SBR-CH14 道德和关联方

道德原则

• 定义：道德是关于对错的道德原则的准则。
• 法律与道德：道德原则不一定要由法律强制执行，尽管法律确实包含了道德判断。

ACCA职业道德和行为准则

• 核心原则：
  • 诚信(integrity)：在所有职业和商业关系中保持坦率和诚实。
  • 客观性(objectivity)：不允许偏见、利益冲突或他人不当影响来左右专业或商业判断。
  • 专业能力与谨慎(Professional competence and due care)：维持专业水平和技能，确保提供基于当前实践、法规和技术发展的合格专业服务。
  • 保密性(Confidentiality)：尊重因职业和商业关系获得的信息的保密性，未经适当授权不得向第三方披露信息。（not allow to disclose the information to third party unless there is legal or professional right or duty）
  • 专业行为(Professional behaviour)：确保遵守（comply with）相关法律和法规，避免任何损害职业声誉（discredit the profession）的行为。

威胁到基本原则的因素

• 自身利益(Self-interest)：财务或其他利益不当地影响专业会计师的判断或行为。
• 自我审查(self-review)：专业会计师不适当地评估以前的判断或活动。
• 代言(advocacy)：专业会计师可能会过度推广客户或雇主的立场，从而损害自己的客观性。
• 熟悉度(familiarity)：与客户或雇主的长期或密切关系导致专业会计师对他们的利益过于同情或接受他们的工作。
• 恐吓(intimidation)：实际或感知到的压力，包括试图对会计师施加不当影响，使会计师不敢客观行动。

保障措施

• 职业、立法或规章创造的保障措施：例如公司治理。
• 客户/会计师事务所自身的系统和程序中的保障措施。
• 专业入门的教育、培训和经验要求，以及持续的专业发展。

财务报告中的道德考虑

• 专业能力( Professional competence)：在做出会计威胁和披露决定时，专业能力是一个关键问题。

面临的挑战与威胁 会计专业人士在工作中可能遭遇多种对遵守伦理原则构成威胁的情况，例如： 时间紧迫导致难以充分审核信息。 信息不全或受限，影响决策质量。 经验、教育或资源不足，难以正确执行任务。 个人利益（如绩效奖金、股权激励）可能影响客观性。

• 客观性和诚信(Objectivity and integrity)：可能会因财务利益（如与利润相关的奖金或股票期权）或鼓励不道德行为的诱因而受到威胁。
• 受到外部压力或因个人利益而面临被牵涉进误导性信息:
  • 包含实质性误导的陈述；
  • 包含鲁莽提供的陈述或信息；
  • 以偏见准备的；
  • 省略或隐瞒了必须包含的信息，或者这样的省略或隐瞒会导致误导。

道德的重要性

• 对会计专业人士的重要性：会计专业人士知道，使用他们服务的人，特别是使用财务报表的决策者，期望他们具有高度的能力、可靠性和客观性。
• 职业声誉：专业人士的良好声誉是他或她最重要的资产之一。

董事的责任

• 财务报表的准备：董事负责按照国际财务报告准则(IFRS)和法定法律、法规准备财务报表。
• 诚实与道德：董事有责任诚实、道德行事，不应受个人利益和收益的驱动。

会计师的责任

• 遵守基本原则：会计师应遵守ACCA规则书中规定的基本原则。

不道德行为的原因/目的

• 管理层面：经常寻找财务报告标准的漏洞，以便尽可能地调整财务报表以达到他们期望的目标。
• 原因：市场预期、个人实现奖金、保持市场地位。

决策框架

• 受威胁的基本原则：哪些基本原则受到威胁？
• 相关事实：涉及哪些相关事实？
• 涉及的道德问题：涉及哪些道德问题？
• 减轻威胁的内部程序：是否存在减轻威胁的内部程序？
• 可选行动方案：有哪些可选的行动方案？
• 自我反省：在做出决定并采取所有必要保障措施后，你能否自我反省？

考试场景

• 场景类型：
  • (a) 管理者/上级要求下属执行不符合会计标准或道德上不可接受的行动。
  • (b) 管理者已经执行了不符合会计标准或道德上不可接受的行动，员工或外部审计师发现了这一行动，现在需要适当地响应这一问题。

Illustration 1: Ethical issues   — Kelshall is a public limited company. The current year end is 31  December 20X5.The Finance Director is remunerated(获得报酬与利润、股权有关) with a profit related bonus and share appreciation rights. (Share appreciation  rights mean that the director will become entitled（有权） to a future cash  payment based on the increase in the entity's share price from a  specified level over a specified period of time.)   — Kelshall owns a significant number of owner-occupied properties (自有物业) which historically have been held under the revaluation model（过去式重估模型持有的）.  Recently, due to an economic downturn（经济不景气）, property prices have been falling. The Finance Director is proposing to switch（转换） from the  revaluation model（重估模型） to the cost model（成本模型）.   ——这样子会让资产上升 — Shortly before the year end, the CEO of Kelshall, who holds a large  number of share options, mentioned to （mention to sb 向某人提到）the Finance Director that he was hoping to retire within the next year and was hoping to  maximise Kelshall's share price by his retirement date.   Required    — 1 Discuss the view that the board of directors should be remunerated  with profit-related pay and share-based payment to align（协调） directors’  and stakeholders’ interests. 【讨论这个观点：董事会应该把薪资和利润挂钩来协调董事会和股东之间的利益吗？】   — 2 Discuss whether the Finance Director of Kelshall would be acting  ethically（合乎道德） if he revised（修改） the accounting policy for its properties from the  revaluation model to the cost model.    — 3 Discuss whether the CEO's comment to the Finance Director is  ethical（是否合乎道德） and what action, if any（如果有的话）, the Finance Director should take. （what action should take） 问题一：关于董事会成员薪酬的问题 观点：董事会成员的薪酬应与公司利润和股价挂钩，以确保他们的利益与股东等利益相关者一致。 支持理由： 通过激励措施，董事们将更倾向于提高公司利润和股价，符合股东利益。 长期激励措施（如股权支付）比短期利润奖金更能鼓励董事考虑公司长期发展。 反对理由： 过分关注短期利润可能损害公司的长期利益。 董事可能为了提高短期利润而采取不利于公司持续发展的行为。 问题二：财务总监修改会计政策的道德性 现状：由于经济衰退，公司物业价值下降，财务总监提议从重估模型改为成本模型。 道德考量： 根据IAS 1和IAS 8，会计政策的变更需要确保财务报表的公正性和可靠性(fairness and reliability)，不应仅为了提高个人薪酬。 如果财务总监出于个人利益修改政策，这将违反职业道德准则，是不道德的。 如果财务总监认为成本模型能更真实反映(reflect)公司资产价值，且符合(comply with)会计准则，那么他的行动可能是道德的。 问题三：CEO对财务总监的评论的道德性 现状：CEO希望在退休前最大化公司股价，并向财务总监表达了这一期望。 道德考量： CEO的评论可能对财务总监造成压力，促使其采取不当措施来提高股价。 财务总监应坚守职业道德，不应因CEO的个人期望而改变会计政策。 如果财务总监因CEO的评论而改变政策，这将违反职业道德准则，是不道德的。 财务总监应采取的行动 沟通：财务总监应与CEO沟通，阐明其受ACCA职业道德准则约束，不能因短期股价而牺牲公司长期利益。 透明：如果CEO持续施压，财务总监应向非执行董事或审计委员会报告情况，寻求支持。 坚守原则：财务总监应坚持会计准则和职业道德，确保会计政策的变更是基于提高财务报表质量和公正性，而不是为了迎合个人利益。

1 There is an argument that, as the directors should be acting as the agent for the stakeholders.their interests should be aligned. The key stakeholder, the shareholder, is interested in profitability and returns. By linking the remuneration of directors to profits and share price, itwill incentivise directors to try to maximise profits and share price, thus aligning their interestswith those of the stakeholders.一种观点是，董事作为利益相关者的代理人，他们的利益应该与利益相关者一致。通过将董事的薪酬与公司利润和股价挂钩，可以激励董事努力最大化利润和股价，从而与利益相关者的利益一致。 However, bonuses based on short-term profits could encourage directors to adopt strategiesand accounting policies which maximise profits in the short term but are detrimental to thecompany's profitability, liquidity and solvency in the long term.Share-based payment with vesting periods and vesting conditions based on performance andshare price would be preferable to bonuses based on short-term profits, as they would ensurethat directors act with a longer term goal. However, there is still a danger that strategies andaccounting policies are manipulated to obtain maximum return on exercise.然而，基于短期利润的奖金可能会鼓励董事采取在短期内最大化利润，但对公司长期盈利能力、流动性和偿债能力有害的策略和会计政策。基于长期表现和股价的股权支付方式，比如有归属期限和归属条件的股权，可能比基于短期利润的奖金更可取，因为它们可以确保董事有更长远的目标。 On the other hand, if remuneration was purely cash with no link to the company'sperformance, there would be a danger that the board of directors would not act in the best oftheir ability to maximise return for the stakeholders.另一方面，如果薪酬完全是现金，与公司表现无关，那么董事会可能不会尽最大努力为利益相关者创造回报。

2 lAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements requires financial statements to present fairly thefinancial position, financial performance and cash flows of an entity. This fair presentation isassumed if an entity complies with accounting standards and the lASB's ConceptualFramework. lAS 8 Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors only allows a change inaccounting policy where required by a standard or if it results in financial statementsproviding reliable and more relevant information.The ACCA Code of Ethics and Conduct requires directors to act with integrity and professionalcompetence. Professional competence includes complying with accounting standards and theConceptual Framework. If the Finance Director of Kelshall is revising the accounting policy to maximise hisremuneration rather than provide reliable and more relevant financial information, then hecould be considered to be acting unethically due to non-compliance with lAS 1 and lAS 8. Infact, though, the cost model would not necessarily lead to improved profits (and improvedremuneration) because under the revaluation model, losses are first written off to therevaluation surplus (and reported in other comprehensive income) then profit or loss so mightnot impact profits at all. Also, even under the cost model, assets need to be written downwhere there is evidence of an impairment.lf the motivation of the Finance Director is that the economic downturn is causing volatility inmarket value of properties and the more stable cost model would provide a truer and fairerview, then he could possibly be considered to have acted ethically.

3 The CEO and the Finance Director are both bound by the principles of the ACCA Code ofEthics and Conduct. As directors, they should be acting in the best interests of theshareholders. However, it appears as though the CEO is more concerned with self-interestland maximisingthe gains on his share options by manipulating the share price.This pressure from the CEO is althreat to the integrity and objectivity of the Finance DirectorThe Finance Director is in a difficult position ethically as he reports directly to the CEO andthe CEO has direct influence over his job security and remuneration.The Finance Director could speak directly to the CEO and seek clarification of the intent of hicomments, explaining that he is unable to change Kelshall's accounting policies just tomaximise Kelshall's share price in the short term and that he is bound by the ACCA Code ofEthics and Conduct to act with professional competence. However, if he felt under too muchpressure from the CEO to speak to him directly, he could raise his concerns with the non-executive directors and/or the audit committee.The problem here is that the threats to both the CEO's and the Finance Director's objectivityand integrity are similar so there is a danger that the Finance Director reacts to the CEO'scomments by changing accounting policies to maximise profits and share price rather thanacting in the company's and stakeholders’ best long-term interests. This would definitelyconstitute unethical behaviour.

关联方（IAS 24）

• 定义：与编制财务报表的报告实体存在关系的个人或实体。
• 个人关联：如果个人对报告实体有控制权、重大影响或属于关键管理人员，则与报告实体关联。
  • (i) 对报告实体有控制权或共同控制权的个人；
  • (ii) 对报告实体有重大影响的个人；
  • (iii) 报告实体或其母公司关键管理人员的成员。
• 家庭成员：包括子女、配偶或伴侣、配偶或伴侣的子女以及受抚养人。
  • 该个人的孩子、配偶或同居伴侣；
  • 该个人配偶或同居伴侣的孩子；
  • 该个人或其配偶或同居伴侣的受抚养人。
• 实体关联：如果实体与报告实体是同一集团的成员、联营公司、合营企业或提供关键管理人员服务，则与报告实体关联。

1. 实体和报告实体是同一集团的成员；
2. 一个实体是另一个实体的联营公司或合营企业；
3. 两个实体都是同一第三方的合营企业；
4. 一个实体是第三方的合营企业，而另一个实体是该第三方的联营公司；
5. 实体是为报告实体或相关实体员工提供离职后福利的计划；
6. 实体由(a)部分识别的个人控制或共同控制；[根据IAS 24，当一个实体控制另一个实体时，它们之间存在关联方关系。这种控制关系对于理解集团结构和财务报表的用户来说是重要的信息。]
7. (a)部分(i)识别的个人对实体有重大影响，或为实体或其母公司的关键管理人员；
8. 实体或其集团的任何成员向报告实体或其母公司提供关键管理人员服务。

不是关联方的情形【认真讲】

• 共同董事或关键管理人员：两个实体有共同的董事或关键管理人员(比如两个公司有一样的独立董事，这不能算是关联方)，或一个实体的关键管理人员对另一个实体有重大影响。
• 合营企业：两个冒险者共同控制一个合营企业。
• 经济依赖：客户、供应商、特许经营者、分销商或一般代理人等因经济依赖而关联。

披露要求【前两点没怎么说】

• 披露目的：披露关联方交易的目的是为了提供透明度，确保外部用户能够理解交易的实质，评估其对报告实体财务状况的影响。
• 披露内容：包括母公司/最终控制方的名称、关键管理人员薪酬（分类）、关联方交易的性质和未清余额。
• 披露例外：如果是政府相关实体，可能免除完全披露与政府或其他与同一政府相关的实体之间的交易、未清余额和承诺，但仍需披露政府的名称和关系的性质、每个单独重大交易的性质和金额。（不能因为同时由政府控制而觉得是同一个关联方）

结构化总结：

• 定义与识别：明确了个人和实体如何成为报告实体的关联方。
• 家庭成员：扩展了关联方的定义，包括可能影响交易决策的家庭成员。
• 集团成员：同一集团内的母公司、子公司及同集团的子公司互为关联方。
• 联营与合营企业：涉及联营或合营企业之间的关系，包括共同隶属于同一第三方的情况。
• 员工福利计划：为报告实体或相关实体员工设立的离职后福利计划。
• 控制与影响：由特定个人控制或对该实体有重大影响的情况。
• 关键管理人员服务：提供给报告实体或其母公司的关键管理人员服务

案例分析【514录音10min起】

• Leoval公司：一个由Cavelli 90%控股的私人制造公司，Cavelli是一家上市公司，由Grassi家族通过一项汇集投票权的协议控制。
• 关联方交易：Leoval定期以市场价格向Francesca Cincetti拥有少数股权的另一家公司提供零部件。Leoval为其员工提供无息贷款，以便他们购买年度季票上班。Cavelli向Leoval收取相当于税前利润20%的年度管理服务费。
• 披露要求：根据IAS 24 关联方披露，判断一下哪些是关联方，是否Leoval需要对上述每一项信息进行披露。

illustration: Related parties Ø Leoval is a private manufacturing company that makes car parts. It is 90% owned by Cavelli, a listed entity. Cavelli is a long-established company controlled by the Grassi family through an agreement which pools their voting rights. （控制人与最终控制人——需要披露） Ø Leoval regularly provides parts at market price to another company in which Francesca Cincetti has a minority (23%) holding. Francesca Cincetti is the wife of Roberto Grassi, one of the key Grassi family shareholders that controls Cavelli. （最终控制人是关系密切的家庭成员，联营企业） Ø Leoval advances interest free loans to its employees in order for them to purchase annual season tickets to get to work. The loan repayment is deducted in 12 instalments from the employee’s salaries. Ø Cavelli charges Leoval an annual management services fee of 20% of profit before tax (before accounting for the fee)Ø 30% of Leoval's revenue comes from transactions with a major car maker, Piat. Ø Leavol provides defined benefit pension plan for its employees based on 2% of final salary for each year worked. The plan is currently overfunded and so Leoval has not made any contributions during the current year. Ø Assume that all the above transactions are material in both Leoval's separate financial statements and consolidated financial statements. Required Ø Explain whether disclosures are required by Leoval for each of the above pieces of information by IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures.

Answer： Leoval must disclose its parent (Cavelli) and ultimate controlling party (the Grassi family). This isirrespective of whether transactions have occurred with these related parties during the period.The company in which Francesca Cincetti has a 23% shareholding is related to Leoval as it issignificantly influenced by close family of a person that controls Leoval. Consequently the sales,any outstanding balances and any bad or doubtful debts must be disclosed even though they arat market prices: Leoval might lose this business if Francesca's husband was not a shareholderand investors need to be aware of this. The interest-free loans, although a benefit, are not a related party transaction in themselves; the!are part of the remuneration package of the employees and would be accounted for under lAS 19Employee Benefits. However, if the employees include key management personnel, the transactioand its cost must be disclosed as a related party transaction for them.The management service fee is a transaction with the controling party, and must be disclosed inLeoval's own financial statements but will be eliminated and therefore not reauire disclosure inthe group accounts); it will be particularly important information for the 10% non-controllinginterest shareholders in Leoval. Leoval is dependent on Piat in that it is a major customer, but this in itself, in the absence of anyother information suggesting otherwise, is not a related party issue.Post-employment benefit plans are related parties under lAS 24. Leoval has had no transactionswith the plan in the period requiring disclosure under lAS 24, but recognises other income andexpenses relating to the plan in its financial statements. These are disclosed under lAS 19Employee Benefits.