By topic | By date | By author
Topics:
Computational Mechanism Design
Elicitation & Combinatorial Markets
Incentive-Based Computing
Miscellaneous and Overview
Ph.D. thesis
· Computational Mechanism Design
o Efficiency and Redistribution in Dynamic Mechanism Design (PDF)
by Ruggiero Cavallo.
In the Proc. 9th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'08), Chicago, IL, 2008. (BibTeX entry)·
o Efficient Metadeliberation Auctions (PDF)
by Ruggiero Cavallo and David C. Parkes.
In the Proc. 23rd National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'08), Chicago, IL, 2008. (BibTeX entry)·
o Efficient Online Mechanisms for Persistent, Periodically Inaccessible Self-Interested Agents (PDF)
by Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, and Satinder Singh.
Harvard University Technical Report , 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games (PDF)
by Jacomo Corbo, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, and David Parkes.
Harvard University Technical Report , 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents (PDF)
by Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes, and Quang Duong.
In Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 30, 2007, pages 133-179. (BibTeX entry)·
o An Ironing-Based Approach to Adaptive Online Mechanism Design in Single-Valued Domains (PDF)
by David C. Parkes and Quang Duong.
In the Proc. 22nd National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'07), 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o M-DPOP: Faithful Distributed Implementations of Efficient Social Choice Problems (PDF)
by Adrian Petcu, Boi Faltings, and David C. Parkes.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2007 (Submitted, under review.). (BibTeX entry)·
o An Options Based Solution to the Sequential Auction Problem (PDF)
by Adam I. Juda and David C. Parkes.
Artificial Intelligence Journal, 2007 (Submitted, under review.). (BibTeX entry)·
o On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values (PDF)
by Florin Constantin and David C. Parkes.
In the Proc. Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IX (AMEC'IX), Honolulu, Hawaii, 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o Online Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values (PDF)
by Florin Constantin, Takayuki Ito, and David C. Parkes.
Inthe Proc. 6th International Joint Conference on AutonomousAgents andMultiagent Systems (AAMAS'07), Honolulu, Hawaii, May 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o MDPOP: Faithful Distributed Implementation of Efficient Social Choice Problems (PDF)
by Adrian Petcu, Boi Faltings, and David C. Parkes.
In the Proc. 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'06), pages 1397-1404, 2006. (BibTeX entry)·
o Instantiating the Contingent Bids Model of Truthful Interdependent Value Auctions (PDF)
by Takayuki Ito and David C. Parkes.
Inthe Proc. 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents andMultiagent Systems (AAMAS'06), pages 1151-1158, 2006 ( Best paperaward). (BibTeX entry)·
o An Options-Based Method to Solve the ComposabilityProblem in Sequential Auctions (PDF)
by Adam I. Juda and David C. Parkes.
InAgent Mediated Electronic Commerce VI(3435), Springer Verlag, 2006(Revised Papers from AAMAS Workskshop, New York NY (2004)). (BibTeX entry)·
o Optimal Decision-Making With Minimal Waste: Strategyproof Redistribution of VCG Payments (PDF)
by Ruggiero Cavallo.
In the Proc. of the 5th Int. Joint Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS'06), Hakodate, Japan, 2006. (BibTeX entry)·
o Optimal Coordinated Planning Amongst Self-Interested Agents with Private State (PDF)
by Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, and Satinder Singh.
Inthe Proceedings of the 22nd Conference on Uncertainty in ArtificialIntelligence (UAI'2006), Cambridge, MA, pages 55-62, 2006. (BibTeX entry)·
o Optimal Coordination of Loosely-Coupled Self-Interested Robots (PDF)
by Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, and Satinder Singh.
In the Workshop on Auction Mechanisms for Robot Coordination, AAAI-06, Boston, MA, 2006. (BibTeX entry)·
o The Sequential Auction Problem on eBay: An Empirical Analysis and a Solution (PDF)
by Adam I. Juda and David C. Parkes.
In the Proc. 7th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'06), pages 180-189, 2006. (BibTeX entry)·
o Handling Self-Interest in Groups, with Minimal Cost (PDF)
by Ruggiero Cavallo.
In the Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-06), Nectar Paper Track, Boston, MA, 2006. (BibTeX entry)·
o Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions (PDF)
by Jonathan Bredin and David C. Parkes.
In the Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI'2005), pages 50-59, 2005. (BibTeX entry)·
o Online Auctions with Re-usable Goods (PDF)
by Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Robert Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, and David Parkes.
In the Proc. 6th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'05), pages 165-174, 2005. (BibTeX entry)·
o Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions (PDF)
by Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, and Subhash Suri.
In Decision Support Systems 39, 2005, pages 105-121 (Special issue dedicated to the Fourth ACMConference on Electronic Commerce). (BibTeX entry)·
o Preference-Based Characterizations of Truthfulness and the Limited Expressiveness of Order-Based Domains (PDF)
by Florin Constantin and David C. Parkes.
In the Proc. Workshop on Preference Handling, Edinburgh, Scotland, August 2005 (Position Paper). (BibTeX entry)·
o Adaptive Limited-Supply Online Auctions (PDF)
by Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi, Robert Kleinberg, and David C. Parkes.
In the Proc. ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce, pages 71-80, 2004. (BibTeX entry)·
o Approximately Efficient Online Mechanism Design (PDF)
by David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh, and Dimah Yanovsky.
In the Proc. 18th Annual Conf. on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS'04), 2004. (BibTeX entry)·
o Specification Faithfulness in Networks with Rational Nodes (PDF)
by Jeffrey Shneidman and David C. Parkes.
In the Proc. 23rd ACM Symp. on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC'04), St. John's, Canada, pages 88-97, 2004. (BibTeX entry)·
o GrowRange: Anytime VCG-Based Mechanisms (PDF)
by David C. Parkes and Grant Schoenebeck.
In the Proc. 19th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-04), pages 34-41, 2004. (BibTeX entry)·
o Hard-to-Manipulate Combinatorial Auctions (PDF)
by Saurabh Sanghvi and David C. Parkes.
Harvard University Technical Report , 2004. (BibTeX entry)·
o Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms (PDF)
by David C. Parkes and Jeffrey Shneidman.
In the Proc. 3rd Int. Joint Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems, pages 261-268, 2004. (BibTeX entry)·
o An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design (PDF)
by David C. Parkes and Satinder Singh.
In the Proc. 17th Annual Conf. on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS'03), 2003. (BibTeX entry)·
o Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions (PDF)
by Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, and Subhash Suri.
In the Fourth ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'03), pages 166-175, 2003. (BibTeX entry)·
o Pricing WiFi at Starbucks– Issues in Online Mechanism Design (PDF)
by Eric Friedman and David C. Parkes.
In the Fourth ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'03), pages 240-241, 2003. (BibTeX entry)·
o Using Redundancy to Improve Robustness of Distributed Mechanism Implementations (PDF)
by Jeffrey Shneidman and David C. Parkes.
In the Fourth ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'03), pages 276-277, 2003 (Short paper). (BibTeX entry)·
o Virtual Worlds: Fast and Strategyproof Auctions for Dynamic Resource Allocation (PDF)
by Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer.
In the Fourth ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'03), pages 238-239, 2003 (Short paper). (BibTeX entry)·
o Virtual Worlds: Fast and Strategyproof Auctions for Dynamic Resource Allocation (PDF)
by Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer.
Harvard University Technical Report , 2002. (BibTeX entry)·
· Elicitation & Combinatorial Markets
o Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions for General Valuations (PDF)
by Debasis Mishra and David C. Parkes.
In Journal of Economic Theory 132, 2007, pages 335-366 (Email for pre-print.). (BibTeX entry)·
o ICE: An Expressive Iterative Combinatorial Exchange (PDF)
by Benjamin Lubin, Adam Juda, Ruggiero Cavallo, Sébastien Lahaie, Jeffrey Shneidman, and David C. Parkes.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2007 (Submitted, under review.). (BibTeX entry)·
o Activity Rules for Budget-Constrained Bidders in Ascending Price Combinatorial Auctions
by Pavithra Harsha, Cynthia Barnhart, and David C. Parkes.
Harvard University and MIT Technical Report , 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o Multi-Item Vickrey-Dutch Auctions (PDF)
by Debasis Mishra and David C. Parkes.
Games and Economic Behavior, 2007 (Submitted, under review.). (BibTeX entry)·
o Revenue Analysis of a Family of Ranking Rules for Keyword Auctions (PDF)
by Sébastien Lahaie and David Pennock.
In the Proc. 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'07), 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o An Analysis of Alternative Slot Auction Designs for Sponsored Search (PDF)
by Sébastien Lahaie.
In the Proc. 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'06), 2006. (BibTeX entry)·
o Optimize-and-Dispatch Architecture for Expressive Ad Auctions (PDF)
by David C. Parkes and Tuomas Sandholm.
In the Proceedings of First Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions, 2005. (BibTeX entry)·
o More on the Power of Demand Queries in Combinatorial Auctions: Learning Atomic Languages and Handling Incentives (PDF)
by Sébastien Lahaie, Florin Constantin, and David C. Parkes.
In the Proc. 19th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'05), 2005. (BibTeX entry)·
o TBBL: A Tree-Based Bidding Language for Iterative Combinatorial Exchanges (PDF)
byRuggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, Adam I. Juda, Adam Kirsch, AlexKulesza, Sébastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin, Loizos Michael, and JeffreyShneidman.
In the Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling (IJCAI), 2005. (BibTeX entry)·
o ICE: An Iterative Combinatorial Exchange (PDF)
byDavid C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam Juda, SebastienLahaie, Benjamin Lubin, Loizos Michael, Jeffrey Shneidman, and HassanSultan.
In the Proc. 6th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'05), pages 249-258, 2005. (BibTeX entry)·
o Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions (PDF)
by David C. Parkes and Jayant Kalagnanam.
In Management Science 51, 2005, pages 435-451 (Special Issue on Electronic Markets). (BibTeX entry)·
o Auction Design with Costly Preference Elicitation (PDF)
by David C. Parkes.
In Annals of Mathematics and AI 44, 2005, pages 269-302 (Special Issue on the Foundations of Electronic Commerce). (BibTeX entry)·
o Applying Learning Algorithms to Preference Elicitation (PDF)
by Sébastien Lahaie and David C. Parkes.
In the Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 180-188, May 2004. (BibTeX entry)·
o Preference Elicitation in Proxied Multiattribute Auctions (PDF)
by Aditya V. Sunderam and David C. Parkes.
In the Fourth ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'03), pages 214-215, 2003. (BibTeX entry)·
o On Indirect and Direct Implementations of Core Outcomes inCombinatorial Auctions (PDF)
by David C. Parkes.
Harvard University Technical Report , 2002. (BibTeX entry)·
o Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions (PDF)
by David C. Parkes.
InAgent Mediated Electronic Commerce IV: Designing Mechanisms and Systems(LNAI 2531), J. Padget, D. Parkes, N.Sadeh, O.Shehory, and W.Walsh(eds.) , pages 103-122, Springer-Verlag, 2002. (BibTeX entry)·
o An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction
by David C. Parkes and Lyle H. Ungar.
In the Proc. Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics Workshop on The Economics of the Internet, Stanford, CA, 2002. (BibTeX entry)·
o An Auction-Based Method for Decentralized Train Scheduling (PDF)
by David C. Parkes and Lyle H. Ungar.
In the Proc. 5th International Conference on Autonomous Agents (AGENTS-01), pages 43-50, 2001. (BibTeX entry)·
o Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based PaymentSchemes in Exchanges (PDF)
by David C. Parkes, Jayant R Kalagnanam, and Marta Eso.
In the Proc. 17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-01), pages 1161-1168, 2001. (BibTeX entry)·
o Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Combinatorial Exchanges (PDF)
by David C. Parkes, Jayant R. Kalagnanam, and Marta Eso.
IBM Research Report RC 22218 Technical Report , 2001 (Updated, March 2002). (BibTeX entry)·
o An Iterative Generalized Vickrey Auction: Strategy-Proofness without Complete Revelation (PDF)
by David C. Parkes.
In the Proc. AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents, pages 78-87, March 2001. (BibTeX entry)·
o Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency (HTML)
by David C. Parkes.
Ph.D. thesis, Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania, May 2001. (BibTeX entry)·
o Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice (PDF)
by David C. Parkes and Lyle H. Ungar.
In the Proc. 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-00), pages 74-81, 2000. (BibTeX entry)·
o Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment (PDF)
by David C. Parkes and Lyle H. Ungar.
In the Proc. 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-00), pages 82-89, 2000. (BibTeX entry)·
o iBundle: An Efficient Ascending Price Bundle Auction (PDF)
by David C. Parkes.
In the Proc. 1st ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC-99), pages 148-157, 1999. (BibTeX entry)·
o Accounting for cognitive costs in on-line auction design (PDF)
by David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar, and Dean P. Foster.
In Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce (LNAI 1571), P Noriega and C Sierra (eds.) , pages 25-40, Springer-Verlag, 1999. (BibTeX entry)·
o Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems (PDF)
by David C. Parkes.
In the Proc. IJCAI-99 Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce, Stockholm, Sweden, pages 206-219, July 1999. (BibTeX entry)·
· Incentive-Based Computing
o A Decentralized Auction Framework to Promote EfficientResource Allocation in Open Computational Grids (PDF)
by Laura Kang and David C. Parkes.
Inthe Proc. Joint Workshop on The Economics of Networked Systems andIncentive-Based Computing (NetEcon-IBC), San Diego, CA, 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o An Economically Principled Generative Model of AS Graph Connectivity (PDF)
by Jacomo Corbo, Shaili Jain, Michael Mitzenmacher, and David C. Parkes.
In the Proc. Joint Workshop on The Economics of Networked Systems and Incentive-Based Computing, 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games (PDF)
by Jacomo Corbo, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, and David C. Parkes.
In the Workshop on Internet and Networks Economics (WINE), 2007 (Short paper. To appear). (BibTeX entry)·
o Specifying and Monitoring Economic Environments using Rights and Obligations (PDF)
by Loizos Michael, David C. Parkes, and Avi Pfeffer.
Journal of Autonomous Agents & Multi-Agent Systems, 2007 (Submitted, under review.). (BibTeX entry)·
o A Utility-Based Approach to Bandwidth Allocation and Link Scheduling in Wireless Networks (PDF)
by Qicheng Ma, David C. Parkes, and Matt Welsh.
In the Proc. 1st. International Workshop on Agent Technology for Sensor Networks (ATSN-07), Honolulu, Hawaii, 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o Practical Market-Based Resource Allocation (PDF)
by Alvin AuYoung, Brent Chun, Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Amin Vahdat, and Alex Snoeren.
CSE, University of California San Diego Technical Report CS2007-0901, 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o Passive Verification of the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms in Open Environments (PDF)
by Laura Kang and David C Parkes.
In the Proc. Eighth International Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC 2006), 2006. (BibTeX entry)·
o A study of Nash equilibrium in contribution games for peer-to-peer networks (PDF)
by Jacomo Corbo, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, and David C. Parkes.
In SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev. 40(3), 2006, pages 61-66. (BibTeX entry)·
o Specifying and Monitoring Market Mechanisms using Rights and Obligations (PDF)
by Loizos Michael, David C. Parkes, and Avi Pfeffer.
In the LNAI: Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce VI, 2006 (Revised Papers from AAMAS workshop, New York NY (2004)). (BibTeX entry)·
o Optimizing Streaming Applications with Self-Interested Users using MDPOP (PDF)
by Boi Faltings, David C. Parkes, Adrian Petcu, and Jeffrey Shneidman.
In the Proc. International Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC'06), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2006. (BibTeX entry)·
o Egg: An Extensible and Economics-Inspired Open Grid Computing Platform (PDF)
by John Brunelle, Peter Hurst, John Huth, Laura Kang, Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Margo Seltzer, Jim Shank, and SaulYoussef.
In the Proc. 3rd International Workshop on GridEconomics and Business Models (GECON'06), Singapore, 2006. (BibTeX entry)·
o Why Markets Could (But Don't Currently) Solve Resource Allocation Problems in Systems (PDF)
by Jeffrey Shneidman, Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Alvin AuYoung, Alex C. Snoeren, Amin Vahdat, and Brent Chun.
In the Proc. 10th Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems (HotOS-X), Santa Fe, NM, 2005. (BibTeX entry)·
o Adaptive Resource Allocation for Sensor Networks (PDF)
by Geoff Mainland, David C Parkes, and Matt Welsh.
In the Proc. 2nd USENIX/ACM Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI 2005), 2005. (BibTeX entry)·
o Addressing Strategic Behavior in a Deployed Microeconomic Resource Allocator (PDF)
by Chaki Ng, Philip Buonadonna, Brent N. Chun, Alex C. Snoeren, and Amin Vahdat.
In the Proceedings of 3rd Workshop on the Economics of Peer to Peer Systems (p2pecon), 2005. (BibTeX entry)·
o Computational Risk Management for Building Highly Reliable Network Services (PDF)
by Brent N. Chun, Philip Buonadonna, and Chaki Ng.
In the Proceedings of 1st Workshop on Hot Topics in System Dependability (HotDep), 2005. (BibTeX entry)·
o Mirage: A Microeconomic Resource Allocation System for SensorNet Testbeds (PDF)
byBrent N. Chun, Philip Buonadonna, Alvin AuYoung, Chaki Ng, David C.Parkes, Jeffrey Shneidman, Alex C. Snoeren, and Amin Vahdat.
In the Proceedings of 2nd IEEE Workshop on Embedded Networked Sensors (EmNetsII), 2005. (BibTeX entry)·
o The Price of Selfish Behavior in Bilateral Network Formation
by Jacomo Corbo and David C. Parkes.
Inthe Proc. 24rd ACM Symp. on Principles of Distributed Computing(PODC'05), Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, pages 99-107, 2005 ( The conferenceversion of this paper contains some errors. We are working on arevisedversion). (BibTeX entry)·
o Faithfulness in Internet Algorithms (PDF)
by Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes, and Laurent Massoulie.
Inthe Proc. SIGCOMM Workshop on Practice and Theory of Incentives andGame Theory in Networked Systems (PINS'04), Portland, USA, 2004. (BibTeX entry)·
o Using Virtual Markets to Program Global Behavior in Sensor Networks (PDF)
by Geoff Mainland, Laura Kang, Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes, and Matt Welsh.
In the Proc. 11th ACM SIGOPS European Workshop, Leuven, Belgium, 2004. (BibTeX entry)·
o Selfish Routing and Peering in the Internet (PDF)
by Jacomo Corbo and Thomas Petermann.
In the Santa Fe Inst. Complex Systems Summer School, Santa Fe, NM, June 2004. (BibTeX entry)·
o Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks (PDF)
by Jeffrey Shneidman and David C. Parkes.
In the 2nd Int. Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS'03), 2003. (BibTeX entry)·
o Five AI Challenges in Strategyproof Computing (PDF)
by David C. Parkes.
In the Proc. IJCAI'03 Workshop on Autonomic Computing, Aculpulco, Mexico, 2003. (BibTeX entry)·
o Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation (Extended Abstract) (PDF)
by Jason Woodard and David C. Parkes.
Inthe 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, June 2003(http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/conferences/p2pecon). (BibTeX entry)·
o Strategyproof Computing: Systems Infrastructures for Self-Interested Parties (PDF)
by Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer.
In the 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, Berkeley, CA, June 2003. (BibTeX entry)·
· Miscellaneous and Overview
o Computational Mechanism Design (PDF)
by David C. Parkes.
InLecture notes of Tutorials at 10th Conf. on Theoretical AspectsofRationality and Knowledge (TARK-05), To appear., Institute ofMathematical Sciences, University of Singapore, 2008. (BibTeX entry)·
oGames and Economic Behavior, Special issue Dedicated to the ACMConference on Electronic Commerce (EC'07), by David C. Parkes and MosheTennenholtz (eds.) Elsevier, 2008 (To appear). (BibTeX entry)·
o Online Mechanisms (PDF)
by David C. Parkes.
InAlgorithmic Game Theory, Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, andVijay Vazirani (eds.) , Chapter 16, Cambridge University Press, 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o Practical Secrecy-Preserving, Verifiably Correct andTrustworthy Auctions (PDF)
by David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Stuart M. Shieber, and Christopher Thorpe.
In Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 2007 (Special Issue on ICEC 2006, To appear). (BibTeX entry)·
o The Internet, Evolutionary Variational Inequalities, and the Time-Dependent Braess Paradox (PDF)
by Anna Nagurney, David C. Parkes, and Patrizia Daniele.
In Computational Management Science 4, 2007, pages 355-375. (BibTeX entry)·
o Analysis of Bidding Networks in eBay: Aggregate Preference Identification through Community Detection (PDF)
by R. Kang-Xing Jin, David C. Parkes, and Patrick J. Wolfe.
In the Proc. AAAI Workshop on Plan, Activity and Intent Recognition (PAIR), Vancouver, Canada, 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o Cryptographic Securities Exchanges (PDF)
by Christopher Thorpe and David C. Parkes.
In the Proc. 11th International Conference onFinancial Cryptography and Data Security, Trinidad/Tobago, February 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o Iterative Combinatorial Auctions (PDF)
by David C. Parkes.
In Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (eds.) , Chapter 2, MIT Press, 2006. (BibTeX entry)·
o Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions (PDF)
by David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Stuart M. Shieber, and Christopher Thorpe.
In the Proc. 8th International Conferenceon Electronic Commerce (ICEC'06), pages 70-81, 2006. (BibTeX entry)·
o Decision Support Systems, Special Issue Dedicated to the Fourth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'03) (HTML), by David C. Parkes (eds.) Elsevier, 2005. (BibTeX entry)·
o Management Science, Special Issue on Electronic Markets (HTML), by Anand Anandalingam, Jayant Kalagnanam, David C. Parkes, Michael Rothkopf, and Tuomas Sandholm (eds.) INFORMS, 2005. (BibTeX entry)·
o On Learnable Mechanism Design (PDF)
by David C. Parkes.
In Collectives and the Design of Complex Systems, Kagan Tumer and David Wolpert (eds.) , pages 107-131, Springer-Verlag, 2004. (BibTeX entry)·
o Auctions, Bidding and Exchange Design (PDF)
by Jayant Kalagnanam and David C. Parkes.
InHandbook of Quantitative Supply Chain Analysis: Modeling in theE-Business Era, David Simchi-Levi, S. David Wu, and Max Shen (eds.) ,Chapter 5, Kluwer, 2004. (BibTeX entry)·
o HarTAC– The Harvard TAC SCM'03 Agent (PDF)
by Rui Dong, Terry Tai, Wilfred Yeung, and David C. Parkes.
In the Proc. Second Workshop on Trading Agent Design and Analysis (TADA'04), New York, USA, pages 1-8, 2004. (BibTeX entry)·
o Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy NashEquilibrium (PDF)
by William E Walsh, David C. Parkes, and Rajarshi Das.
InAgent Mediated Electronic Commerce (LNAI 3048), Peyman Faratin, DavidC. Parkes, Juan A. Rodriguez-Aguilar, and William E Walsh (eds.) ,Springer-Verlag, 2004 (Revised Papers from AAMAS workshop, MelbourneAustralia (2003)). (BibTeX entry)·
o Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce V (HTML), by Peyman Faratin, David C. Parkes, Juan A. Rodriguez-Aguilar, and William E Walsh (eds.) Springer-Verlag, 2004. (BibTeX entry)·
o Towards Better Definitions and Measures of Internet Security (PDF)
by James Aspnes, Joan Feigenbaum, Michael Mitzenmacher, and David C. Parkes.
In the Proc. Workshop on Large-Scale-Network Security and Deployment Obstacles, Landsdowne VA, March 2003 (Position Paper). (BibTeX entry)·
o Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms (PDF)
by Rajdeep K Dash, Nicholas R. Jennings, and David C. Parkes.
In IEEE Intelligent Systems, November 2003, pages 40-47 (Special Issue on Agents and Markets). (BibTeX entry)·
o Challenge Problem: Agent-Mediated Decentralized Information Mechanisms (PDF)
by David C. Parkes.
In the Proc. AAMAS'02 Workshop on AgentCities: Challenges in Open Agent Environments, Bologna, Italy, 2002. (BibTeX entry)·
oLecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Agent Mediated ElectronicCommerce IV: Designing Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2002 Workshop (HTML), by Julian A. Padget, David C. Parkes, Norman M. Sadeh, Onn Shehory, and William E. Walsh (eds.) Springer-Verlag, 2002. (BibTeX entry)·
o Approximate and Compensate: A method for risk-sensitive meta-deliberation and continual computation (PDF)
by David C. Parkes and Lloyd Greenwald.
In the Proc. AAAI Fall Symposium on Using Uncertainty within Computation, North Falmouth, USA, 2001. (BibTeX entry)·
o Multiagent Cooperative Search for Portfolio Selection (PDF)
by David C. Parkes and Bernardo A Huberman.
In Games and Economic Behavior 35, 2001, pages 124-165. (BibTeX entry)·
o Cooperative Multiagent Search for Portfolio Selection (PDF)
by David C. Parkes and Bernardo A Huberman.
In the Proc. AGENTS Workshop on Artificial Societies and Computational Markets, 1998. (BibTeX entry)·
o Bouded Rationality (PDF)
by David C. Parkes.
University of Pennsylvania Technical Report , 1997. (BibTeX entry)·
o Learning and Adaption in Multiagent Systems (PDF)
by David C. Parkes and Lyle H. Ungar.
In the Proc. AAAI'97 Multiagent Learning Workshop, Providence, USA, 1997. (BibTeX entry)·
· Ph.D. thesis
o Coordination and Costly Preference Elicitation in Multi-Sided Electronic Markets
by Adam I. Juda.
Ph.D. thesis, Information, Technology and Management, Harvard University, 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o A Modular Framework for Multi-Agent Preference Elicitation
by Sébastien Lahaie.
Ph.D. thesis, Computer Science, Harvard University, 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o Architectural Strategy and Design Evolution in Complex Engineered Systems (HTML)
by Jason Woodard.
Ph.D. thesis, Information, Technology and Management, Harvard University, 2006. (BibTeX entry)·
· Senior thesis
o Joint Action Learners in Competitive Stochastic Games (PDF)
by Ivo Parashkevov.
Undergraduate thesis, Computer Science, Harvard College, 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o The Dancer and the Dance: Agents, Beliefs and Actions in Prediction Markets (PDF)
by Abe Othman.
Undergraduate thesis, Applied Mathematics and Economics, Harvard College, 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o The Role of Value of Information Based Meta-reasoning in Adaptive Sponsored Search Auctions (PDF)
by Jimmy Sun.
Undergraduate thesis, Computer Science and Economics, Harvard College, 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o Economic Approaches to Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning
by Erik Schultink.
Undergraduate thesis, Computer Science, Harvard College, 2007 ( Hoopes Prize). (BibTeX entry)·
o Policy Teaching through Reward Function Learning (PDF)
by Haoqi Zhang.
Undergraduate thesis, Computer Science and Economics, Harvard College, 2007 ( Hoopes Prize). (BibTeX entry)·
o Adaptive Online Mechanism Design in Single-Valued Domains: An Ironing Approach
by Quang Duong.
Undergraduate thesis, Computer Science and Economics, Harvard College, 2007. (BibTeX entry)·
o Leveraging Bidder Behavior to Identify Categories ofSubstitutable and Complementary Goods on eBay (PDF)
by R. Kang-Xing Jin.
Undergraduate thesis, Computer Science, Harvard College, 2006. (BibTeX entry)·
o Utility-Based Bandwidth Allocation and Link Scheduling inWireless Networks: Linear Programming and Market-Oriented Approaches (PDF)
by Qicheng Ma.
Undergraduate thesis, Computer Science, Harvard College, 2006. (BibTeX entry)·
o An Online, Budget-Constrained Truthful Mechanism
by Aditya Sanghvi.
Undergraduate thesis, Computer Science and Economics, Harvard College, 2006. (BibTeX entry)·
o Accelerated Implementations of the Ascending Proxy Auction (PDF)
by John Lai.
Undergraduate thesis, Computer science and Mathematics, Harvard College, 2005 ( Hoopes prize). (BibTeX entry)·
o Uniform Sampling in a Wireless Network Via a Market Inspired Method
by Dimah Yanovsky.
Undergraduate thesis, Computer science, Harvard College, 2005. (BibTeX entry)·
o Distributed Generalized Vickrey Auctions Based on the Dantzig-Wolfeand Benders Decomposition Methods for Linear Programs (PDF)
by Ryan Davies.
Undergraduate thesis, Applied mathematics, Harvard College, April 2005. (BibTeX entry)·
o Combinatorial Clock Auction for Airport Time Slots: An Agent-Based Analysis (PDF)
by Rui Dong.
Undergraduate thesis, Computer science and Economics, Harvard College, April 2005. (BibTeX entry)·
o A Computational Model of the role of affect in decision-making:Learnability of approach avoidance behaviors by simple agents
by Luke Hedrick.
Undergraduate thesis, Computer Science and Psychology, Harvard College, April 2005. (BibTeX entry)·
o DRATS: Dynamically Re-Allocated Team Search (PDF)
by Andrew Bosworth.
Undergraduate thesis, Computer science, Harvard College, April 2004. (BibTeX entry)·
o Consensus Mechanisms: Anytime Strategyproof Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions (PDF)
by Ed Naim.
Undergraduate thesis, Computer science, Harvard College, April 2004. (BibTeX entry)·
o Calculation and Analysis of Nash Equilibria of Vickrey-Based Payment Rules for Combinatorial Exchanges (PDF)
by David Krych.
Undergraduate thesis, Computer science, Harvard College, 2003. (BibTeX entry)·
o Multi-stage Information Acquisition in Auction Design (PDF)
by Kyna Fong.
Undergraduate thesis, Applied mathematics and Economics, Harvard College, 2003 ( Hoopes prize). (BibTeX entry)·
o The Appeal of Randomness: Introducing a Social Commitment Policy Basedon Probabilistic Determination
by Richard Kim.
Undergraduate thesis, Computer Science, Harvard College, April 2002. (BibTeX entry)·
7016
被折叠的 条评论
为什么被折叠?
到【灌水乐园】发言
