship between the competitiveness of an industry and the level of trust of individuals who work in that industry. Their analysis looks at the United States and Germany and estimates the relationship in the cross - section and also over time for workers who switch industries.
虽然到目前为止讨论的例子都聚焦于战争作为群体层面竞争的来源，但同样的逻辑也适用于通过市场力量产生的竞争。虽然这种竞争形式在研究人类历史进程中的文化进化时可能不是特别重要，但对于以市场为核心的经济学领域来说却高度相关。弗朗索瓦等人（2018）最近的一项研究是该研究方向为数不多的成果之一，该研究考察了企业竞争产生的选择效应。他们首先揭示了一个行业的竞争力与在该行业工作的个体的信任水平之间的关系。他们对美国和德国进行了分析，不仅在横截面数据中估计了这种关系，还对换行业的工人进行了时间序列分析。

In this setting, firms are the group and firm competition is the form of group - level competition. Given this, group - level selection is expected to facilitate the emergence of group - level beneficial traits, like generalized trust. Firms with trusting employees perform better and are more likely to survive. This is true despite evidence that suggests that if trust is too high it can lower individual income (Butler et al., 2016). In other words, even though high trust is socially beneficial, it is not necessarily individually optimal.
在这种情况下，企业是群体，企业竞争是群体层面竞争的形式。因此，群体选择有望促进对群体有益的特质（如普遍信任）的出现。拥有值得信任的员工的企业表现更好，也更有可能生存下来。尽管有证据表明，过高的信任可能会降低个人收入（巴特勒等人，2016），但上述结论依然成立。换句话说，即使高信任对社会有益，但对个体而言并不一定是最优的。

The authors confirm these findings and their interpretation by undertaking an event study that exploits the increase in competition that arose from a series of bank deregulations that occurred across U.S. states in the 1980s. Lastly, the authors are able to replicate the effects of group - level selection on generalized trust using a behavioral experiment involving 220 French participants. Participants were placed in groups of 20 and played a series of one - shot anonymous public goods games with other participants from their group. In one treatment arm, payoffs were determined by the relative performance of a participant’s group compared to other groups. In the other treatment arm, payoffs were determined in the standard manner, by the earnings of the participant him/herself. They find that the group - level selection treatment resulted in higher contributions and importantly in higher levels of self - reported trust at the end of the experiment.
作者通过一项事件研究证实了这些发现和他们的解释，该事件研究利用了 20 世纪 80 年代美国各州一系列银行放松管制所带来的竞争加剧这一契机。最后，作者通过一项涉及 220 名法国参与者的行为实验，再现了群体选择对普遍信任的影响。参与者被分成每组 20 人的小组，并与同组的其他参与者进行一系列一次性匿名公共物品博弈。在一个实验组中，参与者的收益取决于其所在小组与其他小组的相对表现。在另一个实验组中，收益则按照标准方式，由参与者个人的收益决定。他们发现，群体选择实验组的参与者在实验结束时贡献更多，并且重要的是，自我报告的信任水平也更高。

The study is important because it provides valuable evidence that market competition can result in group - level selection. This provides a new perspective from which one can think about market competition and its effects.
这项研究很重要，因为它提供了宝贵的证据，表明市场竞争能够导致群体选择。这为人们思考市场竞争及其影响提供了一个新的视角。

3.3.5 Biology, sex, and gender

3.3.5 生物学、性与性别

There are well - known biological differences between men and women. One difference is that the two sexes have very different roles in reproduction. The role of men is to fertilize an egg, while that of women is to carry the egg as it develops, give birth, and (typically) breastfeed the newborn for the first years of life. As a consequence, women can have only one offspring (ignoring the case of twins) per 1–2 year period. By contrast, men can have a much larger number of offspring during this same time. However, due to the nature of sex and childbirth, men have much less certainty that a child that is born is related to them biologically. By contrast, women have near - perfect certainty that a child is her offspring.
男性和女性之间存在众所周知的生物学差异。其中一个差异是两性在生殖过程中扮演截然不同的角色。男性的角色是使卵子受精，而女性则要在卵子发育过程中孕育它，分娩，并（通常）在新生儿出生后的头几年进行母乳喂养。因此，女性每 1 - 2 年通常只能生育一个孩子（不考虑双胞胎的情况）。相比之下，男性在相同时间内可以有更多的后代。然而，由于性行为和分娩的特性，男性对孩子是否是自己亲生的确定性要低得多。而女性几乎可以完全确定孩子是自己的后代。

It has been argued that the different biological constraints faced by men and women result in different optimal mating strategies (e.g., Trivers, 1972; Buss and Scmitt, 1993; Buss, 1994). As we will see, these strategies have implications for gender relations and social structure more generally. For women, the concern is that men will choose a quantity - over - quality mating strategy and not invest sufficient resources into the child. For men, the concern is that the child is not actually theirs and they are allocating resources to another person’s child.
有人认为，男性和女性面临的不同生物学限制导致了不同的最优交配策略（例如，特里弗斯，1972；巴斯和施密特，1993；巴斯，1994）。正如我们将看到的，这些策略对更广泛的性别关系和社会结构产生了影响。对女性来说，她们担心男性会选择重数量轻质量的交配策略，不对孩子投入足够的资源。对男性来说，他们担心孩子实际上不是自己的，而自己却在为别人的孩子投入资源。

These concerns have important social consequences. As mentioned, Becker (2019) studies how the fundamental issue of paternity uncertainty differs depending on ecological conditions. Her study shows that societies that engage in pastoralism tend to exhibit greater control over women’s sexuality by men. This can take the form of norms about female autonomy and practices such as infibulation and veiling. This is because, in a pastoral society, grazing requires men to be absent from the community as their herds move to new pastures. These prolonged periods of absence raised concerns of infidelity, which resulted in the evolution of restrictions on female sexuality.
这些担忧产生了重要的社会后果。如前所述，贝克尔（2019）研究了亲子不确定性这一基本问题如何因生态环境的不同而有所差异。她的研究表明，从事畜牧业的社会中，男性往往对女性的性行为有更强的控制。这可能表现为关于女性自主权的规范以及诸如阴部扣锁和戴面纱等习俗。这是因为在畜牧社会中，放牧需要男性带着畜群前往新的牧场，从而长时间离开社区。这种长时间的分离引发了对女性不忠的担忧，进而导致了对女性性行为限制的演变。

Another evolved response to the issue of paternal uncertainty has been matrilineal kinship. Rather than the father being the primary supporter of a child, it is the mother’s brother (i.e., the maternal uncle). With matrilineal kinship, lineage is traced through women. Men belong to the lineage of their sisters and mothers, and children belong to the lineage of their mother. Thus, a father does not belong to the same lineage as his children. The children belong to their mother’s lineage and the father belongs to his mother and sister’s lineage. As a consequence, the father is not the most important male adult in his children’s lives and, often, he is not the one who provides primary financial support. Instead, this is the mother’s brothers (i.e., the children’s maternal uncles). As explained above, the logic behind this is that while there is no guarantee that the father is genetically related to the children, it is certain that the mother’s brother is related to the children. Thus, the fundamental problem of how to incentivize the father to invest in his children if perceived paternal uncertainty is high is solved by having developed norms and customs where maternal uncles are the ones who invest in children.
对亲子不确定性问题的另一种进化反应是母系亲属制度。在这种制度下，孩子的主要支持者不是父亲，而是母亲的兄弟（即舅舅）。在母系亲属制度中，家族血统通过女性来追溯。男性属于他们姐妹和母亲的家族，孩子则属于母亲的家族。因此，父亲与孩子不属于同一血统。孩子属于母亲的家族，父亲属于他母亲和姐妹的家族。结果是，父亲在孩子的生活中不是最重要的成年男性，而且通常也不是主要的经济支柱。承担这一角色的是母亲的兄弟（即孩子的舅舅）。如前所述，其背后的逻辑是，虽然无法保证父亲与孩子有基因上的联系，但可以确定母亲的兄弟与孩子是有血缘关系的。因此，在亲子不确定性较高的情况下，如何激励父亲对孩子进行投资这一基本问题，通过发展出由舅舅对孩子进行投资的规范和习俗得到了解决。

As we have discussed, matrilineal kinship and control over women’s sexuality are two different evolutionary paths that serve to address the same fundamental biologically - based problem. A testable prediction of this evolutionary perspective is that since the two sets of customs are solutions to the same problem, they are substitutes and the presence of one should be negatively associated with the presence of the other. If one looks at ethnographic data, one finds that matrilineal kinship is associated with weaker control of women’s sexuality. Although data are limited, there is some information on these cultural traits in the Ethnographic Atlas. Within the database, there are 244 patrilineal and 59 matrilineal ethnic groups for which data are available on societal norms about the premarital sexual behavior of girls, which we take to be an indicator of sexual norms more generally. For matrilineal groups with data, only 6.7% (4 of 59) have norms that prohibit any sex before marriage. Among patrilineal groups with data, the same statistic is 34% (82 of 244). By contrast, among matrilineal groups with data, 54% (32 of 59) have norms that fully permit premarital sex, while among patrilineal groups with data, this figure is only 33% (80 of 244).
正如我们所讨论的，母系亲属制度和对女性性行为的控制是两种不同的进化路径，旨在解决基于生物学的同一个基本问题。从这种进化视角可以得出一个可检验的预测：由于这两套习俗是针对同一问题的解决方案，它们是相互替代的关系，一种习俗的存在应该与另一种习俗的存在呈负相关。查看民族志数据就会发现，母系亲属制度与对女性性行为较弱的控制相关。虽然数据有限，但《民族志地图集》中包含了一些关于这些文化特征的信息。在该数据库中，有 244 个父系和 59 个母系族群，这些族群都有关于女孩婚前性行为的社会规范数据，我们将其视为更普遍的性规范指标。在有数据的母系族群中，只有 6.7%（59 个中的 4 个）的族群有禁止婚前性行为的规范。在有数据的父系族群中，这一比例为 34%（244 个中的 82 个）。相比之下，在有数据的母系族群中，54%（59 个中的 32 个）的族群完全允许婚前性行为，而在有数据的父系族群中，这一比例仅为 33%（244 个中的 80 个）。

Another biological difference between men and women lies in their body size and strength, which is an example of a more general phenomenon referred to as sexual dimorphism. Relative to women, men tend to be taller, larger in stature, and have greater upper body strength (Gustafsson and Lindenfors, 2004). These differences have also been fairly stable (i.e., a 15% difference in body mass) for Homo sapiens since at least the Pleistocene (Ruff, 2002). Recent research within economics has studied the consequence of sexual dimorphism for modern gender norms and how it is mediated by historical technologies that made the physical differences more or less important. Alesina et al. (2013b) provide evidence that the greater physical size and strength of males was an important determinant of a gender - based division of labor historically, but primarily in agricultural societies that had adopted intensive plow agriculture. With this form of agriculture, significant upper body strength was needed to control or pull the plow. As a consequence, in these societies, there was a gendered division of labor where men worked outside the home in agriculture and women tended to work within the home. As shown by Alesina et al. (2013b), this division generated norms about the appropriate role of women in society, which persist in the modern era and affect female employment outside the home today. The form of traditional agriculture has even been found to affect preferences for sons over daughters, which results in male - biased sex - ratios (Alesina et al., 2018).
男性和女性之间的另一个生物学差异体现在体型和力量上，这是一种更普遍的现象，被称为性别二态性。与女性相比，男性往往更高、体型更大，并且上身力量更强（古斯塔夫松和林登福斯，2004）。至少从更新世开始，智人在体型上的这些差异（即体重相差 15%）就相当稳定（拉夫，2002）。经济学领域的近期研究考察了性别二态性对现代性别规范的影响，以及历史上的技术如何调节这种影响，这些技术使身体差异的重要性有所不同。阿莱西纳等人（2013b）提供的证据表明，男性较大的体型和更强的力量在历史上是基于性别的劳动分工的一个重要决定因素，但主要体现在采用精耕犁耕农业的农业社会中。在这种农业形式下，需要较大的上身力量来操控或拉动犁。因此，在这些社会中，形成了一种性别化的劳动分工，男性在户外从事农业劳动，女性则倾向于在家中劳作。正如阿莱西纳等人（2013b）所示，这种分工产生了关于女性在社会中合适角色的规范，这些规范一直延续到现代，影响着如今女性的外出就业情况。研究还发现，传统农业形式甚至会影响人们对男孩和女孩的偏好，进而导致性别比偏向男性（阿莱西纳等人，2018）。

3.4 Contributions of economics to cultural evolution

3.4 经济学对文化进化研究的贡献

The study of cultural evolution is a recent area of research, with the bulk of findings emerging in the last few decades. The field began with a small number of scholars who adapted models from evolutionary biology to cultural evolution (e.g., Cavalli - Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985). An important contribution of economics has been to use these theoretical foundations to build more elaborate models that remain tractable and provide insight into a range of economic issues, including preference heterogeneity and segregation (Bisin and Verdier, 2000, 2001b), entrepreneurship (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2014), occupational choice (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2008), female labor force participation (Fernandez, 2013), parenting strategies (Bisin and Verdier, 2001a; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2017), or domestic institutions (Tabellini, 2008; Bisin and Verdier, 2017). A related area of research that has developed within economics is theoretical work that exploits the dynamics of natural selection to understand various aspects of economic growth over the very long - run (e.g., Galor and Moav, 2002; Galor and Michalopoulos, 2012; Galor and Ozak, 2016; Galor and Savitskiy, 2018).
文化进化研究是一个较新的研究领域，大部分研究成果是在过去几十年中取得的。该领域最初由少数几位学者开创，他们将进化生物学的模型应用于文化进化研究（例如，卡瓦利 - 斯福尔扎和费尔德曼，1981；博伊德和里彻森，1985）。经济学的一个重要贡献是在这些理论基础上构建了更精细且易于处理的模型，为一系列经济问题提供了深刻见解，这些问题包括偏好异质性与隔离（比辛和韦迪耶，2000，2001b）、创业（多普克和齐利博蒂，2014）、职业选择（多普克和齐利博蒂，2008）、女性劳动力参与（费尔南德斯，2013）、育儿策略（比辛和韦迪耶，2001a；多普克和齐利博蒂，2017）以及家庭制度（塔贝利尼，2008；比辛和韦迪耶，2017）。经济学领域内发展出的一个相关研究方向是利用自然选择的动态机制来理解长期经济增长的各个方面的理论工作（例如，加洛尔和莫亚夫，2002；加洛尔和米哈洛普洛斯，2012；加洛尔和奥扎克，2016；加洛尔和萨维茨基，2018）。

One way to think about the difference between theoretical studies of culture within evolutionary anthropology and economics is that the prior has tended to focus on studying the emergence of culture and its transmission between individuals. Thus, culture and its evolution is the outcome of interest in the models. By contrast, within economics, culture and its transmission are taken as given and the analysis follows based on this. Thus, the theoretical work within evolutionary anthropology provides the micro - foundations for the assumptions used in a wide range of models within cultural economics.
理解进化人类学和经济学中文化理论研究差异的一种方式是，进化人类学倾向于关注文化的产生及其在个体之间的传播。因此，在其模型中，文化及其进化是研究的核心结果。相比之下，在经济学中，文化及其传播通常被视为既定条件，分析在此基础上展开。因此，进化人类学的理论工作为文化经济学中众多模型所使用的假设提供了微观基础。

While the origins of the study of cultural evolution were primarily theoretical, the field has subsequently become increasingly quantitative (Mesoudi, 2016). It is this line of analysis to which economic historians and growth economists have made the greatest contributions. A large body of evidence documents how the historical environment or historical shocks – what other disciplines would call ecological factors – affects the long - term evolution of cultural traits. For the interested reader, an overview of this body of evidence is provided in Table 3.1. The table reports the citation, the cultural trait that is being explained, the determinant of interest, the unit of observation, the sample, and the primary statistical methods used. Although the list is far from exhaustive, it still shows that economists have made important contributions to a deeper understanding of the historical and ecological factors that have shaped the evolution of cultural traits.
虽然文化进化研究最初主要是理论性的，但该领域随后越来越注重量化研究（梅索迪，2016）。经济史学家和增长经济学家在这一分析方向上做出了最大的贡献。大量证据记录了历史环境或历史冲击（其他学科称之为生态因素）如何影响文化特质的长期演变。感兴趣的读者可在表 3.1 中查看这方面证据的概述。该表列出了文献出处、所解释的文化特质、感兴趣的决定因素、观察单位、样本以及主要使用的统计方法。虽然这份清单并不详尽，但它仍然表明经济学家在深入理解塑造文化特质演变的历史和生态因素方面做出了重要贡献。

Recently, there has been a push for multidisciplinary research that takes a historical/evolutionary perspective and involves both economists and evolutionary anthropologists. An example is a recent collaboration between anthropologist Joseph Henrich and three economists (Schulz et al., 2019). Together, the authors study the historical origins of Western European psychology. They document how the policies of the medieval Roman Catholic Church, such as the prohibition on cousin marriage, weakened extended kinship ties and led to a more individualistic social structure and psychology. To do this, the authors use data from a range of disciplines, including historical data on the duration of exposure to the medieval Western church, ethnographic data on the traditional prevalence of kinship practices like cousin marriage and polygamy, and contemporary survey and experimental data that measure a range of cultural and psychological traits.
最近，人们推动从历史 / 进化视角开展多学科研究，经济学家和进化人类学家都参与其中。人类学家约瑟夫・亨里奇与三位经济学家的合作研究（舒尔茨等人，2019）就是一个例子。他们共同研究了西欧心理学的历史起源。他们记录了中世纪罗马天主教会的政策，如禁止表亲结婚，如何削弱了大家庭亲属关系，并导致了更加个人主义的社会结构和心理。为此，作者使用了来自多个学科的数据，包括关于接触中世纪西方教会时长的历史数据、关于表亲结婚和一夫多妻制等亲属关系传统流行程度的民族志数据，以及衡量一系列文化和心理特质的当代调查和实验数据。

Another way that economics has contributed to the study of cultural evolution is by evidence for the effects that shorter - term factors can have on cultural traits. This literature is summarized in Table 3.2. It has the same structure as Table 3.1 except that it summarizes studies that estimate the more - immediate effects of the factors of interest; namely, effects that are felt within a person’s lifetime rather than multiple generations into the future.
经济学对文化进化研究的另一个贡献是提供了短期因素对文化特质影响的证据。这方面的文献总结在表 3.2 中。该表与表 3.1 结构相同，只是它总结了那些估计感兴趣因素更直接影响的研究，即一个人在其有生之年感受到的影响，而不是对未来几代人的影响。

An additional contribution that economics has made is to estimate the effects that cultural traits have on economic outcomes. Research has shown that culture affects a host of outcomes, including trade, foreign direct investment, political turnover, conflict, innovation, savings, investment, and economic growth. An overview of the key studies from this body of research is provided in Table 3.3.
经济学的另一项贡献是评估文化特质对经济结果的影响。研究表明，文化会影响诸多方面的结果，包括贸易、外国直接投资、政治更替、冲突、创新、储蓄、投资和经济增长。表 3.3 概述了这一研究领域的关键研究成果。

在这里插入图片描述

A particularly noteworthy aspect of the body of economic research summarized in Tables 3.1–3.3 is that the scope of societies studied is relatively broad. This can be seen with a quick glance at the ‘Scope of sample’ column in the three tables. There are many studies of non - Western societies. This is important since it is now well - recognized that the cultural traits of Western European societies – what Henrich et al. (2010b) famously term ‘WEIRD’ societies – are not the modal or even median traits of the World. Instead, they appear to be highly exceptional (Henrich et al., 2010b; Henrich, 2020; Muthukrishna et al., 2020). Many disciplines that seek to better understand human culture and human behavior, most notably psychology, have a very strong tendency to focus almost exclusively on Western societies (Henrich et al., 2010a). In addition, because they are not particularly interested in cross - cultural variation, they then do not ask the question of where this variation is from, which would then cause them to look at history for answers. Thus, there is also a tendency for analysis to be ahistorical (Muthukrishna and Slingerland, 2020). While behavioral economics often shares the same ‘WEIRD’ bias, research within cultural economics generally considers a broad cross - section of societies and takes a historical perspective. The reason for this approach is likely due to the origins of the field, which lie in economic history, economic development, and economic growth, each of which has traditionally been historical and/or global in their focus. In the future, I expect research in this area to continue to become increasingly interdisciplinary, particularly as fields like psychology begin to look beyond WEIRD societies and then seek to understand the historical origins of cross - societal differences on culture and psychology.
表 3.1 - 3.3 总结的经济研究成果中一个特别值得注意的方面是，研究的社会范围相对广泛。只需快速浏览一下这三个表中的 “样本范围” 列就能发现这一点。有许多研究涉及非西方社会。这一点很重要，因为现在人们已经充分认识到，西欧社会的文化特质 —— 亨里奇等人（2010b）将其称为 “WEIRD” 社会（西方的、受过教育的、工业化的、富裕的、民主的社会）—— 并非世界的典型或普遍特质。相反，它们似乎非常独特（亨里奇等人，2010b；亨里奇，2020；穆图克里什纳等人，2020）。许多试图更好地理解人类文化和人类行为的学科，尤其是心理学，有非常强烈的倾向几乎只关注西方社会（亨里奇等人，2010a）。此外，由于它们对跨文化差异不太感兴趣，也就不会追问这种差异从何而来，而这本来会促使它们从历史中寻找答案。因此，这些分析也往往缺乏历史视角（穆图克里什纳和斯林格伦德，2020）。虽然行为经济学常常存在同样的 “WEIRD” 偏见，但文化经济学的研究通常会考虑广泛的社会样本，并采用历史视角。这种研究方法的原因可能在于该领域的起源，它源于经济史、经济发展和经济增长研究，而这些传统上都以历史和 / 或全球范围为重点。未来，我预计这一领域的研究将继续朝着更加跨学科的方向发展，尤其是当心理学等领域开始超越 “WEIRD” 社会，试图理解不同社会在文化和心理方面差异的历史根源时。

An important contribution that I can envision economists – particularly economic historians and political economists – making to evolutionary research is a greater emphasis on power and coercion and an explicit inclusion of states and state actors into theory and empirics. In standard evolutionary models, the evolution of particular cultural traits depends on their relative success. However, in reality, the success of different groups also depends on the institutions and power structures within societies. While there are existing evolutionary studies that incorporate power, coercion, and institutions (e.g., Vehrencamp, 1983), there is scope for a greater and more explicit focus on these aspects of human society within evolutionary frameworks. While there has already been important progress using an evolutionary perspective to think about states and institutions (e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 1998b,a; Gintis, 2000; Platteau, 2000; Aoki, 2001; Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Bowles, 2004; Tabellini, 2008; Bisin and Verdier, 2017; Besley and Persson, 2019), there is much more that remains to be done.
我能预见到经济学家，尤其是经济史学家和政治经济学家，对进化研究的一项重要贡献在于更加强调权力和强制因素，并将国家和国家行为者明确纳入理论和实证研究中。在标准的进化模型中，特定文化特征的演变取决于它们的相对成功程度。然而在现实中，不同群体的成功还取决于社会内部的制度和权力结构。虽然已有一些进化研究纳入了权力、强制和制度因素（例如，费伦坎普，1983），但在进化框架内，仍有空间对人类社会的这些方面进行更深入、更明确的关注。尽管从进化的角度思考国家和制度已经取得了重要进展（例如，鲍尔斯和金蒂斯，1998b、a；金蒂斯，2000；普拉托，2000；青木昌彦，2001；鲍尔斯和金蒂斯，2002；鲍尔斯，2004；塔贝利尼，2008；比辛和韦迪耶，2017；贝斯利和佩尔松，2019），但仍有许多工作有待完成。

A recent example of research along these lines is the theoretical study by Tabellini (2008) which models the interplay of culture and institutions. In the model, a cooperative cultural trait evolves through vertical transmission. He then introduces institutions, which are ‘rules of the game’ that affect the payoffs to the different cultural types in the model. The institutions are determined by majority voting. A potential equilibrium in the model is one where there are a large number of non - cooperative types. They vote for institutions that do not punish those who do not cooperate, which in turn increases the payoffs to non - cooperators. In another equilibrium, the number of cooperators is high, and they are able to implement institutions that punish deviations from cooperation, which reduce the payoff to non - cooperators and increase the payoffs to cooperators, thus sustaining this equilibrium. The model, therefore, shows how culture, which is endogenous to the institutional structure, underpins the type of institutions that emerge.
近期朝这个方向开展的研究中，塔贝利尼（2008）的理论研究是一个例子，该研究对文化与制度之间的相互作用进行了建模。在模型中，一种合作性的文化特征通过垂直传播得以演变。随后他引入了制度，制度作为 “游戏规则”，会影响模型中不同文化类型的收益。制度由多数投票决定。模型中的一个潜在均衡状态是存在大量非合作类型的个体。他们投票支持不对不合作行为进行惩罚的制度，这反过来增加了非合作者的收益。在另一个均衡状态下，合作者数量众多，他们能够实施惩罚不合作行为的制度，这降低了非合作者的收益，增加了合作者的收益，从而维持了这一均衡。因此，该模型展示了内生于制度结构的文化是如何支撑所出现的制度类型的。

While I expect research on the interplay between culture and institutions to develop further – see Bisin and Verdier (2017) for a more recent example – I also expect the empirical research on these questions to progress. There are a few examples of recent papers that have sought to understand the effect of states and institutions on the evolution of cultural traits, but much more remains to be understood. For example, the effect of state presence appears to be different in the limited number of settings that have been studied and we really don’t have a clear sense of why yet (e.g., Becker et al., 2016; Lowes et al., 2017; Dell et al., 2018; Heldring, 2021).
我预计关于文化与制度相互作用的研究将进一步发展 —— 比辛和韦迪耶（2017）的研究就是一个较新的例子。我也期待在这些问题上的实证研究能取得进展。近期有一些论文试图探究国家和制度对文化特征演变的影响，但仍有许多有待深入理解之处。例如，在已研究的有限案例中，国家存在所产生的影响似乎各不相同，而我们目前还不清楚原因（例如，贝克尔等人，2016；洛伊斯等人，2017；戴尔等人，2018；赫尔德林，2021）。

3.5 Conclusions

3.5 结论

In this chapter, I provided an overview of the insights that emerge when history is viewed through an evolutionary lens. The first part of the chapter discussed the theory and empirical evidence for the benefits of cultural evolution. The primary advantage of culture is that it allows one to conserve on information acquisition costs and to tap into the accumulated body of knowledge that has evolved during previous generations. Thus, culture allows the collective knowledge of society to be much greater than the information that any one person could learn in their lifetime. The theoretical models and empirical evidence that I reviewed show that societies can be made better off when decision - making occurs through cultural processes.
在本章中，我概述了从进化视角看待历史时所获得的洞见。本章第一部分讨论了文化进化益处的理论和实证证据。文化的主要优势在于它能节省信息获取成本，并利用前几代人积累的知识体系。因此，文化使得社会的集体知识远远超过任何个人在其有生之年所能学到的信息。我回顾的理论模型和实证证据表明，当通过文化过程进行决策时，社会会变得更好。

I then turned to a discussion of how an evolutionary perspective provides insights into a range of phenomena that are important within economics. I discussed insights into human capital and innovation that can be gained by thinking of these as cumulative cultural processes. I explained how thinking about the nature of cultural evolution helps us better understand historical persistence, path dependence, and the determinants of successful societies. I described a series of evolutionary insights that can be used to provide a deeper understanding of human history. I showed how concepts such as environmental mismatch, the collective brain, cumulative improvements, kludges, group - level selection, sexual dimorphism, and reproduction strategies provide insights into key aspects of economic history, including human capital, innovation, warfare, state formation, cooperation, social structure, gender roles, kinship, social structure, path dependence, and comparative economic development.
接着我探讨了进化视角如何为经济学中的一系列重要现象提供深刻见解。我讨论了将人力资本和创新视为累积文化过程时所获得的相关洞见。我解释了对文化进化本质的思考如何帮助我们更好地理解历史的延续性、路径依赖以及成功社会的决定因素。我阐述了一系列进化视角的见解，这些见解有助于更深入地理解人类历史。我展示了诸如环境错配、集体大脑、累积改进、拼凑、群体选择、性别二态性和生殖策略等概念，如何为经济史的关键方面提供洞见，这些方面包括人力资本、创新、战争、国家形成、合作、社会结构、性别角色、亲属关系、社会结构、路径依赖和比较经济发展。

I ended the chapter by describing the recent wave of research within economic history and growth economics that studies, both theoretically and empirically, cultural evolution and its importance for social and economic outcomes. I discussed the way this research has contributed to the field of cultural evolution and how I expect this to continue in the future.
在本章结尾，我介绍了经济史和增长经济学领域近期的研究热潮，这些研究从理论和实证两方面探讨文化进化及其对社会和经济结果的重要性。我讨论了这项研究对文化进化领域的贡献，以及我对其未来发展的预期。

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A Brief History of Economics

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Guide to Economics

When a firm achieves economies of scale, it means that each subsequent unit produced, distributed, or sold has a lower cost than those that came before it. This is the reason a large business will often enjoy higher profit margins than a smaller one. Cultura RM/Ingolf Hatz / Cultura / Getty Images

当一家公司实现了规模经济时，这意味着它生产、分销或销售的每一个后续单位的成本都低于之前的单位。这就是为什么大型企业往往比小型企业享有更高利润率的原因。Cultura RM/Ingolf Hatz / Cultura / Getty Images

Economics is the science that studies how societies produce goods and services and how they consume them. Economic theory has influenced global finance at many important junctures throughout history and is an integral factor in our everyday lives. However, the assumptions that guide the study of economics have changed dramatically throughout history. Here is a brief look at the history of economic thought.

经济学是一门研究社会如何生产商品和服务以及如何消费它们的科学。经济理论在历史上的许多重要关头都影响了全球金融，并且是我们日常生活中不可或缺的因素。然而，指导经济学研究的假设在历史上发生了巨大的变化。以下是对经济思想历史的简要回顾。

Key Takeaways

关键要点

Civilizations in the Middle East, China, and elsewhere employed sophisticated financial concepts and produced written guides of best economic practices and norms in the first millennium BCE.
中东、中国和其他地区的文明在公元前第一个千年就运用了复杂的金融概念，并编写了关于最佳经济实践和规范的书面指南。
Tunisian philosopher Ibn Khaldun, writing in the 14th century, was among the first theorists to examine the division of labor, profit motive, and international trade.
14世纪写作的突尼斯哲学家伊本·赫勒敦（Ibn Khaldun）是最早研究劳动分工、利润动机和国际贸易的理论家之一。
In the 18th century, Scottish economist Adam Smith used the ideas of French Enlightenment writers to develop a thesis on how economies should work.
18世纪，苏格兰经济学家亚当·斯密（Adam Smith）利用法国启蒙运动作家的思想，提出了关于经济应如何运行的理论。
In the 19th century, Karl Marx and Thomas Malthus expanded on their work.
19世纪，卡尔·马克思（Karl Marx）和托马斯·马尔萨斯（Thomas Malthus）在他的基础上进行了拓展。
Late-19th century economists Léon Walras and Alfred Marshall used statistics and mathematics to express economic concepts, such as economies of scale.
19世纪后期的经济学家莱昂·瓦尔拉斯（Léon Walras）和阿尔弗雷德·马歇尔（Alfred Marshall）使用统计和数学方法来表达规模经济等经济概念。
John Maynard Keynes developed theories in the early 20th century that the Federal Reserve still uses to manage monetary policy today.
20世纪初，约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）提出的理论，美国联邦储备系统至今仍在用于管理货币政策。
Most modern economic theories are based on the work of Keynes and the free-market theories of Milton Friedman, which suggest more capital in the system lessens the need for government involvement.
大多数现代经济理论都基于凯恩斯的著作以及米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）的自由市场理论，这些理论认为，体系中有更多的资本会减少对政府干预的需求。
More recent theories, such as those of Harvard University economist Amartya Sen, argue for factoring ethics into social welfare calculations of economic efficiency.
更近期的理论，比如哈佛大学经济学家阿马蒂亚·森（Amartya Sen）的理论，主张将伦理因素纳入经济效率的社会福利计算中。

Economics in the Ancient World

古代世界的经济学

Economics in its basic form began during the Bronze Age (4000-2500 BCE) with written documents in four areas of the world: Sumer and Babylonia (3500-2500 BCE); the Indus River Valley Civilization (3300-1030 BCE), in what is today’s Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India; along the Yangtze River in China; and Egypt’s Nile Valley, beginning around 3500 BCE. Societies in these areas developed notation systems using markings on clay tablets, papyrus, and other materials to account for crops, livestock, and land.

经济学的基本形式始于青铜时代（公元前4000-2500年），在世界四个地区出现了书面文献：苏美尔和巴比伦（公元前3500-2500年）；印度河流域文明（公元前3300-1030年），位于今天的阿富汗、巴基斯坦和印度；中国长江沿岸；以及大约从公元前3500年开始的埃及尼罗河流域。这些地区的社会使用在泥板、纸莎草和其他材料上做标记的符号系统来记录农作物、牲畜和土地情况。

These accounting systems, arising in tandem with written language, eventually included methods for tracking property transfers, recording debts and interest payments, calculating compound interest, and other economic tools still used today.1

这些与书面语言同时出现的会计系统，最终包括了追踪财产转移、记录债务和利息支付、计算复利以及其他至今仍在使用的经济工具的方法。

From the third millennium BCE onward, Egyptian scribes recorded the collection and redistribution of land and goods. Sumerian traders developed methods to calculate compound interest. The Code of Hammurabi (circa 1810–1750 BCE), the earliest work of economic synthesis, specifies norms for economic activity and provides a detailed framework for commerce, including business ethics for merchants and tradespeople.

从公元前第三个千年起，埃及的抄写员就记录了土地和货物的征收与再分配情况。苏美尔的商人开发出了计算复利的方法。《汉谟拉比法典》（约公元前1810-1750年）是最早的经济综合著作，它规定了经济活动的规范，并为商业提供了详细的框架，包括对商人和手工业者的商业道德规范。

Important

要点

Economics is not the result of one person’s ideas and theories. Instead, the field has been developed over centuries of experience, thought, and discussion.

经济学并非一个人的思想和理论的产物。相反，这一领域是经过几个世纪的经验、思考和讨论逐步发展起来的。

The first millennium BCE saw the emergence of more detailed written treatises on economic thought and practice. The Greek philosopher and poet Hesiod, writing in the eighth century BCE, laid out precepts for managing a farm in his “Works and Days.”

公元前第一个千年见证了更多关于经济思想和实践的详细书面论著的出现。公元前8世纪写作的希腊哲学家和诗人赫西俄德（Hesiod）在他的《工作与时日》中阐述了管理农场的戒律。

Athenian military leader, philosopher, and historian Xenophon built on this in “Oikonomikon,” a treatise on the economic management of an estate. In “Politics,” Aristotle (circa 350 BCE) took these ideas further, concluding that while private property ownership was preferred, the accumulation of wealth for its own sake was “dishonorable.”56

雅典军事领袖、哲学家和历史学家色诺芬（Xenophon）在《经济论》中进一步发展了这一思想，这是一篇关于庄园经济管理的论文。在《政治学》中，亚里士多德（约公元前350年）更进一步，得出结论认为，虽然私有制更受青睐，但为了财富本身而积累财富是 “不光彩的”。56

The Guanzi essays from China (circa the fourth century BCE) laid out one of the first explanations of supply and demand pricing; the crucial roles of a well-managed money supply and a stable currency. Among key insights was the notion that money, not armies, ultimately won wars.

中国的《管子》文章（约公元前4世纪）阐述了最早的供求定价解释之一；以及管理良好的货币供应和稳定货币的关键作用。其中的关键见解之一是，最终赢得战争的不是军队，而是金钱。

In Western Europe during the Middle Ages, economic theory was often blended with ethics, as seen in the work of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and others.

在中世纪的西欧，经济理论常常与伦理观念相融合，这在托马斯·阿奎那（Thomas Aquinas，1225-1274）等人的作品中可以看到。

Few of those writers went into the amount of detail that Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), a Tunisian historian and philosopher, did. In “Al-Muqaddimah,” Ibn Khaldun analyzes economic issues such as the perils of monopolies, the benefits of division of labor and the profit motive, and the rise and fall of economic empires. The importance of his work was recognized by Machiavelli and Hegel, and many of his ideas prefigured those of Adam Smith and those who followed him centuries later.89

很少有作家能像突尼斯历史学家和哲学家伊本·赫勒敦（1332-1406）那样深入细节。在《历史绪论》中，伊本·赫勒敦分析了诸如垄断的危害、劳动分工的好处和利润动机以及经济帝国的兴衰等经济问题。他的作品的重要性得到了马基雅维利（Machiavelli）和黑格尔（Hegel）的认可，他的许多思想预示了几个世纪后亚当·斯密及其追随者的思想。89

The Father of Modern Economics

现代经济学之父

Today, Scottish thinker Adam Smith is widely credited with creating the field of modern economics. However, Smith was inspired by French writers publishing in the mid-18th century, who shared his hatred of mercantilism.

如今，苏格兰思想家亚当·斯密被广泛认为是现代经济学领域的开创者。然而，斯密受到了18世纪中期发表著作的法国作家的启发，这些作家和他一样对重商主义深恶痛绝。

In fact, the first methodical study of how economies work was undertaken by the French physiocrats, notably Quesnay and Mirabeau. Smith took many of their ideas and expanded them into a thesis about how economies should work, as opposed to how they do work.10

事实上，最早对经济如何运行进行系统研究的是法国的重农主义者，特别是魁奈（Quesnay）和米拉波（Mirabeau）。斯密借鉴了他们的许多思想，并将其扩展成了一篇关于经济应该如何运行（而不是实际如何运行）的理论。10

Note

注释

Smith believed that competition was self-regulating and governments should take no part in business through tariffs, taxes, or other means unless it were to protect free-market competition.

斯密认为竞争是自我调节的，政府不应通过关税、税收或其他手段参与商业活动，除非是为了保护自由市场竞争。

Many economic theories today are, at least in part, a reaction to Smith’s pivotal work in the field, namely his 1776 masterpiece “The Wealth of Nations.” In this treatise, Smith laid out several mechanisms of capitalist production, free markets, and value. Smith showed that individuals acting in their own self-interest could as if guided by an “invisible hand,” create social and economic stability and prosperity for all.

如今的许多经济理论，至少在一定程度上，是对斯密在该领域的关键著作的回应，特别是他1776年的杰作《国富论》。在这篇论文中，斯密阐述了资本主义生产、自由市场和价值的几个机制。斯密表明，追求自身利益的个人仿佛受到一只 “看不见的手”的引导，能够为所有人创造社会和经济的稳定与繁荣。

Even devout followers of Smith’s ideas recognize that some of his theories were either flawed or have not aged well. Smith distinguishes between “productive labor,” such as manufacturing products that can be accumulated, and “unproductive labor,” such as tasks performed by a “menial servant,” the value of which “perish[es] in the very instant of their performance.”

即使是斯密思想的忠实追随者也认识到，他的一些理论要么存在缺陷，要么已经不合时宜。斯密区分了 “生产性劳动”，比如制造可以积累的产品，和 “非生产性劳动”，比如 “卑微的仆人” 所做的工作，其价值 “在完成的那一刻就消失了”。

One could argue that in today’s service-dominant economy, the excellent execution of services creates value by strengthening a brand through goodwill and in numerous other ways. His assertion that “equal quantities of labour, at all times and places, may be said to be of equal value to the labourer” ignores the psychological cost of working in hostile or exploitative environments.

有人可能会说，在当今以服务为主导的经济中，优质的服务通过商誉和许多其他方式强化品牌，从而创造价值。他断言 “在任何时候和任何地方，等量的劳动对劳动者来说可以说是具有同等价值的”，这忽略了在恶劣或剥削性环境中工作的心理成本。

As an extension of this, Smith’s labor theory of value—that the value of a good can be measured by the hours of labor needed to produce it—has also largely been abandoned.

作为这一点的延伸，斯密的劳动价值论 —— 即一件商品的价值可以用生产它所需的劳动时间来衡量 —— 在很大程度上也已被摒弃。

The Dismal Science: Marx and Malthus

沉闷的科学：马克思和马尔萨斯

Thomas Malthus and Karl Marx had decidedly poor reactions to Smith’s treatise. Malthus was one of a group of economic thinkers of the late 18th and early 19th centuries who were grappling with the challenges of emergent capitalism following the French Revolution and the rising demands of a burgeoning middle class. Among his peers were three of the greatest economic thinkers of the age, Jean-Baptiste Say, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill.

托马斯·马尔萨斯和卡尔·马克思对斯密的论著反应明显不佳。马尔萨斯是18世纪末和19世纪初的一群经济思想家之一，他们正在应对法国大革命后新兴资本主义带来的挑战以及新兴中产阶级不断增长的需求。他的同侪中有那个时代最伟大的三位经济思想家，让-巴蒂斯特·萨伊、大卫·李嘉图和约翰·斯图尔特·密尔。

Malthus predicted that growing populations would outstrip the food supply. He was proved wrong, however, because he didn’t foresee technological innovations that would allow production to keep pace with a growing population. Nonetheless, his work shifted the focus of economics to the scarcity of goods rather than the demand for them.

马尔萨斯预测人口增长将超过粮食供应。然而，事实证明他是错的，因为他没有预见到技术创新能够使生产跟上人口增长的步伐。尽管如此，他的工作将经济学的重点转移到了商品的稀缺性上，而不是对商品的需求上。

This increased focus on scarcity led Marx to declare that the means of production were the most important components of any economy. Marx took his ideas further and became convinced a class war would be sparked by the inherent instabilities he saw in capitalism.

对稀缺性的关注增加，使得马克思宣称生产资料是任何经济中最重要的组成部分。马克思进一步发展了他的思想，并坚信他在资本主义中看到的内在不稳定性会引发一场阶级战争。

However, Marx underestimated the flexibility of capitalism. Instead of creating a clear division between two classes—owners and workers—the market economy created a mixed class wherein owners and workers held the interests of both parties. Despite his overly rigid theory, Marx accurately predicted one trend: businesses grow larger and more powerful to the degree that free-market capitalism allows.

然而，马克思低估了资本主义的灵活性。市场经济并没有在两个阶级（所有者和工人）之间造成明显的划分，而是创造了一个混合阶级，在这个阶级中，所有者和工人都持有双方的利益。尽管他的理论过于僵化，但马克思准确地预测了一个趋势：在自由市场资本主义所允许的程度内，企业会变得越来越大、越来越强大。

The Marginal Revolution

边际革命

As the ideas of wealth and scarcity developed in economics, economists turned their attention to more specific questions about how markets operate and how prices are determined. English economist William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882), Austrian economist Carl Menger (1840-1921), and French economist Léon Walras (1834-1910) independently developed a new perspective in economics known as marginalism.

随着经济学中关于财富和稀缺性的思想不断发展，经济学家们将注意力转向了更具体的问题，即市场如何运作以及价格如何确定。英国经济学家威廉·斯坦利·杰文斯（1835-1882）、奥地利经济学家卡尔·门格尔（1840-1921）和法国经济学家莱昂·瓦尔拉斯（1834-1910）各自独立地在经济学中发展出了一种新的观点，即边际主义。

Their key insight was that, in practice, people aren’t actually faced with big-picture decisions over entire general classes of economic goods. Instead, they make decisions around specific units of an economic good as they choose to buy, sell, or produce each additional (or marginal) unit. In doing so, people balance the scarcity of each good against the value of the use of the good at the margin.

他们的关键见解是，在实际中，人们实际上并不会面临关于整个经济商品大类的宏观决策。相反，当他们选择购买、出售或生产每一个额外（或边际）单位的某种经济商品时，他们是围绕着该商品的特定单位来做决策的。在这样做的过程中，人们会在边际上平衡每种商品的稀缺性与其使用价值。

These decisions explain, for example, why the price of an individual diamond is relatively higher than the price of an individual unit of water. Though water is a basic need to live, it is often plentiful, and though diamonds are often purely decorative, they are scarce. Marginalism quickly became, and remains, a central concept in economics.

例如，这些决策解释了为什么一颗单独的钻石的价格相对高于一单位水的价格。尽管水是生存的基本需求，但它往往很丰富，而尽管钻石通常纯粹是用于装饰的，但它们很稀缺。边际主义迅速成为并一直是经济学中的一个核心概念。

Speaking in Numbers

用数字说话

Walras went on to mathematize his theory of marginal analysis and made models and theories that reflected what he found. General equilibrium theory came from his work, as did the practice of expressing economic concepts statistically and mathematically instead of just prose. Alfred Marshall took the mathematical modeling of economies to new heights, introducing many concepts that are still not widely understood, such as economies of scale, marginal utility, and the real-cost paradigm.

瓦尔拉斯接着将他的边际分析理论数学化，并建立了反映他研究成果的模型和理论。一般均衡理论源于他的研究成果，用统计和数学方式而不仅仅是用文字来表达经济概念的做法也是如此。阿尔弗雷德·马歇尔将经济的数学建模提升到了新的高度，引入了许多至今仍未被广泛理解的概念，如规模经济、边际效用和实际成本范式。

Fast Fact

快速事实

It is nearly impossible to expose an economy to experimental rigor; therefore, economics is on the edge of science. Through mathematical modeling, however, some economic theories have been rendered testable.

几乎不可能对一个经济体进行严格的实验；因此，经济学处于科学的边缘。然而，通过数学建模，一些经济理论已经可以进行检验了。

The theories developed by Walras, Marshall, and their successors would develop in the 20th century into the neoclassical school of economics—defined by mathematical modeling and assumptions of rational actors and efficient markets. Later, statistical methods were applied to economic data in the form of econometrics, allowing economists to propose and test hypotheses empirically and in a methodologically rigorous manner.

瓦尔拉斯、马歇尔及其追随者所发展的理论在20世纪发展成为新古典主义经济学派—— 其特点是数学建模以及对理性行为者和有效市场的假设。后来，统计方法以计量经济学的形式应用于经济数据，使经济学家能够以实证的方式并按照严格的方法论提出和检验假设。

Keynes and Macroeconomics

凯恩斯与宏观经济学

John Maynard Keynes developed a new branch of economics known as Keynesian economics or macroeconomics. Keynes styled the economists who had come before him as “classical” economists. He believed that while their theories might apply to individual choices and goods markets, they did not adequately describe the operation of the economy as a whole.

约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯发展出了经济学的一个新分支，即凯恩斯主义经济学或宏观经济学。凯恩斯将在他之前的经济学家称为 “古典” 经济学家。他认为，虽然他们的理论可能适用于个体选择和商品市场，但并不能充分描述整个经济的运行情况。

Instead of marginal units or even specific goods markets and prices, Keynesian macroeconomics presents the economy in terms of large-scale aggregates that represent the rate of unemployment, aggregate demand, or average price-level inflation for all goods. Moreover, Keynes’s theory says that governments can be influential players in the economy—saving it from recession by implementing expansionary fiscal and monetary policy to increase economic output and stability.

凯恩斯主义宏观经济学不是从边际单位甚至特定的商品市场和价格的角度来描述经济，而是用代表失业率、总需求或所有商品的平均物价水平通胀率的大规模总量来呈现经济。此外，凯恩斯的理论认为，政府可以在经济中扮演有影响力的角色 —— 通过实施扩张性的财政和货币政策来增加经济产出和稳定性，从而使经济摆脱衰退。

The Neoclassical Synthesis

新古典综合派

By the mid-20th century, these two strands of thought—mathematical, marginalist microeconomics, and Keynesian macroeconomics—would rise to near-complete dominance in the field of economics throughout the Western world.

到20世纪中期，这两种思想流派 —— 数学化的、边际主义的微观经济学和凯恩斯主义宏观经济学 —— 在整个西方世界的经济学领域几乎完全占据了主导地位。

This became known as the neoclassical synthesis, which has since represented mainstream economic thought. It is taught in universities and practiced by researchers and policymakers, with other perspectives labeled as heterodox economics.

这被称为新古典综合派，从那以后它代表了主流经济思想。它在大学中被教授，并被研究人员和政策制定者所采用，而其他观点则被贴上了异端经济学的标签。

Within the neoclassical synthesis, various streams of economic thought have developed, sometimes in opposition to one another. The inherent tension between neoclassical microeconomics (which portrays free markets as efficient and beneficial) and Keynesian macroeconomics—which views markets as inherently prone to catastrophic failure—has led to persistent academic and public policy disagreements, with different theories ascendant at different times.

在新古典综合派内部，发展出了各种经济思想流派，有时它们相互对立。新古典主义微观经济学（将自由市场描绘为高效和有益的）和凯恩斯主义宏观经济学（认为市场本质上容易发生灾难性失败）之间的内在紧张关系，导致了持续的学术和公共政策分歧，不同的理论在不同时期占据主导地位。

Note

注释

Various economists and schools of thought have sought to refine, reinterpret, redact, and redefine neoclassic and Keynesian macroeconomics.

许多经济学家和思想流派都试图完善、重新解释、修订和重新定义新古典主义和凯恩斯主义宏观经济学。

Most prominent is monetarism and the Chicago School, developed by Milton Friedman, which retains neoclassical microeconomics and the Keynesian macroeconomic framework but shifts the emphasis of macroeconomics from fiscal policy (favored by Keynes) to monetary policy. Monetarism was widely espoused through the 1980s, '90s, and 2000s.

最突出的是由米尔顿·弗里德曼发展起来的货币主义和芝加哥学派，它保留了新古典主义微观经济学和凯恩斯主义宏观经济框架，但将宏观经济学的重点从凯恩斯所青睐的财政政策转移到了货币政策上。货币主义在20世纪80年代、90年代和21世纪初被广泛推崇。

Several different streams of economic theory and research have been proposed to resolve the tension between micro- and macroeconomists. This attempt incorporates aspects or assumptions from microeconomics (such as rational expectations) into macroeconomics or further develops microeconomics to provide micro-foundations (such as price stickiness or psychological factors) for Keynesian macroeconomics.

为了解决微观经济学家和宏观经济学家之间的紧张关系，已经提出了几种不同的经济理论和研究流派。这种尝试将微观经济学的一些方面或假设（如理性预期）纳入宏观经济学，或者进一步发展微观经济学，为凯恩斯主义宏观经济学提供微观基础（如价格粘性或心理因素）。

In recent decades, this has led to new theories, such as behavioral economics, and to renewed interest in heterodox theories, such as Austrian-school economics, which were previously relegated to the economic backwaters.

在最近几十年里，这导致了一些新的理论的出现，比如行为经济学，并且重新引发了人们对异端理论的兴趣，比如奥地利学派经济学，这些理论以前曾被置于经济学的边缘地位。

Behavioral Economics

行为经济学

Classical economic theory and theory of markets, from Smith through Friedman, have mainly rested on the assumption that consumers are rational actors who behave in their best interests.

从斯密到弗里德曼的古典经济理论和市场理论，主要基于这样一个假设，即消费者是追求自身最大利益的理性行为者。

However, current economists such as Richard Thaler and Daniel Kahneman, the late Gary Becker, and Amos Tversky have shown that people often do not act in their own best material interests but allow themselves to be swayed by non-material psychological factors and biases.

然而，目前的经济学家，如理查德·塞勒和丹尼尔·卡尼曼、已故的加里·贝克尔以及阿莫斯·特沃斯基，已经表明人们往往不会按照自己的最大物质利益行事，而是会受到非物质的心理因素和偏见的影响。

Behavioral economics has helped popularize several new concepts that make economic modeling and forecasting more difficult than ever. These concepts include:

行为经济学帮助普及了几个新的概念，这些概念使得经济建模和预测比以往任何时候都更加困难。这些概念包括：

The sunk cost fallacy: Continuing to invest in a failing project because of what has been invested so far.
沉没成本谬误：因为到目前为止已经投入的东西，而继续对一个失败的项目进行投资。
Availability heuristics: Thinking a specific consequence of an action is more likely because it comes more easily to mind than other outcomes.
可得性启发法：认为一个行动的某个特定结果更有可能发生，因为它比其他结果更容易想到。
Bounded rationality: People acting without complete information when they know that more information is available.
有限理性：人们在知道有更多信息可用的情况下，在没有完整信息的情况下采取行动。

Factoring in Social Benefit

考虑社会福利因素

A rising cohort of economists has emphasized the importance of factoring in inequalities in income distribution and social well-being when measuring the success of a given economic policy. Pre-eminent among them is Anthony Atkinson (1944-2017), who focused on income redistribution within a given country.20

越来越多的经济学家强调（https://www.investopedia.com/claudia-goldin-8403888），在衡量一项特定经济政策的成功与否时，需要考虑收入分配不平等和社会福利的因素。其中杰出的代表是安东尼·阿特金森（1944-2017），他专注于特定国家内部的收入再分配问题。

Also highly regarded and noteworthy is Amartya Sen, a professor of economics and philosophy at Harvard University, whose work on global inequality won him the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1998.

同样备受尊敬且值得注意的是哈佛大学的经济学和哲学教授阿马蒂亚·森，他关于全球不平等问题的研究使他在1998年获得了诺贝尔经济学奖。

Sen’s work is also notable for reintroducing ethical behavior into his analysis. This concern ties Sen’s thinking back to the writing of the earliest economic thinkers, who saw the over-accumulation of wealth by individuals or groups as ultimately harmful to society.

森的研究还因其在分析中重新引入了伦理行为而值得注意。这种关注将森的思想与最早的经济思想家的著作联系起来，那些思想家认为个人或团体过度积累财富最终会对社会有害。

What Is Economics and Its History?

什么是经济学及其历史？

Economics is the science and study of a society’s ability to produce goods and services, buy and sell them, and consume them. Documentation, theories, and discussions go back thousands of years.

经济学是一门研究社会生产商品和服务、买卖商品和服务以及消费商品和服务的能力的科学。相关的文献记载、理论和讨论可以追溯到几千年前。

Who Invented Economics First?

谁最先发明了经济学？

There is no one person that “invented” economics. Instead, many notable thinkers and societies throughout history have contributed to the field of economics.

并没有某一个人 “发明” 了经济学。相反，历史上许多著名的思想家和社会都对经济学领域做出了贡献。

When Did Economic History Start?

Modern economics is attributed to Adam Smith, who published “The Wealth of Nations” in 1776*.* However, the practices and ideas that led to Smith’s paper were developed over centuries of discussions and ideas around the globe.

经济史从何时开始？

现代经济学归功于亚当·斯密，他在1776年出版了《国富论》。然而，促成斯密这篇著作的实践和思想是经过了几个世纪以来全球范围内的讨论和各种思想的发展而形成的。

The Bottom Line

总结

Economic theory grew out of societies’ need to account for resources, plan for the future, and exchange and allocate goods. Over time, these basic accounting tools grew into increasingly complex financial models, blending the mathematics required to calculate compound interest with ethics and moral philosophy.

经济理论源于社会对资源核算、未来规划以及商品交换和分配的需求。随着时间的推移，这些基本的会计工具发展成了越来越复杂的金融模型，将计算复利所需的数学知识与伦理和道德哲学融合在一起。

Economics as a system to understand and control the material world and mitigate risk emerged and evolved across the globe in a staggered fashion—the Fertile Crescent and Egypt, China and India, ancient Greece, and the Arab world.

作为一种理解和控制物质世界并降低风险的体系，经济学在全球范围内以交错的方式出现并演变 —— 在新月沃地和埃及、中国和印度、古希腊以及阿拉伯世界。

As societies grew wealthier and trade grew more complex, economic theory turned to the mathematics, statistics, and computational modeling that economists use to help guide policymakers. The business cycle, booms and busts, anti-inflation measures, and mortgage interest rates are outgrowths of economics.

随着社会变得更加富裕，贸易也变得更加复杂，经济理论开始借助数学、统计学以及经济学家们所使用的计算建模方法来帮助指导政策制定者。商业周期、经济的繁荣与衰退、反通货膨胀措施以及抵押贷款利率等，都是经济学的产物。

Understanding them helps the market and government adjust for these variables. Balancing out the mathematical modeling approach is the study of factors that are more difficult to quantify but crucial to understand—most notably, the foibles and unpredictability of human psychology.

理解这些内容有助于市场和政府针对这些变量做出调整。与数学建模方法相平衡的是对一些更难以量化但又至关重要的因素的研究—— 最值得注意的是人类心理的弱点和不可预测性。