计算机 墨菲定律
Last week, Intel announced its second-quarter financial results which easily beat the analysts’ consensus expectations by a handsome margin. Yet the stock price plummeted by over 16% right after the earnings call with management. Seven analysts downgraded the stock to a sell and the common theme on all the downgrades was that their 7-nanometer process was delayed again which meant that Intel had fallen behind in its process technology, and was lagging TSMC by a wide margin.
大号 AST周，英特尔宣布其其很容易被一个英俊的保证金击败分析师的普遍预期第二季度的财务业绩。 然而，在与管理层进行财报电话会议后，股价立即暴跌了16％以上。 七名分析师将该股票评级为卖出，所有降级的共同主题是他们的7纳米制程再次被推迟，这意味着英特尔在制程技术上落后了，并且远远落后于台积电。
On its earnings call, Intel posted $19.7BN in revenues vs. the street at $18.54BN and generated EPS of $1.23 vs. $1.12 but it also delivered more bad news on its manufacturing process technology. In a note from Jefferies analyst, Jared Weisfeld, after the earnings call:
英特尔在财报电话会议上公布的收入为197亿美元，而市场为185.4亿美元，每股收益为1.23美元，而上年同期为1.12美元，但它还发布了有关其制造Craft.io技术的更多坏消息。 Jefferies分析师贾里德·韦斯菲尔德(Jared Weisfeld)在财报电话会议后的一份报告中说：
But the 7nm commentary is a thesis changer for many as the Company pushed out its roadmap and outsourcing CPU manufacturing to a 3rd party foundry is officially part of the conversation. The company is seeing a 6 month shift in 7nm product timing vs. prior expectations with yields as the primary culprit, which are 12 months behind target. The Company identified a defect which has caused the delay and they claim to have have root caused the issue and believe there are no fundamental roadblocks.
但是7nm的评论对于许多人来说都是论文的改变者，因为该公司推出了其路线图，并将CPU制造外包给第三方代工厂是此次对话的正式内容。 该公司预计7nm产品时序将比原先的预期发生6个月的转变，而产量的主要原因是良率，这比目标落后了12个月。 该公司发现了导致延误的缺陷，他们声称是造成该问题的根本原因，并认为没有根本的障碍。
There’s a lot to unpack in that paragraph, but the key question it raises is how could it be that Intel, which was for decades the undisputed leader in manufacturing process technology which allowed it to deliver to market the highest performance and highest margin CPUs for PCs and servers, lost its lead so dramatically?
该段中有很多内容需要解压缩，但它提出的关键问题是，怎么可能是英特尔？几十年来，英特尔一直是制造Craft.io技术领域无可争议的领导者，它使它能够向市场提供性能最高，利润最高的PC CPU。和服务器，那么巨大地失去了领先优势？
I believe that Intel is in the middle of what Andy Grove called a “Strategic Inflection Point” (SIP) that goes to the heart of its business. The last time Intel faced such an existential SIP was in 1984 when it was losing market share in memory chips, which was its core business, and it pivoted to become a microprocessor company. In Grove’s book, Only the Paranoid Survive, he described how Intel made that transition and, as a result, by 1995 became the world’s largest and most influential semiconductor company. Clearly Grove made the right decision to pivot into microprocessors as that got the company out of a highly competitive low-margin commodity business and into a ridiculously high margin business of providing a highly differentiated and proprietary product with well over 90% market share.
我相信英特尔正处在安迪·格罗夫(Andy Grove)所称的“战略拐点”(SIP)的中间，而这一点已成为其业务的核心。 英特尔上一次面对这样的生存性SIP是在1984年，当时它正在失去其核心业务存储芯片的市场份额，并开始发展成为微处理器公司。 在格罗夫(Grove)的著作《 只有偏执狂生存 》( Only Paranoid Survive)中 ，他描述了英特尔如何实现这一转变，并因此在1995年成为世界上最大，最有影响力的半导体公司。 显然，格鲁夫(Grove)做出了进入微处理器的正确决策，这使该公司脱离了竞争激烈的低利润商品业务，并提供了可笑的高利润业务，以提供高度差异化的专有产品，其市场份额超过90％。
Intel continued to hold its position as the world’s largest semiconductor company until 2017 when Samsung overtook it by revenues, and TSMC caught up on manufacturing process technology. To understand how Intel became the dominant semiconductor company and hold that position for over 20 years and then lose it, one has to go back in time to 1985 when Intel’s 386 chip was its lead product in the then-nascent PC market.
英特尔一直保持着其全球最大半导体公司的地位，直到2017年三星的收入超过了它，而台积电则赶上了制造Craft.io技术。 要了解英特尔如何成为主导的半导体公司并保持20多年的地位，然后又失去它，必须追溯到1985年，当时英特尔386芯片是当时新兴PC市场的主导产品。
What Grove could not have fully appreciated at the time he was navigating the memory to microprocessor pivot was how significant that move would later turn out to be. At the time, PCs were still a relatively small market and ran MS-DOS from Microsoft which had a clunky text-based user interface. PCs were underpowered compared with the mainframes, and relegated to simple tasks such as word processing and spreadsheets, while mainframes, minicomputers, and workstations continued to be used for “real” computer work. Nobody back then could have imagined that microprocessors from Intel would become the brains behind the entire computer industry for decades to come. When I joined Intel in 1983, nobody even at Intel used PCs for their work. As a software developer, I was coding for a Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) VAX minicomputer and Apollo workstations. Neither of these two companies exists anymore.
在将内存导航到微处理器枢轴时，格罗夫当时还没有完全意识到，此举后来变得多么重要。 当时，个人电脑仍然是一个相对较小的市场，并且运行Microsoft的MS-DOS，后者具有笨拙的基于文本的用户界面。 与大型机相比，PC的功能不足，只能执行诸如文字处理和电子表格之类的简单任务，而大型机，小型计算机和工作站则继续用于“实际”计算机工作。 那时没有人能想到，英特尔的微处理器将在未来几十年成为整个计算机行业的大脑。 当我于1983年加入英特尔公司时，甚至没有人在英特尔公司使用PC来工作。 作为软件开发人员，我正在为Digital Equipment Corporation(DEC)VAX小型计算机和Apollo工作站进行编码。 这两家公司都不存在了。
What Intel was able to accomplish was harnessing the advanced manufacturing expertise that it had honed through manufacturing memory chips in volume, and create an engine of innovation that leveraged the tight coupling of Intel’s microprocessor design and a manufacturing capability that was able to give the CPU designers more and more transistors to build each generation of microprocessor, making it faster and cheaper. Moore’s law was less of a law than a mandate to the manufacturing side of Intel to keep refining the process technology and shrink the size of transistors so as to pack more on to a single chip of silicon while also clocking the processors at faster speeds. To put it in perspective, the 386 had 275,000 transistors and the next generation the 486, which I worked on, had over one million transistors. Today’s Core i7 has around 3 billion transistors.
英特尔能够完成的工作是利用其通过批量生产内存芯片而磨练的先进制造专业知识，并创建创新引擎，利用英特尔微处理器设计的紧密结合和制造能力为CPU设计人员提供支持越来越多的晶体管可以构建每一代微处理器，从而使其更快，更便宜。 摩尔定律不是法律，而是对英特尔制造部门的一项授权，要求其不断完善Craft.io技术并缩小晶体管的尺寸，以便将更多芯片封装到单个硅芯片上，同时还以更快的速度为处理器提供时钟。 确切地说，386拥有275,000个晶体管，而我研究的下一代486拥有超过100万个晶体管。 如今的Core i7拥有约30亿个晶体管。
I remember going to meetings with engineers working in the mainframe and minicomputer companies to get their feedback on the 486, because we, of course, wanted them to use that chip in their next-generation systems, and they laughed at us for even being so presumptions as to assume they would ever use what they considered a toy. However, the were very generous with their suggestions and explained to us how their advanced designs worked and why we would never meet their requirements, but what they failed to take into account, was that as transistor budgets grew, Intel engineers were able to add all these kinds of advanced capabilities, and more, to its CPUs to eventually overtake their proprietary systems in performance, and at far lower costs.
我记得曾与大型机和小型计算机公司的工程师会面，以获取有关486的反馈，因为我们当然希望他们在下一代系统中使用该芯片，他们甚至为如此而笑我们假定他们会使用他们认为是玩具的东西。 但是，他们非常慷慨地提出了建议，并向我们解释了他们的高级设计是如何工作的以及为什么我们永远无法满足他们的要求，但是他们没有考虑到的是，随着晶体管预算的增长，英特尔工程师能够添加所有这些先进的功能以及更多的功能，使其CPU最终在性能上超过了专有系统，并且成本大大降低。
The result of Intel’s rapid innovations and improvements in the price-performance of the x86 CPUs was that it created a Strategic Inflection Point for the entire computer industry. To explain this, I’ll refer back to Grove’s Only the Paranoid Survive book where he wrote:
英特尔快速创新和改进x86 CPU的价格性能的结果是，它为整个计算机行业创造了战略拐点。 为了解释这一点，我将参考格鲁夫在他撰写的《 唯一的偏执狂生存》一书中写道：
The computer industry used to be vertically aligned. As shown in the diagram that follows, this means that an old-style computer company would have its own semiconductor chip implementation, build its own computer around these chips according to its own design and in its own factories, develop its own operating system software (the software that is fundamental to the workings of all computers) and market its own applications software (the software that does things like accounts payable or airline ticketing or department store inventory control). This combination of a company’s own chips, own computers, own operating systems and own applications software would then be sold as a package by the company’s own salespeople. This is what we mean by a vertical alignment. Note how often the word “own” occurs in this description. In fact, we might as well say “proprietary,” which, in fact, was the byword of the old computer industry.
计算机行业过去一直是垂直对齐的。 如下图所示，这意味着一家老式计算机公司将拥有自己的半导体芯片实现，根据自己的设计并在自己的工厂中围绕这些芯片构建自己的计算机，并开发自己的操作系统软件(是所有计算机正常工作的软件)，并销售自己的应用程序软件(该软件执行诸如应付帐款或飞机票或百货商店库存控制之类的事情)。 公司自己的芯片，公司的计算机，操作系统和应用软件的组合然后将由公司自己的销售人员打包出售。 这就是我们所说的垂直对齐方式。 请注意，在此说明中，“拥有”一词的出现频率。 实际上，我们不妨说“专有的”，这实际上是旧计算机行业的代名词。
This vertically integrated approach had its pros and cons. The advantage is that when a company develops every piece themselves, the parts work better together as a whole. The disadvantage is that customers got locked into one vendor and it limited choice. The other disadvantages, which are more important, is that the rate of innovation was only as fast as the slowest link in the chain and that the market was more fragmented, which prevented any one company from reaching economies of scale. The end result was that the computer industry was made up of independent islands with no interoperability or scale. Once a customer chose one solution, they were stuck with it for a very long time and paid a lot more.
这种垂直整合的方法有其优点和缺点。 好处是，当公司自己开发每个零件时，各个零件在整体上可以更好地协同工作。 缺点是客户被锁定在一个供应商中，选择受限。 其他更重要的缺点是，创新速度仅与链中最慢的环节一样快，市场更加分散，这阻止了任何一家公司实现规模经济。 最终结果是计算机工业由独立的孤岛组成，没有互操作性或规模。 一旦客户选择了一个解决方案，他们就会在很长一段时间内陷入困境，并支付更多的费用。
Then the microprocessor came along and as it became the basic building block for the industry. Economies of scale kicked in, which greatly accelerated the rate of improvement, and which also vastly expanded the market for PCs, then later servers, eventually replacing the proprietary systems. Back to Grove:
然后，微处理器问世，并成为该行业的基本构件。 规模经济的出现，极大地提高了改进速度，也极大地扩展了PC市场，随后扩展了服务器市场，最终取代了专有系统。 返回格罗夫：
Over time, this changed the entire structure of the industry and a new horizontal industry emerged. In this new model, no one company had its own stack. A consumer could pick a chip from the horizontal chip bar, pick a computer manufacturer from the computer bar, choose an operating system out of the operating system bar, grab one of several ready-to-use applications off the shelf at a retail store or at a computer superstore and take the collection of these things home. Then he or she fired them up and hoped that they would all work together. He might have trouble making them work but he put up with that trouble and worked a bit harder because for $2,000 he had just bought a computer system that the old way couldn’t deliver for less than ten times the cost. This was such a compelling proposition that he put up with the weaknesses in order to avail himself of the power of this new way of doing business. Over time, this changed the entire structure of the computer industry, and a new horizontal industry, depicted below, emerged.
随着时间的流逝，这改变了整个行业的结构，并且出现了一个新的横向行业。 在这种新模型中，没有一家公司拥有自己的堆栈。 消费者可以从水平芯片条中选择芯片，从计算机条中选择计算机制造商，从操作系统条中选择操作系统，在零售商店中抢购现成的几个可用应用程序之一，或者在一家计算机大型超市，将收集的这些东西带回家。 然后他或她解雇了他们，并希望他们能够一起工作。 他可能无法使它们正常工作，但他忍受了这一麻烦，并且更加努力，因为他花了2,000美元买了一个旧系统无法提供的价格不到10倍的计算机系统。 这是一个引人注目的命题，以至于他忍受了这些弱点，以便利用这种新的经商方式的力量。 随着时间的流逝，这改变了计算机行业的整体结构，并且出现了如下所示的新的横向行业。
As a result of the reorientation of the industry from vertical to horizontal, many computer companies did not survive their Strategic Inflection Point. DEC, Unisys, Apollo, Data General, Prime, Wang, and many others, went out of business or got acquired by PC companies such as Compaq’s acquiring of DEC. One of the key lessons of this massive change in the computer industry as explained by Grove:
由于行业从垂直方向转向水平方向，许多计算机公司无法幸免于战略拐点。 DEC，Unisys，Apollo，Data General，Prime，Wang等许多公司倒闭或被PC公司收购，例如Compaq收购DEC。 格罗夫(Grove)解释说，计算机行业发生巨大变化的主要教训之一是：
By virtue of the functional specialization that prevails, horizontal industries tend to be more cost-effective than their vertical equivalents. Simply put, it’s harder to be the best of class in several fields than in just one.
由于普遍存在的功能专业化，水平行业往往比垂直行业更具成本效益。 简而言之，要在多个领域做到最好，要比仅仅一个领域难。
As industries shift from the vertical to the horizontal model, each participant will have to work its way through a strategic inflection point. Consequently, operating by these rules will be necessary for a larger and larger class of companies as time goes on.
随着行业从垂直模式向水平模式转变，每个参与者都必须努力通过战略拐点。 因此，随着时间的流逝，对于越来越多的公司类别而言，必须遵循这些规则进行操作。
This modularization theory was also thoroughly in Clayton Christensen’s paper on Disruption, disintegration and the dissipation of differentiability and explored in more detail in his book The Innovators Solution where he pointed out that:
克莱顿·克里斯滕森(Clayton Christensen)关于中断，分裂和可微性消散的论文中也对这种模块化理论进行了深入研究，并在他的《创新者解决方案》一书中进行了更详细的探讨，他指出：
Modularity has a profound impact on industry structure because it enables independent, nonintegrated organizations to sell, buy, and assemble components and subsystems. Whereas in the interdependent world you had to make all of the key elements of the system in order to make any of them, in a modular world you can prosper by outsourcing or by supplying just one element. Ultimately, the specifications for modular interfaces will coalesce as industry standards. When that happens, companies can mix and match components from best-of-breed suppliers in order to respond conveniently to the specific needs of individual customers.
模块化对行业结构具有深远的影响，因为它使独立的非集成组织能够销售，购买和组装组件和子系统。 在相互依存的世界中，您必须制造系统的所有关键要素才能制造其中的任何一个要素，而在模块化的世界中，您可以通过外包或仅提供一个要素来实现繁荣。 最终，模块化接口的规范将成为行业标准。 发生这种情况时，公司可以混合和匹配最佳供应商的组件，以方便地响应单个客户的特定需求。
By 1995, this transformation was in full swing and the transition from the “Old Computer Industry” to the “New Computer Industry” was complete, Intel had won. However Intel missed the next inflection point, and by missing that, laid the seeds of the problems that it is facing today.
到1995年，这种转变已全面展开，从“旧计算机产业”到“新计算机产业”的过渡已经完成，英特尔赢得了胜利。 但是，英特尔错过了下一个拐点，而错过了这一拐点，奠定了它今天面临的问题的种子。
The strategic inflection point that Intel missed was mobile, more specifically Apple’s iPhone which was launched in January 2007. Since the Intel x86 CPUs used too much energy, Apple chose to go with chips based on the much more power-efficient ARM architecture. As it happened, Intel acquired StrongARM from Digital Equipment Corporation which then went into the XScale processor and was a low-power chip designed for mobile (subsequently sold to Marvell in 2006). Intel certainly had the engineering and manufacturing capabilities to design and supply the kind of chips that Apple needed in the new iPhone. Apple had already switched from the IBM PowerPC chips to the x86 chips in its Macs and Steve Jobs had a very good relationship with Andy Grove and later Paul Otellini who had become the CEO at the time the iPhone was being designed. As Otellini described it in a 2013 interview in the Atlantic to Alexis Madrigal:
吨他的战略转折点，英特尔错过了移动，更具体并于2007年1月推出以来英特尔的x86 CPU使用了太多的能量苹果公司的iPhone，苹果选择去与基于备受更节能的ARM架构的芯片。 碰巧的是，英特尔从数字设备公司(Digital Equipment Corporation)收购了StrongARM，然后将其用于XScale处理器，这是一种专为移动设备设计的低功耗芯片(后来于2006年出售给了Marvell)。 英特尔当然具有设计和制造能力，可以设计和提供Apple在新款iPhone中所需的芯片。 苹果已经从Mac上的IBM PowerPC芯片转换为x86芯片，史蒂夫·乔布斯与安迪·格罗夫(Andy Grove)和后来的保罗·欧德宁(Paul Otellini)建立了很好的关系，后者在设计iPhone时就担任了首席执行官。 正如欧德宁在2013 年大西洋对亚历克西斯·马德里格(Alexis Madrigal)的采访中所说的那样：
We ended up not winning it or passing on it, depending on how you want to view it. And the world would have been a lot different if we’d done it,” Otellini told me in a two-hour conversation during his last month at Intel. “The thing you have to remember is that this was before the iPhone was introduced and no one knew what the iPhone would do… At the end of the day, there was a chip that they were interested in that they wanted to pay a certain price for and not a nickel more and that price was below our forecasted cost. I couldn’t see it. It wasn’t one of these things you can make up on volume. And in hindsight, the forecasted cost was wrong and the volume was 100x what anyone thought.
我们最终没有赢得它或继续传递它，这取决于您如何查看它。 如果我们做到了，世界将会大不一样。”欧德宁在上个月在英特尔的两个小时的谈话中告诉我。 “您要记住的是，这是在iPhone推出之前，没有人知道iPhone会做什么……最终，他们有一种芯片感兴趣，他们想付出一定的代价。而不是镍，价格低于我们的预测成本。 我看不到 这不是您可以大量弥补的事情之一。 事后看来，预测成本是错误的，交易量是任何人的100倍。
Not being willing to win over Apple meant that Intel was shut out of participating in the mobile phone market, but more importantly, it gave TSMC an opening to become the manufacturer of choice for the chips going into the Apple iPhone and then all the other Android-based mobile devices. It took the horizontal layer that Intel controlled in semiconductors, and split it into two narrower layers: One was the ARM-based CPU architecture which ended up dominating the mobile phone market and the other layer below it was the manufacturing of these devices which TSMC ended up with the lion’s share of. Since ARM licenses its design to other so-called “fab-less” chip design companies, such as Qualcomm, it vastly increased the number of companies innovating around the ARM architecture at a magnitude that Intel couldn’t dream of matching which accelerated the rate of innovation and variety, yet all still compatible with the ARM architecture, so the software designed for mobile phones had a larger market. In addition, TSMC, as the chip fab of choice, was able to scale up and enjoy massive economies of scale which then allowed it to push its process technology forward at an even faster rate and eventually surpass Intel as it recently did. Even Samsung was able to catch up with Intel, first as a supplier of the memory chips and later more advanced logic chips. The result is that the leadership of the mobile era has shifted from Intel and Microsoft, sometimes referred to as Wintel, to ARM and TSMC.
不愿赢得苹果的竞争意味着英特尔被排除在手机市场之外，但更重要的是，它为台积电提供了机会，使其成为苹果iPhone和所有其他Android芯片的首选制造商。基于移动设备。 英特尔采用了半导体所控制的水平层，并将其分为两个较窄的层：一个是基于ARM的CPU架构，最终占领了手机市场，另一层是其制造，而台积电则终止了这些层。最多。 由于ARM将其设计许可给了其他所谓的“无晶圆厂”芯片设计公司，例如高通公司，因此，它极大地增加了围绕ARM架构进行创新的公司数量，而英特尔却梦dream以求，这加快了速度尽管具有创新性和多样性，但它们仍然与ARM体系结构兼容，因此为手机设计的软件拥有较大的市场。 此外，作为首选的芯片制造商，台积电(TSMC)可以扩大规模并享受大规模的规模经济，从而使它以更快的速度推动其Craft.io技术的发展，并最终超过了英特尔。 甚至三星公司也能够赶上英特尔，首先是内存芯片的供应商，然后是更高级的逻辑芯片的供应商。 结果是，移动时代的领导地位已经从英特尔和微软(有时称为Wintel)转移到ARM和TSMC。
This trend was very thoroughly analyzed in Chips and Geopolitics and Intel and the Danger of Integration by Ben Thompson in his Stratechery blog which is an excellent analysis of how TSMC was able to get ahead of Intel in manufacturing of advanced semiconductor products.
Ben Thompson在他的Stratechery博客中的《 芯片与地缘政治学》和《 英特尔与整合的危险》中对这一趋势进行了非常彻底的分析，这很好地分析了台积电在先进的半导体产品制造方面如何领先于英特尔。
Exacerbating these external events, Intel also had the misfortune of poor leadership under Brian Krzanich, which resulted in an increased pace of senior management turnover. Even more recently, Apple has successfully lured many of Intel’s top VLSI chip designers in Israel and Oregon to work on designing Apple’s processors for its next-generation iPhones and iPads and soon, even Macbooks.
加剧这些外部事件的还有英特尔在布赖恩·科扎尼奇(Brian Krzanich)领导下糟糕的领导能力所带来的不幸，这导致高级管理人员流动速度加快。 甚至在最近，苹果公司已经成功地吸引了英特尔在以色列和俄勒冈州的许多顶级VLSI芯片设计师，致力于为其下一代iPhone和iPad以及不久的Macbooks设计苹果的处理器。
Intel is potentially facing as big of a strategic inflection point today as it was in 1984, but the major difference is that its core data center business is highly profitable and still growing due to the continued strength of cloud computing and Intel still dominates as a supplier CPUs used in cloud data centers. That sector requires very high-performance CPUs and power consumption, although a factor, is not as important as it is in a battery-powered mobile device. However, there are a growing number of fabless chip design groups, including Amazon, Google, Huawei, as well as startups such as Ampere that are working on ARM-based high-performance CPUs for data centers, and that market will get even bigger with the future growth of edge-computing in 5G networks. Since TSMC will be manufacturing these ARM server chips, and the new ARM-based chips in the Macbooks are rumored to be faster than Intel’s CPUs (and lower power), Intel’s advantage will erode even in its core data center business.
我 NTEL是潜在的战略转折点的大今天面对，因为它是在1984年，但主要区别是，它的核心数据中心业务的利润率很高并且仍在持续增长，由于云计算的持续强度计算和英特尔仍然占主导地位的云数据中心中使用的供应商CPU。 该部分需要非常高性能的CPU和功耗，尽管有一个因素，但它并不像电池供电的移动设备那么重要。 但是，越来越多的无晶圆厂芯片设计团队，包括亚马逊，谷歌，华为，以及像Ampere这样的初创企业，都在为数据中心开发基于ARM的高性能CPU，并且随着5G网络中边缘计算的未来增长。 由于台积电将制造这些ARM服务器芯片，并且有传言称Macbooks中基于ARM的新芯片比英特尔的CPU速度更快(功耗更低)，因此即使在其核心数据中心业务中，英特尔的优势也将受到侵蚀。
In a January research report from Marc Lipacis, an equity analyst from Jefferies, he makes a strong case that Intel should spin off its manufacturing business which could then directly compete with TSMC. His analysis was that Intel would add $19 to its share price by going fab-less.
杰富瑞(Jefferies)股票分析师马克·利帕克(Marc Lipacis)在1月份的研究报告中，他有力地证明了英特尔应该剥离其制造业务，然后可以直接与台积电竞争。 他的分析是，英特尔将通过无晶圆厂的方式将其股价提高19美元。
By not playing a leading role in the growth of the mobile phone market Intel has lost more than just market share and revenues, but its leadership role in the next era of computing and communications. Intel’s role in the PC era went beyond supplying the CPUs, as it controlled the ecosystem which allowed it to influence the direction of technology to its benefit. In the mobile computing era, Intel is absent and it left the role of the mobile ecosystem leadership to ARM and TSMC.
英特尔没有在手机市场的增长中发挥领导作用，不仅失去了市场份额和收入，而且失去了在下一计算和通信时代的领导地位。 英特尔在PC时代的作用已超出了提供CPU的范围，因为它控制了生态系统，从而使其能够影响技术发展方向以从中受益。 在移动计算时代，英特尔不在了，而是将移动生态系统领导者的角色留给了ARM和TSMC。
As mentioned earlier, Intel also lost a large number of senior managers and has recruited new management from fab-less companies who may be more receptive to spin off the manufacturing part of Intel. The new CEO Bob Swan was brought in from outside the company, first as CFO, and later promoted to CEO, so he may have less attachment to the old ways and have the courage to do something bold. The board, on the other hand, still has a lot of legacy directors, who may not be receptive to such a bold but necessary move. The market certainly has made its position clear as the stock price reflects. History is against Intel’s chances of catching up on the process technology side and the external 10x force of TSMC and ARM. As Grove referred to these types of changes in his book Only the Paranoid Survive, cannot be wished away. Even if Intel has enough inertia to continue on its current path, the macro trends will eventually catch up with it and if it does not manage its way through this strategic inflection point, it will lose its preeminent position in the technology industry.
如前所述，英特尔还失去了大量高级管理人员，并从无晶圆厂的公司招募了新的管理层，他们可能更愿意剥离英特尔的制造部门。 新任首席执行官鲍勃·斯旺(Bob Swan)是从公司外部聘请的，最初是首席财务官，后来又晋升为首席执行官，因此他可能对旧的方式不那么执着，并且有勇气做些大胆的事情。 另一方面，董事会仍然有许多传统董事，他们可能不接受这样大胆但必要的举动。 随着股价的上涨，市场肯定已经明确了其立场。 历史不利于英特尔追赶制程技术方面的机会以及台积电和ARM的外部10倍力量。 就像格罗夫在他的书中提到的这些类型的变化一样， 只有《偏执狂生存 》 才是不可思议的 。 即使英特尔有足够的惯性继续前进，但宏观趋势最终仍将赶上它，如果它无法通过这一战略拐点进行管理，它将失去在技术行业的领先地位。
计算机 墨菲定律
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