This post originally appeared in my bi-weekly newsletter, The State of Surveillance. You can sign up for that here.
Coronavirus. It’s that nagging, just below the surface pull on everyone’s mind, and with good reason. With confirmed cases of the Coronavirus sprawling over 70 countries (as of the time I’m writing this on March 4) and over 90,000 confirmed cases worldwide, much of the world is just now waking up to some of the tough uncomfortable decisions faced by lawmakers when posed with containing a pandemic. While uncertainty around the virus and its global effects abound, news this week from the World Health Organization suggests there’s reason to believe containment is indeed possible — at a cost.
Çoronavirus。 正是这种na，在表面之下吸引着每个人，这是有充分理由的。 随着确诊的冠状病毒病例蔓延到70多个国家 (截至我在3月4日撰写本文的时间)，全球已确认的确诊病例超过90,000例，全球大部分地区现在正意识到立法者面临的一些艰难而艰难的决定构成大流行时。 尽管围绕该病毒及其全球影响的不确定性比比皆是，但世界卫生组织本周的消息表明，我们有理由相信遏制确实是有可能的-为此付出了代价。
Citing recent figures emerging out of China showing a decrease in the number of new confirmed cases, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said, “We are in unchartered territory,” but added, “containment of COVID-19 is feasible and must remain the top priority for all countries.”
世卫组织总干事特德罗斯·阿德诺姆·格布瑞索斯(Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus)援引来自中国的最新数据显示，新确诊病例数量有所减少，他说 ：“我们处于未知领域，”但补充说，“遏制COVID-19是可行的，必须保持所有国家都将其放在首位。”
China, which still has the lion’s share of cases globally, was held as the model to emulate for containing the pathogen. It’s an undeniable fact that the Chinese government, after notable controversy, mobilized at a mind-boggling pace to quartine cities, screen millions of people for the disease, and use surveillance technologies to enforce lockdown.
在全球仍占最大病例数的中国，被视为模仿病原体的模型。 不可否认的是，在发生了争议之后 ，中国政府以令人难以置信的速度动员了四处奔走的城市，对数百万人进行了疾病筛查，并使用监视技术来实施封锁。
This, by all accounts, seems to have been effective at slowing the virus’ spread. But at what cost?
总体而言，这似乎在减缓病毒传播方面是有效的。 但是要花多少钱呢？
Before diving into the pros and cons of China’s recent virus-fighting surveillance fighting techniques, it’s worth taking a second to see what’s at stake.
在深入探讨中国最近的反病毒监视对抗技术的利弊之前，值得花点时间来看看有什么危险。
According to the WHO, the Coronavirus has a mortality rate of just around 3.4%. That’s significantly higher than the seasonal flu and slightly higher than the 1918 Spanish Flu (around 2.5%). As has been stated numerous times elsewhere, unlike recent headline-making pathogens like the Ebola and the Zika virus, Coronavirus symptoms can be extremely mild, or in some cases, nearly nonexistent. This means those infected are less likely to seek medical attention and will continue spreading the virus. So while the Coronavirus fatality rate may be low, the potential for it to infect vast swaths of the population are high. That’s why, within weeks of the first confirmed cases, Coronavirus deaths outnumbered the totals from both Ebola and Zika.
根据世界卫生组织的数据，冠状病毒的死亡率仅为3.4％左右 。 这明显高于季节性流感 ， 略高于1918年的西班牙流感 (约2.5％)。 正如在其他地方多次提到的那样，与最近的头条病原体(如埃博拉病毒和寨卡病毒)不同，冠状病毒的症状可能非常轻微，甚至在某些情况下几乎不存在。 这意味着被感染者不太可能寻求医疗救助，并将继续传播该病毒。 因此，尽管冠状病毒的死亡率可能很低，但它感染大量人群的可能性却很高。 这就是为什么在首例确诊病例的几周内，冠状病毒死亡人数超过了埃博拉病毒和寨卡病毒死亡总数。
In a recent article in The Atlantic, Harvard epidemiology professor Marc Lipsitch predicted somewhere between 40 and 70 percent of the world’s population could be infected with the virus within the next year. With a mortality rate of 3.4%, that’s a potential death toll, on the low end, of around 99,000,000, a figure that would dwarf the 1918 Spanish Flu.
哈佛大学流行病学教授马克·利普西奇(Marc Lipsitch)在最近的《大西洋》杂志上预测，明年全世界约40％至70％的人口可能会感染该病毒。 死亡率为3.4％，这在低端可能造成约99,000,000例死亡，这一数字与1918年西班牙流感相形见war。
Of course, all of this is riddled with uncertainty. Uncertainty over just how far the virus will spread, uncertainty over the deployment of and effectiveness of vaccines, and uncertainty over the reaction from the public and governments. Even Lipsitch, when quoted in the Atlantic article above, immediately qualified his statement by saying the majority of cases likely won’t be severe and that, “It’s likely that many will have mild disease, or may be asymptomatic,”
当然，所有这些都充满不确定性。 病毒传播的范围不确定，疫苗的部署和有效性不确定，公众和政府的React也不确定。 甚至在上面的大西洋文章中引用的Lipsitch，也立即使他的声明合格，他说大多数病例可能不会很严重，并且“很多病例可能患有轻度疾病或无症状”。
Regardless, with shocking figures like the one listed above, caveated though they may be, are all the incentive movements around the globe need to act quickly and use otherwise “radical tactics to prevent a history-making disease. That’s where the question of surveillance comes in.
不管怎样，尽管上面列出的令人震惊的数字，尽管可能会令人震惊，但全球所有的激励运动都需要Swift采取行动，并采取其他“激进策略来预防历史性疾病。 这就是监视的问题了。
Before diving into the pros and cons of China’s recent virus-fighting surveillance fighting techniques, it’s worth taking a second to see what’s at stake.
在深入探讨中国最近的反病毒监视对抗技术的利弊之前，值得花点时间来看看有什么危险。
According to the WHO, the Coronavirus has a mortality rate of just around 3.4%. That’s significantly higher than the seasonal flu and slightly higher than the 1918 Spanish Flu (around 2.5%). As has been stated numerous times elsewhere, unlike recent headline-making pathogens like the Ebola and the Zika virus, Coronavirus symptoms can be extremely mild, or in some cases, nearly nonexistent. This means those infected are less likely to seek medical attention and will continue spreading the virus. So while the Coronavirus fatality rate may be low, the potential for it to infect vast swaths of the population are high. That’s why, within weeks of the first confirmed cases, Coronavirus deaths outnumbered the totals from both Ebola and Zika.
根据世界卫生组织的数据，冠状病毒的死亡率仅为3.4％左右 。 这明显高于季节性流感 ， 略高于1918年的西班牙流感 (约2.5％)。 正如其他地方多次提到的那样，与最近的头条病原体(例如埃博拉病毒和寨卡病毒)不同，冠状病毒的症状可能非常轻微，甚至在某些情况下几乎不存在。 这意味着被感染者不太可能寻求医疗救助，并将继续传播该病毒。 因此，尽管冠状病毒的死亡率可能很低，但它感染大量人群的可能性却很高。 这就是为什么在首例确诊病例的几周内，冠状病毒死亡人数超过了埃博拉病毒和寨卡病毒死亡总数。
In a recent article in The Atlantic, Harvard epidemiology professor Marc Lipsitch predicted somewhere between 40 and 70 percent of the world’s population could be infected with the virus within the next year. With a mortality rate of 3.4%, that’s a potential death toll, on the low end, of around 99,000,000, a figure that would dwarf the 1918 Spanish Flu.
哈佛大学流行病学教授马克·利普西奇(Marc Lipsitch)在最近的《大西洋》杂志上预测，明年全世界约40％至70％的人口可能会感染该病毒。 死亡率为3.4％，这在低端可能造成约99,000,000例死亡，这一数字与1918年西班牙流感相形见war。
Of course, all of this is riddled with uncertainty. Uncertainty over just how far the virus will spread, uncertainty over the deployment of and effectiveness of vaccines, and uncertainty over the reaction from the public and governments. Even Lipsitch, when quoted in the Atlantic article above, immediately qualified his statement by saying the majority of cases likely won’t be severe and that, “It’s likely that many will have mild disease, or may be asymptomatic,”
当然，所有这些都充满不确定性。 病毒传播的范围不确定，疫苗的部署和有效性不确定，公众和政府的React也不确定。 甚至在上面的大西洋文章中引用的Lipsitch，也立即使他的声明合格，他说大多数病例可能不会很严重，并且说：“很可能许多人患有轻度疾病，或者可能是无症状的。”
Regardless, with shocking figures like the one listed above, caveated though they may be, are all the incentive movements around the globe need to act quickly and use otherwise “radical tactics to prevent a history-making disease. That’s where the question of surveillance comes in.
无论如何，尽管上面列出的令人震惊的数字，尽管可能会令人震惊，但全球所有的激励运动都需要Swift采取行动，并采取其他“激进策略来预防历史性疾病。 这就是监视的问题了。
While much reporting in recent weeks has focused on the Chinese government’s ineptness at spotting the outbreak early on and subsequent coverups to diminish the outbreak’s severity, once the cat was out of the bag, the Communist party made an abrupt about-face.
尽管最近几周的报道集中在中国政府无能为力，无法及早发现疫情以及随后的掩盖行动以减轻疫情的严重程度，但一旦这只猫被抢劫一空，共产党突然做出了改变。
Essentially overnight, the Chinese government shut down the city of Wuhan, isolating nearly 11 million people and creating an artificial ghost town. That unprecedented siloing was made possible by the state’s expansive surveillance apparatus, decades in the making.
基本上是一夜之间，中国政府关闭了武汉市 ，将近一千一百万人隔离开来，并创建了一个人造的鬼城。 数十年来，该州庞大的监视设备使史无前例的孤岛成为可能。
Since the outbreak occurred, the Chinese government has deployed drones equipped with facial recognition software to detect people walking without a facemask on, infrared scanners have been stationed at train stations and airports to measure body heat to snuff out people with a fever, and roaming robots are reminding potentially at-risk residents to stay indoors. Even with this juggernaut of surveillance technologies available, China reportedly went a step further and taking a step out of North Korea’s playbook. According to The New York Times, officials asked pressured Wuhan residents to rat out friends and neighbors suspected of being sick.
自疫情爆发以来，中国政府已部署了配备面部识别软件的无人机来检测没有戴口罩的人，在火车站和机场安装了红外扫描仪以测量人体热量，以消灭发烧的人，并漫游机器人正在提醒有潜在危险的居民留在室内 。 据报道，即使有了这种监视技术的强力支持，中国仍走得更远，并走出了朝鲜的剧本。 据《纽约时报》报道，官员要求向武汉居民施加压力，要求他们将涉嫌生病的朋友和邻居赶出来。
Now, as the state claims to have started to stem new cases and citizens are being instructed to return to work, new surveillance tools are appearing. According to recent reporting in the New York Times, those returning to work are subject to constant monitoring by a new required mobile tracking software. Workers sign up for the app and are assigned a color code of green, yellow or red. That color corresponds with a person’s health and is used to decide whether or not individuals can leave quarantine, access subways, or walk out into public spaces
现在，由于该州声称已开始阻止新案件，并指示公民重返工作岗位，因此出现了新的监视工具。 根据《纽约时报》最近的报道，那些重返工作岗位的人将受到新的所需移动跟踪软件的持续监控。 工作人员注册该应用程序，并被分配绿色，黄色或红色的颜色代码。 该颜色与人的健康状况相对应，用于确定个人是否可以离开检疫，使用地铁或走入公共场所
While such an app, under normal circumstances, might run against the grain of a privacy advocate one can understand its rationality in a context of an impending pandemic. But when does that context cease to justify its ends?
虽然在正常情况下，这样的应用程序可能会与隐私权倡导者背道而驰，但人们可以在即将到来的大流行情况下理解其合理性。 但是，这种情况何时才能停止为其目的辩护呢？
According to the same New York Times article, the reporter’s analyzed the software’s code determined that it could share information with police. This is from the Times’ report.
根据《纽约时报》的同一篇文章，记者分析了该软件的代码，确定该软件可以与警察共享信息。 这来自《纽约时报》的报告。
The Times’s analysis found that as soon as a user grants the software access to personal data, a piece of the program labeled “reportInfoAndLocationToPolice” sends the person’s location, city name and an identifying code number to a server. The software does not make clear to users its connection to the police. But according to China’s state-run Xinhua news agency and an official police social media account, law enforcement authorities were a crucial partner in the system’s development.
《泰晤士报》的分析发现，一旦用户授予该软件对个人数据的访问权，该程序的一部分标记为“ reportInfoAndLocationToPolice”的程序就会将该人的位置，城市名称和识别码发送给服务器。 该软件无法向用户表明其与警察的联系。 但是据中国国营新华社和官方的警察社交媒体报道，执法部门是该系统发展的关键伙伴。
That’s just the start. The Chinese government also just passed a new law that effectively bars people from posting any negative content about the government online. The new law, officially called The Provision on the Governance of Online Information Content Ecosystem officially took effect this Sunday. While the change has reportedly been in the works since December, the timing of its implementation is peculiar at the least. According to a Business Insider report quoting a government document, the state says it is enacting the law to “create a positive online ecosystem,” and “preserve national security and the public interest.”
这仅仅是开始。 中国政府还刚刚通过了一项新法律，该法律有效地禁止人们在网上发布有关政府的任何负面内容。 新法律正式称为《在线信息内容生态系统治理规定》，于本周日正式生效。 据报道，自从12月以来就一直在进行这项更改，但至少要特别注意实施的时间。 根据《商业内幕》报道援引政府文件的说法，该州表示正在颁布法律，以“创建一个积极的在线生态系统”，并“维护国家安全和公共利益。”
Here’s Business Insider’s Bill Bostock:
这是《商业内幕》的比尔·波斯托克(Bill Bostock)：
“The law splits online content into three groups: “encouraged,” “negative,” and “illegal,” according to an unofficial translation by Jeremy Daum, who runs the China Law Translate project.
“法律将在线内容分为三类：“鼓励的”，“否定的”和“非法的”，这是由负责中国法律翻译项目的杰里米·道姆(Jeremy Daum)进行的非正式翻译。
Though the new law contains conditions borrowed from existing national security laws, it also contains new conditions that Daum described as “distressingly vague and easily abused.”
尽管新法律包含了从现有国家安全法中借鉴来的条件，但它也包含了新的条件，Daum将其描述为“令人痛苦的模糊和容易滥用的条件”。
Online censorship, to some degree, is nothing new in China, but the new law appears to mark a further commitment by the government to dissuade dissent. More immediately, the timing of the law has, ironically, worried some who fear it could stymie the spread of accurate information about the Coronavirus pandemic.
在某种程度上，在线审查在中国并不是什么新鲜事，但新法律似乎标志着政府对劝阻异议者的进一步承诺。 具有讽刺意味的是，该法律的出台时间使某些人担心，担心这可能会阻碍有关冠状病毒大流行的准确信息的传播。
Despite failing to initially contain the virus within its borders, these extreme tactics issued by the Chinese government were viewed affectionately by some, including the World Health Organization, which previously praised the Chinese government for its fast-acting containment efforts.
尽管起初未能在其边界内遏制该病毒，但包括世界卫生组织(WHO)在内的一些人对中国政府发布的这些极端策略表示赞赏 ，该组织此前赞扬了中国政府的快速遏制工作。
But China’s government operates explicitly in a top-down totalitarian system unmired by prolonged debates and public inquiry produced in more representative democracies. That direct, unilateral decision making power leads to “effective” outcomes, at the expense of measured discussions over how new tools may be used in the future to harm vulnerable groups.
但是，中国政府明确地在自上而下的极权主义体系中运作，而长期的辩论和由更具代表性的民主国家进行的公众询问则使这一制度无法实现。 这种直接的，单方面的决策权会导致“有效”的结果，而这是以对未来如何使用新工具伤害弱势群体的认真讨论为代价的。
This is all to say that in times of great distress, it is more important than ever to consider what we are willing to sacrifice in the name of security. In the United States, in months following the harrowing September 11 terrorist attacks, a similar calculation was made. Acting out of fear, Americans relinquished their rights and stood by as the government enacted the country’s most invasive surveillance policies (including the Patriot Act) all in the name of “safety” and “fighting terrorism.”
这就是说，在苦难时刻，考虑到我们愿意为了安全而牺牲的东西比以往任何时候都更加重要。 在美国，恐怖的9月11日恐怖袭击发生后的几个月，人们进行了类似的计算。 出于恐惧，美国人放弃了自己的权利，在政府以“安全”和“打击恐怖主义”的名义颁布了该国最具侵入性的监视政策(包括《爱国者法案》)的情况下待命。
The Chinese “communist” government is an easy, prescient example to point to when pondering the possibility of opportunistic expanses of surveillance power, but I would argue that the vast majority of government’s, when given the opportunity, will opt for more surveillance, more power, and more authority rather than less. While this might be welcomed in the context of preventing a Spanish Flu level pandemic, the sacrifices made in the short term will outlive any disease and could shape the society that emerges on the other side.
中国的“共产主义”政府是一个简单，有先见之明的例子，在思考机会主义的扩大监督权的可能性时可以指出这一点，但是我认为，如果有机会，绝大多数政府将选择更多的监督，更多的权力。 ，而更多而不是更少。 虽然这在防止西班牙流感大流行的背景下可能会受到欢迎，但短期内做出的牺牲将使任何疾病都无法生存，并可能塑造另一边出现的社会。
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翻译自: https://medium.com/@bmd329/is-surveillance-worth-it-to-fight-coronavirus-b9b19baf1358
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