OtterCTF 内存取证

最新推荐文章于 2024-05-12 22:57:41 发布

A丶R

最新推荐文章于 2024-05-12 22:57:41 发布

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本文链接：https://blog.csdn.net/weixin_51804748/article/details/124786654

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最近小小的学习了一下内存取证，装环境搞了整整一天，非常麻烦，在阅读相关资料时偶然看到了一篇WriteUp，是关于OtterCTF2018的十三道内存取证题目，用的全部是同一个镜像，考察的知识点非常全面，可以用来熟悉一下volatility的使用，关键是比赛平台居然还开着，正好当作内存取证的一次入门学习

OtterCTF

1 - What the password?

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem imageinfo                  
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
INFO    : volatility.debug    : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
          Suggested Profile(s) : Win7SP1x64, Win7SP0x64, Win2008R2SP0x64, Win2008R2SP1x64_24000, Win2008R2SP1x64_23418, Win2008R2SP1x64, Win7SP1x64_24000, Win7SP1x64_23418
                     AS Layer1 : WindowsAMD64PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
                     AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem)
                      PAE type : No PAE
                           DTB : 0x187000L
                          KDBG : 0xf80002c430a0L
          Number of Processors : 2
     Image Type (Service Pack) : 1
                KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xfffff80002c44d00L
                KPCR for CPU 1 : 0xfffff880009ef000L
             KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xfffff78000000000L
           Image date and time : 2018-08-04 19:34:22 UTC+0000
     Image local date and time : 2018-08-04 22:34:22 +0300

题目附件是一个raw文件，先用imageinfo查看一下镜像的信息，支持的系统有很多，我们可以试一试，指定profile为第一个Win7SP1x64，然后看看能否成功调用volshell

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 volshell
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Current context: System @ 0xfffffa8018d44740, pid=4, ppid=0 DTB=0x187000
Welcome to volshell! Current memory image is:
file:///root/%E6%A1%8C%E9%9D%A2/OtterCTF.vmem
To get help, type 'hh()'
>>> hh()

得到正确的镜像系统后，便可以在后面加上--profile=Win7SP1x64来使用后续的命令，第一题需要我们获取这个镜像的用户密码，可以使用hashdump，但得到密码都是哈希加密之后的，使用lsadump或者mimikatz可以得到明文

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 hashdump
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
Rick:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:518172d012f97d3a8fcc089615283940:::
                                                                                                                         
┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 lsadump 
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
DefaultPassword
0x00000000  28 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   (...............
0x00000010  4d 00 6f 00 72 00 74 00 79 00 49 00 73 00 52 00   M.o.r.t.y.I.s.R.
0x00000020  65 00 61 00 6c 00 6c 00 79 00 41 00 6e 00 4f 00   e.a.l.l.y.A.n.O.
0x00000030  74 00 74 00 65 00 72 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   t.t.e.r.........

DPAPI_SYSTEM
0x00000000  2c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ,...............
0x00000010  01 00 00 00 36 9b ba a9 55 e1 92 82 09 e0 63 4c   ....6...U.....cL
0x00000020  20 74 63 14 9e d8 a0 4b 45 87 5a e4 bc f2 77 a5   .tc....KE.Z...w.
0x00000030  25 3f 47 12 0b e5 4d a5 c8 35 cf dc 00 00 00 00   %?G...M..5......

                                                                                                             
┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 mimikatz
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Module   User             Domain           Password                                
-------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------------------------------
wdigest  Rick             WIN-LO6FAF3DTFE  MortyIsReallyAnOtter                    
wdigest  WIN-LO6FAF3DTFE$ WORKGROUP

CTF{MortyIsReallyAnOtter}

2 - General Info

第二题要获取主机名和ip地址

ip地址

能获取的ip地址的最快办法就是netscan，查看网络连接

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 netscan 
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Offset(P)          Proto    Local Address                  Foreign Address      State            Pid      Owner          Created
0x7d60f010         UDPv4    0.0.0.0:1900                   *:*                                   2836     BitTorrent.exe 2018-08-04 19:27:17 UTC+0000
0x7d62b3f0         UDPv4    192.168.202.131:6771           *:*                                   2836     BitTorrent.exe 2018-08-04 19:27:22 UTC+0000
0x7d62f4c0         UDPv4    127.0.0.1:62307                *:*                                   2836     BitTorrent.exe 2018-08-04 19:27:17 UTC+0000
0x7d62f920         UDPv4    192.168.202.131:62306          *:*                                   2836     BitTorrent.exe 2018-08-04 19:27:17 UTC+0000
......
......

netscan的结果很多，这里只放了一部分，期中多次出现的192.168.202.131就是ip地址

主机名

主机名的获取方法有两种，第一种是直接在hashdump的显示中可以看到主机名，第二种就是查注册表，这里使用hivelist查注册表

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 hivelist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Virtual            Physical           Name
------------------ ------------------ ----
0xfffff8a00377d2d0 0x00000000624162d0 \??\C:\System Volume Information\Syscache.hve
0xfffff8a00000f010 0x000000002d4c1010 [no name]
0xfffff8a000024010 0x000000002d50c010 \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM
0xfffff8a000053320 0x000000002d5bb320 \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE
0xfffff8a000109410 0x0000000029cb4410 \SystemRoot\System32\Config\SECURITY
0xfffff8a00033d410 0x000000002a958410 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Boot\BCD
0xfffff8a0005d5010 0x000000002a983010 \SystemRoot\System32\Config\SOFTWARE
0xfffff8a001495010 0x0000000024912010 \SystemRoot\System32\Config\DEFAULT
0xfffff8a0016d4010 0x00000000214e1010 \SystemRoot\System32\Config\SAM
0xfffff8a00175b010 0x00000000211eb010 \??\C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\NTUSER.DAT
0xfffff8a00176e410 0x00000000206db410 \??\C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\NTUSER.DAT
0xfffff8a002090010 0x000000000b92b010 \??\C:\Users\Rick\ntuser.dat
0xfffff8a0020ad410 0x000000000db41410 \??\C:\Users\Rick\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat

主机名信息在system的那一条记录中，再用-o + 地址 printkey 来查看指定的记录

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 -o 0xfffff8a000024010 printkey
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Legend: (S) = Stable   (V) = Volatile

----------------------------
Registry: \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM
Key name: CMI-CreateHive{2A7FB991-7BBE-4F9D-B91E-7CB51D4737F5} (S)
Last updated: 2018-08-04 19:25:54 UTC+0000

Subkeys:
  (S) ControlSet001
  (S) ControlSet002
  (S) MountedDevices
  (S) RNG
  (S) Select
  (S) Setup
  (S) Software
  (S) WPA
  (V) CurrentControlSet

Values:

跟进ControlSet001，一路到最后可以看到主机名的value

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 -o 0xfffff8a000024010 printkey -K "ControlSet001\Control\ComputerName\ComputerName"
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Legend: (S) = Stable   (V) = Volatile

----------------------------
Registry: \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM
Key name: ComputerName (S)
Last updated: 2018-06-02 19:23:00 UTC+0000

Subkeys:

Values:
REG_SZ                        : (S) mnmsrvc
REG_SZ        ComputerName    : (S) WIN-LO6FAF3DTFE

CTF{192.168.202.131}

CTF{WIN-LO6FAF3DTFE}

3 - Play Time

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要找到他玩的游戏，可以用pslist来看看进程，看ip地址可以用netscan

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 pslist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Offset(V)          Name                    PID   PPID   Thds     Hnds   Sess  Wow64 Start                          Exit                          
------------------ -------------------- ------ ------ ------ -------- ------ ------ ------------------------------ ------------------------------
0xfffffa8018d44740 System                    4      0     95      411 ------      0 2018-08-04 19:26:03 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa801947e4d0 smss.exe                260      4      2       30 ------      0 2018-08-04 19:26:03 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa801a0c8380 csrss.exe               348    336      9      563      0      0 2018-08-04 19:26:10 UTC+0000                                                                                             
......
......
0xfffffa801b4a7b30 bittorrentie.e         2308   2836     15      337      1      1 2018-08-04 19:27:19 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa801b4c9b30 bittorrentie.e         2624   2836     13      316      1      1 2018-08-04 19:27:21 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa801b5cb740 LunarMS.exe             708   2728     18      346      1      1 2018-08-04 19:27:39 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa801988c2d0 PresentationFo          724    492      6      148      0      0 2018-08-04 19:27:52 UTC+0000                                                                 
......
......

其中有个进程LunarMS.exe，可以谷歌搜索一下，发现是个游戏，顺势用netscan查出ip地址

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 netscan|grep LunarMS
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
0x7d6124d0         TCPv4    192.168.202.131:49530          77.102.199.102:7575  CLOSED           708      LunarMS.exe    
0x7e413a40         TCPv4    -:0                            -:0                  CLOSED           708      LunarMS.exe    
0x7e521b50         TCPv4    -:0                            -:0                  CLOSED           708      LunarMS.exe

CTF{LunarMS}

CTF{77.102.199.102}

4 - Name Game

要找到Lunar-3这个服上的用户名，我们最好把进程给dump下来进行逆向分析，这里也可以在镜像中通过寻找字符串的方式找到和Lunar-3相关记录

这里可以使用工具010editor

可以看到Lunar-3的后面有一个奇怪的字符串0tt3r8r33z3，这个就是用户名

或者也可以在命令行中直接查找

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# strings /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem|grep Lunar-3 -C 5 
.>SWqn
Y!F[Wq
disabled
mouseOver
keyFocused
Lunar-3
0tt3r8r33z3
Sound/UI.img/
BtMouseClick
Lunar-4
Lunar-1
--
c+Y\
\b+Y
c+Yt
tb+Y4c+Y
b+YLc+Y
Lunar-3
Lunar-4
L(dNVxdNV
L|eNV
{qf8
q r"r r

这里使用strings命令加上grep搜索，-C 5表示查找前后5条记录，同样可以找到可疑字符串

CTF{0tt3r8r33z3}

5 - Name Game 2

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这里先用memdump把前面那个LunarMS.exe游戏进程打印出来，进程号PID可以看前面的pslist

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 memdump -p 708 -D ./
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
************************************************************************
Writing LunarMS.exe [   708] to 708.dmp

这个题给了一个16进制的签名，我们用010来搜索其中的片段5A 0C 00，结果非常多，得慢慢找，可以看到这个M0rtyL0L就是角色名

用hexdump命令也可以查找，结果就不放了，太长了

hexdump -C 708.dmp |grep "5a 0c 00" -A 3 -B 3

CTF{M0rtyL0L}

6 - Silly Rick

[外链图片转存失败,源站可能有防盗链机制,建议将图片保存下来直接上传(img-M2DS33mn-1652614430826)(https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/H4cking2theGate/pic/img/202205151705557.png)]

题目需要获得邮箱密码，又提示说经常复制粘贴，那我们可以用clipboard查看剪贴板

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 clipboard
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Session    WindowStation Format                         Handle Object             Data                                              
---------- ------------- ------------------ ------------------ ------------------ --------------------------------------------------
         1 WinSta0       CF_UNICODETEXT                0x602e3 0xfffff900c1ad93f0 M@il_Pr0vid0rs                                    
         1 WinSta0       CF_TEXT                          0x10 ------------------                                                   
         1 WinSta0       0x150133L              0x200000000000 ------------------                                                   
         1 WinSta0       CF_TEXT                           0x1 ------------------                                                   
         1 ------------- ------------------           0x150133 0xfffff900c1c1adc0

CTF{M@il_Pr0vid0rs}

7 - Hide And Seek

这个题目要找到恶意进程名字，我们可以用pstree查看进程树

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 pstree    
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Name                                                  Pid   PPid   Thds   Hnds Time
-------------------------------------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ----
 0xfffffa801b27e060:explorer.exe                     2728   2696     33    854 2018-08-04 19:27:04 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa801b486b30:Rick And Morty                  3820   2728      4    185 2018-08-04 19:32:55 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801a4c5b30:vmware-tray.ex                 3720   3820      8    147 2018-08-04 19:33:02 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa801b2f02e0:WebCompanion.e                  2844   2728      0 ------ 2018-08-04 19:27:07 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa801a4e3870:chrome.exe                      4076   2728     44   1160 2018-08-04 19:29:30 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801a4eab30:chrome.exe                     4084   4076      8     86 2018-08-04 19:29:30 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801a5ef1f0:chrome.exe                     1796   4076     15    170 2018-08-04 19:33:41 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801aa00a90:chrome.exe                     3924   4076     16    228 2018-08-04 19:29:51 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801a635240:chrome.exe                     3648   4076     16    207 2018-08-04 19:33:38 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801a502b30:chrome.exe                      576   4076      2     58 2018-08-04 19:29:31 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801a4f7b30:chrome.exe                     1808   4076     13    229 2018-08-04 19:29:32 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801a7f98f0:chrome.exe                     2748   4076     15    181 2018-08-04 19:31:15 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa801b5cb740:LunarMS.exe                      708   2728     18    346 2018-08-04 19:27:39 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa801b1cdb30:vmtoolsd.exe                    2804   2728      6    190 2018-08-04 19:27:06 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa801b290b30:BitTorrent.exe                  2836   2728     24    471 2018-08-04 19:27:07 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801b4c9b30:bittorrentie.e                 2624   2836     13    316 2018-08-04 19:27:21 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801b4a7b30:bittorrentie.e                 2308   2836     15    337 2018-08-04 19:27:19 UTC+0000
 0xfffffa8018d44740:System                              4      0     95    411 2018-08-04 19:26:03 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa801947e4d0:smss.exe                         260      4      2     30 2018-08-04 19:26:03 UTC+0000
 0xfffffa801a2ed060:wininit.exe                       396    336      3     78 2018-08-04 19:26:11 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa801ab377c0:services.exe                     492    396     11    242 2018-08-04 19:26:12 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801afe7800:svchost.exe                    1948    492      6     96 2018-08-04 19:26:42 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801ae92920:vmtoolsd.exe                   1428    492      9    313 2018-08-04 19:26:27 UTC+0000
... 0xfffffa801a572b30:cmd.exe                       3916   1428      0 ------ 2018-08-04 19:34:22 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801ae0f630:VGAuthService.                 1356    492      3     85 2018-08-04 19:26:25 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801abbdb30:vmacthlp.exe                    668    492      3     56 2018-08-04 19:26:16 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801aad1060:Lavasoft.WCAss                 3496    492     14    473 2018-08-04 19:33:49 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801a6af9f0:svchost.exe                     164    492     12    147 2018-08-04 19:28:42 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801ac2e9e0:svchost.exe                     808    492     22    508 2018-08-04 19:26:18 UTC+0000
... 0xfffffa801ac753a0:audiodg.exe                    960    808      7    151 2018-08-04 19:26:19 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801ae7f630:dllhost.exe                    1324    492     15    207 2018-08-04 19:26:42 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801a6c2700:mscorsvw.exe                   3124    492      7     77 2018-08-04 19:28:43 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801b232060:sppsvc.exe                     2500    492      4    149 2018-08-04 19:26:58 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801abebb30:svchost.exe                     712    492      8    301 2018-08-04 19:26:17 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801ad718a0:svchost.exe                    1164    492     18    312 2018-08-04 19:26:23 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801ac31b30:svchost.exe                     844    492     17    396 2018-08-04 19:26:18 UTC+0000
... 0xfffffa801b1fab30:dwm.exe                       2704    844      4     97 2018-08-04 19:27:04 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801988c2d0:PresentationFo                  724    492      6    148 2018-08-04 19:27:52 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801b603610:mscorsvw.exe                    412    492      7     86 2018-08-04 19:28:42 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa8018e3c890:svchost.exe                     604    492     11    376 2018-08-04 19:26:16 UTC+0000
... 0xfffffa8019124b30:WmiPrvSE.exe                  1800    604      9    222 2018-08-04 19:26:39 UTC+0000
... 0xfffffa801b112060:WmiPrvSE.exe                  2136    604     12    324 2018-08-04 19:26:51 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801ad5ab30:spoolsv.exe                    1120    492     14    346 2018-08-04 19:26:22 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801ac4db30:svchost.exe                     868    492     45   1114 2018-08-04 19:26:18 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801a6e4b30:svchost.exe                    3196    492     14    352 2018-08-04 19:28:44 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801acd37e0:svchost.exe                     620    492     19    415 2018-08-04 19:26:21 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801b1e9b30:taskhost.exe                   2344    492      8    193 2018-08-04 19:26:57 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801ac97060:svchost.exe                    1012    492     12    554 2018-08-04 19:26:20 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801b3aab30:SearchIndexer.                 3064    492     11    610 2018-08-04 19:27:14 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffa801aff3b30:msdtc.exe                      1436    492     14    155 2018-08-04 19:26:43 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa801ab3f060:lsass.exe                        500    396      7    610 2018-08-04 19:26:12 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa801ab461a0:lsm.exe                          508    396     10    148 2018-08-04 19:26:12 UTC+0000
 0xfffffa801a0c8380:csrss.exe                         348    336      9    563 2018-08-04 19:26:10 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa801a6643d0:conhost.exe                     2420    348      0     30 2018-08-04 19:34:22 UTC+0000
 0xfffffa80198d3b30:csrss.exe                         388    380     11    460 2018-08-04 19:26:11 UTC+0000
 0xfffffa801aaf4060:winlogon.exe                      432    380      3    113 2018-08-04 19:26:11 UTC+0000
 0xfffffa801b18f060:WebCompanionIn                   3880   1484     15    522 2018-08-04 19:33:07 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa801aa72b30:sc.exe                          3504   3880      0 ------ 2018-08-04 19:33:48 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa801aeb6890:sc.exe                           452   3880      0 ------ 2018-08-04 19:33:48 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa801a6268b0:WebCompanion.e                  3856   3880     15    386 2018-08-04 19:34:05 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa801b08f060:sc.exe                          3208   3880      0 ------ 2018-08-04 19:33:47 UTC+0000
. 0xfffffa801ac01060:sc.exe                          2028   3880      0 ------ 2018-08-04 19:33:49 UTC+0000
 0xfffffa801b1fd960:notepad.exe                      3304   3132      2     79 2018-08-04 19:34:10 UTC+0000

其中有个很奇怪的vmware-tray.exe居然是Rick And Morty的子进程，非常奇怪，

可以用dlllist查看一下进程相关的dll文件列表

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 dlllist -p 3720 
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
************************************************************************
vmware-tray.ex pid:   3720
Command line : "C:\Users\Rick\AppData\Local\Temp\RarSFX0\vmware-tray.exe" 


Base                             Size          LoadCount LoadTime                       Path
------------------ ------------------ ------------------ ------------------------------ ----
0x0000000000ec0000            0x6e000             0xffff 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000   C:\Users\Rick\AppData\Local\Temp\RarSFX0\vmware-tray.exe
0x00000000776f0000           0x1a9000             0xffff 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll
0x0000000075210000            0x3f000                0x3 2018-08-04 19:33:03 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\wow64.dll
0x00000000751b0000            0x5c000                0x1 2018-08-04 19:33:03 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\wow64win.dll
0x00000000751a0000             0x8000                0x1 2018-08-04 19:33:03 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\wow64cpu.dll
0x0000000000ec0000            0x6e000             0xffff 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000   C:\Users\Rick\AppData\Local\Temp\RarSFX0\vmware-tray.exe
0x00000000778d0000           0x180000             0xffff 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000   C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ntdll.dll
......
......

这个进程的执行目录是temp，一看就不是正经程序

CTF{vmware-tray.exe}

8 - Path To Glory

[外链图片转存失败,源站可能有防盗链机制,建议将图片保存下来直接上传(img-l6gSMVUC-1652614430827)(https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/H4cking2theGate/pic/img/202205151725053.png)]

这个题目有点意义不明，不明确flag内容到底应该是什么

由于上一题了解到，恶意进程的父进程是Rick And Morty，那么先用filescan找一找这个文件

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 filescan|grep 'Rick And Morty'
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
0x000000007d63dbc0     10      0 R--r-d \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Torrents\Rick And Morty season 1 download.exe
0x000000007d8813c0      2      0 RW-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\Rick\Downloads\Rick And Morty season 1 download.exe.torrent
0x000000007da56240      2      0 RW-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Torrents\Rick And Morty season 1 download.exe
0x000000007dae9350      2      0 RWD--- \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\Rick\AppData\Roaming\BitTorrent\Rick And Morty season 1 download.exe.1.torrent
0x000000007dcbf6f0      2      0 RW-rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\Rick\AppData\Roaming\BitTorrent\Rick And Morty season 1 download.exe.1.torrent
0x000000007e710070      8      0 R--rwd \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Torrents\Rick And Morty season 1 download.exe

一共6个文件，其中有三个exe和三个种子文件，我们要分析来源就要关注种子文件，里面可能放着地址信息

先用dumpfiles转储文件，-Q指定内存地址，把三个种子都拿出来分析

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 dumpfiles -Q 0x000000007d8813c0 -D ./
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
DataSectionObject 0x7d8813c0   None   \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\Rick\Downloads\Rick And Morty season 1 download.exe.torrent

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# strings file.None.0xfffffa801af10010.dat
[ZoneTransfer]
ZoneId=3
                                                                                                                               
┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# strings file.None.0xfffffa801b42c9e0.dat 
d8:announce44:udp://tracker.openbittorrent.com:80/announce13:announce-listll44:udp://tracker.openbittorrent.com:80/announceel42:udp://tracker.opentrackr.org:1337/announceee10:created by17:BitTorrent/7.10.313:creation datei1533150595e8:encoding5:UTF-84:infod6:lengthi456670e4:name36:Rick And Morty season 1 download.exe12:piece lengthi16384e6:pieces560:\I
!PC<^X
B.k_Rk
0<;O87o
!4^"
3hq,
&iW1|
K68:o
w~Q~YT
$$o9p
bwF:u
e7:website19:M3an_T0rren7_4_R!cke
                                                                                                                               
┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# strings file.None.0xfffffa801b51ccf0.dat 
[ZoneTransfer]
ZoneId=3

第二个种子文件中有个website字段M3an_T0rren7_4_R!cke非常可疑

当作答案提交一下，结果错了，最后上网发现末尾的e是没有的，我也不知道为啥

CTF{M3an_T0rren7_4_R!ck}

9 - Path To Glory 2

这个题目更迷了，猜不透让我交啥，这里我看了一下网上办法

先把所有的chrome浏览器进程转储下来，

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 memdump -n chrome.exe  -D ./chrome
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
************************************************************************
Writing chrome.exe [  4076] to 4076.dmp
************************************************************************
Writing chrome.exe [  4084] to 4084.dmp
************************************************************************
Writing chrome.exe [   576] to 576.dmp
************************************************************************
Writing chrome.exe [  1808] to 1808.dmp
************************************************************************
Writing chrome.exe [  3924] to 3924.dmp
************************************************************************
Writing chrome.exe [  2748] to 2748.dmp
************************************************************************
Writing chrome.exe [  3648] to 3648.dmp
************************************************************************
Writing chrome.exe [  1796] to 1796.dmp

再看看有没有和Rick And Morty相关的信息

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# strings ./chrome/* | grep 'Rick And Morty season 1 download.exe' -C 10
......
......
--
wCachePathe
.CachePrefix
CacheLimite
CacheOptions
CacheRepair
GOOGLE~1.LNK
MAPLES~1.URL
BITTOR~1.LNK
Flag.txt
Flag.txt
Rick And Morty season 1 download.exe.lnk
Rick And Morty season 1 download.exe.lnk
.WINDOWS
OpenWithListp
{1NP14R77-02R7-4R5Q-O744-2RO1NR5198O7}\ehaqyy32.rkr
MRUList
.WINDOWS
.tor
.txt
.WIN
.ziphx
Foldv
--
......
......
--
display:inline;width:56px;height:200px;m>
Hum@n_I5_Th3_Weak3s7_Link_In_Th3_Ch@inYear
//sec-s.uicdn.com/nav-cdn/home/preloader.gif
simple-icon_toolbar-change-view-horizontal
 nnx-track-sec-click-communication-inboxic.com
nx-track-sec-click-dashboard-hide_smileyable
Nftd-box stem-north big fullsize js-focusable
js-box-flex need-overlay js-componentone
Jhttps://search.mail.com/web [q origin ]Year
ntrack-and-trace__delivery-info--has-iconf
Rick And Morty season 1 download.exe.torrent
tbl_1533411035475_7.0.1.40728_2033115181
panel-mail-display-table-mail-default35"
Cnpanel-mail-display-table-mail-horizontal.js
trc_rbox text-links-a trc-content-sponsored 
identity_OjpwcmVsb2FkZXIuaHRtbC50d2ln
Move the widget to its desired position.3c8=
Set-Cookie, no-store, proxy-revalidateHxRKw=
Set-Cookie, no-store, proxy-revalidate143/
tbl_1533411035475_7.0.9.40728_2033115181
"mail.com Update" <service@corp.mail.com>e
......
......

找到的结果中Hum@n_I5_Th3_Weak3s7_Link_In_Th3_Ch@in即为flag，然后结果中意外的发现了flag.txt，后面会用到

CTF{Hum@n_I5_Th3_Weak3s7_Link_In_Th3_Ch@in}

10 - Bit 4 Bit

[外链图片转存失败,源站可能有防盗链机制,建议将图片保存下来直接上传(img-519FNYad-1652614430827)(https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/H4cking2theGate/pic/img/202205151803118.png)]

题目告诉我们这个恶意进程是一个勒索软件，要我们找出攻击者的比特币账户地址，那我们肯定是要先把恶意软件dump下来

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 procdump -p 3720  -D ./
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Process(V)         ImageBase          Name                 Result
------------------ ------------------ -------------------- ------
0xfffffa801a4c5b30 0x0000000000ec0000 vmware-tray.ex       OK: executable.3720.exe

接下来就是用dnspy进行逆向分析（直接看伪代码）

[外链图片转存失败,源站可能有防盗链机制,建议将图片保存下来直接上传(img-JhayM3pg-1652614430828)(https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/H4cking2theGate/pic/img/202205151821241.png)]

在form3中可以看到这个软件的显示的信息，直接把address写出来了

CTF{1MmpEmebJkqXG8nQv4cjJSmxZQFVmFo63M}

11 - Graphic’s For The Weak

要找到图片的隐藏信息，那就继续分析，在资源中查看图片，直接可以看到隐藏信息

CTF{S0_Just_M0v3_Socy}

12 - Recovery

这一题就是找出加密文件所使用的密码

分析exe可以看到两个函数，第一个创建密码是随机的，然后有一个发送密码，是把computerName和userName还有password拼接以后进行发送

可以分析出compuerName就是WIN-LO6FAF3DTFE，用户名是Rick，所以这个函数发送的字符串应该是WIN-LO6FAF3DTFE-Rick password，我们直接去这个勒索软件的内存中寻找相关字符串即可

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# strings -el ./3720.dmp | grep 'WIN-LO6FAF3DTFE-Rick' -C 5 
\Desktop\
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ1234567890*!=&?&/
aDOBofVYUNVnmp7
aDOBofVYUNVnmp7
C:\Users\Rick\Desktop\
WIN-LO6FAF3DTFE-Rick aDOBofVYUNVnmp7
.txt
.doc
.docx
.xls
.xlsx

-el参数的e指定了字符编码，l为小端编码，如果想用大端就是-eb

这里搜索到的aDOBofVYUNVnmp7就是password

CTF{aDOBofVYUNVnmp7}

13 - Closure

最后一题要解密文件，容易想到前面提到的flag文件，这个flag文件应该是被加密过的，但我们已经知道密码了

┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 filescan|grep -i 'flag'
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
0x000000007d61b070     16      0 RW-rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\Rick\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\Flag.txt.WINDOWS.lnk
0x000000007e410890     16      0 R--r-- \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\Rick\Desktop\Flag.txt
                                                                                         
┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]
└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 dumpfiles -Q 0x000000007e410890 -D ./
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
DataSectionObject 0x7e410890   None   \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\Rick\Desktop\Flag.txt

先找到flag文件，并且转储下来

解密过程

已知这个勒索软件为HiddenTear，直接在网上找到解密程序HiddenTearDecrypter

先将加密文件的末尾多余的0去掉，再把后缀加上locked

[外链图片转存失败,源站可能有防盗链机制,建议将图片保存下来直接上传(img-VdatTcdV-1652614430830)(https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/H4cking2theGate/pic/img/202205151930272.png)]

拿去解密，密钥已经知道了，直接输入

CTF{Im_Th@_B3S7_RicK_0f_Th3m_4ll}

A丶R

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OtterCTF 内存取证

最近小小的学习了一下内存取证，装环境搞了整整一天，非常麻烦，在阅读相关资料时偶然看到了一篇WriteUp，是关于OtterCTF2018的十三道内存取证题目，用的全部是同一个镜像，考察的知识点非常全面，可以用来熟悉一下volatility的使用，关键是比赛平台居然还开着，正好当作内存取证的一次入门学习OtterCTF1 - What the password?┌──(root㉿kali2022)-[~]└─# vol.py -f /root/桌面/OtterCTF.vmem imageinfo
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