科学知识的社会维度

注：机翻，未校。

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The Social Dimensions of Scientific Knowledge

First published Fri Apr 12, 2002; substantive revision Mon May 27, 2019

Study of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge encompasses the effects of scientific research on human life and social relations, the effects of social relations and values on scientific research, and the social aspects of inquiry itself. Several factors have combined to make these questions salient to contemporary philosophy of science. These factors include the emergence of social movements, like environmentalism and feminism, critical of mainstream science; concerns about the social effects of science-based technologies; epistemological questions made salient by big science; new trends in the history of science, especially the move away from internalist historiography; anti-normative approaches in the sociology of science; turns in philosophy to naturalism and pragmatism. This entry reviews the historical background to current research in this area and features of contemporary science that invite philosophical attention.
对科学知识的社会维度的研究包括科学研究对人类生活和社会关系的影响、社会关系和价值观对科学研究的影响，以及探究本身的社会方面。几个因素结合在一起，使这些问题在当代科学哲学中变得突出。这些因素包括：对主流科学持批评态度的社会运动的出现，如环保主义和女权主义;对科学技术的社会影响的担忧;大科学使认识论问题变得突出;科学史的新趋势，尤其是远离内线主义史学;科学社会学中的反规范方法;将哲学转向自然主义和实用主义。本文回顾了该领域当前研究的历史背景以及引起哲学关注的当代科学特征。

The philosophical work can roughly be classified into two camps. One acknowledges that scientific inquiry is in fact carried out in social settings and asks whether and how standard epistemology must be supplemented to address this feature. The other treats sociality as a fundamental aspect of knowledge and asks how standard epistemology must be modified or reformed from this broadly social perspective. Concerns in the supplementing approach include such matters as trust and accountability raised by multiple authorship, the division of cognitive labor, the reliability of peer review, the challenges of privately funded science, as well as concerns arising from the role of scientific research in society. The reformist approach highlights the challenge to normative philosophy from social, cultural, and feminist studies of science while seeking to develop philosophical models of the social character of scientific knowledge and inquiry. It treats the questions of the division of cognitive labor, expertise and authority, the interactions of science and society, etc., from the perspective of philosophical models of the irreducibly social character of scientific knowledge. Philosophers employ both formal modeling techniques and conceptual analysis in their efforts to identify and analyze epistemologically relevant social aspects of science.
哲学著作大致可分为两个阵营。人们承认科学探究实际上是在社会环境中进行的，并询问是否以及如何补充标准认识论来解决这一特征。另一个将社会性视为知识的一个基本方面，并询问如何从这个广泛的社会角度修改或改革标准认识论。补充方法中的问题包括多个作者提出的信任和问责制、认知劳动的分工、同行评审的可靠性、私人资助科学的挑战以及科学研究在社会中的作用引起的担忧。改革主义方法强调了社会、文化和女权主义科学研究对规范哲学的挑战，同时寻求发展科学知识和探究的社会特征的哲学模型。它从科学知识不可简化的社会特征的哲学模型的角度处理认知劳动、专业知识和权威的分工、科学与社会的互动等问题。哲学家在努力识别和分析科学的认识论相关社会方面时，采用形式建模技术和概念分析。

1. Historical Background 1. 历史背景

Philosophers who study the social character of scientific knowledge can trace their lineage at least as far as John Stuart Mill. Mill, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Karl Popper all took some type of critical interaction among persons as central to the validation of knowledge claims.
研究科学知识的社会特征的哲学家至少可以追溯到约翰·斯图尔特·穆勒 （John Stuart Mill）。穆勒、查尔斯·桑德斯·皮尔斯和卡尔·波普尔都把人与人之间的某种类型的批判性互动作为验证知识主张的核心。

Mill’s arguments occur in his well-known political essay On Liberty, (Mill 1859) rather than in the context of his logical and methodological writings, but he makes it clear that they are to apply to any kind of knowledge or truth claim. Mill argues from the fallibility of human knowers to the necessity of unobstructed opportunity for and practice of the critical discussion of ideas. Only such critical discussion can assure us of the justifiability of the (true) beliefs we do have and can help us avoid falsity or the partiality of belief or opinion framed in the context of just one point of view. Critical interaction maintains the freshness of our reasons and is instrumental in the improvement of both the content and the reasons of our beliefs. The achievement of knowledge, then, is a social or collective, not an individual, matter.
穆勒的论点出现在他著名的政治文章《论自由》（Mill 1859）中，而不是在他的逻辑和方法论著作的背景下，但他明确表示，这些论点适用于任何类型的知识或真理主张。穆勒从人类知识者的易错性论证到对思想的批判性讨论的畅通无阻的机会和实践的必要性。只有这样的批判性讨论才能确保我们所拥有的（真正的）信念是合理的，并可以帮助我们避免在一种观点的背景下构成的虚假或信仰或观点的片面性。批判性互动保持了我们理由的新鲜度，并有助于改进我们信念的内容和理由。因此，知识的获得是一个社会或集体的事情，而不是个人的事情。

Peirce’s contribution to the social epistemology of science is commonly taken to be his consensual theory of truth: “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by truth, and the object represented is the real.” (Peirce 1878, 133) While often read as meaning that the truth is whatever the community of inquirers converges on in the long run, the notion is interpretable as meaning more precisely either that truth (and “the real”) depends on the agreement of the community of inquirers or that it is an effect of the real that it will in the end produce agreement among inquirers. Whatever the correct reading of this particular statement, Peirce elsewhere makes it clear that, in his view, truth is both attainable and beyond the reach of any individual. “We individually cannot hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it for the community of philosophers.” (Peirce 1868, 40). Peirce puts great stock in instigating doubt and critical interaction as means to knowledge. Thus, whether his theory of truth is consensualist or realist, his view of the practices by which we attain it grants a central place to dialogue and social interaction.
皮尔斯对科学社会认识论的贡献通常被认为是他对真理的共识理论：“注定要被所有研究者最终同意的观点就是我们所说的真理，而所代表的对象是真实的。（皮尔斯 1878,133）虽然经常被解读为真理是探究者群体长期趋同的任何东西，但这个概念可以更准确地解释为真理（和“真实”）取决于探究者群体的同意，或者它是真实的一种效果，它最终会在探究者之间产生共识。无论对这一特定陈述的正确解读如何，皮尔斯在其他地方都清楚地表明，在他看来，真理既是可以实现的，也是任何个人都无法企及的。“我们个人无法希望获得我们追求的终极哲学;我们只能为哲学家社区寻找它。（皮尔斯 1868,40）。皮尔斯非常重视激发怀疑和批判性互动作为获得知识的手段。因此，无论他的真理理论是共识主义的还是现实主义的，他对我们实现真理的实践的看法都为对话和社会互动提供了中心位置。

Popper is often treated as a precursor of social epistemology because of his emphasis on the importance of criticism in the development of scientific knowledge. Two concepts of criticism are found in his works (Popper 1963, 1972) and these can be described as logical and practical senses of falsification. The logical sense of falsification is just the structure of a modus tollens argument, in which a hypothesis is falsified by the demonstration that one of its logical consequences is false. This is one notion of criticism, but it is a matter of formal relations between statements. The practical sense of falsification refers to the efforts of scientists to demonstrate the inadequacies of one another’s theories by demonstrating observational shortcomings or conceptual inconsistencies. This is a social activity. For Popper the methodology of science is falsificationist in both its logical and practical senses, and science progresses through the demonstration by falsification of the untenability of theories and hypotheses. Popper’s logical falsificationism is part of an effort to demarcate genuine science from pseudo science, and has lost its plausibility as a description of scientific methodology as the demarcation project has come under challenge from naturalist and historicist approaches in philosophy of science. While criticism does play an important role in some current approaches in social epistemology, Popper’s own views are more closely approximated by evolutionary epistemology, especially that version that treats cognitive progress as the effect of selection against incorrect theories and hypotheses. In contrast to Mill’s views, for Popper the function of criticism is to eliminate false theories rather than to improve them.
波普尔经常被视为社会认识论的先驱，因为他强调批评在科学知识发展中的重要性。在他的著作中可以找到两个批评概念（波普尔 1963 年，1972 年），这些可以被描述为逻辑和实践的证伪意义。证伪的逻辑意义只是 modus tollens 论证的结构，其中假设通过证明其逻辑后果之一是错误的来证伪的。这是一个批评的概念，但这是一个陈述之间的正式关系问题。实际意义上的证伪是指科学家们通过证明观察缺陷或概念不一致来证明彼此理论的不足的努力。这是一项社交活动。对波普尔来说，科学的方法论在逻辑和实践意义上都是证伪主义的，科学是通过证伪理论和假设的不成立性来进步的。波普尔的逻辑证伪主义是将真正的科学与伪科学区分开来的努力的一部分，并且由于划分项目受到科学哲学中自然主义和历史主义方法的挑战，它已经失去了作为科学方法论描述的合理性。虽然批评在当前社会认识论的一些方法中确实发挥了重要作用，但波普尔自己的观点更接近于进化认识论，尤其是将认知进步视为选择对错误理论和假设的影响的版本。与穆勒的观点相反，对波普尔来说，批评的功能是消除错误的理论，而不是改进它们。

The work of Mill, Peirce, and Popper is a resource for philosophers presently exploring the social dimensions of scientific knowledge. However, the current debates are framed in the context of developments in both philosophy of science and in history and social studies of science following the collapse of the logical empiricist consensus. The philosophers of the Vienna Circle are conventionally associated with an uncritical form of positivism and with the logical empiricism that replaced American pragmatism in the 1940s and 1950s. According to some recent scholars, however, they saw natural science as a potent force for progressive social change. (Cartwright, Cat, and Chang 1996; Giere and Richardson, eds., 1996; Uebel 2005) With its grounding in observation and public forms of verification, science for them constituted a superior alternative to what they saw as metaphysical obscurantism, an obscurantism that led not only to bad thinking but to bad politics. While one development of this point of view leads to scientism, the view that any meaningful question can be answered by the methods of science; another development leads to inquiry into what social conditions promote the growth of scientific knowledge. Logical empiricism, the version of Vienna Circle philosophy that developed in the United States, focused on logical, internal aspects of scientific knowledge and discouraged philosophical inquiry into the social dimensions of science. These came into prominence again after the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1962). A new generation of sociologists of science, among them Barry Barnes, Steven Shapin, and Harry Collins, took Kuhn’s emphasis on the role of non-evidential community factors in scientific change even further than he had and argued that scientific judgment was determined by social factors, such as professional interests and political ideologies (Barnes 1977, Shapin 1982, Collins 1983). This family of positions provoked a counter-response among philosophers. These responses are marked by an effort to acknowledge some social dimensions to scientific knowledge while at the same time maintaining its epistemological legitimacy, which they take to be undermined by the new sociology. At the same time, features of the organization of scientific inquiry compel philosophers to consider their implications for the normative analysis of scientific practices.
穆勒、皮尔斯和波普尔的工作是目前探索科学知识的社会维度的哲学家的资源。然而，目前的辩论是在逻辑经验主义共识崩溃后科学哲学和科学历史和社会研究的发展背景下进行的。维也纳圈的哲学家通常与一种不加批判的实证主义形式以及在 1940 年代和 1950 年代取代美国实用主义的逻辑经验主义联系在一起。然而，根据一些最近的学者的说法，他们将自然科学视为推动进步社会变革的强大力量。（Cartwright、Cat 和 Chang 1996;Giere 和 Richardson，编辑，1996 年;Uebel 2005 年）凭借其以观察和公共验证形式为基础，科学对他们来说构成了他们所认为的形而上学蒙昧主义的优越替代品，这种蒙昧主义不仅导致了糟糕的思想，而且导致了糟糕的政治。虽然这种观点的一个发展导致了科学主义，但任何有意义的问题都可以通过科学方法回答的观点;另一个发展导致了对哪些社会条件促进了科学知识增长的探究。逻辑经验主义是在美国发展起来的维也纳圈哲学版本，专注于科学知识的逻辑、内部方面，不鼓励对科学的社会维度进行哲学探究。在托马斯·库恩 （Thomas Kuhn） 的《科学革命的结构》（Structure of Scientific Revolutions，Kuhn 1962） 出版后，这些再次受到关注。新一代的科学社会学家，包括巴里·巴恩斯（Barry Barnes）、史蒂文·沙平（Steven Shapin）和哈里·柯林斯（Harry Collins），比他更进一步地接受了库恩对非证据性社区因素在科学变革中的作用的强调，并认为科学判断是由社会因素决定的，例如职业兴趣和政治意识形态（Barnes 1977， Shapin 1982， Collins 1983）。这一系列立场在哲学家中引起了反击。这些回应的特点是努力承认科学知识的某些社会维度，同时保持其认识论的合法性，他们认为这被新社会学所破坏。同时，科学探究组织的特点迫使哲学家考虑它们对科学实践的规范分析的影响。

2. Big Science, Trust, and Authority 2. 大科学、信任和权威

The second half of the twentieth century saw the emergence of what has come to be known as Big Science: the organization of large numbers of scientists bringing different bodies of expertise to a common research project. The original model was the Manhattan Project, undertaken during the Second World War to develop an atomic weapon in the United States. Theoretical and experimental physicists located at various sites across the country, though principally at Los Alamos, New Mexico, worked on sub-problems of the project under the overall direction of J. Robert Oppenheimer. While academic and military research have since been to some degree separated, much experimental research in physics, especially high energy particle physics, continues to be pursued by large teams of researchers. Research in other areas of science as well, for example the work comprehended under the umbrella of the Human Genome Project, has taken on some of the properties of Big Science, requiring multiple forms of expertise. In addition to the emergence of Big Science, the transition from small scale university or even amateur science to institutionalized research with major economic impacts supported by national funding bodies and connected across international borders has seemed to call for new ethical and epistemological thinking. Moreover, the consequent dependence of research on central funding bodies and increasingly, private foundations or commercial entities, prompts questions about the degree of independence of contemporary scientific knowledge from its social and economic context.
20 世纪下半叶出现了后来被称为“大科学”的东西：将大量科学家组织起来，将不同的专业知识带到一个共同的研究项目中。最初的模式是曼哈顿计划，在第二次世界大战期间在美国开发原子武器。位于全国各地的理论和实验物理学家，虽然主要在新墨西哥州的洛斯阿拉莫斯，但在 J. Robert Oppenheimer 的总体指导下研究该项目的子问题。虽然此后学术和军事研究在某种程度上分开了，但物理学中的许多实验研究，尤其是高能粒子物理学，继续由大型研究团队进行。其他科学领域的研究，例如在人类基因组计划（Human Genome Project）的保护伞下进行的研究，已经具有大科学的一些特性，需要多种形式的专业知识。除了大科学的出现之外，从小规模大学甚至业余科学向由国家资助机构支持并跨越国界联系的具有重大经济影响的制度化研究的转变似乎需要新的伦理和认识论思维。此外，研究随之而来的对中央资助机构和越来越多的私人基金会或商业实体的依赖，引发了人们对当代科学知识独立于其社会和经济背景的独立程度的质疑。

John Hardwig (1985) articulated one philosophical dilemma posed by large teams of researchers. Each member or subgroup participating in such a project is required because each has a crucial bit of expertise not possessed by any other member or subgroup. This may be knowledge of a part of the instrumentation, the ability to perform a certain kind of calculation, the ability to make a certain kind of measurement or observation. The other members are not in a position to evaluate the results of other members’ work, and hence, all must take one anothers’ results on trust. The consequence is an experimental result, (for example, the measurement of a property such as the decay rate or spin of a given particle) the evidence for which is not fully understood by any single participant in the experiment. This leads Hardwig to ask two questions, one about the evidential status of testimony, and one about the nature of the knowing subject in these cases. With respect to the latter, Hardwig says that either the group as a whole, but no single member, knows or it is possible to know vicariously. Neither of these is palatable to him. Talking about the group or the community knowing smacks of superorganisms and transcendent entities and Hardwig shrinks from that solution. Vicarious knowledge, knowing without oneself possessing the evidence for the truth of what one knows, requires, according to Hardwig, too much of a departure from our ordinary concepts of knowledge.
约翰·哈德维格 （John Hardwig） （1985） 阐明了大型研究团队提出的一个哲学困境。参与此类项目的每个成员或子组都是必需的，因为每个人都拥有任何其他成员或子组所不具备的关键专业知识。这可能是对仪器的一部分的了解，执行某种计算的能力，进行某种测量或观察的能力。其他成员无法评估其他成员的工作成果，因此，所有人都必须信任彼此的结果。结果是实验结果（例如，对给定粒子的衰变速率或自旋等特性的测量），实验中的任何单个参与者都无法完全理解其证据。这导致 Hardwig 提出了两个问题，一个是关于证词的证据状态，另一个是关于这些案件中知情主体的性质。关于后者，Hardwig 说，要么是整个群体，但没有一个成员知道，要么是可能的。这些都不是他喜欢的。谈论群体或社区，了解超有机体和超然实体的味道，Hardwig 对这个解决方案退缩了。根据哈德维格的说法，替代知识，即在没有自己拥有自己所知道的真理的证据的情况下知道，这需要与我们通常的知识概念有太多的背离。

The first question is, as Hardwig notes, part of a more general discussion about the epistemic value of testimony. Much of what passes for common knowledge is acquired from others. We depend on experts to tell us what is wrong or right with our appliances, our cars, our bodies. Indeed, much of what we later come to know depends on what we previously learned as children from our parents and teachers. We acquire knowledge of the world through the institutions of education, journalism, and scientific inquiry. Philosophers disagree about the status of beliefs acquired in this way. Here is the question: If A knows that p on the basis of evidence e, B has reason to think A trustworthy and B believes p on the basis of A’s testimony that p, does B also know that p? Some philosophers, as Locke and Hume seem to have, argue that only what one has observed oneself could count as a good reason for belief, and that the testimony of another is, therefore, never on its own sufficient warrant for belief. Thus, B does not know simply on the basis of A’s testimony but must have additional evidence about A’s reliability. While this result is consistent with traditional philosophical empiricism and rationalism, which emphasized the individual’s sense experience or rational apprehension as foundations of knowledge, it does have the consequence that we do not know most of what we think we know.
正如哈德维格所指出的，第一个问题是关于证词的认识价值的更一般性讨论的一部分。许多被认为是常识的东西都是从别人那里获得的。我们依靠专家告诉我们我们的电器、我们的汽车、我们的身体是错的还是对的。事实上，我们后来所了解的大部分内容都取决于我们小时候从父母和老师那里学到的东西。我们通过教育机构、新闻学和科学探究来获取世界知识。哲学家们对以这种方式获得的信仰的地位存在分歧。问题是：如果 A 根据证据 e 知道 p，B 有理由认为 A 值得信赖，而 B 根据 A 的证词 p 相信 p，那么 B 是否也知道 p？一些哲学家，如洛克和休谟，似乎认为只有自己观察到的才能被视为信仰的充分理由，因此，另一个人的证词本身从来都不是信仰的充分保证。因此，B 不能仅仅根据 A 的证词来知道，而必须有关于 A 可靠性的额外证据。虽然这一结果与传统哲学经验主义和理性主义一致，它们强调个人的感官体验或理性理解是知识的基础，但它确实具有我们不知道我们认为我们知道的大部分内容的后果。

A number of philosophers have recently offered alternative analyses focusing on one or another element in the problem. Some argue that testimony by a qualified expert is itself evidential, (Schmitt 1988), others that the expert’s evidence constitutes good reason for, but is not itself evidential for the recipient of testimony (Hardwig 1985, 1988), others that what is transmitted in testimony is knowledge and not just propositional content and thus the question of the kind of reason a recipient of testimony has is not to the point (Welbourne 1981).
许多哲学家最近提供了针对问题中某个要素的替代分析。一些人认为合格专家的证词本身就是证据（Schmitt 1988），另一些人认为专家的证据构成了充分的理由，但其本身并不是证词接受者的证据（Hardwig 1985， 1988），另一些人认为证词中传递的是知识，而不仅仅是命题内容，因此证词接受者具有何种理由的问题并不切中要害（Welbourne 1981）。

However this dispute is resolved, questions of trust and authority arise in a particularly pointed way in the sciences, and Hardwig’s dilemma for the physics experiment is also a specific version of a more general phenomenon. A popular conception of science, fed partly by Popper’s falsificationism, is that it is epistemically reliable because the results of experiments and observational studies are checked by independent repetition. In practice, however, only some results are so checked and many are simply accepted on trust. Not only must positive results be accepted on trust, but claims of failure to replicate as well as other critiques must be also. Thus, just as in the non-scientific world information is accepted on trust, so in science, knowledge grows by depending on the testimony of others. What are the implications of accepting this fact for our conceptions of the reliability of scientific knowledge?
无论这场争论如何解决，信任和权威的问题在科学中以特别尖锐的方式出现，哈德维格对物理实验的困境也是一个更普遍现象的具体版本。一个流行的科学概念，部分是由波普尔的证伪主义所推动的，是它在认识论上是可靠的，因为实验和观察研究的结果是通过独立的重复来检查的。然而，在实践中，只有一些结果被如此检查，而且许多结果只是在信任下被接受。不仅必须基于信任接受积极的结果，而且必须接受复制失败的声明以及其他批评。因此，就像在非科学世界中，信息是靠信任来接受的，在科学中，知识的增长取决于他人的证词。接受这一事实对我们对科学知识可靠性的概念有什么影响？

The philosopher of biology, David Hull, argued in his (1988) that because the overall structure of reward and punishment in the sciences is a powerful incentive not to cheat, further epistemological analysis of the sciences is unnecessary. What scientists have to lose is their reputation, which is crucial to their access to grants, collaborations, prizes, etc. So the structure itself guarantees the veridicality of research reports. But some celebrated recent episodes, such as the purported production of “cold fusion” were characterized by the failure of replication attempts to produce the same phenomenon. And, while the advocates of cold fusion were convinced that their experiments had produced the phenomenon, there have also been cases of outright fraud. Thus, even if the structure of reward and punishment is an incentive not to cheat, it does not guarantee the veridicality of every research report.
生物学哲学家大卫·赫尔 （David Hull） 在他的 （1988） 中指出，因为科学中奖励和惩罚的整体结构是不作弊的强大动力，所以没有必要对科学进行进一步的认识论分析。科学家必须失去的是他们的声誉，这对于他们获得资助、合作、奖品等至关重要。因此，结构本身保证了研究报告的真实性。但最近一些著名的事件，例如所谓的“冷聚变”的产生，其特点是复制尝试未能产生相同的现象。而且，虽然冷聚变的倡导者确信他们的实验产生了这种现象，但也有公然欺诈的案例。因此，即使奖惩结构是不作弊的激励，它也不能保证每一份研究报告的真实性。

On Hull’s view, the scientific community seeks true theories or adequate models. Credit, or recognition, accrues to individuals to the extent they are perceived as having contributed to that community goal. That is, individual scientists seek reputation and recognition, to have their work cited as important and as necessary to further scientific progress. Cheating, by misreporting experimental results or other misconduct, will be punished by loss of reputation. But this depends on strong guarantees of detection. Absent such guarantees, there is as strong an incentive to cheat, to try to obtain credit without necessarily having done the work, as not to cheat.
在赫尔看来，科学界寻求真正的理论或适当的模型。个人的功劳或认可是指被认为为该社区目标做出贡献的个人。也就是说，科学家个人寻求声誉和认可，使他们的工作被视为重要和必要的，以促进科学进步。作弊、误报实验结果或其他不当行为将受到声誉损失的处罚。但这取决于强大的检测保证。没有这样的保证，就有强烈的动机去作弊，试图在不做工作的情况下获得信用，就像不作弊一样。

Both Alvin Goldman (Goldman, 1995, 1999) and Philip Kitcher (1993) have treated the potential for premature, or otherwise (improperly) interested reporting of results to corrupt the sciences as a question to be answered by means of decision theoretic models. The decision theoretic approach to problems of trust and authority treats both credit and truth as utilities. The challenge then is to devise formulas that show that actions designed to maximize credit also maximize truth. Kitcher, in particular, develops formulas intended to show that even in situations peopled by non-epistemically motivated individuals (that is, individuals motivated more by a desire for credit than by a desire for truth), the reward structure of the community can be organized in such a way as to maximize truth and foster scientific progress. One consequence of this approach is to treat scientific fraud and value or interest infused science as the same problem. One advantage is that it incorporates the motivation to cheat into the solution to the problem of cheating. But one may wonder how effective this solution really is. Increasingly, we learn of problematic behavior in science based industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry. Results are withheld or distorted, authorship is manipulated. Hot areas, such as stem cell research, cloning, or gene modification, have been subjected to fraudulent research. Thus, even if the structure of reward and punishment is an in principle incentive not to cheat, it does not guarantee the reliability of every research report. The decision theoretic model needs to include at least one more parameter, namely the anticipated likelihood of detection within a relevant timeframe.
Alvin Goldman （Goldman， 1995， 1999） 和 Philip Kitcher （1993） 都把过早的，或者（不恰当地）感兴趣的结果报告的可能性看作是一个需要通过决策论模型来回答的问题。关于信任和权威问题的决策论方法将信用和真理视为效用。那么挑战就是设计公式，表明旨在最大化信用的行动也能使真相最大化。特别是，Kitcher 开发了一些公式，旨在表明即使在由非认识论动机的个人（即，更多地出于对荣誉的渴望而不是对真理的渴望的个体）所居住的情况下，社区的奖励结构也可以以最大化真理和促进科学进步的方式进行组织。这种方法的一个后果是将科学欺诈和价值或兴趣注入的科学视为同样的问题。一个优点是它将作弊的动机纳入了作弊问题的解决方案中。但人们可能想知道这个解决方案到底有多有效。我们越来越多地了解到以科学为基础的行业（例如制药行业）中存在的问题行为。结果被隐瞒或扭曲，作者身份纵。干细胞研究、克隆或基因改造等热门领域遭受了欺诈性研究。因此，即使奖惩结构原则上是不作弊的激励措施，也不能保证每一份研究报告的可靠性。决策理论模型至少需要包括一个参数，即在相关时间范围内的预期检测可能性。

Community issues have also been addressed under the banners of research ethics and of peer review. One might think that the only ethical requirements on scientists are to protect their research subjects from harm and, as professional scientists, to seek truth above any other goals. This presupposes that seeking truth is a sufficient guide to scientific decision-making. Heather Douglas, in her critical study of the ideal of value-freedom (Douglas 2009), rejects this notion. Douglas draws on her earlier study of inductive risk (Douglas 2000) to press the point that countless methodological decisions required in the course of carrying out a single piece of research are underdetermined by the factual elements of the situation and must be guided by an assessment of the consequences of being wrong. Science is not value-free, but can be protected from the deleterious effects of values if scientists take steps to mitigate the influence of inappropriate values. One step is to distinguish between direct and indirect roles of values; another is the articulation of guidelines for individual scientists. Values play a direct role when they provide direct motivation to accept or reject a theory; they play an indirect role when they play a role in evaluating the consequences of accepting or rejecting a claim, thus influencing what will count as sufficient evidence to accept or reject. The responsibility of scientists is to make sure that values do not play a direct role in their work and to be transparent about the indirect roles of values. A number of writers have taken issue with the tenability of Douglas’s distinction between direct and indirect. Steel and Whyte (2012) examine testing guidelines developed by pharmaceutical companies to point out that the very same decision may be motivated by values playing a direct role or playing an indirect role. If the point is to prohibit practices such as withholding negative results, then it shouldn’t matter whether the practice is motivated by values functioning directly or indirectly. Elliott (2011) questions whether only harmful consequences should be considered. If science is to be useful to policy makers, then questions of relative social benefit should also be permitted to play a role. Finally the cognitive activities demanded by Douglas’s ethical prescriptions for scientists seem beyond the capacities of individual scientists. This point will be pursued below.
社区问题也在研究伦理和同行评审的旗帜下得到解决。有人可能会认为，对科学家的唯一道德要求是保护他们的研究对象免受伤害，并且作为专业科学家，寻求真理高于任何其他目标。这假定寻求真理是科学决策的充分指南。希瑟·道格拉斯 （Heather Douglas） 在她对价值自由理想的批判性研究 （Douglas 2009） 中拒绝了这一概念。Douglas 借鉴了她早期对归纳风险的研究 （Douglas 2000） 来强调，在进行一项研究的过程中所需的无数方法论决定是由情况的事实要素决定的，并且必须以对错误后果的评估为指导。科学并非没有价值，但如果科学家采取措施减轻不适当价值观的影响，就可以保护科学免受价值观的有害影响。第一步是区分价值观的直接和间接作用;另一个是阐明针对个体科学家的指导方针。当价值观提供接受或拒绝理论的直接动机时，它们起着直接的作用;当它们在评估接受或拒绝索赔的后果方面发挥作用时，它们就发挥着间接作用，从而影响什么将被视为接受或拒绝的充分证据。科学家的责任是确保价值观不会在他们的工作中发挥直接作用，并对价值观的间接作用保持透明。许多作家对道格拉斯区分直接和间接的立场的持久性提出了异议。Steel 和 Whyte （2012） 研究了制药公司制定的测试指南，指出相同的决定可能是由发挥直接作用或间接作用的价值观驱动的。如果重点是禁止诸如隐瞒负面结果之类的做法，那么这种做法是直接或间接地受到价值观的激励就无关紧要了。Elliott （2011） 质疑是否只应考虑有害后果。如果科学对政策制定者有用，那么也应该允许相对社会利益的问题发挥作用。最后，道格拉斯为科学家开出的道德处方所要求的认知活动似乎超出了科学家个人的能力范围。下面将探讨这一点。

Torsten Wilholt (2013) argues that the research situation is more complicated than the epistemic vs. nonepistemic tradeoff implied by the decision theoretic approach. In part because of the difficulties in achieving the degree of knowledge required to realize Douglas’s ethical prescriptions, he argues that the reliance called for in science extends beyond the veridicality of reported results to the values guiding the investigators relied upon. Most research involves both results expressed statistically (which requires choice of significance threshold and balancing chances of Type I vs. Type II error) and multiple steps each requiring methodological decisions. These decisions, Wilholt argues, represent trade-offs among the reliability of positive results, the reliability of negative results, and the power of the investigation. In making these tradeoffs, the investigator is per force guided by an evaluation of the consequences of the various possible outcomes of the study. Wilholt extends the arguments about inductive risk offered originally by Richard Rudner and elaborated by Heather Douglas to propose that, in relying on another’s results I am relying not only on their competence and truthfulness, but on their making methodological decisions informed by the same valuations of outcomes as I have. This attitude is more than epistemic reliance, but a deeper attitude: one of trust that we are guided by the same values in a shared enterprise. For Wilholt, then, scientific inquiry engages ethical norms as well as epistemic norms. Formal or mechanical solutions such as those suggested by the application of decision theoretic models are not sufficient, if the community must be held together by shared ethical values.
Torsten Wilholt （2013） 认为，研究情况比决策论方法所隐含的认识论与非认识论权衡更复杂。部分原因是难以达到实现道格拉斯的道德处方所需的知识程度，他认为科学所要求的依赖超越了报告结果的真实性，延伸到指导研究人员所依赖的价值观。大多数研究涉及以统计学方式表达的结果（这需要选择显著性阈值并平衡 I 型与 II 型错误的机会）和多个步骤，每个步骤都需要方法学决策。Wilholt 认为，这些决定代表了积极结果的可靠性、消极结果的可靠性和调查力量之间的权衡。在做出这些权衡时，研究者以评估研究的各种可能结果的后果为指导。威尔霍尔特扩展了理查德·鲁德纳 （Richard Rudner） 最初提出并由希瑟·道格拉斯 （Heather Douglas） 阐述的关于归纳风险的论点，提出，在依赖他人的结果时，我不仅依赖于他们的能力和真实性，还依赖于他们根据与我相同的结果评估做出方法论决定。这种态度不仅仅是认识上的依赖，而是一种更深层次的态度：一种信任，即我们在共享企业中以相同的价值观为指导。因此，对威尔霍尔特来说，科学探究涉及伦理规范和认识规范。如果社区必须由共同的道德价值观维系在一起，那么诸如应用决策论模型所建议的正式或机械解决方案是不够的。

Peer review and replication are methods the scientific community, indeed the research world in general, employs to assure consumers of scientific research that the work is credible. Peer review both of research proposals and of research reports submitted for publication screens for quality, which includes methodological competence and appropriateness as well as for originality and significance, while replication is intended to probe the robustness of results when reported experiments are carried out in different laboratories and with slight changes to experimental conditions. Scholars of peer review have noted various forms of bias entering into the peer review process. In a review of the literature, Lee, Sugimoto, Zhang, and Cronin (2013) report documented bias along gender, language, nationality, prestige, and content as well as such problems as lack of inter-reviewer reliability consistency, confirmation bias, and reviewer conservatism. Lee (2012) argues that a Kuhnian perspective on values in science interprets lack of inter-reviewer consistency as variation in interpretation, applicability, and weight assigned to shared values by different members of the scientific community. Lee and colleagues (2013) argue that journal editors must take much more action than is currently taken to require that researchers make their raw data and other relevant trial information available to enable peer reviewers to conduct their work adequately.
同行评审和复制是科学界，实际上是整个研究界，用来向科学研究的消费者保证工作是可信的。对研究提案和提交用于出版质量筛选的研究报告进行同行评审，包括方法能力和适当性以及原创性和重要性，而复制旨在探索当报告的实验在不同实验室进行时结果的稳健性，实验条件略有变化。同行评议的学者已经注意到进入同行评议过程的各种形式的偏见。在文献综述中，Lee、Sugimoto、Zhang 和 Cronin （2013） 报告记录了性别、语言、国籍、声望和内容方面的偏见，以及缺乏审稿人间可靠性一致性、确认偏差和审稿人保守主义等问题。Lee （2012） 认为，库恩对科学价值观的看法将审查者之间缺乏一致性解释为科学界不同成员对共同价值观的解释、适用性和权重的差异。Lee 及其同事 （2013） 认为，期刊编辑必须采取比目前更多的行动，要求研究人员提供他们的原始数据和其他相关的试验信息，以使同行评审员能够充分开展他们的工作。

One issue that has yet to be addressed by philosophers is the gap between the ideal of replication resulting in confirmation, modification, or retraction and the reality. This ideal lies behind the assumptions of efficacy of structures of reward and sanction. Only if researchers believe that their research reports will be probed by efforts at replication will the threat of sanctions against faulty or fraudulent research be realistic. John Ioannidis and collaborators (Tatsioni, Bonitsis, and Ioannidis 2007; Young, N.S. Ioannidis, and Al-Ubaydli 2008) have shown how infrequently attempts to replicate are actually made and, even more strikingly, how contradicted results persist in the literature. This is an issue that goes beyond individuals and beyond large research collaborators to the scientific community in general. It underscores Wilholt’s contention that the scientific community must be held together by bonds of trust, but much more empirical and philosophical work is needed to address how to proceed when such trust is not justified. The demonstration of widespread lack of replicability on studies in psychology and in biomedical research has prompted debate about the causes and the seriousness of the alleged crisis (Loken and Gelman 2017; Ioannidis 2007; Redish, Kummerfeld, Morris, and Love 2018).
哲学家们尚未解决的一个问题是导致确认、修改或撤回的复制理想与现实之间的差距。这种理想隐藏在奖励和制裁结构的有效性假设背后。只有当研究人员相信他们的研究报告会通过复制努力进行调查时，对错误或欺诈性研究的制裁威胁才会成为现实。John Ioannidis 和合作者（Tatsioni、Bonitsis 和 Ioannidis 2007 年;Young、N.S. Ioannidis 和 Al-Ubaydli 2008 年）表明，实际上尝试复制是多么罕见，更引人注目的是，文献中持续存在着相互矛盾的结果。这是一个超越个人和大型研究合作者的问题，也超出了整个科学界。它强调了威尔霍尔特的论点，即科学界必须通过信任纽带维系在一起，但需要更多的实证和哲学工作来解决当这种信任不合理时如何进行。心理学和生物医学研究中普遍缺乏可复制性的证明引发了关于所谓危机的原因和严重性的辩论（Loken 和 Gelman 2017 年;Ioannidis 2007 年;Redish、Kummerfeld、Morris 和 Love 2018 年）。

Winsberg, Huebner, and Kukla (2013) draw attention to a different kind of supra-empirical, ethical issue raised by the contemporary situation of multiple authorship. What they call “radically collaborative research” involves investigators with different forms of expertise, as in Hardwig’s example, and as is now common across many fields, collaborating to generate an experimental result. For Winsberg, Huebner, and Kukla, the question is not merely reliability, but accountability. Who can speak for the integrity of the research when it has been conducted by researchers with a variety not just of interests, but of methodological standards, most opaque one to another? Winsberg, Huebner, and Kukla argue that a model of the social collaboration is needed as much as a model of the data or of the instruments. They argue further that the laissez-faire Wisdom of Crowds model (according to which local differences in methodological standards will cancel each other out), while perhaps adequate if the question is one of reliability, is not adequate for addressing these issues of accountability. They do not themselves, however, offer an alternative model.
Winsberg、Huebner 和 Kukla （2013） 提请注意当代多重作者情况所引发的另一种超实证的伦理问题。他们所谓的“激进的合作研究”涉及具有不同形式专业知识的研究人员，就像 Hardwig 的例子一样，现在在许多领域都很常见，合作产生实验结果。对于 Winsberg、Huebner 和 Kukla 来说，问题不仅仅是可靠性，还有问责制。当研究是由不仅兴趣广泛而且方法标准多样的研究人员进行时，谁能代表研究的完整性呢？Winsberg、Huebner 和 Kukla 认为，社会协作的模型与数据或工具的模型一样重要。他们进一步论证说，自由放任的群体智慧模型（根据该模型，方法标准上的局部差异将相互抵消），虽然如果问题是可靠性问题，也许是足够的，但不足以解决这些问责问题。然而，它们本身并没有提供另一种模式。

3. Science in Society 3. 社会中的科学

Work on the role of science in society encompasses both general models of the public authority of science and analysis of particular research programs that have a bearing on public life. In their early work, Steve Fuller and Joseph Rouse were both concerned with political dimensions of cognitive authority. Rouse, whose (1987) integrated analytic and continental philosophy of science and technology, sought to develop what might be called a critical pragmatism. This perspective facilitated an analysis of the transformative impact of science on human life and social relations. Rouse emphasized the increased power over individual lives that developments in science make possible. This can only be said to have increased with the development of information technology. Fuller (1988) partially accepted the empirical sociologists’ claim that traditional normative accounts of scientific knowledge fail to get a purchase on actual scientific practices, but took this as a challenge to relocate the normative concerns of philosophers. These should include the distribution and circulation of knowledge claims. The task of social epistemology of science, according to Fuller, should be regulation of the production of knowledge by regulating the rhetorical, technological, and administrative means of its communication. While there has not been much uptake of Fuller’s proposals as articulated, Lee’s work mentioned above begins to make detailed recommendations that take into account the current structures of funding and communication.
关于科学在社会中的作用的工作既包括科学公共权威的一般模型，也包括对与公共生活有影响的特定研究项目的分析。在他们的早期工作中，史蒂夫·富勒和约瑟夫·劳斯都关注认知权威的政治维度。劳斯（Rouse，1987 年）将分析哲学和大陆科学技术哲学相结合，试图发展所谓的批判实用主义。这种观点有助于分析科学对人类生活和社会关系的变革性影响。劳斯强调了科学发展对个人生活的更大力量。这只能说随着信息技术的发展而增加。Fuller （1988） 部分接受了实证社会学家的说法，即传统的科学知识规范性解释无法从实际的科学实践中得到认可，但将此视为重新定位哲学家规范性关注点的挑战。这些应包括知识声明的分发和流通。根据富勒的说法，科学的社会认识论的任务应该是通过调节知识交流的修辞、技术和行政手段来调节知识的生产。虽然富勒的提议没有得到太多的采纳，但李的上述工作开始提出详细的建议，这些建议考虑到了当前的资金和沟通结构。

One key area of socially relevant interdisciplinary science is risk assessment, which involves both research on the effects of various substances or practices and the evaluation of those effects once identified. The idea is to gain an understanding of both positive effects and of negative effects and a method of evaluating these. This involves integrating the work of specialists in the kind of substance whose risks are under assessment (geneticists, chemists, physicists), biomedical specialists, epidemiologists, statisticians, and so on. In these cases, we are dealing not only with the problems of trust and authority among specialists from different disciplines, but also with the effects of introducing new technologies or new substances into the world. The risks studied are generally of harm to human health or to the environment. Interest in applying philosophical analysis to risk assessment originated in response to debates about the development and expansion of nuclear power-generating technologies. In addition, the application of cost-benefit analysis and attempts to understand decision-making under conditions of uncertainty became topics of interest as extensions of formal modeling techniques (Giere 1991). These discussions intersect with debates about the scope of rational decision theory and have expanded to include other technologies as well as applications of scientific research in agriculture and in the myriad forms of biological engineering. Essays on the relation between science and social values in risk research collected in the volume edited by Deborah Mayo and Rachelle Hollander (1991) attempt to steer a course between uncritical reliance on cost-benefit models and their absolute rejection. Coming from a slightly different angle, the precautionary principle represents an approach shifting the burden of proof in regulatory decisions from demonstration of harm to demonstration of safety of substances and practices. Carl Cranor (2004) explores versions of the principle and defends its use in certain decision contexts. Shrader-Frechette (2002) has advocated models of ethically weighted cost-benefit analysis and greater public involvement in risk assessment. In particular she (Shrader-Frechette 1994, 2002) has argued for including members of the public in deliberations about health effects of and reasonable exposure limits on environmental pollutants, especially radioactive materials. Philosophers of science have also worked to make visible the ways in which values play a role in the research assessing the effects of techno-scientifically produced substances and practices themselves, as distinct from the challenges of assigning values to identified risks and benefits.
与社会相关的跨学科科学的一个关键领域是风险评估，它涉及对各种物质或做法的影响的研究，以及一旦确定这些影响就进行评估。这个想法是要了解积极影响和消极影响，以及评估这些影响的方法。这涉及整合风险正在评估的物质类型的专家（遗传学家、化学家、物理学家）、生物医学专家、流行病学家、统计学家等的工作。在这些情况下，我们不仅要处理来自不同学科的专家之间的信任和权威问题，还要处理将新技术或新物质引入世界的影响。研究的风险通常对人类健康或环境有害。将哲学分析应用于风险评估的兴趣源于对关于核能发电技术开发和扩展的辩论的回应。此外，成本效益分析的应用和在不确定性条件下理解决策的尝试作为形式建模技术的扩展成为人们感兴趣的话题 （Giere 1991）。这些讨论与关于理性决策理论范围的辩论相交，并已扩展到包括其他技术以及科学研究在农业和各种形式的生物工程中的应用。Deborah Mayo 和 Rachelle Hollander （1991） 编辑的卷中收集了关于风险研究中科学与社会价值之间关系的论文，试图在对成本效益模型的不加批判的依赖和绝对拒绝之间引导一条路线。从稍微不同的角度来看，预防原则代表了一种将监管决策中的举证责任从损害证明转移到物质和做法安全性的方法。Carl Cranor （2004） 探讨了该原则的各个版本，并为其在某些决策上下文中的使用进行了辩护。Shrader-Frechette （2002） 倡导了道德加权成本效益分析的模式，并鼓励公众更多地参与风险评估。特别是她 （Shrader-Frechette 1994， 2002） 主张让公众参与对环境污染物（尤其是放射性物质）的健康影响和合理暴露限制的讨论。科学哲学家还致力于使价值观在评估技术科学生产的物质和实践本身的影响的研究中发挥作用的方式可见，这与为已确定的风险和收益分配价值的挑战不同。

Douglas (2000) is an influential study of toxicological research on effects of exposure to dioxins. Douglas set her analysis in the framework of inductive risk introduced by Richard Rudner (1953) and also explored by Carl Hempel (1965). The ampliative character of inductive inference means that the premises can be true (and even strongly supportive) and the conclusion false. Rudner argued that this feature of inductive inference means that scientists ought to take the consequences of being wrong into account when determining how strong the evidence for a hypothesis needs to be before accepting the hypothesis. [But see Jeffrey (1956) for a different view.] Douglas proposes that such considerations reach deeper into the scientific process than the acceptance of a conclusion based on the evidence to the construction of the evidence itself. Scientists must make decisions about levels of statistical significance, how to balance the chance of false positives against the chance of false negatives. They must determine protocols for deciding borderline cases in their tissue samples. They must select among possible dose-response models. Deciding in one way has one set of social consequences, and in another way another, opposing, set of consequences. Douglas claims that scientists ought to take these risks into account when making the relevant methodological decisions. Since, even in her examples, public health considerations point in one direction and economic considerations point in another, in the end it is not clear just what responsibility can reasonably be assigned to the individual scientist.
Douglas （2000） 是一项有影响力的毒理学研究，研究了暴露于二恶英的影响。道格拉斯将她的分析置于理查德·鲁德纳 （Richard Rudner） （1953） 引入的归纳风险框架中，卡尔·亨佩尔 （Carl Hempel） （1965） 也对其进行了探索。归纳推理的放大特性意味着前提可以是真的（甚至强烈支持），而结论是假的。Rudner 认为，归纳推理的这一特征意味着科学家在接受假设之前确定假设的证据需要有多强时，应该考虑到错误的后果。[但参见 Jeffrey （1956） 的不同观点。道格拉斯提出，这种考虑比接受基于证据的结论更深入到科学过程，而不是构建证据本身。科学家必须决定统计显著性水平，如何平衡假阳性的机会和假阴性的机会。他们必须确定确定组织样本中临界病例的方案。他们必须在可能的剂量反应模型中进行选择。以一种方式做出决定会产生一组社会后果，而以另一种方式做出决定会产生另一组相反的后果。道格拉斯声称，科学家在做出相关的方法决策时应该考虑到这些风险。因为即使在她的例子中，公共卫生考虑指向一个方向，而经济考虑指向另一个方向，所以最终并不清楚可以合理地为科学家个人分配什么责任。

In addition to risk assessment, philosophers have begun thinking about a variety of research programs and methods that affect human wellbeing. Lacey (2005), for example, delineates the contrasting values informing industrial, conventional agriculture on the one hand and small-scale agroecology on the other. Cartwright (2012), elaborated in Cartwright and Hardie (2012), is primarily a critical analysis of the reliance on randomized control trials to support policy decisions in economic development, medicine, and education. These fail to take account of variations in contexts of application that will affect the outcome. Cartwright’s focus on a particular methodological approach is an extension of philosophers’ traditional engagement in areas of controversy in which philosophical analysis might make a difference. Philip Kitcher’s (1985), which took on sociobiology, and Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson’s (1998), an extensive argument for group level selection, are examples that focus on content and methodology of extensions of evolutionary theory.
除了风险评估之外，哲学家们还开始思考影响人类福祉的各种研究计划和方法。例如，Lacey （2005） 描绘了工业、传统农业和小规模生态农业的对比价值。Cartwright （2012） 在 Cartwright 和 Hardie （2012） 中进行了阐述，主要是对依赖随机对照试验来支持经济发展、医学和教育政策决策的批判性分析。这些没有考虑到应用程序上下文中会影响结果的变化。卡特赖特对特定方法论方法的关注是哲学家传统参与哲学分析可能产生影响的争议领域的延伸。Philip Kitcher （1985） 的研究探讨了社会生物学，Elliott Sober 和 David Sloan Wilson （1998） 对群体水平选择进行了广泛的论证，这些都是关注进化论扩展的内容和方法的例子。

Climate change research has provoked several quite different kinds of analysis. As a complex interdisciplinary field, its evidential structure leaves it vulnerable to challenge. Opponents of limiting the use of fossil fuels have exploited those vulnerabilities to sow public doubts about the reality and/or causes of climate change (Oreskes and Conway 2011). Parker 2006, Lloyd 2010, Parker 2010, Winsberg 2012 have, respectively, investigated strategies for reconciling apparent inconsistencies among climate models, the differences between model-based projections and strictly inductive projections, methods for assessing and communicating the uncertainties inherent in climate models. Philosophers have also considered how to interpret the (American) public’s susceptibility to the climate change deniers. Philip Kitcher (2012) interprets it as lack of information amid a plethora of misinformation and proposes methods for more effective communication of reputable science to the public. Anderson (2011), on the contrary, contends that members of the public are perfectly able to evaluate the reliability of contradictory assessments by following citation trails, etc., whether on the internet or in hard copies of journals. Her view is that the reluctance to accept the reality of climate change is a reluctance to abandon familiar ways of life, which is what averting climate-caused disaster requires all to do. Finally, there is an ethical and political question once the inevitability of climate change is accepted: how should the burdens of taking action be distributed? The industrialized West is responsible for most of the carbon pollution up to the end of the 20th century, but developing nations trying to industrialize have contributed an increasing share, and will continue to do so, in the 21st century. Who bears the burden? And if the effects will only be felt by generations in the future, why should present generations take actions whose harms will be felt now and whose benefits lie in the future and will not be experienced by those bearing the costs? Broome (2008) explores the intergenerational issues, while Raina (2015) explores the global dimensions.
气候变化研究引发了几种截然不同的分析。作为一个复杂的跨学科领域，其证据结构使其容易受到挑战。限制化石燃料使用的反对者利用这些脆弱性来散播公众对气候变化的现实和/或原因的怀疑（Oreskes 和 Conway，2011 年）。Parker 2006、Lloyd 2010、Parker 2010、Winsberg 2012 分别研究了调和气候模式之间明显不一致的策略、基于模型的预测和严格归纳的预测之间的差异、评估和传达气候模式中固有不确定性的方法。哲学家们还考虑了如何解释（美国）公众对气候变化否认者的敏感性。Philip Kitcher （2012） 将其解释为在大量错误信息中缺乏信息，并提出了更有效地向公众传播知名科学的方法。相反，Anderson （2011） 认为，公众完全能够通过跟踪引文轨迹等来评估相互矛盾的评估的可靠性，无论是在互联网上还是在期刊的硬拷贝中。她的观点是，不愿接受气候变化的现实就是不愿意放弃熟悉的生活方式，而这正是避免气候造成的灾难需要所有人去做的。最后，一旦人们接受了气候变化的必然性，就出现了一个伦理和政治问题：应该如何分配采取行动的负担？截至 20 世纪末，工业化的西方要对大部分碳污染负责，但试图实现工业化的发展中国家在 21 世纪贡献了越来越大的份额，并将继续这样做。谁来承担这个负担？如果这种影响只会在未来几代人中感受到，那么为什么当代人要采取行动，这些行动的危害现在就会感受到，好处在于未来，而那些承担代价的人不会体验到呢？Broome （2008） 探讨了代际问题，而 Raina （2015） 探讨了全球维度。

Two additional areas of ongoing scientific controversy are the biological reality (or not) of race and the biology of gender differences. Developments in genetics, and documented racial differences in health, have thrown doubt on earlier anti-realist views of race, such as those articulated by Stephen J. Gould (1981) and Richard Lewontin (Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin 1984). Spencer (2012, 2014) argues for a sophisticated form of biological racial realism. Gannett (2003) argues that biological populations are not independent objects that can provide data relevant to racial realism, while Kaplan and Winther (2013) argue that no claims about race can be read from biological theory or data. The reality and basis of observed gender differences were the subject of much debate in the late 20th century(See Fausto-Sterling 1992). These issues have crystallized in the early 21st century in debates about the brain and cognition drawing the attention of philosophers of biology and cognitive scientists. Rebecca Jordan-Young (2010), Cordelia Fine (2010), and Bluhn, Jacobson and Maibom, eds. (2012) all explore, with an aim of debunking, claims of gendered brains.
另外两个正在进行的科学争议领域是种族的生物学现实（或非种族）和性别差异的生物学。遗传学的发展和记录在案的种族健康差异，使早期的反现实主义种族观点受到质疑，例如 Stephen J. Gould （1981） 和 Richard Lewontin （Lewontin， Rose， and Kamin 1984） 所阐述的观点。Spencer （2012， 2014） 主张一种复杂的生物种族现实主义形式。Gannett （2003） 认为生物种群不是可以提供与种族现实主义相关的数据的独立对象，而 Kaplan 和 Winther （2013） 认为，从生物学理论或数据中可以读取任何关于种族的主张。观察到的性别差异的现实和基础是 20 世纪后期许多争论的主题（参见 Fausto-Sterling 1992）。这些问题在 21 世纪初关于大脑和认知的辩论中具体化，引起了生物学哲学家和认知科学家的注意。Rebecca Jordan-Young （2010）、Cordelia Fine （2010） 和 Bluhn， Jacobson and Maibom， eds. （2012） 都探讨了性别大脑的说法，目的是揭穿性别大脑的说法。

3. Social, Cultural, and Feminist Studies of Science 3. 科学的社会、文化和女权主义研究

Kuhn’s critique of logical empiricism included a strong naturalism. Scientific rationality was to be understood by studying actual episodes in the history of science, not by formal analyses developed from a priori concepts of knowledge and reason (Kuhn 1962, 1977). Sociologists and sociologically inclined historians of science took this as a mandate for the examination of the full spectrum of scientists’ practices without any prior prejudice as to which were epistemically legitimate and which not. That very distinction came under suspicion from the new social scholars, often labeled “social constructivists.” They urged that understanding the production of scientific knowledge required looking at all the factors causally relevant to the acceptance of a scientific idea, not just at those the researcher thinks should be relevant.
库恩对逻辑经验主义的批判包括强烈的自然主义。科学理性是通过研究科学史上的实际事件来理解的，而不是通过从知识和理性的先验概念发展而来的正式分析（Kuhn 1962， 1977）。社会学家和社会学倾向的科学史学家将此视为一项任务，即检查科学家的所有实践，而事先没有任何偏见，即哪些在认识论上是合法的，哪些不是。正是这种区别受到了新社会学者的怀疑，他们经常被贴上“社会建构主义者”的标签。他们敦促说，理解科学知识的产生需要关注与接受科学思想有因果关系的所有因素，而不仅仅是研究人员认为应该相关的因素。

A wide range of approaches in social and cultural studies of science has come under the umbrella label of “social constructivism.” Both terms in the label are understood differently in different programs of research. While constructivists agree in holding that those factors treated as evidential, or as rationally justifying acceptance, should not be privileged at the expense of other causally relevant factors, they differ in their view of which factors are causal or worth examination. Macro-analytic approaches, such as those associated with the so-called Strong Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, treat social relations as an external, independent factor and scientific judgment and content as a dependent outcome. Micro-analyses or laboratory studies, on the other hand, abjure the implied separation of social context and scientific practice and focus on the social relations within scientific research programs and communities and on those that bind research-productive and research-receptive communities together.
科学的社会和文化研究中的广泛方法都被归入“社会建构主义”的总称。标签中的两个术语在不同的研究项目中的理解不同。虽然建构主义者同意认为，那些被视为证据或理性证明接受的因素不应该以牺牲其他因果相关因素为代价来享有特权，但他们对哪些因素是因果关系或值得研究的看法有所不同。宏观分析方法，例如与科学知识社会学中所谓的斯特朗计划相关的方法，将社会关系视为外部的独立因素，将科学判断和内容视为依赖的结果。另一方面，微观分析或实验室研究摒弃了社会背景和科学实践的隐含分离，而是关注科学研究项目和社区内部的社会关系，以及那些将研究生产和接受研究的社区联系在一起的关系。

Researchers also differ in the degree to which they treat the social and the cognitive dimensions of inquiry as independent or interactive. The researchers associated with the macro-analytic Strong Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (Barry Barnes, David Bloor, Harry Collins, Donald MacKenzie, Andrew Pickering, Steve Shapin) were particularly interested in the role of large scale social phenomena, whether widely held social/political ideologies or group professional interests, on the settlement of scientific controversies. Some landmark studies in this genre include Andrew Pickering’s (1984) study of competing professional interests in the interpretation of high energy particle physics experiments, and Steven Shapin and Simon Shaffer’s (1985) study of the controversy between Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes about the epistemological relevance of experiments with vacuum pumps.
研究人员在将探究的社会和认知维度视为独立或互动的程度上也有所不同。与科学知识社会学宏分析斯特朗计划相关的研究人员（巴里·巴恩斯、大卫·布洛尔、哈里·柯林斯、唐纳德·麦肯齐、安德鲁·皮克林、史蒂夫·沙平）对大规模社会现象的作用特别感兴趣，无论是广泛持有的社会/政治意识形态还是群体专业利益，在解决科学争议中的作用。这种类型的一些里程碑式的研究包括 Andrew Pickering （1984） 对解释高能粒子物理实验中相互竞争的专业利益的研究，以及 Steven Shapin 和 Simon Shaffer （1985） 对 Robert Boyle 和 Thomas Hobbes 之间关于真空泵实验的认识论相关性的争论的研究。

The micro-sociological or laboratory studies approach features ethnographic study of particular research groups, tracing the myriad activities and interactions that eventuate in the production and acceptance of a scientific fact or datum. Karin Knorr Cetina’s (1981) reports her year-long study of a plant science laboratory at UC Berkeley. Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar’s (1986) study of Roger Guillemin’s neuroendocrinology laboratory at the Salk Institute is another classic in this genre. These scholars argued in subsequent work (Knorr-Cetina 1983; Latour, 1987) that their form of study showed that philosophical analyses of rationality, of evidence, of truth and knowledge, were irrelevant to understanding scientific knowledge. Sharon Traweek’s (1988) comparative study of the cultures of Japanese and North American high energy physics communities pointed to the parallels between cosmology and social organization but abstained from making extravagant or provocative epistemological claims. The efforts of philosophers of science to articulate norms of scientific reasoning and judgment were, in the view of both macro- and micro-oriented scholars, misdirected, because actual scientists relied on quite different kinds of considerations in the practice of science.
微观社会学或实验室研究方法的特点是对特定研究群体进行人种学研究，追踪最终在产生和接受科学事实或数据过程中产生的无数活动和互动。Karin Knorr Cetina （1981） 报告了她在加州大学伯克利分校对植物科学实验室长达一年的研究。布鲁诺·拉图尔 （Bruno Latour） 和史蒂文·伍尔加 （Steven Woolgar） （1986） 对索尔克研究所 Roger Guillemin 的神经内分泌学实验室的研究是该类型的另一个经典之作。这些学者在随后的工作中争论道（Knorr-Cetina 1983;Latour， 1987）认为，他们的研究形式表明，对理性、证据、真理和知识的哲学分析与理解科学知识无关。Sharon Traweek （1988） 对日本和北美高能物理学社区的文化进行比较研究指出了宇宙学和社会组织之间的相似之处，但没有提出夸张或挑衅性的认识论主张。在宏观和微观学者看来，科学哲学家阐明科学推理和判断规范的努力是错误的，因为实际科学家在科学实践中依赖于完全不同的考虑。

Until recently, apart from a few anomalous figures like Caroline Herschel, Barbara McClintock, and Marie Curie, the sciences were a male preserve. Feminist scholars have asked what bearing the masculinity of the scientific profession has had on the content of science and on conceptions of scientific knowledge and practice. Drawing both on work by feminist scientists that exposed and critiqued gender biased science and on theories of gender, feminist historians and philosophers of science have offered a variety of models of scientific knowledge and reasoning intended to accommodate the criticism of accepted science and the concomitant proposal and advocacy of alternatives. Evelyn Keller (1985) proposed a psycho-dynamic model of knowledge and objectivity, arguing that a certain psychological profile, facilitated by typical patterns of masculine psychological development, associated knowledge and objectivity with domination. The association of knowledge and control continues to be a topic of concern for feminist thinkers as it is also for environmentally concerned critics of the sciences. In this connection, see especially Lacey’s (2005) study of the controversy concerning transgenic crops. Other feminists turned to Marxist models of social relations and developed versions of standpoint theory, which holds that the beliefs held by a group reflect the social interests of that group. As a consequence, the scientific theories accepted in a context marked by divisions of power such as gender will reflect the interests of those in power. Alternative theoretical perspectives can be expected from those systematically excluded from power. (Harding 1986; Rose 1983; Haraway 1978).
直到最近，除了卡罗琳·赫歇尔、芭芭拉·麦克林托克和居里夫人等少数异常人物外，科学都是男性的专属领域。女权主义学者提出了一个问题，即科学职业的男性气质对科学的内容以及科学知识和实践的概念有什么影响。女权主义历史学家和科学哲学家借鉴了女权主义科学家揭露和批判性别偏见科学的工作以及性别理论，提供了各种科学知识和推理模型，旨在容纳对公认科学的批评以及随之而来的替代方案的提议和倡导。Evelyn Keller （1985） 提出了一个知识和客观性的心理动力学模型，认为由男性心理发展的典型模式促进的某种心理特征，将知识和客观性与支配联系起来。知识和控制的关联仍然是女权主义思想家关注的话题，也是关注环境的科学批评家关注的话题。在这方面，请特别参见 Lacey （2005） 对转基因作物争议的研究。其他女权主义者转向马克思主义的社会关系模型，并发展了立场理论的版本，该理论认为一个群体所持有的信仰反映了该群体的社会利益。因此，在以性别等权力分化为标志的背景下被接受的科学理论将反映当权者的利益。可以预期那些被系统性地排除在权力之外的人会有不同的理论观点。（哈丁 1986 年;Rose 1983 年;Haraway 1978 年）。

Still other feminists have argued that some standard philosophical approaches to the sciences can be used to express feminist concerns. Nelson (1990) adopts Quine’s holism and naturalism to analyze debates in recent biology. Elizabeth Potter (2001) adapts Mary Hesse’s network theory of scientific inference to analyse gendered aspects of 17th century physics. Helen Longino (1990) develops a contextual empiricism to analyze research in human evolution and in neuroendocrinology. In addition to the direct role played by gender bias, scholars have attended to the ways shared values in the context of reception can confer an a priori implausibility on certain ideas. Keller (1983) argued that this was the fate of Barbara McClintock’s unorthodox proposals of genetic transposition. Stephen Kellert (1993) made a similar suggestion regarding the then resistance to so-called chaos theory, that is the use of non-linear dynamics to model processes like climate change.
还有一些女权主义者认为，一些标准的科学哲学方法可以用来表达女权主义的担忧。Nelson （1990） 采用 Quine 的整体论和自然主义来分析近代生物学中的争论。伊丽莎白·波特 （2001） 改编了玛丽·黑塞 （Mary Hesse） 的科学推理网络理论，以分析 17 世纪物理学的性别方面。Helen Longino （1990） 发展了一种情境经验主义来分析人类进化和神经内分泌学的研究。除了性别偏见的直接作用外，学者们还关注了在接受背景下的共同价值观如何赋予某些想法先验的不可信性。Keller （1983） 认为，这就是 Barbara McClintock 的非正统基因转座提议的命运。Stephen Kellert （1993） 对当时对所谓混沌理论的抵制提出了类似的建议，即使用非线性动力学来模拟气候变化等过程。

What the feminist and empirical sociological analyses have in common is the view that the social organization of the scientific community has a bearing on the knowledge produced by that community. There are deep differences, however, in their views as to what features of that social organization are deemed relevant and how they are expressed in the theories and models accepted by a given community. The gender relations focused on by feminists went unrecognized by sociologists pursuing macro- or microsociological research programs. The feminist scientists and scholars further differ from the scholars in empirical social and cultural studies of science in their call for alternative theories and approaches in the sciences. These calls imply that philosophical concerns with truth and justification are not only legitimate but useful tools in advancing feminist transformative goals for the sciences. As can be seen in their varying treatments of objectivity, however, philosophical concepts are often reworked in order to be made applicable to the content or episodes of interest (See Anderson 2004, Haraway 1988, Harding 1993, Keller 1985, Longino 1990, Nelson 1990, Wylie 2005)
女权主义和实证社会学分析的共同点是，科学界的社会组织与该界产生的知识有关。然而，对于该社会组织的哪些特征被认为是相关的，以及这些特征如何在特定社区接受的理论和模型中表达，他们的观点存在着深刻的差异。女权主义者关注的性别关系没有被追求宏观或微观社会学研究项目的社会学家所认可。女权主义科学家和学者与科学实证社会和文化研究的学者进一步不同，他们呼吁在科学中采用替代理论和方法。这些呼吁意味着，对真理和正当性的哲学关注不仅是合法的，而且是推进科学女权主义变革目标的有用工具。然而，从他们对客观性的不同处理中可以看出，哲学概念经常被重新设计，以便适用于感兴趣的内容或情节（参见 Anderson 2004， Haraway 1988， Harding 1993， Keller 1985， Longino 1990， Nelson 1990， Wylie 2005）

In addition to differences in analysis of philosophical concepts like objectivity, rationality, or truth, feminist philosophers of science have also debated the proper role of contextual (sometimes called, “external” or “social”) values. Some feminists argue that, given that values do play a role in scientific inquiry, socially progressive values ought to shape not only decisions about what to investigate but also the processes of justification. Philosophers of science should incorporate exemplification of the right values in their accounts of confirmation or justification. Others are less certain about the identification of the values that should and those that should not inform the conduct of science. These philosophers are dubious that a consensus exists, or is even possible in a pluralistic society, on what constitute the values that ought to guide inquiry. In an exchange with Ronald Giere, Janet Kourany (2003a, 2003b) argues that not only science, but philosophy of science ought to be concerned with the promotion of socially progressive values. Giere (2003) replies that what counts as socially progressive will vary among philosophers, and that in a democracy, it is unlikely that a unanimous or near unanimous consensus regarding the values to inform philosophical analysis or scientific inquiry could be achieved either in the larger society or in the smaller social subset of philosophers of science.
除了对客观性、理性或真理等哲学概念的分析存在差异外，女权主义科学哲学家还讨论了情境（有时称为“外部”或“社会”）价值的适当角色。一些女权主义者认为，鉴于价值观确实在科学探究中发挥着作用，社会进步的价值观不仅应该影响关于调查什么的决定，还应该影响证明过程的决定。科学哲学家应该在他们的确认或证明叙述中纳入正确价值的例证。其他人则不太确定应该和不应该为科学行为提供信息的价值。这些哲学家怀疑是否存在共识，甚至在一个多元化社会中是可能的，关于什么构成了应该指导探究的价值观。在与 Ronald Giere 的交流中，Janet Kourany （2003a， 2003b） 认为，不仅科学，而且科学哲学都应该关注促进社会进步的价值观。Giere （2003） 回答说，什么是社会进步的哲学家会有所不同，而在一个民主国家中，对于为哲学分析或科学探究提供信息的价值，不太可能在更大的社会或较小的科学哲学家的社会子集中达成一致或接近一致的共识。

4. Models of the Social Character of Knowledge 4. 知识的社会特征模型

Since 1980, interest in developing philosophical accounts of scientific knowledge that incorporate the social dimensions of scientific practice has been on the increase. Some philosophers see attention to the social as a straightforward extension of already developed approaches in epistemology. Others, inclined toward some form of naturalism, have taken the work in empirical social studies of science discussed above seriously. They have, however, diverged quite considerably in their treatment of the social. Some understand the social as biasing or distorting, and hence see the social as opposed to or competing with the cognitive or epistemic. These philosophers see the sociologists’ disdain for normative philosophical concerns as part of a general debunking of science that demands a response and defense. Some philosophers see the social aspects of science as incidental to deep questions about knowledge, but informative about certain tendencies in scientific communities. Others treat the social as instead constitutive of rationality. These differences in conception of the role and nature of the social inform differences in the several approaches to modeling the sociality of inquiry and knowledge discussed below.
自 1980 年以来，人们对开发包含科学实践的社会维度的科学知识的哲学解释的兴趣一直在增加。一些哲学家将对社会的关注视为认识论中已经发展的方法的直接延伸。其他人倾向于某种形式的自然主义，认真对待上面讨论的科学实证社会研究的工作。然而，他们在对待社会问题上却存在相当大的分歧。有些人将社会理解为偏见或扭曲，因此将社会视为与认知或认识相反或与之竞争。这些哲学家将社会学家对规范性哲学关注的蔑视视为对科学的普遍揭穿的一部分，需要回应和辩护。一些哲学家认为科学的社会方面是关于知识的深刻问题的附带因素，但对科学界的某些趋势提供了信息。另一些人则认为社会是理性的组成部分。这些对社会角色和性质的概念差异表明了下面讨论的对探究和知识的社会性进行建模的几种方法的差异。

Contemporary philosophers pursue both formal and informal modeling approaches in addressing the social character of knowledge. Those pursuing formal models tend to bracket questions about rationality, objectivity, or justification and concentrate on mathematically investigating the effects of community structures on features of the pursuit of knowledge and its diffusion in a community. Those pursuing informal models are more interested in understanding the role of the community in enhancing or constituting desired features of inquiry such as rationality and objectivity and in thinking about the ways knowledge is realized
当代哲学家在处理知识的社会特征时追求正式和非正式的建模方法。那些追求形式模型的人倾向于将有关理性、客观性或正当性的问题括起来，并专注于从数学上研究社区结构对追求知识的特征及其在社区中的传播的影响。那些追求非正式模式的人更感兴趣的是理解社区在增强或构成所需的探究特征（如理性和客观性）方面的作用，以及思考知识的实现方式

Communication and the division of cognitive labor. Among the first issues to be investigated using formal techniques was the division of cognitive labor. While big science projects such as discussed by Hardwig pose a problem of integrating disparate elements of the solution to a question, the division of cognitive labor concerns the appropriate or optimal distribution of efforts towards solving a given problem. If everyone follows the same research strategy to solve a problem or answer a question, then a solution lying outside that strategy will not be reached. If such a solution is better than any attainable via the shared strategy, the community fails to attain the better solution. But how can it be rational to adopt a research strategy other than the one deemed at the time most likely to succeed? Philip Kitcher in his (1993) was concerned to offer an alternative to the strong programme’s proposal that controversy and the persistence of alternative research programs were a function of the varying social or ideological commitments of researchers. However, he also acknowledged that if researchers followed only the strategy judged at the time most likely to lead to truth, they would not pursue unorthodox strategies that might lead to new discoveries. He therefore labeled the observed fact that researchers pursued different approaches to the same problem as the division of cognitive labor and proposed a decision model that attributed the pursuit of a nonorthodox (maverick) research strategy to a rational calculation about the chances of a positive payoff. This chance was calculated on the basis of the likelihood of the maverick strategy being successful (or more successful than the orthodox approach), the numbers of peers pursuing orthodox or other maverick strategies, and the anticipated reward of success. A community can allocate research resources in such a way as to maintain the balance of orthodox and maverick scientists most likely to facilitate progress. Thus, scientific progress can tolerate and indeed benefits from a certain amount of “impure” motivation. Michael Strevens (2003) argued instead that the pursuit of maverick research strategies was to be expected as a consequence of the priority rule. The priority rule refers to the practice of referring to a law or object with the name of the first individual to articulate or perceive and identify it. Think of Boyle’s Law, Halley’s comet, the Planck constant, Avogadro’s number, etc. There’s no such reward attached to pursuing a research strategy devised by another and “merely” adding to what that individual has already discovered. The rewards of research come from being first. And to be first requires pursuing a novel problem or strategy. The division of cognitive labor, understood as different researchers pursuing different research strategies, is a simple effect of the priority rule. Muldoon and Weisberg (2011) reject both Kitcher’s and Strevens’s accounts as presupposing unrealistically uniform and ideal agents. In reality, they observe, scientists have at best imperfect knowledge of the entire research situation, do not know the entirety of the research landscape, and when they do know, know different things. They do not have sufficient information to employ the decision methods Kitcher and Strevens attribute to them. Muldoon and Weisberg propose agent-based modeling as a means to represent the imperfect, non-overlapping, and partial knowledge of the agents deciding what research problems and strategies to pursue. Solomon’s advocacy of dissensus discussed below can be understood as rejecting the premises of the problem. From that point of view the aim of scientific organization ought to be to promote disagreement.
沟通和认知劳动分工。使用形式化技术首先要研究的问题之一是认知劳动的分工。虽然 Hardwig 讨论的大型科学项目提出了整合问题解决方案的不同元素的问题，但认知劳动的分工涉及解决给定问题的努力的适当或最佳分配。如果每个人都遵循相同的研究策略来解决问题或回答问题，那么将无法达成该策略之外的解决方案。如果这样的解决方案比通过共享策略实现的任何解决方案都要好，那么社区就无法获得更好的解决方案。但是，采用当时被认为最有可能成功的研究策略之外，怎么能是合理的呢？菲利普·基彻 （Philip Kitcher） 在他的 （1993） 中关注提供一个替代方案，以取代强计划的建议，即争议和替代研究计划的持续存在是研究人员不同的社会或意识形态承诺的功能。然而，他也承认，如果研究人员只遵循当时判断最有可能导致真相的策略，他们就不会追求可能导致新发现的非正统策略。因此，他将观察到的事实标记为研究人员对同一问题采取不同方法，即认知劳动分工，并提出了一个决策模型，该模型将追求非正统（特立独行）的研究策略归因于对积极回报机会的理性计算。这个机会是根据特立独行策略成功（或比正统方法更成功）的可能性、追求正统或其他特立独行策略的同龄人数量以及预期的成功回报来计算的。社区可以以这样一种方式分配研究资源，以保持最有可能促进进步的正统科学家和特立独行的科学家之间的平衡。因此，科学进步可以容忍并确实受益于一定数量的“不纯”动机。相反，Michael Strevens （2003） 认为，追求特立独行的研究策略是优先规则的结果。优先权规则是指以第一个阐明或感知和识别法律或对象的人的名字来引用法律或对象的做法。想想波义耳定律、哈雷彗星、普朗克常数、阿伏伽德罗数等。追求他人设计的研究策略并“仅仅”增加该个人已经发现的内容并不会带来这样的回报。研究的回报来自于第一。而成为第一需要追求一个新的问题或策略。认知劳动的分工，理解为不同的研究人员追求不同的研究策略，是优先规则的一个简单效果。Muldoon 和 Weisberg （2011） 拒绝了 Kitcher 和 Strevens 的描述，认为它们预设了不切实际的统一和理想的代理人。他们观察到，在现实中，科学家充其量对整个研究情况的了解并不完美，不了解整个研究领域，即使他们知道了，也知道了不同的东西。他们没有足够的信息来使用 Kitcher 和 Strevens 归因于他们的决策方法。Muldoon 和 Weisberg 提出了基于代理的建模作为一种手段，以表示代理决定追求哪些研究问题和策略的不完美、不重叠和部分知识。下面讨论的所罗门对分歧的倡导可以理解为拒绝问题的前提。从这个角度来看，科学组织的目标应该是促进分歧。

Kevin Zollman, following Bala and Goyal (1998), used network theory to model different possible communication structures. The aim of Zollman (2007, 2013) is to investigate what difference communication structures make to the chances of a scientific community settling on a correct (or incorrect) theory or hypothesis and to the speed by which such a consensus is reached. Networks consist of nodes and edges that connect them. The nodes can represent individuals or any group that has uniform beliefs. The nodes can have values of believe or not believe and consensus consists in all nodes in the network taking the same value. Zollman investigates three possible communication structures: the cycle, in which each node is connected only to nodes on either side of it in the cycle; the wheel, in which there is a central node to which all other nodes are exclusively connected; and the complete, in which each node is connected to every other node. Using the mathematics of network theory, Zollman proves the somewhat counterintuitive thesis that the network with limited communication, the cycle, has the highest probability of consensus on the correct hypothesis, while the network with the densest communication, the complete, has a non-negligible probability of consensus (from which departure is not possible) on the incorrect hypothesis. Zollman (2010) also uses this method to investigate the division of labor problem, although he comes at it from a slightly different point of view that do Kitcher or Strevens. Structures with sparse or limited communication are more likely to arrive at the correct hypothesis, but because they take longer to reach consensus, different research approaches may persist in such communities. Under the right circumstances, this will prevent foreclosure on the incorrect hypothesis. Zollman implicitly blames a dense communication structure for the premature abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis of peptic ulcers. Diversity is a good thing as long as the evidence is not decisive, and if the acid hypothesis, which held sway until a new staining method showed the presence of Helicobacter pylori, had been slower to diffuse into the community, the bacterial hypothesis might have been preserved long enough to be better supported.
Kevin Zollman 继 Bala 和 Goyal （1998） 之后，使用网络理论对不同的可能的通信结构进行建模。Zollman （2007， 2013） 的目的是研究通信结构对科学界确定正确（或不正确）理论或假设的机会以及达成这种共识的速度有何影响。网络由节点和连接它们的边缘组成。节点可以表示具有统一信念的个人或任何群体。节点可以具有 believe 或 not believe 的值，并且 consensus 由网络中的所有节点组成，取相同的值。Zollman 研究了三种可能的通信结构：循环，其中每个节点仅连接到循环中其两侧的节点;轮子，其中有一个中心节点，所有其他节点都专门连接到该节点;和 complete，其中每个节点都连接到其他每个节点。使用网络理论的数学，Zollman 证明了一个有点违反直觉的论点，即通信受限的网络，即循环，对正确假设达成共识的可能性最高，而通信最密集的网络，即完全网络，对错误假设达成共识的可能性不可忽略（从中不可能偏离）。Zollman （2010） 也使用这种方法来研究劳动分工问题，尽管他从与 Kitcher 或 Strevens 略有不同的角度来研究这个问题。沟通稀疏或有限的结构更有可能得出正确的假设，但由于它们需要更长的时间才能达成共识，因此不同的研究方法可能会在此类社区中持续存在。在适当的情况下，这将防止因不正确的假设而被取消抵押品赎回权。Zollman 含蓄地将消化性溃疡的细菌假说过早放弃归咎于密集的通信结构。只要证据不是决定性的，多样性就是一件好事，如果酸假说（在新的染色方法显示幽门螺杆菌的存在之前一直占主导地位）扩散到群落的速度较慢，那么细菌假说可能已经保存了足够长的时间，以便得到更好的支持。

While Zollman presents his results as an alternative method to the reward mechanisms discussed by Kitcher, Strevens, and Muldoon and Weisberg, they do not include a mechanism for establishing any of the network structures as the preferred communication system for a scientific community. Kitcher and the others were concerned with how agents might be motivated to pursue a theory or method whose chance of success was either unknown or thought unlikely. Funding bodies like governmental science foundations and private foundations provide or can provide the relevant reward structure. Prize-giving bodies, like the Nobel Foundation or the Kavli Foundation, as well as historical practice, entrench the priority rule. Both of these are community methods that can motivate the choice to pursue high risk, high reward research. It is not clear how communities would select communication structures, nor what kind of system would be able to enforce a structure. Rosenstock, O’Connor, and Bruner (2017) point out in addition that Zollman’s results are very sensitive to how parameters of the models are set. Adjust the number of nodes or the probabilities assigned to the alternative strategies/hypotheses and the Zollman effect disappears. The probability of consensus on the incorrect hypothesis in the densely connected communication structure reduces to close to zero with more nodes or greater disparity of assigned probabilities to alternatives.
虽然 Zollman 将他的结果作为 Kitcher、Strevens、Muldoon 和 Weisberg 讨论的奖励机制的替代方法，但它们不包括建立任何网络结构作为科学界首选通信系统的机制。Kitcher 和其他人关心的是，如何激励代理人追求成功机会未知或被认为不太可能的理论或方法。政府科学基金会和私人基金会等资助机构提供或可以提供相关的奖励结构。诺贝尔基金会或卡弗里基金会等颁奖机构以及历史实践巩固了优先规则。这两种社区方法都可以激励人们选择追求高风险、高回报的研究。目前尚不清楚社区将如何选择通信结构，也不清楚什么样的系统能够强制执行结构。此外，Rosenstock、O’Connor 和 Bruner （2017） 指出，Zollman 的结果对模型参数的设置方式非常敏感。调整节点数或分配给备选策略/假设的概率，Zollman 效应就会消失。在密集连接的通信结构中，随着节点的增加或与备选方案的分配概率的差异更大，对错误假设达成共识的概率降低到接近零。

O’Connor and other colleagues have used evolutionary game theory to model other community phenomena such as the persistence of minority disadvantage in scientific communities (Rubin & O’Connor 2018), scientific polarization (O’Connor & Weatherall 2017), diversity (O’Connor & Bruner 2017), conservatism in science (O’Connor forthcoming). While not necessarily claiming that these game theoretic models are fully descriptive of the phenomena they model, these theorists do claim that given certain initial conditions, certain undesirable social situations (like the disadvantage accruing to minority status) are to be expected rather than being understood as perversions of scientific practice. This would suggest that some ways of addressing those undesirable social outcomes may not be effective and that alternative measures ought to be sought in case of failure.
O’Connor和其他同事使用进化博弈论来模拟其他社区现象，如科学界中少数群体劣势的持续存在（Rubin & O’Connor 2018年，科学两极分化，科学极化（O’Connor & Weatherall 2017年），多样性（O’Connor & Bruner 2017年），科学中的保守主义，即将出版。虽然不一定声称这些博弈论模型完全描述了它们所建模的现象，但这些理论家确实声称，在某些初始条件下，某些不受欢迎的社会情况（如少数群体地位带来的劣势）是可以预期的，而不是被理解为对科学实践的歪曲。这表明，解决这些不良社会结果的一些方法可能无效，如果失败，应该寻求替代措施。

Sociality, rationality, and objectivity. Philosophers who treat the social as biasing or distorting tend to focus on the constructivists’ view that there are no universal principles of rationality or principles of evidence that can be used to identify in any context-independent way which factors are evidential and which not. Reconciliationists tend to argue that what is correct in the sociologists’ accounts can be accommodated in orthodox accounts of scientific knowledge. The key is sifting the correct from the exaggerated or misguided. Integrationists read the relevance of the sociologists’ accounts as supporting the development of new accounts of rationality or objectivity, rather than as grounds for rejecting the cogency of such normative ideals.
社会性、理性和客观性。将社会视为偏见或扭曲的哲学家倾向于关注建构主义的观点，即没有普遍的理性原则或证据原则可以用来以任何独立于上下文的方式识别哪些因素是证据，哪些不是。和解主义者倾向于争辩说，社会学家的叙述中的正确之处可以被纳入对科学知识的正统叙述中。关键是从夸大或误导的中筛选出正确的。整合论者将社会学家的叙述的相关性解读为支持理性或客观性新叙述的发展，而不是拒绝这种规范性理想的说服力的理由。

Philosophers concerned to defend the rationality of science against sociological misrepresentations include Larry Laudan (1984) James Brown (1989, 1994), Alvin Goldman (1987, 1995) and Susan Haack (1996). The details of these philosophers’ approaches differ, but they agree in holding that scientists are persuaded by what they regard as the best evidence or argument, the evidence most indicative of the truth by their lights, and in holding that arguments and evidence are the appropriate focus of attention for understanding the production of scientific knowledge. When evidential considerations have not trumped non-evidential considerations, we have an instance of bad science. They read the sociologists as arguing that a principled distinction between evidential and nonevidential considerations cannot be drawn and devote considerable effort to refuting those arguments. In their positive proposals for accommodating the social character of science, sociality is understood as a matter of the aggregation of individuals, not their interactions, and public knowledge as simply the additive outcome of many individuals making sound epistemic judgments. Individual rationality and individual knowledge are thus the proper focus of philosophers of science. Exhibiting principles of rationality applicable to individual reasoning is sufficient to demonstrate the rationality of science, at least in its ideal form.
致力于捍卫科学理性反对社会学错误陈述的哲学家包括 Larry Laudan （1984）、James Brown （1989， 1994）、Alvin Goldman （1987， 1995） 和 Susan Haack （1996）。这些哲学家的方法的细节各不相同，但他们都同意认为科学家被他们认为最好的证据或论点所说服，他们认为最能表明真理的证据是他们的光芒，并认为论点和证据是理解科学知识生产的适当关注焦点。当证据考虑没有压倒非证据考虑时，我们就有了坏科学的例子。他们把社会学家解读为认为不能在证据和非证据考虑之间划定原则性的区别，并投入相当大的精力来反驳这些论点。在他们关于适应科学的社会特征的积极建议中，社会性被理解为个人的聚集，而不是他们的互动，而公共知识只是许多个人做出合理认识判断的附加结果。因此，个人理性和个人知识是科学哲学家的适当关注点。展示适用于个人推理的理性原则就足以证明科学的合理性，至少在其理想形式中是这样。

Reconciliationists include Ronald Giere, Mary Hesse, and Philip Kitcher. Giere (1988) models scientific judgment using decision theory. This permits incorporating scientists’ interests as one of the parameters of the decision matrix. He also advocates a satisficing, rather than optimizing, approach to modeling the decision situation, thus enabling different interests interacting with the same empirical base to support different selections as long as they are consistent with that base. Mary Hesse (1980) employs a network model of scientific inference that resembles W.V.O. Quine’s web of belief in that its constituents are heterogeneous in character, but all subject to revision in relation to changes elsewhere in the network. She understands the social factors as coherence conditions operating in tandem with logical constraints to determine the relative plausibility of beliefs in the network.
和解主义者包括 Ronald Giere、Mary Hesse 和 Philip Kitcher。Giere （1988） 使用决策理论对科学判断进行建模。这允许将科学家的兴趣作为决策矩阵的参数之一。他还提倡一种令人满意的，而不是优化的方法来模拟决策情况，从而使不同的利益与相同的经验基础互动，只要它们与该基础一致，就可以支持不同的选择。Mary Hesse （1980） 采用了一种类似于 W.V.O. Quine 的信仰网络模型，因为它的组成部分在特征上是异质的，但都可能会根据网络中其他部分的变化进行修改。她将社会因素理解为连贯性条件与逻辑约束一起运作，以确定网络中信念的相对合理性。

The most elaborate reconciliationist position is that developed in Philip Kitcher’s (1993). In addition to modeling relations of authority and the division of cognitive labor as described above, he offers what he terms a compromise between extreme rationalists and sociological debunkers. The compromise model appeals to a principle of rationality, which Kitcher calls the External Standard. It is deemed external because it is proposed as holding independently of any particular historical, cultural or social context. Thus, not only is it external, but it is also universal. The principle applies to change of belief (or shift from one practice to another, in Kitcher’s broader locution), not to belief. It treats a shift (in practice or belief) as rational if and only “the process through which the shift was made has a success ratio at least as high as that of any other process used by human beings (ever) …” (Kitcher 1993, 303). Kitcher’s compromise proposes that scientific ideas develop over time and benefit from the contributions of many differently motivated researchers. This is the concession to the sociologically oriented scholars. In the end, however, those theories that are rationally accepted are those that satisfy Kitcher’s External Standard. Kitcher thus joins Goldman, Haack, and Laudan in the view that it is possible to articulate a priori conditions of rationality or of epistemic warrant that operate independently of, or, perhaps one might say, orthogonally to, the social relations of science.
最详尽的和解主义立场是在 Philip Kitcher （1993） 中发展起来的。除了如上所述对权威关系和认知劳动分工进行建模外，他还提供了他所说的极端理性主义者和社会学揭穿者之间的折衷方案。折衷模型诉诸于理性原则，Kitcher 称之为外部标准。它被认为是外部的，因为它被认为独立于任何特定的历史、文化或社会背景而举行。因此，它不仅是外部的，而且是普遍的。该原则适用于信仰的改变（或从一种实践转变为另一种实践，用基彻更广泛的语言来说），而不是信仰。它认为（在实践中或信念上）转变是合理的，当且只有“做出转变的过程的成功率至少与人类（曾经）使用的任何其他过程的成功率一样高…”（Kitcher 1993,303）。Kitcher 的妥协提出，科学思想会随着时间的推移而发展，并从许多不同动机的研究人员的贡献中受益。这是对社会学导向的学者的让步。然而，最终，那些被理性接受的理论是那些满足基彻外部标准的理论。因此，基彻加入了戈德曼、哈克和劳丹的观点，即有可能阐明独立于科学的社会关系或正交运作的理性或认识保证的先验条件。

A third set of models is integrationist in character. Integrationists use the observations of sociologists of science to develop alternative accounts of scientific rationality and objectivity. Nelson (1990) focuses on a slightly different aspect of Quine’s holism than does Hesse. Nelson uses Quine’s arguments against the independently foundational status of observation statements as the basis for what she calls a feminist empiricism. According to Nelson, no principled distinction can be made between the theories, observations, or values of a community. What counts as evidence, in her view, is fixed by the entire complex of a community’s theories, value commitments, and observations. There is neither knowledge nor evidence apart from such a shared complex. The community is the primary knower on this view and individual knowledge is dependent on the knowledge and values of the community.
第三组模型具有整合主义的性质。整合论者利用科学社会学家的观察来发展对科学理性和客观性的替代解释。Nelson （1990） 关注 Quine 整体论的一个方面与 Hesse 略有不同。纳尔逊使用 Quine 反对观察陈述的独立基础地位的论点作为她所谓的女权主义经验主义的基础。根据 Nelson 的说法，一个社区的理论、观察或价值观之间不能有原则的区分。在她看来，什么才算是证据，是由一个社区的整个理论、价值承诺和观察的综合体决定的。除了这样一个共享的复合体之外，既没有知识也没有证据。社区是这种观点的主要知识者，而个人知识则取决于社区的知识和价值观。

Miriam Solomon’s social empiricism is focused on scientific rationality (Solomon 2001). It, too, involves denying a universal principled distinction among the causes of belief. Solomon draws on contemporary cognitive science literature to argue that what are traditionally called biases are simply among the kinds of “decision vector” that influence belief. They are not necessarily undesirable elements from which science needs to be protected, and can be productive of insight and rational belief. Salience and availability (of data, of measurement technologies), also called cold biases, are decision vectors as much as social ideologies or other motivational factors, “hot biases.” The distinctive feature of Solomon’s social empiricism is her contrast between individual and community rationality. Her (2001) urges the pluralistic view that a community is rational when the theories it accepts are those that have unique empirical successes. Individuals can persist in beliefs that are (from a panoptic perspective) less well supported than others on this view, if the totality of available evidence (or empirical data) is not available to them, or when their favored theory accounts for phenomena not accounted for other theories, even when those may have a greater quantity of empirical successes. What matters to science, however, is that the aggregated judgments of a community be rational. A community is rational when the theories it accepts are those with all or with unique empirical successes. It is collectively irrational to jettison a theory with unique empirical successes. Thus, the community can be rational even when its members are, as judged by traditional epistemic standards, individually irrational. Indeed, individual irrationality can contribute to community rationality in that individuals committed to a theory that accounts for their data keep that data in the range of phenomena any theory accepted by the entire community must eventually explain. In addition to empirical success, Solomon proposes an additional normative criterion. In order to secure appropriate distribution of scientific effort, biases must be appropriately distributed in the community. Solomon proposes a scheme for ascertaining when a distribution is normatively appropriate. Thus, for Solomon, a scientific community is rational when biases are appropriately distributed and it accepts only a theory with all or theories with unique empirical successes as the normative epistemological condition. Rationality accrues only to a community, and not to the individuals constituting the community. As in Zollman’s network models, consensus just is all members of the community assigning the same value (T/F) to a hypothesis or theory.
米里亚姆·所罗门 （Miriam Solomon） 的社会经验主义侧重于科学理性（所罗门 2001）。它也涉及否认信仰原因之间的普遍原则区别。所罗门借鉴当代认知科学文献来论证传统上所谓的偏见只是影响信念的“决策向量”之一。它们不一定是科学需要保护的不受欢迎的元素，并且可以产生洞察力和理性信念。（数据、测量技术的）显著性和可用性，也称为冷偏差，与社会意识形态或其他激励因素（“热偏差”）一样，都是决策向量。所罗门的社会经验主义的显着特点是她在个人理性和社区理性之间的对比。她 （2001） 敦促多元主义观点，即当一个社区接受的理论是那些具有独特实证成功的理论时，它就是理性的。如果无法获得全部可用证据（或经验数据），或者当他们喜欢的理论解释了其他理论没有解释的现象时，即使这些理论可能有更多的实证成功，那么在这种观点上，个人可以坚持（从全景角度来看）不如其他人得到充分支持的信念。然而，对科学来说，重要的是一个社区的集体判断是理性的。当一个社区接受的理论是那些具有全部或具有独特实证成功的理论时，它就是理性的。抛弃一个具有独特实证成功的理论是集体不理性的。因此，即使按照传统认识论标准判断其成员个人是非理性的，社区也可以是理性的。事实上，个人的非理性可以促进社区理性，因为致力于解释他们数据的理论的个人将这些数据保持在整个社区接受的任何理论最终必须解释的现象范围内。除了实证的成功之外，所罗门还提出了一个额外的规范性标准。为了确保科学努力的适当分配，偏见必须在社区中适当分配。所罗门提出了一个方案来确定何时分配在规范上是合适的。因此，对所罗门来说，当偏见得到适当分配时，科学界就是理性的，它只接受一个具有全部的理论或具有独特实证成功的理论作为规范性的认识论条件。理性只属于一个社区，而不是构成社区的个人。与 Zollman 的网络模型一样，共识就是社区的所有成员为假设或理论分配相同的值 （T/F）。

Finally, in Longino’s critical contextual empiricism, the cognitive processes that eventuate in scientific knowledge are themselves social (Longino 1990, 2002). Longino’s starting point is a version of the underdetermination argument: the semantic gap between statements describing data and statements expressing hypotheses or theories to be confirmed or disconfirmed by that data. This gap, created by the difference in descriptive terms used in the description of data and in the expression of hypotheses, means that evidential relations cannot be formally specified and that data cannot support one theory or hypothesis to the exclusion of all alternatives. Instead, such relations are mediated by background assumptions. Eventually, in the chain of justification, one reaches assumptions for which no evidence is available. If these are the context in which evidential relations are constituted, questions arise concerning how the acceptance of such assumptions can be legitimated. According to Longino, the only check against the arbitrary dominance of subjective (metaphysical, political, aesthetic) preference in such cases is critical interaction among the members of the scientific community or among members of different communities. There is no higher authority or transcendent aperspectival position from which it is possible to adjudicate among foundational assumptions. Longino takes the underdetermination argument to express in logical terms the point made by the sociologically oriented researchers: the individuals participating in the production of scientific knowledge are historically, geographically, and socially situated and their observations and reasoning reflect their situations. This fact does not undermine the normative enterprise of philosophy, but requires its expansion to include within its scope the social interactions within and between scientific communities. What counts as knowledge is determined by such interactions.
最后，在 Longino 的批判语境经验主义中，最终在科学知识中产生的认知过程本身就是社会性的（Longino 1990， 2002）。Longino 的起点是 underdetermined 论证的一个版本：描述数据的陈述与表达要由该数据确认或否定的假设或理论的陈述之间的语义差距。这种差距是由数据描述和假设表达中使用的描述性术语的差异造成的，这意味着证据关系无法正式指定，数据无法支持一种理论或假设，从而排除所有替代方案。相反，这种关系是由背景假设中介的。最终，在论证的链条中，人们会得出没有证据的假设。如果这些是构成证据关系的背景，那么关于如何合法地接受这些假设的问题就出现了。根据隆吉诺的说法，在这种情况下，防止主观（形而上学、政治、审美）偏好任意占主导地位的唯一制约是科学界成员之间或不同社区成员之间的批判性互动。没有更高的权威或超越的透视立场，可以从中对基本假设进行裁决。隆吉诺采用“不确定论点”来用逻辑术语表达了以社会学为导向的研究人员所提出的观点：参与科学知识生产的个人在历史、地理和社会上都处于位置，他们的观察和推理反映了他们的处境。这一事实并没有破坏哲学的规范性事业，但需要将其扩展，以包括科学界内部和科学界之间的社会互动。什么算作知识是由这种互动决定的。

Longino claims that scientific communities do institutionalize some critical practices (for example, peer review), but argues that such practices and institutions must satisfy conditions of effectiveness in order to qualify as objective. She argues, therefore, for the expansion of scientific norms such as accuracy and consistency to include norms that apply to communities. These are (1) the provision of venues in which critical interaction can take place, (2) the uptake of critical intervention as demonstrated in change of belief distribution in the community over time in a way that is sensitive to the critical discourse taking place within that community, (3) public accessibility of the standards that regulate discourse, and (4) tempered equality of intellectual authority. By this latter condition, perhaps the most controversial of her proposed norms, Longino means that any perspective has a prima facie capacity to contribute to the critical interactions of a community, though equal standing can be lost owing to failure to engage or to respond to criticism. In her 2002, Longino argues that the cognitive processes of science, such as observation and reasoning, are themselves social processes. Thus the interactions subject to community norms extend not only to discussion of assumptions in finished research, but to the constructive processes of research as well.
Longino 声称科学界确实将一些关键实践制度化（例如，同行评审），但认为这些实践和机构必须满足有效性条件才能成为客观的。因此，她主张扩大科学规范，例如准确性和一致性，以包括适用于社区的规范。这些是 （1） 提供可以进行批判性互动的场所，（2） 采取批判性干预，如随着时间的推移在社区中以对社区内发生的批判性话语敏感的方式改变社区中的信仰分布所证明的，（3） 规范话语的标准的公众可及性， （4） 缓和了知识权威的平等。通过后一个条件，也许是她提出的规范中最具争议的，Longino 意味着任何观点都有为社区的批判性互动做出贡献的初步能力，尽管由于未能参与或回应批评而可能会失去平等地位。在她的 2002 年中，Longino 认为科学的认知过程，例如观察和推理，本身就是社会过程。因此，受社区规范约束的互动不仅延伸到对已完成研究中假设的讨论，还延伸到研究的建设性过程。

Solomon and Longino differ on where they locate normativity and on the role and effectiveness of deliberative processes in actual scientific inquiry. Solomon attends to the patterns of acceptance and to the distribution of decision vectors, regardless of the interactions among community members, while Longino attends to deliberative processes and interactions. They may also differ in their views of what constitutes scientific success.
所罗门和隆吉诺在将规范性定位在哪里以及审议过程在实际科学探究中的作用和有效性上存在分歧。Solomon 关注接受的模式和决策向量的分布，而不管社区成员之间的互动如何，而 Longino 则关注审议过程和互动。他们对科学成功的看法也可能不同。

One set of issues that has yet to give rise to extended philosophical reflection is the question how civilizational differences are expressed in scientific work (See Bala 2008). Here, too, there is a micro- and a macro- version. At the micro level, one might ask how the interactional culture of individual laboratories or theoretical subcommunities is or is not expressed in the outcome of their research. At the macro level one might be asking how large scale cultural features are reflected in the content and practice of science in a given cultural formation. For example, Joseph Needham argued that features of the culture of ancient China directed their technical and intellectual ingenuity into channels that foreclosed the development of anything like the science that developed in Western Europe in the 14th through the 17th centuries. Other cultures developed some aspects of what we now think of as a cosmopolitan or global scientific culture (for example, the mathematics and astronomy of 10th through 14th century Islamic and South Asian scholars) independently of the early modern physics developed in Western and Central Europe. The papers in Habib and Raina (2001) address aspects of these questions with respect to the history of science in India.
尚未引起扩展哲学反思的一组问题是文明差异如何在科学工作中表达的问题（参见 Bala 2008）。这里也有微观和宏版本。在微观层面上，人们可能会问，各个实验室或理论子社区的互动文化如何在他们的研究结果中表达或没有表达。在宏层面上，人们可能会问，在给定的文化形态中，大规模的文化特征如何反映在科学的内容和实践中。例如，李约瑟 （Joseph Needham） 认为，古代中国文化的特点将他们的技术和知识独创性引导到阻碍了 14 至 17 世纪在西欧发展起来的科学发展的渠道。其他文化发展了我们现在认为的世界性或全球科学文化的某些方面（例如，10 至 14 世纪伊斯兰和南亚学者的数学和天文学），独立于西欧和中欧发展的早期现代物理学。Habib 和 Raina （2001） 的论文从印度科学史的角度解决了这些问题的各个方面。

Unity, Plurality and the Aims of Inquiry. The variety of views on the degree of sociality assignable to the epistemological concepts of science lead to different views concerning the ultimate character of the outcome of inquiry. This difference can be summarized as the difference between monism and pluralism. Monism, as characterized in Kellert, Longino, and Waters (2006), holds that the goal of inquiry is and should be a unified, comprehensive, and complete account of phenomena (whether all phenomena, or the phenomena specific to a particular domain of inquiry). If this is so, then the norms of assessment should be informed by this goal and there should be one standard by which theories, models, and hypotheses in the sciences are assessed. Deviation from an accepted theoretical framework is problematic and requires explanation, such as the explanations offered for the division of cognitive labor. Monism, with its commitment to ultimate unity, requires ways to reconcile competing theories or to adjudicate controversy so as to eliminate competition in favor of the one true or best theory. Pluralism, on the other hand, holds that the observed plurality of approaches within a science is not necessarily a flaw but rather reflects the complexity of the phenomena under investigation in interaction with the limitations of human cognitive capacities and the variety of human cognitive as well as pragmatic interests in representations of those phenomena.
统一、多元和探究的目标。关于科学认识论概念的社会性程度的不同观点导致了对探究结果的最终特征的不同观点。这种差异可以概括为一元论和多元论之间的区别。正如 Kellert、Longino 和 Waters （2006） 所描述的那样，一元论认为探究的目标是并且应该是对现象（无论是所有现象，还是特定于特定研究领域的现象）的统一、全面和完整的解释。如果是这样，那么评估的规范应该以这个目标为依据，并且应该有一个标准来评估科学中的理论、模型和假设。偏离公认的理论框架是有问题的，需要解释，例如为认知劳动分工提供的解释。一元论致力于最终的统一，需要各种方法来调和相互竞争的理论或裁决争议，从而消除竞争，转而支持一个真实或最好的理论。另一方面，多元论认为，在一门科学中观察到的多种方法不一定是缺陷，而是反映了所研究现象的复杂性，与人类认知能力的局限性以及人类认知的多样性以及表示这些现象的实用利益相互作用。

Among pluralists, a diversity of views is to be found. Suppes (1978) emphasized the mutual untranslatability of the descriptive terms developed in the course of scientific specialization. Such incommensurability will resist evaluation by a common measure. Cartwright’s (1999) invocation of a dappled world emphasizes the complexity and diversity of the natural (and social) world. Scientific theories and models are representations of varying degrees of abstraction that manage to apply at best partially to whatever phenomena they purport to represent. To the extent they are taken to represent actual process in the real world, they must be hedged by ceteris paribus clauses. Scientific laws and models attach to patches of the world, but not to a seamlessly law-governed whole. Mitchell’s (2002, 2009) integrative pluralism is a rejection of the goal of unification by either reduction to a single (fundamental) level of explanation or abstraction to a single theoretical representation, in favor of a more pragmatically inflected set of explanatory strategies. The success for any particular investigation is answerable to the goals of the investigation, but there may be multiple compatible accounts reflecting both the contingency and partiality of the laws/generalizations that can figure in explanations and the different goals one may bring to investigation of the same phenomenon. The explanations sought in any particular explanatory situation will draw on these multiple accounts as appropriate for the level of representation adequate to achieve its pragmatic ends. Mitchell’s defense of integrative pluralism rests on both the partiality of representation and the complexity of the phenomena to be explained.
在多元论者中，可以找到不同的观点。Suppes （1978） 强调了在科学专业化过程中发展起来的描述性术语的相互不可译性。这种不相称性将抵制用一种常见的衡量标准进行评估。卡特赖特 （1999） 对斑驳世界的引用强调了自然（和社会）世界的复杂性和多样性。科学理论和模型是不同程度抽象的表示，充其量只能部分地应用于它们声称所代表的任何现象。在某种程度上，它们被看作是现实世界中的实际过程，它们必须被 ceteris paribus 条款所对冲。科学定律和模型依附于世界的各个部分，但并非依附于一个无缝受法律支配的整体。Mitchell （2002， 2009） 的综合多元主义是通过简化为单一的（基本）解释层次或抽象为单一的理论表示来拒绝统一目标，以支持一套更实用的解释策略。任何特定调查的成功都与调查的目标有关，但可能有多个兼容的解释，反映了解释中可以体现的规律/概括的偶然性和片面性，以及一个人可能为调查同一现象带来的不同目标。在任何特定的解释情况下寻求的解释都将根据足以实现其实用目的的代表性水平适当地利用这些多重解释。米切尔对综合多元主义的辩护既基于表征的片面性，也基于要解释的现象的复杂性。

Kellert, Longino, and Waters advance a pluralism that sees multiplicity not only among but within levels of analysis. Furthermore they see no reason to require that the multiple accounts be compatible. The multiplicity of noncongruent empirically adequate accounts helps us appreciate the complexity of a phenomenon without being in a position to generate a single account of that complexity. They do not hold that all phenomena will support ineliminable pluralism, but that there are some phenomena that will require mutually irreducible or incompatible models. Which these are is determined by examining the phenomena, the models, and the match between phenomena and models. Like Mitchell, Kellert, Longino, and Waters hold that pragmatic considerations (broadly understood) will govern the choice of model to be used in particular circumstances. Both forms of pluralism (compatibilist and noncompatibilist) abandon the notion that there is a set of natural kinds whose causal interactions are the basis for fundamental explanations of natural processes. The noncompatibilist is open to multiple classification schemes answerable to different pragmatic interests in classifying. To this extent the noncompatibilist pluralist embraces a view close to the promiscuous realism articulated by John Dupré (1993). The compatibilist, or integrative pluralist, on the other hand, must hold that there is a way that different classification schemes can be reconciled to support the envisioned integration of explanatory models.
Kellert、Longino 和 Waters 推进了一种多元化，这种多元化不仅在分析层次之间，而且在分析层次内部都看到了多重性。此外，他们认为没有理由要求多个帐户兼容。不一致的经验充分解释的多样性有助于我们理解现象的复杂性，而无需生成这种复杂性的单一解释。他们并不认为所有现象都会支持不可消除的多元主义，但有些现象需要相互不可简化或不相容的模型。这些是通过检查现象、模型以及现象和模型之间的匹配来确定的。与 Mitchell 一样，Kellert、Longino 和 Waters 认为，实用主义考虑（广义理解）将支配在特定情况下使用的模型的选择。两种形式的多元主义（兼容主义和非兼容主义）都放弃了这样一种观念，即存在一组自然种类，其因果相互作用是自然过程基本解释的基础。不相容论者对多种分类方案持开放态度，这些分类方案在分类中对不同的实用利益负责。在这个程度上，非相容主义多元主义者所接受的观点接近于约翰·杜普雷（John Dupré，1993）所阐述的混杂现实主义。另一方面，兼容论者或整合多元论者必须认为，有一种方法可以调和不同的分类方案，以支持设想的解释模型整合。

Pluralism receives support from several additional approaches. Giere (2006) uses the phenomenon of color vision to support a position he calls perspectival realism. Like the colors of objects, scientific representations are the result of interactions between human cognitive faculties and the world. Other species have different visual equipment and perceive the world differently. Our human cognitive faculties, then, constitute perspectives. We could have been built differently and hence perceived the world differently. Perspectival realism leads to pluralism, because perspectives are partial. While van Fraassen’s (2008) does not take a position on pluralism vs. monism (and as an empiricist and antirealist van Fraassen would not have to), its emphasis on the partiality and perspective dependence of measurement provides a complementary point of entry to such diversity. Solomon (2006) urges a yet more welcoming attitude towards multiplicity. In her view, dissensus is a necessary component of well-functioning scientific communities and consensus can be epistemologically pernicious. In an extension of the arguments in Solomon (2001) she argues that different models and theoretical representations will be associated with particular insights or specific data that are likely to be lost if the aim is to integrate or otherwise combine the models to achieve a consensus understanding. The activity of integrating two or more models is different from the process of one model from a set of alternatives coming eventually to have all the empirical successes distributed among the other models. In her examination of consensus conferences called by the United States National Institutes of Health (Solomon 2011), Solomon finds that such conferences do not resolve existing dissent in the scientific community. Instead, they tend to take place after a consensus has emerged in the research community and are directed more to the communication of such consensus to outside communities (such as clinicians, insurers, health policy experts, and the public) than to the assessment of evidence that might warrant consensus.
多元主义得到了其他几种方法的支持。Giere （2006） 使用色觉现象来支持他称之为透视现实主义的立场。就像物体的颜色一样，科学表征是人类认知能力与世界之间相互作用的结果。其他物种具有不同的视觉设备，对世界的感知也不同。因此，我们人类的认知能力构成了视角。我们本可以以不同的方式构建，因此以不同的方式看待世界。透视现实主义导致多元主义，因为视角是片面的。虽然 van Fraassen’s （2008） 没有对多元主义与一元论采取立场（作为经验主义者和反现实主义者，van Fraassen 不必这样做），但它对测量的偏颇性和视角依赖性为这种多样性提供了一个互补的切入点。Solomon （2006） 敦促对多样性采取更欢迎的态度。在她看来，分歧是运转良好的科学界的必要组成部分，而共识在认识论上可能是有害的。在对 Solomon （2001） 的论点的扩展中，她认为，如果目的是整合或以其他方式组合模型以实现共识理解，那么不同的模型和理论表示将与特定的见解或特定数据相关联，这些见解或数据可能会丢失。整合两个或多个模型的活动不同于一个模型与一组替代方案的过程不同，最终将所有经验成功分配给其他模型。在她对美国国立卫生研究院召集的共识会议（Solomon 2011）的研究中，所罗门发现此类会议并不能解决科学界现有的异议。相反，它们往往发生在研究界形成共识之后，并且更多地是将这种共识传达给外部社区（如临床医生、保险公司、卫生政策专家和公众），而不是评估可能需要达成共识的证据。

Researchers committed to a monist or unified science will see plurality as a problem to be overcome, while researchers already committed to a deeply social view of science will see plurality as a resource of communities rather than a problem. The diversity and partiality that characterizes both a local and the global scientific community characterize the products of those communities as well as the producers. Universalism and unification require the elimination of epistemologically relevant diversity, while a pluralist stance promotes it and the deeply social conception of knowledge that follows.
致力于一元论或统一科学的研究人员将把多元性看作是一个需要克服的问题，而已经致力于深刻的科学社会观的研究人员将把多元性看作是社区的资源，而不是一个问题。本地和全球科学界的多样性和片面性是这些社区和生产者的产品的特征。普遍主义和统一性要求消除认识论上相关的多样性，而多元主义立场则促进了多样性以及随之而来的深刻的社会知识概念。

Sociality and the structure of scientific knowledge. Attention to the social dimensions of scientific knowledge and the consequent potential for plurality has prompted philosophers to rethink the structure of what is known. Many philosophers (including Giere, Kitcher, and Longino) who advocate forms of pluralism invoke the metaphor of maps to explain how scientific representations can be both partial and adequate. Maps only represent those features of the territory mapped that are relevant for the purpose for which the map is drawn. Some maps may represent the physical area bounded by state boundaries, others may represent the population size, or the relative abundance/poverty of natural resources. Winther (forthcoming) explores the variety of kinds of maps used in science and philosophical use of the map metaphor. But the map metaphor is only one of several ways to rethink the structure of scientific knowledge.
社会性和科学知识的结构。对科学知识的社会维度和随之而来的多元性潜力的关注促使哲学家重新思考已知事物的结构。许多倡导多元主义形式的哲学家（包括 Giere、Kitcher 和 Longino）援引地图的隐喻来解释科学表示如何既片面又充分。地图仅表示所绘制的领土中与绘制地图的目的相关的那些要素。一些地图可能表示以州边界为界的物理区域，其他地图可能表示人口规模或自然资源的相对丰度/贫困度。Winther（即将出版）探讨了科学中使用的各种地图以及地图隐喻的哲学使用。但地图的比喻只是重新思考科学知识结构的几种方法之一。

Other philosophers draw more heavily on cognitive science. Giere (2002) takes a naturalist approach to modeling, not so much the distribution of cognitive labor, but the distribution of cognition. This approach takes a system or interactive community as the locus of cognition, rather than the individual agent. Nersessian (2006) extends distributed cognition to model-based reasoning in the sciences. Models are artifacts that focus the cognitive activity of multiple individuals in particular settings. Knowledge is distributed across the minds interacting about the artifacts in that setting. Paul Thagard draws on the increasingly interdisciplinary (and hence social) nature of cognitive science itself to argue that not only does cognitive science (or certain lines of analysis in cognitive science) support a conception of cognition as distributed among interacting agents, but that this conception can be turned back upon cognitive science itself. (Thagard 2012). Finally Alexander Bird (2010) reflects on the sense of knowledge required for attributions such as: “the biomedical community now knows that peptic ulcers are often caused by the bacterium Helicobacter pylori.” Or “There was an explosive growth in scientific knowledge in the twentieth century.” Bird faults other social epistemologists for still making such collective knowledge supervenient on the states of individuals. Instead, he argues, we should understand social knowing as a functional analogue of individual knowing. Both are dependent on the existence and proper functioning of the relevant structures: reasoning and perception for individuals; libraries and journals and other social structures, for collectivities. Scientific knowledge is an emergent effect of collective epistemic interactions, concretized in the texts that have been designated as vehicles for the preservation and communication of that knowledge
其他哲学家更多地借鉴了认知科学。Giere （2002） 采用自然主义的方法来建模，与其说是认知劳动的分布，不如说是认知的分布。这种方法将系统或交互式社区作为认知的场所，而不是单个代理。Nersessian （2006） 将分布式认知扩展到科学中基于模型的推理。模型是在特定环境中关注多个个体的认知活动的工件。知识分布在与该设置中的人工制品互动的头脑中。保罗·萨加德 （Paul Thagard） 利用认知科学本身日益跨学科（以及因此是社会性的）性质来论证，不仅认知科学（或认知科学中的某些分析路线）支持认知分布在相互作用主体之间的概念，而且这种概念可以回到认知科学本身。（Thagard 2012 年）。最后，Alexander Bird （2010） 反思了归因所需的知识感，例如：“生物医学界现在知道消化性溃疡通常是由幽门螺杆菌引起的。“或者”20 世纪科学知识呈爆炸式增长”。伯德指责其他社会认识论者仍然让这种集体知识超越个人的状态。相反，他认为，我们应该将社会认知理解为个体认知的功能类比。两者都取决于相关结构的存在和正常运作：个人的推理和感知;图书馆和期刊以及其他社会结构，为集体服务。科学知识是集体认识互动的涌现效应，具体化在被指定为保存和交流该知识的工具的文本中

5. Social Direction of Science 5. 科学的社会方向

Modern science has been regarded as both a model of democratic self-governance and an activity requiring and facilitating democratic practices in its supporting social context (Popper 1950, Bronowski 1956). In this perspective, science is seen as embedded in and dependent on its supporting social context, but insulated in its practices from the influence of that context. As the reach of science and science-based technologies has extended further and further into the economy and daily life of industrialized societies, new attention is paid to the governance of science. Regardless of one’s views about the social character of knowledge, there are further questions concerning what research to pursue, what social resources to devote to it, who should make such decisions, and how they should be made.
现代科学既被视为民主自治的模式，也被视为在其支持性社会背景下要求和促进民主实践的活动（Popper 1950， Bronowski 1956）。从这个角度来看，科学被视为嵌入并依赖于其支持的社会背景，但其实践与该背景的影响隔绝。随着科学和基于科学的技术越来越深入到工业化社会的经济和日常生活中，科学的治理受到了新的关注。无论一个人对知识的社会性质有何看法，都存在进一步的问题，即进行什么研究，将哪些社会资源投入其中，谁应该做出这样的决定，以及应该如何做出这些决定。

Philip Kitcher (2001) has opened these questions to philosophical scrutiny. While Kitcher largely endorses the epistemological views of his (1993), in the later work he argues that there is no absolute standard of the significance (practical or epistemic) of research projects, nor any standard of the good apart from subjective preferences. The only non-arbitrary way to defend judgments concerning research agendas in the absence of absolute standards is through democratic means of establishing collective preferences. Kitcher, thus, attempts to spell out procedures by which decisions concerning what research directions to pursue can be made in a democratic manner. The result, which he calls well-ordered science, is a system in which the decisions actually made track the decisions that would be a made by a suitably constituted representative body collectively deliberating with the assistance of relevant information (concerning, e.g., cost and feasibility) supplied by experts.
Philip Kitcher （2001） 将这些问题开放给哲学审查。虽然 Kitcher 在很大程度上赞同他 （1993） 的认识论观点，但在后来的工作中，他认为研究项目的意义（实践或认识）没有绝对的标准，除了主观偏好之外，也没有任何好的标准。在没有绝对标准的情况下，为有关研究议程的判断辩护的唯一非武断方法是通过建立集体偏好的民主手段。因此，Kitcher 试图阐明程序，通过这些程序可以以民主的方式做出关于追求哪些研究方向的决定。结果，他称之为井然有序的科学，是一个系统，在这个系统中，实际做出的决策跟踪由适当组成的代表机构做出的决定，这些代表机构在专家提供的相关信息（例如关于成本和可行性）的帮助下集体审议。

Kitcher’s “well-ordered science” has attracted attention from other philosophers, from scientists, and from scholars of public policy. Winning praise as a first step, it has also elicited a variety of criticisms and further questions. The criticisms of his proposal range from worries about the excessive idealism of the conception to worries that it will enshrine the preferences of a much smaller group than those who will be affected by research decisions. Kitcher’s proposal at best works for a system in which all or most scientific research is publicly funded. But the proportion of private, corporate, funding of science compared to that of public funding has been increasing, thus calling into question the effectiveness of a model that presupposes largely public control (Mirowski and Sent 2002, Krimsky 2003). Kitcher’s model, it should be noted, still effects a significant separation between the actual conduct of research and decisions concerning the direction of research and scholars who see a more intimate relation between social processes and values in the context and those in the conduct of research will be dissatisfied with it. Kitcher himself (Kitcher 2011) seems to relax the separation somewhat.
基彻的“井然有序的科学”引起了其他哲学家、科学家和公共政策学者的注意。作为第一步赢得赞誉，它也引发了各种批评和进一步的问题。对他的提议的批评范围从担心这个概念的过度理想主义到担心它会体现一个比那些受研究决策影响的人小得多的群体的偏好。Kitcher 的提议充其量适用于一个所有或大部分科学研究都由公共资助的体系。但是，与公共资金相比，私人、企业、科学资金的比例一直在增加，因此对主要以公共控制为前提的模式的有效性提出了质疑（Mirowski 和 Sent 2002，Krimsky 2003）。应该指出的是，基彻的模型仍然在实际的研究行为和有关研究方向的决策之间产生了显著的分离，在上下文中看到社会过程和价值观之间更密切关系的学者与进行研究的学者会对此感到不满。Kitcher 本人 （Kitcher 2011） 似乎稍微放松了这种分离。

The counterfactual character of the proposal raises questions about the extent to which well-ordered science really is democratic. If the actual decisions do not need to be the result of democratic procedures but only to be the same as those that would result from such procedures, how do we know which decisions those are without actually going through the deliberative exercise? Even if the process is actually carried out, there are places, e.g. in choice of experts whose advice is sought, which permit individual preferences to subvert or bias the preferences of the whole (Roth 2003). Furthermore, given that the effects of scientific research are potentially global, while democratic decisions are at best national, national decisions will have an effect well beyond the population represented by the decision makers. Sheila Jasanoff has also commented that even in contemporary industrialized democracies there are quite different science governance regimes. There is not one model of democratic decision making, but many, and the differences translate into quite different policies (Jasanoff 2005).
该提案的反事实性质引发了人们对井然有序的科学在多大程度上真正是民主的质疑。如果实际的决定不需要是民主程序的结果，而只需要与这些程序的结果相同，那么我们如何知道这些决定是哪些决定，而无需实际进行审议呢？即使这个过程真的进行了，也有一些地方，例如在选择寻求建议的专家时，允许个人偏好颠覆或偏向整体的偏好（Roth 2003）。此外，鉴于科学研究的影响可能是全球性的，而民主决策充其量是全国性的，国家决策的影响将远远超出决策者所代表的人群。希拉·贾萨诺夫 （Sheila Jasanoff） 还评论说，即使在当代工业化民主国家，也存在完全不同的科学治理制度。民主决策的模式不是一种，而是多种多样，差异转化为完全不同的政策（Jasanoff 2005）。

In his (2011) Kitcher abandons the counterfactual approach as he brings the ideal of well-orderedness into contact with actual debates in and about contemporary science. His concern here is the variety of ways in which scientific authority has been eroded by what he terms “chimeric epistemologies.” It’s not enough to say that the scientific community has concluded that, say, the MMR vaccine is safe, or that the climate is changing in a way that requires a change in human activities. In a democratic society, there are many other voices claiming authority, whether on presumed evidential grounds or as part of campaigns to manipulate public opinion. Kitcher suggests mechanisms whereby small groups trusted by their communities might develop the understanding of complicated technical issues through tutoring by members of the relevant research communities and then carry this understanding back to the public. He also endorses James Fishkin’s (2009) experiments in deliberative polling as a means to bring members of the public committed to different sides of a technical issue together with the scientific exponents of the issue and in a series of exchanges that cover the evidence, the different kinds of import different lines of reasoning possess, and the other elements of a reasoned discussion, bring the group to a consensus on the correct view. The pluralist and pragmatically inclined philosophers discussed in the previous section might worry that there is not a single correct view towards which such an encounter ought to converge, but that a broader discussion that incorporates deliberation about aims and values might produce sufficient (temporary) convergence to ground action or policy.
在他的 （2011） 中，Kitcher 放弃了反事实的方法，因为他将井然有序的理想与当代科学中和关于当代科学的实际辩论联系起来。他在这里担心的是科学权威被他所说的“嵌合认识论”以各种方式侵蚀。仅仅说科学界已经得出结论，比如说 MMR 疫苗是安全的，或者气候变化正在以需要改变人类活动的方式变化是不够的。在一个民主社会中，还有许多其他声音声称自己是权威的，无论是基于假定的证据，还是作为操纵公众舆论的运动的一部分。Kitcher 提出了一种机制，即受社区信任的小团体可以通过相关研究社区成员的辅导来发展对复杂技术问题的理解，然后将这种理解带回给公众。他还赞同 James Fishkin （2009） 的审议性民意调查实验，将其作为一种手段，将致力于技术问题不同方面的公众与该问题的科学代表人物聚集在一起，并在一系列涵盖证据、不同推理路线所具有的不同种类的进口以及推理讨论的其他要素的交流中， 使小组就正确的观点达成共识。上一节中讨论的多元主义和实用主义哲学家可能会担心，这样的相遇应该趋同于一个单一的正确观点，但是，包含对目标和价值观的审议的更广泛的讨论可能会产生足够的（暂时的）趋同于基本行动或政策。

6. Conclusion 6. 结论

Philosophical study of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge has been intensifying in the decades since 1970. Social controversies about the sciences and science based technologies as well as developments in philosophical naturalism and social epistemology combine to drive thinking in this area forward. Scholars in a number of cognate disciplines continue to investigate the myriad social relations within scientific communities and between them and their social, economic, and institutional contexts.
自 1970 年以来的几十年里，对科学知识的社会维度的哲学研究一直在加强。关于科学和基于科学的技术的社会争议以及哲学自然主义和社会认识论的发展共同推动了这一领域的思考向前发展。许多相关学科的学者继续研究科学界内部以及它们与社会、经济和制度背景之间的无数社会关系。

While this area first came to prominence in the so-called science wars of the 1980s, attending to social dimensions of science has brought a number of topics to philosophical attention. The phenomenon of Big Science has encouraged philosophers to consider the epistemological significance of such phenomena as trust and cognitive interdependence and the division of cognitive labor. The increased economic and social dependence on science-based technologies has prompted attention to questions of inductive risk and the role of values in assessing hypotheses with social consequences. The controversies over health risks of certain vaccines, over the measurement of environmental pollution, and over the causes of climate change have expanded philosophy of science from its more accustomed areas of logical and epistemological analysis to incorporate concerns about the communication and uptake of scientific knowledge and the ethical dimensions of superficially factual debates.
虽然这一领域在 1980 年代所谓的科学战争中首次受到重视，但关注科学的社会层面已经使许多话题引起了哲学的关注。大科学现象鼓励哲学家考虑信任和认知相互依存以及认知劳动分工等现象的认识论意义。经济和社会对科学技术的日益依赖促使人们关注归纳风险问题以及价值在评估具有社会后果的假设中的作用。关于某些疫苗的健康风险、环境污染测量和气候变化原因的争论已经将科学哲学从其更习惯的逻辑和认识论分析领域扩展到对科学知识的交流和吸收的担忧，以及肤浅的事实辩论的伦理维度。

Partly in response to the work of scholars in the social studies of science, partly in response to the changing role of scientific inquiry through the 20th and into the 21st centuries, philosophers have sought ways to either accommodate the (tenable) results of the sociologists and cultural historians or to modify traditional epistemological concepts used in the analysis of scientific knowledge. These investigations in turn lead to new thinking about the structure and location of the content of knowledge. While debates within philosophy of science between and among adherents to one or another of the models of the sociality of knowledge will continue, an important future step will be a fuller encounter between individual-based social epistemology with its focus on testimony and disagreement as transactions among individuals and the more fully social epistemologies that take social relations or interaction as partially constitutive of empirical knowledge.
部分是为了回应科学社会研究学者的工作，部分是为了回应科学探究在 20 世纪和 21 世纪不断变化的角色，哲学家们一直在寻求适应社会学家和文化历史学家的（站得住脚的）结果或修改用于科学知识分析的传统认识论概念的方法。这些调查反过来又导致了对知识内容的结构和位置的新思考。虽然科学哲学中知识社会性模型的一种或另一种追随者之间的辩论将继续进行，但未来重要的一步将是以个人为基础的社会认识论与更全面的社会认识论之间的更全面相遇，前者侧重于将证词和分歧作为个人之间的交易，后者将社会关系或互动作为经验知识的部分构成。

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• Welbourne, Michael, 1981. “The Community of Knowledge,” Philosophical Quarterly, 31(125): 302–314.
• Wilholt, Torsten, 2013. “Epistemic Trust in Science,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 24(2): 233–253.
• Winsberg, Eric, 2012. “Values and Uncertainties in the Predictions of global Climate Models,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 22(2): 111–137.
• –––, Bryce Huebner, and Rebecca Kukla, 2014. “Accountability and Values in Radically Collaborative Research,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (Part A), 46: 16–23.
• Winther, Rasmus Grønfeldt, forthcoming. When Maps Become the World, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
• Wylie, Alison, 2002. Thinking from Things, Los Angeles: University of California Press.
• Young, N.S., with John Ioannidis, O. Al-Ubaydli, 2008. “Why Current Publication Practices May Harm Science,” Public Library of Science Medicine, 5(10): e201, doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050201
• Zollman, Kevin, 2007. “The Communication Structure of Epistemic Communities,” Philosophy of Science, 74: 574–87.
• –––, 2010. “The Epistemic Benefit of Transient Diversity,” Erkenntnis, 72(1): 17035.
• –––, 2013. “Network Epistemology: Communication in Epistemic Communities,” Philosophy Compass, 8(1): 15–27

Further Reading

• Daston, Lorraine, and Peter Galison, 2010. Objectivity, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Elliott, Kevin, 2017. A Tapestry of Values: An Introduction to Values in Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Fleck, Ludwig, 1973. The Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Hacking, Ian, 1999. The Social Construction of What?, Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press.
• Latour, Bruno, 2004. Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Levi, Isaac, 1980. The Enterprise of Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Radder, Hans (ed.), 2010. The Commodification of Scientific Research, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
• McMullin, Ernan (ed.), 1992. Social Dimensions of Scientific Knowledge, South Bend: Notre Dame University Press.
• Sismondo, Sergio, 1996. Science Without Myth, Albany: State University of New York Press.

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via：

• The Social Dimensions of Scientific Knowledge

  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-knowledge-social/