大卫·希尔伯特：数学问题

最新推荐文章于 2025-01-21 15:43:55 发布

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最新推荐文章于 2025-01-21 15:43:55 发布

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文章标签：持续学习

原文链接：https://mathshistory.st-andrews.ac.uk/Extras/Hilbert_Problems_speech/

版权

缘由

这是一篇转载。站在自己错误的观点上不断成长。

为何要转载这样一篇文章呢？

ROS1云课→29如何借助导航实现走迷宫机器人

文末里面有一段：

18世纪初普鲁士的哥尼斯堡，有一条河穿过，河上有两个小岛，有七座桥把两个岛与河岸联系起来（如概述图）。有个人提出一个问题：一个步行者怎样才能不重复、不遗漏地一次走完七座桥，最后回到出发点。后来大数学家欧拉把它转化成一个几何问题——一笔画问题。他不仅解决了此问题，且给出了连通图可以一笔画的充要条件是：奇点的数目不是0个就是2个（连到一点的数目如果是奇数条，就称为奇点；如果是偶数条，就称为偶点。要想一笔画成，必须中间点均是偶点，也就是有来路必有另一条去路，奇点只可能在两端。因此任何图能一笔画成，奇点要么没有，要么在两端）。

结论

方法不对，努力白费。

旧文

一个热爱自动驾驶但妥妥外行之人的思考-2023-

有一些朋友误会了这篇文章，我也没有多做解释。

我的观点一直一贯都是：以安全为核心的自动驾驶方案是无解的。

任何算法都不可能实现绝对安全。这超出了，数学+物理的能力边界，编程也好，算法也罢，大模型也不可能改变客观规律。

以需求为核心的自动驾驶方案是市场的选择，但并不能保证绝对安全。

研发安全可靠的自动驾驶方案类似数百年来人类对于永动机的追求。

有限集的条件去求解无限集的解决方案？？？

“吾生也有涯，而知也无涯，以有涯随无涯，殆己！”

但是……

如果认真阅读《David Hilbert: Mathematical Problems》

会发现也许上面的推断也是一种误解。

文献

有时会发生这样的情况，我们在假设不足或意义不正确的情况下寻求解决方案，因此没有成功。于是就出现了问题：要证明在给定假设下或者在所考虑的意义上解决方案是不可能的。这样的不可能性证明是由古人进行的，例如，当他们证明等腰直角三角形的斜边与边的比值是无理数时。在后来的数学中，关于某些解的不可能性的问题占据了主导地位，我们通过这种方式认识到，老的和困难的问题，如平行公理的证明、圆的平方或五次方程的根解，最终找到了完全令人满意和严格的解决方案，尽管在某种意义上，它们并非最初所设想的那样。可能是这一重要事实以及其他哲学原因，产生了这样一种信念（每个数学家都持有这种信念，但迄今为止还没有人通过证明来支持它），即每一个明确的数学问题都必然可以通过精确解决而找到答案，要么以实际回答所提问题的形式出现，要么通过证明其解的不可能性以及由此必然导致所有尝试的失败而找到答案。以任何明确的未解决问题为例，如欧拉-马歇罗尼常数的无理性问题，或形式为2的无限多个素数存在的问题。不管这些问题在我们看来有多么难以解决，不管我们在它们面前有多么无助，我们仍然坚信，它们的解决方案必然遵循有限数量的纯逻辑过程。

David Hilbert: Mathematical Problems
David Hilbert's famous 23 Paris problems challenged (and still today challenge) mathematicians to solve fundamental questions. Hilbert's famous address Mathematical Problems was delivered to the Second International Congress of Mathematicians in Paris in 1900. It was a speech full of optimism for mathematics in the coming century and Hilbert felt that open problems were the sign of vitality in the subject. More than 100 years have now passed since Hilbert's address, and we can say now that his address has been extremely influential in shaping mathematics through that 100 years.

The address Mathematische Probleme appeared in Göttinger Nachrichten in 1900, before the Proceedings of the Congress were published. Another version appeared in Archiv der Mathematik und Physik in 1901. M L Laugel translated the address into French for the Proceeding of the Congress and it appeared under the title Sur les problèmes futurs des mathématiques in Compte Rendu du Deuxième Congrès International des Mathématiciens published by Gauthier-Villars, Paris, in 1902. An English translation by Mary Winston Newson was published in the Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society in 1902.

We give below an extract from the address, in which Hilbert speaks of his views on mathematics. The section dealing with the problems themselves is at THIS LINK
Mathematical Problems
By David Hilbert

Who of us would not be glad to lift the veil behind which the future lies hidden; to cast a glance at the next advances of our science and at the secrets of its development during future centuries? What particular goals will there be toward which the leading mathematical spirits of coming generations will strive? What new methods and new facts in the wide and rich field of mathematical thought will the new centuries disclose?

History teaches the continuity of the development of science. We know that every age has its own problems, which the following age either solves or casts aside as profitless and replaces by new ones. If we would obtain an idea of the probable development of mathematical knowledge in the immediate future, we must let the unsettled questions pass before our minds and look over the problems which the science of today sets and whose solution we expect from the future. To such a review of problems the present day, lying at the meeting of the centuries, seems to me well adapted. For the close of a great epoch not only invites us to look back into the past but also directs our thoughts to the unknown future.

The deep significance of certain problems for the advance of mathematical science in general and the important role which they play in the work of the individual investigator are not to be denied. As long as a branch of science offers an abundance of problems, so long is it alive; a lack of problems foreshadows extinction or the cessation of independent development. Just as every human undertaking pursues certain objects, so also mathematical research requires its problems. It is by the solution of problems that the investigator tests the temper of his steel; he finds new methods and new outlooks, and gains a wider and freer horizon.

It is difficult and often impossible to judge the value of a problem correctly in advance; for the final award depends upon the gain which science obtains from the problem. Nevertheless we can ask whether there are general criteria which mark a good mathematical problem. An old French mathematician said: "A mathematical theory is not to be considered complete until you have made it so clear that you can explain it to the first man whom you meet on the street." This clearness and ease of comprehension, here insisted on for a mathematical theory, I should still more demand for a mathematical problem if it is to be perfect; for what is clear and easily comprehended attracts, the complicated repels us.

Moreover a mathematical problem should be difficult in order to entice us, yet not completely inaccessible, lest it mock at our efforts. It should be to us a guide post on the mazy paths to hidden truths, and ultimately a reminder of our pleasure in the successful solution.

The mathematicians of past centuries were accustomed to devote themselves to the solution of difficult particular problems with passionate zeal. They knew the value of difficult problems. I remind you only of the "problem of the line of quickest descent," proposed by Johann Bernoulli. Experience teaches, explains Bernoulli in the public announcement of this problem, that lofty minds are led to strive for the advance of science by nothing more than by laying before them difficult and at the same time useful problems, and he therefore hopes to earn the thanks of the mathematical world by following the example of men like Mersenne, Pascal, Fermat, Viviani and others and laying before the distinguished analysts of his time a problem by which, as a touchstone, they may test the value of their methods and measure their strength. The calculus of variations owes its origin to this problem of Johann Bernoulli and to similar problems.

Fermat had asserted, as is well known, that the diophantine equation

z integers) is insoluble - except in certain self evident cases. The attempt to prove this impossibility offers a striking example of the inspiring effect which such a very special and apparently unimportant problem may have upon science. For Kummer, incited by Fermat's problem, was led to the introduction of ideal numbers and to the discovery of the law of the unique decomposition of the numbers of a circular field into ideal prime factors - a law which today, in its generalization to any algebraic field by Dedekind and Kronecker, stands at the centre of the modern theory of numbers and whose significance extends far beyond the boundaries of number theory into the realm of algebra and the theory of functions.

To speak of a very different region of research, I remind you of the three-body problem. The fruitful methods and the far-reaching principles which Poincaré has brought into celestial mechanics and which are today recognized and applied in practical astronomy are due to the circumstance that he undertook to treat anew that difficult problem and to approach nearer a solution.

The two last mentioned problems - that of Fermat and the problem of the three bodies - seem to us almost like opposite poles - the former a free invention of pure reason, belonging to the region of abstract number theory, the latter forced upon us by astronomy and necessary to an understanding of the simplest fundamental phenomena of nature.

But it often happens also that the same special problem finds application in the most unlike branches of mathematical knowledge. So, for example, the problem of the shortest line plays a chief and historically important part in the foundations of geometry, in the theory of curved lines and surfaces, in mechanics and in the calculus of variations. And how convincingly has F Klein, in his work on the icosahedron, pictured the significance which attaches to the problem of the regular polyhedra in elementary geometry, in group theory, in the theory of equations and in that of linear differential equations.

In order to throw light on the importance of certain problems, I may also refer to Weierstrass, who spoke of it as his happy fortune that he found at the outset of his scientific career a problem on which to work as important as Jacobi's problem of inversion.

Having now recalled to mind the general importance of problems in mathematics, let us turn to the question from what sources this science derives its problems. Surely the first and oldest problems in every branch of mathematics spring from experience and are suggested by the world of external phenomena. Even the rules of calculation with integers must have been discovered in this fashion in a lower stage of human civilization, just as the child of today learns the application of these laws by empirical methods. The same is true of the first problems of geometry, the problems bequeathed us by antiquity, such as the duplication of the cube, the squaring of the circle; also the oldest problems in the theory of the solution of numerical equations, in the theory of curves and the differential and integral calculus, in the calculus of variations, the theory of Fourier series and the theory of potential - to say nothing of the further abundance of problems properly belonging to mechanics, astronomy and physics.

But, in the further development of a branch of mathematics, the human mind, encouraged by the success of its solutions, becomes conscious of its independence. It evolves from itself alone, often without appreciable influence from outside, by means of logical combination, generalization, specialization, by separating and collecting ideas in fortunate ways, new and fruitful problems, and appears then itself as the real questioner. Thus arose the problem of prime numbers and the other problems of number theory, Galois's theory of equations, the theory of algebraic invariants, the theory of abelian and automorphic functions; indeed almost all the nicer questions of modern arithmetic and function theory arise in this way.

In the meantime, while the creative power of pure reason is at work, the outer world again comes into play, forces upon us new questions from actual experience, opens up new branches of mathematics, and while we seek to conquer these new fields of knowledge for the realm of pure thought, we often find the answers to old unsolved problems and thus at the same time advance most successfully the old theories. And it seems to me that the numerous and surprising analogies and that apparently prearranged harmony which the mathematician so often perceives in the questions, methods and ideas of the various branches of his science, have their origin in this ever-recurring interplay between thought and experience.

It remains to discuss briefly what general requirements may be justly laid down for the solution of a mathematical problem. I should say first of all, this: that it shall be possible to establish the correctness of the solution by means of a finite number of steps based upon a finite number of hypotheses which are implied in the statement of the problem and which must always be exactly formulated. This requirement of logical deduction by means of a finite number of processes is simply the requirement of rigour in reasoning. Indeed the requirement of rigour, which has become proverbial in mathematics, corresponds to a universal philosophical necessity of our understanding; and, on the other hand, only by satisfying this requirement do the thought content and the suggestiveness of the problem attain their full effect. A new problem, especially when it comes from the world of outer experience, is like a young twig, which thrives and bears fruit only when it is grafted carefully and in accordance with strict horticultural rules upon the old stem, the established achievements of our mathematical science.

Besides it is an error to believe that rigour in the proof is the enemy of simplicity. On the contrary we find it confirmed by numerous examples that the rigorous method is at the same time the simpler and the more easily comprehended. The very effort for rigour forces us to find out simpler methods of proof. It also frequently leads the way to methods which are more capable of development than the old methods of less rigour. Thus the theory of algebraic curves experienced a considerable simplification and attained greater unity by means of the more rigorous function-theoretical methods and the consistent introduction of transcendental devices. Further, the proof that the power series permits the application of the four elementary arithmetical operations as well as the term by term differentiation and integration, and the recognition of the utility of the power series depending upon this proof contributed materially to the simplification of all analysis, particularly of the theory of elimination and the theory of differential equations, and also of the existence proofs demanded in those theories. But the most striking example for my statement is the calculus of variations. The treatment of the first and second variations of definite integrals required in part extremely complicated calculations, and the processes applied by the old mathematicians had not the needful rigour. Weierstrass showed us the way to a new and sure foundation of the calculus of variations. By the examples of the simple and double integral I will show briefly, at the close of my lecture, how this way leads at once to a surprising simplification of the calculus of variations. For in the demonstration of the necessary and sufficient criteria for the occurrence of a maximum and minimum, the calculation of the second variation and in part, indeed, the wearisome reasoning connected with the first variation may be completely dispensed with - to say nothing of the advance which is involved in the removal of the restriction to variations for which the differential coefficients of the function vary but slightly.

While insisting on rigour in the proof as a requirement for a perfect solution of a problem, I should like, on the other hand, to oppose the opinion that only the concepts of analysis, or even those of arithmetic alone, are susceptible of a fully rigorous treatment. This opinion, occasionally advocated by eminent men, I consider entirely erroneous. Such a one-sided interpretation of the requirement of rigour would soon lead to the ignoring of all concepts arising from geometry, mechanics and physics, to a stoppage of the flow of new material from the outside world, and finally, indeed, as a last consequence, to the rejection of the ideas of the continuum and of the irrational number. But what an important nerve, vital to mathematical science, would be cut by the extirpation of geometry and mathematical physics! On the contrary I think that wherever, from the side of the theory of knowledge or in geometry, or from the theories of natural or physical science, mathematical ideas come up, the problem arises for mathematical science to investigate the principles underlying these ideas and so to establish them upon a simple and complete system of axioms, that the exactness of the new ideas and their applicability to deduction shall be in no respect inferior to those of the old arithmetical concepts.

To new concepts correspond, necessarily, new signs. These we choose in such a way that they remind us of the phenomena which were the occasion for the formation of the new concepts. So the geometrical figures are signs or mnemonic symbols of space intuition and are used as such by all mathematicians. Who does not always use along with the double inequality

a>b>c the picture of three points following one another on a straight line as the geometrical picture of the idea "between"? Who does not make use of drawings of segments and rectangles enclosed in one another, when it is required to prove with perfect rigour a difficult theorem on the continuity of functions or the existence of points of condensation? Who could dispense with the figure of the triangle, the circle with its centre, or with the cross of three perpendicular axes? Or who would give up the representation of the vector field, or the picture of a family of curves or surfaces with its envelope which plays so important a part in differential geometry, in the theory of differential equations, in the foundation of the calculus of variations and in other purely mathematical sciences?

The arithmetical symbols are written diagrams and the geometrical figures are graphic formulas; and no mathematician could spare these graphic formulas, any more than in calculation the insertion and removal of parentheses or the use of other analytical signs.

The use of geometrical signs as a means of strict proof presupposes the exact knowledge and complete mastery of the axioms which underlie those figures; and in order that these geometrical figures may be incorporated in the general treasure of mathematical signs, there is necessary a rigorous axiomatic investigation of their conceptual content. Just as in adding two numbers, one must place the digits under each other in the right order, so that only the rules of calculation, i. e., the axioms of arithmetic, determine the correct use of the digits, so the use of geometrical signs is determined by the axioms of geometrical concepts and their combinations.

The agreement between geometrical and arithmetical thought is shown also in that we do not habitually follow the chain of reasoning back to the axioms in arithmetical, any more than in geometrical discussions. On the contrary we apply, especially in first attacking a problem, a rapid, unconscious, not absolutely sure combination, trusting to a certain arithmetical feeling for the behaviour of the arithmetical symbols, which we could dispense with as little in arithmetic as with the geometrical imagination in geometry. As an example of an arithmetical theory operating rigorously with geometrical ideas and signs, I may mention Minkowski's work, Die Geometrie der Zahlen.

Some remarks upon the difficulties which mathematical problems may offer, and the means of surmounting them, may be in place here.

If we do not succeed in solving a mathematical problem, the reason frequently consists in our failure to recognize the more general standpoint from which the problem before us appears only as a single link in a chain of related problems. After finding this standpoint, not only is this problem frequently more accessible to our investigation, but at the same time we come into possession of a method which is applicable also to related problems. The introduction of complex paths of integration by Cauchy and of the notion of the ideals in number theory by Kummer may serve as examples. This way for finding general methods is certainly the most practicable and the most certain; for he who seeks for methods without having a definite problem in mind seeks for the most part in vain.

In dealing with mathematical problems, specialization plays, as I believe, a still more important part than generalization. Perhaps in most cases where we seek in vain the answer to a question, the cause of the failure lies in the fact that problems simpler and easier than the one in hand have been either not at all or incompletely solved. All depends, then, on finding out these easier problems, and on solving them by means of devices as perfect as possible and of concepts capable of generalization. This rule is one of the most important levers for overcoming mathematical difficulties and it seems to me that it is used almost always, though perhaps unconsciously.

Occasionally it happens that we seek the solution under insufficient hypotheses or in an incorrect sense, and for this reason do not succeed. The problem then arises: to show the impossibility of the solution under the given hypotheses, or in the sense contemplated. Such proofs of impossibility were effected by the ancients, for instance when they showed that the ratio of the hypotenuse to the side of an isosceles right triangle is irrational. In later mathematics, the question as to the impossibility of certain solutions plays a pre-eminent part, and we perceive in this way that old and difficult problems, such as the proof of the axiom of parallels, the squaring of the circle, or the solution of equations of the fifth degree by radicals have finally found fully satisfactory and rigorous solutions, although in another sense than that originally intended. It is probably this important fact along with other philosophical reasons that gives rise to the conviction (which every mathematician shares, but which no one has as yet supported by a proof) that every definite mathematical problem must necessarily be susceptible of an exact settlement, either in the form of an actual answer to the question asked, or by the proof of the impossibility of its solution and therewith the necessary failure of all attempts. Take any definite unsolved problem, such as the question as to the irrationality of the Euler-Mascheroni constant
C, or the existence of an infinite number of prime numbers of the form

+1. However unapproachable these problems may seem to us and however helpless we stand before them, we have, nevertheless, the firm conviction that their solution must follow by a finite number of purely logical processes.

Is this axiom of the solvability of every problem a peculiarity characteristic of mathematical thought alone, or is it possibly a general law inherent in the nature of the mind, that all questions which it asks must be answerable? For in other sciences also one meets old problems which have been settled in a manner most satisfactory and most useful to science by the proof of their impossibility. I instance the problem of perpetual motion. After seeking in vain for the construction of a perpetual motion machine, the relations were investigated which must subsist between the forces of nature if such a machine is to be impossible; and this inverted question led to the discovery of the law of the conservation of energy, which, again, explained the impossibility of perpetual motion in the sense originally intended.

This conviction of the solvability of every mathematical problem is a powerful incentive to the worker. We hear within us the perpetual call: There is the problem. Seek its solution. You can find it by pure reason, for in mathematics there is no ignorabimus.

The supply of problems in mathematics is inexhaustible, and as soon as one problem is solved numerous others come forth in its place. Permit me in the following, tentatively as it were, to mention particular definite problems, drawn from various branches of mathematics, from the discussion of which an advancement of science may be expected.

Let us look at the principles of analysis and geometry. The most suggestive and notable achievements of the last century in this field are, as it seems to me, the arithmetical formulation of the concept of the continuum in the works of Cauchy, Bolzano and Cantor, and the discovery of non-euclidean geometry by Gauss, Bolyai, and Lobachevsky. I therefore first direct your attention to some problems belonging to these fields.
Last Updated March 2006

David Hilbert's 24 Problems
David Hilbert gave a talk at the International Congress of Mathematicians in Paris on 8 August 1900 in which he described 10 from a list of 23 problems. The full list of 23 problems appeared in the paper published in the Proceedings of the conference. The talk was delivered in German but the paper in the conference proceedings is in French. Hilbert began his talk with these words (translated into English):-
Who of us would not be glad to lift the veil behind which the future lies hidden; to cast a glance at the next advances of our science and at the secrets of its development during future centuries? What particular goals will there be towards which the leading mathematical spirits of coming generations will strive? What new methods and new facts in the wide and rich field of mathematical thought will the new centuries disclose?
He ended his talk with these words (translated into English):-
The problems mentioned are merely samples of problems; yet they are sufficient to show how rich, how manifold and how extensive mathematical science is today, and the question is urged upon us whether mathematics is doomed to the fate of those other sciences that have split up into separate branches. ... I do not believe this nor wish it. Mathematical science is in my opinion an indivisible whole. ... with the extension of mathematical knowledge will it not finally become impossible for the single investigator to embrace all departments of this knowledge? In answer let me point out how thoroughly it is ingrained in mathematical science that every real advance goes hand in hand with the invention of sharper tools and simpler methods which at the same time assist in understanding earlier theories and cast aside older more complicated developments. It is therefore possible for the individual investigator, when he makes these sharper tools and simpler methods his own, to find his way more easily in the various branches of mathematics than is possible in any other science. The organic unity of mathematics is inherent in the nature of this science, for mathematics is the foundation of all exact knowledge of natural phenomena. That it may completely fulfil this high mission, may the new century bring it gifted prophets and many zealous and enthusiastic disciples.
A fuller extract from his speech is at THIS LINK

We have entitled this page "Hilbert's 24 Problems" but have only said that his paper contains 23 problems. The 24th Problem appears in a draft of Hilbert's paper, but he then decided to cancel it.

We do not state these problems in full, merely give the reader the context of each problem:
1. The cardinality of the continuum, including well-ordering.

2. The consistency of the axioms of arithmetic.

3. The equality of the volumes of two tetrahedra of equal bases and equal altitudes.

4. The straight line as shortest connection between two points.

5. Lie's concept of a continuous group of transformations without the assumption of the differentiability of the functions defining a group.

6. The axioms of physics.

7. Irrationality and transcendence of certain numbers.

8. Prime number theorems (including the Riemann hypothesis).

9. The proof of the most general reciprocity law in arbitrary number fields.

10. Decision on the solvability of a Diophantine equation.

11. Quadratic forms with any algebraic coefficients.

12. The extension of Kronecker's theorem on Abelian fields to arbitrary algebraic fields.

13. Impossibility of solving the general seventh degree equation by means of functions of only two variables.