Adversarial search

Games

adversarial search problems/games: our agents have one or more adversaries who attempt to keep them from reaching their goals
正常的搜索，search ， csp，配置，games ，strategy/policy

type of games

1. actions: deterministic or stochastic outcomes
2. number of players
3. zero-sum games: all the utility will be a constant
   agents have opposite utilities
   adversial,pure competetion
   general games:
   agents have independent utilities
   cooperation, competition, indifference,…
4. perfect information: 所有信息是否知道，德州扑克有些信息不知道

deterministic zero-sum problems

s: states
player(s): the player moves at this state
action(s): a legal actions set
result(s,a): a transition model, return the utility of a move
terminal-test(s)
terminal-utilities(s,p)

normal search: a comprehensive plan
game: policy/stategy $s\to a$

Minimax

我们的对手behave最优，而且试图最小化我们值

1. terminal utilities： terminal states value
   state value :$v(s)=ma{x}_{s^{\prime }\in successorofs}v(s^{\prime })$
   for terminal states: $v(s)=known$
   2.juest like a depth first search/ post-order visit of the game tree
   min
   
   finite的情况下
   optimal solution
   和一个完全的dfs复杂度相同
   time complexity:$o(b^m)$
   space complexity:$o(bm)$

we can use a depth-limited search instead, but we need a evaluation function for the non-terminal states
不能保证最优
会耗费计算时间，计算复杂度和计算准确度的trade-off
evaluation function

1. utility for a win state should be higher than a tie
2. efficient: computation should be quick
3. consisitent:related to the chance of winning the game

type of evaluation functions
a linear combination of features:
table-based evaluation function
machine learning based evaluation function

alpha-beta pruning

time complexity:$o(b^{m/2})$
会导致internal nodes 的value不对

evaluation functions

input: state
output: the estimate of minimal value of the node
depth-limited minimal 中经常使用
经常用的 evaluation function： a linear combination of features
$Eval(s)=w^{t}f(s)$

expectimax

在game tree中引入chance node： consider average case， expected utility

1. rule:
   $\forall agentconstrolledstates:v(s)==ma{x}_{s^{\prime }\in successorofs}v(s^{\prime })$
   for terminal states: $v(s)=known$
   for chance states: $v(s)={\sum }_{s^{\prime }\in successors(s)}p(s^{\prime }|s)V(s^{\prime })$
   
   can’t prune
   可以用估计进行 depth-limited search

Mixed layer types

可以视情况组合搜索树的层

General Games

multi-agent utilities:
uyility: tuples 每个元素代表了一个agent的效益
each layer try to maximize their utility ignoring others utilities
can cooperate competition and cooperation dymatically

Utility

generate a viable utility function
principle of maximum utility: they must select the action that maximize their expected utility
rational preference:

Axioms of rationality:

given preference satisfies such constraints ,there exists a real-valued function satisfied that

在flat-payment和lottery之间的倾向性
risk-neutral
risk-averse
risk-seeking

题目

对于有上下界的expect问题可能存在剪枝
multi-player 不能剪枝，有合作