社会科学的演变与形成

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social science 社会科学

Written by Liah Greenfeld, Robert A. Nisbet•All

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The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica

Last Updated: Jul 25, 2024

Roger Bacon

罗吉尔·培根（英国思想家、科学家）

Heritage of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance 中世纪和文艺复兴时期的遗产

Effects of theology 神学的影响

The same impulses that led people in that age to explore Earth, the stellar regions, and the nature of matter led them also to explore the institutions around them: state, economy, religion, morality, and, above all, human nature itself. It was the fragmentation of medieval philosophy and theory, and, with this, the shattering of the medieval worldview that had lain deep in thought until about the 16th century, that was the immediate basis of the rise of the several strands of specialized social thought that were in time to provide the inspiration for the social sciences.
那个时代的人们探索地球、恒星区域和物质本质的相同冲动也促使他们探索周围的制度：国家、经济、宗教、道德，尤其是人性本身。正是中世纪哲学和理论的分裂，以及随之而来的中世纪世界观的瓦解，直到 16 世纪左右，才被深深埋藏在思想中，这就是几个专业社会思想崛起的直接基础，这些思想及时为社会科学提供了灵感。

Medieval theology, especially as it appears in St. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa theologiae (1265/66–1273), contained and fashioned syntheses from ideas about humanity and society—ideas indeed that may be seen to be political, social, economic, anthropological, and geographical in their substance. But it is partly this close relation between medieval theology and ideas of the social sciences that accounts for the different trajectories of the social sciences, on the one hand, and the trajectories of the physical and life sciences, on the other. From the time of the English philosopher Roger Bacon in the 13th century, there were at least some rudiments of physical science that were largely independent of medieval theology and philosophy. Historians of physical science have no difficulty in tracing the continuation of this experimental tradition, primitive and irregular though it was by later standards, throughout the Middle Ages. Side by side with the kinds of experiment made notable by Bacon were impressive changes in technology through the medieval period and then, in striking degree, in the Renaissance. Efforts to improve agricultural productivity; the rising utilization of gunpowder, with consequent development of guns and the problems that they presented in ballistics; growing trade, leading to increased use of ships and improvements in the arts of navigation, including use of telescopes; and the whole range of such mechanical arts in the Middle Ages and Renaissance as architecture, engineering, optics, and the construction of watches and clocks—all of this put a high premium on a pragmatic and operational understanding of at least the simpler principles of mechanics, physics, astronomy, and, in time, chemistry.
中世纪的神学，特别是圣托马斯·阿奎那的《神学大全》（1265/66-1273）中出现的神学，包含并塑造了关于人类和社会的观念的综合——这些思想的实质确实可以被视为政治、社会、经济、人类学和地理学的。但是，在一定程度上，正是中世纪神学和社会科学思想之间的这种密切关系，解释了社会科学与物理科学和生命科学的不同轨迹。从 13 世纪英国哲学家罗杰·培根（Roger Bacon）的时代开始，至少有一些物理科学的基本知识在很大程度上独立于中世纪的神学和哲学。物理科学史学家不难追溯这种实验传统的延续，尽管按照后来的标准来看，它是原始的和不规则的，贯穿整个中世纪。与培根所关注的各种实验并列的是中世纪时期令人印象深刻的技术变化，然后是文艺复兴时期的惊人变化。努力提高农业生产力;火药的使用量增加，随之而来的枪支发展以及它们在弹道学中提出的问题;贸易增长，导致船舶使用的增加和航海艺术的改进，包括望远镜的使用;以及中世纪和文艺复兴时期的所有机械艺术，如建筑、工程、光学和钟表的建造——所有这些都高度重视对至少对机械、物理学、天文学以及化学等更简单原理的实用和操作理解。

Copernicus, 17th-century copy of a 16th-century self-portrait; in the Jagiellonian University Museum Collegium Maius, Kraków, Poland.(more)

哥白尼，一幅 16 世纪自画像的 17 世纪复制品；雅盖隆大学博物馆，迈乌斯学院，Kraków，波兰。

Galileo, oil painting by J. Sustermans, c. 1637; in the Uffizi, Florence.

“伽利略，由 J. Sustermans 绘制的油画，约 1637 年；现藏于佛罗伦萨乌菲兹美术馆。”

In short, by the time of Copernicus and Galileo in the 16th century, a fairly broad substratum of physical science existed, largely empirical but not without theoretical implications on which the edifice of modern physical science could be built. It is notable that the empirical foundations of physiology were being established in the studies of the human body being conducted in medieval schools of medicine and, as the career of Leonardo da Vinci so resplendently illustrates, among artists of the Renaissance, whose interest in accuracy and detail of painting and sculpture led to their careful studies of human anatomy.
简而言之，到 16 世纪哥白尼和伽利略的时代，已经存在相当广泛的物理科学基础，主要是实证的，但并非没有理论意义，现代物理科学的大厦可以建立在此基础上。值得注意的是，生理学的实证基础是在中世纪医学院进行的人体研究中建立起来的，正如列奥纳多·达·芬奇（Leonardo da Vinci）的职业生涯所充分说明的那样，在文艺复兴时期的艺术家中，他们对绘画和雕塑的准确性和细节的兴趣导致他们对人体解剖学的仔细研究。

Very different was the beginning of the social sciences. In the first place, the Roman Catholic Church, throughout the Middle Ages and even into the Renaissance and Reformation, was much more attentive to what scholars wrote and thought about the human mind and human behaviour in society than it was toward what was being studied and written in the physical sciences. From the church’s point of view, while it might be important to see to it that thought on the physical world corresponded as far as possible to what Scripture said—witnessed, for example, in the famous questioning of Galileo—it was far more important that such correspondence exist in matters affecting the human mind, spirit, and soul. Nearly all the subjects and questions that would form the bases of the social sciences in later centuries were tightly woven into the fabric of medieval Scholasticism, and it was not easy for even the boldest minds to break this fabric.
社会科学的开端非常不同。首先，罗马天主教会，在整个中世纪，甚至到文艺复兴和宗教改革时期，都更加关注学者们关于人类思想和社会行为的著作和思考，而不是物理科学的研究和著作。从教会的角度来看，虽然确保对物质世界的思考尽可能地与圣经所说的相一致可能很重要——例如，在著名的对伽利略的质询中所见证的——但在影响人类思想、精神和灵魂的事情上，这种对应关系的存在要重要得多。几乎所有在后来几个世纪构成社会科学基础的主题和问题都紧紧地编织在中世纪经院哲学的结构中，即使是最大胆的头脑也很难打破这个结构。

Effects of the classics and of Cartesianism 古典主义和笛卡尔主义的影响

Then, when the hold of Scholasticism did begin to wane, two fresh influences, equally powerful, came on the scene to prevent anything comparable to the pragmatic and empirical foundations of the physical sciences from forming in the study of humanity and society. The first was the immense appeal of the Greek classics during the Renaissance, especially those of the philosophers Plato and Aristotle. A great deal of social thought during the Renaissance was little more than gloss or commentary on the Greek classics. One sees this throughout the 15th and 16th centuries.
然后，当经院哲学的控制确实开始减弱时，两种同样强大的新影响出现了，阻止了任何与物理科学的实用主义和实证基础相媲美的东西在人类和社会的研究中形成。首先是文艺复兴时期希腊经典的巨大吸引力，尤其是哲学家柏拉图和亚里士多德的经典作品。文艺复兴时期的大量社会思想只不过是对希腊经典的修饰或评论。人们在整个 15 世纪和 16 世纪都可以看到这一点。

René Descartes

勒内·笛卡尔（法国哲学家、数学家、物理学家，解析几何之父，二元论唯心主义和理性主义代表人物，提出“我思故我在”和“普遍怀疑”的主张，是西方现代哲学奠基人）。

Second, in the 17th century there appeared the powerful influence of the philosopher René Descartes. Cartesianism, as his philosophy was called, declared that the proper approach to understanding of the world, including humanity and society, was through a few simple, fundamental ideas of reality and, then, rigorous, almost geometrical deduction of more complex ideas and eventually of large, encompassing theories, from these simple ideas, all of which, Descartes insisted, were the stock of common sense—the mind that is common to all human beings at birth. It would be hard to exaggerate the impact of Cartesianism on social and political and moral thought during the century and a half following publication of his Discourse on Method (1637) and his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). Through the Enlightenment into the later 18th century, the spell of Cartesianism was cast on nearly all those who were concerned with the problems of human nature and human society.
其次，在 17 世纪出现了哲学家勒内·笛卡尔（René Descartes）的强大影响力。笛卡尔主义，正如他的哲学所称的那样，宣称理解世界（包括人类和社会）的正确方法是通过一些简单的、基本的现实观念，然后，从这些简单的观念中，严格地、几乎是几何学地推导出更复杂的观念，并最终推导出宏大的、包罗万象的理论，笛卡尔坚持认为，所有这些都是常识的存量——所有人类在出生时共有的思想。在他的《论方法》（1637 年）和他的《第一哲学沉思》（1641 年）出版后的一个半世纪里，很难夸大笛卡尔主义对社会、政治和道德思想的影响。从启蒙运动到 18 世纪后期，笛卡尔主义的魔咒几乎被施加在所有关心人性和人类社会问题的人身上。

Great amounts of data pertinent to the study of human behaviour were becoming available in the 17th and 18th centuries. The emergence of nationalism and the associated impersonal state carried with it ever growing bureaucracies concerned with gathering information, chiefly for taxation, census, and trade purposes. The voluminous and widely published accounts of the great voyages that had begun in the 15th century, the records of soldiers, explorers, and missionaries who perforce had been brought into often long and close contact with indigenous and other non-Western peoples, provided still another great reservoir of data. Until the beginning of the 19th century, these and other empirical materials were used, if at all, solely for illustrative purposes in the writings of the social philosophers. Just as in the equally important area of the study of life, no philosophical framework as yet existed to allow for an objective and comprehensive interpretation of these empirical materials. Only in physics could this be done at the time.
在 17 世纪和 18 世纪，大量与人类行为研究相关的数据变得可用。民族主义的出现和与之相关的非个人国家带来了越来越多的官僚机构，他们主要关注收集信息，主要是为了税收、人口普查和贸易目的。对 15 世纪开始的伟大航海的大量广泛出版的描述，以及士兵、探险家和传教士的记录，他们经常与土著和其他非西方人民进行长期而密切的接触，这提供了另一个巨大的数据宝库。直到 19 世纪初，这些和其他实证材料在社会哲学家的著作中仅用于说明目的，如果有的话。就像在生命研究这个同样重要的领域一样，当时还没有哲学框架来允许对这些实证材料进行客观和全面的解释。当时只有在物理学中才能做到这一点。

Heritage of the Enlightenment 启蒙运动的遗产

There is also the fact that, especially in the 18th century, reform and even revolution were often in the air. The purpose of a great many social philosophers was by no means restricted to philosophical, much less scientific, understanding of humanity and society. The dead hand of the Middle Ages seemed to many vigorous minds in western Europe the principal force to be combatted, through critical reason, enlightenment, and, where necessary, major reform or revolution. One may properly account a great deal of this new spirit to the rise of humanitarianism in modern Europe and in other parts of the world and to the spread of literacy, the rise in the standard of living, and the recognition that poverty and oppression need not be the fate of the masses. The fact remains, however, that social reform is, by definition, a pursuit biased toward what the reformer believes to be good and should exist in place of what actually exists and, as such, is different from the pursuit of scientific knowledge of what is. The very fact that for a long time, indeed through a good part of the 19th century, social reform and social science were regarded as basically the same thing could not have helped but retard the development of such knowledge in regard to human behaviour and society.
还有一个事实是，尤其是在 18 世纪，改革甚至革命的空气中经常弥漫着。许多社会哲学家的目的绝不仅限于哲学上的，更不用说科学的，对人性和社会的理解。在西欧许多精力充沛的头脑中，中世纪的死手似乎是需要通过批判理性、启蒙运动以及必要时的重大改革或革命来对抗的主要力量。我们可以恰当地将这种新精神在很大程度上归功于现代欧洲和世界其他地区人道主义的兴起，以及识字率的普及、生活水平的提高，以及认识到贫困和压迫不一定是大众的命运。然而，事实仍然是，根据定义，社会改革是一种偏向于改革者认为是好的、应该存在的东西而不是实际存在的东西的追求，因此，它与追求什么是科学知识不同。事实上，在很长一段时间里，事实上，在 19 世纪的大部分时间里，社会改革和社会科学基本上被视为一回事，这无助于阻碍这种知识在人类行为和社会方面的发展。

It would be wrong to discount the continuity between the social thought of the 17th and 18th centuries and today’s social sciences. The very idea of social science, as the set of rationally deduced principles on the basis of which society was to be organized, appeared then. Second was the rising awareness of the multiplicity and variety of human experience in the world, a result of trade and exploration. Third was the spreading sense of the self-made character of human behaviour in society—that is, its historical or conventional, rather than God-given, nature. What man made once, man could remake numerous times.
忽视 17 世纪和 18 世纪的社会思想与今天的社会科学之间的连续性是错误的。社会科学的理念，作为社会组织所依据的一套理性推论的原则，在那时出现了。其次是人们越来越意识到世界上人类经验的多样性和多样性，这是贸易和探险的结果。第三是人类行为在社会中自我创造的特征的传播——即它的历史或约定俗成的，而不是上帝赋予的本质。人创造一次的东西，人可以无数次地重塑。

Adam Smith, paste medallion by James Tassie, 1787; in the Scottish National Portrait Gallery, Edinburgh.

“亚当·斯密，由詹姆斯·塔西制作的浮雕奖章，1787年；现藏于爱丁堡苏格兰国家肖像画廊。”

To these may be added two specific concepts of the 17th and 18th centuries, which were inherited by the contemporary social sciences. The first was the idea of structure. Having emerged nearly at the same time in the writings of natural and moral philosophers, it was used by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau with reference to the political structure of the state, by the mid-18th century spreading to highlight the economic writings of the physiocrats and Adam Smith. The idea of structure can also be seen in certain works relating to human psychology and, at opposite reach, to the whole of civil society. Conceptions of structure have in many instances, subject only to minor changes, endured in the contemporary social sciences.
除此之外，还可以添加 17 世纪和 18 世纪的两个具体概念，它们被当代社会科学继承。首先是结构的概念。它几乎同时出现在自然哲学家和道德哲学家的著作中，托马斯·霍布斯、约翰·洛克和让-雅克·卢梭将其用于指代国家的政治结构，到 18 世纪中叶传播开来，以突出重农学家和亚当·斯密的经济著作。结构的概念也可以在某些与人类心理学有关的著作中看到，反之，也可以看到整个公民社会。在许多情况下，结构的概念在当代社会科学中经久不衰，只受到微小的变化。

The second major concept was that of developmental change. Its ultimate roots in Western thought, like those indeed of the whole idea of structure, go back to the Greeks, if not earlier. But it is in the 18th century, above all others, that the philosophy of developmentalism took shape, forming a preview, so to speak, of the social evolutionism of the next century. What was said by such writers as Condorcet, Rousseau, and Smith was that the present is an outgrowth of the past, the result of a long line of development in time, and, furthermore, a line of development that has been caused not by God or fortuitous factors but by conditions and causes immanent in human society. Despite a fairly widespread belief that the idea of social development is a product of prior discovery of biological evolution, the facts are the reverse. Well before any clear idea of genetic speciation existed in European biology, there was a very clear idea of what might be called social speciation—that is, the emergence of one institution from another in time and of the whole differentiation of function and structure that goes with this emergence.
第二个主要概念是发展变化。它在西方思想中的最终根源，就像整个结构思想一样，如果不是更早的话，可以追溯到希腊人。但正是在 18 世纪，发展主义哲学首先形成，可以说是下个世纪社会进化主义的预演。孔多塞、卢梭和斯密等作家所说的是，现在是过去的产物，是时间长线发展的结果，而且，这条发展路线不是由上帝或偶然因素引起的，而是由人类社会内在的条件和原因引起的。尽管人们相当普遍地认为社会发展的想法是先前发现生物进化的产物，但事实恰恰相反。早在欧洲生物学中存在任何明确的遗传物种形成概念之前，就已经有一个非常明确的概念，即所谓的社会物种形成——即一个机构在时间上从另一个机构中出现，以及伴随这种出现的功能和结构的整体分化。

As has been suggested, these and other seminal ideas were contained for the most part in writings whose primary function was to attack the existing order of government and society in western Europe. Another way of putting the matter is to say that these ideas were clear and acknowledged parts of political and social idealism—using that word in its largest sense. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Smith, and other major philosophers had as vivid and energizing a sense of the ideal—the ideal state, the ideal economy, the ideal civil society—as any earlier utopian writer. These thinkers were, without exception, committed to visions of the good or ideal society. Their interest in the “natural”—that is, natural morality, religion, economy, or education, in contrast to the merely conventional and historically derived—sprang as much from the desire to hold a mirror up to a surrounding society that they disliked as from any dispassionate urge simply to find out what humanity and society are made of. These 17th- and 18th-century ideas were to prove decisive in the 19th and later centuries, so far as the social sciences were concerned.
如前所述，这些和其他开创性思想大部分包含在主要功能是攻击西欧现有政府和社会秩序的著作中。另一种说法是说，这些思想是政治和社会理想主义的明确和公认的部分——用这个词来概括它的最大意义。霍布斯、洛克、卢梭、孟德斯鸠、斯密和其他主要哲学家对理想——理想状态、理想经济、理想公民社会——的感受与任何早期的乌托邦作家一样生动而充满活力。这些思想家无一例外地致力于美好或理想社会的愿景。他们对“自然”的兴趣——即自然道德、宗教、经济或教育，而不是仅仅传统和历史衍生的东西——既源于为他们所不喜欢的周围社会举一面镜子的愿望，也源于任何纯粹想找出人性和社会是由什么组成的冷静的冲动。就社会科学而言，这些 17 世纪和 18 世纪的思想在 19 世纪和以后的世纪被证明是决定性的。

The 19th century 19 世纪

The fundamental ideas, themes, and problems of social thought in the 19th century are best understood as responses to the problem of order that was created in people’s minds by the weakening of the old order, or European society, under the twin blows of the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. The breakup of the old order—an order that had rested on kinship, land, social class, religion, local community, and monarchy—set free, as it were, the complex elements of status, authority, and wealth that had been for so long consolidated. In the same way that the history of 19th-century politics, industry, and trade is basically about the practical efforts of human beings to reconsolidate these elements, so the history of 19th-century social thought is about theoretical efforts to reconsolidate them—that is, to give them new contexts of meaning.
19 世纪社会思想的基本思想、主题和问题最好理解为对在法国大革命和工业革命的双重打击下，旧秩序或欧洲社会的削弱在人们心中创造的秩序问题的回应。旧秩序——一种建立在亲属关系、土地、社会阶层、宗教、地方社区和君主制之上的秩序——的瓦解，仿佛解放了长期巩固的地位、权威和财富的复杂元素。就像 19 世纪的政治、工业和贸易史基本上是关于人类重新整合这些元素的实际努力一样，19 世纪社会思想的历史也是关于重新整合它们的理论努力——也就是说，赋予它们新的意义背景。

In terms of the immediacy and sheer massiveness of impact on human thought and values, it would be difficult to find revolutions of comparable magnitude in human history. The political, social, and cultural changes that began in France and England at the very end of the 18th century spread almost immediately through Europe and the Americas in the 19th century and then on to Asia, Africa, and Oceania in the 20th. The effects of the two revolutions, the one overwhelmingly democratic in thrust, the other industrial-capitalist, have been to undermine, shake, or topple institutions that had endured for centuries, even millennia, and with them systems of authority, status, belief, and community.
就对人类思想和价值观的直接性和巨大影响而言，在人类历史上很难找到同等规模的革命。18 世纪末始于法国和英国的政治、社会和文化变革几乎立即蔓延到 19 世纪的欧洲和美洲，然后在 20 世纪蔓延到亚洲、非洲和大洋洲。这两次革命的影响，一场是压倒性的民主革命，另一场是工业资本主义革命，破坏、动摇或推翻了持续了几个世纪甚至几千年的制度，以及随之而来的权威、地位、信仰和社区制度。

It is easy today to deprecate the suddenness, the cataclysmic nature, the overall revolutionary effect of these two changes and to seek to subordinate results to longer, deeper tendencies of more gradual change in western Europe. But as many historians have pointed out, there was to be seen, and seen by a great many sensitive minds of that day, a dramatic and convulsive quality to the changes that cannot properly be subsumed to the slower processes of continuous evolutionary change. What is crucial, in any event, from the point of view of the history of the social thought of the period, is how the changes were actually envisaged at the time. By a large number of social philosophers as well as novelists, in all spheres, those changes were regarded as nothing less than earth-shattering.
今天，人们很容易贬低这两项变化的突然性、灾难性性质和整体革命性影响，并试图将结果服从于西欧更长期、更深刻的变化趋势。但正如许多历史学家所指出的，在那个时代，许多敏感的头脑所看到的，是那些变化的戏剧性和令人痉挛的品质，而这种变化不能被适当地归入持续进化变化的较慢过程。无论如何，从那个时期的社会思想历史的角度来看，至关重要的是当时实际如何设想这些变化。许多社会哲学家和小说家在各个领域都认为这些变化无异于惊天动地。

The coining or redefining of words is an excellent indication of people’s perceptions of change in a given historical period. A large number of words taken for granted today came into being in the period marked by the final decade or two of the 18th century and the first quarter of the 19th. Among these are: industry, industrialist, democracy, class, middle class, ideology, intellectual, rationalism, humanitarian, atomistic, masses, commercialism, proletariat, collectivism, equalitarian, liberal, conservative, scientist, utilitarian, bureaucracy, capitalism, and crisis. Some of these words were invented; others reflect new and very different meanings given to old ones. All alike bear witness to the transformed character of the European social landscape as this landscape loomed up to the leading minds of the age. And all these words bear witness too to the emergence of new social philosophies and, most pertinent to the subject of this article, the social sciences as they are known today.
词语的创造或重新定义是人们对特定历史时期变化的看法的极好表现。大量今天被认为是理所当然的词语是在 18 世纪的最后十年或二十年和 19 世纪上半年出现的。其中包括：工业、实业家、民主、阶级、中产阶级、意识形态、知识分子、理性主义、人道主义、原子主义、大众、商业主义、无产阶级、集体主义、平等主义、自由主义、保守主义、科学家、功利主义、官僚主义、资本主义和危机。其中一些词是发明的;另一些则反映了赋予旧 Ones 的新含义和截然不同的含义。所有这些都见证了欧洲社会景观的转变特征，因为这种景观对那个时代的主导思想来说迫在眉睫。所有这些话也见证了新社会哲学的出现，以及与本文主题最相关的是今天所熟知的社会科学。

Major themes resulting from democratic and industrial change 民主和工业变革产生的主要主题

It is illuminating to mention a few of the major themes in social thought in the 19th century that were almost the direct results of the democratic and industrial revolutions. It should be borne in mind that these themes are to be seen in the philosophical and literary writing of the age as well as in social thought narrowly defined.
提到 19 世纪社会思想中的几个主要主题，这些主题几乎是民主革命和工业革命的直接结果，这很有启发性。应该记住，这些主题可以在那个时代的哲学和文学作品以及狭义的社会思想中看到。

Thomas Robert Malthus, detail of an engraving after a portrait by J. Linnell, 1833.

“托马斯・罗伯特・马尔萨斯，依据 J. Linnell 的肖像所作的雕刻细节，1833 年。”

First, there was the great increase in population. Between 1750 and 1850 the population of Europe went from 140 million to 266 million and of the world from 728 million to well over 1 billion. It was an English clergyman and moral philosopher (considered economist), Thomas Malthus, who, in his famous Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), first marked the enormous significance to human welfare of this increase. With the diminution of historic checks on population growth, chiefly those of high mortality rates—a diminution that was, as Malthus realized, one of the rewards of technological progress—there were no easily foreseeable limits to growth of population. And such growth, he stressed, could only upset the traditional balance between population, which Malthus described as growing at a geometrical rate, and food supply, which he declared could grow only at an arithmetical rate. Not all social thinkers in the century took the pessimistic view of the matter that Malthus did, but few if any were indifferent to the impact of explosive increase in population on economy, government, and society.
首先，人口大幅增长。1750 年至 1850 年间，欧洲人口从 1.4 亿增加到 2.66 亿，世界人口从 7.28 亿增加到超过 10 亿。英国神职人员和道德哲学家（被认为是经济学家）托马斯·马尔萨斯（Thomas Malthus）在他著名的《人口原理论文》（1798 年）中首次指出了这种增长对人类福利的巨大意义。随着历史上对人口增长的制约减少，主要是那些对高死亡率的制约——正如马尔萨斯所意识到的那样，这种减少是技术进步的回报之一——人口增长没有容易预见的限制。他强调，这种增长只会打破人口和粮食供应之间的传统平衡，马尔萨斯将其描述为以几何速度增长，而粮食供应只能以算术速度增长。本世纪并非所有社会思想家都像马尔萨斯那样对这个问题持悲观态度，但很少有人对人炸性增长对经济、政府和社会的影响无动于衷。

Second, there was the condition of labour. It may be possible to see this condition in the early 19th century as in fact better than the condition of the rural masses at earlier times. But the important point is that to a large number of writers in the 19th century it seemed worse and was defined as worse. The wrenching of large numbers of people from the older and protective contexts of village, guild, parish, and family, and their massing in the new centres of industry, forming slums, living in common squalor and wretchedness, their wages generally behind cost of living, their families growing larger, their standard of living becoming lower, as it seemed—all of this is a frequent theme in the literature and social thought of the century. Economic thought indeed became known as the “dismal science,” because writers who focused on economic matters, from David Ricardo to Karl Marx, could see little likelihood of the condition of labour improving under capitalism.
其次是劳动条件。在 19 世纪初，我们可能可以看到这种状况实际上比早期农村群众的状况要好。但重要的一点是，对于 19 世纪的许多作家来说，它似乎更糟，并被定义为更糟。大批人从村庄、行会、教区和家庭等古老的保护环境中被赶走，他们聚集在新的工业中心，形成贫民窟，生活在共同的肮脏和悲惨中，他们的工资通常落后于生活成本，他们的家庭越来越大，他们的生活水平越来越低，就像看起来一样——所有这些都是本世纪文学和社会思想中经常出现的主题。经济思想确实被称为“令人沮丧的科学”，因为从大卫·李嘉图到卡尔·马克思，专注于经济问题的作家们都认为在资本主义制度下劳动状况改善的可能性很小。

Third, there was the transformation of property. Not only was more and more property to be seen as industrial—manifest in the factories, business houses, and workshops of the period—but also the very nature of property was changing. Whereas for most of the history of humankind property had been “hard,” visible only in concrete possessions—land and money—now the more intangible kinds of property such as shares of stock, negotiable equities of all kinds, and bonds were assuming ever greater influence in the economy. This led, as was early realized, to the dominance of financial interests, to speculation, and to a symbolic widening of the gulf between the propertied and the masses in the popular imagination (e.g., the former being represented as fat, the latter as thin). The change in the character of property obscured the similarities between the rich and the poor and encouraged thinking about the concentration of property, the accumulation of immense wealth in the hands of a relative few, and, not least, the possibility of economic domination of politics and culture. It should not be thought that only socialists saw property in this light. From Edmund Burke through Auguste Comte, Frédéric Le Play, and John Stuart Mill to Marx, Max Weber, and Émile Durkheim, one finds conservatives and liberals looking at the impact of this change in analogous ways.
第三，财产的转型。不仅越来越多的财产被视为工业财产（体现在那个时期的工厂、商业场所和车间）上，而且财产的性质也在发生变化。在人类历史的大部分时间里，财产是“坚硬的”，只体现在具体的财产——土地和金钱——而现在，更无形的财产种类，如股票、各种可转让股票和债券，在经济中的影响越来越大。正如人们早就意识到的那样，这导致了经济利益的主导地位、投机以及大众想象中有产者和大众之间的鸿沟的象征性扩大（例如，前者被描绘成胖子，后者被描绘成瘦子）。财产性质的变化掩盖了富人和穷人之间的相似之处，并鼓励人们思考财产的集中、巨额财富在相对少数人手中的积累，以及同样重要的是，政治和文化的经济主导的可能性。我们不应该认为只有社会主义者才能从这个角度看待财产。从埃德蒙·伯克（Edmund Burke）到奥古斯特·孔德（Auguste Comte）、弗雷德里克·勒普莱（Frédéric Le Play）和约翰·斯图亚特·穆勒（John Stuart Mill），再到马克思、马克斯·韦伯（Max Weber）和埃米尔·涂尔干（Émile Durkheim），人们发现保守派和自由派都以类似的方式看待这一变化的影响。

Fourth, there was urbanization—the sudden increase in the number of towns and cities in western Europe and the increase in number of persons living in the historic towns and cities. Whereas in earlier centuries, the city had been regarded almost uniformly as a setting of civilization, culture, and freedom of mind, now one found more and more writers aware of the other side of cities: the atomization of human relationships, broken families, the sense of the mass, of anonymity, alienation, and disrupted values. Sociology particularly among the social sciences was to turn its attention to the problems of urbanization. The contrast between the seemingly natural type of community found in rural areas and the seemingly artificial individualistic society of the cities is a basic contrast in sociology, one that was given much attention by such European thinkers as the French sociologists Le Play and Durkheim; the German sociologists Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel, and Weber; the Belgian statistician Adolphe Quetelet; and, in America, the sociologists Charles H. Cooley and Robert E. Park.
第四，城市化——西欧城镇数量的突然增加，以及居住在历史悠久的城镇的人数增加。在前几个世纪，这座城市几乎一致地被视为文明、文化和思想自由的场所，而现在，人们发现越来越多的作家意识到城市的另一面：人际关系的原子化、破碎的家庭、大众感、匿名感、疏离感和价值观的破坏。社会学，尤其是社会科学中的社会学，将注意力转向城市化问题。农村地区看似自然的社区类型与城市中看似人为的个人主义社会之间的对比是社会学中的一个基本对比，法国社会学家勒普莱和涂尔干等欧洲思想家对此给予了极大的关注;德国社会学家费迪南德·托尼斯（Ferdinand Tönnies）、格奥尔格·西梅尔（Georg Simmel）和韦伯（Weber）;比利时统计学家阿道夫·奎特莱特（Adolphe Quetelet）;在美国，社会学家查尔斯·库利（Charles H. Cooley）和罗伯特·帕克（Robert E. Park）。

Fifth, there was technology. With the spread of mechanization, first in the factories and then in agriculture, social thinkers could see possibilities of a rupture of the historic relation between humans and nature, between humans and humans, and even between humans and God. To thinkers as politically different as Thomas Carlyle and Marx, technology seemed to lead to dehumanization of the worker and to a new kind of tyranny over human life. Marx, though, far from despising technology, thought the advent of socialism would counteract all this. Alexis de Tocqueville declared that technology, and especially technical specialization of work, was more degrading to the human mind and spirit than even political tyranny. It was thus in the 19th century that the opposition to technology on moral, psychological, and aesthetic grounds first made its appearance in Western thought.
第五，有技术。随着机械化的普及，首先是在工厂，然后是农业，社会思想家可以看到人类与自然之间、人与人之间、甚至人与上帝之间的历史关系破裂的可能性。对于像托马斯·卡莱尔和马克思这样政治不同的思想家来说，技术似乎导致了工人的非人化和对人类生活的一种新型暴政。然而，马克思非但没有鄙视技术，反而认为社会主义的到来会抵消这一切。亚历克西斯·德·托克维尔（Alexis de Tocqueville）宣称，技术，尤其是工作的技术专业化，甚至比政治暴政更能降低人类的思想和精神。因此，在 19 世纪，基于道德、心理和审美理由对技术的反对首次出现在西方思想中。

Sixth, there was the factory system. The importance of this to 19th-century thought has been intimated above. Suffice it to add that along with urbanization and spreading mechanization, the system of work whereby masses of workers left home and family to work long hours in the factories became a major theme of social thought as well as of social reform.
第六，工厂制度。这对 19 世纪思想的重要性已在上文中阐明。只需补充一点，随着城市化和机械化的普及，大量工人离开家庭在工厂长时间工作的工作制度成为社会思想和社会改革的主要主题。

Alexis de Tocqueville, detail of an oil painting by Théodore Chassériau, 1850; in the Château de Versailles.(more)

“亚历克西·德·托克维尔，出自泰奥多尔·查塞里奥的油画细节，1850 年；现藏于凡尔赛宫。”

Seventh, and finally, mention is to be made of the development of political masses—that is, the slow but inexorable widening of franchise and electorate through which ever larger numbers of persons became aware of themselves as voters and participants in the political process. This too is a major theme in social thought, to be seen most luminously perhaps in Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1835–40), a classic work that took not merely America but democracy everywhere as its subject. Tocqueville saw the rise of the political masses, more especially the immense power that could be wielded by the masses, as the single greatest threat to individual freedom and cultural diversity in the ages ahead.
第七，也是最后一点，要提到政治群众的发展——也就是说，选举权和选民的缓慢但不可阻挡的扩大，通过这种扩大，越来越多的人开始意识到自己是政治进程的选民和参与者。这也是社会思想中的一个主要主题，托克维尔的《美国的民主》（1835-40 年）也许最为突出地体现出来，这是一部经典著作，不仅以美国为主题，而且以各地的民主为主题。托克维尔将政治群众的崛起，尤其是群众可能拥有的巨大权力视为未来时代对个人自由和文化多样性的最大威胁。

These, then, are the principal themes in the 19th-century writing that may be seen as direct results of the two great revolutions. As themes, they are to be found not only in social thought but, as noted above, in a great deal of the philosophical and literary writing of the century. In their respective ways, the philosophers Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and Ralph Waldo Emerson were as struck by the consequences of the revolutions as were any specifically social thinkers. So too were such novelists as Honoré de Balzac and Charles Dickens.
因此，这些是 19 世纪写作的主要主题，可以被视为两次伟大革命的直接结果。作为主题，它们不仅存在于社会思想中，而且如上所述，存在于本世纪的许多哲学和文学作品中。哲学家乔治·威廉·弗里德里希·黑格尔（Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel）、塞缪尔·泰勒·柯勒律治（Samuel Taylor Coleridge）和拉尔夫·沃尔多·爱默生（Ralph Waldo Emerson）以他们各自的方式，与任何特定的社会思想家一样，都对革命的后果感到震惊。奥诺雷·德·巴尔扎克（Honoré de Balzac）和查尔斯·狄更斯（Charles Dickens）等小说家也是如此。

New ideologies 新的意识形态

Matthew Arnold, detail of an oil painting by G.F. Watts; in the National Portrait Gallery, London.

“马修·阿诺德，出自G.F. 瓦茨的油画细节；现藏于伦敦国家肖像画廊。”（英国诗人、评论家。）

One other point must be emphasized about these themes. They became, almost immediately in the 19th century, the bases of new ideologies. How people reacted to the currents of democracy and industrialism stamped them conservative, liberal, or radical. On the whole, with rarest exceptions, liberals welcomed the two revolutions, seeing in their forces opportunity for freedom and welfare never before known to humankind. The liberal view of society was overwhelmingly democratic, capitalist, industrial, and, of course, individualistic. The case is somewhat different with conservatism and radicalism in the century. Conservatives, beginning with Burke and continuing through Hegel and Matthew Arnold to such minds as John Ruskin later in the century, disliked both democracy and industrialism, preferring the kind of tradition, authority, and civility that had been, in their minds, displaced by the two revolutions. Theirs was a retrospective view, but it was a nonetheless influential one, affecting a number of the leading thinkers of the century, among them Comte and Tocqueville and later Weber and Durkheim. The radicals accepted democracy but only in terms of its extension to all areas of society and its eventual annihilation of any form of authority that did not spring directly from the people as a whole. And although the radicals, for the most part, accepted the phenomenon of industrialism, especially technology, they were uniformly antagonistic to capitalism.
关于这些主题，必须强调另一点。它们几乎立即在 19 世纪成为新意识形态的基础。人们对民主和工业主义潮流的反应使他们被打上了保守、自由或激进的烙印。总的来说，除了极少数例外，自由主义者欢迎这两次革命，在他们的力量中看到了人类前所未有的自由和福利的机会。自由主义的社会观压倒性地是民主、资本主义、工业化，当然还有个人主义。本世纪的保守主义和激进主义的情况有些不同。保守派，从伯克开始，一直到黑格尔和马修·阿诺德，再到本世纪后期的约翰·罗斯金等思想家，都不喜欢民主和工业主义，更喜欢在他们心目中被两次革命取代的那种传统、权威和文明。他们的观点是回顾性的，但它仍然是一个有影响力的观点，影响了本世纪许多领先的思想家，其中包括孔德和托克维尔，以及后来的韦伯和涂尔干。激进分子接受了民主，但仅限于将其扩展到社会的所有领域，并最终消灭了任何不是直接来自全体人民的权威。尽管激进分子在很大程度上接受了工业主义现象，尤其是技术，但他们始终反对资本主义。

These ideological consequences of the two revolutions proved extremely important to social thought, for it would be difficult to identify an intellectual in the century—whether a philosopher or a writer—who was not, in some degree at least, caught up in ideological currents. In referring to proto-sociologists such as Henri de Saint-Simon, Comte, and Le Play; to proto-economists such as Ricardo, Jean-Baptiste Say, and Marx; to proto-political scientists such as Bentham and John Austin; and even to anthropologists like Edward B. Tylor and Lewis Henry Morgan, one has before one persons who were engaged not merely in the study of society but also in often strongly partisan ideology. Some were liberals, some conservatives, others radicals. All drew from the currents of ideology that had been generated by the two great revolutions.
事实证明，两次革命的这些意识形态后果对社会思想极为重要，因为很难确定本世纪的知识分子——无论是哲学家还是作家——至少在某种程度上没有被意识形态潮流所困。在提到原始社会学家，如亨利·德·圣西蒙、孔德和勒普莱;到李嘉图、让-巴蒂斯特·萨伊和马克思等原始经济学家;到原始政治学家，如 Bentham 和 John Austin;甚至对于像爱德华·泰勒（Edward B. Tylor）和刘易斯·亨利·摩根（Lewis Henry Morgan）这样的人类学家来说，在他们之前的人不仅从事社会研究，而且往往参与强烈的党派意识形态研究。有些人是自由派，有些人是保守派，有些人是激进派。所有这些都来自两次大革命产生的意识形态潮流。

New intellectual and philosophical tendencies 新的知识和哲学倾向

It is important also to identify three other powerful tendencies of thought that influenced all of the social sciences. The first is a positivism that was not merely an appeal to science but almost reverence for science; the second, humanitarianism; the third, the philosophy of evolution.
确定影响所有社会科学的其他三种强大的思想趋势也很重要。首先是一种实证主义，它不仅是对科学的诉求，而且几乎是对科学的崇敬;第二种是人道主义;第三个是进化论的哲学。

The positivist appeal of science was to be seen everywhere. The 19th century saw the virtual institutionalization of this ideal—possibly even canonization. The great aim was that of dealing with moral values, institutions, and all social phenomena through the same fundamental methods that could be seen so luminously in physics and, after Darwin, in biology. Prior to the 19th century, no very clear distinction had been made between philosophy and science, and the term philosophy was even preferred by those working directly with physical materials, seeking laws and principles in the fashion of Sir Isaac Newton or William Harvey—that is, by persons whom one would now call scientists.
科学的实证主义吸引力无处不在。19 世纪见证了这种理想的虚拟制度化——甚至可能是圣典化。其伟大目标是通过相同的基本方法来处理道德价值观、制度和所有社会现象，这些方法在物理学和达尔文之后的生物学中可以如此耀眼地看到。在 19 世纪之前，哲学和科学之间并没有非常明确的区别，那些直接与物理材料打交道的人甚至更喜欢哲学这个词，他们以艾萨克·牛顿爵士或威廉·哈维的方式寻求规律和原则——也就是说，我们现在被称为科学家的人。

Auguste Comte, drawing by Tony Toullion, 19th century; in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.

“奥古斯特·孔德，托尼·图利翁创作的画作，19 世纪；现藏于巴黎国家图书馆。”

In the 19th century, in contrast, the distinction between philosophy and science became an overwhelming one. Virtually every area of human thought and behaviour was considered by a rising number of persons to be amenable to scientific investigation in precisely the same degree that physical data were. More than anyone else, it was Comte who heralded the idea of the scientific treatment of social behaviour. His Cours de philosophie positive (published in English as The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte), published in six volumes between 1830 and 1842, sought to demonstrate irrefutably not merely the possibility but the inevitability of a science of humanity, one for which Comte eventually suggested the word sociology and that would do for humanity as an aspect of reality exactly what biology had already done for individual humans as biological organisms.
相比之下，在 19 世纪，哲学和科学之间的区别变得压倒性。实际上，越来越多的人认为人类思想和行为的每一个领域都适合进行科学研究，其程度与物理数据完全相同。孔德比任何人都更能预示着科学处理社会行为的理念。他的 Cours de philosophie positive（英文出版为 The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte）在 1830 年至 1842 年间出版了六卷，旨在无可辩驳地证明一门关于人类的科学不仅存在可能性，而且是必然性的，为此，孔德最终提出了社会学一词，它将对人类作为现实的一个方面产生影响，就像生物学已经对作为生物有机体的个体人类所做的那样。

Humanitarianism, though a very distinguishable current of thought in the century, was closely related to the idea of a science of society. The ultimate purpose of social science was thought by almost everyone to be the welfare of society, the improvement of its moral and social condition. Humanitarianism, strictly defined, is the institutionalization of compassion; it is the extension of welfare and succour from the limited areas in which these had historically been found, chiefly family, village, and the church, to society at large. One of the most notable and also distinctive aspects of the 19th century was the constantly rising number of persons, almost wholly from the new middle class, who worked directly for the betterment of society. In the many projects and proposals for relief of the destitute, improvement of slums, amelioration of the plight of the insane, the indigent, and imprisoned, and other afflicted minorities could be seen the spirit of humanitarianism at work. All kinds of associations were formed, including temperance associations, groups and societies for the abolition of slavery and of poverty and for the improvement of literacy, among other objectives. Nothing like the 19th-century spirit of humanitarianism had ever been seen before in western Europe—not even in France during the Enlightenment, where interest in humankind’s salvation tended to be more intellectual than humanitarian in the strict sense. Humanitarianism was the guiding spirit of the 19th century social reform and, as noted earlier, social reform and social science were regarded as identical. All that helped the cause of the one could be seen as helpful to the other.
人道主义虽然是本世纪非常独特的思潮，但与社会科学的理念密切相关。几乎每个人都认为社会科学的最终目的是社会的福利，改善社会的道德和社会状况。严格定义的人道主义是同情心的制度化;它是福利和救助从历史上发现这些的有限领域（主要是家庭、村庄和教会）延伸到整个社会。19 世纪最值得注意和最独特的方面之一是人数不断增加，他们几乎全部来自新的中产阶级，他们直接为改善社会而努力。在许多救济贫困者、改善贫民窟、改善精神病人、贫困者、被监禁者和其他受苦的少数群体的困境的项目和提案中，可以看到人道主义精神在发挥作用。成立了各种协会，包括节制协会、废除奴隶制和贫困以及提高识字率等目标的团体和社团。19世纪的人道主义精神在西欧从未见过——甚至在启蒙运动时期的法国也没有，那里对人类救赎的兴趣往往更像是知识性的，而不是严格意义上的人道主义。人道主义是 19 世纪社会改革的指导精神，如前所述，社会改革和社会科学被认为是相同的。所有有助于一方事业的事物都可以被视为对另一方有益。

Herbert Spencer

赫伯特·斯宾塞（英国著名的哲学家、社会学家和教育家）

The third of the intellectual influences is that of evolution. It was to affect every one of the social sciences, each of which was as much concerned with the development of things as with their structures. An interest in development was to be found in the 18th century, as noted earlier. But this interest was small and specialized compared with 19th-century theories of social evolution. The impact of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, published in 1859, was of course great and further enhanced the appeal of the evolutionary view of things. But it is very important to recognize that ideas of social evolution had their own origins and contexts and that Darwin’s theory was fundamentally misinterpreted by most social thinkers. The evolutionary works of such influential authors as Comte, Herbert Spencer, and Marx had been completed, or well begun, before publication of Darwin’s work and were Linnaen, that is, first, assuming inheritance of acquired characteristics and unilinear progressive development from simpler and less durable to more complex and more durable forms of life; and, second, classificatory or descriptive in nature, organizing and cataloguing data but offering little in terms of understanding. The important point, in any event, is that the idea or the philosophy of evolution was in the air throughout the century and was profoundly contributory to the idea of sociology as a science similar to such fields as geology, astronomy, and biology. Evolution was as permeative and confusing an idea as the Trinity had been in medieval Europe. Darwin both completely transformed it and endowed it with an immense authority, making evolution coterminous with science. Social scientists would claim this authority, though very few of them would be aware of the transformation which it reflected.
第三个智力影响是进化的影响。它影响了每一门社会科学，每门社会科学都同样关注事物的发展和它们的结构。如前所述，18 世纪人们对发展产生了兴趣。但与 19 世纪的社会进化理论相比，这种兴趣很小而且很专业。查尔斯·达尔文（Charles Darwin）于 1859 年出版的《物种起源》（On the Origin of Species）的影响当然是巨大的，它进一步增强了进化论对事物的看法的吸引力。但是，认识到社会进化论的思想有其自身的起源和背景，而达尔文的理论从根本上被大多数社会思想家误解了，这一点非常重要。孔德、赫伯特·斯宾塞和马克思等有影响力的作家的进化论著作在达尔文的著作出版之前就已经完成或开始了，它们是林南，也就是说，首先，假设后天特征的遗传和从更简单、更不持久的生命形式到更复杂、更持久的生命形式的单线性渐进发展;第二种，本质上是分类或描述性的，组织和编目数据，但在理解方面提供的内容很少。无论如何，重要的一点是，进化论的思想或哲学在整个世纪中都弥漫着空气，并且对社会学作为一门类似于地质学、天文学和生物学等领域的科学的思想做出了深刻的贡献。进化论是一个渗透和令人困惑的观念，就像中世纪欧洲的三位一体一样。达尔文既彻底改变了它，又赋予了它巨大的权威，使进化论与科学并驾齐驱。社会科学家会声称这种权威，尽管他们中很少有人会意识到它所反映的转变。

History of the separate disciplines 独立学科的历史

Among the disciplines that formed the social sciences, two contrary, for a time equally powerful, tendencies at first dominated them. The first was the drive toward unification, toward a single, master social science, whatever it might be called. The second tendency was toward specialization of the individual social sciences. If, clearly, it is the second that has triumphed, with the results to be seen in the disparate, sometimes jealous, highly specialized disciplines seen today, the first was not without great importance and must also be examined.
在构成社会科学的学科中，有两门相反的学科，在一段时间内同样强大，起初的趋势占据了主导地位。首先是走向统一，走向单一的、掌握社会科学的动力，无论它叫什么。第二种趋势是个别社会科学的专业化。如果很明显，第二项取得了胜利，其结果可以在今天看到的不同、有时令人嫉妒、高度专业化的学科中看到，那么第一项并非没有非常重要，也必须加以检验。

What emerges from the critical rationalism of the 18th century is not, in the first instance, a conception of need for a plurality of social sciences, but rather for a single science of humanity that would take its place in the hierarchy of the sciences that included the fields of astronomy, physics, chemistry, and biology. In the 1840s, Comte called for a new science, one with humanity, not humans as animals, as its subject (humans as animals already being a subject of biology). Although he conceived of society as the distinguishing characteristic of humanity, he assuredly had but a single encompassing science in mind—not a congeries of disciplines, each concerned with some single aspect of human behaviour in society. The same was true of Bentham, Marx, and Spencer. All of these thinkers, and there were many others to join them, saw the study of society as a unified enterprise. They would have scoffed, and on occasion did, at any notion of a separate economics, political science, sociology, and so on. Humanity is an indivisible thing, they would have argued; so, too, must be the study of society, its distinguishing characteristic.
从 18 世纪的批判理性主义中得出的，首先并不是需要多种社会科学的概念，而是需要一门单一的人文科学，在包括天文学、物理学、化学和生物学领域的科学等级制度中占有一席之地。在 1840 年代，孔德呼吁一门新的科学，一门以人性而不是作为动物的人类为学科的科学（作为动物的人类已经是生物学的主题）。尽管他认为社会是人类的显著特征，但他心中肯定只有一门包罗万象的科学——而不是一门学科的集合，每个学科都与人类社会行为的某个单一方面有关。边沁、马克思和斯宾塞也是如此。所有这些思想家，以及许多其他加入他们的思想家，都将社会研究视为一项统一的事业。他们会嘲笑，有时也会嘲笑任何独立的经济学、政治学、社会学等概念。他们会争辩说，人性是不可分割的;对社会的研究也必须如此，社会的显著特征。

It was, however, the opposite tendency of specialization or differentiation that won out. No matter how the century began, or what were the dreams of a Comte, Spencer, or Marx, when the 19th century ended, not one but several distinct, competitive social sciences were to be found. Aiding this process was the development of the colleges and universities. The growing desire for an elective system, for a substantial number of academic specializations, and for differentiation of academic degrees contributed strongly to the differentiation of the social sciences. This was first and most strongly to be seen in Germany, where, from about 1815 on, all scholarship and science were based in the universities and where competition for status among the several disciplines was keen. But by the end of the century the same phenomenon of specialization was to be found in the United States (where admiration for the German system was very great in academic circles) and, in somewhat less degree, in France and England. On the face of it, the differentiation of the social sciences in the 19th century was but one aspect of a larger process that was to be seen vividly in the physical sciences and the humanities. No major field escaped the lure of specialization of investigation, and clearly, a great deal of the sheer bulk of learning that passed from the 19th to the 20th century was the direct consequence of this specialization. But the reasons behind specialization in the social sciences, the category that earlier did not exist, were different.
然而，专业化或差异化的相反趋势占了上风。无论这个世纪是如何开始的，也无论孔德、斯宾塞或马克思的梦想是什么，当 19 世纪结束时，人们都会发现不是一个，而是几个截然不同的、有竞争力的社会科学。帮助这一过程的是学院和大学的发展。对选修制度、大量学术专业和学位差异化的日益增长的渴望极大地促进了社会科学的差异化。这在德国最先也是最强烈地出现，从大约 1815 年开始，所有的学术和科学都以大学为基础，几个学科之间对地位的竞争非常激烈。但到本世纪末，同样的专业化现象也出现在美国（学术界对德国制度的钦佩非常大），法国和英国的程度也稍小一些。从表面上看，19 世纪社会科学的分化只是一个更大过程的一个方面，而这一过程在物理科学和人文科学中可以生动地看到。没有一个主要领域能逃脱研究专业化的诱惑，显然，从 19 世纪到 20 世纪的大量学术是这种专业化的直接结果。但是，社会科学专业化背后的原因，这个以前不存在的类别，是不同的。

Economics 经济学

It was economics that first attained the status of an exclusive area of speculation and study among the social sciences. The huge volumes on administration, with their extensive lexicons, written by German cameralists, and that autonomy and self-regulation that the physiocrats and Smith (especially as interpreted by German academics) had found, or thought they had found, in the processes of wealth, in the operation of prices, rents, interest, and wages, during the 18th century became the basis of a separate and distinctive trend of thought, called “political economy,” in the 19th. Hence the emphasis upon what came to be widely called laissez-faire. If, as it was argued, the processes of wealth operate naturally in terms of their own built-in mechanisms, then not only should these be studied separately but they should, in any wise polity, be left alone by government and society. This was, in general, the overriding emphasis of such thinkers as Ricardo, Mill, and Nassau William Senior in England, of Frédéric Bastiat and Say in France, and, somewhat later, the Austrian school of Carl Menger. This emphasis is today called “classical” in economics, and it is even now, though with substantial modifications, a strong position in the field.
正是经济学首先在社会科学中获得了一个专属的投机和研究领域的地位。18 世纪，由德国摄影家撰写的大量行政管理著作及其广泛的词典，以及主学家和斯密（尤其是德国学者的解释）在财富过程中发现的或认为他们已经发现的自主性和自我调节，成为一种独立而独特的思想趋势的基础。在 19 世纪被称为“政治经济学”。因此，强调后来被广泛称为自由放任的东西。如果像人们所说的那样，财富的过程是按照它们自己的内在机制自然运作的，那么它们不仅应该被单独研究，而且在任何明智的政体中，它们都应该被政府和社会所忽视。总的来说，这是英国的李嘉图、穆勒和老拿骚·威廉、法国的弗雷德里克·巴斯蒂亚和萨伊，以及后来的奥地利学派卡尔·门格尔（Carl Menger）等思想家的压倒一切的重点。这种强调在今天被称为经济学中的“古典”，即使经过大量修改，它现在在该领域仍然占据着强势地位。

There were from the beginning, however, thinkers on the subject, including Smith himself, who diverged sharply from this laissez-faire, classical view. In Germany the enormously influential Friedrich List originated the school of “national economy”—which would be today recognized as economic nationalism, opposing international free trade and advocating protectionist measures for domestic economy (a view with which Smith agreed under certain circumstances, the difference between Smith and List being that the former was a pragmatist, while for the latter the position was a matter of principle). There were also the so-called historical economists, proceeding from the presuppositions of social evolution, referred to above. Such figures as Wilhelm Roscher and Karl Knies in Germany tended to dismiss the assumptions of timelessness and universality regarding economic behaviour that were axiomatic among the German followers of Smith, and they strongly insisted upon the developmental character of capitalism, evolving in a long series of stages from other types of economy.
然而，从一开始就有关于这个问题的思想家，包括斯密本人，他们与这种自由放任的古典观点截然不同。在德国，极具影响力的弗里德里希·李斯特（Friedrich List）开创了“国民经济”学派——今天被认为是经济民族主义，反对国际自由贸易并倡导国内经济的保护主义措施（斯密在某些情况下同意这一观点，斯密和李斯特的区别在于前者是实用主义者，而后者的立场是一个原则问题）。还有所谓的历史经济学家，他们从上面提到的社会进化的前提出发。德国的威廉·罗舍尔（Wilhelm Roscher）和卡尔·克尼斯（Karl Knies）等人物倾向于摒弃在斯密的德国追随者中不言而喻的关于经济行为的永恒性和普遍性的假设，他们强烈坚持资本主义的发展特征，从其他类型的经济中分一系列漫长的阶段演变而来。

Karl Marx

卡尔·马克思

Also prominent throughout the century were those who came to be called the socialists. They too repudiated any notion of timelessness and universality in capitalism and its elements of private property, competition, and profit. Not only was this system but a passing stage of economic development; it could be—and, as Marx was to emphasize, would be—shortly supplanted by a more humane and also realistic economic system based upon cooperation, the people’s ownership of the means of production, and planning that would eradicate the vices of competition and conflict.
在整个世纪中，那些后来被称为社会主义者的人也非常突出。他们也否定了资本主义及其私有财产、竞争和利润要素中任何永恒和普遍的概念。这个系统不仅是经济发展的过渡阶段;它可能——而且，正如马克思所强调的，将很快被一种更人道、更现实的经济制度所取代，这种经济制度的基础是合作、人民对生产资料的所有权以及消除竞争和冲突弊端的计划。

Political science 政治学

Rivalling economic thought in popularity during the century was “political science,” so called long before “science” was appropriated as the proper name for the unbiased exploration of the empirical world. The line of systematic interest in the state that had begun in modern Europe with Niccolò Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, among others, widened and lengthened in the 19th century, the consequence of the two revolutions. If the Industrial Revolution seemed to supply all the problems frustrating the existence of a stable and humane society, the political-democratic revolution could be seen as containing many of the answers to these problems. It was the democratic revolution, especially in France, that created the vision of a political government responsible for all aspects of human society and, most important, possessed the power to wield this responsibility. This power, known as sovereignty, could be seen as holding the same relation to political science in the 19th century that capital held to economic thought. A very large number of political “scientists” essentially ruminated on the varied properties of sovereignty. There was a strong tendency on the part of such thinkers as Bentham, Austin, and Mill in England and Francis Lieber and Woodrow Wilson in the United States to see the state and its claimed sovereignty over human lives in much the same terms in which classical political economists saw capitalism.
在本世纪流行的经济思想中，与“政治学”相媲美的是“政治学”，早在“科学”被用作对实证世界进行公正探索的专有名称之前，它就已经被称为“政治学”。从尼科洛·马基雅维利、霍布斯、洛克和卢梭等人开始于现代欧洲的系统性国家利益线，在 19 世纪扩大了和延长，这是两次革命的结果。如果说工业革命似乎提供了阻碍稳定和人道社会存在的所有问题，那么政治民主革命可以被视为包含了这些问题的许多答案。正是民主革命，尤其是在法国，创造了一个负责人类社会各个方面的政治政府的愿景，最重要的是，它拥有行使这一责任的权力。这种被称为主权的权力可以被视为与 19 世纪的政治学有着相同的关系，就像资本与经济思想的关系一样。非常多的政治“科学家”基本上都在思考主权的各种特性。英国的边沁、奥斯汀和穆勒，以及美国的弗朗西斯·利伯和伍德罗·威尔逊等思想家都强烈倾向于以古典政治经济学家看待资本主义的方式看待国家及其声称的对人类生活的主权。

Among political scientists there was the same historical-evolutionary dissent from this view, however, that existed in political economy. Such writers as Sir Henry Maine in England, Numa Fustel de Coulanges in France, and Otto von Gierke in Germany declared that state and sovereignty were not timeless and universal nor the results of some “social contract” envisaged by such philosophers as Locke and Rousseau but, rather, structures formed slowly through developmental or historical processes. Hence the strong interest, especially in the late 19th century, in the origins of political institutions in kinship, village, and caste, and in the successive stages of development that have characterized these institutions. In political science, as in political economy, in short, the “classical” analytical approach was strongly rivalled by the evolutionary. Both approaches go back to the 18th century in their fundamental elements, but what is seen in the 19th century is the greater systematization and the much wider range of data employed.
然而，在政治学家中，对这种观点存在同样的历史进化论异议，这与政治经济学中存在的相同。英国的亨利·缅因爵士（Sir Henry Maine）、法国的努马·福斯特尔·德·库朗热（Numa Fustel de Coulanges）和德国的奥托·冯·吉尔克（Otto von Gierke）等作家宣称，国家和主权不是永恒的和普遍的，也不是洛克和卢梭等哲学家所设想的某种“社会契约”的结果，而是通过发展或历史过程缓慢形成的结构。因此，特别是在 19 世纪后期，人们对亲属、村庄和种姓政治制度的起源以及这些制度的连续发展阶段产生了浓厚的兴趣。简而言之，在政治学中，就像在政治经济学中一样，“经典”分析方法与进化论有力地竞争。这两种方法的基本要素都可以追溯到 18 世纪，但在 19 世纪可以看到更大的系统化和更广泛的数据使用。

Cultural anthropology 文化人类学

Anthropology also originated in the 19th century. Strictly defined as the science of humankind, it could be seen as superseding specialized areas of focus such as political economy and political science. In practice and from the beginning, however, anthropology concerned itself overwhelmingly with small-scale preindustrial societies. On the one hand was physical anthropology, concerned chiefly with the evolution of humans as a biological species, with the successive forms and protoforms of the species, and with genetic systems. On the other hand was social and cultural anthropology: here the interest was in the full range of humankind’s institutions, though its researches were in fact confined to those found among existing preliterate peoples in Africa, Oceania, Asia, and the Americas. Above all other concepts, “culture” was the central element of this great area of anthropology, or ethnology, as it was often called to distinguish it from physical anthropology. Culture, as a concept, called attention to the nonbiological, nonracial, noninstinctual dimension of human life, the basis of what is called civilization: its values, techniques, and ideas in all spheres. Tylor’s landmark work of 1871, Primitive Culture, defined culture as the part of human behaviour that is learned—an inadequate definition, as proved by the fact that much of animal behaviour is also learned, the difference between animal and human behaviour being, rather, in the character of their respective learning: direct among animals and mostly indirect among humans. Since of all social sciences cultural anthropology places the greatest emphasis on the cultural foundations of human behaviour and thought in society, this inadequate definition has been in no small part responsible for the inadequate understanding of culture in all of them.
人类学也起源于 19 世纪。它被严格定义为人类的科学，可以被视为取代了政治经济学和政治学等专业重点领域。然而，在实践中，从一开始，人类学就压倒性地关注小规模的前工业化社会。一方面是体质人类学，主要关注人类作为生物物种的进化，物种的连续形式和原始形式，以及遗传系统。另一方面是社会和文化人类学：这里的兴趣在于人类的所有制度，尽管它的研究实际上仅限于非洲、大洋洲、亚洲和美洲现有的未识字民族的研究。在所有其他概念中，“文化”是人类学或民族学这一伟大领域的核心要素，因为人们通常这样称呼它以区别于体质人类学。文化作为一个概念，呼吁人们关注人类生活的非生物、非种族、非本能的维度，这是所谓文明的基础：它在各个领域的价值观、技术和思想。泰勒 1871 年的里程碑式著作《原始文化》将文化定义为人类行为中被学习的一部分——这个定义是不充分的，正如动物的大部分行为也是被学习的事实所证明的那样，动物和人类行为之间的区别在于它们各自学习的性质：在动物之间是直接的，在人类之间主要是间接的。由于在所有社会科学中，文化人类学最强调人类行为和社会思想的文化基础，因此这种不适当的定义在很大程度上是导致所有社会科学对文化理解不足的原因。

Scarcely less than political science or political economy, cultural anthropology shared in the themes of the two revolutions and their impact on the world. If the data that cultural anthropologists actually worked with were generally in the remote areas of the world, it was the effects of the two revolutions that, in a sense, kept opening up these parts of the world to their inquiry. And, as was true of the other social sciences, the cultural anthropologists were immersed in economic problems and problems of polity, social class, and community, albeit among preliterate rather than “modern” peoples.
文化人类学几乎不亚于政治学或政治经济学，它与两次革命的主题及其对世界的影响相同。如果说文化人类学家实际研究的数据通常来自世界的偏远地区，那么从某种意义上说，正是两次革命的影响不断为世界这些地区打开了他们的研究空间。而且，与其他社会科学一样，文化人类学家沉浸在经济问题和政体、社会阶层和社区问题中，尽管这些问题是在识字前而不是“现代”民族中。

Overwhelmingly, without major exception indeed, cultural anthropology was evolutionary in thrust in the 19th century. Tylor and Sir John Lubbock in England, Morgan in the United States, Adolf Bastian and Theodor Waitz in Germany, and all others in the main line of the study of “primitive” culture saw existing indigenous societies in the world as prototypes of their own “primitive ancestors”—fossilized remains, so to speak, of stages of development that western Europe had once gone through. Despite the vast array of data compiled on non-Western cultures, the same basic European-centred objectives are to be found among cultural anthropologists as among other social thinkers in the century. Almost universally, then, the modern West was regarded as the latest point in a line of progress that was single and unilinear and on which all other peoples in the world could be fitted as illustrations, as it were, of Western people’s own past.
事实上，绝大多数情况下，文化人类学在 19 世纪是进化论的。英国的泰勒和约翰·拉伯克爵士、美国的摩根、德国的阿道夫·巴斯蒂安和西奥多·怀茨，以及“原始”文化研究主线的所有其他人都将世界上现存的土著社会视为他们自己的“原始祖先”的原型——可以说，是西欧曾经经历过的发展阶段的化石遗骸。尽管汇编了大量关于非西方文化的数据，但在文化人类学家和本世纪的其他社会思想家中可以找到相同的以欧洲为中心的基本目标。因此，现代西方几乎普遍被视为单一和单线进步路线中的最新点，世界上所有其他民族都可以根据它来说明西方人民自己的过去。

Sociology 社会学

Sociology came into being in precisely these terms, and during much of the century it was not easy to distinguish between a great deal of so-called sociology and social or cultural anthropology. Even if almost no sociologists in the century made empirical studies of indigenous peoples, as did the anthropologists, their interest in the origin, development, and probable future of humankind was not less great than what could be found in the writings of the anthropologists. It was Comte who applied to the science of humanity the word sociology, and he used it to refer to what he imagined would be a single, all-encompassing, science that would take its place at the top of the hierarchy of sciences—a hierarchy that Comte saw as including astronomy (the oldest of the sciences historically) at the bottom and with physics, chemistry, and biology rising in that order to sociology, the latest and grandest of the sciences. There was no thought in Comte’s mind—nor was there in the mind of Spencer, whose general view of sociology was very much like Comte’s—of there being other competing social sciences. Sociology would be to the whole of the social, i.e., human, world what each of the other great sciences was to its appropriate sphere of reality.
社会学正是在这些术语中诞生的，在本世纪的大部分时间里，要区分大量的所谓社会学和社会或文化人类学并不容易。即使本世纪几乎没有社会学家像人类学家那样对土著人民进行实证研究，他们对人类起源、发展和可能的未来的兴趣并不亚于人类学家的著作。正是孔德将社会学一词应用于人类科学，他用它来指代他想象中的一门单一的、包罗万象的科学，它将在科学等级制度的顶端占据一席之地——孔德认为这个等级制度包括天文学（历史上最古老的科学）在底部和物理学。化学和生物学按照这个顺序上升到社会学，这是最新和最伟大的科学。孔德的脑海中没有思想——斯宾塞的脑海中也没有——他对社会学的一般看法与孔德非常相似——还有其他相互竞争的社会科学。社会学之于整个社会，即人类世界，就像其他伟大的科学之于其适当的现实领域一样。

Both Comte and Spencer believed that civilization as a whole was the proper subject of sociology. Their works were concerned, for the most part, with describing the origins and development of civilization and also of each of its major institutions. Both declared sociology’s main divisions to be “statics” and “dynamics,” the former concerned with processes of order in human life (equated with society), the latter with processes of evolutionary change. Both thinkers also saw all existing societies in the world as reflective of the successive stages through which Western society had advanced in time over a period of tens of thousands of years.
孔德和斯宾塞都认为，文明作为一个整体是社会学的适当主题。他们的作品在很大程度上涉及描述文明的起源和发展，以及文明的每个主要机构。两者都宣称社会学的主要分支是“静态”和“动力学”，前者关注人类生活的秩序过程（等同于社会），后者关注进化变化的过程。两位思想家还认为世界上所有现存的社会都反映了西方社会在数万年的时间中发展的连续阶段。

Not all thinkers in the 19th century, who would be considered sociologists today, shared this approach, however. Side by side with the “grand” view represented by Comte and Spencer were those in the century who were primarily interested in the social problems that they saw around them—consequences, as they interpreted them, of the two revolutions, the industrial and democratic. Thus, in France just after mid-century, Le Play published a monumental study of the social aspects of the working classes in Europe, Les Ouvriers européens (1855; “European Workers”), which compared families and communities in all parts of Europe and even other parts of the world. Tocqueville, especially in the second volume of Democracy in America, provided an account of the customs, social structures, and institutions in America, dealing with these—and also with the social and psychological problems of Americans in that day—as aspects of the impact of the democratic and industrial revolutions upon traditional society.
然而，并非所有 19 世纪的思想家（今天被认为是社会学家）都同意这种方法。与孔德和斯宾塞所代表的“宏大”观点并列的是那些本世纪的人，他们主要对他们周围看到的社会问题感兴趣——正如他们所解释的那样，是工业革命和民主革命的后果。因此，在本世纪中叶之后的法国，Le Play 出版了一篇关于欧洲工人阶级社会方面的不朽研究，Les Ouvriers européens（1855 年;“欧洲工人”），该研究比较了欧洲各地甚至世界其他地区的家庭和社区。托克维尔，特别是在《美国的民主》第二卷中，描述了美国的习俗、社会结构和制度，处理了这些问题——以及当时美国人的社会和心理问题——作为民主革命和工业革命对传统社会影响的各个方面。

Ferdinand Tönnies, bust in Husum, Germany.

斐迪南·滕尼斯，位于德国胡苏姆的半身像。
斐迪南·滕尼斯（1855—1936）社会学形成时期的著名社会学家，德国的现代社会学的缔造者之一。他的社会学著作，尤其是成名作《共同体与社会》对社会学界产生了深远的影响。

At the very end of the 19th century, in both France and Germany, there appeared some of the works in sociology that were to prove more influential in their effects upon the actual academic discipline in the 20th century. Tönnies, in his Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1887; translated as Community and Society), sought to explain all major social problems in the West as the consequence of the West’s historical transition from the communal, status-based, concentric society of the Middle Ages to the more individualistic, impersonal, and large-scale society of the democratic-industrial period. In general terms, allowing for individual variations of theme, these are considered the views of Weber, Simmel, and Durkheim (all of whom also wrote in the late 19th and early 20th century). These were the figures who, starting from the problems of Western society that could be traced to the effects of the two revolutions, did the most to establish the discipline of sociology as it was practiced for much of the 20th century.
在 19 世纪末，在法国和德国，出现了一些社会学著作，这些著作被证明对 20 世纪实际学术学科的影响更大。Tönnies 在他的 Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft（1887 年，译为《社区与社会》）中，试图解释西方的所有主要社会问题，这些问题是西方从中世纪的公共、基于地位的、同心的社会向民主工业时期更加个人主义、非个人化和大规模社会的历史转变的结果。一般来说，考虑到主题的个体变化，这些被认为是韦伯、西美尔和涂尔干的观点（他们都在 19 世纪末和 20 世纪初写作）。这些人物从可以追溯到两次革命影响的西方社会问题开始，为建立 20 世纪大部分时间所实践的社会学学科做出了最大的贡献。

Social psychology 社会心理学

Wilhelm Wundt.

威廉·冯特（1832年8月16日—1920年8月31日），德国生理学家、心理学家、哲学家，被公认为是实验心理学之父。他于1879年在莱比锡大学创立世界上第一个专门研究心理学的实验室，这被认为是心理学成为一门独立学科的标志。他学识渊博，著述甚丰，一生作品达540余篇，研究领域涉及哲学、心理学、生理学、物理学、逻辑学、语言学、伦理学、宗教等。

Social psychology as a distinct trend of thought also originated in the 19th century, although its outlines were perhaps somewhat less clear than was true of the other social sciences. The close relation of the human mind to the social order, its dependence upon education and other forms of socialization, was well known in the 18th century. In the 19th century, however, an ever more systematic thinking came into being to uncover the social and cultural roots of human psychology and also the several types of “collective mind” that analysis of different cultures and societies in the world might reveal. In Germany, Moritz Lazarus and Wilhelm Wundt sought to fuse the study of psychological phenomena with analyses of whole cultures. Folk psychology, as it was called, did not, however, last very long.
社会心理学作为一种独特的思潮也起源于 19 世纪，尽管它的轮廓可能比其他社会科学要不清晰。人类思想与社会秩序的密切关系，以及它对教育和其他形式的社会化的依赖，在 18 世纪是众所周知的。然而，在 19 世纪，一种更加系统的思考出现了，以揭示人类心理的社会和文化根源，以及对世界上不同文化和社会的分析可能揭示的几种类型的“集体思想”。在德国，莫里茨·拉撒路（Moritz Lazarus）和威廉·温特（Wilhelm Wundt）试图将心理现象的研究与对整个文化的分析融合在一起。然而，俗间心理学，正如它的名字一样，并没有持续很长时间。

Much more esteemed were the works of such thinkers as Gabriel Tarde, Gustave Le Bon, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, and Durkheim in France and Simmel in Germany (all of whom also wrote in the early 20th century). Here, in concrete, often highly empirical studies of small groups, associations, crowds, and other aggregates (rather than in the main line of psychology during the century, which tended to be sheer philosophy at one extreme and a variant of physiology at the other) are to be found the real beginnings of social psychology. Although the point of departure in each of the studies was the nature of association, they dealt, in one degree or another, with the internal processes of psychosocial interaction, the operation of attitudes and judgments, and the social basis of personality and thought—in short, with those phenomena that would, at least in the 20th century, be the substance of social psychology as a formal discipline.
更受尊敬的是法国的加布里埃尔·塔尔德（Gabriel Tarde）、古斯塔夫·勒庞（Gustave Le Bon）、吕西安·莱维-布鲁尔（Lucien Lévy-Bruhl）和涂尔干（Durkheim）和德国的西梅尔（Simmel）等思想家的著作（他们都在 20 世纪初写作）。在这里，在对小团体、协会、人群和其他聚合体（而不是在本世纪心理学的主线中，在一个极端往往是纯粹的哲学，另一个极端往往是生理学的变体）的具体、通常是高度实证的研究中，可以找到社会心理学的真正开端。尽管每项研究的出发点都是联想的性质，但它们或多或少地涉及社会心理互动的内部过程、态度和判断的运作以及人格和思想的社会基础——简而言之，至少在 20 世纪，这些现象会成为社会心理学作为一门正式学科的实质。

Social statistics and social geography 社会统计和社会地理学

Two final 19th-century trends to become integrated into the social sciences in the 20th century are social statistics and social (or human) geography. At that time, neither achieved the notability and acceptance in colleges and universities that such fields as political science and economics did. Both, however, were as clearly visible by the latter part of the century and both were to exert a great deal of influence on the other social sciences by the beginning of the 20th century: social statistics on sociology and social psychology preeminently; social geography on political science, economics, history, and certain areas of anthropology, especially those areas dealing with the dispersion of races and the diffusion of cultural elements. In social statistics the key figure of the century was Quetelet, who was the first, on any systematic basis, to call attention to the kinds of structured behaviour that could be observed and identified only through statistical means. It was he who brought into prominence the momentous concept of “the average man” and his behaviour. The two major figures in social or human geography in the century were Friedrich Ratzel in Germany and Paul Vidal de La Blache in France. Both broke completely with the crude environmentalism of earlier centuries, which had sought to show how topography and climate actually determine human behaviour, and they substituted the more subtle and sophisticated insights into the relationships of land, sea, and climate on the one hand and, on the other, the varied types of culture and human association that are to be found on Earth.
19 世纪最后两个被纳入 20 世纪社会科学的趋势是社会统计学和社会（或人文）地理学。当时，两者都没有在高等院校中取得像政治学和经济学等领域那样的知名度和接受度。然而，这两者都在本世纪下半叶清晰可见，并且到 20 世纪初，两者都对其他社会科学产生了巨大影响：社会学和社会心理学的社会统计学占主导地位;社会地理学关于政治学、经济学、历史和人类学的某些领域，特别是那些涉及种族分散和文化元素扩散的领域。在社会统计学方面，本世纪的关键人物是奎特莱特，他是第一个在任何系统的基础上，引起人们对只有通过统计手段才能观察到和识别的结构化行为类型的人们的关注。正是他使“普通人”这一重要概念和他的行为变得突出。本世纪社会或人文地理学领域的两位主要人物是德国的弗里德里希·拉策尔（Friedrich Ratzel）和法国的保罗·维达尔·德拉布拉什（Paul Vidal de La Blache）。两者都与前几个世纪粗暴的环保主义完全决裂，后者试图展示地形和气候如何实际决定人类行为，他们一方面取代了对陆地、海洋和气候关系的更微妙和复杂的见解，另一方面，他们取代了地球上各种类型的文化和人类交往。

Robert A. NisbetLiah Greenfeld

Social science from the turn of the 20th century 20 世纪之交的社会科学

Science and social science 科学和社会科学

It is impossible to understand, much less to assess, the social sciences without first understanding what, in general, science is. The word itself conveys little. As late as the 18th century, science was used as a near-synonym of art, both meaning any kind of knowledge—though the sciences and the arts could perhaps be distinguished by the former’s greater abstraction from reality. Art in this sense designated practical knowledge of how to do something—as in the “art of love” or the “art of politics”—and science meant theoretical knowledge of that same thing—as in the “science of love” or the “science of politics.” But, after the rise of modern physics in the 17th century, particularly in the English-speaking world, the connotation of science changed drastically. Today, occupying on the knowledge continuum the pole opposite that of art (which is conceived as subjective, living in worlds of its own creation), science, considered as a body of knowledge of the empirical world (which it accurately reflects), is generally understood to be uniquely reliable, objective, and authoritative. The change in the meaning of the term reflected the emergence of science as a new social institution—i.e., an established way of thinking and acting in a particular sphere of life—that was organized in such a way that it could consistently produce this type of knowledge.
如果不首先了解科学通常是什么，就不可能理解社会科学，更不可能评估社会科学。这个词本身传达的意义不大。直到 18 世纪，科学几乎被用作艺术的同义词，两者都意味着任何类型的知识——尽管科学和艺术可能可以通过前者与现实的更大抽象来区分。在这个意义上，艺术是指关于如何做某事的实践知识——如“爱的艺术”或“政治的艺术”——而科学是指关于同一事物的理论知识——如“爱的科学”或“政治的科学”。但是，在 17 世纪现代物理学兴起之后，特别是在英语世界，科学的内涵发生了翻天覆地的变化。今天，在知识连续体上占据与艺术相反的一极（艺术被认为是主观的，生活在自己创造的世界中），科学被认为是经验世界的知识体系（它准确地反映了这一点），通常被理解为独特可靠、客观和权威。该术语含义的变化反映了科学作为一种新的社会制度的出现——即在特定生活领域中一种既定的思维和行为方式——它的组织方式使其能够始终如一地产生这种类型的知识。

Also called “modern science”—to distinguish it from sporadic attempts to produce objective knowledge of empirical reality in the past—the institution of science is oriented toward the understanding of empirical reality. That institution presupposes not only that the world of experience is ordered and that its order is knowable but also that the order is worth understanding in its own right. When, as in the European Middle Ages, God was conceived as the only reality worth knowing, there was no place for a consistent effort to understand the empirical world. The emergence of the institution of science, therefore, was predicated on the reevaluation of the mundane vis-à-vis the transcendental. In England the perceived importance of the empirical world rose tremendously with the replacement of the religious consciousness of the feudal society of orders by an essentially secular national consciousness following the 15th-century Wars of the Roses (see below Applications of the science of humanity: nationalism, economic growth, and mental illness). Within a century of redefining itself as a nation, England placed the combined forces of royal patronage and social prestige behind the systematic investigation of empirical reality, thereby making the institution of science a magnet for intellectual talent.
科学机构也被称为“现代科学”——为了区别于过去零星地试图产生对经验现实的客观知识——科学机构以理解经验现实为导向。这个机构不仅假定经验世界是有序的，而且它的秩序是可知的，而且这种秩序本身就值得理解。当像欧洲中世纪一样，上帝被认为是唯一值得了解的现实时，就没有地方持续努力来理解经验世界。因此，科学机构的出现是建立在对世俗与超验的重新评估之上的。在15世纪的玫瑰战争之后，随着封建秩序社会的宗教意识被本质上世俗的民族意识所取代，实证世界的重要性大大上升（见下文人文科学的应用：民族主义、经济增长和精神疾病）。在重新定义自己作为一个国家的一个世纪内，英格兰将皇室赞助和社会声望的联合力量置于对实证现实的系统调查背后，从而使科学机构成为吸引知识人才的磁铁。

The goal of understanding the empirical world as it is prescribed a method for its gradual achievement. Eventually called the method of conjecture and refutation, or the scientific method (see hypothetico-deductive method), it consisted of the development of hypotheses, formulated logically to allow for their refutation by empirical evidence, and the attempt to find such evidence. The scientific method became the foundation of the normative structure of science. Its systematic application made for the constant supersession of contradicted and refuted hypotheses by better ones—whose sphere of consistency with the evidence (their truth content) was accordingly greater—and for the production of knowledge that was ever deeper and more reliable. In contrast to all other areas of intellectual endeavour (and despite occasional deviations) scientific knowledge has exhibited sustained growth. Progress of that kind is not simply a desideratum: it is an actual—and distinguishing—characteristic of science.
理解经验世界的目标规定了逐步实现的方法。最终被称为猜想和反驳的方法，或科学方法（见假设-演绎法），它包括假设的发展，逻辑地表述以允许通过经验证据反驳它们，并试图找到这些证据。科学方法成为科学规范结构的基础。它的系统应用使得相互矛盾和反驳的假设不断被更好的假设所取代——这些假设与证据的一致性范围（它们的真理内容）相应地更大——并且产生了越来越深入和可靠的知识。与所有其他智力努力领域相反（尽管偶尔会出现偏差），科学知识表现出持续增长。这种进步不仅仅是一种观点：它是科学的一个实际的、独特的特征。

There was no progressive development of objective knowledge of empirical reality before the 17th century—no science, in other words. In fact, there was no development of knowledge at all. Interest in questions that, after the 17th century, would be addressed by science (questions about why or how something is) was individual and passing, and answers to such questions took the form of speculations that corresponded to existing beliefs about reality rather than to empirical evidence. The formation of the institution of science, with its socially approved goal of systematic understanding of the empirical world, as well as its norms of conjecture and refutation, was the first, necessary, condition for the progressive accumulation of objective and reliable knowledge of empirical reality.
在 17 世纪之前，没有经验现实的客观知识的进步发展——换句话说，没有科学。事实上，根本没有知识的发展。对 17 世纪之后由科学解决的问题（关于事物为什么或如何存在的问题）的兴趣是个人的和传递的，对这些问题的回答采取了与关于现实的现有信念相对应的猜测形式，而不是与经验证据相对应的。科学机构的形成，其社会认可的对经验世界的系统理解的目标，以及它的猜想和反驳的规范，是逐步积累关于经验现实的客观和可靠知识的第一个必要条件。

For the science of matter, physics, the institutionalization of science was also a sufficient condition. But the development of sciences of other aspects of reality—specifically of life and of humanity—was prevented for several more centuries by a philosophical belief, dominant in the West since the 5th century bce, that reality has a dual nature, consisting partly of matter and partly of spirit (see also mind-body dualism; spiritualism). The mental or spiritual dimension of reality, which for most of this long period was by far the more important, was empirically inaccessible. Accordingly, the emergence of modern physics in the 17th century led to the identification of the material with the empirical, the scientific, and later with the objective and the real. And this identification in turn caused anything nonmaterial to be perceived as ideal (see idealism), outside the scope of scientific inquiry, subjective, and, eventually, altogether unreal.
对于物质科学、物理学来说，科学的制度化也是一个充分的条件。但是，现实其他方面的科学发展——特别是生命和人类的科学——被一种哲学信仰阻止了几个世纪，这种哲学信仰自公元前 5 世纪以来在西方占主导地位，即现实具有双重性质，部分由物质和部分精神组成（另见身心二元论;唯灵论）。现实的精神或精神层面，在这段漫长时期的大部分时间里是最重要的，但从经验上来说是无法接近的。因此，17 世纪现代物理学的出现导致材料与经验、科学以及后来的客观和现实相认同。而这种认同反过来又导致任何非物质的东西被认为是理想的（参见唯心主义），在科学探究的范围之外，是主观的，最终，完全是不真实的。

That misconception of the nonmaterial placed the study of life and especially the study of humanity—both of whose subjects were undeniably real, though they also evidently contained nonmaterial dimensions—between the horns of a dilemma. Either those tremendously important aspects of reality could not be scientifically approached at all, or they needed to be reduced to their material dimensions, a project that was logically impossible. Both areas of study, consequently, were confined either to the mere collection and cataloging of information that could not be scientifically interpreted (in the case of the study of life, the assignment of “natural history”) or to the formulation of speculations that could not be empirically tested (so-called “theory” as regards humanity). A progressive accumulation of objective knowledge regarding these aspects of empirical reality—a science of such aspects—was beyond reach.
这种对非物质的误解使对生命的研究，尤其是对人性的研究——不可否认，这两个主题都是真实的，尽管它们显然也包含非物质的维度——处于两难境地的角中。要么根本无法用科学来接近现实的那些极其重要的方面，要么它们需要被简化到它们的物质维度，这在逻辑上是不可能的。因此，这两个研究领域要么局限于对无法科学解释的信息进行单纯的收集和编目（在生命研究的情况下，分配了“自然历史”），要么局限于无法通过实证检验的推测的形成（关于人类的所谓“理论”）。关于经验现实的这些方面的客观知识的逐步积累——一门关于这些方面的科学——是遥不可及的。

Darwin: On the Origin of SpeciesTitle page of the 1859 edition of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection.(more)

达尔文：《物种起源》——查尔斯·达尔文《物种起源：通过自然选择的方式》1859 年版的标题页。
查尔斯·罗伯特·达尔文（Charles Robert Darwin，1809年2月12日—1882年4月19日），英国生物学家，进化论的奠基人。

Biology escaped this ontological trap in 1859 with the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species. The theory of evolution by means of natural selection, operative throughout all of life and irreducible to any of the laws of physics (though operating within the conditions of those laws and therefore logically consistent with them), allowed life to be characterized as an autonomous reality, breaking through the blinders of psychophysical dualism and adding to reality at least one other colossal dimension: the organic. The realization that its subject matter was autonomous established the study of life as an independent field of scientific inquiry—the science of organic reality. Since then, biology has been progressing by leaps and bounds, building on past achievements and ever improving or replacing biological theories by better ones, able to withstand tests by more empirical evidence.
生物学在 1859 年随着达尔文的《物种起源》的出版而摆脱了这个本体论陷阱。通过自然选择进行的进化论，贯穿整个生命，并且不可简化为任何物理定律（尽管在这些定律的条件下运作，因此在逻辑上与它们一致），允许生命被描述为一个自主的现实，突破了心理物理二元论的盲点，为现实增加了至少另一个巨大的维度：有机的。认识到其主题是自主的，将生命研究确立为一个独立的科学探究领域——有机现实科学。从那时起，生物学一直在突飞猛进，以过去的成就为基础，不断改进或用更好的理论取代生物学理论，能够经受住更多实证证据的考验。

Social science in the research universities 研究型大学的社会科学

Biology thus created a way to circumvent the dualist psychophysical ontology—the cognitive obstacle preventing the development of sciences other than the one focusing on material reality, physics—and made scientific activity and knowledge possible regarding nonmaterial empirical reality, which included humanity. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the development of a science of humanity were finally in place. Unfortunately, however, no accumulation of reliable objective knowledge about humanity followed. The reason for that failure was the institutionalization in the United States at the turn of the 20th century of the social sciences as academic disciplines within the newly formed research universities.
因此，生物学创造了一种方法来规避二元论的心理物理本体论——除了专注于物质现实、物理学的科学之外，阻碍科学发展的认知障碍——并使关于非物质经验现实（包括人类）的科学活动和知识成为可能。发展人文科学的必要和充分条件终于到位。然而，不幸的是，关于人类的可靠客观知识并没有随之积累。失败的原因是 20 世纪之交美国社会科学作为新成立的研究型大学的学术学科的制度化。

In the half-century after the American Civil War (1861–65), the United States rapidly became the most populous and the most prosperous society in the Western world. That prosperity created numerous opportunities for lucrative and prestigious academic careers in the country’s new university establishment, whose immediately robust bureaucracies and graduate departments for professional training were soon the model for other countries to follow. The bureaucratization and departmentalization within the research universities did not affect the development of the exact and natural sciences, which were then already on a firm footing and progressing apace, but it effectively prevented the formation of a science of humanity, erecting a series of obstacles on the way to the accumulation of objective knowledge of that core aspect of empirical reality, instead of facilitating the development of such a science (e.g., by protecting practicing scientists from the pressures of public opinion).
在美国南北战争（1861-65 年）后的半个世纪里，美国迅速成为西方世界人口最多、最繁荣的社会。这种繁荣为该国新成立的大学机构创造了许多有利可图和享有盛誉的学术职业机会，其立即强大的官僚机构和专业培训研究生院很快就成为其他国家效仿的榜样。研究型大学内部的官僚化和部门化并没有影响精确科学和自然科学的发展，这些科学当时已经站稳了脚跟并迅速发展，但它有效地阻止了人文科学的形成，在积累经验现实的核心方面的客观知识的道路上设置了一系列障碍。而不是促进这样一门科学的发展（例如，通过保护执业科学家免受公众舆论的压力）。

American research universities were generally the creation of two groups: post-Civil War business magnates, who appreciated the possibilities for revolutionizing industrial production opened up by advances in physics and biology and were eager to invest in the development of science; and elements of the East Coast gentry, the scions of old families who had formed the bulk of the colonial and pre-Civil War traditional cultural elite. The latter group was not intellectually sophisticated and was not much interested in the nature or history of science. Their central concern was the change in the traditional structure of American society that had been brought about by increasing immigration and in particular by the rise, from the less genteel strata of society, of a new business elite—the “new rich,” whom the cultural elite generally derided as “robber barons.” Worried that those changes threatened their own position in society, the traditional elite also believed that great wealth, unconnected to the style of life which had legitimated social status before the Civil War, created numerous social problems and was deleterious to society as a whole. In 1865 some prominent members of the traditional elite formed in Boston the American Association for the Promotion of Social Science (AAPSS), the goal of which, according to the organization’s constitution, was
美国研究型大学通常由两个群体组成：南北战争后的商业巨头，他们欣赏物理学和生物学的进步为工业生产带来革命性的可能性，并渴望投资于科学的发展;以及东海岸绅士的元素，他们是老家族的后裔，他们构成了殖民地和南北战争前传统文化精英的大部分。后者在智力上并不成熟，对科学的性质或历史不太感兴趣。他们主要关心的是美国社会传统结构的变化，这种变化是由移民的增加所带来的，特别是由于从社会中较不上流的阶层崛起的新商业精英——“新富豪”，文化精英通常嘲笑他们为“强盗大亨”。由于担心这些变化威胁到他们自己的社会地位，传统精英还认为，巨大的财富与内战前使社会地位合法化的生活方式无关，造成了许多社会问题，对整个社会有害。1865 年，一些传统精英的杰出成员在波士顿成立了美国社会科学促进协会（AAPSS），根据该组织的章程，其目标是

to aid the development of social science, and to guide the public mind to the best practical means of promoting the amendment of laws, the advancement of education, the prevention and repression of crime, the reformation of criminals, and the progress of public morality, the adoption of sanitary regulations, and the diffusion of sound principles on questions of economy, trade, and finance.
协助社会科学的发展，并引导公众思想采取最佳的实际手段，以促进法律的修改、教育的进步、预防和制止犯罪、罪犯的改造和公共道德的进步、卫生法规的通过和经济问题的合理原则的传播，贸易和金融。

The constitution further declared that the AAPSS
宪法进一步宣布，AAPSS

will give attention to pauperism, and the topics related thereto; including the responsibility of the well-endowed and successful, the wise and educated, the honest and respectable, for the failures of others. It will aim to bring together the various societies and individuals now interested in these objects, for the purpose of obtaining by discussion the real elements of truth; by which doubts are removed, conflicting opinions harmonized, and a common ground afforded for treating wisely the great social problems of the day.
将关注贫穷主义和与之相关的话题;包括有天赋和成功的人、聪明和受过教育的人、诚实和受人尊敬的人对他人失败的责任。它的目标是将现在对这些对象感兴趣的各种社会和个人聚集在一起，目的是通过讨论获得真理的真正要素;通过这种怀疑，可以消除疑虑，协调相互矛盾的意见，并为明智地处理当今的重大社会问题提供共同基础。

Rhetorically, the declaration reasserted the authority of the traditional elite, which the rise of the independent business elite had largely undermined. Wisdom and education were equated with honesty and respectability, and wise and educated members of the AAPSS, it was implied, were already in possession of social science—they already knew, prior to any research, the sound principles upon which the great questions of economy, trade, finance, and the responsibilities of the business classes should be based. In that context, “social science” was not an open-ended process of accumulation of objective knowledge of empirical reality by means of logically formulated conjectures subject to refutation by contradictory evidence. Rather, it was a form of political advocacy, practiced and supported by those who considered themselves possessed of a special insight and capable of “obtaining by discussion the real elements of truth.” In other words, the “science” the AAPSS sought to foster was an ideology.
从修辞上讲，该宣言重申了传统精英的权威，而独立商业精英的崛起在很大程度上削弱了这种权威。智慧和教育等同于诚实和可敬，而 AAPSS 的聪明和受过教育的成员，暗示他们已经拥有社会科学——他们在进行任何研究之前就已经知道经济、贸易、金融和商业阶层责任等重大问题应该基于的合理原则。在那种背景下，“社会科学”不是一个开放式的过程，通过逻辑制定的猜想来积累对经验现实的客观知识，这些猜想可能会被相互矛盾的证据反驳。相反，它是一种政治宣传形式，由那些认为自己拥有特殊洞察力并能够“通过讨论获得真理的真正要素”的人实践和支持。换句话说，AAPSS 试图培养的“科学”是一种意识形态。

The preoccupations of social science so conceived, as indicated in the AAPSS constitution, ranged from “pork as an article of food” to the management of insane asylums. From the start, however, two areas dominated: “economy, trade, and finance”—including national debt, industrial relations, and related topics, reflecting the economic focus of the gentry’s social criticism—and education, including the “relative value of classical and scientific instruction in schools and colleges.” Here “scientific instruction” referred to instruction in the physical sciences (biology having barely begun), which was relatively new, while classical instruction was what the members of the traditional elite had received in their own schools and colleges. The latter form of education had lost some of its prestige as a result of the demonstrated success of the business magnates, most of whom had received no formal education at all. The elite’s insistence on the social importance of such (nonscientific) education was thus connected to its need to protect its status.
正如 AAPSS 章程所指出的，如此设想的社会科学关注点范围从“猪肉作为食物”到精神病院的管理。然而，从一开始，两个领域就占据主导地位：“经济、贸易和金融”——包括国债、劳资关系和相关主题，反映了士绅社会批判的经济重点——以及教育，包括“古典和科学教学在学校和学院中的相对价值”。这里的“科学教学”指的是物理科学的教学（生物学才刚刚开始），这是相对较新的，而古典教学是传统精英成员在他们自己的学校和学院中接受的。由于商业巨头的成功，后一种形式的教育已经失去了一些声望，他们中的大多数人根本没有接受过正规教育。因此，精英们坚持这种（非科学）教育的社会重要性，这与他们保护自身地位的需要有关。

Johns Hopkins University Homewood House, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.

“约翰·霍普金斯大学，霍普金斯之家，位于马里兰州巴尔的摩的约翰·霍普金斯大学。”

Within a year the AAPSS merged with the American Social Science Association (a subsidiary of the Massachusetts Board of Charities), also formed in 1865. The leading patrician reformers—the ASSA’s officers—included three future research-university presidents, who would play a major role in the creation of these new institutions. Social scientists capitalized on the uncultured businessmen’s interest in natural science and harnessed it to their specific status concerns: offering their cooperation in developing institutions for the promotion of science, they established themselves as authorities over how far the definition of science would reach. By the time of the founding of the first research university, Johns Hopkins, in 1876, it was thoroughly in the interests of those who identified themselves as social scientists to be generally recognized as members of the scientific profession, alongside physicists and biologists. In the wake of the Darwinian revolution in biology, the prestige of science among the educated classes had skyrocketed, quickly catching up with the respect commanded by religion and indeed leaving it behind. Science was emerging as the preeminent intellectual and even moral authority within American society, and it was only natural for social scientists (many of whom, incidentally, were clergymen) to wish to share in the authority it afforded.
一年之内，AAPSS 与同样成立于 1865 年的美国社会科学协会（马萨诸塞州慈善委员会的子公司）合并。主要的贵族改革者——ASSA 的官员——包括三位未来的研究型大学校长，他们将在这些新机构的创建中发挥重要作用。社会科学家利用了没有文化的商人对自然科学的兴趣，并将其用于解决他们特定的地位问题：在发展促进科学的机构方面提供合作，他们将自己确立为科学定义将达到多大程度的权威。到 1876 年第一所研究型大学约翰霍普金斯大学成立时，与物理学家和生物学家一起被普遍认为是科学界成员完全符合那些自认为是社会科学家的人的利益。在达尔文生物学革命之后，科学在受教育阶层中的声望飙升，很快就赶上了宗教所要求的尊重，实际上将其抛在了后面。科学正在成为美国社会中卓越的知识甚至道德权威，社会科学家（顺便说一句，其中许多人是神职人员）希望分享它所提供的权威是很自然的。

That desire was evident in two developments that followed closely on the heels of the founding of Johns Hopkins: the division of “social science” into “disciplines” and efforts to model those disciplines on physics. The latter development helped to establish as virtually unquestionable the twin beliefs that (1) the basis of the scientific method, what made science objective, was quantification, and, accordingly, that (2) the degree of scientific legitimacy possessed by a discipline corresponded to the volume of quantitative text it produced (i.e., the extent to which quantitative symbols were used in its publications).
这种愿望在约翰霍普金斯大学成立后紧随其后的两项发展中显而易见：“将”社会科学“划分为”学科“，并努力以物理学为这些学科建模。后一种发展有助于确立几乎无可置疑的双重信念：（1）科学方法的基础，使科学客观的是量化，因此，（2）一门学科所拥有的科学合法性程度与其产生的定量文本的数量相对应（即，在其出版物中使用定量符号的程度）。

The first social science to be institutionalized as an academic discipline within the research universities was history—specifically, economic history. Many social scientists from patrician American families had spent time in German universities, in whose liberal arts faculties history had already emerged as a highly respectable profession; the first American university professors were thus encouraged to see themselves as historians. In its turn, the economic focus of the new historians reflected the old target of their social criticism. In 1884, only eight years after the founding of Johns Hopkins, American historians held their first annual convention, where they formed a professional organization, the American Historical Association (AHA). During the AHA’s meeting in 1885, some historians left the AHA to form the American Economic Association (AEA). Several years later, a group of the first American economists left the AEA to form the American Political Science Association (APSA). And in 1905, some of those political scientists, who had earlier identified as economists and before that considered themselves historians, quit the APSA to form the American Sociological Society (ASS), now called the American Sociological Association (ASA). Thus, by the very early 20th century, it could be said that an association of gentry activists and social critics, affiliated with a charitable organization, had spawned four academic disciplines, splitting social science into history, economics, political science, and sociology.
在研究型大学中，第一个被制度化为一门学科的社会科学是历史——具体来说，就是经济史。许多来自美国贵族家庭的社会科学家都曾在德国大学学习过，在这些大学里，文科学院的历史已经成为一个非常受人尊敬的职业;因此，第一批美国大学教授被鼓励将自己视为历史学家。反过来，新历史学家的经济焦点反映了他们社会批评的旧目标。1884 年，约翰霍普金斯大学成立仅八年后，美国历史学家举行了他们的第一次年度大会，在那里他们成立了一个专业组织，即美国历史协会（AHA）。在 1885 年 AHA 会议期间，一些历史学家离开了 AHA，成立了美国经济协会（AEA）。几年后，一群第一批美国经济学家离开了 AEA，成立了美国政治学协会（APSA）。1905 年，一些早期自认为是经济学家、在此之前认为自己是历史学家的政治科学家退出了 APSA，成立了美国社会学学会（ASS），现在称为美国社会学协会（ASA）。因此，到 20 世纪初，可以说一个隶属于慈善组织的绅士活动家和社会批评家协会催生了四个学科，将社会科学分为历史、经济学、政治学和社会学。

The relatively spontaneous fission of social science was different in character from specialization within physics and biology. Scientific specialization was prompted by developments in the understanding of the subject matter: anomalies in earlier theories contradicted by evidence, the raising of new questions, or the discovery of previously unknown causal factors. It accompanied the advancement of objective knowledge of empirical reality and contributed to its further progress. The break-up of “social science” into separate disciplines, in contrast, was driven not by scientific necessity but primarily by the desire of social scientists and research-university administrators to create additional career opportunities for themselves and their associates. Thus, in a manner of speaking, the cart was placed before the horse.
社会科学相对自发的裂变在性质上与物理学和生物学的专业化不同。对主题理解的发展推动了科学专业化：早期理论中的异常与证据相矛盾，提出新问题，或发现以前未知的因果因素。它伴随着经验现实的客观知识的进步，并为其进一步发展做出了贡献。相比之下，将“社会科学”分解为不同的学科并不是出于科学的必要性，而主要是出于社会科学家和研究型大学管理人员为自己和他们的同事创造更多职业机会的愿望。因此，从某种意义上说，马车被放在马之前。

The first step in that scientifically backward process was the foundation of professional associations. The existence of professional associations ostensibly justified the establishment of university departments in which the declared but undefined professions would be practiced and new generations of professionals trained. Such associations, however, mostly contributed to bureaucratization and served vested interests, doing little to advance any genuine understanding of humanity. Two more professions with longer histories, anthropology and psychology (both of which were independent of social criticism and largely unconcerned with the threat to the status of traditional elites posed by the uncultured rich) were incorporated within academic social sciences during this formative period. In neither case did their incorporation accurately reflect their already developed professional identities, but it did not interfere with their intellectual agendas and was accepted.
这个科学落后过程的第一步是建立专业协会。专业协会的存在表面上证明了建立大学系的合理性，在这些系中，将从事已宣布但未定义的职业，并培训新一代的专业人士。然而，这些协会大多助长了官僚化，为既得利益服务，对促进对人性的真正理解几乎没有什么帮助。在这个形成时期，另外两个历史更悠久的职业，人类学和心理学（两者都独立于社会批评，在很大程度上不关心未受文化的富人对传统精英地位构成的威胁）被纳入学术社会科学。在这两种情况下，他们的加入都没有准确反映他们已经发展的专业身份，但这并没有干扰他们的知识议程并被接受。

The identities and agendas of the three disciplines that arose from history in the research university—economics, political science, and sociology—were to develop within that also nascent institutional environment, which, like them, was in large measure brought into being by the desire of the traditional elite to re-establish its political and cultural authority. That environment attracted to the new social sciences people actuated by three quite independent motives, which would be the source of persistent confusion regarding the identity and agenda of each of those disciplines. To begin with, the conviction of the original American social scientists that they, better than anyone else, knew how society should be organized—that they, as experts on questions of the general good and social justice, were wielders of moral authority and should be natural advisors to policy makers—persisted even after social science split into economics, political science, and sociology. The desire to be treated as the wielders of such authority, as natural leaders of society, was the first motive.
研究型大学历史学中产生的三个学科——经济学、政治学和社会学——的身份和议程将在那个同样新生的制度环境中发展，与它们一样，这个环境在很大程度上是由传统精英重建其政治和文化权威的愿望而产生的。这种环境吸引了由三个相当独立的动机驱动的新社会科学人士，这将是关于这些学科的身份和议程的持续混乱的根源。首先，最初的美国社会科学家坚信，他们比任何人都更了解社会应该如何组织——他们作为普遍利益和社会正义问题的专家，是道德权威的持有者，应该成为政策制定者的天然顾问——即使在社会科学分裂为经济学之后，这种信念仍然存在。政治学和社会学。希望被视为这种权威的持有者，作为社会的天然领导者，是第一个动机。

All three disciplines continued to attract people who were interested not so much in understanding reality but in changing it, to paraphrase Marx’s famous thesis. However, such authority no longer could be claimed on the basis of a genteel lifestyle: with science successfully competing with religion as the source of certain knowledge and even ultimate meaning, what was now required was being recognized as scientists. Accordingly, the emphasis in social science shifted from “social” to “science,” and, as noted above, the term was understood to mean “like physics (and biology)” rather than “any kind of knowledge.” The desire for the status of scientists, specifically, was the second independent motive that attracted people to the social sciences.
这三个学科继续吸引着那些对理解现实不感兴趣，而是对改变现实感兴趣的人，套用马克思的著名论点。然而，这种权威不再能以上流社会的生活方式为基础来宣称：随着科学成功地与宗教竞争，成为某些知识甚至终极意义的来源，现在需要的是被承认为科学家。因此，社会科学的重点从“社会”转向“科学”，如上所述，该术语被理解为“像物理学（和生物学）一样”而不是“任何类型的知识”。具体来说，对科学家地位的渴望是吸引人们进入社会科学的第二个独立动机。

That motive was also the main reason behind the rise of the discipline of economics. Economics was explicitly modeled on physics (mainly in its use of quantification to express its ideas), reflecting the general ambition among would-be economists to hold with regard to society the position that physicists (and biologists) had held with regard to the natural world. Yet, social scientists knew exceedingly little about natural science and the nature of science beyond the fact that physics and biology were producing authoritative knowledge of their subject matters. They had a very limited understanding of what the authority of that knowledge was based on. As outside observers, it appeared to them (as it did to others) that scientific practice characteristically involved the use of numbers and algorithms—an esoteric language of expression. They concluded—in sharp contrast to the emerging humanistic discipline of philosophy of science, which focused on the scientific method of investigation and inference—that scientific knowledge was knowledge so expressed. Although efforts to quantify their subject matters were characteristic of all three of the newborn social sciences, economics went farthest in developing quantitative mannerisms and substituting the outward manner of formulating ideas for the method of arriving at them. As a means of establishing professional status, that practice again proved very effective: such mannerisms eventually made economics an exclusive domain, a kind of secret society with a language that nobody else understood, and established it as the queen of the social sciences, with commensurate political influence. For their part, both political science and sociology were also deeply preoccupied with their scientific status, and the quantitative methodologies and manners of expression they adopted were (and remain) valuable in maintaining it, though neither discipline has achieved the level of authority enjoyed by economics.
这个动机也是经济学学科崛起的主要原因。经济学明确地以物理学为蓝本（主要在于它使用量化来表达其思想），反映了潜在经济学家的普遍雄心，即在社会上持有物理学家（和生物学家）对自然界的立场。然而，社会科学家对自然科学和科学的本质知之甚少，只知道物理学和生物学正在产生关于其学科的权威知识。他们对这种知识的权威性所基于的理解非常有限。作为外部观察者，在他们看来（就像对其他人一样）科学实践的特点是涉及数字和算法的使用——一种深奥的表达语言。他们得出的结论是，科学知识就是如此表达的知识，这与新兴的人文主义科学学科形成鲜明对比，后者侧重于调查和推理的科学方法。尽管努力量化其主题是所有三门新生社会科学的特征，但经济学在发展定量方式和取代形成思想的外在方式方面走得最远。作为建立专业地位的一种手段，这种做法再次被证明非常有效：这种举止最终使经济学成为一个专属领域，一种拥有其他人听不懂的语言的秘密社团，并使其成为社会科学的女王，具有相应的政治影响力。就他们而言，政治学和社会学也都深深地关注着他们的科学地位，他们所采用的定量方法和表达方式对维持科学地位很有价值（并且仍然如此），尽管这两门学科都没有达到经济学所享有的权威水平。

The cultivation of their scientific status allowed the new disciplines to view their histories as part of the history of science: the story of the progressive accumulation of objective knowledge of reality and the ever more accurate and complete understanding of causal interrelationships between its constituent elements. Just like physics and biology, it was subsequently believed, the social sciences continued and dramatically improved upon a long tradition of unsystematic (because not scientific) thought on their subjects. The persistence of that narrative—in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence—attracted to economics, political science, and sociology people actuated by a third motive: a genuine interest in understanding empirical human reality. Believing the social-science narrative, those students eagerly underwent whatever methodological training their mentors suggested and shrugged off the latter’s ideological views and related activist tendencies as personal matters. Such social-science idealists have been responsible for much worthy scholarship produced over the first century and a half of social science’s academic existence.
他们的科学地位的培养使新学科能够将其历史视为科学史的一部分：对现实的客观知识的逐步积累，以及对其构成要素之间的因果关系的日益准确和完整的理解的故事。就像物理学和生物学一样，人们后来认为，社会科学在其学科上延续并极大地改进了长期的非系统性（因为不是科学的）思维传统。面对压倒性的相反证据，这种叙事的持续存在被经济学、政治学和社会学的人所吸引，他们的动机是第三个动机：对理解经验人类现实的真正兴趣。这些学生相信社会科学的叙事，热切地接受了他们的导师建议的任何方法论训练，并将后者的意识形态观点和相关激进主义倾向视为个人问题。这些社会科学理想主义者在社会科学学术存在的第一个半世纪中产生了许多有价值的学术成果。

In the meantime, psychology—always insistent that, focusing on the individual, it was unlike the other social sciences—largely reverted to its roots in natural science, content to study the animal brain and to leave the riddle of the human mind to philosophers. The preoccupations of the other social sciences have been quite irrelevant to it. The discipline of history, almost immediately abandoned by those of its original members primarily interested in self-promotion, early opted out of the social sciences and joined the ranks of the humanities, on the whole practicing scholarship for its own sake rather than laying any claim to social authority. In anthropology, too, the authority of the profession and the question of whether it should be considered a science have mattered far less than in the three core disciplines of the social science family. Anthropologists have found sufficient satisfaction in doing fieldwork in settings that, while affecting them deeply, could hardly have any bearing on their standing within their own society.
与此同时，心理学——始终坚持关注个人，与其他社会科学不同——在很大程度上回到了自然科学的根源，满足于研究动物的大脑，并将人类心灵的谜题留给哲学家。其他社会科学的关注点与它完全无关。历史学科，几乎立即被那些主要对自我推销感兴趣的原始成员所抛弃，他们很早就选择退出社会科学，加入了人文学科的行列，总的来说，他们是为了自己的利益而从事学术研究，而不是要求任何社会权威。在人类学中，该专业的权威性以及它是否应该被视为一门科学的问题也远不如在社会科学家族的三个核心学科中重要。人类学家在田野工作中发现了足够的满足感，这些环境虽然对他们影响很深，但几乎不会对他们在自己社会中的地位产生任何影响。

As was true of natural history before the rise of biology, the disciplines of history and anthropology, along with exceptional sociologists, political scientists, and economists, have certainly added valuable information to the common stores of knowledge about humanity. But such information, not being organized according to the logic of science, cannot on its own spur the development of knowledge and, therefore, does not lead to progress in understanding. Science is essentially a collective, continuous enterprise, impossible without certain institutional conditions—very specific ways of thinking and acting—that are fundamentally different from those that currently exist in research universities, insofar as the subject of humanity is concerned. The contributions of those social-science disciplines and scholars can be likened to the insights of exceptional individuals, capturing one or another aspect of material or organic reality before the emergence of physics and biology: they do not build up. Their significance is limited to cultural and historical moments of public interest in the particular subjects they happen to treat.
正如生物学兴起之前的自然历史一样，历史学和人类学学科，以及杰出的社会学家、政治学家和经济学家，无疑为人类知识的共同储备增添了有价值的信息。但是，这种信息如果不按照科学的逻辑进行组织，就不能本身刺激知识的发展，因此，它不会导致理解的进步。科学本质上是一个集体的、持续的事业，如果没有某些制度条件——非常具体的思维和行为方式——就人类主题而言，这些条件与目前存在于研究型大学的那些有着根本的不同，就不可能实现。这些社会科学学科和学者的贡献可以比作杰出个人的洞察力，在物理学和生物学出现之前捕捉到物质或有机现实的一个或另一个方面：它们不是建立起来的。它们的意义仅限于公众对它们碰巧涉及的特定主题感兴趣的文化和历史时刻。

Public interest changes with historical circumstances, causing the social sciences to switch directions: fashionable subjects and theories suddenly fall out of favour, and new ones just as quickly come into it, preventing any cumulative development. For example, from the 1940s through the 1980s, World War II and the Cold War made totalitarianism a major focus of political science and inspired in it the creation of the subdiscipline of Sovietology. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 deprived both areas of study of their relevance to policy makers and forced hundreds of political scientists to seek new subjects to investigate, resulting in the new fields of nationalism studies, transition studies (see transitional justice), democratization studies, and global studies, among others. Meanwhile, the discontent of many intellectuals with Western society, made legitimate by the Holocaust, shifted the ideology of social justice from preoccupation with economic structures (e.g., socioeconomic class) to preoccupation with identity (e.g., race, religion, gender, and sexual orientation), affecting, in particular, sociology. The discrediting of Marxism with the collapse of Soviet communism in Russia and eastern Europe reinforced this ideological reorientation: American (and then international) sociology became the science of “essentialist” inequalities (i.e., inequalities based on ascribed identities)—inequality now replacing the longtime staple of sociological research, stratification. As a science, sociology claimed the authority to discern such inequalities and to provide leadership in their elimination. Similarly, feminist, queer, and other subaltern (subordinate) perspectives, regularly included in the syllabi of courses on social science theory, prescribed how human reality should be interpreted. Such theories in turn inspired the founding of new programs in and departments of African American, Latinx (formerly Latin American), women’s, gender, and sexuality studies, which were duly recognized as belonging within the social sciences across the United States. Because racial and sexual diversity were topmost on the political agenda of the cultural elite outside academia (being viewed within the elite as promoting equality between identity groups), the universities became politically dependent on the social sciences in the sense of being reliant on them to maintain the favour of the cultural elite. This, in turn, protected the position of the social sciences within the universities even as the STEM disciplines (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics), which generally failed to attract women and ethnic minorities (excepting Jews and East and South Asians) in significant numbers, received most outside funding. In contrast, the humanities, which had neither financial nor political utility, lacked such protection.
公共利益随着历史环境的变化而变化，导致社会科学改变方向：时髦的学科和理论突然失宠，新的学科和理论也很快出现，阻止了任何累积的发展。例如，从 1940 年代到 1980 年代，第二次世界大战和冷战使极权主义成为政治学的主要焦点，并激发了苏联学分支学科的创建。1991 年苏联解体剥夺了这两个研究领域与政策制定者的相关性，并迫使数百名政治科学家寻找新的研究对象，从而产生了民族主义研究、过渡研究（见过渡时期正义）、民主化研究和全球研究等新领域。与此同时，许多知识分子对西方社会的不满，因大屠杀而合法化，将社会正义的意识形态从关注经济结构（例如，社会经济阶层）转变为关注身份（例如，种族、宗教、性别和性取向），尤其影响了社会学。苏联共产主义在俄罗斯和东欧的崩溃对马克思主义的诋毁加强了这种意识形态的重新定位：美国（然后是国际）社会学变成了“本质主义”不平等（即基于归属身份的不平等）的科学——不平等现在取代了社会学研究的长期主打——分层。作为一门科学，社会学声称有权辨别这种不平等并在消除这些不平等方面发挥领导作用。同样，女权主义、酷儿和其他从属（从属）观点，经常包含在社会科学理论课程大纲中，规定了应该如何解释人类现实。这些理论反过来又激发了非裔美国人、拉丁裔（前拉丁美洲人）、妇女、性别和性研究的新项目及其部门的成立，这些项目被正式承认属于美国各地的社会科学。由于种族和性别多样性在学术界以外的文化精英的政治议程上是最重要的（在精英内部被视为促进身份群体之间的平等），大学在政治上变得依赖社会科学，即依赖它们来维持文化精英的青睐。这反过来又保护了社会科学在大学中的地位，即使 STEM 学科（科学、技术、工程和数学）通常无法吸引大量女性和少数族裔（犹太人以及东亚和南亚人除外）获得大部分外部资金。相比之下，既没有经济效用也没有政治效用的人文学科则缺乏这样的保护。

Harry Dexter White and John Maynard KeynesJohn Maynard Keynes (right) and Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Harry Dexter White, 1946.(more)

哈里·德克斯特·怀特与约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯——1946年，右侧为英国经济学家约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯，左侧为美国财政部助理秘书哈里·德克斯特·怀特。

In a class of its own regarding authoritative status, the discipline of economics, from its beginning, oscillated between two theoretical and fundamentally prescriptive positions, both inherited from policy and philosophical debates of the 18th and 19th centuries. The classical, or liberal, position (regularly, though mistakenly, identified with Adam Smith) argued for free trade and competition and the self-regulation of the market. The opposing view, originally formulated by Friedrich List in the National System of Political Economy (1841), advocated state intervention and regulation, often in the form of protective tariffs. In the 20th century the interventionist approach came to be known as Keynesian economics, after the British economist John Maynard Keynes. After the Cold War, the classical theory was promoted largely under the name “economic globalization” and the opposing interventionist approach under the name “economic nationalism.” (That fact is ironic, as, historically, economic globalization had been an expression of the economic nationalism of the most competitive nations.) The oscillation between the two theories in economics broadly reflects status fluctuations among leading economic powers, as illustrated by the emergence of the United States—in the 19th and early-20th centuries the staunchest representative of protectionism—as the main champion of free trade immediately after World War II and by China’s analogous development as it rose to economic near-dominance in the second decade of the 21st century.
经济学学科从一开始就自成一派，在权威地位之间摇摆不定，这两种立场都继承自 18 世纪和 19 世纪的政策和哲学辩论。古典主义或自由主义立场（经常，尽管被错误地认定为亚当·斯密）主张自由贸易和竞争以及市场的自我调节。相反的观点最初由弗里德里希·李斯特（Friedrich List）在《国家政治经济学体系》（1841 年）中提出，主张国家干预和监管，通常以保护性关税的形式。在 20 世纪，干预主义方法以英国经济学家约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）的名字被称为凯恩斯主义经济学。冷战后，古典理论主要以“经济全球化”的名义推广，而相反的干预主义方法则以“经济民族主义”的名义进行推广。（这一事实具有讽刺意味，因为从历史上看，经济全球化一直是最具竞争力国家经济民族主义的表现。这两种经济学理论之间的摇摆大致反映了主要经济大国之间的地位波动，美国在19世纪和20世纪初是保护主义最坚定的代表，在二战后立即成为自由贸易的主要拥护者，而中国在21世纪第二个十年崛起为经济近乎主导地位时的类似发展也就说明了这一点。

One reason why there is no development in the social sciences—why, unlike the sciences, they cannot accumulate objective knowledge of reality within their domains—is that their focus is not their own: as discussed above, they shift in response to changing outside interests within the larger society. But social sciences can greatly reinforce those outside interests by creating the language in which to express them and by placing behind them the authority of science, presenting them as objective and “true.” In the frequent cases of correspondence between outside social interests and the self-interest of the social science professions, that capacity allows the social sciences to wield tremendous influence, directly affecting the legislative process, jurisprudence, the media, primary and secondary education, and politics in the United States (and, to a certain extent, in the rest of the Americas, Europe, and Australia). Indeed, within the long tradition of Western social thought, the “social sciences” stand out as one of the most powerful social forces—that power being due almost exclusively to their name. The intellectual significance of the disconnected, discontinuous efforts of which social sciences consist has been always limited and entirely dependent on the cultural clout of American society. In the 21st century, however, the increasing influence of East and South Asia (e.g., China and India) in world culture, economics, and politics has revealed the collective project of the social sciences as irrelevant to the concerns of societies outside the West. Claiming the authority of science but dispensing with objectivity, these academic disciplines, unlike the exact and natural sciences, can never become a common legacy of humanity. Remembered only as an episode, however influential, in 20th- and early 21st-century Western intellectual history, the social sciences could lose intellectual significance altogether.
社会科学没有发展的一个原因——为什么与科学不同，它们无法在自己的领域内积累关于现实的客观知识——是它们的重点不是自己的：如上所述，它们会随着更大社会中不断变化的外部利益而转移。但是，社会科学可以通过创造表达这些利益的语言，并将科学的权威置于它们后面，将它们呈现为客观和“真实”，从而极大地加强这些外部利益。在外部社会利益与社会科学专业的自身利益之间经常出现对应关系的情况下，这种能力使社会科学能够发挥巨大的影响力，直接影响美国的立法程序、法学、媒体、中小学教育以及政治（在某种程度上，在美洲其他地区，欧洲和澳大利亚）。事实上，在西方社会思想的悠久传统中，“社会科学”是最强大的社会力量之一——这种力量几乎完全归功于它们的名字。社会科学所包含的互不相连、不连续的努力的智力意义一直受到限制，并且完全取决于美国社会的文化影响力。然而，在 21 世纪，东亚和南亚（例如中国和印度）在世界文化、经济和政治中的影响力越来越大，这表明社会科学的集体项目与西方以外社会的关注无关。这些学科声称科学的权威，但摒弃了客观性，与精确科学和自然科学不同，它们永远不可能成为人类的共同遗产。在 20 世纪和 21 世纪初的西方思想史上，社会科学只被人们记住，无论多么有影响力，它可能会完全失去知识意义。

Remarkably, the phrase “social science” came from Europe, where it stood for a science of humanity. In Europe, the idea of the methodical pursuit of objective knowledge of humanity was entertained beginning in the 1840s, if not earlier. That science was necessarily conceived by analogy with physics—because biology as a science did not yet exist—and it was indeed called “social physics” by Comte, who later changed its name to “sociology.” The emphasis on society was suggested by the necessity to manage contemporary sensibilities. Unlike psychiatry and psychology, which were institutionalized as medical professions, the new comprehensive science of humanity would focus on what was human outside the individual, leaving the individual to the eventual science of biology—“organic physics” for Comte—which also figured prominently in his philosophy of science. That understandable compromise, however, jeopardized the future of the science of humanity: it was not appreciated how much was, in fact, in a name.
值得注意的是，“社会科学”一词来自欧洲，在那里它代表着人文科学。在欧洲，有条不紊地追求人类客观知识的想法从 1840 年代开始就开始流行，如果不是更早的话。这门科学必然是通过类比物理学来构思的——因为生物学作为一门科学还不存在——它确实被孔德称为“社会物理学”，后来孔德将其更名为“社会学”。对社会的重视是由管理当代情感的必要性所暗示的。与被制度化为医学专业的精神病学和心理学不同，新的综合人类科学将关注个体之外的人性，将个体留给最终的生物学科学——孔德的“有机物理学”——这在他的科学哲学中也占有重要地位。然而，这种可以理解的妥协却危及了人类科学的未来：人们并没有意识到一个名字实际上包含了多少。

Early attempts at a science of humanity: Durkheim and Weber 人文科学的早期尝试：涂尔干和韦伯

Émile Durkheim

埃米尔·涂尔干（法国社会学家爱米尔·涂尔干是现代社会学的开拓者，与马克思、韦伯并列为社会学的三大奠基人。他的主要思想集中于四部巨著，包括《社会分工论》、《社会学方法的规则》、《自杀论》和《宗教生活的基本形式》。涂尔干的论文和专著涉及教育、宗教、自杀、法律和犯罪等领域，为确立社会学为一门独立学科做出了巨大贡献）

At the turn of the 20th century, two European thinkers, Emile Durkheim in France and Max Weber in Germany, adopted the name “sociology” for the comprehensive science of humanity that both, independently, set out to develop. The subject-matter of the new science, Durkheim postulated, was a reality sui generis, of its own kind. It was, like life, autonomous, characterized by its own causality and irreducible to the laws of physics or biology, though existing within the conditions of those laws. Weber was not as explicit as Durkheim, but he, too, clearly recognized the autonomy of the human realm: without it there would be no logical justification for the existence of a separate science of humanity alongside physics and biology. Durkheim conceived of sociology as essentially the science of institutions, which he defined as collective ways of thinking (involving collective mental representations) and acting in various spheres of human life—e.g., in a family, in a market, or in a legislature. In Weber’s conception, sociology was the science of subjectively meaningful social action—i.e., action conceptualized or envisioned by the actor. Thus, for both, sociology was the science of symbolic reality, though Durkheim focused on symbolic phenomena at the collective level (today generally called “culture”), while Weber’s emphasis was on the individual level—i.e., the mind. Neither, however, stressed the symbolic character of his subject. Durkheim, for historical reasons, did not use the word “culture,” but Weber, before deciding in favour of “sociology,” thought of calling his project “cultural history.”
在 20 世纪之交，两位欧洲思想家，法国的埃米尔·涂尔干（Emile Durkheim）和德国的马克斯·韦伯（Max Weber），采用了“社会学”这个名称，来指代两人各自独立发展的综合性人类科学。涂尔干假设，新科学的主题是其自身的现实。它和生命一样，是自主的，以自身的因果关系为特征，尽管存在于物理或生物学定律的条件下，但它不可归结于物理定律或生物学定律。韦伯不像涂尔干那样明确，但他也清楚地认识到人类领域的自主性：没有它，就没有逻辑理由证明在物理学和生物学之外存在一门独立的人类科学。涂尔干认为社会学本质上是一门关于制度的科学，他将其定义为集体思维方式（涉及集体心理表征）并在人类生活的各个领域（例如，在家庭、市场或立法机构中）采取行动。在韦伯的概念中，社会学是一门关于主观意义社会行动的科学，即由行为者概念化或设想的行动。因此，对两者来说，社会学都是一门关于符号现实的科学，尽管涂尔干专注于集体层面的符号现象（今天通常称为“文化”），而韦伯则强调个人层面——即心灵。然而，两者都没有强调他的主题的象征性。由于历史原因，涂尔干没有使用“文化”这个词，但韦伯在决定支持“社会学”之前，考虑将他的项目称为“文化史”。

Max WeberMax Weber, 1918.

马克斯·韦伯(1918)
马克斯・韦伯，全名马克西米利安・卡尔・埃米尔・韦伯（德语：Maximilian Karl Emil Weber，Max Weber，1864 年 4 月 21 日－1920 年 6 月 14 日），男，德国社会学家、历史学家、政治学家、经济学家、哲学家，现代西方一位极具影响力的思想家，与卡尔・马克思和埃米尔・杜尔凯姆并称为社会学的三大奠基人。

As a science of symbolic reality, of culture and the mind across the spheres of human life, sociology necessarily integrated history and could not be imagined as separate from it: for both Durkheim and Weber, sociology divorced from history would amount to a science separate from its data. The organization of the “social sciences” in American research universities and all the academic institutions built on their model would make no sense to either of them, in general. Of course, specializations focusing on major institutions—politics, economy, family, religion, science, law—would be necessary, and Durkheim had this in mind when he spoke of political science, legal history, and anthropology as “sociological sciences,” or subfields of sociology, just as genetics and ecology are subfields of biology and inorganic chemistry and mechanics are subfields of physics. Weber examined the construction of meaning in politics, economy, and religion. For him, as for Durkheim, to consider sociology as one among several self-contained “social science” disciplines, each with its own subject, would be analogous to considering biology a separate discipline from other life sciences.
作为一门关于符号现实、跨越人类生活领域的文化和思想的科学，社会学必然整合了历史，不能被想象为脱离历史：对于涂尔干和韦伯来说，脱离历史的社会学就相当于一门脱离其数据的科学。一般来说，美国研究型大学和所有建立在他们模式之上的学术机构的“社会科学”组织对他们中的任何一个来说都毫无意义。当然，专注于主要机构（政治、经济、家庭、宗教、科学、法律）的专业化是必要的，涂尔干在将政治学、法律史和人类学称为“社会学科学”或社会学的子领域时考虑到了这一点，就像遗传学和生态学是生物学的子领域，无机化学和力学是物理学的子领域一样。韦伯研究了政治、经济和宗教中意义的建构。对他来说，就像涂尔干一样，将社会学视为几个独立的“社会科学”学科之一，每个学科都有自己的学科，这就类似于将生物学视为独立于其他生命科学的学科。

Yet, neither Durkheim nor Weber succeeded in articulating a logically justified program of research for the human science they envisioned. The term “sociology” misled them. Focusing attention on society, it implied that humanity was essentially a social phenomenon, in effect assuming rather than analyzing its ontology. But a moment’s thought is sufficient to realize that society is an attribute of numerous animal species. As a corollary of life, it obviously belongs within the province of biology, automatically making sociology a biological discipline and entailing that all sociologists, as a rule unfamiliar with biology, are unqualified to be sociologists. (The same could be said for all of the other social sciences.) The existence of sociology as an autonomous science is justified only by the irreducibility of the reality it presumes to study to organic and material phenomena.
然而，涂尔干和韦伯都没有成功地为他们设想的人文科学阐明一个合乎逻辑合理的研究计划。“社会学”一词误导了他们。将注意力集中在社会上，它暗示人类本质上是一种社会现象，实际上是假设而不是分析其本体论。但片刻的思考就足以意识到社会是众多动物物种的属性。作为生命的必然结果，它显然属于生物学的范畴，它自动使社会学成为一门生物学科，并意味着所有不熟悉生物学的社会学家通常都没有资格成为社会学家。（所有其他社会科学也是如此。社会学作为一门自主科学的存在，只有通过它假定研究的现实的不可简化性来证明其为有机现象和物质现象。

For all the persuasiveness of Durkheim’s lucid prose, however, it was not the existence of collective representations as such that explained the need for and justified sociology. Can one imagine a more rigidly structured social life, or one more clearly governed by shared, immutable, collective representations, than that of bees? Weber’s subjective meanings were equally inadequate—in this case not because of the evidence that animal actions, which are oriented toward the behaviour of others, are also based on subjective meanings but precisely because there is no such evidence: the very subjectivity of such meanings makes it impossible for them to be accessed by others. What was needed, then, was positive evidence of a qualitative distinction between humanity and the rest of the animal world, something evidently affecting all human life, to which biology had no access. The intellectual milieu of both thinkers led them away from such evidence.
然而，尽管涂尔干清晰的散文很有说服力，但并不是集体表征的存在本身解释了社会学的必要性和理由。我们能想象出一个比蜜蜂结构更严格的社会生活，或者一个更明显地由共享的、不变的、集体的表征支配的社会生活吗？韦伯的主观意义同样不充分——在这种情况下，不是因为有证据表明动物的行为（以他人的行为为导向）也是基于主观意义的，而恰恰是因为没有这样的证据：这种意义的主观性使得它们不可能被其他人所理解。因此，我们需要的是人类与动物世界其他部分之间质性区别的积极证据，这显然影响着所有人类生活，而生物学无法接触到这一点。这两位思想家的知识环境使他们远离了这些证据。

Despite explicitly postulating that the reality he focused on was sui generis, Durkheim never committed himself as to the nature of that reality. Although he was exclusively preoccupied with human social reality, his emphasis on the social obscured the distinctiveness of humanity and made it unclear why mental representations should be so central in his thinking. Durkheim’s attitude to psychology further complicated matters, leading him to insist strenuously that sociology was concerned only with collective representations and not with individual “ideas” and that it had nothing in common with the psychology and psychiatry of his day, which were predominantly biological, focused on the organ of the brain.
尽管明确假设他所关注的现实是独特的，但涂尔干从未承诺过该现实的本质。尽管他完全专注于人类的社会现实，但他对社会的强调掩盖了人性的独特性，并让人不清楚为什么心理表征应该在他的思考中如此重要。涂尔干对心理学的态度使问题进一步复杂化，导致他极力坚持认为社会学只关心集体表征，而不关心个人“思想”，它与他那个时代的心理学和精神病学没有任何共同之处，它们主要是生物学的，专注于大脑器官。

As Durkheim, in France, had to manage relations with scientists who doubted the scientific credentials of sociology, the difficulty that Weber faced in Germany had to do chiefly with philosophy: to pursue his research agenda, he needed to place himself outside the materialist-idealist dispute. As noted above, materialism was identified with the realm of the real and claimed all of empirical science as its own. Although action certainly belonged to the real, Weber’s interests lay with the empirical study of motives and ideas—which, philosophers would say, being ideal, could perhaps be intuited but could not be studied empirically. Weber thus declared action to be the subject of sociology, but he defined “action” as encompassing both action and inaction—as being both overt and covert, active and passive, comprising both decisions to act (to publicly express thoughts through acting) and decisions not to act—all of this insofar as it was subjectively meaningful for the actor. While enormously productive in the sense of directing so much of Weber’s work, that stratagem, however, was not successful: Weber’s sociology is still commonly interpreted as an idealist response to the historical materialism (see dialectical materialism) of Marx. But Weber was no more an idealist than a materialist. Both disembodied ideas and material phenomena (e.g., population, natural resources, death) interested him only in their meaning for the relevant actors—that is, the ways in which such ideas or phenomena interacted with the individual mind and were reflected in and interpreted by it. But the mind, populated as it was with ideas from the outside, was at every moment connected to the collective consciousness on which Durkheim focused. Durkheim’s collective representations, interacting with the mind, created subjective meanings—the central subject of Weber’s sociology.
由于法国的涂尔干必须处理与怀疑社会学科学地位的科学家的关系，韦伯在德国面临的困难主要与哲学有关：为了追求他的研究议程，他需要将自己置于唯物主义和唯心主义的争论之外。如上所述，唯物主义被认定为真实领域，并声称所有实证科学都是自己的。虽然行动肯定属于真实，但韦伯的兴趣在于对动机和思想的实证研究——哲学家会说，这些是理想的，也许可以凭直觉进行，但不能进行实证研究。因此，韦伯宣布行动是社会学的主题，但他将“行动”定义为包括行动和不行动——既公开又隐蔽，主动和被动，包括行动的决定（通过行动公开表达思想）和不行动的决定——所有这些都是只要它对行动者具有主观意义。虽然在指导韦伯的大部分工作方面取得了巨大的成果，但这种策略并不成功：韦伯的社会学仍然通常被解释为对马克思的历史唯物主义（见辩证唯物主义）的唯心主义回应。但韦伯与其说是一个唯心主义者，不如说是一个唯物主义者。无形体的观念和物质现象（例如，人口、自然资源、死亡）都只对它们对相关行为者的意义感兴趣——也就是说，这些观念或现象与个体思想互动并被个体思想反映和解释的方式。但是，头脑中充满了来自外部的思想，每时每刻都与涂尔干所关注的集体意识相连。涂尔干的集体表征与心灵互动，创造了主观意义——这是韦伯社会学的中心主题。

Both of the founding thinkers of sociology thought of it as the science that investigates specifically human mental phenomena. Unfortunately, “collective representations” and “social action” were vague new terms that suggested many things to many people, so much so that neither of the two thinkers had any inkling of the close affinity between their projects. Being unable, because of the dominant intellectual trends in their respective countries, to name their subject matter clearly, they were also unable to determine or properly analyze its nature or to argue convincingly why it, and only it, justified the establishment of a new, independent science alongside physics and biology. In the meantime, in the United States, powerful vested interests already stood in the way of such a science.
社会学的两位奠基思想家都认为它是专门研究人类心理现象的科学。不幸的是，“集体表征”和“社会行动”是模糊的新术语，对许多人来说暗示了很多事情，以至于这两位思想家都没有意识到他们的项目之间的密切联系。由于各自国家的主流知识趋势，他们无法清楚地命名他们的主题，他们也无法确定或正确分析其性质，也无法令人信服地论证为什么它，而且只有它，才能证明在物理学和生物学之外建立一门新的、独立的科学是合理的。与此同时，在美国，强大的既得利益集团已经阻碍了这样一门科学的诞生。

Outline of a future science of humanity 人类未来科学的概要

Humanity as a symbolic phenomenon 人性作为一种象征性现象

The possible emergence of a new intellectual centre of the world in East and South Asia, mentioned above, may offset and eventually nullify those vested interests. That development in turn could create the conditions necessary for the rise of a science of humanity, one that would be capable of progressively accumulating objective knowledge of its subject matter. Intellectually, the first step in that direction would be to identify the quality that distinguishes humanity from the subject matter of biology, defining humanity as an ontological category in its own right. Comparative zoology provides the empirical basis for such an identification. Comparing human beings with other animals immediately highlights the astonishing variability and diversity of human societies and human ways of life (what humans actually do in their roles as parents, workers, citizens, and so on) and the relative uniformity of animal societies, even among the most social and intelligent animals, such as wolves, lions, dolphins, and primates. Keeping in mind the minuscule quantitative difference between the genome of Homo sapiens and that of chimpanzees (barely more than 1 percent), it is clear that the enormous difference in variability of ways of life cannot be accounted for genetically—that is, in terms of biological evolution. Instead, it is explained by the fact that, while all other animals transmit their ways of life, or social orders, primarily genetically, humans transmit their ways of life primarily symbolically, through traditions of various kinds and, above all, through language. It is the symbolic transmission of human ways of life (both the symbolic transmission itself and the human ways of life that are necessarily so transmitted) to which the term “culture” implicitly refers. Culture in this sense qualitatively—and radically—separates human beings from the rest of the biological animal kingdom.
如上所述，在东亚和南亚出现一个新的世界知识中心可能会抵消并最终抵消这些既得利益。这种发展反过来可以为人文科学的兴起创造必要的条件，这门科学将能够逐步积累有关其主题的客观知识。从智力上讲，朝着这个方向迈出的第一步是确定将人类与生物学主题区分开来的品质，将人类定义为一个独立的本体论范畴。比较动物学为这种鉴定提供了实证基础。将人类与其他动物进行比较，立即凸显了人类社会和人类生活方式（人类作为父母、工人、公民等角色的实际作用）的惊人变异性和多样性，以及动物社会的相对统一性，即使是在最具社会性和智慧的动物中，如狼、狮子、海豚和灵长类动物。考虑到智人和黑猩猩的基因组在数量上的微小差异（仅略高于 1%），很明显，生活方式变异性的巨大差异不能用遗传学来解释——也就是说，不能用生物进化来解释。相反，它可以解释为，虽然所有其他动物主要通过基因传递他们的生活方式或社会秩序，但人类主要通过各种传统，尤其是通过语言，象征性地传递他们的生活方式。“文化”一词隐含地指的是人类生活方式的象征性传播（包括象征性传播本身和必然如此传递的人类生活方式）。从这个意义上说，文化从质量上和根本上将人类与生物动物王国的其他部分区分开来。

This empirical evidence of human distinctiveness shows that humanity is more than just a form of life—i.e., a biological species. It represents a reality of its own, nonorganic kind, justifying the existence of an autonomous science. The justification is provided not by the existence as such of society among humans but by the symbolic manner in which human societies are transmitted and regulated. Stating the point explicitly in this way shifts the focus of inquiry from social structures—the general focus of social sciences—to symbolic processes and opens up a completely new research program, in its significance analogous to the one that Darwin established for biology. Humanity is essentially a symbolic—i.e., cultural, rather than social—phenomenon.
人类独特性的这一经验证据表明，人类不仅仅是一种生命形式，即一种生物物种。它代表了它自己的非有机现实，证明了自主科学的存在是合理的。这种理由不是由人类社会本身的存在提供的，而是由人类社会的传递和调节的象征性方式提供的。以这种方式明确地陈述这一点，将研究的重点从社会结构（社会科学的一般关注点）转移到符号过程，并开辟了一个全新的研究计划，其意义类似于达尔文为生物学建立的研究计划。人性本质上是一种象征性的现象，即文化现象，而不是社会现象。

When the science of humanity at last comes into being, it will make use of the information collected in the social sciences but will not be a social science itself. Its subject matter, whichever aspects of human life it explores, will be the symbolic process on its multiple levels—the individual level of the mind and the collective levels of institutions, nations, and civilizations (see below Institutions, nations, and civilizations)—and the multitude of specific processes of which it consists. The science of humanity will be the science of culture, and its subdisciplines will be cultural sciences.
当人类科学最终出现时，它将利用在社会科学中收集的信息，但其本身不会是一门社会科学。它的主题，无论它探讨人类生活的哪个方面，都将是其多个层面的象征过程——心灵的个体层面和机构、国家和文明的集体层面（见下文机构、国家和文明）——以及它所包含的众多具体过程。人文科学将是文化科学，其子学科将是文化科学。

In contrast to the current social sciences, but like biology and physics, the science of humanity will have an inherent general standard for assessing particular claims and theories. As an autonomous reality, humanity is necessarily irreducible to the laws operating within the organic reality of life and to the laws operating within the physical reality of matter. It nevertheless exists within the boundary conditions of those laws—i.e., within the (organic and physical) reality created by the operation of those laws. Consequently, it is impossible without those boundary conditions. All the regularities of autonomous phenomena existing within the boundary conditions of other phenomena of a different nature (i.e., organic regularities existing within the boundary conditions of matter and cultural regularities existing within the boundary conditions of life) must be logically consistent with the laws operating within those boundary conditions. Therefore, every regularity postulated about humanity—every generalization, every theory—beginning with the definition of its distinctiveness, must entail mechanisms that relate that regularity to the human animal organism—mechanisms of translation or mapping onto the organic world. Indeed, the recognition that humanity is a symbolic reality implies such mechanisms, which connect every regularity in that reality to human biological organisms through the mind—the symbolic process supported by the individual brain.
与当前的社会科学相反，但与生物学和物理学一样，人文科学将有一个固有的一般标准来评估特定的主张和理论。作为一个自主的现实，人类必然不能简化于在生命的有机现实中运作的规律，也不可简化于在物质的物理现实中运作的规律。然而，它存在于这些定律的边界条件中——即，存在于这些定律的运作所创造的（有机的和物理的）现实中。因此，没有这些边界条件是不可能的。存在于其他不同性质现象的边界条件内的自主现象的所有规律性（即存在于物质边界条件内的有机规律和存在于生命边界条件内的文化规律）必须在逻辑上与在这些边界条件中运行的规律一致。因此，每一个关于人类的规律性假设——每一个概括性、每一个理论——从其独特性的定义开始，都必须包含将这种规律性与人类动物有机体联系起来的机制——翻译或映射到有机世界的机制。事实上，承认人类是一个象征性的现实意味着这样的机制，这些机制通过思想将现实中的每一个规律与人类生物有机体联系起来——这是由个体大脑支持的象征过程。

The postulation of the mind and other distinguishing characteristics of humanity follows directly from the recognition of humanity as a symbolic reality, because such characteristics are logically implied in the nature of symbols. Symbols are arbitrary signs: the meanings they convey are defined by the contexts in which they are used. Every context changes with the addition of every new symbol to it—which is to say, every context changes constantly. Every present meaning depends on the context immediately preceding it and conditions the contexts and meanings following it, the changes thus occurring in time. That fact means that symbolic reality is a temporal phenomenon—a process. (It must always be remembered that the concept of structure in discourse about culture can only be a metaphor; nothing stands still in culture—it is essentially historical, in other words.) The symbolic process—that is, the constant assignment and reassignment of meanings to symbols (their interpretation)—happens in the mind, which is implicitly recognized as distinct from the brain (or from whatever other physical organ it may be associated with) in languages in which “mind” is a concept. The mind, supported by and in contrast to the brain, is itself a process—analogous, for instance, to the physical processes of digestion, happening to food in the stomach, or breathing, happening to air in the lungs. More specifically, it is the processing of symbolic stimuli—culture—in the brain. That fact makes culture both a historical and a mental phenomenon. In the science of humanity, moreover, it necessitates a perennial focus on the individual (methodological individualism, indeed already recommended by Weber), the individual being defined as a culturally constituted being and the mind being seen as individualized culture (“culture in the brain”). It also precludes the reification of social structures of whatever kind, be they classes, races, states, or markets. Although the mind is the creative element in culture (the symbolic process in general and the specific processes of which it consists on the collective level), its creativity is necessarily oriented by cultural stimuli operating on it from the outside. The symbolic process, just like the organic process of life, takes place on the individual and the collective levels at once, involving both continuity and contingency. Like genetic mutations in the process of life, change is always a possibility, but its nature (and thus the direction of evolution in the case of life and the direction of history in the case of humanity) can never be predicted.
心灵的假设和人类的其他显著特征直接来自对人类作为象征现实的承认，因为这些特征在逻辑上隐含在符号的本质中。符号是任意的符号：它们所传达的含义由使用它们的上下文定义。每个上下文都会随着每个新符号的添加而变化——也就是说，每个上下文都在不断变化。每一个现在的意义都取决于它之前的语境，并制约着它之后的语境和意义，从而在时间上发生的变化。这一事实意味着象征现实是一个时间现象——一个过程。（必须永远记住，在关于文化的话语中，结构的概念只能是一个隐喻;文化中没有什么是一成不变的——换句话说，它本质上是历史的。符号过程——即不断为符号分配和重新分配意义（它们的解释）——发生在头脑中，在以“心”为概念的语言中，它被隐含地认为与大脑（或可能与它相关的任何其他物理器官）不同。由大脑支持并与大脑相反的思想本身就是一个过程——例如，类似于消化的物理过程，发生在胃里的食物，或者呼吸，发生在肺部的空气中。更具体地说，它是大脑中对象征性刺激（文化）的处理。这一事实使文化既是一种历史现象，也是一种精神现象。此外，在人文科学中，它需要长期关注个人（方法论个人主义，实际上已经被韦伯推荐了），个人被定义为文化构成的存在，而心灵被视为个人化的文化（“大脑中的文化”）。它还排除了任何种类的社会结构的统一，无论是阶级、种族、国家还是市场。尽管心灵是文化中的创造性元素（一般的象征过程以及它在集体层面上所包含的特定过程），但它的创造力必然是由来自外部对其产生的文化刺激所引导的。象征性过程，就像生命的有机过程一样，同时发生在个人和集体的层面上，涉及连续性和偶然性。就像生命过程中的基因突变一样，变化总是可能的，但它的性质（以及生命的进化方向和人类的历史方向）永远无法预测。

Identity, will, and the thinking self 身份、意志和思考自我

From the nature of symbols and symbolic processes one can also formulate hypotheses regarding the inner structure or anatomy of the mind, which can then be methodically tested against empirical evidence—historical, psychological, psychiatric, and even neuroscientific. The variability of human social orders, which is a function of the fact that human ways of life are constituted and transmitted symbolically rather than genetically, implies that, in contrast to all other animals, who are born into a specific ordered world, clearly organized by their genes, human beings are born into a world with numerous, potentially mutually exclusive, possibilities, and very early on in life (from early childhood) they must be able to adapt themselves to the possibilities that happen to be realized around them. Not being genetically equipped for any particular possibility, humans, in the first years of their lives, must grow adaptive mechanisms for focusing on such possibilities. Those mechanisms are the constituent processes of the mind.
从符号的性质和象征过程，人们还可以提出关于心灵内部结构或解剖结构的假设，然后可以根据经验证据（历史、心理学、精神病学甚至神经科学）进行系统性的检验。人类社会秩序的可变性，这是人类生活方式以象征性而不是基因方式构成和传递这一事实的一个功能，这意味着，与所有其他动物相比，它们出生在一个特定的有序世界中，显然由它们的基因组织起来，而人类出生在一个拥有众多、可能相互排斥的可能性，并且在生命的早期（从幼儿时期开始），他们必须能够适应周围碰巧实现的可能性。人类在基因上没有为任何特定的可能性做好准备，在他们生命的最初几年，必须培养适应机制来关注这些可能性。这些机制是心智的组成过程。

Two of those processes can be logically deduced from the essentially indeterminate (arbitrary, potentially variable) nature of human social orders: identity and will (see free will). No other animal (with the exception of pets, whose world is the same as their human companions and is thus, by definition, also cultural) has a need for identity and will: their positions vis-à-vis other members of their group and their actions under all likely circumstances—that is, the circumstances of the species’ adaptive niche—are genetically dictated. Being genetically unique, each animal has individuality, but only human individual character has (and is mostly a reflection of) this adaptive subjective dimension. Identity and will constitute functional requirements of the individual’s adaptation to the indeterminate cultural environment. They represent the different aspects of the self, or “I”—identity being a relationally-constituted self and will being the acting self, or agency.
从人类社会秩序本质上不确定的（任意的、潜在的可变的）性质中，可以逻辑地推导出其中两个过程：身份和意志（见自由意志）。没有其他动物（宠物除外，它们的世界与人类伴侣相同，因此，根据定义，也是文化的）需要身份和意志：它们相对于群体其他成员的位置以及它们在所有可能的情况下的行为——即物种的适应性生态位的情况——都是由基因决定的。由于基因独特，每种动物都有个性，但只有人类的个体性格具有（并且主要是反映）这种适应性的主观维度。身份和意志构成了个人适应不确定文化环境的功能要求。它们代表了自我或“我”的不同方面——身份是关系构成的自我，而意志是行动的自我或能动性。

Identity may be understood as symbolic self-definition: the image of one’s position in a sociocultural “space” within a larger image of the relevant sociocultural terrain. The larger image is an individualized microcosm of the particular culture in which one is immersed, a mental map of the variable aspects of the sociocultural environment, analogous to representations of the changing spatial environment yielded by place cells, discovered in neurological experiments with rodents (see Spatial memory: Place cells, head-direction cells, and grid cells). Like the indication of a rat’s place on the spatial mental map, the human identity map defines the individual’s possibilities of adaptation to the sociocultural environment. Because that environment is so complex, however, the human individual, unlike a rat, is presented in the map with various possibilities of adaptation, which cannot be objectively and clearly ranked. They must be ranked subjectively—i.e., the individual must choose or decide which of them to pursue. This subjective ranking of options is a function of the general character of the mental map (for instance, what place on it is occupied by God and the afterlife, or by the nation, or by one’s favourite sports team, etc.) and where one is placed on it in relation to such other presences.
身份可以被理解为象征性的自我定义：在相关社会文化领域的更大形象中，一个人在社会文化“空间”中的位置形象。更大的图像是一个人所沉浸的特定文化的个体化缩影，是社会文化环境可变方面的心理地图，类似于在啮齿动物的神经学实验中发现的地方细胞产生的不断变化的空间环境的表示（见空间记忆：地方细胞、头部方向细胞和网格细胞）。就像老鼠在空间心理地图上的位置一样，人类身份地图定义了个人适应社会文化环境的可能性。然而，由于环境如此复杂，与老鼠不同，人类个体在地图上呈现了各种适应可能性，无法客观和清晰地排序。它们必须进行主观排序——即个人必须选择或决定追求其中的哪一个。这种主观的选项排序是心理地图的一般特征的函数（例如，上帝和来世占据了什么位置，或者被国家占据，或者被一个人最喜欢的运动队占据了什么位置，等等），以及一个人相对于这些其他存在被放置在它上面的位置。

While identity serves as a representation (and agent) of a particular culture (the culture in which the individual is immersed), will is a function of the symbolic process in general—i.e., it reflects the intentionality of symbols. Human actions (except involuntary reflexes) are not determined reactions but products of decision and choice. The nature of the human response to any stimulus is indeterminate: it is the will that steps in, as it were, in a split-second intermediate stage between stimulus and reaction, deciding in that moment what the response will be. The word “consciousness” is frequently applied to these moments of decision, but, unless rendered problematic by special circumstances, both identity and will are largely unconscious processes in the sense that humans very rarely think about or become consciously aware of them.
虽然身份是特定文化（个人沉浸其中的文化）的代表（和代理人），但意志是一般象征过程的功能——即，它反映了符号的意向性。人类行为（非自愿反射除外）不是决定性的反应，而是决策和选择的产物。人类对任何刺激的反应的性质都是不确定的：在刺激和反应之间的瞬间中间阶段，意志就会介入，在那一刻决定反应会是什么。“意识”这个词经常被用来指这些决定的时刻，但是，除非由于特殊情况而变得有问题，否则身份和意志在很大程度上都是无意识的过程，因为人类很少思考或有意识地意识到它们。

Given the character of the human environment, the logical reasons for the existence of identity and will are rather obvious: both “structures” are necessary for the individual’s adaptation to that environment and, therefore, for the individual’s survival. Discoverable only logically, they remain hypothetical until tested against empirical evidence. This is not so as regards the thinking component of the mind—the thinking “I,” or the “I” of self-consciousness (which can also be called “the ‘I’ of Descartes,” because it is to that notion that Descartes referred in his famous dictum, cogito, ergo sum [Latin: “I think, therefore I am”]). Each person is aware of a thinking “I.” Its existence is known directly through experience—in other words, empirically. This knowledge is absolute, or certain, in the sense that it is impossible to doubt. It is, in fact, the only certain knowledge available to human beings. The thinking “I” is not necessary for the individual’s adaptation to the sociocultural environment and to his or her survival in it, but human existence in general would be impossible without it. It is a necessary condition for the culture process on the collective level. As the “I” of self-consciousness, the thinking “I” makes possible self-consciousness for any individual human; as the process of self-conscious thought, the one explicitly symbolic process among all symbolic mental processes, it makes possible indirect learning and thereby the transmission of human ways of life across generations and distances. It is not just a process informed and directed by our symbolic environment, but an essentially symbolic process, similar to the development of language, musical tradition, elaboration of a theorem—and to the transmission of culture, in general—in the sense that it actually operates with formal symbols, the formal media of symbolic expression. This is the reason for the dependence of thought on language, which has been frequently noted. Thought extends only as far as the possibilities of the formal symbolic medium in which it operates.
鉴于人类环境的特征，身份和意志存在的逻辑原因相当明显：这两种“结构”对于个人适应该环境都是必要的，因此，对于个人的生存也是必要的。它们只能从逻辑上发现，在与经验证据进行检验之前，它们仍然是假设的。对于心灵的思维成分——思考的“我”或自我意识的“我”（也可以称为“笛卡尔的’我’”，因为笛卡尔在他的著名格言 cogito， ergo sum [拉丁语：“我思，故我在”]）中提到了这个概念。每个人都意识到一个思考的“我”。它的存在是通过经验直接认识的——换句话说，是经验性的。这种知识是绝对的，或者说是确定的，从不可能怀疑的意义上说。事实上，它是人类唯一可用的确定知识。思考的“我”对于个人适应社会文化环境和在其中生存不是必需的，但如果没有它，人类的生存一般是不可能的。这是集体层面文化过程的必要条件。作为自我意识的“我”，思考的“我”使任何个体人类的自我意识成为可能;作为自我意识思维的过程，是所有象征性心理过程中的一个明确的象征性过程，它使间接学习成为可能，从而使人类生活方式跨代和跨距离的传递成为可能。它不仅仅是一个由我们的符号环境告知和指导的过程，而是一个本质上的符号过程，类似于语言的发展、音乐传统的发展、定理的阐述——以及一般的文化传播——从某种意义上说，它实际上是与形式符号一起运作的，即象征表达的形式媒介。这就是思想对语言的依赖性的原因，这一点经常被注意到。思想只延伸到它运作的形式象征媒介的可能性。

How can one test the anatomy of the mind, most of which is discoverable only through logical deduction? As in medicine, malfunction provides an excellent empirical test. Under normal conditions, the three “structures” of the mind are perfectly integrated, but in cases of mental illness integrated minds disintegrate into the three components, each of which can then be observed in its specific malfunction. This is particularly clear in the case of functional mental disease of unknown organic basis, such as depressive disorders (unipolar or bipolar) and schizophrenia—which in fact are generally identified by clinicians with the loss of aspects of the self or its complete disintegration. Depressive disorders, for example, specifically affect the will: depressed patients lose motivation, sometimes to such an extent that they find it difficult to get out of bed or to do the simplest things. In the manic stage of manic-depressive disorder (bipolar disorder), patients lose control of themselves altogether, being unable to will themselves to act or to stop acting, in retrospect explaining that they “lost their mind” or that the person who acted or did not act “wasn’t me.” The impairment of the will in bipolar disorder entails self-loathing (in the case of depression) and extremely high self-confidence (during acute mania)—i.e., an uncertain, oscillating sense of identity. Both depressive disorders and schizophrenia express themselves in delusions, or beliefs that one is what one definitely is not. Accordingly, both the overall nature of one’s mental map and one’s place on it radically change. In schizophrenia in particular, the thinking “I” completely separates from the mind, and patients experience their own thoughts as implanted from outside and their self-consciousness as being watched or observed by someone else. At the same time, their thinking (which they experience as alien) faithfully reflects the tropes and commonplaces of their cultural environment.
如何测试心灵的解剖结构，其中大部分只能通过逻辑推理来发现？就像在医学上一样，功能障碍提供了极好的经验测试。在正常情况下，心智的三个“结构”是完美的整合，但在精神疾病的情况下，整合的心智会瓦解成三个组成部分，然后每个组成部分都可以在其特定的故障中观察到。这在未知的器质基础的功能性精神疾病的情况下尤其明显，例如抑郁症（单相或双相）和精神分裂症 - 事实上，临床医生通常将其识别为自我各个方面的丧失或其完全瓦解。例如，抑郁症特别影响意志：抑郁症患者失去动力，有时甚至达到难以下床或做最简单的事情的程度。在躁狂抑郁症（双相情感障碍）的躁狂阶段，患者完全失去了对自己的控制，无法让自己行动或停止行动，回想起来解释说他们“失去了理智”或行动或不行动的人“不是我”。双相情感障碍的意志受损会导致自我厌恶（在抑郁症的情况下）和极高的自信心（在急性躁狂症期间）——即一种不确定的、摇摆不定的身份感。抑郁症和精神分裂症都表现为妄想，或者认为一个人绝对不是。因此，一个人的心理地图的整体性质和一个人在其中的位置都发生了根本性的变化。特别是在精神分裂症中，思考的“我”完全与头脑分离，患者体验到他们自己的思想是从外部植入的，他们的自我意识是被别人监视或观察的。与此同时，他们的思维（他们认为自己是异类的）忠实地反映了他们文化环境的比喻和司空见惯。

Certain subdisciplines of the science of humanity will make the cultural process on the individual level of the mind their special subject. One possible branch, analogous to cellular biology, might study the interrelations between different symbolic components of the human mental process. Another, analogous to biochemistry or biophysics, might study the interrelations between the symbolic and the organic components of the mental process—that is, the interrelations between the mind and the brain. The formation, transmission, changes, and pathologies of identity, will, and the thinking self will be central subjects in these subdisciplines, which will necessarily inform, and be informed by, the study of the cultural process on the collective level, just as cellular biology, biochemistry, and biophysics are interconnected with the focused study of particular forms of life, from kingdoms to species (e.g., entomology, primatology) and with subdisciplines such as genetics, ecology, and evolutionary biology, which focus on macro-level life processes.
人类科学的某些分支学科将使个人心灵层面的文化过程成为他们的特殊主题。一个可能的分支，类似于细胞生物学，可能会研究人类心理过程的不同符号成分之间的相互关系。另一个类似于生物化学或生物物理学的研究，可能研究心理过程的象征和有机组成部分之间的相互关系——即心灵和大脑之间的相互关系。身份、意志和思考自我的形成、传递、变化和病理学将是这些子学科的中心主题，它们必然会为集体层面的文化过程研究提供信息，并从中获得信息，就像细胞生物学、生物化学和生物物理学与对特定生命形式的集中研究相互联系一样。从界到物种（例如，昆虫学、灵长类动物学）以及遗传学、生态学和进化生物学等子学科，这些子学科专注于宏层面的生命过程。

Institutions, nations, and civilizations 机构、国家和文明

Knowledge accumulated (and left uninterpreted) in the course of the history of the social sciences—specifically, knowledge that amounts to comparative history—when examined from the perspective of the science of humanity and in light of the recognition of the symbolic and mental nature of the subject, allows one to identify several layers of the cultural process on the collective level. Those layers can be distinguished analytically, though not empirically, given that all cultural processes are happening simultaneously in several of these layers in various combinations, which in every particular case are subject to empirical investigation.
在社会科学历史的进程中积累（且未被解释）的知识——具体来说，相当于比较历史的知识——当从人文科学的角度进行考察，并鉴于对该主题的象征和心理性质的认识时，人们可以在集体层面上识别文化过程的几个层次。这些层次可以通过分析来区分，但不能从实证上来区分，因为所有的文化过程都是以各种组合在几个层次中同时发生的，在每一个特定情况下，这些层次都受到实证调查的约束。

There are three autonomous layers. In order of increasing generality they are: (1) the layer of social institutions, or established “ways of thinking and acting” (as Durkheim defined them) in the various spheres of social life, such as economy, family, politics, and so on; (2) the layer of nations (in the past, mostly religions), understood as functionally-integrated, geopolitically bounded systems of social institutions; and (3) the layer of civilizations, the most durable and causally significant of the three layers. Civilizations are family sets of autonomous systems, sharing the same (civilizational) first principles (e.g., monotheism and logic) and, although not systematically related to each other, interdependent in their development. The mind is the active element in the collective cultural process at all layers, constantly involved in their perpetuation and change while being constantly affected, constrained, and stimulated by them. Civilizations constitute the independent and thus the fundamental layer of the cultural process on the collective level, in the sense of depending on no other cultural process on that level but only on the mind in their origins. They are a framework subsuming all the others and subsumed in none, causally significant in every layer below and—together with mind—ultimately responsible for cultural diversity in the world.
有三个自治层。按照越来越普遍的顺序，它们是：（1）社会制度的层次，或涂尔干在社会生活的各个领域（如经济、家庭、政治等）中建立的“思维和行为方式”（正如涂尔干所定义的那样）;（2）国家层（过去主要是宗教），被理解为功能整合的、地缘政治界的社会制度体系;（3）文明层，这三个层中最持久且具有因果意义的。文明是自治系统的家族集合，共享相同的（文明）第一原则（例如，一神论和逻辑），尽管彼此之间没有系统性的关系，但在它们的发展中相互依存。思想是各个层面集体文化过程中的积极元素，不断参与它们的延续和变化，同时不断受到它们的影响、约束和刺激。文明构成了集体层面上文化过程的独立层次，因此也是文化过程的基本层次，从某种意义上说，在这个层面上不依赖于其他文化过程，而只依赖于其起源中的思想。它们是一个包含所有其他框架的框架，也不包含任何框架，在下面的每一层都具有因果意义，并且与思想一起最终负责世界上的文化多样性。

The only concept from the social sciences that can be appropriated and built upon within the science of humanity is Durkheim’s concept of anomie, which implicates the psychological mechanisms that connect cause and effect in any particular case (connecting the mind and culture in one process) and therefore lends itself easily to investigation by empirical evidence. Anomie refers to a condition of systemic inconsistency among collective representations, directly affecting individual experience and creating profound psychological discomfort. The discomfort motivates participants in the situation in question to resolve the bothersome inconsistency. Thus the concept encompasses the most generally applicable theory of sociocultural change—a change in identity, which leads to changes in established ways of thinking and acting within more or less extended areas of experience.
社会科学中唯一可以在人类科学中挪用和建立的概念是涂尔干的 anomie 概念，它涉及在任何特定情况下连接因果关系的心理机制（将思想和文化连接在一个过程中），因此很容易通过经验证据进行调查。失范是指集体表征之间的系统性不一致的情况，直接影响个人体验并造成深刻的心理不适。这种不适促使相关情况的参与者解决令人烦恼的不一致。因此，这个概念包含了最普遍适用的社会文化变迁理论——身份的变化，它导致在或多或少扩展的经验领域内既定的思维和行为方式发生变化。

Applications of the science of humanity: nationalism, economic growth, and mental illness 人文科学的应用：民族主义、经济增长和精神疾病

This minimal exposition of the ground principles of the science of humanity already provides a sufficient basis for raising and answering, logically and empirically, questions regarding phenomena that the current social sciences are capable of approaching, if at all, only speculatively. As examples, one can focus on three such phenomena that have been at the centre of public discussion since at least the late 19th century: nationalism, economic growth, and functional mental illness. The amount of information collected about them is enormous; all three have been subjects of voluminous descriptive and “theoretical” (speculative) literature. Yet, this literature has not been able to explain them, failing to answer the fundamental question of what causes these phenomena, or why they exist. The practical effects of this inability to understand the forces controlling human life cannot be exaggerated.
这种对人文科学基本原则的这种最低限度的阐述已经为逻辑和实证地提出和回答当前社会科学能够处理的现象问题提供了足够的基础，如果有的话，也只能以推测的方式处理。例如，我们可以关注至少自 19 世纪末以来一直是公众讨论中心的三种现象：民族主义、经济增长和功能性精神疾病。收集的有关他们的信息量是巨大的;这三者都是大量描述性和“理论”（思辨性）文学的主题。然而，这些文献无法解释它们，未能回答是什么导致这些现象或它们为什么存在的基本问题。这种无法理解控制人类生活的力量的实际影响怎么夸大都不为过。

Within the framework of the science of humanity, one would approach nationalism, economic growth, and functional mental illness without any preconceptions other than that they are symbolic, by definition historical phenomena—i.e., products of new symbolic contexts, created by the reinterpretation of certain collective representations by certain minds at certain specific moments in the cultural process. The first step would be to establish when and where—in what circumstances—these moments occurred. An appearance of new vocabularies (to explicitly record new experiences and transmit new meanings) is by far the best, though not the only, indicator. In the case of nationalism, the name itself orients research toward European languages. Their examination before the concept enters broad circulation—that is, beginning in the 18th century and moving backward—reveals that the concept of the nation as generally understood today—as the people to which one belongs, from which one derives one’s essential identity, and to which one owes allegiance—first appeared in the early 16th century in England, signaling a dramatic change in the meanings of the words nation and people. Before that time, nation referred to exceedingly small groups of very highly placed individuals, representatives of temporal and ecclesiastical rulers at church councils, each such group a tiny elite making decisions determining the collective fates of large populations, and people denoted the overwhelming majorities within those populations—i.e., their common, or lower, classes, the “rabble” or plebs. Whereas membership in the conciliar nation communicated a sense of great power and dignity, there was none in being one of the people; membership in a people meant being a nobody. This distinction existed within the context of the European feudal “society of orders,” which divided the population of every Christian principality into separate categories of humanity, as different from each other as species of animals are. Indeed, they were thought to differ even in the nature of their blood (which could not be mixed): the small upper military order of the nobility (comprising 2 to 4 percent of the population) was believed to have blue blood, while the huge lower order of the people was believed to have red blood.
在人文科学的框架内，人们可以不带任何先入之见地看待民族主义、经济增长和功能性精神疾病，除了它们是象征性的，根据定义而言，历史现象——即新的象征性背景的产物，由某些思想在文化过程中的某些特定时刻对某些集体表征的重新解释而创造。第一步是确定这些时刻发生的时间和地点——在什么情况下。新词汇的出现（明确记录新体验并传递新含义）是迄今为止最好的指标，但不是唯一的指标。就民族主义而言，这个名字本身就将研究导向欧洲语言。在这个概念广泛流传之前——即从 18 世纪开始向后发展——他们的研究揭示了今天普遍理解的国家概念——一个人所属的人民，一个人的基本身份来自这个民族，一个人应该效忠于这个民族——最早出现在 16 世纪初的英国。标志着 nation 和 people 这两个词的含义发生了巨大变化。在那之前，国家是指由非常高位的个人组成的极小的群体，他们是教会会议上世俗和教会统治者的代表，每个这样的群体都是决定大量人口集体命运的极小精英，而人民则表示这些人口中的绝大多数——即他们的共同或较低阶层，即“乌合之众”或平民。虽然作为 conciliar 国家的成员传达了一种强大的力量和尊严的感觉，但作为人民中的一员却没有;加入一个民族意味着成为一个无名小卒。这种区别存在于欧洲封建“秩序社会”的背景下，该社会将每个基督教公国的人口分为不同的人类类别，就像动物物种一样彼此不同。事实上，人们甚至认为他们的血统性质也不同（不能混淆）：贵族的少数上层军事阶层（占人口的 2% 到 4%）被认为拥有蓝色血统，而庞大的下层人民被认为拥有红色血统。

The Houses of Lancaster and York

兰开斯特家族与约克家族（后文有扩展阅读，《权力的游戏》的创作来源。）

In the second half of the 15th century, however, protracted conflict between the two branches of the English royal family, known as the Wars of the Roses, actually destroyed the blue-blooded upper order. A new (in fact plebeian) family assumed the crown; the new king needed help from the new aristocracy to carry out his rule; a period of mass, generally upward, mobility began; and enterprising individuals who knew that their blood was “red” found themselves occupying positions which formerly could be occupied only by those whose blood was “blue.” Their experience was positive but not understandable to them. Attempting to explain it to themselves and to make it seem legitimate, they stumbled upon the paradoxical but extremely appealing idea that the English people themselves were a nation. The equation of the two concepts, people and nation, symbolically elevated the masses, making all of the English equal. Their identity—the place of each individual on his or her mental map of the sociocultural terrain—was transformed as it became the dignified national identity that is inclusively granted to members of a sovereign community of fundamentally equal members.
然而，在 15 世纪下半叶，英国王室的两个分支之间旷日持久的冲突，被称为玫瑰战争，实际上摧毁了蓝血统的上层社会。一个新的（实际上是平民）家庭继承了王冠;新国王需要新贵族的帮助来执行他的统治;一段大规模的、通常是向上的、流动性的时期开始了;而那些知道自己的血统是 “红色 ”的有进取心的人发现自己所占据的位置，以前只有那些 “蓝色 ”的人才能占据。他们的经历是积极的，但对他们来说却无法理解。他们试图向自己解释并使其看起来合法，却偶然发现了一个自相矛盾但极具吸引力的想法，即英国人民本身就是一个国家。人民和国家这两个概念的等式象征性地提升了大众，使整个英国人平等。他们的身份——每个人在他或她的社会文化地形的心理地图上的位置——发生了变化，因为它成为有尊严的民族身份，被包容性地授予一个由基本平等成员组成的主权社区的成员。

Schematically, the circumstances in which nationalism emerged can be described as follows: the personal experience of a significant number of well-placed (influential) individuals contradicts existing collective representations, resulting in an irritating anomic situation; because the experience is positive, these individuals reinterpret collective representations in a way that makes it normal (understandable and legitimate); the image of reality and personal identity change to reflect this reinterpretation, establishing different ways of thinking and, therefore, acting in the society at large. The change in identity and the image of social reality in the first place affects status arrangements (i.e., the organization of social positions, the system of social stratification): nationalism creates a polity-wide community of equals, making individuals interchangeable and mobility between strata possible, expected, and ultimately dependent on individual choice (making one free) and effort. This, in turn, changes the nature of political institutions. Defined as the decision-making elite (nation), the entire community must now be represented in the government: the impersonal state, as the abstraction of popular sovereignty, replaces the personal government of kings. Other specific institutions are similarly affected. Eventually, the dignity implied in nationalism brings to it new converts, and national consciousness spreads first to England’s colonies and neighbours and then farther and farther around the world.
从示意图上讲，民族主义出现的情况可以描述如下：大量地位高（有影响力）的个人经历与现有的集体表征相矛盾，导致令人恼火的异常情况;因为体验是积极的，这些个体以一种使其正常（可理解和合法）的方式重新解释集体表征;现实和个人身份的形象发生了变化，以反映这种重新解释，建立了不同的思维方式，从而在整个社会中采取行动。身份和社会现实形象的变化首先影响地位安排（即社会地位的组织、社会分层系统）：民族主义创造了一个平等的政体社区，使个人在各阶层之间可以互换和流动，这是可能的、意料之中的，并最终取决于个人选择（使一个人自由）和努力。这反过来又改变了政治制度的性质。被定义为决策精英（国家）的整个社区现在必须在政府中得到代表：非个人国家作为人民主权的抽象，取代了国王的个人政府。其他特定机构也受到类似影响。最终，民族主义所隐含的尊严带来了新的皈依者，民族意识首先传播到英格兰的殖民地和邻国，然后传播到世界各地越来越远。

The growing influence of England and then Great Britain, which rapidly emerged as the preeminent European power carefully watched everywhere, was an important factor in the attention nationalism initially attracted, and England’s own precocious nationalism was the reason why the country’s influence grew. Nationalism is an inherently competitive form of consciousness. National membership endows with dignity the personal identity of every national, making national populations deeply invested in the dignity of the nation as a whole, or its standing among other nations (into which the national image of reality from the moment of its emergence divides the world). Standing among others is always relative and cannot be achieved once and for all. Nations are impelled to compete for dignity—prestige, respect of others—constantly. They choose to compete for it in those areas which offer them the best chances to end up on top: Russia, for instance, from the outset of its existence as a nation in the 18th century staked its national dignity on military strength, adding to it, when the time was right, the splendor of its high culture (science, literature, ballet, and so on) but never competing in the economic arena. England, the first nation, became ardently competitive when it faced no challengers, having its pick of competitive arenas. Answering the need to justify the personal experience of upward mobility, English nationalism prioritized the individual, and it was natural for England to challenge the world to economic competition, which directly involved the great majority of its people. Nationalist competitiveness—a race whose finish line is ever-receding, because the prize is a nation’s standing relative to others—drove the classes engaged in economic activity to produce a new, modern economy, the one since called “capitalist,” which differed drastically from the traditional economies that had existed everywhere before nationalism. Whereas traditional economies were oriented toward subsistence, nationalism reoriented the English and then other economies toward growth. With economic performance the basis of international prestige, nations opting for competition in the economic arena cannot afford to stop growing, whatever the costs—political, psychological, or other. This explains another central dimension of modern life, which has preoccupied social thinkers for at least 250 years and which the social sciences have never been able to account for, and thus regard as “natural”: economic growth, and specifically the reorientation of national economies toward economic growth beginning in the late 16th century.
英格兰和英国的影响力不断增长，英国迅速崛起，成为无处不在的欧洲卓越大国，这是民族主义最初引起关注的重要因素，而英格兰自身早熟的民族主义是该国影响力增长的原因。民族主义本质上是一种竞争性的意识形式。国家成员身份赋予每个国家的个人身份尊严，使国家人民深深地投资于整个国家的尊严，或它在其他国家中的地位（从其出现的那一刻起，现实的国家形象就分裂了世界）。站在他人中间总是相对的，不可能一劳永逸地实现。国家被迫不断地争夺尊严——声望、对他人的尊重。他们选择在那些为他们提供最佳机会最终登顶的领域竞争：例如，俄罗斯从 18 世纪建国之初就将其国家尊严押在军事实力上，在适当的时候，它增加了其高雅文化的辉煌（科学、文学、芭蕾舞等），但从未在经济舞台上竞争过。英格兰是第一个在没有挑战者的情况下变得极具竞争力的国家，拥有自己的竞技场。为了证明个人向上流动的经历是合理的，英国民族主义将个人放在首位，英国自然而然地向世界挑战经济竞争，这直接涉及其绝大多数人民。民族主义竞争——一场终点线不断后退的竞赛，因为奖品是一个国家相对于其他国家的地位——驱使从事经济活动的阶级产生一种新的现代经济，这种经济后来被称为“资本主义”，它与民族主义之前存在于各地的传统经济截然不同。传统经济以自给自足为导向，而民族主义则使英国和其他经济体重新转向增长。由于经济表现是国际声望的基础，选择在经济舞台上竞争的国家无法承受停止增长的代价，无论代价如何——政治、心理或其他方面。这解释了现代生活的另一个核心维度，它已经困扰了社会思想家至少 250 年，而社会科学从未能够解释，因此将其视为“自然”的：经济增长，特别是从 16 世纪后期开始国民经济向经济增长的重新定位。

The reorientation of the English economy (the first to reorient) toward growth occurred within decades of the emergence of national identity and consciousness. Another phenomenon that closely accompanied that cultural (symbolic and mental) change was the noticeable rise in rates of functional mental illnesses, which would eventually be identified as schizophrenia and affective disorders. Although individual cases of such illnesses had been recorded well before the 15th century (indeed as far back as the Bible and ancient Greece), with the rise of nationalism they became a public-health and social problem of the first order. Other societies that acquired national identity and consciousness after England also experienced sharply increased incidences of such illnesses, which continued to rise as nationalism spread in them, reaching epidemic proportions in some countries (e.g., the United States).
英国经济向增长的重新定位（第一个重新定位）发生在民族认同和意识出现后的几十年内。与这种文化（象征和精神）变化密切相关的另一个现象是功能性精神疾病发病率的显着上升，最终被确定为精神分裂症和情感障碍。尽管在 15 世纪之前就已经记录了此类疾病的个别病例（实际上可以追溯到圣经和古希腊），但随着民族主义的兴起，它们成为首要的公共卫生和社会问题。在英国之后获得民族认同和意识的其他社会也经历了此类疾病发病率的急剧增加，随着民族主义在其中的传播，这种发病率继续上升，在一些国家（例如美国）达到了流行病的程度。

For more than 200 years, psychiatry, which emerged in response to this problem, has attempted to combat functional mental disease, which nevertheless remains unexplained and, as a result, incurable (though their symptoms can sometimes be alleviated through medication or therapeutic intervention). Considered in the framework of the science of humanity as outlined above, however, its causes become clear. Nationalism necessarily affects the formation of individual identity. A member of a nation can no longer learn who or what he or she is from the environment, as would an individual growing up in an essentially religious and rigidly stratified, nonegalitarian order, in which each person’s position and behaviour are defined by birth and (supposedly) divine providence. Beyond the very general category of nationality (national identity), a modern individual must decide what he or she is and should do and, on that basis, construct his or her own personal identity. Schizophrenia and depressive (unipolar and bipolar) illnesses are caused specifically by the values of equality and freedom as self-realization, which make every individual his or her own maker. The rates of such mental diseases increase in accordance with the extent to which a particular society is devoted to these values—inherent in the nationalist image of reality (i.e., in the national consciousness)—and the scope of freedom of choice within it. Conflicting collective representations do not allow for the construction of a meaningful mental map, and blurred or nonexistent identity impairs the will and dissolves the self, destroying the mind as individualized culture and leaving the individual to experience his or her thinking “I,” untethered to identity and will, as an alien presence.
200 多年来，为应对这个问题而出现的精神病学一直试图与功能性精神疾病作斗争，但这种疾病仍然无法解释，因此无法治愈（尽管他们的症状有时可以通过药物或治疗干预来缓解）。然而，在上述人类科学的框架中考虑，其原因就变得很清楚了。民族主义必然影响个人身份的形成。一个国家的成员无法再从环境中了解他或她是谁或她是什么，就像在一个本质上是宗教的、严格的分层、非平等的秩序中长大的人一样，在这个秩序中，每个人的地位和行为都是由出生和（据说）上帝的旨意决定的。除了非常笼统的国籍（国家身份）类别之外，现代个人必须决定他或她是什么，应该做什么，并在此基础上构建他或她自己的个人身份。精神分裂症和抑郁症（单相情感障碍和双相情感障碍）疾病是由平等和自由作为自我实现的价值观专门引起的，这使每个人都成为他或她自己的创造者。这种精神疾病的发病率根据特定社会对这些价值观的投入程度而增加——这些价值观是民族主义现实形象所固有的（即民族意识）所固有的——以及其中选择的自由范围。相互冲突的集体表征不允许构建有意义的心理地图，模糊或不存在的身份损害了意志并消解了自我，摧毁了作为个人化文化的思想，让个体体验他或她的思想“我”，不受身份和意志的束缚，作为一个外来的存在。

The various historical connections between different layers of the cultural process come into sharper focus when one considers the spread of nationalism into Japan and China—that is, beyond the family of cultures, all embedded in monotheism, in which nationalism emerged. Nationalism was introduced in Japan by the Western powers who bent the small country to their will by their show of military strength in 1853, deeply humiliating its elites. Recognizing the implications of nationalism for collective dignity, these elites convert to the new consciousness, the country became extremely competitive, and within a few decades it emerged as a formidable military and economic power. The humiliation of China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) was the reason for the birth of Chinese nationalism; Chinese elites also adopted it in an effort to restore the dignity of their empire. The colossal Chinese population remained unengaged until the ideological turn initiated by Deng Xiaoping (1904–97) connected national dignity to economic performance, thereby dignifying the population’s main activity. Accordingly, both nationalism and capitalism (understood as an economic system oriented toward growth) spread in Japan and China. But, unlike monotheistic civilizations—in which, by definition, reality is imagined as a consistently ordered universe and which, therefore, place great value on logical consistency—cultures (and minds) within the Sinic civilization (all cultures rooted in China) are not bothered by contradictions. As a result, conflicting collective representations (anomie), which are implicit in the freedom and equality implied by nationalism, do not have there the disorienting psychological effects that they have in societies embedded in monotheism. Remarkably, East Asian societies, as epidemiologists have repeatedly stressed, remain largely immune from functional mental illness.
当人们考虑到民族主义向日本和中国的传播时，文化过程不同层次之间的各种历史联系就变得更加突出——也就是说，超越了文化家族，所有这些都植根于民族主义的一神论中。民族主义是由西方列强引入日本的，他们在 1853 年通过展示军事实力使这个小国屈服于他们的意志，深深地羞辱了其精英。认识到民族主义对集体尊严的影响，这些精英皈依了新的意识，这个国家变得极具竞争力，并在几十年内成为一个强大的军事和经济强国。中国在第一次中日战争（1894-95 年）中战败的耻辱是中国民族主义诞生的原因;中国精英也采用了它，以恢复他们帝国的尊严。庞大的中国人口一直没有参与，直到邓小平（1904-97 年）发起的意识形态转向将国家尊严与经济表现联系起来，从而使人民的主要活动有尊严。因此，民族主义和资本主义（被理解为一种以增长为导向的经济制度）都在日本和中国传播开来。但是，与一神论文明不同——根据定义，现实被想象成一个始终有序的宇宙，因此非常重视逻辑的一致性——汉尼克文明（所有植根于中国的文化）内的文化（和思想）不受矛盾的困扰。因此，民族主义所隐含的自由和平等中隐含的相互冲突的集体表征（anomie）并没有像在一神论所嵌入的社会中那样产生令人迷失方向的心理影响。值得注意的是，正如流行病学家一再强调的那样，东亚社会在很大程度上仍然不受功能性精神疾病的影响。

The prospect of a science of humanity, like the pursuit of objective knowledge through the method of conjecture and refutation about any aspect of empirical reality, holds great promise. But it can develop only in conditions that would allow for its institutionalization. Although such conditions do not exist today, they may yet exist in the future.
人文科学的前景，就像通过对经验现实的任何方面的猜想和反驳来追求客观知识一样，有着巨大的前景。但它只能在允许其制度化的条件下发展。虽然这些条件今天不存在，但将来可能仍然存在。

via ： Social science - Sociology | Britannica

https://www.britannica.com/topic/social-science/Sociology

A History of the Social Sciences in 101 Books | Books Gateway | MIT Press

https://direct.mit.edu/books/edited-volume/5620/A-History-of-the-Social-Sciences-in-101-Books

玫瑰战争

玫瑰战争（1455-1487 年）是英国贵族与君主之间的一场王朝冲突，这场冲突导致了长达 40 年的断断续续的战斗、处决和谋杀阴谋。以爱德华三世（1327-1377 年在位）后裔为核心，英国精英分为两大阵营：约克家族和兰开斯特家族。

战争的名称来源于双方的制服徽章，尽管这些徽章在当时并不常用：约克的白玫瑰和兰开斯特的红玫瑰。患有精神疾病的兰开斯特国王英格兰亨利六世（1422-61 年和 1470-71 年）受到约克公爵理查德（1411-1460 年）的威胁，理查德的儿子成为英格兰国王爱德华四世（1461-70 年和 1471-83 年）。爱德华最终由他的弟弟英格兰国王理查德三世（1483-1485 年）继位，理查德三世与爱德华年幼的继承人 -"塔中王子 "-之死的联系而臭名昭著，震惊了贵族阶层。因此，在理查德于 1485 年在博斯沃思战场战死后，为兰开斯特王朝的亨利. 都铎继位打开了大门。亨利. 都铎成为英格兰的亨利七世（1485-1509 年），通过与约克的伊丽莎白联姻，他将两个家族联合起来，创建了一个新的家族：都铎家族。这场冲突对广大民众的影响可能有限，但随着家族的兴衰，贵族阶层肯定受到了震动。大众从未停止过对这场冲突的想象, 从莎士比亚到乔治.R.R.马丁（George R.R. Martin）和电视剧《权力的游戏》（Game of Thrones）。

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英格兰的爱德华四世和蒂克斯伯里修道院的兰开斯特里亚逃亡者

玫瑰名字的由来

小说家沃尔特.司各特爵士（Walter Scott，1771-1832 年）最早为困扰 15 世纪英格兰的王朝冲突起了一个浪漫的名字–“玫瑰战争”（Wars of the Roses），这是根据两个主要家族后来的徽章（实际上这两个家族的徽章都不是当时最受欢迎的徽章）命名的：白玫瑰代表约克家族，红玫瑰代表兰开斯特家族。这种划分比单纯的两个家族要复杂一些，因为每个家族都在英格兰的其他贵族家族中获得了盟友，从而形成了两大集团：兰开斯特家族和约克家族。在冲突过程中，任何一方的盟友都有可能根据倾向、死亡和机遇而改变效忠对象。该名称的另一个问题是，王朝冲突并不是战争，而是一系列断断续续的战斗、小规模冲突、几次小规模围攻、处决和谋杀阴谋。还有一点非常值得怀疑，生活在 15 世纪英格兰的人们是否认为自己是玫瑰战争这一历史事件的一部分。

玫瑰战争的起因

玫瑰战争的起因有很多，随着冲突的继续，新的参与者和动机也不断出现，使战争进一步延续。最早的起因可能是亨利. 博林布鲁克（Henry Bolingbroke），他在 1399 年用武力夺取了王位，自立为英格兰国王亨利四世（1399-1413 年在位），然后谋杀了他的前任英格兰国王理查二世（1377-1399 年在位）。亨利是第一位兰开斯特王朝的国王（他的父亲是兰开斯特公爵约翰-冈特）。弑君已成为一种令人震惊但并非不成功的政治策略。

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拔掉红玫瑰和白玫瑰

Live Auctioneers (Public Domain)

亨利六世无能统治是战争爆发的开始。亨利六世的父亲亨利五世（1413-1422 年在位）突然去世，年幼的他被推上了王位。在野心勃勃、肆无忌惮的摄政王和朝臣们的包围下，国王在位期间，国内某些地区无法无天，经济衰退。就在亨利成年的时候，他在百年战争（1337-1453 年）中最终败给了法国。英国的男爵们在如何对付法国的问题上产生了重大的分歧：是像亨利五世那样采取更加强硬的态度，还是通过谈判达成某种协议，抑或是完全放弃欧洲大陆。问题之一是资金和海外军事行动的巨额开支。亨利很容易听信别人的话，在最需要果断的时候却优柔寡断。

约克公爵理查德有两件事对他有利。首先，他是爱德华三世的曾外孙；其次，他是英国首富。

亨利六世还不明智地将自己卷入了男爵之间的个人纷争，这进一步加剧了王国的两极分化。1445 年，亨利决定迎娶法国查理七世（1422-1461 年在位）的侄女玛格丽特.安茹（Margaret of Anjou，卒于 1482 年），这使局势进一步恶化。一些男爵认为这是对法国人的屈服，而玛格丽特对这位摇摆不定、非常不喜欢战争的国王的明显影响是另一个争论的焦点。似乎亨利的不受欢迎还不止于此，他选择的宠臣，尤其是不受欢迎的威廉. 德拉波尔（William de la Pole）、萨福克伯爵（Earl of Suffolk），为国王树敌更多。1450 年，杰克-凯德（Jack Cade）率领平民发动叛乱，抗议高额税收、宫廷腐败和地方司法不公。平民可能不会对政府产生任何直接影响，但这种动乱或许给了那些热衷于推翻政权的贵族另一个借口，而不仅仅是扩大自己的利益。面对所有这些压力，再加上他的外祖父法国查理六世（1422-1461 年在位）的精神问题，亨利在 1453 年精神崩溃也许就不足为奇了。他的精神崩溃很可能是由于对法国的最终失败以及失去了除加莱以外的所有英国领土而引发的。亨利病得很重，不能动弹，不能说话，也不认识任何人。在这种情况下，王国需要一位摄政王，于是国家的问题真正开始激增，英格兰开始分裂成两个交战阵营。

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英格兰的玫瑰战争，1455-1487

Simeon Netchev (CC BY-NC-ND)

约克公爵

随着王权的消亡，英格兰男爵们的财富和权力也在不断增加。历史学家注意到了一种被称为 "巴斯塔德封建制度 "的现象。这一现象削弱了王室对土地、财富和地方政治权力的控制。大庄园主们像国王一样统治着自己的地区，并能够建立起由只忠于他们的家臣组成的私人军队。最终，其中一些男爵变得野心勃勃，他们想起了亨利. 博林布鲁克的成功，甚至认为自己有资格成为英格兰国王。只要男爵身上流淌着一点王室血统，他们就能说服其他人追随自己，尤其是那些不认可现任国王的男爵。这些强大的政治人物被一些历史学家称为 "大权在握"的人，因为他们有能力推翻合法的君主。此外，现在法国的战争已经结束，这些 "大权在握 "的人可以动用他们所有的武装家臣和财富，在领地内实现自己的私人野心。

这一时期最强大的男爵是约克公爵理查德。理查德有两方面的优势。首先，他是英格兰爱德华三世的曾外孙，也是马奇伯爵的侄子，马奇伯爵曾声称自己是英格兰理查德二世（1377-1399 年）的合法继承人。其次，他是英格兰最富有的人。这两个因素加上公爵的野心和军事才能，对亨利本已不稳固的王位构成了极其危险的威胁。当亨利第一次精神健康出现问题时，摄政王的人选显然是理查德，而他也确实在 1454 年被任命为王国保护人。

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玫瑰战争—约克家族对兰开斯特家族

Simeon Netchev (CC BY-SA)

战争确实影响了贵族，英国 60 个贵族家族的一半领主都以一种或另一种方式被杀害。

人们对亨利统治的评价如此之低，以至于理查德被视为改革的先锋。也许这位约克公爵一心想要清理宫廷，整顿王国，但最终，他还是打出了自己的牌：想赢得了王位。首先，理查德寻求被提名为亨利的正式继承人（当时国王还没有孩子）。他拥有强大的盟友，尤其是米德尔汉姆的内维尔家族，内维尔家族非常希望能与其叫好，对抗自己的敌人—强大的珀西家族。不过，理查德也有两个重要的敌人：安茹的玛格丽特（Margaret of Anjou）憎恨理查德，萨默塞特伯爵埃德蒙. 博福特（Edmund Beaufort）也是爱德华三世的后裔，是个野心勃勃的贵族。但在1455 年 5 月 22 日，萨默塞特伯爵最终在玫瑰战争的第一场战役—圣奥尔本斯战场上被杀。事实证明，玛格丽特女王是一个更难对付的对手，她接替了疯癫的丈夫，率领军队对抗约克公爵。1459年10月12日，理查德在卢德洛的卢德福德桥战役中战败，被迫逃往爱尔兰。与此同时，1459 年的 "魔鬼议会"认定他是叛徒，剥夺了他的继承权。

1460 年 7 月 10 日，约克公爵的儿子爱德华在北安普顿击败了玛格丽特女王。回到英格兰后，约克公爵劝说当时在伦敦塔的亨利指定他为王位的正式继承人，10 月 24 日的协议法案批准了这一决定。然而，就在理查德垂涎的王位几乎唾手可得时，他却在 1460 年 12 月 30 日的韦克菲尔德战役中被王后率领的保皇党杀害。理查德的头颅被悬挂在约克郡米克里盖特的长矛上，并带上了纸质王冠，以提醒所有人他只是个篡位者。然而，这并不是约克党人的终点，而只是他们更大崛起的开始。

理查德的儿子爱德华成为约克家族的领袖，也是国王和王后的头号敌人。约克的爱德华有一张王牌，那就是他的盟友、富可敌国的沃里克伯爵理查德. 内维尔（1428-1471 年）,他的实力如此强大，以至于被视为“国王的制造者”。1461 年 3 月，爱德华赢得了英国历史上规模最大、持续时间最长的托顿血战，证明了他值得支持。1461 年 6 月 28 日，亨利六世被废黜，爱德华成为爱德华四世，加冕成为第一位约克国王。1470年，爱德华的老盟友沃里克背叛了他，恢复了亨利六世的王位（“Readeption”），爱德华的统治短暂中断，战争变得更加黑暗。第二年，爱德华在战场上（1471 年 4 月 14 日的巴尼特战役和 5 月 4 日的特克斯伯里战役）夺回了王位，沃里克伯爵和亨利六世唯一的儿子在此过程中被杀。玛格丽特女王被囚禁，亨利于 1471 年 5 月 21 日在伦敦塔被谋杀，这是一场血腥的事件，约克家族似乎赢得了战争。

理查三世和亨利. 都铎

爱德华四世的弟弟是格洛斯特公爵理查德（生于 1452 年），他将成为这场致命的权力游戏的下一个核心人物。理查德在哥哥成为国王之前一直忠心耿耿地与他并肩作战，当爱德华于1483年意外去世（可能是中风）时，理查德看到了一个戏剧性上位的机会。爱德华由他的另一个儿子爱德华（生于 1470 年）正式继位，但当时他只有 12 岁。然而，男爵们又一次徘徊在年幼的君主周围，争夺至高无上的地位，其中最咄咄逼人的是他的叔叔理查德。

年轻、尚未加冕的英格兰王爱德华五世和他的弟弟理查德（生于 1473 年）被囚禁在伦敦塔，在那里他们被称为 “塔中王子”。与此同时，王国保护人格洛斯特公爵理查德管理着王国。夏天的时候，人们在伦敦塔的院子里看见王子们几次，但随后他们就消失了。人们普遍认为理查德谋杀了他们，后来的都铎王朝历史学家和威廉. 莎士比亚（William Shakespeare，1564-1616 年）也持这种观点，他还将理查德的统治描绘得比实际情况更加暗淡。值得注意的是，从爱德华五世之死中获益最多的人是他的叔叔，他本人于 1483 年 7 月 6 日在威斯敏斯特大教堂加冕为理查三世。然而，通过这种可怕的罪行夺取王位只会自找麻烦，就连约克党人也感到震惊，于是玫瑰战争又一次出现了戏剧性的转折。

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理查德三世和亨利七世，彩色玻璃窗

John Taylor (CC BY)

兰卡斯特王朝虽然被爱德华四世清除了，但并没有完全消失，他们现在由一位名叫亨利.都铎的人领导。亨利身上确实流淌着一些王室血统，那是爱德华三世的儿子约翰. 冈特（John of Gaunt）的私生子博福特（Beaufort）家族的后裔。尽管博福特家族在1407年获得了合法地位，但这并不算是什么王室血统，不过在亨利六世没有留下任何继承人之后，这也是兰开斯特家族所能指望的最好结果了。不过，亨利. 都铎还是拉拢了一些非常得力的盟友。除了义愤填膺的前约克派支持者外，还有伍德维尔家族（伊丽莎白. 伍德维尔是爱德华四世的王后）、白金汉公爵，以及亨利流亡的地方—英吉利海峡对岸的法国查理八世（1483-1498 年在位），他急于破坏英格兰的稳定，使其远离自己的领土。

1484年，理查三世的继承人（又一个爱德华）去世，这或许是玫瑰战争重燃战火的导火索。这时，亨利. 都铎与王位之间只差一个人，而且是一个极不受欢迎的人。1485年8月，亨利.都铎率领一支法国雇佣军在南威尔士的米尔福德港登陆，并于1485年8月22日在莱斯特郡的博斯沃思战场迎战理查德的军队。在那里，理查德被他的一些重要盟友（威廉. 斯坦利爵士和亨利. 珀西爵士）抛弃，理查德本人则在贸然冲向亨利. 都铎时被杀。1485 年 10 月 30 日，新国王加冕为英格兰亨利七世（1485-1509 年）。亨利仍然不得不面对以兰伯特. 西姆内尔（Lambert Simnel）为中心的约克派的反抗，但这在1487年6月的斯托克菲尔德战役中被平息了。这就是玫瑰战争的最后一幕，尽管在接下来的半个世纪里约克派还会有一些小规模的反抗。

玫瑰战争的影响

除了兰开斯特王朝和约克王朝国王之间王位交换之外，这场战争对历史产生的最重要影响之一就是亨利七世建立了都铎王朝。1486 年，亨利迎娶了爱德华四世的女儿约克的伊丽莎白，从而使双方联合起来。国王甚至为这个新王朝创造了一个新的标志：都铎玫瑰，它融合了兰开斯特家族和约克家族的玫瑰。亨利的儿子继位，成为英格兰的亨利八世（1509-1547 年），都铎王朝一直统治到 1603 年，见证了英格兰的黄金时代。

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在塔中谋杀王子

Art UK (Public Domain)

战争并没有影响到大多数普通民众，因为战争通常只限于贵族之间的冲突，即使有些战斗和战役会在发生地造成死亡、破坏和混乱。事实上，在整个战争期间，有 13 场独立的战役，实际战斗时间不到 24 个月。国家的许多地区完全没有受到影响。不过，战争确实对贵族造成了影响，英格兰 60 个贵族家族中有一半的领主都在战争中丧生。这是因为许多小规模冲突只涉及贵族，而劫持人质索取赎金的旧习不再奏效，因为人们不愿意或无法支付赎金，这使得对手不得不永远退出游戏。此外，虽然许多男爵从战争中获利，但战争结束后，国王又牢牢地控制了他们的领地，加强了对税收的监管，并没收了已灭绝家族和政治对手的财产。对于大多数人来说，这种财富的前后转移并不意味着什么。战争结束时，名字可能变了，但该国 3% 的精英仍然拥有 95% 的财富。

最后，战争在英国文化中留下了不可磨灭的印记，因为战争的曲折经历和背叛一直吸引着历史学家和小说家。都铎王朝的宣传家们热衷于夸大战争的破坏力和约克党人的恶行，以更好地展示他们自己以及将他们的君主视作是国家的救世主。威廉. 莎士比亚（William Shakespeare，1564-1616 年）对这一时期特别感兴趣，他的历史剧《亨利六世》和《理查三世》就是以这一时期为背景创作的。即使到了 21 世纪，玫瑰战争仍给乔治. 马丁（George R. R. Martin）等作家带来灵感，他的小说又为电视剧《权力的游戏》提供了主题和人物。