单期
静态模型
偏好: 稻田条件
技术: 一次齐次
消费者最优化行为
max c , l u ( c , l ) s . t . c = w ( h − l ) + ( 1 + r ) k 0 + π , 0 ≤ l ≤ h u 2 u 1 = w \max\limits_{c,l}\quad u(c,l)\\ {s.t.}\quad c=w(h-l)+(1+r)k_0+\pi,0\leq l \leq h\\ \frac{u_2}{u_1}=w c,lmaxu(c,l)s.t.c=w(h−l)+(1+r)k0+π,0≤l≤hu1u2=w
消费与闲暇的边际替代率等于工资率
厂商最优化行为
π = z f ( k d , n d ) − ( 1 + r ) k d + ( 1 − δ ) k d − w n d , δ = 1 max k d , n d [ z f ( k d , n d ) − ( 1 + r ) k d − w n d ] z f 1 = 1 + r z f 2 = w \pi = zf(k_d,n_d)-(1+r)k_d+(1-\delta)k_d-wn_d,\delta = 1\\ \max\limits_{k_d,n_d}\quad [zf(k_d,n_d)-(1+r)k_d-wn_d]\\ zf_1=1+r\\ zf_2=w π=zf(kd,nd)−(1+r)kd+(1−δ)kd−wnd,δ=1kd,ndmax[zf(kd,nd)−(1+r)kd−wnd]zf1=1+rzf2=w
当生产函数为一次齐次时,欧拉定律:
z f ( k , n ) = z f 1 k + z f 2 n zf(k,n)=zf_1k+zf_2n zf(k,n)=zf1k+zf2n
规模报酬不变时,最大化利润为零:
z f ( k , n ) − ( 1 + r ) k − w n = 0 zf(k,n)-(1+r)k-wn=0 zf(k,n)−(1+r)k−wn=0
竞争均衡
始终满足:
c − y + w [ n d − ( h − l ) ] + ( 1 + r ) ( k d − k s ) c-y+w[n_d-(h-l)]+(1+r)(k_d-k_s) c−y+w[nd−(h−l)]+(1+r)(kd−ks)
劳动市场、消费品市场和资本租赁市场:
h − l = n d ( 1 ) c = y ( 2 ) k s = k 0 = k d ( 3 ) h-l=n_d\quad (1)\\ c=y\quad (2)\\ k_s=k_0=k_d\quad (3) h−l=nd(1)c=y(2)ks=k0=kd(3)
瓦尔拉斯定理:(1)、(2)、(3)中任两个出清,另一个也出清。
帕累托最优
万能的计划者:
max c , l u ( c , l ) s . t . c = z f ( k 0 , ( h − l ) ) z f 2 = u 2 u 1 \max\limits_{c,l}\quad u(c,l)\\ {s.t.}\quad c=zf(k_0,(h-l))\\ zf_2=\frac{u_2}{u_1} c,lmaxu(c,l)s.t.c=zf(k0,(h−l))zf2=u1u2
消费者预算约束线 / 消费可能性曲线
比较静态分析
设生产技术: y = z n y=zn y=zn
最优化问题: max l u [ z ( h − l ) , l ] \max\limits_l\quad u[z(h-l),l] lmaxu[z(h−l),l]
一阶条件: − z u 1 [ z ( h − 1 ) , l ] + u 2 [ z ( h − 1 ) , l ] = 0 -zu_1[z(h-1),l]+u_2[z(h-1),l]=0 −zu1[z(h−1),l]+u2[z(h−1),l]=0
均衡工作: w = ∂ y ∂ n = z w=\frac{\partial{y}}{\partial{n}}=z w=∂n∂y=z
d l d z = u 1 + z ( h − l ) u 11 − ( h − l ) u 21 z 2 u 11 − 2 z u 12 + u 22 \frac{dl}{dz}=\frac{u_1+z(h-l)u_{11}-(h-l)u_{21}}{z^2u_{11}-2zu_{12}+u_{22}} dzdl=z2u11−2zu12+u22u1+z(h−l)u11−(h−l)u21
分母小于0,分子不确定
政府行为
假设政府将其购买的消费品全部销毁
政府预算约束: g = τ g=\tau g=τ
生产函数: y = z n y=zn y=zn
w ( c , l , g ) = u ( c , l ) + v ( g ) v ( g ) = 0 w(c,l,g)=u(c,l)+v(g)\\ v(g)=0 w(c,l,g)=u(c,l)+v(g)v(g)=0
消费者与厂商最优化行为
消费者:
max c , l u ( c , l ) s . t . c = w ( h − l ) − τ − w u 1 + u 2 = 0 \max\limits_{c,l}\quad u(c,l)\\ {s.t.}\quad c=w(h-l)-\tau\\ -wu_1+u_2=0 c,lmaxu(c,l)s.t.c=w(h−l)−τ−wu1+u2=0
厂商:
max n ( z − w ) n w = z \max\limits_n (z-w)n\\ w=z nmax(z−w)nw=z
竞争均衡与比较静态分析
− z u 1 [ ( z ( h − l ) − g ) , l ] + u 2 [ ( z ( h − l ) − g ) , l ] = 0 d l d g = − z u 11 + u 12 z 2 u 11 − 2 u 12 + u 22 < 0 d c d g = z u 12 − u 22 z 2 u 11 − 2 u 12 + u 22 < 0 -zu_1[(z(h-l)-g),l]+u_2[(z(h-l)-g),l]=0\\ \frac{dl}{dg}=\frac{-zu_{11}+u_{12}}{z^2u_{11}-2u_{12}+u_{22}}<0\\ \frac{dc}{dg}=\frac{zu_{12}-u_{22}}{z^2u_{11}-2u_{12}+u_{22}}<0 −zu1[(z(h−l)−g),l]+u2[(z(h−l)−g),l]=0dgdl=z2u11−2u12+u22−zu11+u12<0dgdc=z2u11−2u12+u22zu12−u22<0
两期
实际利率: r r r
贴现利率: ρ \rho ρ
贴现因子: β = 1 1 + ρ \beta=\frac{1}{1+\rho} β=1+ρ1
t t t期债券购买数: b t b_t bt
纯两期
偏好: ν ( c 1 , c 2 ) = u ( c 1 ) + β u ( c 2 ) \nu(c_1,c_2)=u(c_1)+\beta{u(c_2)} ν(c1,c2)=u(c1)+βu(c2)
禀赋: ∑ i = 1 N y 1 i = Y 1 , ∑ i = 1 N y 2 i = Y 2 \sum\limits_{i=1}^N y_{1i}=Y_1,\sum\limits_{i=1}^N y_{2i}=Y_2 i=1∑Ny1i=Y1,i=1∑Ny2i=Y2
消费者最优化行为
max c 1 , c 2 , b 1 u ( c 1 ) + β u ( c 2 ) s . t . c 1 + b 1 = y 1 , c 2 = y 2 + b 1 ( 1 + r ) \max\limits_{c_1,c_2,b_1}\quad u(c_1)+\beta u(c_2)\\ {s.t.}\quad c_1+b_1=y_1,c_2=y_2+b_1(1+r) c1,c2,b1maxu(c1)+βu(c2)s.t.c1+b1=y1,c2=y2+b1(1+r)
欧拉方程: u ′ ( c 1 ) u ′ ( c 2 ) = β ( 1 + r ) \frac{u'(c_1)}{u'(c_2)}=\beta{(1+r)} u′(c2)u′(c1)=β(1+r)
取 u ( c t ) = l n ( c t ) u(c_t)=ln(c_t) u(ct)=ln(ct):
c 1 = y 2 + y 1 ( 1 + r ) ( 1 + β ) ( 1 + r ) c 2 = [ y 2 + y 1 ( 1 + r ) ] ( β 1 + β ) b 1 = y 1 − y 2 + y 1 ( 1 + r ) ( 1 + β ) ( 1 + r ) c_1=\frac{y_2+y_1(1+r)}{(1+\beta)(1+r)}\\ c_2=[y_2+y_1(1+r)](\frac{\beta}{1+\beta})\\ b_1=y_1-\frac{y_2+y_1(1+r)}{(1+\beta)(1+r)} c1=(1+β)(1+r)y2+y1(1+r)c2=[y2+y1(1+r)](1+ββ)b1=y1−(1+β)(1+r)y2+y1(1+r)
比较静态分析:
∂ c 2 ∂ r = y 1 β 1 + β > 0 \frac{\partial{c_2}}{\partial{r}}=\frac{y_1\beta}{1+\beta}>0 ∂r∂c2=1+βy1β>0
市场均衡
资本市场与商品市场条件
∑ i = 1 n b 1 i = 0 ∑ i = 1 n c 1 i + ∑ i = 1 n c 2 i = Y 1 + Y 2 Y 2 Y 1 = 1 + g \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}{b_{1i}}=0\\ \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}{c_{1i}}+\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}{c_{2i}}=Y_1+Y_2\\ \frac{Y_2}{Y_1} = 1+g i=1∑nb1i=0i=1∑nc1i+i=1∑nc2i=Y1+Y2Y1Y2=1+g
得到:
b 1 i = y 1 i − y 2 i + y 1 i ( 1 + r ) ( 1 + β ) ( 1 + r ) r ∗ = Y 2 β Y 1 − 1 1 + r ∗ = ( 1 + ρ ) ( 1 + g ) r ∗ ≈ ρ + g b_{1i}=y_{1i}-\frac{y_{2i}+y_{1i}(1+r)}{(1+\beta)(1+r)}\\ r^*=\frac{Y_2}{\beta{Y_1}}-1\\ 1+r^*=(1+\rho)(1+g)\\ r^*\approx\rho+g b1i=y1i−(1+β)(1+r)y2i+y1i(1+r)r∗=βY1Y2−11+r∗=(1+ρ)(1+g)r∗≈ρ+g
比较静态分析
∂ r ∗ ∂ Y 2 = 1 β Y 1 > 0 \frac{\partial{r^*}}{\partial{Y_2}}=\frac{1}{\beta{Y_1}}>0 ∂Y2∂r∗=βY11>0
考虑资本
偏好: ν ( c 1 , c 2 ) = u ( c 1 ) + β u ( c 2 ) \nu(c_1,c_2)=u(c_1)+\beta{u(c_2)} ν(c1,c2)=u(c1)+βu(c2)
技术: y = z f ( k ) y=zf(k) y=zf(k),稻田条件
禀赋: k 0 k_0 k0
消费者最优化行为
预算约束方程:
c 1 + s 1 = ( 1 + r 1 ) k 1 s + π 1 c 2 = ( 1 + r 2 ) s 1 + π 2 c_1+s_1=(1+r_1)k_1^s+\pi_1\\ c_2=(1+r_2)s_1+\pi_2 c1+s1=(1+r1)k1s+π1c2=(1+r2)s1+π2
效用最大化:
max c 1 , c 2 , s 1 u ( c 1 ) + β u ( c 2 ) s . t . c 1 + s 1 = ( 1 + r 1 ) k 1 s + π 1 , c 2 = ( 1 + r 2 ) s 1 + π 2 u ′ ( c 1 ) u ′ ( c 2 ) = β ( 1 + r 2 ) \max\limits_{c_1,c_2,s_1}\quad u(c_1)+\beta u(c_2)\\ {s.t.}\quad c_1+s_1=(1+r_1)k_1^s+\pi_1,c_2=(1+r_2)s_1+\pi_2\\ \frac{u'(c_1)}{u'(c_2)}=\beta (1+r_2) c1,c2,s1maxu(c1)+βu(c2)s.t.c1+s1=(1+r1)k1s+π1,c2=(1+r2)s1+π2u′(c2)u′(c1)=β(1+r2)
厂商最优化行为
max k 1 π 1 = z f ( k 1 d ) − ( 1 + r 1 ) k 1 d + ( 1 − δ ) k 1 d max k 2 π 2 = z f ( k 2 d ) −