爱因斯坦的科学哲学

注：机翻，未校。

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Einstein’s Philosophy of Science

First published Wed Feb 11, 2004; substantive revision Fri Sep 13, 2019

Albert Einstein (1879–1955) is well known as the most prominent physicist of the twentieth century. His contributions to twentieth-century philosophy of science, though of comparable importance, are less well known. Einstein’s own philosophy of science is an original synthesis of elements drawn from sources as diverse as neo-Kantianism, conventionalism, and logical empiricism, its distinctive feature being its novel blending of realism with a holist, underdeterminationist form of conventionalism. Of special note is the manner in which Einstein’s philosophical thinking was driven by and contributed to the solution of problems first encountered in his work in physics. Equally significant are Einstein’s relations with and influence on other prominent twentieth-century philosophers of science, including Moritz Schlick, Hans Reichenbach, Ernst Cassirer, Philipp Frank, Henri Bergson, Émile Meyerson.
阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦（Albert Einstein，1879-1955 年）是 20 世纪最杰出的物理学家。他对 20 世纪科学哲学的贡献虽然具有同等重要性，但鲜为人知。爱因斯坦自己的科学哲学是来自新康德主义、传统主义和逻辑经验主义等不同来源的元素的原始综合体，其显着特点是它将现实主义与整体主义、不确定主义形式的传统主义新颖地融合在一起。特别值得注意的是，爱因斯坦的哲学思想是如何驱动并促进解决他在物理学工作中首次遇到的问题的。同样重要的是，爱因斯坦与其他 20 世纪著名科学哲学家的关系和影响，包括莫里茨·施利克、汉斯·赖兴巴赫、恩斯特·卡西尔、菲利普·弗兰克、亨利·柏格森、埃米尔·迈耶森。

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1. Introduction: Was Einstein an Epistemological “Opportunist”? 1. 引言：爱因斯坦是认识论的“机会主义者”吗？

Late in 1944, Albert Einstein received a letter from Robert Thornton, a young African-American philosopher of science who had just finished his Ph.D. under Herbert Feigl at Minnesota and was beginning a new job teaching physics at the University of Puerto Rico, Mayaguez. He had written to solicit from Einstein a few supportive words on behalf of his efforts to introduce “as much of the philosophy of science as possible” into the modern physics course that he was to teach the following spring (Thornton to Einstein, 28 November 1944, EA 61–573). Here is what Einstein offered in reply:
1944 年末，阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦收到了一封来自罗伯特·桑顿 （Robert Thornton） 的信，罗伯特·桑顿是一位年轻的非裔美国科学哲学家，他刚刚在明尼苏达州师从赫伯特·费格尔 （Herbert Feigl） 完成博士学位，并开始在波多黎各大学马亚圭斯分校教授物理学。他写信向爱因斯坦征求一些支持的话，以代表他努力将“尽可能多的科学哲学”引入他将于次年春天教授的现代物理学课程中（桑顿致爱因斯坦，1944 年 11 月 28 日，EA 61-573）。以下是 Einstein 的回答：

I fully agree with you about the significance and educational value of methodology as well as history and philosophy of science. So many people today—and even professional scientists—seem to me like somebody who has seen thousands of trees but has never seen a forest. A knowledge of the historic and philosophical background gives that kind of independence from prejudices of his generation from which most scientists are suffering. This independence created by philosophical insight is—in my opinion—the mark of distinction between a mere artisan or specialist and a real seeker after truth. (Einstein to Thornton, 7 December 1944, EA 61–574)
我完全同意你关于方法论以及科学历史和哲学的重要性和教育价值。今天很多人——甚至是专业科学家——在我看来就像一个见过数千棵树但从未见过森林的人。对历史和哲学背景的了解使他能够摆脱他那一代的偏见，而大多数科学家都受到这种偏见的困扰。在我看来，这种由哲学洞察力创造的独立性是纯粹的工匠或专家与真正追求真理的人之间的区别标志。（爱因斯坦致桑顿，1944 年 12 月 7 日，EA 61-574）

That Einstein meant what he said about the relevance of philosophy to physics is evidenced by the fact that he had been saying more or less the same thing for decades. Thus, in a 1916 memorial note for Ernst Mach, a physicist and philosopher to whom Einstein owed a special debt, he wrote:
爱因斯坦所说的哲学与物理学的相关性，可以从他几十年来或多或少地说同样的事情这一事实中得到证明。因此，在 1916 年为爱因斯坦欠下特别债务的物理学家和哲学家恩斯特·马赫 （Ernst Mach） 撰写的纪念信中，他写道：

How does it happen that a properly endowed natural scientist comes to concern himself with epistemology? Is there no more valuable work in his specialty? I hear many of my colleagues saying, and I sense it from many more, that they feel this way. I cannot share this sentiment. When I think about the ablest students whom I have encountered in my teaching, that is, those who distinguish themselves by their independence of judgment and not merely their quick-wittedness, I can affirm that they had a vigorous interest in epistemology. They happily began discussions about the goals and methods of science, and they showed unequivocally, through their tenacity in defending their views, that the subject seemed important to them. Indeed, one should not be surprised at this. (Einstein 1916, 101)
一个有适当天赋的自然科学家是如何开始关注认识论的呢？难道在他的专业领域没有更有价值的工作吗？我听到我的许多同事说，我从更多的同事那里感受到，他们也有这种感觉。我不能同意这种观点。当我想到我在教学中遇到的最有能力的学生时，即那些以独立判断而不仅仅是机智而著称的学生，我可以肯定他们对认识论有着浓厚的兴趣。他们愉快地开始讨论科学的目标和方法，并通过坚韧不拔地捍卫自己的观点，明确地表明这个主题对他们来说似乎很重要。事实上，人们不应该对此感到惊讶。（爱因斯坦 1916,101）

How, exactly, does the philosophical habit of mind provide the physicist with such “independence of judgment”? Einstein goes on to explain:
究竟，哲学上的思维习惯是如何为物理学家提供这种“判断的独立性”的呢？Einstein 继续解释说：

Concepts that have proven useful in ordering things easily achieve such an authority over us that we forget their earthly origins and accept them as unalterable givens. Thus they come to be stamped as “necessities of thought,” “a priori givens,” etc. The path of scientific advance is often made impassable for a long time through such errors. For that reason, it is by no means an idle game if we become practiced in analyzing the long commonplace concepts and exhibiting those circumstances upon which their justification and usefulness depend, how they have grown up, individually, out of the givens of experience. By this means, their all-too-great authority will be broken. They will be removed if they cannot be properly legitimated, corrected if their correlation with given things be far too superfluous, replaced by others if a new system can be established that we prefer for whatever reason. (Einstein 1916, 102)
被证明对事物排序有用的概念很容易获得对我们的权威，以至于我们忘记了它们的尘世起源，并将它们视为不可改变的给定。因此，它们被打上了“思想的必需品”、“先验的给定”等的标签。由于这样的错误，科学进步的道路往往在很长一段时间内无法通行。因此，如果我们习惯于分析长期存在的司空见惯的概念，并展示它们的正当性和有用性所依赖的环境，以及它们是如何从既定的经验中单独成长起来的，那么这绝不是一场闲逛的游戏。这样，他们太伟大的权威就会被打破。如果它们不能得到适当的合法化，它们就会被删除，如果它们与给定事物的相关性太过多余，它们就会被纠正，如果可以建立一个我们出于任何原因喜欢的新系统，它们就会被其他系统所取代。（爱因斯坦 1916,102）

One is not surprised at Einstein’s then citing Mach’s critical analysis of the Newtonian conception of absolute space as a paradigm of what Mach, himself, termed the “historical-critical” method of philosophical analysis (Einstein 1916, 101, citing Ch. 2, §§ 6–7 of Mach’s Mechanik, most likely the third edition, Mach 1897).
爱因斯坦随后引用马赫对牛顿绝对空间概念的批判性分析，作为马赫本人所说的哲学分析的“历史批判”方法的范式，这并不奇怪（爱因斯坦 1916,101，引用马赫机械学第 2 章，§§ 6-7，很可能是第三版，马赫 1897）。

The place of philosophy in physics was a theme to which Einstein returned time and again, it being clearly an issue of deep importance to him. Sometimes he adopts a modest pose, as in this oft-quoted remark from his 1933 Spencer Lecture:
哲学在物理学中的地位是爱因斯坦一次又一次地回到的主题，这显然对他来说是一个非常重要的问题。有时他会采取谦虚的姿态，就像他 1933 年斯宾塞讲座中经常引用的这句话一样：

If you wish to learn from the theoretical physicist anything about the methods which he uses, I would give you the following piece of advice: Don’t listen to his words, examine his achievements. For to the discoverer in that field, the constructions of his imagination appear so necessary and so natural that he is apt to treat them not as the creations of his thoughts but as given realities. (Einstein 1933, 5–6)
如果你想从理论物理学家那里学到他使用的方法，我会给你以下建议：不要听他的话，检查他的成就。因为对于那个领域的发现者来说，他的想象力的结构似乎是如此必要和自然，以至于他倾向于不把它们看作是他思想的创造，而是看作是给定的现实。（爱因斯坦 1933,5-6）

More typical, however, is the confident pose he struck three years later in “Physics and Reality”:
然而，更典型的是他在三年后在《物理与现实》（Physics and Reality）中摆出的自信姿态：

It has often been said, and certainly not without justification, that the man of science is a poor philosopher. Why then should it not be the right thing for the physicist to let the philosopher do the philosophizing? Such might indeed be the right thing at a time when the physicist believes he has at his disposal a rigid system of fundamental concepts and fundamental laws which are so well established that waves of doubt can not reach them; but it can not be right at a time when the very foundations of physics itself have become problematic as they are now. At a time like the present, when experience forces us to seek a newer and more solid foundation, the physicist cannot simply surrender to the philosopher the critical contemplation of the theoretical foundations; for, he himself knows best, and feels more surely where the shoe pinches. In looking for a new foundation, he must try to make clear in his own mind just how far the concepts which he uses are justified, and are necessities. (Einstein 1936, 349)
人们经常说，科学家是一个拙劣的哲学家，这当然不是没有道理的。那么，为什么物理学家让哲学家来做哲学化不是正确的事情呢？当物理学家认为他有一个由基本概念和基本定律组成的僵化系统时，这确实可能是正确的事情，这些基本概念和基本定律是如此成熟，以至于怀疑的浪潮无法到达它们;但是，在物理学本身的基础已经像现在这样成问题的时候，这是不可能的。在像现在这样的时代，当经验迫使我们寻求一个更新、更坚实的基础时，物理学家不能简单地将对理论基础的批判性沉思交给哲学家;因为，他自己最清楚，也更肯定地感觉到鞋子的夹在哪里。在寻找新的基础时，他必须试图在自己的头脑中弄清楚他所使用的概念在多大程度上是合理的，而且是必要的。（爱因斯坦 1936,349）

What kind of philosophy might we expect from the philosopher-physicist? One thing that we should not expect from a physicist who takes the philosophical turn in order to help solve fundamental physical problems is a systematic philosophy:
我们可以期待这位哲学家-物理学家提供什么样的哲学？我们不应该期望一个物理学家为了帮助解决基本的物理问题而转向哲学，那就是系统哲学：

The reciprocal relationship of epistemology and science is of noteworthy kind. They are dependent upon each other. Epistemology without contact with science becomes an empty scheme. Science without epistemology is—insofar as it is thinkable at all—primitive and muddled. However, no sooner has the epistemologist, who is seeking a clear system, fought his way through to such a system, than he is inclined to interpret the thought-content of science in the sense of his system and to reject whatever does not fit into his system. The scientist, however, cannot afford to carry his striving for epistemological systematic that far. He accepts gratefully the epistemological conceptual analysis; but the external conditions, which are set for him by the facts of experience, do not permit him to let himself be too much restricted in the construction of his conceptual world by the adherence to an epistemological system. He therefore must appear to the systematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous opportunist: he appears as realist insofar as he seeks to describe a world independent of the acts of perception; as idealist insofar as he looks upon the concepts and theories as free inventions of the human spirit (not logically derivable from what is empirically given); as positivist insofar as he considers his concepts and theories justified only to the extent to which they furnish a logical representation of relations among sensory experiences. He may even appear as Platonist or Pythagorean insofar as he considers the viewpoint of logical simplicity as an indispensable and effective tool of his research. (Einstein 1949, 683–684)
认识论和科学的互惠关系是值得注意的。他们相互依赖。没有与科学接触的认识论就变成了一个空洞的计划。没有认识论的科学——就其完全可以思考的而言——是原始的和混乱的。然而，寻求一个清晰体系的认识论者一奋力争取到这样一个体系，他就倾向于从他的体系的意义上解释科学的思想内容，并拒绝任何不适合他的体系的东西。然而，这位科学家无法将他对认识论系统性的努力进行到那么远。他感激地接受了认识论概念分析;但是，由经验的事实为他设定的外部条件，不允许他在构建他的观念世界时，由于坚持一个认识论体系，而使自己受到太多的限制。因此，在系统认识论者看来，他必须表现为一种不择手段的机会主义者：只要他试图描述一个独立于感知行为的世界，他就表现得像现实主义者一样;他认为这些概念和理论是人类精神的自由发明（不能从逻辑上从经验中得出的）而成为唯心主义者;作为实证主义者，只要他认为他的概念和理论只有在它们提供感官经验之间关系的逻辑表示的程度上才是合理的。他甚至可能表现为柏拉图主义者或毕达哥拉斯主义者，因为他认为逻辑简单性的观点是他研究中不可或缺的有效工具。（爱因斯坦 1949,683-684）

But what strikes the “systematic epistemologist” as mere opportunism might appear otherwise when viewed from the perspective of a physicist engaged, as Einstein himself put it, in “the critical contemplation of the theoretical foundations.” The overarching goal of that critical contemplation was, for Einstein, the creation of a unified foundation for physics after the model of a field theory like general relativity (see Sauer 2014 for non-technical overview on Einstein’s approach to the unified field theory program). Einstein failed in his quest, but there was a consistency and constancy in the striving that informed as well the philosophy of science developing hand in hand with the scientific project.
但是，当从爱因斯坦自己所说的“对理论基础的批判性沉思”的物理学家的角度来看时，那些让“系统认识论学家”觉得纯粹的机会主义可能就显得不同了。对爱因斯坦来说，这种批判性思考的首要目标是在广义相对论等场论模型之后为物理学创建一个统一的基础（参见 Sauer 2014 关于爱因斯坦统一场论程序方法的非技术概述）。爱因斯坦的追求失败了，但这种努力的一致性和恒常性为科学哲学与科学项目齐头并进。

Indeed, from early to late a few key ideas played the central, leading role in Einstein’s philosophy of science, ideas about which Einstein evinced surprisingly little doubt even while achieving an ever deeper understanding of their implications. For the purposes of the following comparatively brief overview, we can confine our attention to just five topics:
事实上，从早期到晚期，一些关键思想在爱因斯坦的科学哲学中发挥了核心和主导作用，爱因斯坦对这些思想的怀疑令人惊讶地毫不怀疑，即使他对它们的含义有了越来越深入的理解。为了进行以下相对简短的概述，我们可以将注意力集中在五个主题上：

• Theoretical holism. 理论整体论。
• Simplicity and theory choice.
  简单性和理论选择。
• Univocalness in the theoretical representation of nature.
  自然的理论表征的统一性。
• Realism and separability.
  真实感和可分离性。
• The principle theories-constructive theories distinction.
  原则理论和建构理论是不同的。

The emphasis on the continuity and coherence in the development of Einstein’s philosophy of science contrasts with an account such as Gerald Holton’s (1968), which claims to find a major philosophical break in the mid-1910s, in the form of a turn away from a sympathy for an anti-metaphysical positivism and toward a robust scientific realism. Holton sees this turn being driven by Einstein’s alleged realization that general relativity, by contrast with special relativity, requires a realistic ontology. However, Einstein was probably never an ardent “Machian” positivist,[1] and he was never a scientific realist, at least not in the sense acquired by the term “scientific realist” in later twentieth century philosophical discourse (see Howard 1993). Einstein expected scientific theories to have the proper empirical credentials, but he was no positivist; and he expected scientific theories to give an account of physical reality, but he was no scientific realist. Moreover, in both respects his views remained more or less the same from the beginning to the end of his career.
爱因斯坦科学哲学发展的连续性和连贯性与杰拉尔德·霍尔顿 （Gerald Holton） （1968） 等描述形成鲜明对比，后者声称在 1910 年代中期找到了重大的哲学突破，其形式是从对反形而上学实证主义的同情转向强大的科学现实主义。霍尔顿认为，这种转变是由爱因斯坦所谓的认识推动的，即广义相对论与狭义相对论相反，需要一个现实的本体论。然而，爱因斯坦可能从来不是一个狂热的“马奇式”实证主义者，[1]他从来不是一个科学实在主义者，至少在二十世纪后期的哲学话语中，他不是“科学实在论者”一词所获得的意义上的（见霍华德 1993）。爱因斯坦期望科学理论具有适当的实证依据，但他不是实证主义者;他期望科学理论能够解释物理现实，但他不是科学实在主义者。此外，在这两个方面，他的观点从他职业生涯的开始到结束都或多或少地保持不变。

Why Einstein did not think himself a realist (he said so explicitly) is discussed below. Why he is not to be understood as a positivist deserves a word or two of further discussion here, if only because the belief that he was sympathetic to positivism, at least early in his life, is so widespread (for a fuller discussion, see Howard 1993).
为什么爱因斯坦不认为自己是一个现实主义者（他明确地说过）下面讨论。为什么他不能被理解为实证主义者，值得在这里进一步讨论一两句，哪怕只是因为他至少在生命的早期就同情实证主义的信念是如此普遍（有关更全面的讨论，参见 Howard 1993）。

That Einstein later repudiated positivism is beyond doubt. Many remarks from at least the early 1920s through the end of his life make this clear. In 1946 he explained what he took to be Mach’s basic error:
爱因斯坦后来否定了实证主义，这是毋庸置疑的。至少从 1920 年代初到他生命的尽头，许多评论都清楚地表明了这一点。1946 年，他解释了他认为是马赫的基本错误：

He did not place in the correct light the essentially constructive and speculative nature of all thinking and more especially of scientific thinking; in consequence, he condemned theory precisely at those points where its constructive-speculative character comes to light unmistakably, such as in the kinetic theory of atoms. (Einstein 1946, 21)
他没有正确地看待所有思维，尤其是科学思维的本质上的建设性和思辨性;因此，他恰恰在理论的建设性-思辨特征明确无误地显现出来的时候谴责了理论，比如在原子动力学理论中。（爱因斯坦 1946,21）

Is Einstein here also criticizing his own youthful philosophical indiscretions? The very example that Einstein gives here makes any such interpretation highly implausible, because one of Einstein’s main goals in his early work on Brownian motion (Einstein 1905b) was precisely to prove the reality of atoms, this in the face of the then famous skepticism of thinkers like Mach and Wilhelm Ostwald:
爱因斯坦在这里也是在批评他自己年轻时的哲学轻率吗？爱因斯坦在这里举的例子使得任何这样的解释都非常不可信，因为爱因斯坦在他早期关于布朗运动的工作（Einstein 1905b）中的主要目标之一恰恰是证明原子的真实性，这与当时著名的 Mach 和 Wilhelm Ostwald 等思想家的怀疑论相抗衡：

My principal aim in this was to find facts that would guarantee as much as possible the existence of atoms of definite size.… The agreement of these considerations with experience together with Planck’s determination of the true molecular size from the law of radiation (for high temperatures) convinced the skeptics, who were quite numerous at that time (Ostwald, Mach), of the reality of atoms. (Einstein 1946, 45, 47)
我这样做的主要目的是找到事实，尽可能保证一定大小的原子的存在…这些考虑与经验的一致性，以及普朗克根据辐射定律（对于高温）确定的真实分子大小，使当时相当多的怀疑论者（Ostwald，Mach）相信原子的真实性。（爱因斯坦 1946， 45， 47）

Why, then, is the belief in Einstein’s early sympathy for positivism so well entrenched?
那么，为什么爱因斯坦早期对实证主义的同情如此根深蒂固呢？

The one piece of evidence standardly cited for a youthful flirtation with positivism is Einstein’s critique of the notion of absolute distant simultaneity in his 1905 paper on special relativity (Einstein 1905c). Einstein speaks there of “observers,” but in an epistemologically neutral way that can be replaced by talk of an inertial frame of reference. What really bothers Einstein about distant simultaneity is not that it is observationally inaccessible but that it involves a two-fold arbitrariness, one in the choice of an inertial frame of reference and one in the stipulation within a given frame of a convention regarding the ratio of the times required for a light signal to go from one stationary observer to another and back again. Likewise, Einstein faults classical Maxwellian electrodynamics for an asymmetry in the way it explains electromagnetic induction depending on whether it is the coil or the magnet that is assumed to be at rest. If the effect is the same—a current in the coil—why, asks Einstein, should there be two different explanations: an electrical field created in the vicinity of a moving magnet or an electromotive force induced in a conductor moving through a stationary magnetic field? To be sure, whether it is the coil or the magnet that is taken to be at rest makes no observable difference, but the problem, from Einstein’s point of view, is the asymmetry in the two explanations. Even the young Einstein was no positivist.
年轻时与实证主义调情的一个标准引用证据是爱因斯坦在他 1905 年关于狭义相对论的论文（Einstein 1905c）中对绝对遥远同时性概念的批评。爱因斯坦在那里谈到了“观察者”，但以一种认识论上中立的方式，可以用惯性参考系的讨论来代替。远距离同时性真正困扰爱因斯坦的不是它在观测上是不可接近的，而是它涉及双重任意性，一个是惯性参考系的选择，另一个是关于光信号从一个静止观察者到另一个静止观察者再返回所需的时间比率的约定的给定框架内的规定。同样，爱因斯坦指责经典麦克斯韦电动力学在解释电磁感应的方式上存在不对称性，这取决于假设是线圈还是磁体处于静止状态。爱因斯坦问道，如果效应是相同的——线圈中的电流——为什么应该有两种不同的解释：在移动磁铁附近产生的电场，还是在穿过静止磁场的导体中感应出的电动势？可以肯定的是，无论是线圈还是磁铁被认为是静止的，都没有明显的区别，但从爱因斯坦的角度来看，问题在于这两种解释的不对称性。即使是年轻的爱因斯坦也不是实证主义者。

First generation logical empiricists sought to legitimate their movement in part by claiming Einstein as a friend. They may be forgiven their putting a forced interpretation on arguments taken out of context. We can do better.
第一代逻辑经验主义者试图通过声称爱因斯坦是朋友来部分地使他们的运动合法化。他们对断章取义的论点进行强行解释是可以原谅的。我们可以做得更好。

Einstein’s philosophy of science is an original synthesis drawing upon many philosophical resources, from neo-Kantianism to Machian empiricism and Duhemian conventionalism. Other thinkers and movements, most notably the logical empiricists, drew upon the same resources. But Einstein put the pieces together in a manner importantly different from Moritz Schlick, Hans Reichenbach, and Rudolf Carnap, and he argued with them for decades about who was right (however much they obscured these differences in representing Einstein publicly as a friend of logical empiricism and scientific philosophy). Starting from the mid-1920s till the end of the decade Einstein show some interest in the rationalistic realism of Émile Meyerson (Einstein, 1928; cf. Giovanelli 2018; on the contemporary debate between Einstein and Bergson, see Canales 2015). Understanding how Einstein puts those pieces together therefore sheds light not only on the philosophical aspect of his own achievements in physics but also upon the larger history of the development of the philosophy of science in the twentieth century.
爱因斯坦的科学哲学是借鉴了许多哲学资源的原始综合，从新康德主义到马奇经验主义和杜希米亚传统主义。其他思想家和运动，尤其是逻辑经验主义者，也利用了同样的资源。但爱因斯坦以一种与莫里茨·施利克（Moritz Schlick）、汉斯·赖兴巴赫（Hans Reichenbach）和鲁道夫·卡纳普（Rudolf Carnap）截然不同的方式把这些碎片放在一起，他与他们争论了几十年谁是对的（尽管他们在公开表示爱因斯坦是逻辑经验主义和科学哲学的朋友时，如何掩盖了这些差异）。从 1920 年代中期开始到本世纪末，爱因斯坦对埃米尔·迈耶森 （Émile Meyerson） 的理性主义现实主义表现出一些兴趣（爱因斯坦，1928 年;参见 Giovanelli 2018;关于爱因斯坦和柏格森之间的当代辩论，参见 Canales 2015）。因此，了解爱因斯坦如何将这些碎片组合在一起，不仅可以阐明他自己在物理学成就的哲学方面，还可以阐明 20 世纪科学哲学发展的更大历史。

2. Theoretical Holism: The Nature and Role of Conventions in Science 2. 理论整体论：科学中约定的性质和作用

Any philosophy of science must include an account of the relation between theory and evidence. Einstein learned about the historicity of scientific concepts from Mach. But his preferred way of modeling the logical relationship between theory and evidence was inspired mainly by his reading of Pierre Duhem’s La Théorie physique: son objet et sa structure (Duhem 1906). Einstein probably first read Duhem, or at least learned the essentials of Duhem’s philosophy of science around the fall of 1909, when, upon returning to Zurich from the patent office in Bern to take up his first academic appointment at the University of Zurich, he became the upstairs neighbor of his old friend and fellow Zurich physics student, Friedrich Adler. Just a few months before, Adler had published the German translation of La Théorie physique (Duhem 1908), and the philosophy of science became a frequent topic of conversation between the new neighbors, Adler and Einstein (see Howard 1990a).
任何科学哲学都必须包括对理论和证据之间关系的解释。爱因斯坦从马赫那里了解了科学概念的历史性。但他对理论和证据之间的逻辑关系进行建模的首选方式主要受到他对 Pierre Duhem 的 La Théorie physique： son objet et sa structure（Duhem 1906 年）的阅读的启发。爱因斯坦第一次阅读杜赫姆的著作，或者至少是在 1909 年秋天左右了解到杜赫姆科学哲学的精髓，当时，当他从伯尔尼的专利局回到苏黎世，在苏黎世大学接受了他的第一个学术任命时，他成为了他的老朋友和苏黎世物理学同学的楼上邻居。 弗里德里希·阿德勒。就在几个月前，阿德勒出版了《La Théorie physique》（Duhem 1908）的德文译本，科学哲学成为新邻居阿德勒和爱因斯坦之间经常谈论的话题（见霍华德 1990a）。

Theoretical holism and the underdetermination of theory choice by empirical evidence are the central theses in Duhem’s philosophy of science. His argument, in brief, is that at least in sciences like physics, where experiment is dense with sophisticated instrumentation whose employment itself requires theoretical interpretation, hypotheses are not tested in isolation but only as part of whole bodies of theory. It follows that when there is a conflict between theory and evidence, the fit can be restored in a multiplicity of different ways. No statement is immune to revision because of a presumed status as a definition or thanks to some other a priori warrant, and most any statement can be retained on pain of suitable adjustments elsewhere in the total body of theory. Hence, theory choice is underdetermined by evidence.
理论整体论和经验证据对理论选择的不确定性是 Duhem 科学哲学的中心论点。简而言之，他的论点是，至少在像物理学这样的科学中，实验中充满了复杂的仪器，其使用本身就需要理论解释，假设不是孤立地测试的，而只是作为整个理论的一部分。因此，当理论和证据之间存在冲突时，可以通过多种不同的方式恢复拟合。没有一个陈述可以幸免于被修改，因为作为定义的假定地位或由于其他一些先验的保证，而且大多数任何陈述都可以在理论整体的其他地方进行适当调整的痛苦中保留下来。因此，理论选择没有证据决定。

That Einstein’s exposure to Duhem’s philosophy of science soon left its mark is evident from lecture notes that Einstein prepared for a course on electricity and magnetism at the University of Zurich in the winter semester of 1910/11. Einstein asks how one can assign a definite electrical charge everywhere within a material body, if the interior of the body is not accessible to test particles. A “Machian” positivist would deem such direct empirical access necessary for meaningful talk of a charge distribution in the interior of a sold. Einstein argues otherwise:
爱因斯坦在 1910/11 年冬季学期为苏黎世大学准备电和磁学课程的讲义中可以明显看出，爱因斯坦很快就接触到了杜赫姆的科学哲学。爱因斯坦问道，如果测试粒子无法进入物体内部，那么如何在物质体内的任何地方分配确定的电荷。一个 “马奇式的 ”实证主义者会认为，这种直接的经验访问对于有意义地谈论被出售的房子内部的电荷分配是必要的。爱因斯坦则不这么认为：

We have seen how experience led to the introd. of the concept of the quantity of electricity. it was defined by means of the forces that small electrified bodies exert on each other. But now we extend the application of the concept to cases in which this definition cannot be applied directly as soon as we conceive the el. forces as forces exerted

on electricity

rather than on material particles. We set up a conceptual system the individual parts of which do not correspond directly to empirical facts. Only a certain totality of theoretical material corresponds again to a certain totality of experimental facts.

We find that such an el. continuum is always applicable only for the representation of el. states of affairs in the interior of ponderable bodies. Here too we define the vector of el. field strength as the vector of the mech. force exerted on the unit of pos. electr. quantity inside a body. But the force so defined is no longer directly accessible to exp. It is one part of a theoretical construction that can be correct or false, i.e., consistent or not consistent with experience, only as a whole. (Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, hereafter CPAE, Vol. 3, Doc. 11 [pp. 12–13])
我们发现，这样的 el. continuum 总是仅适用于在可思考的物体内部表示 el. 事态。在这里，我们也将 el. 场强的矢量定义为施加在正电单位上的机械力的矢量。数量。但是这样定义的力不再直接用于 exp。它是理论结构的一部分，可以是正确的或错误的，即，与经验一致或不一致，只能作为一个整体。（阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦论文集，以下简称 CPAE，第 3 卷，第 11 期 [第 12-13 页]）

One can hardly ask for a better summary of Duhem’s point of view in application to a specific physical theory. Explicit citations of Duhem by Einstein are rare (for details, see Howard 1990a). But explicit invocations of a holist picture of the structure and empirical interpretation of theories started to prevail at the turn of the 1920s.
对于杜赫姆的观点，在应用于特定物理理论方面，我们很难要求更好的总结。爱因斯坦对 Duhem 的明确引用很少见（有关详细信息，请参见 Howard 1990a）。但在 1920 年代之交，对结构的整体图景和理论的实证解释的明确援引开始盛行。

During the decade 1905–1915, Einstein had more or less explicitly assumed that in a good theory there are certain individual parts that can be directly coordinated with the behavior of physically-existent objects used as probes. A theory can be said to be ‘true or false’ if such objects respectively behave or do not behave as predicted. In special relativity, as in classical mechanics, the fundamental geometrical/kinematical variables, the space and time coordinates, are measured with rods and clocks separately from the other non-geometrical variables, say, charge electric field strengths, which were supposed to be defined by measuring the force on a charge test particle. In general relativity, coordinates are no longer directly measurable independently from the gravitational field. Still, the line element dsds (distance between nearby spacetime points) was supposed to have a ‘natural’ distance that can be measured with rods and clocks. In the late 1910s, pressed by the epistemological objections raised by different interlocutors—in particular Hermann Weyl (Ryckman 2005) and the young Wolfgang Pauli (Stachel, 2005)—Einstein was forced to recognize that this epistemological model was at most a provisional compromise. In principle rod- and clock-like structures should emerge as solutions of a future relativistic theory of matter, possibly a field theory encompassing gravitation and electromagnetism. In this context, the sharp distinction between rods and clocks that serve to define the geometrical/kinematical structure of the theory and other material systems would become questionable. Einstein regarded such distinction as provisionally necessary, give the current state of physics. However, he recognized that in principle a physical theory should construct rods and clocks as solutions to its equations (see Ryckman 2017, ch. VII for an overview on Einstein view on the relation between geometry and experience).
在 1905 年至 1915 年的十年中，爱因斯坦或多或少明确地假设，在一个好的理论中，有一些单独的部分可以直接与用作探针的物理存在物体的行为相协调。如果一个理论的行为与预测的相同或不相同，则可以说这些理论是“真或假的”。在狭义相对论中，就像在经典力学中一样，基本的几何/运动学变量，即空间和时间坐标，是用棒和钟与其他非几何变量分开测量的，例如电荷电场强度，这些变量应该通过测量电荷测试粒子上的力来定义。在广义相对论中，坐标不再独立于引力场直接测量。尽管如此，line 元素 d s 双倍 （附近时空点之间的距离）应该有一个可以用棒和钟测量的“自然”距离。在 1910 年代后期，受到不同对话者——特别是赫尔曼·韦尔（Hermann Weyl，Ryckman，2005）和年轻的沃尔夫冈·泡利（Wolfgang Pauli，Stachel，2005）——提出的认识论反对意见的压力，爱因斯坦被迫承认，这种认识论模型最多只是一种临时的妥协。原则上，棒状和钟状结构应该作为未来物质相对论理论的解决方案出现，这可能是一个包含引力和电磁学的场论。在这种情况下，用于定义理论和其他材料系统的几何/运动结构的杆和钟之间的鲜明区别将变得值得怀疑。鉴于目前的物理学状况，爱因斯坦认为这种区分是暂时必要的。然而，他认识到，原则上物理理论应该构建杆和钟作为其方程的解（参见 Ryckman 2017，第七章，关于爱因斯坦关于几何与经验之间关系的观点的概述）。

Einstein addressed this issue in several popular writings during the 1920s, in particular, the famous lecture Geometrie und Erfahrung (Einstein 1921, see also Einstein, 1923, Einstein, 1924, Einstein 1926; Einstein 1926; see Giovanelli 2014 for an overview). Sub specie temporis, he argued, it was useful to compare the geometrical/kinematical structures of the theory with experience separately from the rest of physics. Sub specie aeterni, however, only geometry and physics taken together can be said to be ‘true or false.’ This epistemological model became more appropriate, while Einstein was moving beyond general relativity in the direction of theory unifying the gravitational and the electromagnetic field. Einstein had to rely on progressively more abstract geometrical structures which could not be defined in terms of the behavior of some physical probes. Thus, the use of such structures was justified because of their role in the theory as a whole. In the second half of the 1920s, in correspondence with Reichenbach (Giovanelli 2017) and Meyerson (Giovanelli 2018), Einstein even denied that the very distinction between geometrical and non-geometrical is meaningful (Lehmkuhl 2014).
爱因斯坦在 1920 年代的几篇流行著作中谈到了这个问题，特别是著名的讲座 Geometrie und Erfahrung（爱因斯坦 1921 年，另见爱因斯坦，1923 年，爱因斯坦，1924 年，爱因斯坦 1926 年;爱因斯坦 1926 年;有关概述，请参阅 Giovanelli 2014）。他认为，将理论的几何/运动结构与物理学其他部分的经验分开进行比较是有用的。然而，只有几何学和物理学放在一起才能说是“真或假”。当爱因斯坦在统一引力场和电磁场的理论方向上超越广义相对论时，这种认识论模型变得更加合适。爱因斯坦不得不依赖越来越抽象的几何结构，这些结构无法用某些物理探测器的行为来定义。因此，使用这种结构是合理的，因为它们在整个理论中的作用。在 1920 年代后半期，爱因斯坦在与 Reichenbach （Giovanelli 2017） 和 Meyerson （Giovanelli 2018） 的通信中甚至否认几何和非几何之间的区别是有意义的（Lehmkuhl 2014）。

A different, but especially interesting example of Einstein’s reliance on a form of theoretical holism is found in a review that Einstein wrote in 1924 of Alfred Elsbach’s Kant und Einstein (1924), one of the flood of books and articles then trying to reconcile the Kant’s philosophy. Having asserted that relativity theory is incompatible with Kant’s doctrine of the a priori, Einstein explains why, more generally, he is not sympathetic with Kant:
爱因斯坦在 1924 年写的一篇关于阿尔弗雷德·埃尔斯巴赫 （Alfred Elsbach） 的《康德与爱因斯坦》（1924 年）的评论中发现了爱因斯坦依赖某种形式的理论整体论的一个不同但特别有趣的例子，这是当时试图调和康德哲学的大量书籍和文章之一。在断言相对论与康德的先验学说不相容之后，爱因斯坦解释了为什么更普遍地说，他并不同情康德：

This does not, at first, preclude one’s holding at least to the Kantian problematic, as, e.g., Cassirer has done. I am even of the opinion that this standpoint can be rigorously refuted by no development of natural science. For one will always be able to say that critical philosophers have until now erred in the establishment of the a priori elements, and one will always be able to establish a system of a priori elements that does not contradict a given physical system. Let me briefly indicate why I do not find this standpoint natural. A physical theory consists of the parts (elements) A, B, C, D, that together constitute a logical whole which correctly connects the pertinent experiments (sense experiences). Then it tends to be the case that the aggregate of fewer than all four elements, e.g., A, B, D, without C, no longer says anything about these experiences, and just as well A, B, C without D. One is then free to regard the aggregate of three of these elements, e.g., A, B, C as a priori, and only D as empirically conditioned. But what remains unsatisfactory in this is always the arbitrariness in the choice of those elements that one designates as a priori, entirely apart from the fact that the theory could one day be replaced by another that replaces certain of these elements (or all four) by others. (Einstein 1924, 1688–1689)
起初，这并不排除一个人至少对康德有问题的持有，例如，卡西尔就是这样做的。我什至认为，这种立场可以被任何自然科学的发展所严格驳斥。因为人们总是能够说，到目前为止，批判哲学家在建立先验元素方面犯了错误，而人们总是能够建立一个与给定的物理系统不矛盾的先验元素系统。让我简要说明为什么我认为这种立场不自然。物理理论由部分（元素）A、B、C、D 组成，它们共同构成了一个逻辑整体，它正确地连接了相关的实验（感官体验）。然后，往往是这样的情况是，少于所有四个元素的集合，例如，没有 C 的 A、B、D 不再说明这些体验的任何内容，同样，没有 D 的 A、B、C 也是如此。然后，人们可以自由地将其中三个元素的聚合，例如 A、B、C 视为先验元素，而只有 D 是经验条件的。但是，在这方面仍然不令人满意的是，在选择那些被指定为先验元素的元素时，它总是武断的，完全抛开了这个理论有一天可能会被另一个理论取代，而另一个理论又可以取代这些元素中的某些元素（或全部四个元素）被其他元素取代的事实。（爱因斯坦 1924,1688-1689）

Einstein’s point seems to be that while one can always choose to designate selected elements as a priori and, hence, non-empirical, no principle determines which elements can be so designated, and our ability thus to designate them derives from the fact that it is only the totality of the elements that possesses empirical content.
爱因斯坦的观点似乎是，虽然人们总是可以选择将选定的元素指定为先验的，因此是非经验的，但没有原则决定哪些元素可以被指定，因此我们指定它们的能力源于这样一个事实，即只有元素的整体才具有经验内容。

Much the same point could be made, and was made by Duhem himself (see Duhem 1906, part 2, ch. 6, sects. 8 and 9), against those who would insulate certain statements against empirical refutation by claiming for them the status of conventional definitions. Edouard Le Roy (1901) had argued thus about the law of free fall. It could not be refuted by experiment because it functioned as a definition of “free fall.” And Henri Poincaré (1901) said much the same about the principles of mechanics more generally. As Einstein answered the neo-Kantians, so Duhem answered this species of conventionalist: Yes, experiment cannot refute, say, the law of free fall by itself, but only because it is part of a larger theoretical whole that has empirical content only as a whole, and various other elements of that whole could as well be said to be, alone, immune to refutation.
同样的观点也可以提出，而且是由杜赫姆本人提出的（见杜赫姆 1906 年，第 2 部分，第 6 章，第 8 节和第 9 节），反对那些通过声称某些陈述具有传统定义的地位来使某些陈述与实证反驳隔离开来的人。爱德华·勒罗伊 （1901） 曾这样论证过自由落体定律。它不能用实验来反驳，因为它的作用是 “自由落体” 的定义。亨利·庞加莱 （Henri Poincaré） （1901） 对更普遍的力学原理说了大致相同的话。正如爱因斯坦回答了新康德主义者一样，杜赫姆也回答了这种约定俗成论者：是的，实验不能反驳，比如说，自由落体定律，但这只是因为它是一个更大的理论整体的一部分，这个理论整体只作为一个整体具有经验内容，而这个整体的其他各种元素也可以说是， 独自一人，不受反驳。

That Einstein should deploy against the neo-Kantians in the early 1920s the argument that Duhem used against the conventionalism of Poincaré and Le Roy is interesting from the point of view of Einstein’s relationships with those who were leading the development of logical empiricism and scientific philosophy in the 1920s, especially Schlick and Reichenbach. Einstein shared with Schlick and Reichenbach the goal of crafting a new form of empiricism that would be adequate to the task of defending general relativity against neo-Kantian critiques (see Schlick 1917 and 1921, and Reichenbach 1920, 1924, and 1928; for more detail, see Howard 1994a). But while they all agreed that what Kant regarded as the a priori element in scientific cognition was better understood as a conventional moment in science, they were growing to disagree dramatically over the nature and place of conventions in science. The classic logical empiricist view that the moment of convention was restricted to conventional coordinating definitions that endow individual primitive terms, worked well, but did not comport well with the holism about theories
爱因斯坦应该在 1920 年代初期将杜赫姆用来反对庞加莱和勒罗伊的约定俗成主义的论点用于反对庞加莱和勒罗伊的约定俗成主义的角度来看，从爱因斯坦与 1920 年代引领逻辑经验主义和科学哲学发展的人的关系的角度来看，这很有趣。爱因斯坦与施利克和赖兴巴赫有着共同的目标，即创造一种新的经验主义形式，足以捍卫广义相对论以对抗新康德主义的批判（参见施利克 1917 年和 1921 年，以及赖兴巴赫 1920 年、1924 年和 1928 年;更多细节参见霍华德 1994a）。但是，尽管他们都同意康德认为科学认知中的先验元素更适合理解为科学中的约定俗成的时刻，但他们对约定在科学中的性质和地位却产生了巨大的分歧。经典的逻辑经验主义观点认为，约定俗成的时刻仅限于赋予单个原始术语的约定俗成的协调定义，这很有效，但与关于理论的整体论并不相称

It was this argument over the nature and place of conventions in science that underlies Einstein’s gradual philosophical estrangement from Schlick and Reichenbach in the 1920s. Serious in its own right, the argument over conventions was entangled with two other issues as well, namely, realism and Einstein’s famous view of theories as the “free creations of the human spirit” (see, for example, Einstein 1921). In both instances what troubled Einstein was that a verificationist semantics made the link between theory and experience too strong, leaving too small a role for theory, itself, and the creative theorizing that produces it.
正是这种关于科学惯例的性质和地位的争论，是爱因斯坦在 1920 年代逐渐在哲学上与 Schlick 和 Reichenbach 疏远的基础。关于约定俗成的争论本身就很严肃，它也与另外两个问题纠缠在一起，即现实主义和爱因斯坦著名的理论观点，即“人类精神的自由创造”（例如，参见爱因斯坦 1921 年）。在这两个例子中，让爱因斯坦感到困扰的是，验证主义的语义学使理论和经验之间的联系太强，而给理论本身和产生它的创造性理论化留下的作用太小了。

If theory choice is empirically determinate, especially if theoretical concepts are explicitly constructed from empirical primitives, as in Carnap’s program in the Aufbau (Carnap 1928), then it is hard to see how theory gives us a story about anything other than experience. As noted, Einstein was not what we would today call a scientific realist, but he still believed that there was content in theory beyond mere empirical content (on the relations between Einstein’s realism and constructism see Ryckman 2017, ch. 8 and 9). He believed that theoretical science gave us a window on nature itself, even if, in principle, there will be no one uniquely correct story at the level of deep ontology (see below, section 5). And if the only choice in theory choice is one among conventional coordinating definitions, then that is no choice at all, a point stressed by Reichenbach, especially, as an important positive implication of his position. Reichenbach argued that if empirical content is the only content, then empirically equivalent theories have the same content, the difference resulting from their different choices of coordinating definitions being like in kind to the difference between “es regnet” and “il pleut,” or the difference between expressing the result of a measurement in English or metric units, just two different ways of saying the same thing. But then, Einstein would ask, where is there any role for the creative intelligence of the theoretical physicist if there is no room for genuine choice in science, if experience somehow dictates theory construction?
如果理论选择是经验决定的，特别是如果理论概念是从经验原语中明确构建的，就像 Carnap 在 Aufbau 的程序（Carnap 1928）一样，那么就很难看出理论如何给我们一个关于经验以外的任何事物的故事。如前所述，爱因斯坦并不是我们今天所说的科学实在论者，但他仍然相信理论中还有超越单纯经验内容的内容（关于爱因斯坦的实在论和建构主义之间的关系，参见 Ryckman 2017，第 8 章和第 9 章）。他相信理论科学为我们提供了一个了解自然本身的窗口，即使原则上在深层本体论的层面上不会有一个唯一正确的故事（见下文，第 5 节）。如果理论上唯一的选择是传统的协调定义中的一个，那么这根本不是选择，赖兴巴赫特别强调这一点，作为他立场的重要积极含义。Reichenbach 认为，如果实证内容是唯一的内容，那么实证等价理论具有相同的内容，它们对协调定义的不同选择所产生的差异就像“es regnet”和“il pleut”之间的区别，或者用英制或公制单位表示测量结果之间的差异， 只是两种不同的表达方式。但是，爱因斯坦会问，如果科学中没有真正选择的空间，如果经验以某种方式决定了理论构建，那么理论物理学家的创造性智慧又有什么作用呢？

The argument over the nature and role of conventions in science continued to the very end of Einstein’s life, reaching its highest level of sophistication in the exchange between Reichenbach and Einstein the Library of Living Philosopher’s volume, Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Physicist (Schilpp 1949). The question is, again, whether the choice of a geometry is empirical, conventional, or a priori. In his contribution, Reichenbach reasserted his old view that once an appropriate coordinating definition is established, equating some “practically rigid rod” with the geometer’s “rigid body,” then the geometry of physical space is wholly determined by empirical evidence:
关于科学惯例的性质和作用的争论一直持续到爱因斯坦生命的最后阶段，在赖兴巴赫和爱因斯坦之间的交流中达到了最高的复杂性 活着的哲学家图书馆的卷， 阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦：哲学家-物理学家 （Schilpp 1949）。问题再次是，几何的选择是经验的、约定俗成的还是先验的。在他的贡献中，Reichenbach 重申了他的旧观点，即一旦建立了一个适当的协调定义，将一些“实际刚性的杆”等同于几何学的“刚性体”，那么物理空间的几何就完全由经验证据决定：

The choice of a geometry is arbitrary only so long as no definition of congruence is specified. Once this definition is set up, it becomes an empirical question which geometry holds for physical space.… The conventionalist overlooks the fact that only the incomplete statement of a geometry, in which a reference to the definition of congruence is omitted, is arbitrary. (Reichenbach 1949, 297)
只要没有指定同余的定义，几何体的选择是任意的。一旦建立了这个定义，它就变成了一个经验问题，哪个几何学适用于物理空间…约定俗成者忽略了这样一个事实，即只有几何学的不完整陈述（其中省略了对全等定义的引用）是任意的。（赖兴巴赫 1949 年，297 页）

Einstein’s clever reply includes a dialogue between two characters, “Reichenbach” and “Poincaré,” in which “Reichenbach” concedes to “Poincaré” that there are no perfectly rigid bodies in nature and that physics must be used to correct for such things as thermal deformations, from which it follows that what we actually test is geometry plus physics, not geometry alone. Here an “anonymous non-positivist” takes “Poincaré’s” place, out of respect, says Einstein, “for Poincaré’s superiority as thinker and author” (Einstein 1949, 677), but also, perhaps, because he realized that the point of view that follows was more Duhem than Poincaré. The “non-positivist” then argues that one’s granting that geometry and physics are tested together contravenes the positivist identification of meaning with verifiability:
爱因斯坦巧妙的回答包括“赖兴巴赫”和“庞加莱”两个角色之间的对话，其中“赖兴巴赫”向“庞加莱”承认，自然界中没有完美的刚体，必须用物理学来校正热变形等事情，由此可以得出，我们实际测试的是几何学加物理学，而不仅仅是几何学。爱因斯坦说，在这里，一个“匿名的非实证主义者”取代了“庞加莱”的位置，这是出于尊重，“因为庞加莱作为思想家和作家的优越性”（爱因斯坦 1949,677），但也可能是因为他意识到，接下来的观点比庞加莱更像杜赫姆。然后，“非实证主义者”争辩说，承认几何学和物理学是一起测试的，这与实证主义对意义和可验证性的认定相矛盾：

Non-Positivist: If, under the stated circumstances, you hold distance to be a legitimate concept, how then is it with your basic principle (meaning = verifiability)? Must you not come to the point where you deny the meaning of geometrical statements and concede meaning only to the completely developed theory of relativity (which still does not exist at all as a finished product)? Must you not grant that no “meaning” whatsoever, in your sense, belongs to the individual concepts and statements of a physical theory, such meaning belonging instead to the whole system insofar as it makes “intelligible” what is given in experience? Why do the individual concepts that occur in a theory require any separate justification after all, if they are indispensable only within the framework of the logical structure of the theory, and if it is the theory as a whole that stands the test? (Einstein 1949, 678).
非实证主义者：如果在所述情况下，你认为距离是一个合法的概念，那么它与你的基本原则（意义 = 可验证性）又如何呢？难道你不能走到否认几何陈述的意义，只让步于完全发展的相对论（它仍然根本不作为成品存在）的地步吗？难道你不承认，在你的意义上，任何“意义”都不属于物理理论的个别概念和陈述，而这种意义属于整个系统，只要它使经验中给出的东西“可理解”呢？如果理论中出现的单个概念仅在理论的逻辑结构框架内是必不可少的，并且如果整个理论经得起考验，为什么它们毕竟需要任何单独的理由呢？（爱因斯坦 1949,678）。

Two years before the Quine’s publication of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951), Einstein here makes explicit the semantic implications of a thoroughgoing holism.
在奎因出版《经验主义的两个教条》（1951 年）的两年前，爱因斯坦在这里明确了彻底的整体论的语义含义。

If theory choice is empirically underdetermined, then an obvious question is why we are so little aware of the underdetermination in the day-to-day conduct of science. In a 1918 address celebrating Max Planck’s sixtieth birthday, Einstein approached this question via a distinction between practice and principle:
如果理论选择在经验上是不确定的，那么一个明显的问题是，为什么我们如此少地意识到日常科学行为中的不确定性。在 1918 年庆祝马克斯·普朗克 60 岁生日的演讲中，爱因斯坦通过区分实践和原则来回答这个问题：

The supreme task of the physicist is … the search for those most general, elementary laws from which the world picture is to be obtained through pure deduction. No logical path leads to these elementary laws; it is instead just the intuition that rests on an empathic understanding of experience. In this state of methodological uncertainty one can think that arbitrarily many, in themselves equally justified systems of theoretical principles were possible; and this opinion is, in principle, certainly correct. But the development of physics has shown that of all the conceivable theoretical constructions a single one has, at any given time, proved itself unconditionally superior to all others. No one who has really gone deeply into the subject will deny that, in practice, the world of perceptions determines the theoretical system unambiguously, even though no logical path leads from the perceptions to the basic principles of the theory. (Einstein 1918, 31; Howard’s translation)
物理学家的首要任务是…寻找那些最普遍、最基本的法则，从中通过纯粹的演绎来获得世界图景。没有逻辑路径通向这些基本定律;相反，它只是建立在对经验的移情理解之上的直觉。在这种方法论不确定的状态下，人们可以认为任意许多本身同样合理的理论原则体系是可能的;而这个观点，原则上肯定是正确的。但是物理学的发展表明，在所有可以想象的理论结构中，有一个理论结构在任何特定时间都证明了自己无条件地优于所有其他理论结构。真正深入研究过这个主题的人都不会否认，在实践中，感知的世界明确地决定了理论体系，即使没有从感知到理论基本原则的逻辑路径。（爱因斯坦 1918,31;霍华德的翻译）

But why is theory choice, in practice, seemingly empirically determined? Einstein hinted at an answer the year before in a letter to Schlick, where he commended Schlick’s argument that the deep elements of a theoretical ontology have as much claim to the status of the real as do Mach’s elements of sensation (Schlick 1917), but suggested that we are nonetheless speaking of two different kinds of reality. How do they differ?
但是，为什么在实践中，理论选择似乎是由经验决定的呢？爱因斯坦在前一年给施利克的一封信中暗示了一个答案，他在信中赞扬了施利克的论点，即理论本体论的深层元素与马赫的感觉元素一样（Schlick 1917）对真实地位的要求一样多，但暗示我们仍然在谈论两种不同的现实。它们有何不同？

It appears to me that the word “real” is taken in different senses, according to whether impressions or events, that is to say, states of affairs in the physical sense, are spoken of.

If two different peoples pursue physics independently of one another, they will create systems that certainly agree as regards the impressions (“elements” in Mach’s sense). The mental constructions that the two devise for connecting these “elements” can be vastly different. And the two constructions need not agree as regards the “events”; for these surely belong to the conceptual constructions. Certainly on the “elements,” but not the “events,” are real in the sense of being “given unavoidably in experience.”
如果两个不同的民族彼此独立地追求物理学，他们将创造出在印象（马赫意义上的“元素”）方面肯定一致的系统。两人为连接这些“元素”而设计的心理结构可能大不相同。而且这两种结构在“事件”方面不需要达成一致;因为这些肯定属于概念结构。当然，在“元素”上，但不是“事件”上，是真实的，因为“在经验中不可避免地被赋予”。

But if we designate as “real” that which we arrange in the space-time-schema, as you have done in the theory of knowledge, then without doubt the “events,” above all, are real.… I would like to recommend a clean conceptual distinction here. (Einstein to Schlick, 21 May 1917, CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 343)
但是，如果我们把我们在时空图式中安排的东西指定为“真实的”，就像你在知识论中所做的那样，那么毫无疑问，“事件”首先是真实的…我想在这里推荐一个清晰的概念区分。（爱因斯坦致施利克，1917 年 5 月 21 日，CPAE，第 8 卷，第 343 号文件）

Why, in practice, are physicists unaware of underdetermination? It is because ours is not the situation of “two different peoples pursu[ing] physics independently of one another.” Though Einstein does not say it explicitly, the implication seems to be that apparent determination in theory choice is mainly a consequence of our all being similarly socialized as we become members of a common scientific community. Part of what it means to be a member of a such a community is that we have been taught to make our theoretical choices in accord with criteria or values that we hold in common.
为什么在实践中，物理学家没有意识到不确定呢？这是因为我们的情况不是“两个不同的民族彼此独立地追求物理学”。虽然爱因斯坦没有明确说出来，但其含义似乎是，理论选择中的明显决定主要是当我们成为共同科学社区的成员时，我们所有人都被类似的社会化的结果。成为这样一个社区的一员，部分意义在于，我们被教导要根据我们共同持有的标准或价值观来做出我们的理论选择。

3. Simplicity and Theory Choice 3. 简单性和理论选择

For Einstein, as for many others, simplicity is the criterion that mainly steers theory choice in domains where experiment and observation no longer provide an unambiguous guide. This, too, is a theme sounded early and late in Einstein’s philosophical reflections (for more detail, see Howard 1998, Norton 2000, van Dongen 2002, 2010, Giovanelli 2018). For example, the just-quoted remark from 1918 about the apparent determination of theory choice in practice, contrasted with in-principle underdetermination continues:
对爱因斯坦来说，就像对许多其他人来说，简单性是主要指导实验和观察不再提供明确指导的领域的理论选择的标准。这也是爱因斯坦哲学思考中早期和晚期出现的主题（更多细节，参见 Howard 1998， Norton 2000， van Donggen 2002， 2010， Giovanelli 2018）。例如，刚才引用的 1918 年关于实践中理论选择的明显决定与原则上的不确定形成对比的评论继续说道：

Furthermore this conceptual system that is univocally coordinated with the world of experience is reducible to a few basic laws from which the whole system can be developed logically. With every new important advance the researcher here sees his expectations surpassed, in that those basic laws are more and more simplified under the press of experience. With astonishment he sees apparent chaos resolved into a sublime order that is to be attributed not to the rule of the individual mind, but to the constitution of the world of experience; this is what Leibniz so happily characterized as “pre-established harmony.” Physicists strenuously reproach many epistemologists for their insufficient appreciation of this circumstance. Herein, it seems to me, lie the roots of the controversy carried on some years ago between Mach and Planck. (Einstein 1918, p. 31)
此外，这个与经验世界单独协调的概念系统可以简化为一些基本法则，整个系统可以从这些法则中逻辑地发展出来。随着每一次新的重要进步，这里的研究人员都看到他的期望被超越了，因为这些基本定律在经验的压力下越来越简化。他惊奇地看到，表面上的混乱被分解成一种崇高的秩序，这种秩序不是由于个人思想的统治，而是由经验世界的构成造成的;这就是莱布尼茨如此高兴地描述的“预先建立的和谐”。物理学家极力指责许多认识论者对这种情况的认识不足。在我看来，这就是几年前马赫和普朗克之间争论的根源所在。（爱因斯坦 1918 年，第 31 页）

There is more than a little autobiography here, for as Einstein stressed repeatedly in later years, he understood the success of his own quest for a general theory of relativity as a result of his seeking the simplest set of field equations satisfying a given set of constraints.
这里不仅仅是一本自传，因为正如爱因斯坦在晚年反复强调的那样，他明白自己对广义相对论的追求之所以成功，是因为他寻求满足一组给定约束的最简单的场方程。

Einstein’s celebration of simplicity as a guide to theory choice comes clearly to the fore in the early 1930s, when he was immersed his project of a unified field theory (see, van Dongen 2010 for a reconstruction of the philosophical underpinning of Einstein’s search of a unified field theory). Witness what he wrote in his 1933 Herbert Spencer lecture:
爱因斯坦将简单性作为理论选择的指南的颂扬在 1930 年代初期明显地突出了，当时他沉浸在他的统一场论项目中（参见 van Dongen 2010 年重建爱因斯坦寻求统一场论的哲学基础）。请看他在 1933 年的赫伯特·斯宾塞 （Herbert Spencer） 讲座中所写的内容：

If, then, it is true that the axiomatic foundation of theoretical physics cannot be extracted from experience but must be freely invented, may we ever hope to find the right way? Furthermore, does this right way exist anywhere other than in our illusions? May we hope to be guided safely by experience at all, if there exist theories (such as classical mechanics) which to a large extent do justice to experience, without comprehending the matter in a deep way?

To these questions, I answer with complete confidence, that, in my opinion, the right way exists, and that we are capable of finding it. Our experience hitherto justifies us in trusting that nature is the realization of the simplest that is mathematically conceivable. I am convinced that purely mathematical construction enables us to find those concepts and those lawlike connections between them that provide the key to the understanding of natural phenomena. Useful mathematical concepts may well be suggested by experience, but in no way can they be derived from it. Experience naturally remains the sole criterion of the usefulness of a mathematical construction for physics. But the actual creative principle lies in mathematics. Thus, in a certain sense, I take it to be true that pure thought can grasp the real, as the ancients had dreamed. (Einstein 1933, p. 183; Howard’s translation)
对于这些问题，我完全有信心地回答，在我看来，正确的道路存在，而且我们有能力找到它。迄今为止，我们的经验证明我们有理由相信，自然是数学上可以想象的最简单的实现。我坚信，纯粹的数学结构使我们能够找到那些概念以及它们之间的那些规律般的联系，这些联系为理解自然现象提供了钥匙。有用的数学概念很可能由经验提出，但绝不能从中得出。经验自然仍然是数学结构对物理学有用性的唯一标准。但真正的创造原则在于数学。因此，在某种意义上，我认为纯粹的思想可以把握真实，就像古人所梦想的那样。（爱因斯坦 1933 年，第 183 页;霍华德的翻译）

Einstein’s conviction that the theoretical physicist must trust simplicity is that his work was moving steadily into domains ever further removed from direct contact with observation and experiment. Einstein started to routinely claim that this was the lesson he had drawn from the way in which he had found general relativity (Norton 2000). There are, however, good reasons to think that Einstein’s selective recollections (Jannsen and Renn 2007) were instrumental to his defense of relying on a purely mathematical strategy in the search for a unified field theory (van Dongen 2010):
爱因斯坦坚信理论物理学家必须相信简单性，因为他的工作正在稳步进入与观察和实验直接接触越来越远的领域。爱因斯坦开始经常声称，这是他从发现广义相对论的方式中吸取的教训（Norton 2000）。然而，有充分的理由认为爱因斯坦的选择性回忆（Jannsen 和 Renn 2007）有助于他为依赖纯粹的数学策略来寻找统一场论辩护（van Dongen 2010）：

The theory of relativity is a beautiful example of the basic character of the modern development of theory. That is to say, the hypotheses from which one starts become ever more abstract and more remote from experience. But in return one comes closer to the preeminent goal of science, that of encompassing a maximum of empirical contents through logical deduction with a minimum of hypotheses or axioms. The intellectual path from the axioms to the empirical contents or to the testable consequences becomes, thereby, ever longer and more subtle. The theoretician is forced, ever more, to allow himself to be directed by purely mathematical, formal points of view in the search for theories, because the physical experience of the experimenter is not capable of leading us up to the regions of the highest abstraction. Tentative deduction takes the place of the predominantly inductive methods appropriate to the youthful state of science. Such a theoretical structure must be quite thoroughly elaborated in order for it to lead to consequences that can be compared with experience. It is certainly the case that here, as well, the empirical fact is the all-powerful judge. But its judgment can be handed down only on the basis of great and difficult intellectual effort that first bridges the wide space between the axioms and the testable consequences. The theorist must accomplish this Herculean task with the clear understanding that this effort may only be destined to prepare the way for a death sentence for his theory. One should not reproach the theorist who undertakes such a task by calling him a fantast; instead, one must allow him his fantasizing, since for him there is no other way to his goal whatsoever. Indeed, it is no planless fantasizing, but rather a search for the logically simplest possibilities and their consequences. (Einstein 1954, 238–239; Howard’s translation)
相对论是现代理论发展基本特征的一个美丽例子。也就是说，一个人开始的假设变得越来越抽象，越来越远离经验。但作为回报，人们更接近科学的首要目标，即通过逻辑推论和最少的假设或公理来包含最大的经验内容。因此，从公理到经验内容或可检验结果的智力路径变得越来越长和微妙。理论家在寻找理论时，越来越被迫让自己被纯粹数学的、形式化的观点所指导，因为实验者的物理经验无法将我们引向最高抽象的区域。试探性演绎取代了适合年轻科学状态的主要归纳方法。这样的理论结构必须经过相当彻底的阐述，才能产生可以与经验相比较的结果。当然，在这里，实证事实也是全能的法官。但是，它的判断只能基于伟大而艰难的智力努力，这些努力首先弥合了公理和可检验后果之间的广泛空间。理论家必须完成这项艰巨的任务，并清楚地认识到，这种努力可能注定只能为他的理论的死刑铺平道路。我们不应该责备承担这种任务的理论家，称他为幻想家;相反，我们必须允许他幻想，因为对他来说，没有其他方法可以达到他的目标。事实上，这不是无计划的幻想，而是对逻辑上最简单的可能性及其后果的寻找。（爱因斯坦 1954,238-239;霍华德的翻译）

What warrant is there for thus trusting in simplicity? At best one can do a kind of meta-induction. That “the totality of all sensory experience can be ‘comprehended’ on the basis of a conceptual system built on premises of great simplicity” will be derided by skeptics as a “miracle creed,” but, Einstein adds, “it is a miracle creed which has been borne out to an amazing extent by the development of science” (Einstein 1950, p. 342). The success of previous physical theories justifies our trusting that nature is the realization of the simplest that is mathematically conceivable
有什么理由可以这样相信简单呢？充其量可以做一种元归纳。“所有感官体验的整体都可以在建立在极其简单的前提之上的概念系统的基础上被’理解’”，这将被怀疑论者嘲笑为“奇迹信条”，但是，爱因斯坦补充说，“这是一个奇迹信条，它已经被科学的发展证明得以惊人的程度”（爱因斯坦 1950， 第 342 页）。以前物理理论的成功证明了我们相信自然是数学上可以想象的最简单的实现的合理性

But for all that Einstein’s faith in simplicity was strong, he despaired of giving a precise, formal characterization of how we assess the simplicity of a theory. In 1946 he wrote about the perspective of simplicity (here termed the “inner perfection” of a theory):
但是，尽管爱因斯坦对简单性的信念很坚定，但他对我们如何评估理论的简单性给出精确、正式的描述感到绝望。1946 年，他写了关于简单性的观点（这里称为理论的“内在完美”）：

This point of view, whose exact formulation meets with great difficulties, has played an important role in the selection and evaluation of theories from time immemorial. The problem here is not simply one of a kind of enumeration of the logically independent premises (if anything like this were at all possible without ambiguity), but one of a kind of reciprocal weighing of incommensurable qualities.… I shall not attempt to excuse the lack of precision of [these] assertions … on the grounds of insufficient space at my disposal; I must confess herewith that I cannot at this point, and perhaps not at all, replace these hints by more precise definitions. I believe, however, that a sharper formulation would be possible. In any case it turns out that among the “oracles” there usually is agreement in judging the “inner perfection” of the theories and even more so concerning the degree of “external confirmation.” (Einstein 1946, pp. 21, 23).
这种观点的确切表述遇到了很大的困难，在自古以来的理论选择和评估中发挥了重要作用。这里的问题不仅仅是对逻辑上独立的前提的列举之一（如果这样的事情完全可能而没有歧义的话），而是一种不可衡量的品质的相互权衡…我不会试图为[这些]断言缺乏准确性找借口…理由是我可以使用的空间不足;我必须在此承认，在这一点上，我不能，也许根本不能，用更精确的定义来取代这些暗示。然而，我相信更清晰的表述是可能的。无论如何，事实证明，在“神谕”之间，通常对判断理论的“内在完美”是一致的，在“外部确认”的程度上更是如此。“（爱因斯坦 1946 年，第 21、23 页）。

As in 1918, so in 1946 and beyond, Einstein continues to be impressed that the “oracles,” presumably the leaders of the relevant scientific community, tend to agree in their judgments of simplicity. That is why, in practice, simplicity seems to determine theory choice univocally.
与 1918 年一样，在 1946 年及以后，爱因斯坦仍然对“神谕”印象深刻，这些“神谕”——大概是相关科学界的领导者——倾向于同意他们对简单的判断。这就是为什么在实践中，简单性似乎完全决定了理论的选择。

4. Univocalness in the Theoretical Representation of Nature 4. 自然的理论表征的统一性

In the physics and philosophy of science literature of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the principle according to which scientific theorizing should strive for a univocal representation of nature was widely and well known under the name that it was given in the title of a widely-cited essay by Joseph Petzoldt, “The Law of Univocalness” [“Das Gesetz der Eindeutigkeit”] (Petzoldt 1895). An indication that the map of philosophical positions was drawn then in a manner very different from today is to found in the fact that this principle found favor among both anti-metaphysical logical empiricists, such as Carnap, and neo-Kantians, such as Cassirer. It played a major role in debates over the ontology of general relativity and was an important part of the background to the development of the modern concept of categoricity in formal semantics (for more on the history, influence, and demise of the principle of univocalness, see Howard 1992 and 1996). One can find no more ardent and consistent champion of the principle than Einstein.
在 19 世纪末和 20 世纪初的科学物理学和科学哲学文学中，科学理论化应根据该原则力求对自然的单一表征，其名称在约瑟夫·佩佐尔特 （Joseph Petzoldt） 被广泛引用的文章标题中给出，“统一法则”[“Das Gesetz der Eindeutigkeit”]（佩茨沃尔特 1895 年）。哲学立场地图的绘制方式与今天截然不同，这表明这一原则在反形而上学的逻辑经验主义者（如卡纳普）和新康德主义者（如卡西尔）中都得到了青睐。它在关于广义相对论本体论的辩论中发挥了重要作用，并且是形式语义学中现代分类概念发展背景的重要组成部分（有关单一性原则的历史、影响和消亡的更多信息，请参见 Howard 1992 和 1996）。没有比爱因斯坦更热心和始终如一的这一原则的拥护者了。

The principle of univocalness should not be mistaken for a denial of the underdetermination thesis. The latter asserts that a multiplicity of theories can equally well account for a given body of empirical evidence, perhaps even the infinity of all possible evidence in the extreme, Quinean version of the thesis. The principle of univocalness asserts (in a somewhat anachronistic formulation) that any one theory, even any one among a set of empirically equivalent theories, should provide a univocal representation of nature by determining for itself an isomorphic set of models. The unambiguous determination of theory choice by evidence is not the same thing as the univocal determination of a class of models by a theory.
统一原则不应被误认为是对 underdetermined 论点的否定。后者断言，理论的多样性同样可以很好地解释给定的经验证据，甚至可能是极端的奎因版本论文中所有可能证据的无限。统一性原则断言（以一种有点不合时宜的表述）任何一种理论，甚至是一组经验上等价的理论中的任何一种，都应该通过为自己确定一组同构的模型来提供自然的单一表示。通过证据明确地确定理论选择与通过理论单独确定一类模型不是一回事。

The principle of univocalness played a central role in Einstein’s struggles to formulate the general theory of relativity. When, in 1913, Einstein wrongly rejected a fully generally covariant theory of gravitation, he did so in part because he thought, wrongly, that generally covariant field equations failed the test of univocalness. More specifically, he reasoned wrongly that for a region of spacetime devoid of matter and energy—a “hole”—generally covariant field equations permit the construction of two different solutions, different in the sense that, in general, for spacetime points inside the hole, they assign different values of the metric tensor to one and the same point (for more on the history of this episode, see Stachel 1980 and Norton 1984). But Einstein’s “hole argument” is wrong, and his own diagnosis of the error in 1915 rests again, ironically, on a deployment of the principle of univocalness. What Einstein realized in 1915 was that, in 1913, he was wrongly assuming that a coordinate chart sufficed to fix the identity of spacetime manifold points. The application of a coordinate chart cannot suffice to individuate manifold points precisely because a coordinate chart is not an invariant labeling scheme, whereas univocalness in the representation of nature requires such invariance (see Howard and Norton 1993 and Howard 1999 for further discussion).
单一性原则在爱因斯坦制定广义相对论的斗争中发挥了核心作用。当爱因斯坦在 1913 年错误地拒绝完全普遍协变的万有引力理论时，他这样做的部分原因是他错误地认为一般协变场方程没有通过单一性的测试。更具体地说，他错误地推断，对于没有物质和能量的时空区域——一个“空洞”——通常协变场方程允许构造两种不同的解，区别在于，一般来说，对于空洞内的时空点，它们将不同的度量张量值分配给同一个点（有关本集历史的更多信息， 参见 Stachel 1980 和 Norton 1984）。但爱因斯坦的“空洞论证”是错误的，具有讽刺意味的是，他自己在 1915 年对错误的诊断再次建立在对单一性原则的部署之上。爱因斯坦在 1915 年意识到的是，在 1913 年，他错误地假设坐标图足以固定时空流形点的同一性。坐标图的应用不足以单独划分流形点，正是因为坐标图不是一个不变的标签方案，而自然表示的单一性需要这种不变性（进一步讨论参见 Howard 和 Norton 1993 和 Howard 1999）。

Here is how Einstein explained his change of perspective in a letter to Paul Ehrenfest of 26 December 1915, just a few weeks after the publication of the final, generally covariant formulation of the general theory of relativity:
以下是爱因斯坦在 1915 年 12 月 26 日给保罗·埃伦费斯特 （Paul Ehrenfest） 的一封信中解释他的观点转变，就在广义相对论的最终、通常是协变的表述发表几周后：

In §12 of my work of last year, everything is correct (in the first three paragraphs) up to that which is printed with emphasis at the end of the third paragraph. From the fact that the two systems

G(x)G(x)

and

G′(x)G′(x)

, referred to the same reference system, satisfy the conditions of the grav. field, no contradiction follows with the univocalness of events. That which was apparently compelling in these reflections founders immediately, if one considers that

1. the reference system signifies nothing real
   参考系统并不意味着任何真实
2. that the (simultaneous) realization of two different gg-systems (or better, two different grav. fields) in the same region of the continuum is impossible according to the nature of the theory.
   即（同时）实现两个不同的 g g -根据理论的性质，在连续体的同一区域的系统（或者更好的是，两个不同的引力场）是不可能的。

In place of §12, the following reflections must appear. The physically real in the universe of events (in contrast to that which is dependent upon the choice of a reference system) consists in spatiotemporal coincidences.* [Footnote : and in nothing else!] Real are, e.g., the intersections of two different world lines, or the statement that they do not intersect. Those statements that refer to the physically real therefore do not founder on any univocal coordinate transformation. If two systems of the gμvgμv (or in general the variables employed in the description of the world) are so created that one can obtain the second from the first through mere spacetime transformation, then they are completely equivalent. For they have all spatiotemporal point coincidences in common, i.e., everything that is observable.
必须显示以下反射，而不是 §12。在事件宇宙中，物理上的真实（与依赖于参考系统的选择相反）由时空的巧合组成。[脚注：没有别的了！实数是，例如，两条不同世界线的交集，或者它们不相交的陈述。因此，那些指代物理真实的陈述并不建立在任何单一的坐标转换之上。如果 g μ v gμv （或一般地描述世界时使用的变量）是如此被创造的，以至于人们可以通过纯粹的时空转换从第一个获得第二个，那么它们是完全等价的。因为它们具有所有共同的时空点重合，即所有可观察的事物。

These reflections show at the same time how natural the demand for general covariance is. (CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 173)
这些反射同时表明，对一般协方差的需求是多么自然。（CPAE，第 8 卷，第 173 号文件）

Einstein’s new point of view, according to which the physically real consists exclusively in that which can be constructed on the basis of spacetime coincidences, spacetime points, for example, being regarded as intersections of world lines, is now known as the “point-coincidence argument.” Einstein might have been inspired by a paper by the young mathematician Erich Kretschmann (Howard and Norton 1993; cf. Giovanelli 2013) or possibly by a conversation with Schlick (Engler and Renn, 2017). Spacetime coincidences play this privileged ontic role because they are invariant and, thus, univocally determined. Spacetime coordinates lack such invariance, a circumstance that Einstein thereafter repeatedly formulated as the claim that space and time “thereby lose the last vestige of physical reality” (see, for example, Einstein to Ehrenfest, 5 January 1916, CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 180).
爱因斯坦的新观点，即物理上的真实完全由可以根据时空巧合构建的东西组成，例如，时空点被视为世界线的交点，现在被称为“点-巧合论证”。爱因斯坦可能受到了年轻数学家埃里希·克雷奇曼 （Erich Kretschmann） 的一篇论文的启发（Howard 和 Norton 1993;参见 Giovanelli 2013），也可能受到了与 Schlick 的对话（Engler 和 Renn，2017 年）的启发。时空巧合扮演着这种特权本体角色，因为它们是不变的，因此是单一决定的。时空坐标缺乏这种不变性，爱因斯坦此后一再将这种情况表述为空间和时间“因此失去了物理现实的最后一丝残余”（例如，参见爱因斯坦致埃伦费斯特，1916 年 1 月 5 日，CPAE，第 8 卷，第 180 号文件）。

One telling measure of the philosophical importance of Einstein’s new perspective on the ontology of spacetime is the fact that Schlick devoted his first book, Raum und Zeit in den gegenwärtigen Physik (1917), a book for which Einstein had high praise (see Howard 1984 and 1999). But what most interested Einstein was Schlick’s discussion of the reality concept. Schlick argued that Mach was wrong to regard only the elements of sensation as real. Spacetime events, individuated invariantly as spacetime coincidences, have as much or more right to be taken as real, precisely because of the univocal manner of their determination. Einstein wholeheartedly agreed, though he ventured the above-quoted suggestion that one should distinguish the two kinds of reality—that of the elements and that of the spacetime events—on the ground that if “two different peoples” pursued physics independently of one another they were fated to agree about the elements but would almost surely produce different theoretical constructions at the level of the spacetime event ontology. Note, again, that underdetermination is not a failure of univocalness. Different though they will be, each people’s theoretical construction of an event ontology would be expected to be univocal.
爱因斯坦关于时空本体论的新观点在哲学上的重要性的一个有力衡量标准是，施利克将他的第一本书《Raum und Zeit in den gegenwärtigen Physik》（1917 年）献给了爱因斯坦，这本书受到了爱因斯坦的高度赞扬（参见 Howard 1984 和 1999）。但爱因斯坦最感兴趣的是施利克对现实概念的讨论。施利克认为，马赫只将感觉的元素视为真实是错误的。时空事件，不变地被个体化为时空巧合，具有同样或更多的权利被视为真实，正是因为它们的确定方式是单一的。爱因斯坦全心全意地同意，尽管他大胆地提出了上面引用的建议，即应该区分两种现实——元素的现实和时空事件的现实——理由是如果“两个不同的民族”彼此独立地追求物理学，他们注定要对元素达成一致，但几乎可以肯定的是，在时空事件本体论的层面上会产生不同的理论结构。再次注意，这种不确定并不是一贯的失败。尽管他们各不相同，但每个民族对事件本体论的理论构建都应该是一致的。

Schlick, of course, went on to become the founder of the Vienna Circle, a leading figure in the development of logical empiricism, a champion of verificationism. That being so, an important question arises about Schlick’s interpretation of Einstein on the univocal determination of spacetime events as spacetime coincidences. The question is this: Do such univocal coincidences play such a privileged role because of their reality or because of their observability. Clearly the former—the reality of that which is univocally determined—is important. But are univocal spacetime coincidences real because, thanks to their invariance, they are observable? Or is their observability consequent upon their invariant reality? Einstein, himself, repeatedly stressed the observable character of spacetime coincidences, as in the 26 December 1915 letter to Ehrenfest quoted above (for additional references and a fuller discussion, see Howard 1999).[2]
当然，施利克后来成为维也纳圈的创始人，逻辑经验主义发展的领军人物，验证主义的拥护者。既然如此，关于施利克对爱因斯坦关于将时空事件单调确定为时空巧合的解释，出现了一个重要的问题。问题是：这种不明确的巧合是因为它们的现实性还是因为它们的可观察性而发挥了如此特殊的作用。显然，前者——由单一决定的事物的现实——是重要的。但是，单调的时空巧合是真实的，因为它们的不变性使它们是可观察的吗？或者它们的可观察性是它们不变的现实的结果？爱因斯坦本人一再强调时空巧合的可观察特性，如上文引用的 1915 年 12 月 26 日给 Ehrenfest 的信（有关更多参考资料和更全面的讨论，参见 Howard 1999）。[2]

Schlick, still a self-described realist in 1917, was clear about the relationship between observability and reality. He distinguished macroscopic coincidences in the field of our sense experience, to which he does accord a privileged and foundational epistemic status, from the microscopic point coincidences that define an ontology of spacetime manifold points. Mapping the former onto the latter is, for Schlick, an important part of the business of confirmation, but the reality of the spacetime manifold points is in no way consequent upon their observability. Indeed, how, strictly speaking, can one even talk of the observation of infinitesimal spacetime coincidences of the kind encountered in the intersection of two world lines? In fact, the order of implication goes the other way: Spacetime events individuated as spacetime coincidences are real because they are invariant, and such observability as they might possess is consequent upon their status as invariant bits of physical reality. For Einstein, and for Schlick in 1917, understanding the latter—physical reality—is the goal of physical theory.
施利克在 1917 年仍然自称是一个现实主义者，他很清楚可观察性与现实之间的关系。他将我们感官经验领域的宏观巧合与定义时空流形点本体论的微观点巧合区分开来，他确实赋予了这些巧合特权和基础的认识地位。对 Schlick 来说，将前者映射到后者是确认业务的重要组成部分，但时空流形点的现实绝不取决于它们的可观察性。事实上，严格来说，我们怎么能谈论在两条世界线的交汇处遇到的那种无限小的时空巧合的观察呢？事实上，隐含的顺序是相反的：被单独划分为时空巧合的时空事件是真实的，因为它们是不变的，而它们可能拥有的这种可观察性是它们作为物理现实的不变位的地位的结果。对于爱因斯坦和 1917 年的施利克来说，理解后者——物理现实——是物理理论的目标。

5. Realism and Separability 5. 现实主义和可分离性

As we have seen, Schlick’s Raum und Zeit in den gegenwärtigen Physik promoted a realistic interpretation of the ontology of general relativity. After reading the manuscript early in 1917, Einstein wrote to Schlick on 21 May that “the last section ‘Relations to Philosophy’ seems to me excellent” (CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 343), just the sort of praise one would expect from a fellow realist. Three years earlier, the Bonn mathematician, Eduard Study, had written another well-known, indeed very well-known defense of realism, Die realistische Weltansicht und die Lehre vom Raume (1914). Einstein read it in September of 1918. Much of it he liked, especially the droll style, as he said to Study in a letter of 17 September (CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 618). Pressed by Study to say more about the points where he disagreed, Einstein replied on 25 September in a rather surprising way:
正如我们所看到的，施利克的 Raum und Zeit in den gegenwärtigen Physik 促进了对广义相对论本体论的现实解释。爱因斯坦在 1917 年初阅读了这份手稿后，于 5 月 21 日写信给施利克说，“在我看来，最后一节’与哲学的关系’非常好”（CPAE，第 8 卷，第 343 页），正是人们期望从现实主义者那里得到的那种赞美。三年前，波恩数学家爱德华·研究 （Eduard Study） 写了另一篇著名的、实际上是非常著名的现实主义辩护书，Die realistische Weltansicht und die Lehre vom Raume （1914）。爱因斯坦在 1918 年 9 月读了这本书。他喜欢其中的大部分内容，尤其是滑稽的风格，正如他在 9 月 17 日对 Study 的一封信中所说的那样（CPAE，第 8 卷，第 618 号文件）。在《研究》杂志的追问下，爱因斯坦在9月25日以一种相当令人惊讶的方式回答说：

I am supposed to explain to you my doubts? By laying stress on these it will appear that I want to pick holes in you everywhere. But things are not so bad, because I do not feel comfortable and at home in any of the “isms.” It always seems to me as though such an ism were strong only so long as it nourishes itself on the weakness of it counter-ism; but if the latter is struck dead, and it is alone on an open field, then it also turns out to be unsteady on its feet. So, away we go!
我应该向你解释我的疑惑吗？通过强调这些，我似乎想在你身上到处挑洞。但事情并没有那么糟糕，因为我在任何 “主义” 中都感到不舒服和自在。在我看来，这种主义只有在它反抗主义的弱点上滋养自己时，它总是强大的;但是，如果后者被撞死了，而且它独自一人在开阔的田野上，那么它也会站不稳。所以，我们走吧！

“The physical world is real.” That is supposed to be the fundamental hypothesis. What does “hypothesis” mean here? For me, a hypothesis is a statement, whose truth must be assumed for the moment, but whose meaning must be raised above all ambiguity. The above statement appears to me, however, to be, in itself, meaningless, as if one said: “The physical world is cock-a-doodle-doo.” It appears to me that the “real” is an intrinsically empty, meaningless category (pigeon hole), whose monstrous importance lies only in the fact that I can do certain things in it and not certain others. This division is, to be sure, not an arbitrary one, but instead ….
“物理世界是真实的。”这应该是基本假设。这里的“假设”是什么意思？对我来说，假设是一个陈述，它的真实性必须暂时假设，但其意义必须超越所有歧义。然而，在我看来，上述陈述本身毫无意义，就好像有人说：“物理世界是 cock-a-doodle-doo。在我看来，“真实”本质上是一个空洞、无意义的类别（鸽子洞），其可怕的重要性只在于我可以在其中做某些事情，而不能做某些其他事情。可以肯定的是，这种划分不是武断的，而是…

I concede that the natural sciences concern the “real,” but I am still not a realist. (CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 624)
我承认自然科学关注的是“真实”，但我仍然不是一个现实主义者。（CPAE，第 8 卷，第 624 号文件）

Lest there be any doubt that Einstein has little sympathy for the other side, he adds:
为了避免怀疑爱因斯坦对另一方几乎没有同情心，他补充说：

The positivist or pragmatist is strong as long as he battles against the opinion that there [are] concepts that are anchored in the “A priori.” When, in his enthusiasm, [he] forgets that all knowledge consists [in] concepts and judgments, then that is a weakness that lies not in the nature of things but in his personal disposition just as with the senseless battle against hypotheses, cf. the clear book by Duhem. In any case, the railing against atoms rests upon this weakness. Oh, how hard things are for man in this world; the path to originality leads through unreason (in the sciences), through ugliness (in the arts)-at least the path that many find passable. (CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 624)
实证主义者或实用主义者只要反对存在锚定在“先验”中的概念的观点，他就是强大的。当他的热情中忘记了所有知识都包含在概念和判断中时，这就是一个弱点，它不在于事物的本质，而在于他的个人性格，就像与假设的无意义斗争一样，参见杜赫姆的一本清晰的书。无论如何，对原子的指责就建立在这种弱点上。哦，这个世界上的人类生活是多么艰难啊;通往原创性的道路通向非理性（在科学中），通过丑陋（在艺术中）——至少是许多人认为可以走的路。（CPAE，第 8 卷，第 624 号文件）

What could Einstein mean by saying that he concedes that the natural sciences concern the “real,” but that he is “still not a realist” and that the “real” in the statement, “the physical world is real,” is an “intrinsically empty, meaningless category”?
爱因斯坦说他承认自然科学关注的是“真实”，但他“仍然不是一个现实主义者”，而“物理世界是真实的”这句话中的“真实”是一个“本质上空洞、毫无意义的范畴”，这是什么意思呢？

The answer might be that realism, for Einstein, is not a philosophical doctrine about the interpretation of scientific theories or the semantics of theoretical terms.[3] For Einstein, realism is a physical postulate, one of a most interesting kind, as he explained on 18 March 1948 in a long note at the end of the manuscript of Max Born’s Waynflete Lectures, Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance (1949), which Born had sent to Einstein for commentary:
答案可能是，对爱因斯坦来说，现实主义不是一种关于科学理论解释或理论术语语义的哲学学说。[3] 对爱因斯坦来说，现实主义是一个物理假设，是最有趣的假设之一，正如他在 1948 年 3 月 18 日马克斯·伯恩的韦恩弗莱特讲座《原因与机会的自然哲学》（1949 年）手稿末尾的长注中解释的那样，伯恩将该手稿寄给爱因斯坦进行评论：

I just want to explain what I mean when I say that we should try to hold on to physical reality. We are, to be sure, all of us aware of the situation regarding what will turn out to be the basic foundational concepts in physics: the point-mass or the particle is surely not among them; the field, in the Faraday - Maxwell sense, might be, but not with certainty. But that which we conceive as existing (’actual’) should somehow be localized in time and space. That is, the real in one part of space, A, should (in theory) somehow ‘exist’ independently of that which is thought of as real in another part of space, B. If a physical system stretches over the parts of space A and B, then what is present in B should somehow have an existence independent of what is present in A. What is actually present in B should thus not depend upon the type of measurement carried out in the part of space, A; it should also be independent of whether or not, after all, a measurement is made in A.
我只是想解释一下我说我们应该努力坚持物理现实的意思。可以肯定的是，我们所有人都知道物理学中的基本基本概念的情况：点质量或粒子肯定不在其中;在法拉第-麦克斯韦的意义上，磁场可能是，但不是确定的。但是，我们认为存在（“实际”）的事物应该以某种方式在时间和空间中被定位。也就是说，空间某一部分 A 中的真实应该（理论上）以某种方式独立于在空间的另一部分 B 中被认为是真实的事物而“存在”。如果一个物理系统延伸到空间 A 和 B 的部分，那么 B 中存在的东西应该以某种方式独立于 A 中存在的东西。因此，B 中实际存在的东西不应该取决于在空间部分 A 中进行的测量类型;它还应该独立于是否在 A 中进行测量。

If one adheres to this program, then one can hardly view the quantum-theoretical description as a complete representation of the physically real. If one attempts, nevertheless, so to view it, then one must assume that the physically real in B undergoes a sudden change because of a measurement in A. My physical instincts bristle at that suggestion.
如果一个人坚持这个程序，那么他就很难把量子论描述看作是物理真实的完整表示。然而，如果一个人试图这样看待它，那么他必须假设 B 中的物理真实由于 A 中的测量而发生了突然的变化。我的身体直觉对这个建议感到愤怒。

However, if one renounces the assumption that what is present in different parts of space has an independent, real existence, then I do not at all see what physics is supposed to describe. For what is thought to by a ‘system’ is, after all, just conventional, and I do not see how one is supposed to divide up the world objectively so that one can make statements about the parts. (Born 1969, 223–224; Howard’s translation)
然而，如果一个人放弃存在于太空不同部分的事物具有独立、真实的存在的假设，那么我根本看不到物理学应该描述什么。因为“系统”所认为的毕竟只是约定俗成的，我看不出一个人应该如何客观地划分世界，以便对各个部分做出陈述。（生于 1969 年，223-224 年;霍华德的翻译）

Realism is thus the thesis of spatial separability, the claim that spatial separation is a sufficient condition for the individuation of physical systems, and its assumption is here made into almost a necessary condition for the possibility of an intelligible science of physics.
因此，现实主义是空间可分离性的论点，声称空间分离是物理系统个体化的充分条件，它的假设在这里几乎成为可理解的物理科学可能性的必要条件。

The postulate of spatial separability as that which undergirds the ontic independence and, hence, individual identities of the systems that physics describes was an important part of Einstein’s thinking about the foundations of physics since at least the time of his very first paper on the quantum hypothesis in 1905 (Einstein 1905a; for more detail on the early history of this idea in Einstein’s thinking, see Howard 1990b). But the true significance of the separability principle emerged most clearly in 1935, when (as hinted in the just-quoted remark) Einstein made it one of the central premises of his argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics (see Howard 1985 and 1989). It is not so clearly deployed in the published version of the Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen paper (1935), but Einstein did not write that paper and did not like the way the argument appeared there. Separability is, however, an explicit premise in all of Einstein’s later presentations of the argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics, both in correspondence and in print (see Howard 1985 for a detailed list of references).
空间可分离性假设是支撑物理学所描述的系统的本体独立性的基础，因此，物理学所描述的系统的个体身份是爱因斯坦思考物理学基础的重要组成部分（至少从 1905 年他的第一篇关于量子假说的论文开始（Einstein 1905a;有关爱因斯坦思想中这一思想的早期历史的更多详细信息， 见 Howard 1990b）。但可分离性原则的真正意义在 1935 年最明显地显现出来，当时（正如刚才引用的评论所暗示的那样）爱因斯坦将其作为他论证量子力学不完备性的核心前提之一（参见 Howard 1985 和 1989）。在爱因斯坦、波多尔斯基和罗森的论文（1935 年）的出版版本中，它并没有那么明确地部署，但爱因斯坦并没有写那篇论文，也不喜欢这个论点出现在那里的方式。然而，在爱因斯坦后来对量子力学不完备性论证的所有陈述中，无论是通信还是印刷品，可分离性都是一个明确的前提（参见 Howard 1985 有关参考文献的详细列表）。

In brief, the argument is this. Separability implies that spacelike separated systems have associated with them independent real states of affairs. A second postulate, locality, implies that the events in one region of spacetime cannot physically influence physical reality in a region of spacetime separated from the first by a spacelike interval. Consider now an experiment in which two systems, A and B, interact and separate, subsequent measurements on each corresponding to spacelike separated events. Separability implies that A and B have separate real physical states, and locality implies that the measurement performed on A cannot influence B’s real physical state. But quantum mechanics ascribes different theoretical states, different wave functions, to B depending upon that parameter that is measured on A. Therefore, quantum mechanics ascribes different theoretical states to B, when B possesses, in fact, one real physical state. Hence quantum mechanics is incomplete.
简而言之，论点是这样的。可分离性意味着空间状分离系统与它们相关联，独立的真实事态。第二个假设，局部性，意味着一个时空区域中的事件不能物理影响与第一个时空区域相隔的时空区域中的物理现实。现在考虑一个实验，其中两个系统（A 和 B）相互作用并分离，每个系统的后续测量对应于类空间分离事件。可分离性意味着 A 和 B 具有不同的实际物理状态，而局部性意味着对 A 进行的测量不会影响 B 的实际物理状态。但是量子力学根据在 A 上测量的参数将不同的理论状态、不同的波函数赋予 B。因此，量子力学将不同的理论状态归于 B，而 B 实际上拥有一种真实的物理状态。因此，量子力学是不完整的。

One wants to ask many questions. First, what notion of completeness is being invoked here? It is not deductive completeness. It is closer in kind to what is termed “categoricity” in formal semantics, a categorical theory being one whose models are all isomorphic to one another. It is closer still to the principle discussed above—and cited as a precursor of the concept of categoricity—namely, the principle of univocalness, which we found doing such important work in Einstein’s quest for a general theory of relativity, where it was the premise forcing the adoption of an invariant and thus univocal scheme for the individuation of spacetime manifold points.
一个人想问很多问题。首先，这里援引了什么完整性的概念？它不是演绎完整性。它在种类上更接近形式语义学中所谓的“分类性”，分类理论是指其模型彼此同构的理论。它更接近上面讨论的原理——并被引用为分类概念的先驱——即单一性原则，我们发现它在爱因斯坦寻求广义相对论的过程中做了如此重要的工作，它是迫使采用不变的、因此是单一的方案来划分时空流形点的前提。

The next question is why separability is viewed by Einstein as virtually an a priori necessary condition for the possibility of a science of physics. One reason is because a field theory like general relativity, which was Einstein’s model for a future unified foundation for physics, is an extreme embodiment of the principle of separability: “Field theory has carried out this principle to the extreme, in that it localizes within infinitely small (four-dimensional) space-elements the elementary things existing independently of the one another that it takes as basic, as well as the elementary laws it postulates for them” (Einstein 1948, 321–322). And a field theory like general relativity can do this because the infinitesimal metric interval—the careful way to think about separation in general relativistic spacetime—is invariant (hence univocally determined) under all continuous coordinate transformations.
下一个问题是为什么爱因斯坦将可分离性视为物理学可能性的先验必要条件。一个原因是，像广义相对论这样的场论，是爱因斯坦为未来物理学的统一基础而建立的模型，是可分离性原理的极端体现：“场论将这一原理发挥到了极致，因为它将基本事物定位在无限小的（四维）空间元素中，这些基本事物彼此独立存在，它认为是基本的， 以及它为他们假设的基本定律“（Einstein 1948， 321-322）。像广义相对论这样的场论可以做到这一点，因为无穷小的度量区间——在广义相对论时空中考虑分离的谨慎方式——在所有连续坐标变换下都是不变的（因此是单定的）。

Another reason why Einstein would be inclined to view separability as an a priori necessity is that, in thus invoking separability to ground individuation, Einstein places himself in a tradition of so viewing spatial separability with very strong Kantian roots (and, before Kant, Newtonian roots), a tradition in which spatial separability was known by the name that Arthur Schopenhauer famously gave to it, the principium individuationis (for a fuller discussion of this historical context, see Howard 1997).
爱因斯坦倾向于将可分离性视为先验必然性的另一个原因是，在这样援引可分离性来建立基础个体化时，爱因斯坦将自己置于一个传统中，即以非常强大的康德根源（在康德之前，牛顿根源）来看待空间可分离性，在这个传统中，空间可分离性以阿瑟·叔本华 （Arthur Schopenhauer） 的著名名称而闻名， principium individuationis（有关这一历史背景的更全面讨论，请参见 Howard 1997）。

A final question one wants to ask is: “What does any of this have to do with realism?” One might grant Einstein’s point that a real ontology requires a principle of individuation without agreeing that separability provides the only conceivable such principle. Separability together with the invariance of the infinitesimal metric interval implies that, in a general relativistic spacetime, there are joints everywhere, meaning that we can carve up the universe in any way we choose and still have ontically independent parts. But quantum entanglement can be read as implying that this libertarian scheme of individuation does not work. Can quantum mechanics not be given a realistic interpretation? Many would say, “yes.” Einstein said, “no.”
人们想问的最后一个问题是：“这一切与现实主义有什么关系？人们可能会同意爱因斯坦的观点，即真正的本体论需要一个个体化原则，而不同意可分离性提供了唯一可以想象的这种原则。可分离性以及无穷小度量区间的不变性意味着，在广义相对论的时空中，到处都有关节，这意味着我们可以以任何我们选择的方式瓜分宇宙，并且仍然拥有本体独立的部分。但量子纠缠可以被解读为暗示这种自由意志主义的个体化方案不起作用。量子力学不能被给出一个现实的解释吗？许多人会说，“是的。“爱因斯坦说：”不。

6. The Principle Theories—Constructive Theories Distinction 6. 原则理论—建设性理论的区别

There is much that is original in Einstein’s philosophy of science as described thus far. At the very least, he rearranged the bits and pieces of doctrine that he learned from others—Kant, Mach, Duhem, Poincaré, Schlick, and others—in a strikingly novel way. But Einstein’s most original contribution to twentieth-century philosophy of science lies elsewhere, in his distinction between what he termed “principle theories” and “constructive theories.”
到目前为止，爱因斯坦的科学哲学中有很多原创性。至少，他以一种引人注目的新颖方式重新排列了他从其他人——康德、马赫、杜赫姆、庞加莱、施利克等人那里学到的点点滴滴的学说。但爱因斯坦对 20 世纪科学哲学最原始的贡献在于别处，在于他对他所谓的“原理理论”和“建设性理论”的区分。

This idea first found its way into print in a brief 1919 article in the Times of London (Einstein 1919). A constructive theory, as the name implies, provides a constructive model for the phenomena of interest. An example would be kinetic theory. A principle theory consists of a set of individually well-confirmed, high-level empirical generalizations, “which permit of precise formulation” (Einstein 1914, 749). Examples include the first and second laws of thermodynamics. Ultimate understanding requires a constructive theory, but often, says Einstein, progress in theory is impeded by premature attempts at developing constructive theories in the absence of sufficient constraints by means of which to narrow the range of possible constructive theories. It is the function of principle theories to provide such constraint, and progress is often best achieved by focusing first on the establishment of such principles. According to Einstein, that is how he achieved his breakthrough with the theory of relativity, which, he says, is a principle theory, its two principles being the relativity principle and the light principle.
这个想法在 1919 年伦敦泰晤士报的一篇简短文章（Einstein 1919）中首次出现。建构理论，顾名思义，为感兴趣的现象提供了一个建构模型。一个例子是动力学理论。原则论由一组单独得到充分证实的高级经验概括组成，“允许精确表述”（Einstein 1914， 749）。示例包括热力学的第一定律和第二定律。最终的理解需要一个建设性的理论，但爱因斯坦说，理论的进步往往会受到缺乏足够约束的情况下过早地尝试发展建设性理论的阻碍，从而缩小可能的建设性理论的范围。原则理论的功能就是提供这种约束，而进步往往最好通过首先关注这些原则的建立来实现。根据爱因斯坦的说法，这就是他在相对论上取得突破的方式，他说，相对论是一种原理理论，它的两个原理是相对论和光原理。

While the principle theories-constructive theories distinction first made its way into print in 1919, there is considerable evidence that it played an explicit role in Einstein’s thinking much earlier (Einstein 1907, Einstein to Sommerfeld 14 January 1908, CPAE, vol. 5, Doc. 73, Einstein 1914). Nor was it only the relativity and light principles that served Einstein as constraints in his theorizing. Thus, he explicitly mentions also the Boltzmann principle, S=klogWS=klog⁡W, as another such:
虽然原则理论和建构理论的区别在 1919 年首次出版，但有相当多的证据表明它在更早的爱因斯坦思想中发挥了明确的作用（爱因斯坦 1907 年，爱因斯坦致索默菲尔德 1908 年 1 月 14 日，CPAE，第 5 卷，第 73 号文件，爱因斯坦 1914 年）。在爱因斯坦的理论化中，也不仅仅是相对论和光原理作为约束。因此，他还明确提到了玻尔兹曼原理， S = k 日志 W S=klogW ，如下所示：

This equation connects thermodynamics with the molecular theory. It yields, as well, the statistical probabilities of the states of systems for which we are not in a position to construct a molecular-theoretical model. To that extent, Boltzmann’s magnificent idea is of significance for theoretical physics … because it provides a heuristic principle whose range extends beyond the domain of validity of molecular mechanics. (Einstein 1915, p. 262).
这个方程将热力学与分子理论联系起来。它还产生了我们无法构建分子理论模型的系统状态的统计概率。从这个意义上说，玻尔兹曼的宏伟思想对理论物理学具有重要意义…因为它提供了一个启发式原理，其范围超出了分子力学的有效性领域。“（爱因斯坦 1915 年，第 262 页）。

Einstein is here alluding the famous entropic analogy whereby, in his 1905 photon hypothesis paper, he reasoned from the fact that black body radiation in the Wien regime satisfied the Boltzmann principle to the conclusion that, in that regime, radiation behaved as if it consisted of mutually independent, corpuscle-like quanta of electromagnetic energy. The quantum hypothesis is a constructive model of radiation; the Boltzmann principle is the constraint that first suggested that model.
爱因斯坦在这里提到了著名的熵类比，在他 1905 年的光子假说论文中，他从维也纳状态中的黑体辐射满足玻尔兹曼原理这一事实进行了推理，得出的结论是，在该状态下，辐射的行为就像它由相互独立的、类似小球的电磁能量子组成。量子假说是辐射的建设性模型;玻尔兹曼原理是首次提出该模型的约束。

There are anticipations of the principle theories-constructive theories distinction in the nineteenth-century electrodynamics literature, James Clerk Maxwell, in particular, being a source from which Einstein might well have drawn (see Harman 1998). At the turn of the century, the “physics of principles” was a subject under wide discussion. At the turn of 1900, Hendrik A. Lorentz (Lorentz 1900, 1905; see Frisch 2005) and Henri Poincaré (for example, Poincaré 1904; see, Giedymin 1982, Darrigol 1995) presented the opposition between the “physics of principles“ and the “physics of models“ as commonplace. In a similar vein, Arnold Sommerfeld opposed a “physics of problems“, a style of doing physics based on concrete puzzle solving, to the “practice of principles“ defended by Max Planck (Seth 2010). Philipp Frank (1908, relying on Rey 1909) defined relativity theory as a “ conceptual theory“ based on abstract, but empirically well confirmed principles rather than on intuitive models. Probably many other examples could be find. . But however extensive his borrowings (no explicit debt was ever acknowledged), in Einstein’s hands the distinction becomes a methodological tool of impressive scope and fertility. What is puzzling, and even a bit sad, is that this most original methodological insight of Einstein’s had comparatively little impact on later philosophy of science or practice in physics. Only in recent decades, Einstein constructive-principle distinction has attracted interest in the philosophical literature, originating a still living philosophical debate on the foundation of spacetime theories (Brown 2005, Janssen 2009, Lange 2014).[4]
在 19 世纪的电动力学文献中，人们预料到了原则理论和建构理论的区别，特别是詹姆斯·克拉克·麦克斯韦 （James Clerk Maxwell），很可能是爱因斯坦的来源（参见 Harman 1998）。在世纪之交，“原理物理学”是一个被广泛讨论的话题。在 1900 年之交，亨德里克·洛伦兹（Hendrik A. Lorentz，洛伦兹 1900,1905;见 Frisch 2005）和亨利·庞加莱（Henri Poincaré，例如，Poincaré 1904;参见 Giedymin 1982，Darrigol 1995）提出了“原理物理学”和“模型物理学”之间的对立，这是司空见惯的。同样，阿诺德·索默菲尔德 （Arnold Sommerfeld） 反对“问题物理学”，一种基于具体解谜的物理学风格，反对马克斯·普朗克 （Max Planck） 捍卫的“原则实践”（Seth 2010）。菲利普·弗兰克（Philipp Frank，1908 年，依赖 Rey 1909 年）将相对论定义为基于抽象但经过经验充分证实的原理的“概念理论”，而不是基于直觉模型。可能还可以找到许多其他例子。.但是，无论他的借款多么广泛（从未承认过明确的债务），在爱因斯坦的手中，这种区分成为一种具有令人印象深刻的范围和丰富性的方法论工具。令人费解，甚至有点悲哀的是，爱因斯坦的这一最原始的方法论见解对后来的科学哲学或物理学实践的影响相对较小。直到最近几十年，爱因斯坦的建构原则区分才引起了哲学文献的兴趣，引发了一场关于时空理论基础的仍然活生生的哲学辩论（Brown 2005， Janssen 2009， Lange 2014）。[4]

7. Conclusion: Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Physicist 7. 结论：阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦：哲学家-物理学家

Einstein’s influence on twentieth-century philosophy of science is comparable to his influence on twentieth-century physics (Howard 2014). What made that possible? One explanation looks to the institutional and disciplinary history of theoretical physics and the philosophy of science. Each was, in its own domain, a new mode of thought in the latter nineteenth century, and each finally began to secure for itself a solid institutional basis in the early twentieth century. In a curious way, the two movements helped one another. Philosophers of science helped to legitimate theoretical physics by locating the significant cognitive content of science in its theories. Theoretical physicists helped to legitimate the philosophy of science by providing for analysis a subject matter that was radically reshaping our understanding of nature and the place of humankind within it. In some cases the help was even more direct, as with the work of Einstein and Max Planck in the mid-1920s to create in the physics department at the University of Berlin a chair in the philosophy of science for Reichenbach (see Hecht and Hartmann 1982). And we should remember the example of the physicists Mach and Ludwig Boltzmann who were the first two occupants of the new chair for the philosophy of science at the University of Vienna at the turn of the century.
爱因斯坦对 20 世纪科学哲学的影响与他对 20 世纪物理学的影响相当（Howard 2014）。是什么让这一切成为可能？一种解释着眼于理论物理学和科学哲学的制度和学科历史。在自己的领域中，每个国家都是 19 世纪后期的一种新思维模式，并且每个国家最终在 20 世纪初开始为自己奠定坚实的制度基础。这两个运动以一种奇怪的方式相互帮助。科学哲学家通过在理论中定位科学的重要认知内容，帮助理论物理学合法化。理论物理学家通过提供分析主题来帮助科学哲学合法化，该主题从根本上改变了我们对自然界和人类在其中的位置的理解。在某些情况下，帮助甚至更直接，例如爱因斯坦和马克斯·普朗克在 1920 年代中期为柏林大学物理系为 Reichenbach 设立了科学哲学教席的工作（参见 Hecht 和 Hartmann 1982）。我们应该记住物理学家 Mach 和 Ludwig Boltzmann 的例子，他们是世纪之交维也纳大学科学哲学新教席的前两位使用者。

Another explanation looks to the education of young physicists in Einstein’s day. Not only was Einstein’s own youthful reading heavily focused on philosophy, more generally, and the philosophy of science, in particular (for an overview, see Einstein 1989, xxiv–xxv; see also Howard 1994b), in which respect he was not unlike other physicists of his generation, but also his university physics curriculum included a required course on “The Theory of Scientific Thought” (see Einstein 1987, Doc. 28). An obvious question is whether or not the early cultivation of a philosophical habit of mind made a difference in the way Einstein and his contemporaries approached physics. As indicated by his November 1944 letter to Robert Thorton quoted at the beginning of this article, Einstein thought that it did.
另一种解释着眼于爱因斯坦时代年轻物理学家的教育。不仅爱因斯坦自己年轻时的阅读主要集中在哲学上，更广泛地说，特别是科学哲学（有关概述，参见 Einstein 1989， xxiv–xxv;另见 Howard 1994b），在这方面他与他那一代的其他物理学家没有什么不同，而且他的大学物理课程包括一门关于“科学思想理论”的必修课程（参见 Einstein 1987， Doc. 28）。一个明显的问题是，早期培养的哲学思维习惯是否对爱因斯坦和他的同时代人对待物理学的方式产生了影响。正如本文开头引用的 1944 年 11 月写给罗伯特·索顿 （Robert Thorton） 的信所表明的那样，爱因斯坦认为确实如此。

Bibliography

Einstein’s Work

Einstein’s letters and manuscripts, if unpublished, are cited by their numbers in the Einstein Archive (EA) control index and, if published, by volume, document number, and, if necessary, page number in:

[CPAE] The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, John Stachel, et al. (eds.), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987–present.

Works by year

1905a	“Über einen die Erzeugung und Verwandlung des Lichtes betreffenden heuristischen Gesichtspunkt.” Annalen der Physik 17:132–148. Repr. in CPAE, Vol. 2, Doc. 14.
1905b	“Über die von der molekularkinetischen Theorie der Wärme geforderte Bewegung von in ruhenden Flüssigkeiten suspendierten Teilchen.” Annalen der Physik 17: 549–560. Repr. in CPAE, Vol. 2, Doc. 16.
1905c	“Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper.” Annalen der Physik 17: 891–921. Repr. in CPAE, Vol. 2, Doc. 23.
1907	“Bemerkungen zu der Notiz von Hrn Paul Ehrenfest: ‘Die Translation deformierbarer Elektronen und der Flächensatz’” Annalen der Physik 22: 206–208. Repr. in CPAE, Vol. 2, Doc. 44.
1914	“Antrittsrede des Hrn.Einstein” Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Halbband 1: 739–742. Repr. in CPAE, Vol. 3, Doc. 18.
1915	“Theoretische Atomistik.” In Die Kultur der Gegenwart. Ihre Entwicklung und ihre Ziele. Paul Hinneberg, ed. Part 3, Mathematik, Naturwissenschaften, Medizin. Section 3, Anorganischen Naturwissenschaften. E. Lecher, ed. Vol. 1, Die Physik. Emil Warburg, ed. Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 251–263. Repr. in CPAE, Vol. 4, Doc. 20.
1916	“Ernst Mach.” Physikalische Zeitschrift 17: 101–104. Repr. in CPAE, Vol. 6, Doc. 29.
1918	“Motive des Forschens.” In Zu Max Plancks sechzigstem Geburtstag. Ansprachen, gehalten am 26. April 1918 in der Deutschen Physikalischen Gesellschaft. Karlsruhe: C. F. Müller, pp. 29–32. English translation: “Principles of Research.” In Einstein 1954, 224–227. Repr. in CPAE Vol. 7, Doc. 7.
1919	“Time, Space, and Gravitation.” Times (London). 28 November 1919, 13–14. Reprinted as “What is the Theory of Relativity?” In Einstein 1954, 227–232. Repr. in CPAE, Vol. 7, Doc. 29.
1921	Geometrie und Erfahrung. Erweiterte Fassung des Festvortrages gehalten an der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Belin am 27. Januar 1921. Berlin: Julius Springer. English translation: “Geometry and Experience.” In Einstein 1954, 232–246. Repr. in CPAE, Vol. 7, Doc. 52.
1923	“Grundgedanken und Probleme der Relativitätstheorie.” In Les Prix Nobel en 1921–1922. Carl Gustaf Santesson, ed., Stockholm: Nobel Foundation. Repr. in CPAE, Vol. 14, Doc. 75.
1924	Review of Elsbach 1924. Deutsche Literaturzeitung 45, 1688–1689. Repr. in CPAE, Vol. 14, Doc. 321.
1925	“Nichteuklidische Geometrie und Physik.” Neue Rundschau 36, no. 1: 16–20. Repr. in CPAE, Vol. 14, Doc. 220.
1926	Space–Time Encyclopædia Britannica, 13th ed., edited by James Louis Garvin, Supplementary Vol. 3, London and New York: The Encyclopædia Britannica Co., Ltd., 1926, pp. 608–611. Repr. in CPAE, Vol. 15, Doc. 148.
1928	A propos de “La Déduction Relativiste” de M. Émile Meyerson [Meyerson 1925] Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger 45, 161–166. English translation: Meyerson 1985, 252–256.
1933	On the Method of Theoretical Physics. The Herbert Spencer Lecture, delivered at Oxford, 10 June 1933. Oxford: Clarendon Press. New translation by Sonja Bargmann in Einstein 1954, 270–276.
1930	“Das Raum-, Äther- und Feld-Problem der Physik.” English translation: In Einstein 1954, 276–285.
1935	with Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen, “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?” Physical Review 47: 777–780.
1936	“Physik und Realität.” Journal of The Franklin Institute 221: 313–347. English translation: “Physics and Reality.” Jean Piccard, trans. Journal of the Franklin Institute 221: 348–382. Reprinted in Einstein 1954, 290–323.
1946	“Autobiographical Notes.” In Schilpp 1949, 1–94. Quotations are taken from the corrected English translation in: Autobiographical Notes: A Centennial Edition. Paul Arthur Schilpp, trans. and ed. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1979.
1948	“Quanten-Mechanik und Wirklichkeit.” Dialectica 2: 320–24.
1949	“Remarks Concerning the Essays Brought together in this Co-operative Volume.” In Schilpp 1949, 665–688.
1950	“On the Generalized Theory of Gravitation.” Scientific American 182, April, 13–17. Reprinted in Einstein 1954, 341–356.
1954	Ideas and Opinions. New York: Bonanza Books.

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• –––, 1917. Raum und Zeit in den gegenwärtigen Physik. Zur Einführung in das Verständnis der allgemeinen Relativitätstheorie, Berlin: Julius Springer; English translation of the 3rd edition, Space and Time in Contemporary Physics: An Introduction to the Theory of Relativity and Gravitation, Henry L. Brose (trans.), London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1920; reprinted in Schlick 1979, vol. 1, 207–269.
• –––, 1921. “Kritizistische oder empiristische Deutung der neuen Physik”, Kant-Studien 26: 96–111. English translation: “Critical or Empiricist Interpretation of Modern Physics”, in Schlick 1979, vol. 1, 322–334.
• –––, 1979. Philosophical Papers, 2 volumes, Henk L. Mulder and Barbara F. B. van de Velde-Schlick (eds.), Peter Heath (trans.), Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel.
• Seth, Suman, 2010. Crafting the Quantum, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
• Stachel, John, 1980. “Einstein’s Search for General Covariance, 1912–1915” (paper delivered at the Ninth International Conference on General Relativity and Gravitation, Jena, Germany (DDR), 17 July 1980), in Howard and Stachel 1989, 63–100.
• Study, Eduard, 1914. Die realistische Weltansicht und die Lehre vom Raume. Geometrie, Anschauung und Erfahrung (Die Wissenschaft: Volume 54), Braunschweig: Friedrich Vieweg & Sohn.
• van Dongen, Jeroen, 2002. Einstein’s Unification: General Relativity and the Quest for Mathematical Naturalness, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Amsterdam.
• –––, 2010. Einstein’s Unification, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press

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via：

• Einstein’s Philosophy of Science (SEP)

  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/einstein-philscience/