抽象类不能声明主体_软件的主导地位能否继续

抽象类不能声明主体

Opinions are my own and not intended to be investment advice.

观点是我自己的，并不打算成为投资建议。

As I was doing research on another post, I was struck by just how much the tech sector has outperformed some of the other S&P 500 sectors:

当我在另一篇文章上进行研究时，我被科技行业在许多标普500指数领域的表现超越而震惊：

Tech beat everything else (Data: Sharadar, plot created by author)

科技胜过其他一切(数据：Sharadar，由作者创建的情节)

Imagine being long tech and short energy, what a trade! But that’s hindsight. A more relevant question going forward is whether the tech sector can continue outperforming like it has or will its returns relative to the broader market come back to earth at least a little?

想象一下，技术含量高而能源短缺，这是什么交易！ 但这是事后看来。 未来一个更相关的问题是，科技行业是否可以继续表现出比以往更好的表现，或者相对于大盘而言，其回报是否至少会回归现实？

This is a multi-faceted question and over a long period of time valuations (and the expectations implied by those valuations) matter too. But today we will examine a more strategic question:

这是一个多方面的问题，而且在很长一段时间内，估值(以及这些估值所隐含的期望)也很重要。 但是今天我们将研究一个更具战略意义的问题：

Why do software companies tend to be winner take all?

为什么软件公司倾向于成为赢家？

In other words, why do the various niches of the software industry tend towards economic moats that massively strengthen the dominant players at the expense of their competitors?

换句话说，为什么软件行业的各个领域趋向于经济护城河，这些护城河以牺牲竞争对手的利益为代价而大大增强了主导者的地位？

Because in a winner take all world, barring regulation or obsolescence, entrenched and dominant companies can strengthen their competitive positions and gobble up their markets, including adjacent ones, as they please. That’s a recipe for massive profits and would help justify tech’s premium earnings multiple relative to the broader market.

因为在制胜者的统治下，除非监管或过时，否则根深蒂固且占主导地位的公司可以根据自己的意愿加强其竞争地位，并吞噬包括相邻市场在内的市场。 这是获得巨额利润的秘诀，将有助于证明技术的溢价收益是相对于整个市场的倍数。

零边际成本和零分销成本 (Zero Marginal Costs And Zero Distribution Costs)

One key aspect of software is that it has zero marginal costs (I wrote a post about marginal costs, link below) and zero distribution costs (Ben Thompson write extremely eloquently about that here on his blog).

软件的一个关键方面是它的边际成本为零(我写了一篇有关边际成本的文章，以下链接)，而分销成本为零( Ben Thompson在其博客上非常雄辩地对此进行了论述)。

What this means is that it costs a software company basically nothing to serve an additional customer. Everything is in the cloud these days — the resources to produce the new customer’s instance of the software is calculated and allocated automatically, and delivered seamlessly via the web.

这意味着为一家额外的客户服务基本上不需要花费软件公司任何费用。 如今，一切都在云中-可以自动计算和分配用于产生新客户软件实例的资源，并通过Web无缝交付。

That’s pretty convenient. It’s why software companies often give away much of their product for free. For example, you can start using Slack for free. It’s only once you’re hooked that you start paying them a subscription fee for a souped up version with more bells and whistles.

那很方便。 这就是软件公司经常免费赠送其大部分产品的原因。 例如，您可以免费开始使用Slack。 只有上钩之后，您才开始向他们支付订阅费，以购买更多版本的铃声。

And if the product resonates with users, zero marginal and distribution costs allows a company to scale really fast. As long as the company can afford to pay their AWS (Amazon Web Services) bill, there’s no real limit to the amount of incremental customers a software company can serve. And the more people that try it, the more usage data the company collects, and the more it can iterate its product towards something that people find increasingly useful.

而且，如果产品引起用户共鸣，那么零边际成本和分销成本将使公司真正快速地扩展。 只要公司有能力支付其AWS(Amazon Web Services)账单，软件公司可以服务的增量客户数量就没有真正的限制。 尝试的人越多，公司收集的使用数据就越多，就越能将其产品迭代为人们发现越来越有用的产品。

This type of try first, subscribe later approach has another benefit — it circumvents the traditional purchasing process of companies and all the bureaucracy that comes with it. Distribution becomes much more grassroots. For example, engineering teams frustrated with the existing communication software, can independently download Slack, start using it, become delighted with it, and get locked-in to the product. Once that happens, it’s just a matter of time before the company becomes a paying Slack customer.

这种先尝试后订阅的方法还有另一个好处-它规避了公司的传统购买流程以及随之而来的所有官僚机构。 分配变得越来越草根。 例如，工程团队对现有的通信软件感到沮丧，可以独立下载Slack，开始使用它，对其感到满意，然后将其锁定在产品中。 一旦发生这种情况，公司成为Slack的付费客户只是时间问题。

软件通常是赢家 (Software Is Often Winner Take All)

The fact that software distribution in the cloud era tends to be much more grassroots is a critical one towards understanding why software tends to be winner take all.

在云时代，软件分发趋向于更多的基层这一事实对于理解为什么软件趋于成为赢家的关键至关重要。

Back in the old days of enterprise software, having a good relationship with the IT purchasing manager was an edge (for making the sale). If your company’s salesmen were smooth enough and post-sale support was good enough, you could get away with having an inferior product. So companies invested heavily in their sales and distribution capabilities.

在过去的企业软件中，与IT采购经理保持良好关系是一种优势(进行销售)。 如果贵公司的销售人员足够顺利，并且售后支持足够好，那么您可以摆脱劣质产品的困扰。 因此，公司在其销售和分销能力上进行了大量投资。

Those advantages count for much less today — cloud software is free and quick to download and use by anyone and is always up-to-date, so no consultants needed. And instead of salesmen, companies nowadays spend their sales and marketing dollars on getting as many free trials in the hands of potential users as possible (lots of Google advertising and content marketing).

如今，这些优势的价值要小得多-云软件是免费提供的，任何人都可以免费下载和使用，并且始终是最新的，因此不需要顾问。 如今，公司已经取代销售人员，将其销售和营销费用投入到尽可能多的潜在用户手中进行免费试用(大量Google广告和内容营销)。

But they also spend tons of time, effort, and money on getting the user experience just right. Because they know that small differences in quality (even perceived quality) relative to their competitors can translate into huge differences in popularity, and ultimately mean the difference between a successful IPO and going bankrupt. In other words, the winners are the ones that go viral.

但是他们还花费大量时间，精力和金钱来获得正确的用户体验。 因为他们知道，相对于竞争对手而言，质量上的微小差异(甚至是感知质量)会转化为知名度上的巨大差异，最终意味着成功IPO与破产之间的差异。 换句话说，赢家就是病毒。

比喻 (An Analogy)

The best analogy I can think of is: old-school enterprise software is like TV shows back in the day and cloud software is like content on YouTube.

我能想到的最好的比喻是：老式的企业软件就像是过去的电视节目，而云软件就像是YouTube上的内容。

Back in the day TV shows that made it onto the air were guaranteed at least some viewers. Viewers who watched a certain channel at a certain time had no choice but to watch the show that was on. So if you were a maker of TV shows, your relationship with the distribution channel (the folks at the TV station) mattered. And as long as you were best buds with the head honcho, you could get your shows on air and get viewers. So the number 1 ranked show’s numbers were not hugely better than the number 5 ranked show’s.

过去，至少有一些观众可以观看播出的电视节目。 在特定时间观看某个频道的观众别无选择，只能观看正在播放的节目。 因此，如果您是电视节目的制作者，那么您与发行渠道(电视台的人们)之间的关系就很重要。 而且，只要您是头戴头巾的最佳发芽者，就可以播出节目并吸引观众。 因此，排名第一的节目的数字并没有比排名第五的节目的数字好很多。

On YouTube there are no such guarantees. There is tons of content and all of it is available on-demand. At any given time, I watch only what I want to watch. In this kind of environment, it doesn’t matter who you know. The only thing that matters is whether a video resonates with viewers just a bit more than other similar videos. And if it does, it will get clapped and shared, causing it to be perceived by the masses as the best (even if the initial difference in quality was minuscule).

YouTube上没有此类保证。 有很多内容，所有内容都可以按需提供。 在任何给定的时间，我只会看自己想看的东西。 在这种环境下，认识谁都没有关系。 唯一重要的是，视频是否会比其他类似视频更能引起观众共鸣。 如果这样做的话，它将被鼓掌和分享，从而使它被大众认为是最好的(即使最初的质量差异很小)。

Photo by Brett Jordan on Unsplash

布雷特·乔丹( Brett Jordan)在 Unsplash上 拍摄

And after a while, its relative popularity (as in all things viral, popularity begets more popularity) becomes all the momentum it needs. After all, if everyone says this is the best piano cat video, who am I to disagree? That’s why the number 1 video in a category on YouTube can have orders of magnitude more views than the number 5 video.

一段时间后，它的相对受欢迎度(在所有病毒式传播中，受欢迎程度会越来越高)变成了它所需的全部动力。 毕竟，如果每个人都说这是最好的钢琴猫视频，那么我该反对谁呢？ 因此，YouTube类别中排名第一的视频的观看次数比排名第五的视频高出几个数量级。

云软件的病毒性质 (The Viral Nature Of Cloud Software)

There’s virality in cloud software too. If a software company’s product starts to take off (because it gets the UX just right, gets free trials in front of lots of potential users, and gets a little lucky), its popularity can take off much like a viral video’s. And popularity begets more users, more brand awareness, and even more popularity.

云软件也具有病毒性。 如果软件公司的产品开始流行(因为它可以正确使用UX，可以在众多潜在用户面前免费试用，并且有一点运气)，那么它的流行性就可以像病毒视频一样Swift流行。 受欢迎程度会吸引更多的用户，更多的品牌知名度以及更大的受欢迎度。

And unlike a viral video, viral software eventually converts users into paying subscribers. And this money allows the company to add features and keep refining its user experience, which pleases its customers and further widens the gap between it and its competitors. In other words, what was initially just a perception of better ultimately becomes self-fulfilling — because the money advantage allows the company to turn perception into reality.

与病毒视频不同，病毒软件最终将用户转换为付费订户。 这笔钱使该公司可以添加功能并不断完善其用户体验，从而取悦客户并进一步扩大与竞争对手之间的差距。 换句话说，最初只是对更好的看法最终变成了自我实现，因为金钱优势使公司能够将看法变成现实。

Lastly, I would be remiss if I didn’t mention that luck plays a material role. When small differences in perceived value can magnify into huge differences in results, it’s often the fortunate ones that win (as much as companies want you to believe that their success was preordained). Yes, having a good product matters. But when two software competitors with similar products are battling it out, trying to predict the outcome in advance is much like trying to figure out which piano cat video will earn more views.

最后，如果我没有提到运气起着重要作用，我将被忽略。 当感知价值的微小差异会放大结果的巨大差异时，往往是幸运的获胜者(就像公司希望您相信其成功是注定的一样)。 是的，拥有一个好的产品很重要。 但是，当两个具有类似产品的软件竞争对手在竞争时，试图提前预测结果就像试图弄清楚哪个钢琴猫视频会获得更多观看次数。

Very hard to do. But what we can bet on is that the software company that’s lucky enough to earn the title of “best in class” will also likely be able to earn massively more than its competition (and sustain or increase that advantage over time). That appears to be bullish for the software winners of today.

很难做到。 但是我们可以打赌的是，足够幸运地获得“同类最佳”称号的软件公司也有可能获得比竞争对手更多的利润(并随着时间的推移保持或增加这种优势)。 对于今天的软件赢家而言，这似乎是乐观的。

翻译自: https://medium.com/alpha-beta-blog/can-softwares-dominance-continue-883f5a7f9620

抽象类不能声明主体