翻译: 人工智能如何让世界变得更美好七

5. Work and meaning 5. 工作与意义

Even if everything in the preceding four sections goes well—not only do we alleviate disease, poverty, and inequality, but liberal democracy becomes the dominant form of government, and existing liberal democracies become better versions of themselves—at least one important question still remains. “It’s great we live in such a technologically advanced world as well as a fair and decent one”, someone might object, “but with AI’s doing everything, how will humans have meaning? For that matter, how will they survive economically?”.
即使上述四部分内容进展顺利——我们不仅减轻了疾病、贫困和不平等，而且自由民主成为政府的主导形式，现有的自由民主国家也变得更好——但至少还有一个重要问题。有人可能会反驳说：“我们生活在一个技术如此先进、公平体面的世界，这很好，但人工智能可以做所有事情，人类将如何生存？就此而言，他们将如何在经济上生存？”

I think this question is more difficult than the others. I don’t mean that I am necessarily more pessimistic about it than I am about the other questions (although I do see challenges). I mean that it is fuzzier and harder to predict in advance, because it relates to macroscopic questions about how society is organized that tend to resolve themselves only over time and in a decentralized manner. For example, historical hunter-gatherer societies might have imagined that life is meaningless without hunting and various kinds of hunting-related religious rituals, and would have imagined that our well-fed technological society is devoid of purpose. They might also have not understood how our economy can provide for everyone, or what function people can usefully service in a mechanized society.
我认为这个问题比其他问题更难。我并不是说我对这个问题的看法一定比其他问题更悲观（尽管我确实看到了挑战）。我的意思是，这个问题更模糊，更难提前预测，因为它与社会如何组织的宏观问题有关，这些问题往往只能随着时间的推移和分散的方式自行解决。例如，历史上的狩猎采集社会可能认为，如果没有狩猎和各种与狩猎有关的宗教仪式，生活就毫无意义，并会认为我们这个衣食无忧的科技社会毫无目的。他们可能还不理解我们的经济如何养活每个人，或者人们在机械化社会中可以发挥什么作用。

Nevertheless, it’s worth saying at least a few words, while keeping in mind that the brevity of this section is not at all to be taken as a sign that I don’t take these issues seriously—on the contrary, it is a sign of a lack of clear answers.
尽管如此，还是值得至少说几句话，同时请记住，本节的简短并不意味着我不认真对待这些问题 - 相反，这表明缺乏明确的答案。

On the question of meaning, I think it is very likely a mistake to believe that tasks you undertake are meaningless simply because an AI could do them better. Most people are not the best in the world at anything, and it doesn’t seem to bother them particularly much. Of course today they can still contribute through comparative advantage, and may derive meaning from the economic value they produce, but people also greatly enjoy activities that produce no economic value. I spend plenty of time playing video games, swimming, walking around outside, and talking to friends, all of which generates zero economic value. I might spend a day trying to get better at a video game, or faster at biking up a mountain, and it doesn’t really matter to me that someone somewhere is much better at those things. In any case I think meaning comes mostly from human relationships and connection, not from economic labor. People do want a sense of accomplishment, even a sense of competition, and in a post-AI world it will be perfectly possible to spend years attempting some very difficult task with a complex strategy, similar to what people do today when they embark on research projects, try to become Hollywood actors, or found companies28. The facts that (a) an AI somewhere could in principle do this task better, and (b) this task is no longer an economically rewarded element of a global economy, don’t seem to me to matter very much.
关于意义的问题，我认为，仅仅因为人工智能可以做得更好就认为自己所从事的任务毫无意义，这种想法很可能是错误的。大多数人在任何方面都不是世界上最优秀的，但这似乎并没有特别困扰他们。当然，今天他们仍然可以通过比较优势做出贡献，并可能从他们创造的经济价值中获得意义，但人们也非常享受那些不产生经济价值的活动。我花了很多时间玩电子游戏、游泳、在外面散步和和朋友聊天，所有这些都没有产生任何经济价值。我可能会花一天时间努力提高电子游戏的水平，或者更快地骑自行车上山，而某个地方的某个人比我更擅长这些事情，对我来说并不重要。无论如何，我认为意义主要来自人际关系和联系，而不是经济劳动。人们确实想要一种成就感，甚至是一种竞争感，在后人工智能时代，人们完全有可能花费数年时间，用复杂的策略尝试一些非常困难的任务，就像今天人们从事研究项目、试图成为好莱坞演员或创办公司时所做的那样 28 。在我看来，(a) 某个地方的人工智能在原则上可以更好地完成这项任务，(b) 这项任务不再是全球经济中获得经济回报的要素，但这些事实似乎并不重要。

The economic piece actually seems more difficult to me than the meaning piece. By “economic” in this section I mean the possible problem that most or all humans may not be able to contribute meaningfully to a sufficiently advanced AI-driven economy. This is a more macro problem than the separate problem of inequality, especially inequality in access to the new technologies, which I discussed in Section 3.
在我看来，经济部分实际上比意义部分更难。本节中的“经济”是指大多数或所有人类可能无法为足够先进的人工智能驱动经济做出有意义的贡献。这是一个比我在第 3 节中讨论的不平等问题（尤其是新技术获取不平等）更宏观的问题。

First of all, in the short term I agree with arguments that comparative advantage will continue to keep humans relevant and in fact increase their productivity, and may even in some ways level the playing field between humans. As long as AI is only better at 90% of a given job, the other 10% will cause humans to become highly leveraged, increasing compensation and in fact creating a bunch of new human jobs complementing and amplifying what AI is good at, such that the “10%” expands to continue to employ almost everyone. In fact, even if AI can do 100% of things better than humans, but it remains inefficient or expensive at some tasks, or if the resource inputs to humans and AI’s are meaningfully different, then the logic of comparative advantage continues to apply. One area humans are likely to maintain a relative (or even absolute) advantage for a significant time is the physical world. Thus, I think that the human economy may continue to make sense even a little past the point where we reach “a country of geniuses in a datacenter”.
首先，短期内我同意比较优势将继续 保持 人工智能将与人类产生联系 ，并提高其生产力，甚至可能在某种程度上为人类创造公平的竞争环境 。只要人工智能在 90% 的工作中表现更好，那么剩下的 10% 就会使人类获得更高的杠杆率，提高薪酬，并创造出大量新的人类工作岗位，补充和放大人工智能所擅长的工作，这样“10%” 就会扩大到几乎每个人 。事实上，即使人工智能可以比人类更好地完成 100% 的工作，但它在某些任务上仍然效率低下或成本高昂，或者如果对人类和人工智能的资源投入 是 有意义的差异，那么比较优势的逻辑仍然适用。人类的一个领域 是 可能在相当长的时间内保持相对（甚至绝对）优势的是物理 世界。 因此，我认为，即使过了这一阶段，人类经济仍然可能继续有意义。 我们 达到“数据中心里的天才之国”。

However, I do think in the long run AI will become so broadly effective and so cheap that this will no longer apply. At that point our current economic setup will no longer make sense, and there will be a need for a broader societal conversation about how the economy should be organized.
然而，我确实认为，从长远来看，人工智能将变得如此广泛有效且如此便宜，以至于这种情况将不再适用。到那时，我们当前的经济格局将不再合理，社会将需要就经济应如何组织展开更广泛的对话。

While that might sound crazy, the fact is that civilization has successfully navigated major economic shifts in the past: from hunter-gathering to farming, farming to feudalism, and feudalism to industrialism. I suspect that some new and stranger thing will be needed, and that it’s something no one today has done a good job of envisioning. It could be as simple as a large universal basic income for everyone, although I suspect that will only be a small part of a solution. It could be a capitalist economy of AI systems, which then give out resources (huge amounts of them, since the overall economic pie will be gigantic) to humans based on some secondary economy of what the AI systems think makes sense to reward in humans (based on some judgment ultimately derived from human values). Perhaps the economy runs on Whuffie points. Or perhaps humans will continue to be economically valuable after all, in some way not anticipated by the usual economic models. All of these solutions have tons of possible problems, and it’s not possible to know whether they will make sense without lots of iteration and experimentation. And as with some of the other challenges, we will likely have to fight to get a good outcome here: exploitative or dystopian directions are clearly also possible and have to be prevented. Much more could be written about these questions and I hope to do so at some later time.
虽然这听起来可能很疯狂，但事实是，文明在过去成功地经历了重大的经济转变：从狩猎采集到农耕，从农耕到封建，从封建到工业化。我怀疑，一些新的、更奇怪的东西将会被需要，而这是今天没有人能很好地预见到的。它可能很简单，就是为每个人提供大量的全民基本收入，尽管我怀疑这只是解决方案的一小部分。它可能是人工智能系统的资本主义经济，然后根据人工智能系统认为应该奖励人类的某种次级经济（基于最终从人类价值观中得出的某种判断），将资源（大量的资源，因为整个经济蛋糕将是巨大的）分配给人类。也许经济靠 Whuffie 点数运行。或者也许人类将继续具有经济价值 毕竟，这在某种程度上是通常的经济模型所无法预料的。所有这些解决方案都 吨 可能出现的问题，如果没有大量的 迭代 和实验。与其他一些挑战一样，我们可能必须努力才能获得 好的结果：剥削或反乌托邦的方向显然也是可能的，而且必须 预防。关于这些问题，还有很多可以写，我希望以后能这样做。

参考

https://darioamodei.com/machines-of-loving-grace