是的，美国财政部的确制定了计划以解决银行问题，重振贷款证券化市场。这就像恐惧和贪婪一样确实存在，你知道它们大量存在，给经济带来了一波波周期性的欣喜和失望。你老听金融高人和其他无所不知的观察人士说，美国财政部没有具体计划。这些人士一直受到猜疑时代怀疑主义观点的影响。他们的观点笼罩在一堆云里雾里的缩略语和越来越大的术语表中。美国国际集团(AIG)用纳税家庭（通常年收入为6.3万美元）提供的资金给高管发留职奖金的景象也转移了这些人的注意力。（73个AIG高管每人在工资之外还能至少拿到100万美元。）在这场拼图游戏中，财政部已经摆出片片积木，但少有外部人士可以一揽全局。下面就仅让我尝试着展示这个拼图的全貌。我们面临的问题是：没人对美国大型银行的财务实力拥有信心。即便是银行之间也彼此不信任。没人确切知道他们帐面上的贷款和证券价值几何。没人知道哪些银行足够强大能够度过经济衰退。将消费者贷款和住房贷款进行证券化并出售给投资者的那个市场已经行将就木。借款人难以获得贷款。银行无法出售他们不想留着的贷款或是证券。AIG拿了纳税人的钱回头给高管发奖金惹得全国震怒之后，解决银行和证券市场问题变得更加困难。美国总统奥巴马(Barack Obama)和财政部长盖特纳(Timothy Geithner)无法指望国会批准追加救助资金，哪怕他们可能确实需要这么做。因此他们必须吸引私人资金，依赖美国联邦储备委员会(Fed)无须获得国会批准便可动用数目不限资金的神奇能力，为前任已经获得的那些用来救市的纳税人资金加上杠杆。财政部的银行战略有两手。一方面，向19家最大银行注入足够的资本，确保所有人相信他们能够抵御严重衰退。另一方面，从银行帐面上去除问题资产，以便银行能够加快新贷款发放步伐，促使精明的大型投资者向银行注资，帮助实现第一个目标。命名不祥的“压力测试”计划──这使人想到花旗集团(Citigroup)在跑步机上轰然倒下的画面──本来是想重树市场信心，只不过宣布之后似乎反而加重了笼罩在银行业上方的质疑和不确定性。这个计划是想在4月底之前查清19家大型银行每家需要多少缓冲资本，以度过一场严重衰退（这就是压力测试），然后给于那些需要更多资本的银行六个月的时间，也就是到10月31日之前筹集到所需资本，或是通过私下筹资，或是按照不同于前任财政部长鲍尔森(Henry Paulson)注资协议的条款获得更多的纳税人资金。在此之前，美国联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)将担保银行债务，所以市场无须害怕为这些银行提供贷款，或者说财政部希望如此。19家银行中没人会通不过这次测试；唯一的问题是哪家银行会在秋天需要纳税人资金。曾经，如果你需要贷款，那就去银行贷。但在危机爆发之前，将贷款转化为证券的“影子银行体系”承担了40%的消费者信贷。为了重启这一死去的市场，美联储和财政部最终启动了四个月之前宣布的一项倡议，向对冲基金和其他机构以非常诱人的条件提供贷款，促使他们购买由新贷款组成的证券产品。值得期待的是他们对原有贷款也做同样的处理。盖特纳计划的最后一部分很快就要公布了：从银行和其他金融机构那里购买问题贷款和证券（大多与地产有关）。为这些资产确定合理价格是一个难题。鲍尔森的财政部花了数月时间试图安排拍卖，以便政府收购这些资产。但却从未购买什么资产。盖特纳的财政部认定这一方法没有用。而且，财政部也没有足够的纳税人资金以收购足以改变局面的大量资产。因此，盖特纳的计划就是美联储和Pimco或贝莱德(BlackRock)等基金公司组建合资企业。财政部则向其中投入资金，比如，数额可以和私人投入资本一比一地匹配。由私人投资者而非政府来评估与住房或消费贷款相关的大约1万亿美元证券资产，从中选择收购对象。由私人投资者来确定收购价位。这是他们的事。如果有收益的话，纳税人和投资者可以共享。如果美联储向这些企业提供贷款，他们就能够收购更多证券，支付更高价格。另一套合资企业将评估银行帐面上大约1万亿美元的问题贷款，从中选择进行收购。联邦存款保险公司将提供贷款，用于进行杠杆收购。这样做是希望一些银行将问题资产出售给新组建的合资企业之后，对私人投资者显得更有吸引力，以同时化解银行体系两个方面的问题。鲍尔森主政的财政部构思了这条道路，但担心把纳税人资金交给私人投资者管理会惹来政治方面的麻烦。（这可不是多虑。想像一下，如果基金经理用纳税人资金发出巨额薪水和高额利润，他们将面临国会怎样的拷问。）盖特纳主政的财政部找不到比这更好的替代方案，他们正在探寻着。盖特纳救市计划或许不一定有用。但它确实存在。David Wessel相关阅读美国本周将公布更多银行不良资产处置细节 2009-03-17巴菲特：美国银行业能够走出当前的危机 2009-03-09美国银行业公布1990年以来首次季度亏损 2009-02-27贝南克：可利用现有工具解决银行业问题 2009-02-26银行压力测试面临压力 2009-02-26 本文涉及股票或公司document.write (truthmeter('2009年03月20日09:12', 'AIG'));美国国际集团英文名称：American International Group Inc.总部地点：美国上市地点：纽约证交所股票代码：AIG
Yes, Virginia, the U.S. Treasury does have a plan to fix the banks and reignite markets in which loans are turned into securities. It exists as certainly as fear and greed exist, and you know that they abound and give the economy recurrent bouts of euphoria and despondency.You hear from pundits and other all-knowing observers that the Treasury has no detailed plan. These people have been affected by the skepticism of a skeptical age. Their vision is clouded by a bewildering number of acronyms and proliferating 'term sheets.' Their attention is distracted by the spectacle of taxpaying families (typical income: $63,000) financing AIG 'retention bonuses' (73 people: $1 million or more each on top of their salaries).The Treasury has thrown pieces of the jigsaw puzzle on the table, but few outsiders can see the whole of its plan. Here's a modest attempt to show the cover of the jigsaw-puzzle box.The problem: No one has confidence in the financial strength of the nation's big banks. Even banks don't trust other banks. No one is sure what the loans and securities on their books are worth. No one knows which banks are strong enough to survive the recession. The market in which consumer and real-estate loans (made by banks or others) are turned into securities and sold to investors is moribund. Borrowers have trouble getting loans. Banks can't sell loans or securities they don't want.Fixing banks and securities markets is even trickier in the wake of the uproar over bonuses paid by American International Group after the company was propped up with taxpayer money. President Barack Obama and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner cannot expect Congress to approve more bailout money even though they probably need it. So they must leverage the taxpayer money that their predecessors have already secured by luring private money and relying on the Federal Reserve's amazing ability to come up with unlimited sums without congressional consent.The Treasury's bank strategy is twofold. One, get enough capital into the 19 biggest banks so everyone believes each can withstand a really bad recession. Two, get toxic assets off their books so banks will pick up the pace of new lending, and savvy big-money investors will put money into the banks and help achieve the first objective.The unfortunately named 'stress test' -- which conjured up images of Citigroup collapsing on a treadmill -- was meant to be a confidence builder, though announcing it seems instead to have magnified doubts and uncertainty about the banks. The notion is to figure out by the end of April how much capital cushion each of the 19 big banks needs to survive a bad recession (that's the 'stress test') and then give those that need more capital six months, until Oct. 31, to raise it privately or take a bigger taxpayer investment on different terms than former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson offered. Until then, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. will guarantee bank debt so no one need worry about lending to them, or so the Treasury hopes. None of the 19 banks will flunk the test; the only question is which will need taxpayer capital in the fall.Once upon a time, if you wanted a loan you went to a bank. But the 'shadow banking system,' where loans are turned into securities, did 40% of consumer lending before the crisis. To restart that dead market, the Fed and Treasury finally are beginning an initiative they announced four months ago to lend money to hedge funds and others on very sweet terms to buy packages of securities made up of new loans. Look for them to offer to do the same with old loans.The last piece of the Geithner plan comes soon: Buying toxic loans and securities, mostly linked to real estate, from the banks and others. One challenge is putting a fair price on them. The Paulson Treasury spent months trying to fashion auctions in which the government would buy these assets. It never bought any. The Geithner Treasury decided that approach wouldn't work. What's more, it hasn't nearly enough taxpayer money to buy enough of the assets to make a difference.So the plan is to form joint ventures between the Fed and money managers like Pimco or BlackRock. The Treasury kicks in, say, $1 for every $1 the private guys put in. The private investors, not the government, decide what securities to buy from the $1 trillion or so in securities linked to real estate or consumer loans. The private guys decide what price to pay. That's their business. Taxpayers and the investors would share the profits, if any. If the Fed lends to these ventures, they'll be able to buy more securities and pay more for them.A separate set of joint ventures will shop among the $1 trillion or so in toxic loans on bank books. This effort will be leveraged by FDIC lending. The hope is that some banks will make themselves more attractive to private investors by selling toxic assets to the new joint ventures, and thus ease both parts of the banking problem simultaneously.The Paulson Treasury pondered this approach, but feared a political backlash from giving taxpayer money to private investors to manage. (That's no small worry. Imagine the grilling money managers would face from Congress for making megasalaries and killer profits with taxpayer money.) The Geithner Treasury couldn't find an alternative it preferred, and it looked.The Geithner plan might not work. It does exist.David Wessel
Yes, Virginia, the U.S. Treasury does have a plan to fix the banks and reignite markets in which loans are turned into securities. It exists as certainly as fear and greed exist, and you know that they abound and give the economy recurrent bouts of euphoria and despondency.You hear from pundits and other all-knowing observers that the Treasury has no detailed plan. These people have been affected by the skepticism of a skeptical age. Their vision is clouded by a bewildering number of acronyms and proliferating 'term sheets.' Their attention is distracted by the spectacle of taxpaying families (typical income: $63,000) financing AIG 'retention bonuses' (73 people: $1 million or more each on top of their salaries).The Treasury has thrown pieces of the jigsaw puzzle on the table, but few outsiders can see the whole of its plan. Here's a modest attempt to show the cover of the jigsaw-puzzle box.The problem: No one has confidence in the financial strength of the nation's big banks. Even banks don't trust other banks. No one is sure what the loans and securities on their books are worth. No one knows which banks are strong enough to survive the recession. The market in which consumer and real-estate loans (made by banks or others) are turned into securities and sold to investors is moribund. Borrowers have trouble getting loans. Banks can't sell loans or securities they don't want.Fixing banks and securities markets is even trickier in the wake of the uproar over bonuses paid by American International Group after the company was propped up with taxpayer money. President Barack Obama and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner cannot expect Congress to approve more bailout money even though they probably need it. So they must leverage the taxpayer money that their predecessors have already secured by luring private money and relying on the Federal Reserve's amazing ability to come up with unlimited sums without congressional consent.The Treasury's bank strategy is twofold. One, get enough capital into the 19 biggest banks so everyone believes each can withstand a really bad recession. Two, get toxic assets off their books so banks will pick up the pace of new lending, and savvy big-money investors will put money into the banks and help achieve the first objective.The unfortunately named 'stress test' -- which conjured up images of Citigroup collapsing on a treadmill -- was meant to be a confidence builder, though announcing it seems instead to have magnified doubts and uncertainty about the banks. The notion is to figure out by the end of April how much capital cushion each of the 19 big banks needs to survive a bad recession (that's the 'stress test') and then give those that need more capital six months, until Oct. 31, to raise it privately or take a bigger taxpayer investment on different terms than former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson offered. Until then, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. will guarantee bank debt so no one need worry about lending to them, or so the Treasury hopes. None of the 19 banks will flunk the test; the only question is which will need taxpayer capital in the fall.Once upon a time, if you wanted a loan you went to a bank. But the 'shadow banking system,' where loans are turned into securities, did 40% of consumer lending before the crisis. To restart that dead market, the Fed and Treasury finally are beginning an initiative they announced four months ago to lend money to hedge funds and others on very sweet terms to buy packages of securities made up of new loans. Look for them to offer to do the same with old loans.The last piece of the Geithner plan comes soon: Buying toxic loans and securities, mostly linked to real estate, from the banks and others. One challenge is putting a fair price on them. The Paulson Treasury spent months trying to fashion auctions in which the government would buy these assets. It never bought any. The Geithner Treasury decided that approach wouldn't work. What's more, it hasn't nearly enough taxpayer money to buy enough of the assets to make a difference.So the plan is to form joint ventures between the Fed and money managers like Pimco or BlackRock. The Treasury kicks in, say, $1 for every $1 the private guys put in. The private investors, not the government, decide what securities to buy from the $1 trillion or so in securities linked to real estate or consumer loans. The private guys decide what price to pay. That's their business. Taxpayers and the investors would share the profits, if any. If the Fed lends to these ventures, they'll be able to buy more securities and pay more for them.A separate set of joint ventures will shop among the $1 trillion or so in toxic loans on bank books. This effort will be leveraged by FDIC lending. The hope is that some banks will make themselves more attractive to private investors by selling toxic assets to the new joint ventures, and thus ease both parts of the banking problem simultaneously.The Paulson Treasury pondered this approach, but feared a political backlash from giving taxpayer money to private investors to manage. (That's no small worry. Imagine the grilling money managers would face from Congress for making megasalaries and killer profits with taxpayer money.) The Geithner Treasury couldn't find an alternative it preferred, and it looked.The Geithner plan might not work. It does exist.David Wessel
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